1

Wie is ons? / Who are we?

2

We are an informal group of police and defence veterans as well as civilian researchers who would like to

foster an interest in South Africa’s police, defence and national security history from 1652 with cut-off-date

1994; when the new South Africa came into being.

As veterans we only tell and explain what we did; for we were the “on the spot” eyewitnesses! In fact we

are the ones you saw on TV and in the news reels of the time following orders from parliament. However

we have to debate the incidents because our memory is fallible as we grow older. In the terms of the day

"we earned the T-shirt and right to tell our stories for you to enjoy with malice towards none." We all can

learn from the past.

3

Revival of the “Old” Nongqai

We have attempted to revive the spirit of the old “Nongqai” – to conserve our southern Africa national

security history. We also pay homage to our departed comrades.

There is no longer a SA Police Force Museum Since 1652, the date from which we kept records, the records show that policing in southern Africa was

relatively good! Bad apples were kicked out. Later we got Inspector King from the UK. Our first detectives

were not bad either, taking into consideration the limited forensic assistance available. We are attempting

to conserve and preserve our national security history. So much is owed to so few – those few who formed

a dotted line between peace and total anarchy.

Administration We are mainly a “one-man-show”, so if we do not respond immediately to your email – please send a

reminder to heymanshb@gmail.com or enongqai@gmail.com or phone Hennie Heymans at 012-329-

4229.

We were “fighters” and not “writers”. As we mellow with time, we have not become very good “clerks”.

History is such an all absorbing subject; we have do much reading, research, scanning, liaison and other

tasks - so sometimes we tend to forget, however that’s one of the ‘bonuses or plights’ when we get old.

We also need knowledgeable persons for our website which is a virtual museum and archive.

There is also a vacancy for a Honorary Blog Master; and a

Honorary Graphic artist.

4

Legalities This publication is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in policing/ national

security or to cover all aspects of those referred to. Readers should take legal, medical and/or other advice

before applying the information contained in this publication to specific issues or transactions.

The Nongqai contains various and sundry personal opinions of different correspondents and neither the

compiler of the Nongqai nor the Nongqai will be held responsible for any of their comments which is

entirely their own and not necessarily that of eNongqai or its publishers.

5

The Colour of the South African Police Force

Comment by Hennie Heymans: We all always strive towards historical correctness. I have a sneaky

suspicion that the battle honours of South West Africa 1914 – 1915 were due to the good work of

Hartigan’s Horse. In German East Africa 1916 – 1918 it could have been the same regiment (now 7 SA

Light Horse) or it could have been the good work of former policemen in the SA Mounted Rifles. These

battle honours need some checking up to do. No battle honours were awarded for the good work in

South West Africa from 1966 until the implementation of Resolution 534.

Any new info welcome.

The Fighting Police of South Africa: Lt TEM Thursby-Attwell In a faded old Nongqai c1918 I found a photo of 1/Lt TEM Thursby-Attwell. It is his brainchild, this concept:

“The Fighting Police of South Africa”. Well he should know as he was an eyewitness to history in the

Police and on the battlefield. (Most old Natal Police members had no choice: They were transferred from

the Natal Police in 1913 to the 2nd & 3rd brigades of the South African Mounted Rifles.)

We know the following about Constable Thursby-Attwell:

He served in the SA Constabulary

In the Transvaal Police

We know he was a Constable in the SAP at Malmesbury in the Cape

He purchased his discharge in January 1916 for the purpose of going to figt in East Africa.

He was a member of 11th SAI where joined as a Private.

He rose to Commissioned Rank first as a 2nd Lieut.

Promoted to 1st Lieut and then rejoined the SAP as a Constable. Below is his book: “The Fighting Police of South Africa”

“The Fighting Police of South Africa”

This is how Protea Boekwinkel describes their book:

“This is a copy of the extremely rare and seldom

seen copy of the history of the Police in South Africa

from 1879 to 1922.

