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“OnPossibilityofDis/AbilityinHusserl’sPhenomenology”

ShinjiHAMAUZU(Osaka University, Clinical Philosophy)

PEACEVIIConference“PhenomenologyofDis/Ability”16-18.DecemberTokyoUniversityKomaba Campus

Contents

Introduction1.“Ilive”2.“Actualityandpotentiality”3.“Mylivebody”4.“Ican”5.“Capability”6.“Normalityandabnormality”Colosing words:Intersubjectivity ofdis/ability

Introduction

• InthistalkIshallexaminehowfarwecandevelopthephenomenologyofDis/AbilitybasedonHusserl’sphenomenology.IintendtoneitherstayrigidlywithintheframeworkofHusserl’sphenomenology,norgofarbeyondit.I’llexaminecarefullythepossibilityofHusserl’sphenomenologyontheproblemofdis/ability.

1.“Ilive”

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• Inhis“FundamentalPhenomenologicalOutlook”ofIdeasVol.1(1912)Husserldescribedhisideaof“naturalstandpoint”byusingCartesianword“cogito”,butheimmediatelyparaphraseditwith“thefundamentalformofall‘wakeful(actual)’living”(III,59)and,insteadof“egosum,egocogito”hewrote“Iam,thislifeis,Ilive:cogito”(III,97)andcalledit“theflawinglife”(ibid.).

• Whatis“living”and“life”inthiscontext?Usuallywewouldanswer,livingmeansbreathing,eating,drinking,discharging,sitting,walking,etc.Theseactionsarerelatedtophysicalsidesoflivingandcan’thappenwithoutmybody.Livingmeansfurtherfeeling,willing,thinking,remembering,expecting,etc.Theseactionsarerelatedtomentalsidesofliving.Wewouldalsosaythatlivingmeanstalkingtoothers,listeningtoothers,discussingwithothers,playingsomethingwithothers,etc.Theseactionshaveaphysicalandmentalrelationshiptoothers.

• Generallyspeaking,whereasbodilyactionsareperformedinthespaceandthetime,mentalactionsareperformedmainlyonlyintime,butsometimesinspaceaswell.Lifehasnotonlyspatialaspectsintheexpanse,butalsotemporalaspectsintheflawing.ThereforeHusserlunderstoodtheterm“cogito”inawidersensethanDescartes,andHusserldidn’tdrawoutthebody-minddualismfrom“cogito”byseeingonlythementalaspectin“cogito”,butgraspedbothaspectsoflifeinit.Whenhetalkedabout“intentionality”asafundamentalideaofphenomenology,heusedoftentheword“consciousness”,e.g.“Weunderstandunderintentionalitythepeculiarityoflivedexperience(Erlebnis)tobe‘consciousnessofsomething’”(III,188).Howeverlater,e.g.inhismanuscriptforToThePhenomenologyofIntersubjectivity (1920,XIII,71etpassim)orinhislectureTheFirstPhilosophy(1923,VIII,120etpassim),heparaphraseditwiththecoinage“consciousness-life”(Bewußtseinsleben).Thushehadatendencytousetheword“life”or“living”insteadof“thinking”for“cogito”.

2.“Actualityandpotentiality”

• I’vejustmentionedHusserl’susageofwords“all‘wakeful(actual)’living”insteadof“cogito”.Whatdoesitmean?Hethoughtthat“cogito”inanarrowsenseisperformedin“actuality”,but“cogito”inawidersenseincludes“inactuality (potentiality)”aswell.Hewrote:“Cogito”means“‘Ihaveaconsciousnessofsomething,Iperformanactofconsciousness.’InordertokeepthisfixedconceptwereservetheCartesianexpressionofcogito.”(III,73)Cogitoinanarrowsensemeansforhimonlysuchaperformative actinactuality,butdoesn’tcoveralllivedexperienceorconsciousness-lifeinactualityaswellaspotentiality.So,hewrote:“Ifanintentionallivedexperience(Erlebnis)isactual,thesubjectinitisdirectedtotheintentionalobject.Animmanent‘lookingat’belongstocogitoitself.”(ibid.)Butimmediatelyheadded:“Theactuallivedexperiencesaresurroundedbya‘garden(Hof)’ofinactual livedexperiences.Thestreamoflivedexperiencescan’tcomposedonlyofactuality.”(ibid.)

