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Stichproben.WienerZeitschriftfrkritischeAfrikastudienNr.20/2011,11.Jg.,6993.

69

Ethnonationalistmovementsand

politicalmobilisationinAfrica:

TheNigeria

experience

(1990

2003)

KehindeOlusolaOlayode

Abstract:

ContemporarysocialmovementsinAfricaareshruggingoffstate

patronagein

order

to

reconstruct

the

substance

and

direction

of

locallevel development. They are also addressing issues of

emancipation, empowerment and social transformation. The

mobilisation of marginalised groups for political struggles,

resistance to dominant groups within the state, and the

importance attributed to participatorymodels of their activities

have demonstrated that African social movements are

increasinglybecomingpolitical.

Againstthis

background

analysis,

four

ethno

regional

organisations in Nigeria are examined in the study. These

organizationsaretheMovementfortheSurvivalofOgoniPeople

(MOSOP);EgbeAfenifere (Societyof the loversofgood things);

OhanaezeNdigbo (Igbo Citizens Assembly) and, the Arewa

Consultative Forum (ACF). The study attempts to answer the

followingquestions:howstrongareethnonationalistmovements

in influencing the direction of political struggles? Are ethno

nationalist

movements

enhancing

popular

participation

through

engaging the state,or simply extricating their constituents from

statehegemony?Whichsocialclassesaremobilisedinthecourse

ofpoliticalstruggleand the strategiesused inmobilisation?The

study was conducted at first hand in Nigeria employing a

qualitative approach involving desk reviews, interviews,

engagementwithlocaldebatesandtheuseofarchivalmaterials.


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Stichproben70

Introduction

The forces of economic globalisation and democratisation underlie the

politicalturbulenceacrossAfricainthelastdecadeofthetwentiethcentury,

asvariousgroupsstruggled tosurviveeconomichardshipanddemandeddemocratic reforms. The partial retreat of the state amidst the external

impositionofeconomicliberalisationopenedupspacefornewautonomous

formsoforganization,manyofwhichavoidedquestionsofpoliticalpower

andsought localsolutions togrowingeconomicandsocialdecline.Party

statesbecamemorewilling to tolerate socialmovement initiativeswhich

might alleviate problems they were unable to address. It was in these

strugglesthatAfricansocialmovementsblossomed, therebystrengthening

civilsocietys

efficacy,

but

at

the

same

time,

they

also

deepened

centrifugal

forces.

FromtheNigerianexperience,thepaperarguesthatbeyondthecivicpublic

realm, therearevastnetworksofsocialmovementswhosecapacitieshave

hardlybeenmeasured in academic research. Operating at this level are

numerous informal grassroots associations ranging from revolving credit

unions, vigilante groups, religious sects, neighbourhood associations, co

operative societies, traditional musical groups and ethnoregional

movements.The

character

of

social

movements

in

Africa

has

shifted

significantly in the 1980s and 1990s (Olayode 2004: 56f). Contemporary

socialmovementsareshruggingoffstatepatronageinordertoreconstruct

the substance and direction of locallevel development. They are also

addressingissuesofemancipation,empowermentandsocialtransformation.

Themobilisationofmarginalisedgroupsforpoliticalstruggles,resistanceto

dominant groupswithin the state, and the importance attributed to the

participatorymodeloftheiractivitieshasdemonstratedthatAfricansocial

movementsare

increasingly

becoming

political

(Olayode

2004:

258f).

Against this background analysis, four ethnoregional organizations in

Nigeriaareexamined in thestudy.Theseorganizationsare theMovement

for theSurvivalofOgoniPeople (MOSOP);EgbeAfenifere (Societyof the

loversofgoodthings);OhanaezeNdigbo(IgboCitizensAssembly);andthe

ArewaConsultativeForum(ACF).Thegroupswereselectedinviewofthe

formidablerolestheyareplayinginpoliticalmobilisationoftheirrespective

ethnicgroupsinNigeria.Thesegroupsstartedobviouslyassociocultural

organizationswithin

groups

that

felt

marginalised,

and

have

become

political pressure movements. Their strategies for empowerment and


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Ethnonationalistmovementsandpoliticalmobilisation 71

struggleevolvedinpoliticallyandsociallyrepressivesettings.Thefocuson

ethnonationalist movements is informed by the strong bond to ethnic

sentiments, which is widespread in most African countries. Ethnic

affiliations havebeenmanipulatedby political leaders as instruments ofmobilisationinsociopoliticalstruggles.

The study attempts to answer the following questions: How strong are

ethnonationalist movements in influencing the direction of political

struggles? Which social classes are mobilised in the course of political

struggleandwhatmobilisationstrategiesdo theyuse?Do theactivitiesof

ethnonationalistmovements transcendethnoregional interests?Whatare

thelimitationsofethnonationalistmovementsindemocratisationstruggles?

Thestudy

was

conducted

at

first

hand

in

Nigeria

employing

aqualitative

approach involvingdesk reviews,engagementwith localdebatesand the

use of archival materials. Although, the study focuses largely on the

Nigerian experience, it was informed by diverse experiences of ethno

nationalism inmanyAfrican countries, notably, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan,

CongoandEthiopia.Thefindingsandconclusionsofthestudyarelikelyto

resonatewith theexperienceofotherAfricancountriesbecauseof similar

socioeconomicandpoliticalexperiences.

TheoreticalConsideration

Voluntaryorganizationsorassociations thatdonotseekstatepowerhave

been conceived of as civil society, drawing onHegelian notions of the

relationshipbetweenthemodernstateandsocietyundercapitalism.Fowler

(2002:287300)describescivil societyasanarea forvoluntary formaland

informal collective citizen engagement distinct from families, state and

profit seeking organizations. In the broadest sense, civil society

encompassesall

social,

economic,

cultural

and

political

relations,

but

the

emphasisisusuallyonthepoliticalaspectsoftheserelations.

Included in civil society are variety of social movements, village and

neighbourhood associations, womens groups, religious groupings,

intellectuals,thepressandothermedia,civicorganizations,associationsof

professionals,entrepreneurs,andemployees,whosepurposesanddirection

arenotcontrolledby the institutionsof state (Hawthron2002:276).Social

movementsarecollectiveeffortsonthepartofexcludedgroups,topromote

orresist

changes

in

the

structure

of

society

that

involve

recourse

to

non

institutional forms of political participation (McAdam 1982: 25). The


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Stichproben72

coherence of social movements is highly dependent on the ability of

members to forge common interests, goals and strategies.Human rights

tendtobefundamentaltotheseinterestsandstrategiesbecauseallegations

and perceptions of discrimination, exclusion, oppression, injustice, andexploitation,which all arise fromdenials andviolationsofhuman rights,

underlie the emergence of social movements (Alani 2003: 23ff). Ethno

nationalistmovements emerge in response to changes inpolitical context

and their development and outcomes largely depend on their protest

strategiesandlocationinbroaderwavesofmobilization,inwhichtheyare

usuallyembedded.Ethnonationalistmovementsarepurposeorientedand

goaldirected activities of a group over collective grievances (Aderemi

/Osahon2008:

350ff).

