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Schopenhauer as MoralPhilosopher —Towards the

Actuality of his Ethics

David E.Cartwright (Whitewater, USA)

Iam greatly honored to be given the opportunity to address this congressassembled to note the bicentennial of Arthur Schopenhauer's birth.IviewScho-penhauer as one of myconstant teachers since Ihave gained a number ofinsightsfrom his philosophy and Ianticipate gleaning future visions. Thus Schopenhauerhas played, and continues toplay, a vital role inmyphilosophic education. Per-haps one dayIwillbecome wise. Ifthis were tobe the case, again, itwould furtherincrease my debt to Schopenhauer. Isay increase my debt since Ican assure younow that Ialready stand in this debt. And as there is a particular satisfaction inpublicly recognizing such an intellectual debt, Iam pleased to acknowledge mydebt to Schopenhauer. Homage to a benefactor, however, is also dangerous sinceitserves to increase one's sense of debt when one becomes aware of the need torecognize itin the firstplace. Thus Iaddress this congress witha double sense ofmy debt to Schopenhauer. Iwonder with which sort of coin does one repay suchdebts? Certainly repayment must be made withcoin the creditor would value. SoIwilltry to repay some of my tremendous debt to Schopenhauer withcoin hewould value.Iwillattempt to do thisby being honest about his philosophy. Iwilltry to tell the truth.

I

The aim ofmytalkis twofold.Iwant to argue that Schopenhauer was firstandforemost a moral philosopher. Byarguing thisIdo not wish to simply claim thathis ethics is the most significant aspect of his philosophy, although Ido believethat this is the case. Rather, Iwillargue that to understand Schopenhauer as aphilosopher one must realize that the defining drives of his willtophilosophizewere moral and that these moral concerns permeate most levels of his theorizing.Ifthis is the case, toproperly appreciate Schopenhauer's philosophy we must putitina context, a moral context.Ialso willdevelop that element of his moral phi-losophy which accounts for its actuality —

its meaning forus today.Iwant,how-ever, to state this ina properly Schopenhauerian spirit. That is,Iwillnot empha-size or highlight the particular, isolated, or accidental correspondence betweenour current problems and elements of his moral philosophy. Iwish to isolate theuniversal and always applicable dimensions ofhis moral philosophy, that whichapplies today because itapplies to all ages.Iknow that mycontention that Schopenhauer was firstand foremost a moral

philosopher is controversial. Insome of the better known English commentariesonhis philosophy just the opposite is sometimes suggested. For example, Frede-ric Copleston claimed that Schopenhauer's world had "no moral significance atall,"and Patrick Gardiner wrote that Schopenhauer should not be "...accused ofneglecting the claims of moral thought and conduct...," as if a careful readermight mount such an accusation. 1 J also realize that in the past as well as in thepresent his metaphysics and aesthetics seem to speak inmore lively terms to the

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artist, writer,philosopher, and the learned than the ethical dimensions ofhis phi-losophy. Morever, after the publication of Parerga und Paralipomena, whenSchopenhauer enjoyed some of the recognition which he so desperately desired,his fame was for his "worldly wisdom," something he viewed as of secondaryvalue compared to the unconditional value found inphilosophy proper, truth.Withhispopularity, however, we also find that beginning ofthe culturalpicture ofSchopenhauer as the nihilistic pessimist, the misanthropist and misogynist,atheist, the brooding and cantankerous philosopher of the dark and irrationalwill.Now the veryimage of Schopenhauer as philosopher arises in the popularmind as the antithesis to any moral theorist. Ifhe is imagined as proclaiming anymoral values, he is viewed as expressing negative values

— hopelessness, failure,pessimism, bitterness, and irrationality. Thus Schopenhauer stands outside theseamless mainstream of Western moral thought. A thinker not simply against thetide,but outside the tide of popular and academic tradition. In the United States,if we even bother to include Schopenhauer in our anthologies on ethics, he ap-pears as an oddity, a nineteenth century misfit not worthy of serious philosoph-ical consideration, wedged uncomfortably between Hegel and Mill.And so Scho-penhauer stands, ignored; a curiosity at best, a philosophical rogue at worst.

Recognizing the moral and humanistic bases that define Schopenhauer's philoso-phical project should help defuse such unfair attitudes towards his philosophy.