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• Inthiscontextheintroducedtheimportantwordssuchas“garden”,“background”and“horizon”.Hewrote:“Theactuallyperceived,themoreorlessclearpresenttogetherispartlyacceptedandpartlysurroundedbyadarklybeingconscioushorizonofundefinedreality.…Theundefinedsurroundingsareinfinite.Thereisnecessarilyahazyandneverfullydefinedhorizon.”(III,57)Or,inotherwordsincludinganexample:“Thegraspingisagraspingout,eachperceivedthinghasabackgroundofexperience.Aroundthepapertherearebooks,pencils,inkpot,etc.inacertainsenseof‘perceived’thereinthefieldofintuitions.…Everyperceptionofthinghasagardenofinstitutionofbackground.Thisisa‘consciousness-lived-experience(Bewußtseinslebnis)’,orinaword‘consciousness’aswell.”(III,71)Thefundamentalconceptofintentionalityisnowunderstoodinawidersense,andsuchunderstandingincludestheconceptsofactualityandpotentionality.ThereforeHusserlwrote:“Eveniftheintentionalityisnot‘performed’inthespecialmodalityofactuality,itcanbealready‘stirred’inthe‘background’withoutbeingperformed.”(III,189)

• Howistheperceptionof“background”or“horizont”inpotentialitypossible?Takethisexample,thereisahouseinfrontofme.IamlookingatthefrontofthehouseandfromhereIcanseeneitherthesidenorthebackofit.ButifIcangoaround,Icanseeboth.EvenifIviewitfromhere,Icanimagineitandseethehousealreadywithbackgroundofthesideandtheback.Howisthispossible?Thisquestionbringsustotheproblemof“mylivedbody(mein Leib)”inHusserl’sphenomenology.AlreadyinhislectureThingandSpace (1905),sevenyearsearlierthanIdeasVol.1 (1912),Hementionedtheideaof“Iaslivedbody(Ichleib)”(XVI,10,etpassim).Therearetworelevantandimportantpointswhichhedevelopedinthislecture:Ontheonehand:“Perceptionofthingsisperceptionofwhatisgraspedoutfromthebackground.”ThisisthepointIhavejustmentionedinIdeasVol.1.Ontheotherhand:“Perceptionhasarelationshiptomylivedbody(Ichleib).”(XVI,10)

• RegardingthefirstpointIwouldlikeaddsomepassagesfromthislectureasfollows:“Thethinghasmorethantheperceivedorappearingfrontsideinthesenseofperception.…Originalappearanceandunoriginalappearancearenotseparated,butunitedintheappearanceinthewidersense.”(XVI,50)“Totheappearanceitbelongsthatthevisiblepointsouttheinvisible.”(XVI,245)“ThethingsareseenandwiththeseenthingstheBetween(Zwischen)isgrasped.…Thespaceisthereforeratherseentogether.”(XVI,261f.)ButnowIwouldliketogoontothesecondpoint.

3.“Mylivedbody(Ichleib)”

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• Inthislecture ThingandSpace,Husserldevelopedtheideaof“mylivedbody”asfollows:“Aperceivedthingisnotaloneforitself,butstandsbeforeeyesmidstacertainintuitivecircumstanceofthings.Forinstancethelampstandsonthetablemidstbooks,papersandotherthings.Thephysicalcircumstancesissimilarlyperceived.…Mylivedbody(Ichleib)belongstothesethingswhichareperceivedtogether.”(XVI,80)Everythingaroundmeisrelatetomybody.“It[Thelivedbody]standsthereasthealwaysstayingpointofrelationship.…Itdefinesrightandleft,frontandback,aboveandbelow.Ittakesaspecialpositionintheperceivedworldofthings.”(ibid.)

• Heemphasizedthepeculiarityofmylivedbodyamongotherthingsaroundme.“Ontheonehandthelivedbodyisathingaswell,aphysicalthingasotherthings.…Itisathingmidstotherthings.Ontheotherthisthingisjustlivedbody,bearerofI.…Theconstitutionofphysicalthingsisintertwinedwiththeconstitutionofmylivedbody(Ichleib)inastrangecorrelation.”(XVI,162)Becausemylivedbodytakesaspecialpositionandislocatedinaspecialplace(here),athinglyingfarawaycanbeseenonlyasasmallthinginadistanceandonlyinoneside.IfIcanapproachtoitandgoaroundit,Iamabletoseeitindetailsandwithmultiplesides,andinsomecaselookintoit,touchitandanalyse it,andthenIseewhatthethingoriginallyis.(cf.XVI,115f.)

