Domestic drivers for Canadian and US Arctic Policy

ISA Annual Conference 2012 San Diego

“Power, Principles and Participation in the Global Information Age”

April 1-4, 2012

Author:

Kristofer Bergh

Researcher

Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI

Contact:

Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Stockholm, Sweden tel. +46(0)8 655 97 17 bergh@sipri.org

Unpublished work! Please do not cite or circulate!

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Table of Contents

Summary 3

I. Introduction 3

II. Arctic Foreign Policy in Canada and the US 5

Security 6

Governance 8

Economic development 9

III. Domestic Drivers for Policy 10

United States of America 10

Canada 16

IV. Three cases for further research 22

The US inability to ratify UNCLOS 22

Arctic exclusivity: letting in the outsiders 24

Delimitations of maritime boundaries 26

V. Conclusions 28

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Summary

The melting polar ice creates a fundamentally new geopolitical situation in the Arctic that

warrants attention both on a national and international level. New challenges as well as

opportunities require international cooperation in order to ensure a cooperative and peaceful

development in the region. While the The United States are just waking up to the changes, Canada

has made the Arctic a top political priority. Increased attention is needed to meet the challenges in

the region, yet the two countries need to be weary of how their domestic posturing vis a vis the

region is affecting foreign policy and international relations. While the relative non-politicization of

the Arctic issue in the U.S. offers larger room for maneuver in international negotiations, the

opposite is true for Canada. The U.S., however, is limited in its capacity to cooperate in the Arctic

by its inability to ratify the UN Convention on the law of the sea.

I. Introduction

The Arctic ice is melting. The summer of 2011 witnessed a near record low extent of sea ice

in the Arctic region and the season of relative openness is growing longer. The receding ice opens

the region to economic development, including through the exploitation of hydrocarbons and

minerals which were previously unaccessible. In September, both the Northern Sea Route and the

North West Passage were open for some time, which enables shorter shipping routes between Asia,

Europe and North America.1 Amid great opportunity, great challenges await. Increased human

activity in the sparsely populated and inhospitable environment requires new initiatives to achieve

safety and security for the region's inhabitants, environment and visitors. The Arctic countries have

all reopened their eyes towards the region and this has manifested itself in different ways. The two

North American states with Arctic coastline, Canada and the United States have both increased their

attention towards the region, but they have adopted substantially different approaches, based on

their interests and relationship with the region, leaving them in disagreement on some key issues.

While in Canada the Arctic has been made a top national priority, closely linked to Canadian

identity and sovereignty, the U.S. treat the Arctic challenges as relatively minor international issues,

to be balanced by a variety of more pressing needs. Attention may be given to the region by the top

levels of leadership in the U.S., but the Arctic is not in the minds of the American public and thus

1 National Snow & Ice Data Center, 'Summer 2011: Arctic sea ice near record lows', 4 October, 2011, <http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2011/100411.html>.

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not a politicized issue. The opposite is true for Canada.

Though geography certainly goes some way in explaining the different national interests and

policies the two states have in the region, other factors apply as well. National interests and policies

are not formulated in a vacuum, the state is not a unitary actor and in treating it as such one runs the

risk of presenting an over simplified narrative that excludes important actors, motivations,

dynamics, constraints and opportunities that influence international relations and diplomacy.

Understanding what drives Arctic foreign policy is essential to meet the challenges of the region

and ensure a peaceful and cooperative development. Therefore, this paper will explore the domestic

drivers for Canadian and U.S. foreign policy by focusing on three areas; security, governance and

economic development.

Foreign policy and international negotiations are not conducted independently from domestic

politics. In order to understand what drives the Arctic policies of the region's states one must also

look at the national dimension. The state is not a unitary actor and in treating it as such one runs the

risk of presenting an over simplified narrative that excludes important actors, motivations,

dynamics, constraints and opportunities that influence international relations and diplomacy. Robert

D. Putnam has suggested that international diplomacy should be understood as a two- level game,

where the first level constitutes international negotiations and diplomacy and the second level

constitutes domestic politics. While level I represents those actors who are in a position to negotiate

and ratify agreements on an international level, level II can represent domestic politics in the form

of “bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes or even public opinion”. Putnam argues

that domestic politics can constrain international negotiations by decreasing the “win-sets” for a

Level II constituency. The win-set would be the all the outcomes acceptable to the Level II

constituents or “the set of all possible Level I agreements that would “win” - that is, gain the

necessary majority among the constituents”. Therefore, larger win-sets are more likely to result in a

Level I agreement. However, larger win-sets also opens up for far reaching compromise and

sometimes negotiators may be in a better bargaining position to reach a specific agreement by

pointing out the restrictions stemming from the domestic arena. The size of the win-sets will be

determined by the Level II preferences and coalitions as well as the design of its institutions. The

strategies of the Level I negotiators may also impact the win-sets. Level I negotiators must thus take

into account the opinions and concerns of the level II constituency.2

Domestic opinion can thus influence foreign policy by reducing or increasing the diplomatic

2 Putnam, R. D., 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988).

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room for maneuvering in international negotiations, but foreign policy can also be used to impact

domestic opinion. Depending on how a certain foreign policy issue is framed it will resonate

differently with a domestic constituency and may yield different results in terms of support for the

government or acceptance of its policies. Framing a certain issue as an existential threat to the state

may for example be an effective way to drum up support for measures that would otherwise be seen

as extraordinary.3 Playing the security card may can be an effective way of creating a “rallying

around the flag” effect and galvanizing public opinion. This in turn can reduce win-sets in

international diplomacy by raising the political stakes around the issue, leaving fewer acceptable

options for the Level II constituency. One example of combining Putnam's two-level games with the

notion of framing is James Manicom's paper on Canadian domestic politics and cooperation on

boundary disputes in the Arctic.4 Understanding the interaction between issue framing and the two-

level game that constitute international negotiations allows us to open the black box of foreign

policy making and move beyond the view of the state as a unitary and monolithic actor.

II. Arctic foreign policy in Canada and the USA

In the United States, the U.S. Arctic is defined as “all US territory north and west of the

boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim rivers, including their watersheds; all

contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas, and the

Aleutian Island chain” (see fig. 1). The foreign and domestic U.S. policy for the Arctic region is

stipulated in a National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential

Directive from January 9, 2009.5 This is the final presidential directive issued by President George

W. Bush, yet the document has largely been accepted by the succeeding Obama administration and

is thus considered bipartisan. The U.S. policy puts a heavy emphasis on issues of national security

in the changing and increasingly accessible Arctic region. Other issues highlighted in the document

are the environment, economic development, governance, indigenous communities and science.

Canadians define their Arctic as the area “North of 60”, that is the 60 th latitude. This area is

comprised by Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and a small area in northern Quebec. In

3 The securitization framework developed by the Copenhagen School explores the constructions of threats and the consequences of framing issues as threats to the security of the state or individual. See: Buzan, B., Weaver, O. and de Wilde J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1998).

4 Manicom, J., 'Maritime Boundary Disputes in East Asia: Lessons for the Arctic', International Studies Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 3 (August 2011).

5 Arctic Regional Policy, National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, January 9, 2009 (NSPD66/HSPD25)

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Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future from 2009 Canada's national

strategy for its northern regions are presented. Canada's Arctic foreign policy is presented in the

Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy from August 2010. The Northern Strategy, which is a

comprehensive document outlining Canada's priorities in the region, published under authority of

the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and

Non-status Indians, focuses on four priority areas; sovereignty, social and economic development,

environment and improved governance for the people of the north. The Arctic foreign policy

focuses on the international dimensions of the same four pillars with an emphasis on the first one:

Arctic sovereignty.

Figure 1. U.S. Arctic boundaries

Security

Both the U.S.and Canadian policies puts heavy emphasis on security and sovereignty in the

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Arctic region. The U.S. directive states that the U.S. “has broad and fundamental national security

interests in the Arctic region”6 and Canada states that “exercising sovereignty over Canada's North

[...] is our number one Arctic foreign policy priority”. Both countries acknowledge that increasing

accessibility will lead to more human activity in the region, for good or bad. The U.S. mentions

concerns about terrorist activities and maritime law-enforcement while Canada states concern about

organized crime and illegal trafficking of drugs and people. The U.S. names several military

challenges with implications for the Arctic, including “missile defense and early warning;

deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and

maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight”. Canada's foreign

policy strategy is more evasive on the issue of military threats in the region. While acknowledging

that “sovereignty is the foundation for realizing the full potential of Canada's North”7, there is no

mention of threats against Canadian sovereignty and although the North is of growing geopolitical

interest to “Canada, to other Arctic states and, increasingly, to others far from the region itself”, 8

“Canada does not anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic”9.