Schopenhauer's basic stance as a moral philosopher is pronounced innume-rous dimensions of his writings. Even the most elementary details suggest hismoral posture. The fourth book of The World as Willand Representation, whichhe called the "ethical book [ethisches Buch]" (W1,272/11, 320),2 is the longest —as is its supplementary set of essays in the second volume. His writings on ethicsare augmented by the two essays which compose Die beiden Grundprobleme derEthik, chapters 8 and 9 of the second volume of Parerga und Paralipomena, andthe penultimate chapter of Ueber den Willen inder Natur, "Hinweisung auf dieEthik".The core of the writingshe defined as ethical surpassed insheer number ofpages those devoted separately to epistemology, metaphysics, and aesthetics. Theproportion of his writings on ethics increases substantially if we take seriously,which weshould, claims advanced later inhis philosophical career, i.c., hisphilo-sophy leads to a "higher metaphysical ethical standpoint" (P I,313/V,333) andthat he "...had a greater right than Spinoza to call my metaphysics 'ethics."(WN, 141) This "right" is based, he tells us, on the fact that his metaphysics isitselfprimarily ethical and is "...constructed out of the material ofethics [aus demStoffe der Ethik ... konstruirt ist]." (WN,141) Schopenhauer's basic idea here isthat the willis the proper object of moral evaluation and since the world is essen-tially will,the world itself is subject to moral evaluation. This synthesis of hismetaphysics and ethics not onlysubstantially and dramatically expands the lengthof his writings onethical themes, this synthesis allows him toavoid what he calledthe fundamental errorof any philosophical system, "... the greatest and most per-nicious, the real perversity of the mind," the belief "... that the world has onlyaphysical and not a moral significance [moralische Bedeutung]." (P II,201/VI,214)His metaphysical-ethical standpoint allows hirn to claim that he had demonstra-ted that "... the supreme point at which the meaning of existence generally arrivesis undoubtedly ethical." (B,200/ IV,261) Thus he avoided the pernicious beliefthat the world has no moral significance.

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As the core of writings Schopenhauer regarded as ethical shows, he had abroader conception of moral philosophy than that which functions inthe Anglo-American, analytical tradition. Whereas we tend to view his essays On the Free-dom of the Willand On the Basis ofMorality as discussing traditional topics inethics, e.g., freedom and determinism, moral responsibility, metaethics, the vir-tues, the foundation of morality, philosophy of right, Schopenhauer referred tothese essays as dealing with"morality in the narrower sense," (WII,589/111, 676)thereby indicating that he employed a broader conception of ethics, one whichincludes discussions of eternal justice, thanatology, the metaphysics of sexuallove,asceticism and salvation. 3 Schopenhauers broader conception of moral phi-losophy deals with any phenomenon that expresses either the affirmation ordenial of the willat the most basic existential level. He also attributed the utmostimportance tomoral investigation, calling them the "most serious", (W1, 271/11,319) and telling us that they are "...uncomparably more important than physical,and ingeneral all others." (WII,589/111, 676) The same importance and priorityof ethics is also mirrored inhis discussion of human accomplishment. Schopen-hauer, who cannot be accused of ignoring the importance of the artist, philoso-pher, and genius, ranked moral accomplishment higher than allothers. So he toldus that "moral excellence stands higher than all theoretical wisdom ... Whoever ismorally noble reveals by his actions the deepest knowledge, the highest wisdom,however he may be lacking inintellectual excellence;" (B,210/IV,270) "What arewit and genius in comparison with this [goodness of heart]? What is Bacon?"(W \u03a0, 232/\u0399\u0399\u0399, 262)

That Schopenhauer regarded moral investigation so seriously and valuedmoral accomplishment so highly should come as no surprise. Nor should his de-velopment of an ethical-metaphysical standpoint be unexpected. Inhis discussionof the human need for metaphysics, Schopenhauer derived the drive to philoso-phize from a type of existential astonishment which springs from the knowledgeof death and suffering. He told us that "...undoubtedly itis the knowledge ofdeath, and therewith the consideration ofthe suffering and misery oflife, that givethe strongest impulse tophilosophical reflection and metaphysical explanationsof the world.

"(WII,161/111, 177)Ifthe drive tophilosophize, to do metaphysics,

two tasks which Schopenhauer conflates, begins with the problems of death andsuffering, these drives are satisfied inhis ethics only after he has elaborated hisepistemology, metaphysics, and aesthetics, withthe latter containing adescriptionof the short-lived release from liferealized through the aesthetic experience, butjudged as onlya propaedeutic to the more serious side ofthings. (W1, 267/11, 316)Schopenhauers metaphysics of the willalso includes a pronouncement of themoral significance of itsphenomenal existence; it is something that ought not be.The süffering of existence sterns from its nature as represented willing,and sincethe world is something itought not be, its inevitable süffering is eternally just.Thus hismetaphysics is to console inan odd sort of way.Wc deserve what wcget.