• Inordertoseeathingindetails,“thethingmustbeturnedorpushed,orImustmoveme,myeyes,mylivedbody,goaroundit,approachitandgooff.”(XVI,155)Mylivedbodyisnotasimplethingamongotherthings,butisan“organ”withwhichIcansee,hear,feel,smell,goandmove.Itisanorganofmyperception.“Theeyescanmove,thehead,theupperbody,etc,aswell.…Importantisthe“movingitself”,whichisexpressedinthekinesthetical senses.”(XVI,158)Theterm“kinesthese”wasalsoanimportantcoinagecomposedof“kinesis(movement)”and“aesthesis(sense)”whichHusserlborrowedfromthecontemporarypsychologyandchangeditintoaphenomenologicalconcept.Thatis,sotospeak,nosensesIfeelatthings,butsensesIfeelwithmymovingmyownlivedbody.

• Hewrote:“Thetouchinghand‘seems’ashavingsenseoftouch.Directedtothetouchedobjectsmoothnessorroughnessseemsasbelongingtoit.Ilookafterthetouchinghand,ithasthesenseofsmoothnessofroughness,andithasthemattheappearingfingertips.… IfItouchtherighthandwiththelefthand,theappearanceoftheleftandrighthandconstitutesitselfalternatelywithsensesoftouchandkinesthese,theonemovingonanother.”(XVI,162)Hecontinued:“Hereisimportantthattheconstitutionofphysicalthingsisintertwinedwiththeconstutution ofmylivedbody(Ichleib)inthestrangeway.”(XVI,ibid.)

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• Husserldevelopedtheideaof“livedbody“furtherabouttenyearslaterinthemanuscriptofIdeasVol.2. “Thelivedbody(Leib)isthemediumofallperceptionsandtheorganofperception.Itisnecessarilypresentinallperceptions.Theeyeisdirectedtotheseenintheseeingandrunsoverthecorner,theareaetc.Thehandslidesovertheobjectbytasting.Iapproachtheearbymovinginordertolistento.”(IV,56)Thelivedbodyisnodeadbodyorthing,butthelivingbodywhichisfunctioninginthecenterofmyperception.“Thelivedbodybecomesthebearerofthepointoforientation,thezeropoint,andofhereandnow,fromwhichthepureIgetsintuitionsofthespaceandthewholeworldofsense.Thereforeeachappearingthinghasinitselfarelationoforientationtothelivedbody,andnotonlythereallyappearingthingbutalsoeachthingwhichcanappear.”(ibid.)“Ihaveallthingsoppositely,theyare‘there’- withasoleexceptionofthelivedbodywhichisalways‘here’.”(IV,159)

• Becausemylivedbodystaysinthecenterofmyperception,evenifImovewithit.“WhereasIhaveagainsteveryotherthingsthefreedomtochangemystandpointtothemvoluntarily,Ihavenopossibilitytoremovemefrommylivedbody.Therefore,thevarietyofpossibilitiesastohowthelivedbodymayappearislimited.Icanseeonlythecertainpartsofthebodyinaspecialshorteningofperspectiveandtheotherparts(i.g.thehead)areunseenatallforme.Thesamebodywhichservesmeasmediumofallperceptionsstandsmeonmywayofperceptionandisastrangelyinperfectly constitutedthing.”(IV,159)

• InthiscontextweencounterthefamouspassagebecauseMerleau-Ponty whoreadHusserl’smanuscriptofIdeasVol.2 attheHusserlArchiveinLeuvan quotedinhisPhenomenologyofPerception asfollows:“Ihaveappearanceoftouchbytouchingthelefthand.NamelyIdon’tonlyfeel,butperceiveandhaveappearanceofasoftandsuchandsuchformedsmoothhand.…Butbytouchingthelefthand,Ifindthereaseriesofsensesoftouchwhicharelocalizedthere.…IfIspeakofphysicalthing‘lefthand‘,Iignorethesesenses.…IfIaddthemtoit,thephysicalthingdoesn’tgetrich,butitbecomeslivedbody,itsenses.”(IV,145)Livedbodyislivingbodywhichsensesandmoves,andwithwhichIcansenseandmove.