Like

other

social

movements,

African

ethno

nationalist

movementsrarelyappearinisolationandoftendeveloptogetherwithother

movementsandformingcyclesofcontention.Consequently,Africanethno

nationalistmovementsshouldbestudiedasaspeciesofsocialmovements.

Ethnicnationalism isthemobilisationofethnicgroupsbyusing language,

ethnohistory,religion,traditionsandcustoms.Inotherwords,throughthe

rediscovery of an ethnic past, national identity could inspire ethnic

communities to claim their rights as nations (Isiksal 2002: 9).Abelief in

commonhistorical

evolution

provides

an

inheritance

of

symbols,

heroes,

events, values, and hierarchies and confirms the social identities for

separatingbothinsidersandoutsiders(Ake2000:93).

Farfrombeingprimordialandalargelyuncontrollablesourceofinstability,

contemporary ethnonationalism ispolitical and to some extent, artificial.

Ethnicmobilisationhasbeenapolitical instrumentof theAfricanelites in

thepostindependenceperiod,muchthesamewaythatthephenomenonof

nationalismwasinthedecolonisationstruggle.Itisagainstthisbackground

thatethno

nationalist

movements

should

be

understood.

Mobilisation strategies of ethnonationalist movements may range from

sporadic peaceful protests to sustained violent campaigns like terrorism,

armed rebellion and economic sabotage. Among the claims of African

ethnonationalistmovementsaredemands for regionalautonomy,greater

political freedom within a federation, resource control and outright

secession on the basis of selfdetermination. Most ethnonationalist

movementsinvokeethnicsentimentsbasedoncommonancestry,religious

identity,presumed

racial

discrimination

and

past

injustice

for

mass

mobilisation. Ethnonationalist movements tend to express relatively


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modest goals or reforms within an existing political structure. Their

demandsareusuallyontheplatformofcivilandeconomicrights,whichare

directedtoconstitutedstateauthorities(Agbu2004:11ff).

Given the above conceptualisation, it is obvious that ethnonationalistmovements in Africa did not emerge with the advent of neoliberal

economic reforms. A feature of the nascent African working class

populations in the urban areas during the colonial period was their

organization into sociocultural associations. Such associations were

important in advancing the interests of their members and, in more

instances,incatapultingtheirmemberstopoliticalpositions.Thedifference

between ethnonationalistmovements then andnow lies in the expanded

mandateof

todays

associations.

The

manner

in

which

aparticular

ethnicity

is given an organization form to advance specific political or economic

interestiscentraltothisarticle.

EthnonationalistmovementsandpoliticalstrugglesinAfrica:A

historicaloverview

Ethnonationalism characterised the decolonisation process as various

indigenous ethnicmovements inmanyAfrican countries championed the

causeof

independence

against

European

colonial

powers

after

World

War

II.

The successofnationalistparties restedon their capacity tomobilise and

demonstratemasssupport,bylinkingwithandarticulatingtheaspirations

and grievances of various socialmovements like trade unions,womens

movements,religiousgroupsandethnicmovements.

Theinitialpostcolonialperiod,fromtheearly1960suntilaroundthemid

1970s,sawtheemergenceofapostindependencestateoftendominatedby

a centralised ruling party, which now viewed autonomous social

movementsas

athreat

to

the

central

project

of

national

development,

dominated by the postcolonial state. Given the widely perceived

illegitimacyofcoloniallydemarcatedborders,thepowervacuumcreatedby

thewithdrawalofEuropeanpowers,andtheprecariousexistenceofnascent

independent states, internal decolonization began immediately after

independence. These struggles were largely spearheaded by ethno

nationalistmovements,whichfoughtforsecessionorautonomyfromtheir

independentstates(forexample,Biafra,Eritrea,SouthSudanandChad)or

contestingthe

ideological

make

up

of

their

countries

under

the

influence

of

theColdWarrivalry(forexample,AngolaandMozambique).


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Stichproben74

InEthiopia,ethnonationalistmovementsgrew immenselyduringmilitary

rule(19741991).ApartfromtheEritreannationalistmovements,themajor

ethnic organizations included the Oromo Liberation Front, and Afar

Liberation Front;minor organizations included IslamicOromoLiberationFront,Western SomaliLiberation Front andOgadeniNational Liberation

Front.By1991,theEthiopianarmyhadgrown insize,buttheregimewas

overcome by the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice , Ethiopian

Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front , OLF and other opposition

factions after a long civil war (Welch 1995: 120123). In South Africa,

although theAfricanNationalCongress andothersopposed to apartheid

had initially focused on nonviolent campaigns, the brutality of the

SharpevilleMassacre

of

March

21,

1960

caused

many

blacks

to

embrace

the

ideaofviolentresistance.Itwasinthiscontextthatblackstudentsformed

theSouthAfricanStudents Organizationin1969,anallblackstudentgroup,

andfromthisgrewanincreasinglymilitantBlackConsciousnessMovement.

Thisnewmovementcalled for resistance toapartheid, freedomofspeech,

andmorerightsforSouthAfricanblacks.

In the early 1990s,diverse and longstanding socioeconomic andpolitical

grievances combinedwith the fallofcommunism, suddenlymade radical

politicalchange

possible.

The

transition

to

multi

party

democracy

across

muchofAfricainvolvedbothmassprotestmovementsandthemobilisation

of existing organizations, particularly trade unions, ethnocultural

organizationsand churchbodies (Duruji2008:7578).Thedecline in state

capacity and the redirection of external funding to nongovernmental

organizations strengthened the existing social movements with credible

grassroots linkages.Theparticipationoforganizationswhicharerooted in

ethnonationalagendaintheprodemocracymovementsandwhoseleaders

overlapwith

the

pro

democracy

movements

has

always

posed

achallenge.

The activities of ethnonational and cultural organizations sometimes are

exclusionaryofpeopleofothernationalitiestherebypromotingsectionalor

parochial interest thatmayultimatelyhampercollectiveefforts toachieve

nationbuilding.

EthnonationalistMovementsandPoliticalMobilisationinNigeria(1990

2003)

Thefour

ethno

regional

organizations

examined

in

this

study

epitomise

the

conflicts inherent when subnational groups seek greater political and


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economic clouts and use the language of human rights and the

democratisation struggle as basis of their campaigns (Fasehun 2002:10).

Whilethesegroupsoperatebetweentheprimaryunitsofsocietyandruling

collective institutionson theonehand,on theotherhand, theyemphasisethe collective identity of specific groups, and are willing to use

confrontationtoachievetheirobjectives.