InSchopenhauer's analysis of the drive to philosophize and the need for me-taphysical comfort we confront his existential autobiography. Schopenhauerwrote that when he was 17 years old, like Buddha, he was seized by the "wretch-edness of life [Jammer des Lebens]," when he observed sickness, oldage, pain, anddeath. 4 These phenomena signified for the young Schopenhauer that whatever isresponsible for this world is a devil.As the great Schopenhauerian scholar Arthur

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Hübscher pointed out, on these youthful broodings "rests the origin of his wholephilosophical approach: at the outset we are confronted with the problem ofethics." 5Although Schopenhauer wrotephilosophy in the grand style where anytopic is a proper subject ofphilosophical investigation, Schopenhauer's style is to

never forget what he perceived as the misery of the human condition, the need tounderstand everything inhuman experience, to explain this,and to seek the mean-ingfor our existence. The meaning of life,he tells us, is "undoubtedly ethical", (B,200/IV,261) and Schopenhauer closes his philosophy by discussing quietism andasceticism, since these themes are "...insubstance identical with that of allmeta-physics and ethics." (WII,615/111, 707)

Schopenhauer's basic stance as a moral philosopher is exhibited inthe extentof his writings on ethical themes, his identification of his philosophy as an ethical-metaphysical position, his analysis of the drive to philosophize, which mirrorsSchopenhauer's youthful ethical motivations to do philosophy, and the foremostimportance he attributed to moral investigations and moral accomplishment.Although the question, "What is a good life?" ultimately employs an oxymoronaccording to his scheme of thinking (wecan imagine himreplying "ironwood" tothe very conception of a "good life"),Schopenhauer's philosophy is a struggle toanswer this question in light of his understanding that "alllifeis suffering" (W I,310/11, 366) and that suffering is evil. The summum bonum of his philosophybecomes the self-effacement of the will,its self-denial (cf. W1,362/11, 428) and theconclusion of his philosophy is designed to communicate the most important ofall truths, "... the need for salvation from an existence given up to suffering anddeath, and its attainability through the denial of the wi11... by a decided opposi-tion tonature." (WII,628/111, 723) Salvation bydenying the will-to-livebecomesthe highest good within his metaphysical-ethical perspective.

II

For a theorist like Nietzsche, Schopenhauer's "most important truth" signi-fies hisnihilism and contempt forhuman existence. 6 Toa philosopher like Lukâcs,itsuggests Schopenhauer's immoralism and a release from "all social obligationand allresponsibility." 7To understand why Schopenhauer is neither a nihilist norimmoralist, we need to reexamine the basic motivation of his philosophy; howSchopenhauer struggled to understand the nature of reality in light of the allpervasive presence of suffering and destruction. The misery of the human condi-tionbecomes the cornerstone of his moral philosophy. Ishould say the misery ofthe sentient condition, really, since Schopenhauer was alive to the suffering ofnon-humans ina way seldom found inphilosophers within the Western philoso-phical tradition. Iemphasize suffering here, even though Schopenhauer oftenprovides equal billing to death

—sometimes he even assigns priority to the pro-

blem ofdeath, e.g.,"Death is the real inspiring genius orMusagetes ofphilosophy,

and for this reason Socrates defined philosophy as \u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c4\u03b7 [preparationfor death]." (W 11, 463/111, 528) His philosophy, however, is ultimately ambiva-lent towards the problem of death. Isay this because the fear of death is exposedas a delusion by Schopenhauer. The truth is that itis best not to be. In otherwords, Schopenhauer's advice to Hamlet would be unequivocal. 8

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YetSchopenhauer would not recommend suicide since itdoes not lead tonotbeing. "Aye,there's the rub." Ifwe fear death because webelieve that death anni-hilates our essential nature, wehave no reason to fear it.Further, ifwe fear deathbecause itdeprives us of something valuable, then we are functioning under adelusion according to Schopenhauer. That is, the cunning of the willis revealednotonly inour sexual urgings, itis also expressed inourbelief that lifeis valuable.Hence death does not deprive us of something that is valuable. The fear of deathis unwarranted ina Schopenhauerian perspective.