The issue of sovereignty both for Canada and the U.S. is closely related to the prospect of

new resource findings in the area and the extended continental shelf and boundary issues that may

have impact on the countries access to these resources. The U.S. recognizes that there are disputed

areas in the Arctic that may contain resources critical to the country's energy security. One of these

disputed areas is part of the Beaufort Sea where the U.S. recognizes a maritime boundary between

Alaska and Canada based on equidistance which Canada disagrees with. The Canadian policy

regards this and other existing disputes as “discreet boundary issues” and make clear that they in no

way poses defense challenges for Canada, or impacts their opportunity to cooperate with other

Arctic states. Another point of disagreement between the states is the North West Passage, which

the U.S. considers an international strait where any ship has the right of innocent passage. The

U.S. relates both the NWP and the Northern Sea Route to the freedom of the seas and recognizes its

implications for strategic straits anywhere in the world. Canada on the other hand states that it

“controls all maritime navigation in its waters”10, which by the Canadian definition includes the

NWP.

6 Arctic Regional Policy, National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, January 9, 2009 (NSPD66/HSPD25)

7 Government of Canada, Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad (Government of Canada: 2010), p. 5.

8 Ibid., p. 3.9 Ibid., p. 26.10 Ibid., p. 8.

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The foremost solution to security as well as sovereignty issues in both countries policies is to

enhance capacity and capability to operate militarily in the Arctic. While the U.S. policy calls for

general improvements to “protect United States air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic region”,

Canada has a more detailed vision to “better monitor, protect and patrol its Arctic land, sea and

sky”. The Canadian government has announced several initiatives that aims to strengthen military

presence in the Arctic, including a new icebreaker, new patrol ships, military infrastructure in the

region including bases and ports, strengthening of NORAD and yearly military exercises in the

region in cooperation with other Arctic states, including the U.S. These measures are in line with

the “Canada First Defence Strategy” and will better prepare Canada for “unforeseen events” in the

region. Both the U.S. and Canada are, however, emphasize the role of peaceful negotiations to

settle disputes in the region in accordance with international law.

Governance

The U.S. directive encourages the Senate to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) and, like Canada, recognizes the convention to be the primary legal framework to settle

boundary and continental shelf issues in the region. Ratification of the UNCLOS will serve U.S.

national security interests worldwide by ensuring mobility of its navy and guarantee access to

seabed resources primarily in the Arctic region. Canada expects to submit a claim on the extended

continental shelf to the UN Commission on the limit of the Continental Shelf in December 2013.

Both countries express support for the Arctic Council and views the cooperation between the

eight arctic states within this forum as beneficial for the region as a whole. Canada states that the

Council needs further developing and welcomes future legally binding agreements, a more visible

and transparent Council and a formalized secretariat and funding.11 The U.S. on the other hand is

satisfied with the limited mandate of the council and does not want the council to “be transformed

into a formal international organization”12.

Both countries agree that the Arctic differs so much from the Antarctic that any

implementation of an “Antarctic treaty” style legal regime would be inappropriate.

The Canadian policy also highlights the indigenous communities in the region and states that

they should have influence over Canadian Arctic foreign policy both through direct contacts with

11 Government of Canada, Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad (Government of Canada: 2010), p. 25f.

12 Arctic Regional Policy, National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, January 9, 2009 (NSPD66/HSPD25)

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the federal government and through international fora such as the Arctic Council.13

Economic development

Both countries agree that the receding ice paves the way for economic opportunities.. The

primary interest for both countries is the looming prospects of hydrocarbons hidden in the arctic

seabed, increasingly accessible with the receding ice. The U.S. ties these possible resources to the

nation's energy security and states that “energy development in the Arctic region will play an

important role in meeting growing global energy demand”. The U.S. will work to develop these

resources in line with “open and transparent market principles”, but also in an environmentally and

socially sustainable manner, taking into account the Arctic environment as well as the interests of

indigenous communities in the region. Canada recognizes the economic potential of the region's oil,

gas and mineral resources for Northerners as well as Canadians in general, while also

acknowledging the dangers of exploitation, not least in light of the impacts of the oil spill in the

Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Both countries welcomes further international cooperation on oil spill

preparedness and response, including through the Arctic Council.

Another aspect of development in the arctic that may require international cooperation on risk

mitigation is the prospect of increased shipping in the region. The U.S. and Canada agree that as

shipping in the Arctic is likely to increase as the region becomes more accessible, new infrastructure

and better practices for search and rescue are needed. Both countries agree that working through the

International Maritime Organization (IMO) is an effective way to increase safety and security of

Arctic shipping, including for the environment. Canada supports the development of a mandatory

polar code for shipping under the auspices of the IMO. Canada also recognizes that the North West

Passage is “not predicted to become a viable, large-scale transit route in the near term”.

When it comes to economic development in the Arctic, environmental and social

sustainability is highlighted in both countries' policies, and the unique challenges to the Arctic's

fragile eco system and indigenous communities are recognized. This trade off is especially apparent

when it comes to exploiting the region's untapped energy resources. The U.S. policy “seeks to

ensure that energy development throughout the Arctic occurs in an environmentally sound manner,

taking into account the interests of indigenous and local communities, as well as open and

transparent market principles”. Canada plans to make investments and promote trade in the region

that benefit “Northerners and all Canadians”. Canada also states that it will work to improve the

13 Government of Canada, Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad (Government of Canada: 2010), p. 23.

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social situation of northern communities including on issues such as languages and human health.

III. Domestic politics and Arctic foreign policy

United States of America

The United States is an Arctic Country by virtue of the state of Alaska, which has both

territory above the Arctic Circle and coastline to the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic has since the end of

the Cold War been an overlooked region in federal U.S. politics. With the decreasing ice cover and

increasing global attention given to the region, this is changing and the Arctic is establishing itself

on the federal government's agenda.

In the White House, Arctic expertise has come from the National Security Council through

U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral Thomas F. Atkin14. Other White Hose staffers working on Arctic

issues may be found in the White House's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Office

of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).15 The U.S. sent a high-level delegation to the April 2011

Arctic Council Ministerial meeting in Greenlandic Nuuk, including Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton and Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar. In the U.S. State Department, Secretary Clinton

has developed a personal interest in Arctic issues.16 She has repeatedly called for the ratification of

UNCLOS, stating that it goes “hand in hand” with the challenges in the Arctic and that ratification

is long over due17. Both Clinton’s visit to Nuuk and to a previous meeting in Ottawa, where the

Arctic littoral states met to discuss seabed mapping and search and rescue in March of 2010,

testifies to this. At the 2010 Ottawa meeting she publicly criticized her Canadian hosts for excluding

non-littoral Arctic states and indigenous groups from discussions, stating that "we need all hands on

deck because there is a huge amount to do, and not much time to do it"18. Former U.S. Deputy

Secreaty of State, James Steinberg has also been vocal on the Arctic and called for ratification of

UNCLOS as well as strengthening of Arctic governance, including the Arctic Council.19 The State

14 RADM Atkin served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Transborder Security between June 2009 – August 2010.

15 Rogin, J., 'Who's in charge of Arctic policy?' The Cable, Foreign Policy, 7 May 2010. <http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/07/who_s_in_charge_of_arctic_policy>

16 Interview with senior official at U.S. State Department. 17 Clinton, H., 'Transcript of Hillary Clinton's Confirmation Hearing', Council on Foreign Relations, 13 Jan. 2009.

<http://www.cfr.org/us-election-2008/transcript-hillary-clintons-confirmation-hearing/p18225>18 AFP 'Inuit welcome Clinton's comments on Arctic. 31 Mar. 2010

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h03Zrlr0IVGRg0f7C7_ySFAgCU1A>19 Steinberg, J. B., 'The United States: Visions of Global Order' First plenary session of The 8th IISS Global Strategic

Review: Global Security Governance and the Emerging Distribution of Power, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 11 Sep. 2010. <http://www.iiss.org/EasySiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=46775&type=full&servicetype=Attachment>

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Department also hosts the Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs under the Bureau of Oceans and

International Environmental and Scientific Affairs where U.S. Senior Arctic Official, Julie Gourley,

who represents the U.S. in most Arctic Council contexts, is based.