The selectedperiodof the study19902003wasoneof themost turbulent

periodsofNigeriasmodernhistory.Therewere three successivemilitary

rulersbetween1990and1999withunprecedentedrecordsofhumanright

abuses,economichardshipsandpoliticalmanipulationsthatculminatedin

the annulment of the 1993 presidential election. It was not surprising

thereforethat

ethno

nationalist

movements

blossomed

as

diverse

groups

were revitalised to resist military dictatorships and canvass sectional

interest.A transition todemocracy in 1999with the electionofOlusegun

Obasanjo lastedbetween 1999 and 2003 for his first term in office. The

period also witnessed heightened ethnic tension, sectarian violence and

ethnonationalistagitations fordevolutionofpower from thecentre to the

regionsandarenewedcallforrenegotiationofbasisforstatehood.

Thefourselectedmovements inthissectionwerechosentoshowregional

varietyin

the

activities

of

the

ethno

nationalist

movements

in

Nigeria.

Whereas,MOSOP (Ogoni),Afenifere (Yoruba) and theOhanazeNdigbo

(Igbo)reflectedethnicspecificitiesandaffiliations, theArewaConsultative

ForumisaregionalmovementthatembracesallNortherners,irrespectiveof

ethnicorreligiousaffiliations.Theselectedmovementsalsostartedassocio

cultural groups but later became involved in political mobilisation to

redressperceived injusticeagainsttheirownpeople.Thegroupsalsohave

deepaffiliationsandsupportat thegrass rootdue toability toconnect to

historicalheritage

and

socio

cultural

traditions

of

their

people.

MovementfortheSurvivalofOgoniPeople(MOSOP)

TheOgonipeopleareanindigenousgroupthathavebeenknowntooccupy

theirpresentlocationforaboutfivehundredyears(Olarodeetal1998:72).

Thepeople,estimatedatoverhalfamillion innumber, live inanareaof

about100,000squarekilometres,making theareaoneof themostdensely

populated inAfrica.TheOgoni speak four related languageswithKhana

andGokana

serving

as

the

two

major

ones.

Irrespective

of

these

differences,

thepeopleareunitedintheirpeculiarenvironmentalreality.


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Stichproben76

TheOgonistrugglearosefromtheirstrategiclocationintheNigerianstate.

ThoughNigeriaisreceivingbillionsofdollarsannuallyfromoil,mostofit

seems tobe disappearing into the national economy and private hands

withoutperceptiblebenefitstomostNigerians,andparticularlytotheareasoforigin.FewOgoniprofitfromjobs,development,oramenitiesintheoil

industry.Instead,theysufferedseriousenvironmentaldegradationthathas

polluted fishing streams and freshwater sources, poisoned land through

spills and blowouts, and created an atmosphere fouled by decades of

flaringnaturalgas(Olorode1998:9f).Thus,theOgonistrugglewasagainst

political marginalisation, economic exploitation, and environmental

degradation (Adediwura 2004: 10). The struggle was about the

emancipationof

the

people,

the

re

establishment

of

the

rights

of

a

community as small asOgoni, andby implication, this stretches to other

similarminoritygroupsthroughoutNigeria(Obasa2002:5).

TheOgoni struggle clearly illustrates the interplayofpolitics, economics,

and ethnicity. Political and socioeconomic changes do not necessarily

directlydiminishethnicawarenessandidentity;theymayinfactprovokeit.

Thus,toassumethatethnicityisprimarilytheprovinceofthelesseducated

inAfrica ismistaken. Detribalisationdoesnot automatically result from

greatereducation,

job

mobility,

or

other

measures

of

modernisation

(Young1983:112).Leadershipofethnicallybasedmovementshasbecomea

majoravenueforaspirantpoliticalleaders.

In1990,MOSOPdraftedtheOgoniBillofRights,whichcalledforinternal

autonomy for theOgoniwithin theNigerian federation as a solution to

their marginalisation. As contained in the Bill of Rights, the Ogoni

demandedpoliticalcontrolofOgoniaffairs;therighttocontrolandtheuse

ofa fairproportionofOgonieconomic resources forOgonidevelopment;

theright

to

protect

the

Ogoni

environment

and

ecology

from

further

degradation,and;tohaveadequateanddirectrepresentationasofrightin

all Nigerian Institutions (MOSOP. Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990: 2f).While

makingthedemandsforselfdetermination,theOgoniequallyreaffirmed

theirwish to remainapartof theFederalRepublicofNigeria (MOSOP.

Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990: 3). The Bill also authorisedMOSOP tomake

representation, foras longas the injusticesagainstOgonicontinue, to the

United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Commonwealth

Secretariat,the

African

Commission

on

Human

Rights

and

other


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internationalbodieswhichhavearoletoplay inprotectingtherightsofa

minoritygroup.

Inclaimingtherighttoagreaterfinancialshare,Ogoni leaderschallenged

thefundamentalprinciplesofcentralisedgovernment.ControlofrevenueisthebasisofpoliticalpowerinNigeria.Nottobetakenbysurprise,onMay5,

1993 the Babangida administration promulgated the Treason and

Treasonable Offences Decree, under which the death penalty could be

imposedforadvocacyofethnicautonomy.

TheOgoni struggle and the organization ofMOSOPwere pressedmost

vigorouslybyKenSaroWiwa.TheOgonireceivedsympathetichearingand

interest from theNetherlandsbasedUnrepresentedNations and Peoples

organization(UNPO),

and

the

International

Federation

for

the

Rights

of

Ethnic,Linguistic,ReligiousandOtherMinorities,basedinNewYork.The

UnitedNations subCommissionon thePreventionofDiscriminationand

Protection of Minorities also received the petition of the Ogoni people

against theNigerianmilitaryregime. Inall these international fora,Ogoni

materialswerewidely circulated,and theNigeriangovernmentandShell

Petroleum Development Companywere called upon to respond (Welch

1995:116).TheShellPetroleumDevelopmentCooperationwasallegedtobe

collaboratingwith

the

military

government

of

General

Abacha

to

suppress

the agitation of the Ogoni People. Apart from being the largest

multinationaloilcompanyoperating in theOgoni land,Shellwasalso the

biggest culprit responsible for gas flaring, land andwater pollution and

otherenvironmentaldegradationintheOgoniland(Olorode1998:13f).

Ken SaroWiwa and other Ogoni leaders were harassed and detained

severaltimesbyagenciesofthefederalgovernmentbetween1993and1994.

However, itwasGeneral SaniAbachawho subsequently arraigned Saro

Wiwaand

others

before

the

Civil

Disturbance

Tribunal

in

February

1995,

having implicated them inamurderchargepreferredagainst themby the

state.Theywereeventuallyconvictedandsentenced todeathbyhanging.