4.“Ican ”

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• Inconnectionwiththeideaof“livedbody(Leib)”,Husserloftenusedalso“Ican(Ich kann)”.E.g.inIdeasVol.2:“Thesubjecthas“ability”(Ican)tomovethelivedbodyfreelyandtoperceivetheouterworldthroughit.”(IV,152)Intheparagraph59titledwith“TheIassubjectofability(Vermögen)”,Husserlwrote:“TheIasunityisasystemof‘Ican’.Thereitistodistinguishbetweenthephysicalandthephysicalmediated‘Ican’andthemental‘Ican’.Ihaveanabilityonmybody,amtheonewhomovesandcanmovethishand.Icanplaypiano.”(IV,253f.)Nevertheless,itdoesn’tmeanthatIcandoitalways,butsometimesIcan’tdoit.Hecontinued:“Butitdoesn’tworkalways.Iforgotplayingitagainandamoutofpractice.Ilearnmybody.…ButifIamillforlongtime,Imustlearngoingandcomeintoitsoon.ButifIammentallyill,Ilostcontrolofpartsofmybody.‘Ican’t’.InthissenseIbecameanother.”(ibid.)

• InthiscontextHusserldiscussedmanyissuesregarding“ability”alsoinrelationshiptoactualityandpotentiality,asfollows:“ThementalIcanbegraspedasanorganismofability(Vermögen)withit’sdevelopmentinanormaltypicalstyle,namelywithstepsofchildren,youth,ripenessandelderly.Thesubject‘can’bevariousandisdefinedaccordingtoit’sabilitythroughstimulusandactualmotivetodo.Itisalwaysactiveaccordingtoit’sabilityandchanges,getsrich,strongorweakalwaysthroughit’sdoing.Theabilityisnoempty‘can’,butapositivepotentialitywhichcomesintoactualityandisalwaysreadytogotoactivity.”(IV,254f.)IamnotalwaysabletodosomethingandIchangefrompotentialitytoactualityandvisaversa,andchangefrominabilitytoabilityvisaversa.

• Husserlcontinued:“Atlasteverythingissentbacktoprimaryability(Urvermögen)ofsubjectandthentoacquiredability,sprungfromtheearlieractualityoflife.ThepersonalIconstitutesitselfintheoriginalgenesisnotonlyasimpulsivelydefinedpersonality,fromthebeginningandalwaysimpulsed byoriginal‘instincts’andfollowingthem,butalsoashigher,autonomous,freeactive,especiallyleadbymotiveofreason.”(IV,255)Heinitiatedtheideaofgeneticphenomenologywhichwasdevelopedlater.

• Husserlcharacterized“able/capable”asapracticalpossibilityandsaid:“WhatIcan,amableto,amcapablefor,whatstandsformeconsciously,isapracticalpossibility.”(IV,258)Thenhecontinued:“Intheexperiencethe‘Ican”and“Ican’t”aredistinguishedaccordingtoit’sphenomenologicalcharacter.Thereisanactionwithoutoppositionoraconsciousnessofabilitywithoutopposition,andanactionwithovercomingofopposition.…Thereisadegreeofoppositionandpowerofovercoming.Theoppositioncanbeirresistible.Thenwearepushedto‘itdoesn’twork’,‘Ican’t’,‘Idon’thavethepower’”.(IV,258f.)Husserlmentionedhereourtoday’sthemeof“abilityanddisability”whichIhaveaccordingtothesituation.

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5.“Capability”(Vermöglichkeit)

• InthiscontextHusserldiscussed“can”and“ability”invariouspassages,e.g.:“Allmy‘can’(Können)inthephysicalsphereismediatedbymy‘bodilyactivity(Leibesbetätigung)’andbymyphysical‘can’(leibliches Können)andability(Vermögen).ThroughexperienceIknowthatpartsofmylivedbodymoveintheoriginalwaywhichisdistinguishedfromallotherthingsandmovementsofthings,namelyinthecharacterofsubjectivemovement,‘Imove’(Ich bewege).”(IV,259)

• However,I’mnotalwaysabletodosomething,orsometimesamunableordisabletodoacertainthing,e.g.asfollows:“Myhandfallsasleep.— nowIcan’tmoveit,itisbenumbedtemporarily.Iexperiencethesameintheareaofouter‘following’ofbodilymovement.Thehandputsasidesomethingthatstandsontheway,‘itworks’.Sometimesitworks‘withdifficulty’,‘withlessdifficulty’,‘withoutresistance”anditdoesn’tworksometimes.Theoppositionisunovercominginspite ofallendeavours.”(ibid.)Thenheconcludedasfollows:“Itisofimportancetobringoutthecontrastbetweenthepossibilityinthesenseofmere‘logical’possibilityandthepracticalpossibilityof‘can’(Können)withexamples.”(IV,261)