We can exploit Schopenhauer's ambivalent attitude towards the problem ofdeath to reach the central insight ofhismoral philosophy. Ifdeath eliminates onlythe phenomenal expression ofmyPlatonic idea, the suffering lifeofthis represen-tation is absent from this vale of tears;Ihave vanished from the stage of space andtime. However, my essential nature as the will-to-liveis not abolished withmyphenomenal death according to Schopenhauer. Itisexpressed within the sufferinglives of other sentient creatures and knowing intellects. The ground ofsufferinghence remains after my death. From apractical point of view,ignoring the highlyproblematic nature of Schopenhauer's position, Schopenhauer intimates that weshould not be indifferent towards the suffering of others

—that is even a concern

that transcends our own death. While some theorists likeMax Scheler claim thatSchopenhauer's idealism renders human suffering unimportant, considerationslike the above serve to illustrate the vacuity of this complaint. 9 In this regard,Schopenhauer's monism serves to remind us that after ourphenomenal death westillhave a vital stake in the phenomenal lives of those who come after us. Suffer-ing is an evil,according to Schopenhauer, an evil towards which we should neverbe indifferent. Although my finitude willremove myphenomenal suffering, suf-fering willstillexist and withitevil.Inthis wayboth Schopenhauer's idealism andmetaphysical monism provides anexpression of deep concern withany subject ofpain and misery.

There is nothing philosophically new inSchopenhauer's regarding sufferingas anevil. What wasunique, however, was the magnitude of evilhe saw embodiedinsuffering. This comes to the forefront inhis remarks later inthe second volumeof his main work where he argued that "... were the evil in the world even ahundred times less than itis,its mere existence would stillbe sufficient toestablisha truth that maybe expressed invarious ways...that wehave not tobe pleased butrather sorry about the existence of the world; that its non-existence would bepreferable to its existence ...." (WII,576/111, 661) Although Ibelieve that Scho-penhauer's assessment of the magnitude of the evilof suffering can not be ratio-nallydefended, itgraphically illustrates how profoundly he regarded the problemof suffering —

the problem of evil.Infact, one of the many things Schopenhauerprided himself on was his treatment of the problem of evil.He tells us that,unlikeothers who were willingto hide from the problem and sought sophisms to ab-solve the esse of the world from the heavy responsibility of evil,he above waswillingtohold the creator morally responsible for its creation ofevil.

Indeed, Schopenhauer's will-to-live,the basis ofreality, is evil.Thus hispessi-mism has a metaphysical grounding. Even ifwe are not convinced by his argu-mentation at this point, it is clear that Schopenhauer was deeply affected by theproblem of suffering. Here he appears Buddhistic, something that delighted himconsiderably. Another striking parallel between Buddhism and Schopenhauer is

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their high estimation of the moral significance of compassion. It is Schopenhau-er's basis [Urgrund] of allactions which possess moral worth, the only incentivehe recognized formorally good behaviour. It is easy tounderstand Schopenhau-er's overestimation of the value of compassion. He detailed itas a naturally occur-ringdisposition to refrain from harming or wronging others and as a dispositionto relieve another's misery. As such he saw itas the conative source of the cardinalvirtues of justice and philanthropy. He also attributed a humanizing function tocompassion since it expresses the proper sort of ethical-ontological stance to-wards others. Through compassion we transcend our native egocentric attitudeby cognizing the evilof another's suffering. Although Nicholas Rescher has adifferent perspective than Schopenhauer, he expresses a Schopenhauerian pointwhen he wrote that "The vicarious affects come into operation when someoneinternalizes the welfare of another by way of prizing iton the basis of the rela-tionship that subsists between them

—a relationship that may be as tenuous as

mere common humanity." 10

The basis of the compassionate relationship, however, is nothing as tenuous asbiological taxa or moral ideas inSchopenhauer's view.Nor does compassion servesimply as a means for populating the world withother beings, though Schopen-hauer did regard the moral egoist as the practical correlate of the theoreticalegoist, the solipsist. The truth of the former is apparent in his analysis of thedevilish personality, the malicious character, who must liveina worldwithbeingswhose suffering must be there tobe enjoyed. For the malicious person there must

be others or the world loses its charm. The problem with the malicious character,Schopenhauer thought, is that the suffering of another is viewed as a good. 11 Thisis just the opposite perspective from that exemplified in the attitude and behav-iour of the compassionate character who views the suffering of others as an eviltorelieve. It is at this level that we now have a unity of interests and a consensusbetween phenomenally distinct individuals

—suffering is an evil that must be

abolished. This unity of interests, as we all know, is just the reflection of theontological unity ofallbeings, according toSchopenhauer. Itishis monism whichgrounds the possibility of compassion. On the level of representation, compas-sion involves the cognition of this unity between the agent and the sufferer andthis leads to feelings of kinship ina world dominated by the struggle of the will-to-live. Our natural attitudes towards our own suffering, the almost involuntaryimpulse to relieve it,becomes extended towards that of an other. Thus what hassome of the deepest roots inindividuality, the recognition of my suffering as anevil,becomes the driving force of moral goodness. Incompassionating another'sdistress, Irecognize the evilof the other's suffering and treat itas my own. Thepractical result of this is to realize that for the truly compassionate agent, "Thereis no difference between suffering and seeing suffering."12