Thesentencewashastilyconfirmedbythearmedforcesrulingcounciland

disregarding international calls for clemency, the Ogoni leaders were

hanged onNovember 10, 1995during theCommonwealthConference in

Auckland.

In spite of thebrutal suppression of theOgoni struggleby themilitary

government,the

activism

of

Ken

Saro

Wiwa

has

had

aprofound

impact

on

ethnoregional struggles and environmental campaign in Nigeria. The


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Stichproben78

establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission and the

Ministry ofNigerDeltaAreawere indirectly part of the legacies of the

Ogoni struggle. The Commission and the Ministry were established to

oversee the disbursement of funds and execution of projects in the oilproducingareas.Also,thegovernmenthasincreasedtherevenueallocation

of theoilproducingarea fromone to thirteenpercentof the totalnational

revenue.

Themost enduring legacy ofMOSOP is the continuous struggle of the

people of the NigerDelta region, particularly the youth. Drawing

inspiration largely from theOgonistruggle, therehavebeenproliferations

ofother/further?ethnoregionalorganizationsandviolentstruggles in the

NigerDelta

area.

Rampart

youths

have

been

kidnapping

expatriate

workers

ofthenotableoilcompaniesoperatinginthearea,usingthemasbargainsto

winconcessionsfromthecompaniesandthegovernment.

EgbeAfenifere:thePanYorubaSocioculturalOrganization

HistoricalbackgroundofYorubaNationalism

Yorubanationalism arose from the intenseYoruba/Igbo rivalriesbetween

1940 and 1947when the leadership of theYoruba in theNigerianYouth

Movement(NYM),

was

directly

challenged

by

the

emergence

of

Nnamdi

Azikwe,whobecame the symbolof Igbo achievement and emancipation.

TheserivalriesprecipitatedacrisiswithintheranksofNYMthateventually

ledtoitscollapse,losingallitsIgbomembership.Beforeitscollapse,NYM

had championed the struggle against colonialism at the initial stage.

Though,themostimportantpoliticalactivitiesofthatperiodwereinitially

confined almost exclusively to Lagos and led mainly by the Yoruba

intelligentsia,theleaderswerenationalintheiroutlook.

Asaresult

of

the

collapse

of

NYM,

Chief

Obafemi

Awolowo

1and

other

prominentYorubamembersoftheNYMweredisillusionedandconcluded

that the realitiesongrounddidnot support theiroriginal ideaof a pan

Nigeriannationalism(Arifalo,2001:23).Thisdevelopment,tosomeextent

would later influence Awolowos ideas on federalism. Also, it was this

developmentthat ledtotheformationofanorganizationthatwouldweld

1ChiefObafemiAwolowowas a foremostNigerian nationalist and a revered Yoruba

leader.

He

was

the

first

Premier

of

the

defunct

Western

Region

of

Nigeria

and

his

political

idealsofstatewelfarismandtruefederalismstillshapethecontemporarypoliticsofthe

Yoruba.


11/25


together the Yoruba speaking people as the first practical step to the

buildingofalastingnationalunity.TheorganizationwasformedinLondon

in1945andwasknownasEgbeOmoOduduwa.Itwasinitiallyformedas

asocioculturalorganizationtopromotepoliticalawarenessandarallyingforumtoprotecttheinterestoftheYoruba.

ThefundamentalsofYorubanationalismwerebasedonaliberaldemocratic

state governedby a competent,widelyrespected leadership; founded on

socialjustice,equity,equality,enlightenmentandfreedom(Arifalo2001:10

13).Thegoalwastruefederalismreflectedinregionalautonomyandatotal

devolutionofpowerfromthecentretotheregion.

Expoundinghisthesisonfederalismin1946,ChiefObafemiAwolowo,the

firstsecretary

of

the

Action

Group

(AG)2

argued:

Nigeriaisnotanation.Itisameregeographicalexpression.There

arenoNigeriansinthesamesenseasthereareEnglish,Welsh,or

French.ThewordNigerianismerelyadistinctiveappellationto

distinguishthosewholivewithintheboundariesofNigeriafrom

thosewhodonot.(WestAfricanPilot1946:23)

ForAwolowo,

the

differences

among

the

varying

ethnic

groups

in

languages, social organization, religion and educational advancement

sloweddown progress in certain sections and thereby caused frustration

amongmoreambitiousgroups.Hearguesthateachoftheconstituentunits

ofNigeriawas a nationby itselfwithmany tribes and clans, and they

should be allowed to solve their problems, according to their peculiar

traditions and ideals (Awolowo 1947: 67f). Thus, the basis of Yoruba

nationalism liketheOgonistruggle isrootedin selfdeterminationwithin

theNigerian

state.

Theaimsand theobjectivesof theEgbeOmoOduduwawere tounite the

variousgroupsinYorubaland,andtocreateandfostertheideaofasingle

nationalisminYorubaland.Thiswasclearlyspeltoutintheconstitutionof

thesocietythus:

2

The

Action

Group,

a

left

leaning

political

party,

formed

in

the

1950s

was

supported

largelybytheYorubapopulationofthethenWesternregionofNigeria.Italsohadappeal

inthelaterMidWesternandMiddleBeltregionsofthecountry.


12/25

Stichproben80

The Egbe, as a cultural organizationwould study the political

problems of Yoruba land, combat the disintegrating forces of

tribalism,stampoutdiscriminationwithinthegroupandagainst

minorities, and generally infuse the idea of a single nationalitythroughouttheregion.(Arifalo2001:85).

Whenthecolonialofficerscouldnolongertreatthenationalistmovements

and the demands for selfdetermination by Nigerians with hubris,

constitutionsthatsoughttobalancetheculturaldiversityofthepeoplewere

promulgated and elections were held under them. The constitutional

developmentwaspartlyaresponsetogrowingethnicconsciousness,which

wasfastlydeterminingpoliticalgroupings.ItwasinthiscontextthatEgbe

OmoOduduwa

formed

the

Action

Group

(AG),

the

political

party

that

maintainedafirmholdovertheWesternregionfromtheearly1950suntil

its proscription by the military government in 1966. Thus, Egbe Omo

Oduduwabecame theplatform for thepropagationof the ideologyof the

partyandalsoavitallinkbetweenthepartyandthetraditionalrulers.For

theordinarypeople in the ruralareasofYoruba landwhosepoliticaland

cultural interest were almost inseparable, there was no clear distinction

betweenEgbeOmoOduduwa and EgbeAfenifere, theYoruba name for

ActionGroup.