In the Department of the Interior Secretary Ken Salazar has taken the lead on the Arctic. The

department has several bureaus involved in the Arctic, including bureaus for Indian Affairs, Land

Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service and the Bureau of Ocean Energy

Management, Regulation and Enforcement. The Department of the Interior is also home to the U.S.

Geological Survey who has produced one of the most influential and widely cited estimates of

undiscovered Arctic oil and gas.20

As of April, 2011, the Arctic lies within the area of responsibility of two of the U.S. Armed

Forces Unified Combatant Commands, namely the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)

and the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). As USNORTHCOM is responsible for the U.S.

Homeland and has strong relationships with Canada and NORAD as well as the U.S. Coast Guard,

its commander is in the lead on Arctic planning, identification of future capabilities and

requirements or engagement with other agencies and bodies.21 The Arctic is a maritime environment

and naturally the Navy is the largest player at the Department of Defence. The U.S. Navy has been

in the forefront of climate change adaptation, notably through the U.S. Navy Task Force Climate

Change (TFCC), headed by RADM David Titley. The TFCC, created in 2009, was tasked with

establishing roadmaps for the Navy's response to climate change, first in the Arctic (Navy Arctic

Roadmap, November 200922) and then more generally (Navy Climate Change Roadmap, April

201023). The Navy Arctic Roadmap makes several recommendations to be implemented over 2009-

2014 fiscal years in the areas of

− Strategy, policy, missions, and plans

− operations and training

− Investments in weapons, platforms, sensors, command, control, communications,

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), installations and

facilities

− Strategic communications and outreach

20 US Geological Survey, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, USGS Fact Sheet 2008. <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>

21 Department of Defence, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the North West Passage, (DoD: May 2011), p. 20. <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf>

22 U.S. Navy 'U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap', Oct. 2009. <www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_roadmap.pdf>23 U.S. Navy 'U.S. Navy Climate Change Roadmap', Apr. 2010 <www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/CCR.pdf>

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Recommended among other things are, development of strategic objectives, ratification of

UNCLOS, continued exercises, and procurement of new capabilities. Former U.S. Navy Admiral

Gary Roughead has also expressed support for UNCLOS, stating that a ratification would give the

U.S. “a seat at the table”.24 In addition to the roadmap, the U.S. Congress in May of 2010 requested

from the DoD a report on “Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage”, which was delivered one

year later. The report assesses the national security objectives in the region and the existing and

needed capabilities to achieve those objectives as well as the need for new infrastructure, including

a new deep-water port and the need for new ice-breaking capacity. The report also discussed the

advantages and disadvantages of designating the Arctic an area of responsibility of two Unified

Combatant Commands and a single Combatant Commander.25 The report summarizes the desired

strategic end-state for the Arctic as “a stable and secure region where U.S. national interests are

safeguarded and the U.S. homeland is protected”. Future challenges will include “shortfalls in ice

and weather reporting and forecasting; limitations in [...] C4ISR due to lack of assets and harsh

environmental conditions; limited inventory of ice-capable vessels; and limited shore-based

infrastructure.”26 The region's development must be closely monitored and needs should be

reassessed continuously in order to develop capacity just in time, as opposed to “late-to-need”. As

far as military posturing in the region, the DoD assesses that current presence is adequate to achieve

short term objectives.

Since 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is based within the Department of Homeland

Security. According to the Coast Guard, U.S. Interests in the Polar Regions include “national

security, law enforcement, maritime safety, diplomatic, humanitarian aid, scientific research,

economic sustainability, and marine environmental protection”.27 As the Arctic region becomes

more accessible and home to more human activity, their role there is likely to gain importance. The

Coast Guard is responsible for the U.S. icebreaking capabilities, an are operating the the only large

icebreaker in active use, the USCGC Healy. Calls for increased icebreaking capacity are often

voiced in the U.S. and the need was brought to the fore in January 2012 when USCGC Healy

escorted a freighter with an emergency supply of fuel to Nome, Alaska.28

24 Cavas, C. P., 'Roughead says Russian, Chinese navies growing', Navy Times, 16 Mar. 2011.<http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/03/defense-navy--cno-assesses-russian-chinese-navies-031611/>

25 Department of Defence, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the North West Passage, (DoD: May 2011). <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf>

26 Ibid., p. 3.27 U.S. Coast Guard, Report to Congress: U.S. Coast Guard Polar Operations (Congressional Research Service: 2008)28 Yardley, W., 'Tanker with crucial fuel delivery is sighted off Nome', The New York Times, 13 Jan. 2012.

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The Coast Guard is the primary federal agency to handle offshore oil spills and as the energy

extraction develops in the region, so will the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is also advising the

Department of Commerce on the streamlining of the process to awarding offshore drilling permits

in the Arctic.29 The USCG are engaged in public debate on the Arctic, as well as in discussions with

the state department on legal issues such as the status of the North West Passage. It is the Coast

Guard's view that the NWP is and international strait and that they have right of passage.30 The

Coast Guard fully and openly supports ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty and in an effort to

get the ratification through the senate, both the previous and present USCG Commandants have

testified in front of the senate, supporting the state departments efforts.31

The interagency U.S. Arctic Policy Group was created in 1971 by the National Security

Council and then national security advisor Henry Kissinger.32 The group, which is chaired by the

State Department and includes representatives of the departments of Defense, Interior, Commerce,

Transportation, and National Science Foundation, aims to implement “U. S. Arctic policy and

reviewing and coordinating U. S. activities and programs in the Arctic, with the exception of purely

domestic Arctic-related matters internal to Alaska.”33 The Arctic Policy Group “meets monthly to

develop and implement U.S. programs and policies in the Arctic, including those relevant to the

activities of the Arctic Council”.34

In an effort to secure the U.S. energy future, and reduce dependence on foreign oil, advancing

domestic oil production has been made a priority for the Obama administration. In May 2011

President Obama announced in a radio address that the government had established an interagency

working group to streamline the permitting process for drilling in the Arctic.35 The Interagency

Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska will be

chaired by the deputy secretary of the department of the interior, Hayes. The working group will

29 Boda, K. and Venckus, S., U.S. Coast Guard, Interview with the author, Washington, D.C., 13 Sep. 201130 Ibid.31 U.S. Coast Guard, 'Statement by Adm. Thad Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard, on the convention on the law

of the sea', Press Release, 17 May 2007, <http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/786/156912>Department of Homeland Security, 'Testimony of Admiral Robert Papp Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard on Coast Guard Operations in the Arctic, Before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation', Press release, 1 Dec. 2011,<http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/20111201-papp-coast-guard-operations-in-the-arctic.shtm>

32 Kissinger, H., 'National Security Decision Memorandum 144', National Security Council 22 Dec. 1971,<http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_144.pdf>

33 Ibid.34 Arctic Council, Member state biographies: United States of America.

<http://ac.npolar.no/member_state/united_states_of_america>35 White House, 'Weekly Address: President Obama Announces New Plans to Increase Responsible Domestic Oil

Production', Press release, 14 May 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/13/weekly-address-president-obama-announces-new-plans-increase-responsible->

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coordinate between the deputy secretary level of among others the departments of Defence,

Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, Homeland Security and the Environmental Protection Agency. 36

Before once again catching the attention of the federal government, the Arctic was a concern

almost exclusively for the state of Alaska. As Alaska is a sparsely populated state, it occupies only

one seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and in addition, over 65% of Alaska's land is owned

and managed by the federal government. Current Alaskan senators Mark Begitch (D) and Lisa

Murkowski (R) have been less successful in bringing in federal money to the state than predecessor

Ted Stevens, the longest serving republican senator of all time, who lost the senate election in 2008

after allegations of corruption.37 Alaska is not a very powerful actor in Washington DC, which has

led to tension between state and federal governments, notably over the drilling for oil in national

wildlife refuges, including the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and the reduction of federal grants

earmarked for Alaska.38 Both Alaskan Senators have a number of Arctic bills floating around the