• Husserltalkedlater,e.g.inTheCrisisofEuropeanSciences(1938)(VI,164etpassim),aboutthispracticalpossibilityofthe“can”orpossibilitybasedonabilitywithhiscoinage“Vermöglichkeit”.Thisisacompoundwordcomposedof“beableto(Vermögen)and possiblity(Möglichkeit)andIwouldliketotranslateitwiththeEnglishword“capability”.IfIcanmakeabridgebetweentheideaofthe“livedbody”,“horizon”,“potentiality”and“capability”,Iwouldsay,inactuality ofhorizonmeanspotentialityandpossibility,e.g.“Icangofurther”.Itisnoemptylogicalpossibility,butthe“capability”(Vermöglichkeit)motivatedby“Icango”withmykinestheticlivedbody.Thehorizonisthusa“playingspace”(Spielraum)ofthepossibleandphysicalexperience.Ithasarelationshipto“mylivedbody(Ichleib)”asthe“zeropoint”oforientationandperspective.AlthoughIborrowedthiswordfromMarthaNussbaum,Idon’thaveenoughtimetoelucidatetherelationshipandthegapbetweenHusserl’s“Vermöglichkeit”andNussbaum’s“capability”.NeverthelessIwouldliketomentionitshortlyagainattheclosingwordofthistalk.

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• Itmeans,however,thatthehorizonisnotonlyopenedbycapability,butalsoislimitedbyordependsonmycapabilityofe.g.“Icango”.IfIcouldaddtheabovementionedgeneticphenomenologytothispoint,Iwouldsaythatthishorizonhasdiversityaccordingtothestepsofmydevelopmentfromchildhood,youthtoelderlyandmyconditionsashealthy,sick,fatigue,awakeorasleep.Andeachofushumanbeingshasadifferentabilityordisability,adifferentwayofgoing,seeing,hearingandsmelling.Weallhavedifferenthorizons,andhowtheydifferdependsonourowndis/ability.

6.“Normalityandabnormality”

• InthiscontextHusserlsometimesmentionedthedichotomyofthe“normal/abnormal”,and“normalityandabnormality”whichheusedinhisposthumousmanuscriptsToPhenomenologyofIntersubjectivity (XIII-XV).Weshouldexaminethisdichotomycarefully,becauseheintroduceditinordernottodiscriminate,buttodevelophisgeneticphenomenology.Hewrote:“Abnormalityisamodificationofnormality,standsoutfromit,andcomestoit.…Eachsubjecthashisnormalitywithinwhichabnormalityemergesasacertainstyleofdisturbing”(XV,154)Hecontinued:“Normalityhasvariousformsandstepswhichbelongtotheconstitutionofhumanbeingswhereheorshe‘becomes”him- orherselfandfromchildtonormalripemanorwoman.”(ibid.)“Child”couldbecharacterizedasabnormalonlyincontrasttoripenormaladult.Abnormalityisarelativeconceptwhichcanbedefinedincontrasttonormality.

• Abnormalityaswellasnormalityhasvarioussteps.Husserlwrote:“Thestepsofnormalityandabnormalitycorrespondtothestepsofconstitutionofbeings.Theworldconstitutedinthenormalityisconstitutedasworldincludingtheabnormality.…Eachnormalsubjecthasoccasionallyabnormaldeviationsfromhisnormalexperience.”(XV,155)AsexamplesofabnormalityHusserlsometimesusestheterms“children”,“crazy”,“disease”,“sleep”,“lossofconsciousness”and“animals”.Heintroducedtheseexamplesnotinthesenseofdiscrimination,assomethingapartfromnormality,butasvarious“modifications”,“steps”,“changes”ofnormality.Weourselvescouldbedevelopedfromsuchabnormalityandcouldfallintosuchabnormality.