TheRevivalofYorubaNationalisminthe1990s

TherevivalofYorubanationalisminthe1990swasanchoredinopposition

to decades ofmilitary autocracy, and the Northern oligarchys claim to

power,and the struggle for the realisationof thepresidentialmandateof

ChiefMoshoodAbiolaintheJune12,1993presidentialelection.Itwasfor

therealisationoftheseobjectivesthattheEgbeAfeniferewasrevivedonthe

basisof

the

original

structures

of

the

defunct

Egbe

Omo

Oduduwa.

It

was

largelymadeupofpolitical associatesof the lateObafemiAwolowo and

other Nigerians who believed in his political ideals. The group had

organisedundertheumbrellaofOwoMeetingbeforetheadoptionofthe

nameEgbeAfenifereinJanuary1993.

The core values of Afenifere are rooted in the political philosophy of

ObafemiAwolowo.Afeniferewaslargelyinstrumentalinrallyingtogether

all theprogressivegroups inNigeriaduring thedemocratisationstruggle.

Forexample,

the

group

was

responsible

for

the

formation

of

the

People

SolidarityParty (PSP) thatwasnot registered alongsideothersby former


13/25


presidentIbrahimBabangidaregime.Afeniferealsoplayedacrucialrolein

the coalition that was formed by prodemocracy movements to resist

militarydictatorship.As agroup,Afeniferebecame the rallyingpoint for

theYorubaatacrucialtime.Forapeopleknownfortheirfrontlinerole inthe struggles for freedom, justice and good governance right from the

colonial era, Afenifere was a ready platform in the struggle for the

actualisationoftheannulled1993presidentialelection.Itwasnotsurprising

therefore thatunder the leadershipofAfenifere, theNationalDemocratic

Coalition (NADECO), a coalition of prodemocracy groups, became a

formidableforceagainstprolongedmilitaryrule.

In the transition programme of General Abdusalam Abubakar, Egbe

Afeniferetogether

with

other

sixteen

progressive

unions

established

the

Alliance for Democracy (AD), thus following the footstep of EgbeOmo

Oduduwa.TheAlliance forDemocracy subsequentlybecame thepolitical

platformonwhichAfeniferepropagatedandprotected the interestof the

Yoruba.FortheAfenifere,onlyapanYorubapoliticalpartycouldofferthe

legitimate platform to canvass for the core values they stood for,

particularly,truefederalismandnationalrestructuring.

OhanaezeNdigbo

(Igbo

Citizens

Assembly)

A parallel organization that operated in a similar way to Afenifere is

OhanaezeNdigbo,whichwas established after theNigerian civilwar to

championthecauseofIgbonationalism.

The Igbopredicated theirdemands on theirperceivedmarginalisation in

thenationspowercalculationbythesuccessivegovernmentsafterthewar.

Accordingtotheirpersistentargument,theyhavenovisiblepresenceinthe

powerhierarchyofthefederalbureaucracy,inthearmedforces,andinthe

commerceand

industry

sector.

They

also

contend

that

they

are

deliberately

being screened out from positions of political power. This is apart from

whattheyperceivedasthedeliberaterefusalofsuccessivegovernmentsto

develop and renovate the infrastructural facilities in the SouthEast zone,

whichovertheyearsremainthewoesofNdigbo.

The Igbo seem to have a valid case in their claim for marginalisation.

Successive military governments appeared not to have forgotten the

experiences of the Biafra war. Rather than implementing the postwar

sloganof

reconciliation,

rehabilitation

and

reconstruction,

the

Igbo

would

notbeentrustedwithsensitiveandstrategicpositions,eitherinthemilitary


14/25

Stichproben82

orthegovernmentbureaucracy.Throughdeliberateandcovertgovernment

policies like thequota systemandethnicbalancingwithin the federation,

Igbo republicanism has been repressed. 3 Individuals, who would have

normally been promoted within the military, the ministries, and theuniversities throughselfeffortandmerit,havebeensystematicallypassed

over.Thesefailuresandhindranceshavegivenrisetoacollectivefeelingof

abandonment,betrayal and frustration;which led to the revival of Igbo

nationalism,championedbytheOhanaezeNdigbo.

Literally,Ohanaezemeanscommunity,thepeopleandtheirleaders.Itis

anappealingnomenclaturethatcapturestheessenceofgovernanceinIgbo

land.Theleader(Eze)isameremessenger,delegatedbythepeople(Oha)

todo

their

bidding,

as

his

potentials

would

allow,

but

the

central

authority

remains with the gathering of the people (assembly). Ohanaeze was

expected to serveasa focalpointof reference,directionand toprovidea

collectiveleadershipinmattersaffectingtheinterest,solidarityandgeneral

welfare of Ndigbo in the context of the Nigerian state. It was also to

promote,developandadvance Igbo languageandculture,and to inspire

confidence and pride in Ndigbo, and encourage their achievement

orientationinvariousaspectsoflife(Olayode2004:189).Asanonpartisan,

nonsectarian

organization,

Ohanaeze

committed

itself

to

the

principles

of

freedom,equality,justice, freeenterpriseand the struggle topreserve the

Igbocorporateexistencethatisfreefromrancourandsubmissivetothewill

of God (Ohanaeze 2003: 1f). The Igbo question in Nigerian politics is

basically centred on the enthronement of social justice, equity, mutual

participationandintegration.Fromawiderviewpoint,theIgboquestionis

anintegralpartoftheunresolvednationalquestion.

Although established as a sociocultural organization,OhanaezeNdigbo

hasbeen

using

cultural

renaissance

for

creating

political

awareness,

grassroots mobilisation, and to draw attention of governments to the

alleged injustices against Ndigbo by successive governments since

independence. For example, Ohanaeze presented a petition before the

3Forexample,sincetheendoftheBiafrawaruntil2011,noofficerfromIgbooriginwas

appointedasservicechiefintheNigerianarmedforceswhileitwasonlyin2010thatthe

first

Inspector

general

of

police

from

Igbo

origin

was

appointed.

Also

since

the

end

of

the

civilwar,Nigeriahasnotelectedapresident from Igbooriginunlike theHausaFulani

andYorubawhohavehadtheirturnsinrulingNigeria.


15/25


Oputa Panel on human rights violations.4 The representation of Igboby

OhanaezelegitimisedtheorganizationastheauthenticvoiceoftheNdigbo.

Ohanaezespetitionwashinged on the thesis that theNorth,working in

concertwithsomeotherpartsofthecountryhadembarkedonadeliberateprogrammetomarginaliseandexterminatetheIgbo(Onwubiko2001:23).

Ohanaezedefinesmarginalisationasapurposefuldenialofrightsofsome

membersofagivenunitbysomeothermembersofthegroupwhocontrol

thepowerofallocationofresources(Onwubiko2001:14).

The remedies Ohanaeze sought include financial compensation for the

bereaved and dismissed Biafran officers; compensation for the scorched

earthpolicyduringthewarandreversalsofeconomicmarginalisationand

restitutionswhere

possible.