The moral significance of compassion, the evilof suffering, the concern forthose who remain after our death, define the actuality of Schopenhauer's moralphilosophy. This leads us to recognize what must figure centrally inany moraltheory and what should be basic inany moral life,i.e., striving to eliminate evilismorally significant, any feeling, emotion, passion, disposition, attitude, or cogni-tive state that leads to this end is morally significant, and this includes behaviourweperform now that is designed to prevent the suffering offuture sentient beings.Itis clear that Schopenhauer overstated his case that compassion is the only basis

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for morally valuable actions. It is also the case that many ofhis remarks concern-ing the metaphysical basis ofcompassion are unwarranted. The same can be saidof his assessment of the magnitude of the evilof suffering. Suffering, and Ishouldsay unnecessary suffering for some ofitis very useful and beneficial

—think of

the last time youput your hand on the stove—,is perhaps the evilpar excellence,

but its mere presence does not justifyhis assertion that itwould have been betterhad the world never existed. But this point is academic. The world does exist,replete with the evilofunnecessary suffering. The lesson Schopenhauer teaches ustoday is not unique nor particularly profound. However, this may be the veryreason itneeds to be repeated. To a morally sensitive person, the suffering ofanother isnever a matter ofindifference

—even ifone does not detect itorcould

not detect it.Schopenhauer's pessimism may be warranted, unfortunately, by thesimple realization that for the vast majority of us, the unnecessary suffering ofothers is a matter ofindifference. Itis that sort of world that ought not be, not theworld itself.

11l

The last statement wouldhave provided a natural end to my talk.Concludingat that point, however, would have resulted ina failure to keep my promise torepay my debt to Schopenhauer incoin he would value. To close at that pointwould be less than honest, since what Iisolated as the ever-actual dimensions ofhis moral philosophy are not consistent with the development of his thought. Asa brute fact, whatIhave highlighted is not consistent witha number ofhis mosthighly regarded truths. The "truths" Iemphasized forbid the transition fromvirtue to sainthood, to a "resigned saintliness." Ipull up short on this point.Imust pullup short at this point.Iconfine his actuality towhat he called moralityin the "narrower sense," ignoring his broader sense of morality reflected inasce-ticism and his theory of salvation. Ifindhis morality expressed by the maxim"Neminem Uede, imo omnes, quantum potes, juva",and not in the tranquil eyesof the resigned saint.

To understand my point clearly itis necessary to say some things about Scho-penhauer's hierarchy of moral character types. InSchopenhauer's axiologicalanalysis of character, he detailed arange of moral character types which span fromthe very worst sort ofcharacter, the malicious character, to the very best sort ofcharacter, the saint. The morally good character ranks one stage below the saint.13

Schopenhauer argued that "fromthe same source from whichall goodness, affec-tion, virtue,and nobility of character spring, there ultimately arises also what Icall denial of the will-to-live.

"(W 1, 378/11, 447) The "source" that accounts for

the transition from "goodness" to "holiness" is the penetration oithe principiumindividuationis, the ability to see past the forms of space and time, to see the otherside of the veilof Maya. The ability to see through the principium individuationisis one of the functions Schopenhauer ascribed to compassion, an emotion thatmorally good characters are regularly disposed to have towards others' distress.Schopenhauer never provided an explanation of how the good character seesthrough the veil of Maya, calling the phenomenon "the great mystery of ethics"and "practical mysticism," but we are told that the good character recognizes"...his owninner being-in-itself in the phenomenal appearance ofanother [...er

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sein eigenes Wesen an sich inder fremden Erscheinung wiedererkenne]." (B,212/IV,273) The saint has the same sort ofknowledge, but is said toperceive the unityof being with "a high degree of distinctness [inhohem Grade der Deutlichkeit]."(W 1, 378/11, 447)

Unlike the good character, however, the saint refrains from helping others andturns inward to deny her inner nature, the will,which is the ground of the suffer-ing world of representation. Inaddition to the grand paradox of his philosophy,the intellect's final victory over the will,we face a number of subsequent pro-blems. Schopenhauer accounted for the moral superiority of the good characterover the egoist on two bases. First,unlike the egoist, the good character recogni-zes the reality of the other as a being whose welfare merits consideration. Thus hehas a sense of a moral community. Second, the good character adjusts his behav-iour accordingly. He refrains from harming and strives to help others. The saint,however, denies the reality of the other as a being whose welfare merits consider-ation and neither refrains from harming others, at least inthe sense that not help-ing may harm, nor helps others. Now the saint resembles the egoist. Both areindifferent towards the suffering of others. Andlike the self-absorbed egoist thesaint only concentrates on herself, her willas object- to-be-denied. It might beargued, moreover, that the saint is more worthy of censure than the egoist. Theegoist has the excuse of never having transcended the natural and immature stand-point of self-interest. The saint knew what the egoist never knows, but seems toreturn to the level of the egoist. In spite of these considerations, Schopenhauerregards the saint as the crown ofcreation, as the highest development ofrepresen-tationalkind.