Senate. Sen. Begitch has among other things proposed strengthening Alaska's adaptation to climate

change, better oil spill prevention and response, implementing the Arctic Marine Shipping

Assessment and the creation of a U.S. Arctic Ambassador39. The last of which is opposed by the

State Department.40 Senator Murkowski is a vigorous proponent of UNCLOS and has proposed

strengthening of Arctic maritime infrastructure including new icebreakers, ports and surveying the

Arctic seabed for both safer transportation and delineation of the continental shelf.41 Murkowski

was part of the delegation at the Arctic Council Ministerial in Nuuk. Chairman of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry has also taken a personal interest in Arctic issues and

made a push for the Senate ratification of UNCLOS in 2009.42

The United States Senate is also where opposition to the ratification of UNCLOS can be

found Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) is one of the staunchest opponents and has together with a

handful of senators successfully blocked the Senate from approving the ratification twice. In the

36 Hayes D., 'Keynote speech' Arctic Oil and Gas Development: Conference at CSIS, 13 Jul., 2011<http://csis.org/multimedia/video-arctic-oil-and-gas-development-david-hayes-keynote>

37 Stevens served the U.S. Senate between 1968 and 2008 and became known for aggressively going after federal funds to develop Alaska. He was also, like most other Alaskan politicians, in favor of developing Alaska's energy resources. Stevens died in a plane crash in august 2010. Bolstad, E., 'Changes in Congress leave Alaska with fewer earmarks', Anchorage Daily News, 22 February 2010,<http://www.adn.com/2010/02/21/1150433/congress-changes-cut-state-earmarks.html>

38 Bolstad, E., 'Changes in Congress leave Alaska with fewer earmarks', Anchorage Daily News, 22 February 2010,<http://www.adn.com/2010/02/21/1150433/congress-changes-cut-state-earmarks.html>

39 For a list of bills sponsored by Senator Begich, see <http://begich.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=SponsoredBills>40 Gourley, J., U.S. Department of State, Interview with the author, Washington, D.C., 14 Sep. 2011.41 For Senator Murkowski's work on the Arctic, see: <http://murkowski.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Arctic>42 Winter, A., 'Sen. Kerry looks for window to ratify Law of the Sea', The New York Times, 7 May, 2009.

<http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/05/07/07greenwire-sen-kerry-looks-for-window-to-ratify-law-of-th-12208.html?pagewanted=1>

14

words of Senator Inhofe, UNCLOS “hampers the operations of the Navy and it has the potential to

hamper the efforts of the proliferation security initiative. It would allow foreign vessels and

warships passage rights into our territorial waters. It creates regulation and taxation by an

international body, and it presents a legal danger for American businesses through exposure to the

international court system.”43

Alaskan state government has also addressed the senate on the changing Arctic's impact on

issues including national and homeland security, foreign policy and energy security. Alaska State

Governor Sean Parnell has for instance talked about the strategic impact of the Arctic in U.S.

policy before the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. 44 Lt.

Gov. Mead Treadwell, has both as a representative of the State of Alaska and as the former chair of

the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, repeatedly testified before congress on the importance of

preparing for a more accessible Arctic, raising among other issues, the need for new U.S.

icebreakers.45

Even if national and homeland security are stated as the primary concerns in the U.S. Arctic

policy it is clear that the prospects for economic opportunity, and especially energy development, is

the strongest driver for the new attention that the region is receiving. With its bid for exploratory

drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas in the summer of 2012, Shell is the company at the

forefront of the oil industry's entry into offshore drilling in the Arctic and their frustration about the

slow approval process was vital in the creation of the inter agency coordination group on offshore

permitting in Alaska. Shell is also constructing their own icebreaker and as the ship is completed in

the spring of 2012, the company's capacity to maneuver in the Arctic will be close to that of the

U.S. government.46 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is also supporting UNCLOS by actively

lobbying senators for ratification.47 43 Inhofe, J. M., 'Law of the Sea Treaty', Press release, 25 Sep. 2008.

<http://inhofe.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.JimsJournal&ContentRecord_id=9a3ef095-802a-23ad-4378-0fd106a07c07&Region_id=&Issue_id=>

44 Parnell, S., 'The strategic importance of the Arctic in U.S. Policy', Statement before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Homeland Security Appropriations, Anchorage, 20 Aug. 2009.<http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/Parnell_testimony-20Aug09.pdf>

45 See for instance Treadwell, M., 'Is America prepared for an accessible Arctic?' Testimony before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Washington D.C., 16 Jul. 2008, <http://www.arctic.gov/testimony/treadwell-07-16-08.pdf>. and Treadwell, M., 'America is missing the boat', Statement before the United States Hose of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Washington D.C., 1 Dec. 2011. <http://ltgov.alaska.gov/treadwell_media/pdf/2011-12-01-Written.pdf>

46 According to the builder, the 360-foot “Aiviq” will be able to break ice at least a meter thick and will be operational in minus 50 degrees C. Its specifications are comparable to the USCGC Healy, the Coast Guard's most advanced ice-breaker. Demer, L., 'Shell to unveil icebreaker for Arctic Alaska offshore drilling' Anchorage Daily News, 6 Dec. 2011, <http://www.adn.com/2011/12/05/2204274/shell-about-to-unveil-200-million.html>

47 In 2008 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce wrote to the Democratic and Republican leaders in the Senate urging them

15

Several think tanks and environmental groups have also taken an interest in the U.S. Arctic.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies have produced extensive reports on the U.S. role

in the Arctic and has during several conferences highlighted U.S. lack of capacity to operate in the

region and the importance of ratifying UNCLOS.48 Another think tank that has taken an interest in

UNCLOS is the Heritage Foundation who have repeatedly published texts urging the senate not to

ratify the convention.49 The World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace and PEW Environment Group are all

actively trying to stop or postpone drilling in the U.S. Arctic. While PEW have paid for national

television ads to which question Arctic drilling, WWF are publishing reports on the dangers of

Arctic drilling and have teamed up with Coca Cola to protect the habitats of Polar Bears.50

Canada

The Canadian federal government's interest in the Arctic region has historically fluctuated

between indifference and keen interest, much depending on who occupies the prime minister seat.

During three periods of time, the Arctic has been particularly prominent in Canadian politics,

between 1969-1977, 1983-1991 and from 2006 up until today. These periods have roughly

corresponded with the prime ministerships of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Brian Mulroney, and current

prime minister Stephen Harper.51 With the prospect of an increasingly accessible Arctic, Harper has

made the Arctic a national priority and a key part of his domestic and foreign policies. Harper has

repeatedly stated that a top priority for Canada in the Arctic is to assert its sovereignty over the

region and that Canada needs to “use it or lose it”.52 Harper has in his speeches on the region

stressed the importance of the Arctic to the Canadian national identity, emphasizing both its history

and prospects for the future. Harper has announced increased spending towards bolstering Canadian

capacity to operate in the region, including militarily.

to work for the ratification of UNCLOS, see: <http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Reid-McConnell%20letter08.pdf> 48 Conley, H. A., and Kraut, J., U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic, (CSIS: Washington, D.C., Apr. 2010),

<http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf>, Conley, H. A., A new Security Architecture for the Arctic, (CSIS: Washington, D.C., Jan. 2012). <http://csis.org/files/publication/120117_Conley_ArcticSecurity_Web.pdf>

49 Groves, S., U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea erodes U.S. Sovereignty over U.S. Extended continental shelf, The Heritage Foundation, 7 Jun. 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/un-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-erodes-us-sovereignty-over-us-extended-continental-shelf>Groves, S., Law of the Sea Treaty could cost U.S. Trillions,The Heritage Foundation, 6 Jul. 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/07/law-of-sea-treaty-could-cost-us-trillions>

50 Eichbaum, W., WWF, Interview with the author, Washington, D.C., 12 Sep. 2011.AP, 'U.S. Arctic drilling target of TV ads', CBC News, 7 Dec. 2011, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2011/12/07/pew-arctic-drilling-campaign.html?cmp=rss>

51 Cornut, J., 'Why and When we study the Arctic in Canada,' International Journal, vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), p. 944.