Apart

from

demanding

anational

apology

for

the injuries inflicted against Igbo people, Ohanaeze also sought an

assuranceofOzomena anationalvowthatNdigbowillneverbeanobject

ofvictimisationinNigeriaagain.

Whilemakingsuggestionsonhow tomove thenation forwardbefore the

OputaPanel, thegroup asserted that the constitutionmust addressmore

explicitlyandunequivocallythefoundationquestionofthecharacterofthe

Nigerianstate.Itthereforedemandedasovereignnationalconferenceofall

theethnic

groups

as

the

proper

and

effective

forum

for

resolving

the

nationalquestion(Nwabueze2001:4f).

However, theweaknessofOhanaezeas a socioculturalorganizationwas

clearlyexposedbyitsventuringintopartisanpolitics.UnliketheAfenifere,

Ohanaezedoesnothave apolitical structure topropagate and realise its

political vision for theNdigbo. Also, it does not have charter ormoral

positionthatempowersittosanctionitsmembersthatareputtingpersonal

andparty interestsoverandabovecollectiveaspirationof theNdigbo. In

otherwords,

Ohanaeze

is

avoluntary

cultural

organization

without

any

powerofchastisementorenforcement.Itcanonlymakemoralpropositions

totheindividualpoliticians,whichtheyareatlibertytoacceptorreject.

Despite its shortcomings,OhanaezeNdigbo hasmade impact in raising

political awareness among the Igbo and articulating a common political

objective.Theyhavealsomadesomeprogressinclosingthecracksamong

4

The

Oputa

Panel

modelled

after

South

Africas

Truth

and

Conciliation

Commission

was

setupbytheregimeofPresidentObasanjoin2001toinvestigatecasesofabuseofpower

bysuccessivemilitaryregimes.


16/25

Stichproben84

the Igbo, therebyenabled them tobemoreassertive in theirdemands for

equitywithintheNigeriannation.

ArewaConsultative

Forum

(ACF)

The Hausa and Fulani are often grouped together by historians in

connection with the Islamic Jihad of the early 19th century and the

foundation of the Sokoto Caliphate and some independent Emirates.

EspeciallysincethenmanyFulaniadoptedtheHausalanguageandculture

and intermarriedwith them to such an extent that the two groups have

becomedifficult todistinguish.Thisgrouphas twoculturalelements that

most sharply distinguish them from the Igbo and to a lesser extent, the

Yoruba:adeep

but

diffuse

Islamic

faith

and

atradition

of

large

scale

rule

throughcentralisedauthoritarianstates.

The structure of Emirate power was highly centralised. The Emirs

appointedtheadministrativeelites,conferredaristocratictitles,anddirectly

orindirectlycontrolledallofficesdowntothevillagechiefsandwardheads.

The scope of Emirs authority was immense, primarily because it was

theocratic, restingonadeep religious foundation.Toleranceofopposition

was antithetical to the autocratic political style of the North. Almost

absolutepower

produced

an

equally

absolute

duty

of

obedience

on

the

part

of themassof the citizens,adutywhichwas innowayabatedby Islam

injunction(Dudley1968:34).

AtameetingoftheNortherneducatedelitesinKanoonDecember1948,a

culturalorganizationknownas JamiyyaMutanenArewa (theNorthern

Peoples Congress) was formed, apparently influenced by the political

activities of ethnoregional groupings in the South (Kwanashie 2002: 12).

The statedobjectives of theorganization, to combat the three fatal evils,

namely:laziness,

corruption

and

political

ignorance

clearly

showed

that

its

interestwentbeyondculturalaffairs (NPC1963:8). In1951, theCongress

wasconvertedtoapoliticalpartywiththeslogan:OneNorth,OnePeople,

Irrespective of Religion, Rank or Tribe. Unlike the other parties that

developed at the period, the Congresss conception of the North was

monolithic, both territorially and culturally. It aimed to represent all

communitiesandallsocialclasseswithintheregion.Thepartybuiltupan

activemembership thathasbeendescribedas representing a coalitionof

intereststhat

included

hereditary

rulers,

traditional

chiefs,

the

western

educatedelites,themerchants,peasantsandthemalams(Clifford2003:8).


17/25


IncontrasttoAfenifere,MOSOPandOhanaezeNdigbowhichrepresented

definite ethnic groups, Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) is a regional

political pressure group that emerged as countervailing force to the

resurgenceofethnoregionalgroupingsintheSouth.Itwasarealignmentofforces torevive the ideaof monolithicNorth,whichwaschampionedby

the defunct Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) under the leadership of

AhmaduBello.5Accordingtoitsconstitution,theaimsandobjectiveofthe

Forumwere to fosterand strengthen the foundationofNorthernunity in

the context of oneNigeria and set upmachinery for regulardialogue to

ensure that issues likely tocausebreachof thepeaceare settledamicably

(ACF2001:23).

Ironically,the

ACF

that

championed

the

candidature

of

aSoutherner

for

the

presidencyin1999hasbeenmostvocalinitsaccusationofmarginalisation

against the president since his inauguration. Thus, the ACF decided to

champion the perceived northern agenda in the 2003 general election

snatchingpowerbacktotheNorthand installingapresidentthatrespects

and guarantees the interests of theNorth.MohammedBuhari,whowas

generallyperceivedas theACFcandidate,contestedand lost toOlusegun

Obasanjointhe2003presidentialelection.

Whilethe

marginalisation

cry

of

the

North

may

seem

bogus

within

the

larger context of national spread of political appointments and resource

allocation,theACFhasbeentherallyingpointoftheNorthernelitesinits

oppositiontopromoteandarticulatetheinterestoftheNorth.

EthnonationalistMovementsandConflictsin

DemocraticNigeria(19992003)

The restoration of democracy to Nigeria in 1999 after sixteen years of

unbrokenmilitary

dictatorship

raised

hope

for

apeaceful

resolution

of

the

unresolvedissuesofthenationalquestion.Democracythusopenedupthe

space for the revival of ethnonationalist sentiments, which had been

suppressedbyrepressivemilitaryrule.

5Inthe1959independenceelections,AhmaduBelloledtheNPCtowinapluralityofthe

parliamentary seats and forged an alliance with Nnamdi Azikiwes NCNC (National

Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons) to form Nigerias first indigenous federal

governmentwhich ledto independence fromBritain.Informing the1960 independence

federal

government

of

the

Nigeria,

Bello

as

president

of

the

NPC,

chose

to

remain

Premier

ofNorthernNigeriaanddevolvedthepositionofPrimeMinisteroftheFederationtothe

deputypresidentoftheNPC.