Bynoting these problems, Irealize thatIhave not mentioned problems unre-cognized by other scholars. Ieven have tried to develop an apparent trail out ofthese problems in other papers. 14 However, Icannot see any consistent way ofresolving Schopenhauer's "narrower sense" ofmorality and his analysis of moralgoodness and his theory ofsalvation. One could attribute an altruistic motivationto the saint, e.g.,by denying his willhe is attacking the root cause of allsuffering;thus he is trying to do something for all sufferers. In this way we can see animportant difference between the egoist and the saint. We can also appreciate adifference between the saint and the morally good character, one based on thebetter knowledge of the former, i.e., the saint clearly realizes that his essence, hiswill,is responsible for the suffering human and animal world and he attempts to

relieve allsuffering bydenying that will.Incontrast, the good character shares thesaint's concern for the suffering worldbut does not realize its root cause. Thus thegood character shares the same concern as the saint, but tries to relieve individualexpressions ofsuffering, a strategy whichmust fail.She can never eliminate allthesuffering she wishes tosuccor; even a Mother Theresa or an AlbertSchweitzer didlittleto diminish the magnitude of actual and future misery. In this way,however,the good person could be viewed as stillserving the willbyhelping perpetuate thisscene of misery; she manifests the cunning of the willby acting under the delusionthat phenomenal behaviour can resolve the problem of the evil, that we can behappy in this world; that such help could make a difference in a world whoseessence is the will-to-live.

We should also note that Schopenhauer attributed an altruistic motivation tosome ascetics is clear on other grounds. Not only does he emphasize a connection

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between moral virtue and the denial of the willwhich is based on the cognition ofthe unityof being, he viewed virtuous behaviour as expressing phenomenally andmomentarily the same thing expressed by resignation, e.g., "... moral virtuesspring from an awareness of that identity of allbeings; this, however, lies not inthe phenomenon, but in the thing-in-itself, in the root of all beings. Ifthis is thecase, then virtuous action is a momentary passing through the point, the perma-nent return to which is the denial of the will-to-live."(W \u03a0, 610/\u0399\u0399\u0399, 700) Lifeisjudged, moreover, as not worthwhile by the metaphysical saint, because of theuniversality of suffering, even incases inwhich the potential saint enjoys a relati-vely good life.Incontrast to the metaphysical saint Schopenhauer mentions otherascetics who are likewise moved to resign because of the cognition of suffering.We could call these deniers of the willindividual ascetics since they deny theirwills because of extreme personal suffering, because of their own misery. UsingStobaeus' Greek, he calls this second path to salvation \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, "the next,best course," (W \u03a0, 636/\u0399\u0399\u0399, 731) indicating that even though itis the path follow-ed by the vast majority of ascetics, itlacks the moral magnificance of the "bestcourse."

Attributing altruistic motivations to the metaphysical saint does not solve theproblem, however. This motivation and this saint's penetrating cognitions intothe unity of being may begin to explain why the metaphysical saint receives thehighest ranking inSchopenhauer's hierarchy of moral character types, but itdoesnot make itclear why there is a moral difference between the saint and goodperson. To this we should add that from Schopenhauer's perspective, the meta-physical saint is the only person who purposely adopts a strategy designed to

relieve allsuffering by denying his will,which is viewed as the metaphysical will,the root cause ofallmisery. The problem with this is that Schopenhauer wrote asifthere were successful metaphysical saints

—individuals who denied their wills.

Since there is stilla world as representation, what they have denied can not be themetaphysical will.What such saints may accomplish is the silencing of their ownwill,but that seems tobe allthey accomplish. 15 This is all that the individual saintever accomplishes and this is just what we should expect. Although the individualsaint lacks both the cognition into the unity ofbeing and the altruistic motivationof the metaphysical saint, what the individual saint must deny is her willand thiswillisalso the metaphysical will.Again, Schopenhauer writes as ifthere have beensuccessful individual saints and we still exist and suffer. What they have denied,then, cannot be the metyphysical will,the root cause of allsuffering and being. Itcan onlybe their individual willor character that is silenced. Thus there seems tobe a distinction without any real difference between these two types of saints.