52 'Arctic of 'strategic importance' to Canada: PM', CBC News, 19 Aug. 2009, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/08/19/harper-nanook-arctic-north-sovereignty414.html>

16

Harper's emphasis on the military aspect of Arctic sovereignty and the importance of “boots

on the ground” in the region has earned him criticism from groups that argue that the main

challenges in the region are not military in nature but are rather comprised by threats to human

security and the environment.53 Canada's decision to pull out of the Kyoto accords together with

decreased funding for both environmental and polar research raises concerns that the most pressing

issues in the Arctic are not getting enough attention. In 2011 more than 200 million dollars in

funding for environmental research was cut by the Harper administration.54 The cuts have forced the

Polar Environment Atmospheric Research Laboratory in Eureka, Nunavut to close down, despite

subsequent losses of valuable climate change data.55

The Arctic makes up a large part of Canada's territory and the region is home to some 100 000

Canadian citizens.56 Though rich in natural resources, the region remains relatively poor and is

heavily subsidized by the federal government. The work of most federal departments thus extends

into the Arctic and the department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development is specifically

tasked with dealing with the domestic challenges that the region offers. The work of several

departments has implications foreign policy that affects the region, the most important being the

Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).

Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, has made several strong public

statements on the Arctic. At the launch of the Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy, Cannon

stated that “the Arctic is an essential part of the Canadian national identity” and that “exercising

sovereignty on the Canadian North, as well as on the rest of Canada, is a top foreign-policy priority

for Canada”.57 During a trip to a remote Canadian research outpost in the Arctic in April 2010,

Cannon sharply dismissed an alleged Russian parachute jump over the North Pole as a “stunt” and

manifestation of Russian “propaganda” in the Arctic. Cannon, who chose to use sterner language

than his prepared talking notes would suggest,58 received criticism from the Russian Arctic

53 Dey, A., 'The North is calling. But not for more CF-18s' Canadian International Council, 19 Oct. 2011, <http://www.opencanada.org/features/blogs/dispatch/the-north-is-calling-but-not-for-more-c-18s/>Smith, H. A., 'Choosing not to see: Canada, Climate Change and the Arctic', International Journal, vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), pp. 931-942.

54 Leahy, S., 'Canada cuts environmental spending, The Guardian, 9 Nov. 2011<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/canada-cuts-environment-spending>

55 'High Arctic research station forced to close', CBC News, 28 Feb. 2012,<http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2012/02/28/science-pearl-arctic-research.html>

56 Population in the three Arctic territories: Yukon: 33,897, Northwest Territories: 41,462, Nunavut: 31,906. Statistics Canada <www.statcan.gc.ca>

57 Cannon, L., 'Address at launch of Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy', Ottawa, 20 Aug. 2010 <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2010/2010-057.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>

58 Blanchfield, M., 'Cannon ditches script on proposed Russian parachute jump, documents show', The Globe and Mail, 20 Feb. 2011. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/cannon-ditches-script-on-proposed-russian-parachute-jump-documents-show/article1914757/>

17

Ambassador Anton Visiliev who accused Cannon of being “provocative” and catering to a domestic

audience by scoring points by being tough on Russia.59 Cannon was defeated in the 2011 federal

election and subsequently lost his seat, leaving the DFAIT without a minister for foreign affairs

during the 2011 Nuuk ministerial. The Canadian delegation to the meeting was instead headed by

Health Minister Leona Aglukkaq, the only Canadian MP from Nunavut and first Inuk in history to

be appointed to the Cabinet of Canada. In May 2011, Cannon was succeeded by John Baird.

Canadian foreign policy on the Arctic concerns several federal departments and is coordinated

by the Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Circumpolar Affairs Division is

responsible for coordinating and implementing the international aspects of Canada's Northern

Strategy, including working with the Arctic Council, and is headed by Canada's Senior Arctic

Official the Director General for the Environment, Energy and Sustainable Development Bureau

within the DFAIT. The SAO has taken over much of the workload of the Circumpolar Ambassador,

a position that was axed by the current government in an effort to save costs in 2006.60

DFAIT is also responsible for Canada's program for mapping its extended continental shelf.

The program aims to map the part of Canada's continental shelf that extends beyond 200 nautical

miles in order to make a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

under the auspices of UNCLOS. As Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2003, a claim must be submitted

before the end of 2013. DFAIT is working together with the Departments of Natural Resources and

Fisheries and Oceans as well as internationally, with Russia, Denmark and the U.S. to prepare the

submission. The goal with this process is to determine the full extent of the area over which Canada

has sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil.

Canadian International Centre for the Arctic Region (CICAR) is a DFAIT initiative to

coordinate and improve diplomatic efforts on the Arctic. The Centre is located in Oslo, Norway and

has additional staff in Washington D.C., Anchorage and Moscow. CICAR was inaugurated in 2009

by Foreign Minister Cannon and aims to conduct strategic regional analysis in order to improve

DFAIT's ability to make informed decisions on Arctic related foreign policy issues.

Bilateral relations with other Arctic Countries is a natural part of Canada's Arctic foreign

policy and DFAIT manages these relations through its embassies throughout the region. Canada has

a special relationship with the U.S., with whom Canada has many important agreements and great

59 Blanchfield, M., 'Russian envoy blames tough talk from Tories on Cold War 'inertia'', The Globe and Mail, 26 May, 2011, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/russian-envoy-blames-tough-talk-from-tories-on-cold-war-inertia/article2036267/>

60 'Circumpolar ambassador job axed', CBC News, 3 Oct. 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2006/10/03/circumpolar-cuts.html>

18

interdependency in fields such as military and trade. In spite of sometimes boisterous statements

from the DFAIT on Russia's Arctic ambitions, Canada and Russia enjoys peaceful cooperation in a

number of fields, both in the Arctic and beyond.

In March 2010 DFAIT invited all Arctic coastal states to an Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers'

Meeting in Chelsea, Quebec. As with previous meetings exclusive to the coastal states, such as the

Ilulissat meeting of 2008, Canada was criticized for excluding other Arctic states. This time the

sharpest critique came not from the excluded countries, but from the U.S. Secretary of State.

As the Harper Government has emphasized the military aspects of protecting Canada's Arctic

sovereignty, the DND has been given an important role in Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy. Several

large investments in military materiel and basing has been announced by Harper, including 6-8

Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships61 and a docking and refueling facility in Nanisivik and a Canadian

Forces Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay62. The procurement of the Arctic patrol ships has

been criticized from several directions, because the ships are not considered strong enough for

heavy ice breaking, but also because the the Coast Guard is more suited for Arctic operations than

the Navy. Chairman of the Senate committee on national security and defence, Colin Kenny and

Chairman of the Senate committee on fisheries and oceans, Bill Rompkey has argued that that the

Coast Guard has more experience and competence to operate in the Arctic than the Navy and that

“moving the navy into the Arctic will drain its effectiveness elsewhere”.63 Senator Kenny has also

called the procurement of patrol vessels “a dumb idea”, arguing that proper icebreakers are needed

more.64 The procurement of 65 units of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters has been motivated with the

promise that the stealth fighter can protect Canada from the “threats of the 21st century at home,

across vast distances and in harsh environmental conditions, and abroad.”65 The F-35, however, is

not considered an ideal choice for operations in Arctic conditions by others.66

Following the government's early announcements on increased defence spending, Prime

Minister Harper together with the Minister of National Defence, Peter MacKay presented in May

61 According to the Department of National Defence, the cost of the ships is estimated to 3,1 billion CAD and the first ship is anticipated to be finished in 2015. See: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/2/pro-pro/artic-eng.asp>

62 Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, 'Expanding Canadian forces operations in the Arctic' Press release, 10 Aug. 2007, <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1785>

63 Kenny, C. and Rompkey, B., 'Wrong decision on ships could sink navy', Times Colonist, 16 Jul. 2009, <http://www2.canada.com/victoriatimescolonist/news/comment/story.html?id=7edf3213-4eb4-4788-876e-0cd353362a94&p=2>

64 McLeod, P., 'Arctic patrol ships 'dumb'', The Chronicle Herald, 16 Mar. 2012, <http://thechronicleherald.ca/novascotia/74207-arctic-patrol-ships-dumb>

65 Department of National Defence, 'Government of Canada strengthens sovereignty while generating significant economic benefits', Press release, 16 Jul. 2010. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3472>