18/25

Stichproben86

Witharelativeliberalenvironmentthatopenedupthespaceforfreedomof

associationandexpression,anew formofethnonationalismhasemerged

inNigeriathroughmilitantandviolenceorientedmovementswhoarenot

afraidtoengagesecurityforcesinopenarmedconfrontations.Someoftheseethnonationalistsentimentshavemanifested in theemergenceofmilitant

ethnonationalistmovements,especiallyintheNigerDeltaregionunderthe

umbrellaof theMovement for theEmancipationofNigerDelta (MEND),

the renewed demand for defunct Republic of Biafra spearheadedby the

MovementfortheActualizationofSovereignStateofBiafra(MASSOB),the

incessantclashesamongminoritygroupsintheMiddleBeltregionandthe

frequent religious disturbances and Shariainstigated riots in the North

(Duruji2010:

1f).

Other

militant

movements

that

emerged

are

the

Niger

DeltaVolunteerForce,EgbesuBoysofAfrica,OoduaPeoplesCongressand

BakassiBoys,amongothers.Theactivitiesoftheseorganizationsprovoked

spontaneousethnoreligiouscrisisoutsidetheconfinesofthelaw.

Thecapabilityof thenewdemocraticgovernment toaddress the issuesof

the national question was however, constrained by its institutional

weakness,whichwas a fall out of decades ofmilitary dictatorships. For

example, the partystructures and the legislatures thatwere nonexistent

duringmilitary

rule

emerged

too

weak

and

inexperienced

to

respond

to

the

challengesofposttransitional conflicts.Also, thepolice and thejudiciary

had been greatly enfeebled and subjected to government manipulation

during themilitaryera, thereby lacking thepubliccredibilityandpopular

confidence to arbitrate on conflictual issues (Olayode 2009: 24f). The

inabilityofthestatetomanagethesecriseseffectivelyendangersthenascent

democracyandweakensthefabricofthestate.

InthefirstfouryearsfollowingtheeraofdemocraticruleinNigeria(1999

2003),about

10,000

people

were

killed

and

over

750,000

people

have

been

displacedinethnoreligiousviolenceacrossthecountry(Olayode2009:31).

TheconcernofmostNigerianswiththeescalationofethnoreligiouscrises

isitsimpactondemocraticconsolidation.Inthefaceofescalationofethno

religiousviolenceinthecountryandtheseemingimpotenceofthepoliceto

maintainpeace,thegovernmentreliedheavilyonthemilitarytobringthe

situationundercontrol(Olayode2004:222ff).

The heavy reliance on the army by a democratic government for the

maintenanceof

peace

has

raised

doubts

about

subordination

of

military

to

civil authority. Beside the threat of the military, the growing domestic


19/25


instability and turmoil seriously negates the ideals ofdemocracy.Hence,

democratic consolidation in a context of heightened interethnic rivalry,

divisionanddistrustseemsquiteunlikely.Thestrangulationofpublicspace

by successivemilitarydictators, repressive oneparty state and intolerantcivil rulers have largely prevented socialmovements from playingmore

activerolesinpoliticalmobilisation.Inmanycases,socialmovementshave

beenforcedtooperatefromundergroundandinaveryhostileenvironment

characterisedbyrepressionandintimidation.

Conclusion

The organizations examined in this article differ inmany respects from

conventionalcivil

society

organizations.

They

started

initially

as

socio

cultural groups and later involved in political struggles; sought major

restructuring;focusedoncollectivegrievances;andwerehighlyselectivein

their use of human rights language. Thebasis of their struggle is self

determination within a national entity. They often utilised traditional

symbolsand cultural solidarity forgrassrootsmobilisation.Their senseof

unity toa largeextentwasdefinedby resentmentagainstexploitationby

outsiderseventhoughtheseoutsiderswerecitizensofthesamecountry

(Welch1995:

131).

For instance, the Ogoni and Igbo nationalismweremotivatedby deep

seated feelingsofeconomic injusticeandpoliticalmarginalisation.Almost

the same logic drove theAfeniferes resolve to roll out a political party.

Perhaps, more than the Igbo, the Yoruba felt a sense of political

marginalisationinthedeliberatefrustrationoftheirpastattemptstocapture

federal power, especially with the annulment of the June 12, 1993

Presidentialelection.

Thus,the

struggle

for

power

sharing

in

Nigeria

was

reduced

to

astruggle

for hegemony among the three major ethnic groups, namely the

Hausa/Fulani,theYorubaandtheIgbo.Theoverthreedecadesofmilitary

dictatorshipresultedinanincreasinghegemonyoftheHausa/Fulanifaction

tothenear exclusionoftheothertwocontendersforpower.TheSouthern

minoritygroupsas typifiedby theOgonialsobelieve that theydeserve to

have a substantial control of oil revenue, which is extracted from their

communitiesinsteadofthetokenstheyreceiveasrevenueallocationfrom

thefederal

account.


20/25

Stichproben88

From the analysis of the four ethnoregional organizations, there were

fundamental differences in the context and political aspirations of the

leaders of the North and South. In the South, though in some cases

traditional chiefs have been coopted by the ruling class to providelegitimacyandpopularacceptance;politicalleadershiplargelysprangfrom

thepeople, that is, from thegrassroots. In theNorth,however, the ruling

classmadeupofthesonsandkinsmenoftheEmirstookoverthepolitical

leadershipofthepeople.Theyexpectedlywouldrepresent theirownclass

interests,rather than thepopularwillof thepeople.Whileoppositionwas

not tolerated in theNorth, theSouthbycontrast,hadcultural traditionof

opposition emanating from the wider dispersion of authority: a certain

respectfor

rights

of

criticism

and

opposition,

stemming

from

the

limits

of

centralisedauthority.Also, in theNorth,powerwasused topreserve the

position of a traditional dominant class, which incorporated rising

commercialandprofessionalelementsinasubordinaterole.Bycontrast,in

theSouth, the rulingpartieswereenginesofclass formation, inaugurated

andcontrolledbymodernprofessionalandbusinesselites,whoentrusted

thetraditionalrulersinsubordinatepositions.

Although,theACF, like theAfenifere,MOSOP,andOhanaeze,believes in

thecorporate

existence

of

Nigeria

as

anation,

it

disapproves

of

the

clamouring for national restructuring, resource control, rotational

presidencyandfederalism,theissuesthatformthebasisofethnoregional

nationalismintheSouth.ApartfromACF,othernortherneropinionleaders

areclearlyopposedtoanyformofpoliticalrestructuringofthecountryora

SovereignNationalConference.Thisoppositionmayprobablybeduetothe

fear of losing out its structural dominance,which hasbeen thebasis of

politicalhegemonysinceindependence.