This analysis suggests that the metaphysical saint's highest ranking inScho-penhauer's moral hierarchy is due to the saint's knowledge of the unity of beingand the universality of suffering and her altruistic disposition. Itcertainly can notbe due to some accomplishment greater than that of the individual saint. Bothseem to achieve the same thing when they successfully resign. In the same regard,what separates the metaphysical saint from the morally good character is not analtruistic disposition, but the saint's better knowledge of the unity of being andthe universality ofsuffering. Isay "better knowledge" here, since Schopenhauerdoes claim that the morally good character knows the unity of being. Iam notsure how one can know this truth better than another who also knows the same

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thing. Schopenhauer, who often resorts to visual metaphors, resorts to one here.He wroteof seeing "through the prinapium individuationis [dieses Durchschau-en des principii individuationis]" (W I,379/11, 447) and having the veil of Maya"liftedfrom the eyes [vorden Augen gelüftet]." (W1, 379/11, 447) This knowledgeappears tobe noninferential and nonpropositional. The difference maybe akin toone person seeing the whole of something but in a fog, while another sees thewhole without the fog. How one could perceive the unity of being, however, isbeyond me. How do phenomenal beings become so vitreous? We could grantthere is such a difference inperceptual intuition,but whywould this be a moraldifference?

Schopenhauer claims that the metaphysical saint also recognizes the universa-lityofsuffering and takes all this suffering as his own.Ifwe assume that this betterknowledge of the unityof being and universality of 'suffering leads to an enlargedaltruistic disposition, wecan understand the difference between the metaphysicalsaint and the morally good person

-the metaphysical saint has a greater altruistic

disposition, a greater and actual concern for allothers. But ifthis is the case, themetaphysical saint makes a tremendous mistake by resigning. Resignation anddenial of the willdoes not relieve anyone's suffering but the saint's. Even if wewere inclined to ignore the consequences of behaviour and evaluate the moralworth of agents and actions by the intentions ormotives of the agent, there arecertain situations in which we must not discount the consequences. For example,inany case inwhichitis impossible to obtain the desired results ofour intentionsormotives, we should not attribute any moral worth to either the agent, insofar asthis act is concerned, or the action itself. That is,ifIbelieve thatIcan help othersby causing them misery, even though mymotive orintention tohelp is worthyofpraise, howItry to do this is open to censure. The reason for this is that itis notjust due to moral bad luck thatIfail consistently. Rather, Ifailbecause Iemploymeans which willsystematically guarantee that Ifail.

Schopenhauer's metaphysical saint stands in worse shape than the helpfulsadist. Insofar as there are masochists, he willactually help people on occasion.So there is some moral luck involved here. Schopenhauer's saint, however, is sy-stematically doomed to failure since resignation willnot relieve everyone's suffer-ing

—not evenonce-in-a-while. Nomoral luck is ever involved here. Because this

is the case, we should not attribute any moral worth to the behaviour of themetaphysical saint. He might attempt to relieve allsuffering, but he can never doitby resigning. While itis true that compassionate involvement in the lives ofothers can not do this either, itcan relieve some individual's suffering some of thetime. Doing this, moreover, is important —

as Schopenhauer realized. This, afterall,is what begins to separate moral from nonmoral behaviour inSchopenhauer'sown moral theory. Itcan not be a matter of indifference, moreover, to the childstarving at the foot of the saint. Here a few crumbs of food does more than thesaint's quixotic resigned altruism. Insofar as there are genuine altruistic disposi-tions manifest in the metaphysical saint's character, his altruism should tell himthat the representational world should not be abandoned. While Schopenhaueremphasized that moral goodness and intelligence are distinct features of perso-nalities, a morally good person should have sufficient intelligence to realize thatthere are more proper modes of expressing altruism than anything involved inresignation.

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In conclusion, honesty compelled me to elucidate some of the conflicts be-tween those dimensions of Schopenhauer's moral philosophy that are actual andsome of his most highly valued doctrines. Inparticular they conflict with hismoral hierarchy of character types and what he claimed was "the most importanttruth there can be," that salvation is obtained by the denial of the will.(WII,628/111, 723) Ifwe obtain salvation in this way, there is nothing morally significantabout this act. It is something no morally sensitive person would select. Themetaphysical saint, like the individual saint, is a self-saver and not a world-saver.ThusIcan notunderstand whySchopenhauer goes past his "narrower sense" ofmorality which ends at the morally good character. Even on Schopenhauer's owncriterion, the behaviour of the self-absorbed saint is morally indifferent, i.e., "themoral significance of an action can lie only in its reference to others. Only inrespect to this can ithave moral worth or worthlessness." (B, 142/IV,206) So ifthe saint is morally sensitive to the universality of suffering, and even though in-dividual acts do littleto diminish universal suffering, this attempt to eliminate evilmust take place. We must stick to Schopenhauer's "narrower sense" of moralityand realize that weneed to try to do that which can not be done

—eliminate evil.