66 Pugliese, D., 'Cabinet ministers Peter van Loan and Peter MacKay at odds over F-35's ability to communicata while

19

2006 a new defence strategy for Canada named the “Canada First Defence Strategy”. The main

priority for the new strategy is to enhance the Canadian forces ability to defend the country and

protecting Canadians at home. In line with the Harper government's focus on the North, the Arctic

region is given prominence in the strategy and it states that “the Canadian Forces must have the

capacity to exercise control over and defend Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic” and that “the

military will play an increasingly vital role in demonstrating a visible Canadian presence in this

potentially resource- rich region”.67 The strategy, that aims to increase Canada's defence spending

from 18 billion CND in 2008-09 to 30 billion CND in 2027-28, sets out to invest in more personnel,

better military infrastructure, increased readiness and new hardware.68

The Canadian Rangers are a sub-component of the Canadian Forces reserve who have also

been bolstered under the auspices of protecting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. The Rangers are

a volunteer force made up mainly by Inuit, First Nations and Métis, but also non-aboriginal

northerners. The rangers perform surveillance and “sovereignty patrols” in the Canadian Arctic and

represent the only military presence in large part of Canada's sparsely populated north. The number

of Rangers is set to increase from 4 100 in 2007 to 5 000 in 2012.69

Since 2007, an annual military training exercise named operation Nanook has taken place in

the north. The integrated exercise, that include the Canadian Forces (Navy, Army, Air Force, Special

Forces and Rangers), Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Canadian Coast Guard, aims to

exercise sovereignty in the Arctic and to develop capacity for emergency response.70 Operation

Nanook 2010 and 2011 also comprised international partners as the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard

and the Danish Navy participated along side the Canadian Forces. Nanook 2011 was a two part

operation where the first part was a presence patrolling operation that was conducted together with

the international partners. The second part was an all of government exercise simulating an air

disaster and a maritime emergency.71

The prospect of an open North West Passage with possibility of trans oceanic transportation is

obviously on the radar of the Canadian government. However, a commercially viable option of

operating in the Arctic', The Ottawa Citizen, 25 Oct. 2011,<http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2011/10/25/cabinet-ministers-peter-van-loan-and-peter-mackay-at-odds-over-f-35%E2%80%99s-ability-to-communicate-while-operating-in-the-arctic/>

67 Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy, (Department of National Defence: Ottawa 2008), <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf>, p. 8.

68 Ibid., p. 4.69 Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, 'Expanding Canadian forces operations in the Arctic' Press release, 10 Aug.

2007, <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1785>70 For information on Operation Nanook, see Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's website:

<http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/northstrat_nanook-stratnord_nanook.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>71 Ibid.

20

transporting goods through the NWP is not likely to become a reality anytime soon. Not only the

extent of the ice is determining the possibility of transportation in the region, factors such as lack of

infrastructure, reliable maps and capable vessels all suggest that any talk about a commercially

viable NWP is premature. Nevertheless, the Canadian has made the passage a national priority and

vehemently defends the right to call it internal waters, instead of an international strait, as the U.S.

and others would like to see. The Canadians are anxious over increased transport in its northern

archipelago and the federal department Transport Canada has worked intensely to promote a

mandatory polar code for all maritime traffic in polar waters, which would give Canada some

control over passing ships. In 1970, after an unannounced visit by the U.S. ship Manhattan in the

NWP that led to some diplomatic tension between the two countries, Canada introduced the Arctic

Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA). The act gave Canada more control over traffic in the

NWP at the same time as it managed to appease domestic demands for a tough stance on the U.S.72

As opposed to the U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is a civil organization

under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and it has no mandate to enforce military security or

law enforcement. The CCG's main mission in the Canadian Arctic is ice-breaking and they operate

Canada's fleet of two heavy and four medium sized ice-breakers. Despite it's civilian role, Canada

relies on the CCG and its ice-breakers as “the primary means of projecting its sovereignty in the

Arctic”.73 Voices have been raised for arming the Coast Guard and a report from the Standing

Committee on Fisheries and Oceans from December 2009, recommended that CCG ice-breakers be

armed with deck weaponry and that personnel with law-enforcement authority should be included

in the crew.74 The CCG has been described as an “orphan”, lost in Canada's federal bureaucracy and

both under prioritized and under funded.75 With the renewed interest in the Arctic and increased

potential for Arctic missions, not least related to patrolling the North West Passage.

The Canadian Arctic is made up by three administrative territories, Yukon, the North Western

Territories, and Nunavut. The territories have in the past lacked the jurisdictional powers extended

to the ten provinces and have instead received their powers directly from the federal government.

72 Bow, B. J.,The Politics of Linkage: Power Interdependence and Ideas in Canada-US Relations, (UCB Press: Vancouver 2009), p. 83.

73 Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Controlling Canada's Arctic Waters: Role of the Canadian Coast Guard, (Senate of Canada: Dec. 2009), <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/402/fish/rep/rep07dec09-e.pdf> p. 47.

74 Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Controlling Canada's Arctic Waters: Role of the Canadian Coast Guard, (Senate of Canada: Dec. 2009), p. 31.

75 Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, The Coast Guard in Canada's Arctic: Interim Report, (Senate of Canada: 2008), <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/sen/yc25-0/YC25-0-392-4-eng.pdf>, p. 35.

21

Development today is moving towards extending jurisdictional powers to the territories much like it

is done in the provinces. The Yukon Act of 2003 have made governance in the territory similar to

that of the provinces and Yukon for instance is now in control over its natural resources. Although

the other two territories are eventually likely to follow Yukon, the federal government still has more

authority over the three territories than over the southern provinces.

The non state actors with the strongest interest in the Canadian Arctic are obviously the

aboriginal peoples of the region. Aboriginals in Canada are usually divided into Inuit, First-Nations

and Métis and together comprise around 3,8% of Canada's population. Of these peoples, the Inuit

have a special standing in the Canadian Arctic due to their long occupancy of the region. The Inuit

also play a special role in Canada's sovereignty claims over the region, well illustrated by the

Nunavut Land Claims Agreement from 1993 that effectively created the territory of Nunavut

(meaning “our land” in Inuktitut) and recognized the Inuit's contributions to Canadian history,

identity and sovereignty of the Arctic, as well as stating that “Canada's sovereignty over the waters

of the arctic archipelago is supported by Inuit use and occupancy”.76

Two of the cross border aboriginal peoples who have traditionally dwelt in Canada and Alaska

are represented by the Gwich'in Council International and the Arctic Athabaskan Council as

permanent participants in the Arctic Council. The Inuit Circumpolar Council is also a permanent

participant and represents inuit in Greenland/Denmark, Canada, Alaska/USA and Chukotka/Russia.

IV. Three cases for further reseach

As the Arctic faces several transnational challenges in the years ahead, it is important to

understand the domestic restraints to international cooperation in the region. In the cases of the

U.S. and Canada three examples are outlined below; the U.S. inability to ratify UNCLOS, Canada's

reluctance towards inviting outsiders into Arctic cooperation, and the bilateral boundary issues

between the two countries. The three examples are superficially analyzed using Putnam's two-level

games and the notion of framing. Deeper analysis would require further research.

The U.S. inability to ratify UNCLOS

The United States played an integral part in the international negotiations for the Law of the

Sea Treaty and though an agreement that was acceptable to the U.S. negotiators was reached in

76 The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement of 1993 can be found at: <http://www.gov.nu.ca/hr/site/doc/nlca.pdf>

22

1994, the U.S. Senate has as of yet failed to ratify it. As the Arctic opens up and the U.S. begins to

look north more attention is given to the treaty and the stipulations under it that may allow the U.S.

to expand its maritime territory along its extended continental shelf. The Reagan administration,

who were the principal negotiators to the convention did not sign the agreement because of the

Department of the Interior's strong feelings on sea-bed mining rights, that ultimately reduced the

Level I win-set to the point that it was un-ratifiable in its present form. The Clinton administration

managed to get the controversial deep sea mining clause omitted in negotiations in 1994 in an

excellent example of how a narrow Level II win-set contributes to a strong bargaining position. The

Level I negotiations finished in 1994 when the Clinton administration signed the agreement after it

got its will through on deep-sea mining rights. Clinton proceeded to submit the treaty to the U.S.