Thebackground

to

the

emergence

of

ethno

nationalist

movements

was

the

utilisation of ethnic solidarityby the governing elites across the various

regions asmeansofbargaining forpoliticalpower andgaining economic

concessions from the centre. However, while the elite factor is amajor

impetus forethnicmobilisation, it is importanttoemphasise thatordinary

peoplealsoparticipateactivelyoutofa feeling that theywillbenefit from

theexpressionsofethnicmobilisation,which theyusuallyperceiveas the

bestwaytoadvancetheirinterest.Manyscholarshavediscussedethnicity


21/25


asbargainingtoolinthestruggleforeconomicaccumulationandpolitical

power.6

TheNigerianexperienceisareflectionofthegeneraltrend.Africanpolitical

struggles remain severelydividedbyethnonationalism.Transitionsawayfrom authoritarian rule provide some opportunities for transethnic co

operation,but in thenear termandon thewhole, theyhave theopposite

effect. Africa continues to demonstrate a range of political vectorswith

regardtoethnicityandpoliticalmobilisation.

Asdemonstrated from theNigerian experience, there hasbeen a change

since theearly90s in thecharacterofsocioculturalmovements fromnon

partisan to political movements. As a result of the harsh political

environmentunder

successive

military

dictators,

socio

cultural

movements

were deeply involved in stirring up opposition to military rule and

grassrootmobilisation fordemocratisation inNigeria.Thisnew trend isa

remarkable departure from the welfare and leisure preoccupations

characteristic of the colonial and immediate postcolonial sociocultural

clubs.Thus,manyoldandnewassociationsarestriving toenhance their

capacitytodirecttheirownaffairs.Theyarealsorejectingtraditionalroles

assigned by the state and are addressing issues of emancipation,

empowermentand

social

transformation.

In

some

cases,

their

independence

hasputthemonacollisioncoursewithgovernment.

Apart from changes in the content of associations, the new trend is a

manifestationof the consolidation of an autonomous sociopolitical space

between the state and family structureswithinwhich cultures, traditions,

politics, and interest articulation prevails. The inability of the various

groups to resolve or agree on some of the issues related to the national

question is primarily responsible for the fragmentation of social

movementsin

Nigeria

along

ethno

regional

lines.

Rather

than

view

these

divisionsasa drawbackor theabsenceofagenuine socialmovement in

Africa, theyarepartof theprocessof itsgrowthand theresolutionof the

lingeringnationalquestion.

As revealed in the study, the activities ofMOSOP, EgbeAfenifere, Egbe

OmoOduduwa,ACF,andtheOhanaezeNdigbohavedeepenedNigerias

democratisation, and promoted pluralism in the society. However, the

potential for withdrawal from the state also exists within these

6Amongothers,seeNnoli1980;Osaghae(1994).


22/25

Stichproben90

organisations.Theseassociationsoperateinthesocalledprimordial,public

realm,andthusnotadditivesintheircontributiontoacommonconceptof

individual liberty.Kinship,onwhichmuchof the strengthsof the ethno

nationalist movements are ultimately based, is intrinsically segmentary.Mostof the ethnoregional associations inAfrica areprimarily concerned

withthewelfareoftheirownkinsmen.

Therefore,thesocioculturalstructuresofasocietyaffectthewayinwhich

civilsocietyconfigures,and interactswith thestate.Africahashada long

historyofsocioculturalgroupingsalongethnoregionallines.Asarguedin

this paper, this salient feature has notbeen significantly diminishedby

modernisation. In the struggle fordecolonisation, culturalorganizations,

religiousgroups

and

ethnic

unions

featured

prominently.

Likewise,

in

the

third wave of democratisation of 1990s, ethnic solidarities were often

utilised for grassrootsmobilisation againstdictatorships, and forpolitical

mobilisation. Thus, contrary to the conventional views, ethnonationalist

movementsoperateindependentlyandrelativelyfreeinthepublicdomain,

without undue interference from the state. They therefore qualify for

inclusionintothearenaofsocialmovement.

ThemostnoticeablefeatureofAfricanethnonationalistmovementsisthat

theyare

primarily

social

and

cultural

and

only

secondarily

political

in

orientation.Ethnonationalistmovementsarelocatedintheculturalsphere

asamajorarenaforcollectiveactionratherthaninstrumentalactioninthe

state.Moreover,with little concern to directly challenge the state, these

groupsresistedincorporationininstitutionallevels.Theytendtofocusona

singleissue,oralimitedrangeofissuesconnectedtoasinglebroadtheme

suchasmarginalisation,peace, resource sharingandenvironment.Ethno

nationalist movements set their focus on grassroots with the aim of

representingthe

interests

of

marginal

or

excluded

groups.

Paralleled

with

thisideology,theorganizationsmobilizationstrategyisalsolocallybased,

centred on small social groups and loosely held by personal or

informationalnetworkssuchasradios,newspapersandposters.Thislocal

andissuecentredcharacteristicwhichdoesnotnecessarilyrequireahighly

agreed ideology or agreement on ultimate endsmakes thesemovements

distinctivefromtheoldlabourmovementwithahighdegreeoftolerance

of political and ideological difference appealing to broader sections of

population.


23/25


Abstract:

GegenwrtigeSozialeBewegungen inAfrika schtteln staatliche

Patronage ab, um die Inhalte und Ausrichtungen lokalerEntwicklung neu zu gestalten. Sie werfen Fragen von

Emanzipation, Empowerment und sozialem Wandel auf. Die

Mobilisierung marginalisierter Gruppen fr politische Kmpfe,

der Widerstand gegen vorherrschende Gruppen innerhalb des

Staates und die Bedeutung, die partizipatorischen

Handlungsmodellen beigemessen wird zeigt, dass afrikanische

soziale Bewegungen zunehmend politisch werden. Vor diesem

Hintergrundwerden

in

dieser

Studie

vier

ethno

regionale

Organisationen inNigeriauntersucht.DiesesinddasMovement

for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP); Egbe Afenifere

(Society of the lovers of good things); OhanaezeNdigbo (Igbo

CitizensAssembly) und dasArewaConsultative Forum (ACF).

DieStudieversucht, folgendeFragenzubeantworten:Wie stark

beeinflussen ethnonationalistische Bewegungen die Richtung

politischer Kmpfe? Strken ethnonationalistische Bewegungen

einegesellschaftliche

Partizipation

durch

die

Auseinandersetzung

mit dem Staat oderbefreien sie ihreMitglieder von staatlicher

Hegemonie?WelchesozialenKlassenwerdenwhrendpolitischer

Kmpfemobilisiert?DerArtikelbasiert auf Feldforschungen in

Nigeriaund folgt einemqualitativenAnsatzderauf Interviews,

TeilnahmeanlokalenDebattenundArchivmaterialzurckgreift.

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04 - olayode - ethno-nationalist movements and political mobilisation in africa.pdf

Documents

political mobilisation

vigilante groups

dominant groups

s olayode

traditional musical

neighbourhood associations

social transformation

revolving creditunions