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• Thereforeheintroducedthegeneticmethodwhichhecalled“Abbau”(XV,133)andcouldbetranslatedwiththeEnglishword“deconstruction”.Accordingtothismethod,byimaginingastepwheresomedimensionofnormalconstitutionofworldlacks,wecanimaginetheworldofabovementionedabnormalitysuchas“crazy”,“disease”,“sleep”,“lossofconsciousness”,etc.Thisissotospeakamethodtounderstandtheabnormalityasamodificationofnormality.Husserlunderstoodthedichotomyofnormalityandabnormalityratherinrelativity.Hewrote:“Abnormalpeopleareonlyabnormalregardingtoadefinitelayerofcharacteristicsofnormalcommonworld,whereastheyhaveexperienceotherwiseintotalharmonywithnormalpeopleandarenormalinotherpoints.”(XV,158)

• Wecouldunderstandthisrelativityofnormalityandabnormalityfromthepointofviewofabilityanddisability.Normalityischaracterizedbyabilitybywhichsomeoneisabletodosomethingasnormalpeople,whereasabnormalityischaracterizedbydisabilitybywhichsomeoneisdisabled,andthatdisabilitypreventsthemfromdoingsomethingasnormalpeople.IfIfallinthesituationofabnormality,I’mnotabletodowhatIwasabletodoinmynormality.Husserlwroteinatext:“Ibecomesomehowsick.FromtheinnersideIhavealivedexperienceasabnormal.BecauseofcontinuingofbadfeelingsIgetconsciousnessofweaknesssuchasdisabilityformovinginanormalway,performingmyfamiliarabilityandgatheringmythoughts.Ifeelthedisappearanceofmyconsciousness.”(XLII,2)InmyabnormalsituationofsicknessIlostmyabilityIhaveinnormalsituation.Assaid,myabilitycouldopenmyhorizonand“life-world”as“horizonofhorizon”,whereasmylostofabilitynamelymydisabilitycouldlimitmy“life-world”.Theextentofmy“life-world”dependsonmyabilityanddisability. )

• AsotherexamplesfornormalityandabnormalityHusserlintroduced“adult”and“children”.Thisshouldbeunderstoodintermsofdevelopmentandthegeneticphenomenology.Geneticphenomenologyshouldcovernotonlyissuesofdevelopmentandgenesis,i.e.howwegetabilityandnormality,butalsoissuesofageingandlosingthem,i.e.howweloseabilityandnormalityandfallintodisabilityandabnormality.Andwhatisinterestingformeisthatheintroducedtheissuesof“birthanddeath”(XV,138etpassim)inthiscontext,namelyasanextremepoleofabnormality.Hecharacterizedbothextremecasesas“problemsofborder”(cf.XLII)withwhichthephenomenologicalmethodcan’tcopewell.Heaskedhimself:“Nowitisimportanttosetworld,birthanddeathseriouslyintheessentialrelationshipandtoshowhowfartheyarenotonlyafactandhowfaraworldandhumanswithoutdeathisunthinkable.”(XV,172)Imyselfamalsointerestedintheissuesof“ageing”becauseHusserlwrote:“AlsoImyselfwilldie-- likeIwasonceborn,developedintoadulthoodandgotold.Butthequestionis,whatthismeans.”(XXIX,332)Howeverthesethemeswouldgobeyondtoday’sthemeandshouldbediscussedinanotherchance.

Closingwords:Intersubjectivity ofdis/ability

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• InendingthistalkIwouldliketomentionthethemeofintersubjectivity ofdis/abilityinHusserl’sphenomenology.Assaidpreviously,hediscussednormalityandabnormalityinrelativity,namelywecantalkaboutnormalandabnormalonlyinrelationshiptoeachother.Thenweshoulddiscussthecontrastbetweenabilityanddisabilityinrelationshiptoeachotheraswell.Dis/abilityisnotacharacteristicwhichindividualspossessbyhim- orherselfwithoutanyrelationshiptoeachother.I’vetriedtotranslateHusserl’scoinage“Vermöglichkeit“,i.e.possibilitiesbased onability with“capability”whichIborrowedfromtheAmericanphilosopherMarthaCravenNussbaum.Alsothisconceptshouldbeunderstandnotassomethingbelongingtoindividuals,butsomethingcharacteristicofrelationshipsorcircumstanceswhereindividualsareliving.Althoughwecan’tfindinmyopinionsomuchpassagesleadingtothisthoughtinHusserl’stext,itisimportantandremarkablethathediscussedissuesofdis/ablity inthecontextofphenomenologyofintersubjectivity.

Thankyouforyourattention!