Horkheimer captured the essence of this when he wrote, "To stand up for thetemporal against merciless eternity is morality in Schopenhauer's sense." 16

Notes

1 See, Frederic J. Copleston, Arthur Schopenhauer: Philosopher ofPessimism (Lon-don: Burns, Oates &Washbourne, 1946) and Patrick Gardiner, Schopenhauer (Harmonds-worth:Penguin, 1967) p.235.

2 Unless otherwise noted, Ishall employ the following key to Schopenhauer'swritings:

\u0392 = On the Basis ofMorality,trans. E. EJ. Payne (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,1965).

W IorII= The World as Willand Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York:Dover Publications, 1969) vol.I,11.

\u03a1IorII=Parerga and Paralipomena, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Oxford:Clarendon Press,1974) vol.I,11.

References following the citation from the English translation are to the volume andpage number to the same work in the 3rd edition of Arthur Hiibscher's Schopenhauer:Sämtliche Werke (Wiesbaden: F. A. Brockhaus, 1972; now 4th ed. 1988), 7 volumes. Theonly exception to this willbe references to Ueber den WilleninderNatur whichwillbe tothe German text whichItranslated:

3 Also see the preface to the first edition ofDie beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik(IV,E, v-vi)where the two prize essays which compose the workare said to "... mutuallycontribute to the completion of a system of the fundamental truths of ethics." (B 3)

4 Arthur Schopenhauer, Der Handschriftliche Nachlaß, edited by Arthur Hübscher(Frankfurt am Main:Verlag Waldemar Kramer, 1966-1975) Vol. IV(1), p. 96.

5 Arthur Hübscher, Denker gegen den Strom (Bonn: Bouvier VerlagHerbert Grund-mann, 1973; now 4thed. 1988), p. 11, my translation.

6 See, for example, section 21, "Expeditions of an UntimelyMan", inTwilightof theIdols.

WN =Sämtliche Werke, Vol.4.

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7 Georg Lukâcs, "The Bourgeois Irrationalism of Schopenhauer's Metaphysics", inMichael Fox ed., Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement (New Jersey: Barnes &Noble Books, 1980) p. 192. This essay was originallypublished in German inLukâcs'Werke (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1962) Vol. 9, pp. 172-219 as "Schopenhauer".

1 Schopenhauer's advice to Hamlet is found at WI,324/11, 383.9 See Max Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy, translated by Peter Heath (Hamden,

Conn.: The Shoestring Press, 1970) p. 55. The originalGerman is Wesen und Formen derSympathie (Bonn: Cohen, 1926), p. 63.

10 Nicholas Rescher, Unselfishness: The Role of the Vicarious Affect inMoralPhiloso-phy, and Social Theory (London: University ofPittsburgh Press, 1975) p. 9

11 See W I,362-65/11, 428-3112 This remark comes fromCalderón de la Barca's Nosiempre elpeor es cierto, Jornada

11, p. 229 and is quoted withapproval by Schopenhauer at B, 165/IV,229.13 Ihave provisionally described his hierarchy ofmoral character types inmy "Scho-

penhauer's AxiologicalAnalysis of Character," in the forthcoming special volume of theRevue Internationale de Philosophie dedicated to Schopenhauer's 200th birthday.

14 See my "Schopenhauerian Optimism and an Alternative to Resignation?" inScho-penhauer-Jahrbuch, Vol. 66 (1985) pp. 153-164.

15 This is,Itake it,the upshot ofhis remark at W \u03a0, 609/\u0399\u0399\u0399, 700- that the individual-

ity inherent in the will,character, is that which is abolished by denial of the will.Thispassage, then, emphasizes that onlythe saint is succored by his act ofresignation

-other's

have their own metaphysical characters to tend. Italso suggests that itisnot the metaphy-sical will-to-liveper se that is denied inresignation. This passage should be contrasted to

those at W I,368 which suggest an altruistic motivation to themetaphysical saint and thatitis the metaphysical willwhich is the object of denial.

16 MaxHorkheimer, "Schopenhauer Today," inFox ed., Schopenhauer: His Philosoph-ical Achievement, op. cit., p. 32, originally titled as "Die Aktualität Schopenhauers," inSchopenhauer Jahrbuch, Vol.42 (1961) p. 25.