Senate for ratification where it met such strong opposition that it was not ratified. In 2007 President

Bush again submitted the treaty to the senate and despite full cooperation from the Democratic

Party and several republican senators the treaty was not ratified. It is now up to the Obama

administration to carry on where the past two administrations have failed and persuade the Level II

constituency of the Senate to accept and ratify the treaty.

Today, ratification of UNCLOS is supported by nearly all U.S. maritime stakeholders

including Navy, Coast Guard, and industry, as well as the Obama administration. Yet ratification at

this time still looks unlikely due to the current situation in senate. A handful of republican senators

adamantly oppose the convention on the grounds that it undermines U.S. sovereignty, and they

may, according to parliamentary procedure, prevent the motion to ratify UNCLOS to reach a vote

on the senate floor. As the ice melts in the Arctic however, the cost of a “no-agreement” is rising.

Something that the Alaskan senators are more than willing to point out. On the other hand, the cost

of a no-agreement on the Law of the Sea for a Senator from Arkansas is still low and for some a

status quo would be preferable. Those actors in the senate who are seeking a no-agreement are

actively politicizing the issue, framing it in terms of sovereignty and security and playing on

conservative suspicions of the UN system. The opposition to the convention is, however, likely

based more on an ideological resentment towards the UN together with a desire to damage the

current administration at any cost, rather than real concern over security or sovereignty.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has approved it and has twice sent it to the senate

where the vote was blocked both times. Even if the two-thirds majority that is needed in the senate

most likely exists, the political costs associated with pursuing ratification are high for an already

weakened Obama administration. The recent experience with the ratification process of the new

23

START treaty is evidence that even a motion with broad bipartisan support will prove difficult to

pass in the current U.S. political environment. The new START treaty was a high priority of the

Obama administration and its ratification proved an important foreign policy victory for the

president, and thus worth fighting for. With an even weaker position in the senate today, and 2012

being an election year, the Obama administration is forced to carefully pick its battles and the

ratification of UNCLOS is unlikely to prove important enough to pursue. UNCLOS has the

potential to be ratified by a broad bipartisan majority, but in the current congress this may be too

costly or difficult. The 2012 federal election may alter the situation in favor of ratification, not only

if the Democratic party gains a larger majority. With endorsement of the Navy, Coast Guard and

business community it might actually be easier for a Republican majority to push ratification

through the senate. For a 2012 ratification to be possible, democrats must emphasize the existing

bipartisan support of the convention and to the best of their ability try to de-politicize the issue.

Republicans on the other hand must show statesmanship and responsibility, even at the cost of

domestic criticism from more conservative elements of the Republican Party and its voters.

Arctic exclusivity: letting in the outsiders

Canada, together with Russia, is representing the sternest opposition to allowing more actors

into the international Arctic cooperation. The Canadian viewpoint is that Arctic affairs are best left

to the Arctic states and that outsiders have a small or no role to play in the region. This attitude has

led to frustration among a number of actors who perceive that they have a legitimate interest in the

region and should be allowed to observe, or participate in the Arctic cooperation. The Canadian

attitude towards Arctic outsiders is clearly illustrated in the country's reluctance towards accepting

new observers into the Arctic Council. Canada has openly opposed granting the EU permanent

observer status in the Arctic Council because of the Union's ban on imports of seal products. Former

foreign minister Lawrence Cannon stated in 2009 that “Canada doesn't feel that the European

Union, at this stage, has the required sensitivity to be able to acknowledge the Arctic Council, as

well as its membership, and so therefore I'm opposed to it”.77 Norway's foreign minister Jonas Gahr

Store on the other hand stated that “Norway shares that view with Canada. But for Norway, that's

yet another reason to invite the observers in”.78 The EU is not the only would-be permanent

observer who have been met by Canadian suspicion. A few Chinese statements has led to Canadian

77 'Canada against EU entry to Arctic Council because of seal trade ban' CBC News, 29 Apr. 2009, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/04/29/cda-eu-arctic-seal.html>

78 'Arctic Council snubs EU as observer over seal dispute', AFP, 29 Apr. 2009, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g8ihJqNKy6YdBE7bHW6KBPilNq8Q>

24

unease over China's motives in the Arctic and a fear that China is willing to challenge Canada's

sovereignty over the North West Passage.79 For years, negotiation on admitting more observers into

the Arctic Council has been met with a no-agreement, where the consensus based council has not

managed to come to a conclusion about whether or not the ad-hoc observers should be granted

permanent observer status. Canadians have a strong Arctic identity and the issue of Canadian

sovereignty in the Arctic is on people's minds. Out of the eight Arctic countries, the Canadian public

are the least interested in letting outsiders into the council. 22% in northern Canada and only 15% in

southern Canada thinks that “non-Arctic states, like China or organizations like the European

Union, should be invited to the Arctic Council and have a say in Arctic affairs”.80 Indigenous groups

also strongly oppose an expanded council. EU's ban on seal imports is one important reason,

another is the fear of marginalization of the permanent participants if large actors like EU and China

would be granted a permanent seat at the table. As the domestic political cost of granting China or

EU permanent observer status would be high, public opinion and the influence from indigenous

groups is decreasing the win-sets for the Canadian Arctic Council delegation in council

negotiations. The domestic politics must be weighed against the increasing frustrations from China

and the EU, which in turn could cause political costs in the international arena. Canada's excluding

inclination is visible not only within the framework of the Arctic Council. In discussions with

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Harper stated that he saw no role for NATO in

the Arctic and that those non-Arctic members of NATO who sought such a role were looking to

increase their influence where “they don't belong”.81

The March 2010 meeting in Chelsea, Quebec was harshly criticized for its exclusive guest

list, comprised solely of the five littoral states. Indigenous groups together with Finland, Iceland

and Sweden argue that the Arctic Five format undermines the Arctic Council. The sharpest criticism

came from the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who before the meeting lamented the

Canadian decision to exclude actors other than the coastal states and stated that “Significant

international discussions on Arctic issues should include those who have legitimate interests in the

region”.82 By heavily emphasizing sovereignty, Harper has created a climate where Canadian

79 Curtis Wright, D., The Panda Bear Readies to Meet the Polar Bear: China Debates and Formulates Foreign Policy Towards Arctic Affairs and Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty, (CDFAI: Calgary 2011).

80 The Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation and The Canada Center for Global Security Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs, Rethinking the top of the world: Arctic security public opinion survey, Jan. 2011. <http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/files/downloads/FINAL%20Survey%20Report.pdf> p. 53

81 US Embassy in Ottawa, 'Canadian PM and NATO S-G Discuss Afghanistan, the Strategic Concept and the Arctic', Cable to the U.S. State Department, no. 10OTTAWA21, 20 Jan. 2010, <http://wikileaks.free.de/cable/2010/01/10OTTAWA21.html>

82 Gillies, R., 'Clinton rebukes Canada on Arctic meeting', The Guardian, 29 March 2010,

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engagement in international cooperation on the Arctic in general, and the engagement with non-

Arctic states in particular, can be interpreted by Canadians as concessions undermining Canadian

sovereignty. The U.S., however, along with other Arctic countries who do not have a strong Arctic

identity, and where the Arctic is not particularly politicized, such as Sweden and Finland, are

supportive of a more inclusive Arctic Council. Broad cooperation in the region is of key importance

to counteract misunderstandings and suspicions that may arise between Arctic insiders and

outsiders.

Delimitations of maritime boundaries

Between the U.S. and Canada there are two lingering disagreements on maritime boundaries

as well as possible overlaps as the countries work to extended their continental shelves. In the

Beaufort Sea, there is a wedge of maritime territory extending from the Alaska/Yukon border, the

ownership of which is disputed. The U.S. argues that the boundary should follow the equidistance

from the coast of the two states as is stipulated in UNCLOS. The Canadians on the other hand refer

to the Treaty of St. Petersburg from 1825 which states that the international boundary between

Canada and what was then Russian territory would follow the 141st meridian West “as far as the

frozen Ocean”.83 The other disagreement between Canada and the U.S. is the status of the North

West Passage, where Canada adamantly argues that the passage should be considered Canadian

internal waters under the framework of UNCLOS. The U.S. has time and again argued the

importance of the freedom of the seas and that the passage constitutes an international strait where

innocent passage by foreign vessels should be allowed. During 2013 Canada will also submit their

claim to an extended continental shelf to the CLCS and possible overlaps exists with Denmark,

Russia and the U.S. As the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS no timetable for a U.S. submission

exists.

The seabed under the wedge of maritime territory in the Beaufort Sea is believed to contain

both oil and natural gas but as long as there is ambiguity over its ownership no one is going to make

the necessary investments to exploit it. A no-agreement is thus costly for both sides as the potential

resources becomes out of bounds for everyone. A potential Level II actor with vested interest in a

settlement is the oil and gas industry. As this industry is largely transnational it can cooperate with

both the U.S. and Canadian government and thus their win-set is potentially a large one, though a

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9009648>83 The Convention Between Great Britain and Russia from 1825 can be found at:

<http://explorenorth.com/library/history/bl-ruseng1825.htm>

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no-agreement would still be costly. As for public opinion on how to resolve the Beaufort dispute,

there is a clear difference between the two countries. In Canada the number of people who think

that Canada should “assert full sovereignty” over the area rather than strike a deal with the U.S. is

around 50% while corresponding numbers in the U.S. is only 10%.84 To what extent these numbers

stem from the Canadian government's framing of the Arctic in terms of sovereignty and identity and

the relative non politicization of the issue in the U.S. is difficult to tell, but the difference is

significant. The Canadian reluctance to strike a deal reduces the Level II win-set and may actually

give Canada a stronger bargaining position over a U.S. with a relatively large Level II win-set.

However, pushing any negotiated settlement through the U.S. senate is not likely to be an easy task.

The U.S. has showed a bit of interest in the settlement of the Norway/Russia maritime boundary

dispute in 2010 and how that could be applied to the case in the Beaufort Sea .85 Despite these recent

developments, the Beaufort Sea disagreement still lingers in relative obscurity both in the U.S. and

Canada.

The North West Passage is firmly situated high on the Canadian political agenda. The Arctic

in general and the The North West Passage in particular is in Canada closely associated with

Canadian history and national identity. To play on these nationalistic sentiments in a domestic

setting, like when Conservative MP Daryl Kramp put in a bid to rename the waterway into “the

Canadian Northwest Passage”, risks raising the stakes and has an adverse effect on international

cooperation in the Arctic. According to James Manicom, “Arctic boundary delimitation risks being

caught up in domestic identity politics” and exacerbate tension, as has been the case during similar

disputes in East Asia.86 The signals that the Harper government is sending out domestically will be

interpreted abroad whether they are communicated in an international setting or not. By upping the

ante in on the Arctic in the domestic setting, Canada is reducing the Level II win-set and thus

reducing its room for maneuver in Level I negotiations. The U.S. on the other hand has low

domestic political stakes in the Arctic and interest in the region is still relatively low among the

general public. A complicating factor with the North West Passage is the US' reluctance of making

the strait into a precedent applicable elsewhere in the world. The U.S. Navy emphasizes the

freedom of the seas and argues against accepting the passage as Canadian internal waters as this

84 The Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation and The Canada Center for Global Security Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs, Rethinking the top of the world: Arctic security public opinion survey, Jan. 2011. <http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/files/downloads/FINAL%20Survey%20Report.pdf> p. 40.

85 'Obama and Stoltenberg discussed the High North', Barents Observer, 21 Oct. 2011, <http://www.barentsobserver.com/obama-and-stoltenberg-discussed-the-high-north.4975336.html>

86 Manicom, J., 'Maritime Boundary Disputes in East Asia: Lessons for the Arctic', International Studies Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 3 (August 2011), pp. 355, 377

27

might influence development concerning other straits, such as the strategically important Strait of

Hormuz. The U.S. Navy thus has a narrower win-set than other U.S. Level II actors which would

reduce room for maneuver in Level I negotiations. Today the two countries “agree to disagree”,

which essentially is the equivalent of a no-agreement. A no-agreement on the North West Passage

has proven quite beneficial for both sides, but as the ice melts and opportunity for traffic rises, so

does the cost of a no-agreement and more calls for some sort of agreement are likely to be voiced.

The interest in the Norway/Russia compromised settlement might be a testament to the

Obama administration's openness to a pragmatic solution to the dispute in Beaufort Sea. The US'

bargaining position when it comes to maritime boundaries is also considerably weakened by the

non-ratification of UNCLOS which places the country at the sidelines of the maritime legal

framework. According to Canadian expert Michael Byers, Canada's best bet to get a U.S.

recognition of the North North West Passage as Canadian internal waters is to play on the the

passage's unique conditions, such as the length of the passage, how difficult it is to traverse it and

the near absence of historical traffic in order to avoid setting an international precedent

V. Conclusions

With the increased global attention given to the Arctic region due to the changing climate, the

governments of the U.S. and Canada have both pushed the Arctic further up on the political agenda.

In Canada this shift was clear when Stephen Harper took office in 2006 and declared the Arctic as a

national priority. In the U.S., the shift has been more subtle, starting with the NSPD66/HSPD25

issued during the last days of the Bush Administration and continued and reinforced by an Obama

administration increasingly attentive to Arctic issues.

In Canada, Harper has placed his focus on Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and has

proposed military solutions as a part of the answer to the upcoming challenges in the region. The

Arctic is a highly politicized issue in Canada closely tied to national identity. Even though the

majority of the Canadian population lives close to the southern border to the U.S. and will not

likely travel “north of 60” during their lifetime, the Canadian North remains a source of national

pride and not least a distinguishing feature setting Canada apart from the rest of North America.

Pressing “the Arctic button” has been viewed as a way of creating a “rally round the flag-effect” in

an otherwise internationalist society. Harper has been accused of playing the Arctic card to gain

political support rather than actually addressing real challenges in the region which are more often

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social and environmental than military. Several leaked cables from the U.S. embassy in Ottawa

seem to confirm that Harper's tough talk on Arctic sovereignty is aimed primarily at a domestic

audience, rather than reflecting substantive foreign policy concerns. Decreased funding for

environmental research and the withdrawal from the Kyoto process together with increased military

spending and a tough attitude to observers and outsiders in the Arctic Council and other

international fora suggests a shift in priorities for Canada. Tying the Arctic so closely to Canadian

national identity also gives the Arctic issue a degree of indivisibility, which reduces Canadian room

for maneuver in international negotiations. Tying the north to identity politics may win support for

the government in power, but not necessarily lead to the best solutions for the region. Canadian

officials also need to be mindful about how tough talk will be interpreted abroad. While US analysts

may recognize that the tough talk is directed at a domestic audience, others might find a cause for

concern.

In the contiguous U.S. there is no sense of an Arctic identity and traditionally the region has

mostly been the concern of the state of Alaska. As the ice melts however, the Arctic has become

more prominent on the federal government's radar, but the changes in the region are still not

something that occupies the mind of the general public in the U.S. outside of Alaska. Although

national security is named as a top priority in the 2009 presidential directive, it is clear that the U.S.

government is not anticipating any military confrontations in its Arctic areas in either the short or

medium term. Nor are disagreements with Canada over the Beaufort Sea and the North West

Passage a matter of great concern in Washington. The main driver for the increased attention is

rather the prospects of economic opportunity in the region. The Obama administration has a

pronounced interest in increasing the domestic production of energy and drilling offshore off the

north slope of Alaska is seen as a way of enhancing the US' energy security. The U.S. Government

has made an effort to streamline the applications process for exploratory drilling and the first

drillings are expected in the summer of 2012. The fact that the Arctic is such a peripheral issue in

the U.S. gives the government some autonomy to act in the region. Subsequently however, action

offers few political rewards, which makes the government reluctant to invest political capital.

Looking at the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy and the North

American Arctic in this paper, three issues were identified as interesting for further research. First of

all, domestic politics prevents the U.S. from signing UNCLOS, which limits the country's ability to

operate effectively in the Arctic. Secondly, Harper's tough language reduces the number of

acceptable outcomes in future negotiations on maritime delimitation in the Arctic. On the other

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hand it may strengthen Canada's bargaining position. While the U.S. disinterest in the region

suggests larger room for maneuver in negotiations, the Department of Defence will never accept a

precedent harmful to U.S. interests being established based on the North West Passage. Lastly, in

framing the Arctic in terms of national security and sovereignty, the ability to cooperate with Arctic

outsiders is reduced. Canada is thus less interested in bringing non-Arctic actors into the

circumpolar cooperation than the United States.

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