Important book. Binding loose. Some tape

markings. No dust jacket as published”.1

Price: R 4,150.00

1 https://www.proteaboekwinkel.com/index.php/rare-africana/history/south-african-history/the-fighting-police-of-south-africa.html

6

7

8

Maj-Gen IP de Villiers, CB, MC. Known to the British Embassy in personal correspondence as “Peter”, to some as in the force as “IP” while

the men called him “Mussolini” because he was a strict disciplinarian. He was appointed first as Lieut-

Colonel and as Commissioner of Police carried the rank of “Colonel”. When War broke out he was

appointed Major-General, two other police officers rose to the rank of Brigadier, they were Bobby Palmer

and Fred Cooper.

Editorial / Redaksioneel: The Fighting Police of southern Africa “The police are paid to be killed” – Gen Coen Brits to Gen Louis Botha

Turning to General Brits he (that is Gen Louis Botha) said: “Do you think you could get your men together, and gallop those guns like we used to do the English?” Old Koen (sic) looked the long smooth glacis of sand leading down to the guns, and the dark rocks on either side of them, and he said: “General, my men are now all spread out among the rocks; it would take too long to collect them. Let Trew try with the Bodyguard and we will support him; the police are paid to be killed.”2

Oom Coen or rather

Major-General Coenraad

Jacobus “Coen” Brits (18

April1869 – 17 July 1932).3

This General was a real

Boer general – an

interesting character - one

needs to do a book on him!

Lt-Col Henry Freame ‘Harry”

Trew (1872 – 1948) An Aus-

tralian by birth, commissioned

in the Australian Forces in

1890, during the Anglo Boer

War he joined the SA

Constabulary. Author of two

books. 4

Dedication: Sgt Rodney Fall This piece of work – which is work in Progress - is dedicated to a late friend and colleague, No 47174 Sgt

RG Fall from King’s Rest Police Station on the Bluff in Durban who died in Rhodesia whilst on active

service. Rodney came from Cape Town and died on 1 November 1968.5,6. We will never forget our old

comrades! Salute.

2 Trew, HF: Botha Treks, Blackie & Son, London (1936); page 106.

3 Uys, I: South African Military Who’s who 1452 – 1992 , Fortress, (1992); page 31.

4 Uys, I: South African Military Who’s who 1452 – 1992 , Fortress, (1992); page 238.

5 SAP Force Order No 3/1969 par 1 – deaths.

6 It was a Friday night, I was at the Bluff Drive-Inn when the news came through of Rodney’s death; I remember how shocked I

9

The Nongqai does not have a photo of Rodney Fall or a photo of his grave.

Contents Wie is ons? / Who are we? ........................................................................................................................... 1

Revival of the “Old” Nongqai ........................................................................................................................ 3

There is no longer a SA Police Force Museum ............................................................................................ 3

Administration ............................................................................................................................................... 3

Legalities ...................................................................................................................................................... 4

The Colour of the South African Police Force .............................................................................................. 5

The Fighting Police of South Africa: Lt TEM Thursby-Attwell ....................................................................... 5

Maj-Gen IP de Villiers, CB, MC. ................................................................................................................... 8

Editorial / Redaksioneel: The Fighting Police of southern Africa .................................................................. 8

Dedication: Sgt Rodney Fall ......................................................................................................................... 8

Vir Die Grens Veteraan: Mej Hanlie van Straaten ...................................................................................... 16

A poem: For the Noble Course: Nico Moolman .......................................................................................... 17

Boodskap van Generaal M.C.W. Geldenhuys ............................................................................................ 18

Gen Mike Geldenhuys and Gen HV “Vic” Verster at the Volkskas-siege .................................................... 19

Work in Progress ........................................................................................................................................ 19

“Why Police?” .......................................................................................................................................... 19

The Problem ............................................................................................................................................ 19

What is the history? ................................................................................................................................. 19

“No Nonsense Police Generals” and SADF Admirals & Generals ........................................................... 21

Some notes on the Fighting Police of South Africa .................................................................................... 23

From Horses to Casspirs......................................................................................................................... 23

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 23

Anglo Boer War (1899-1902) .................................................................................................................. 23

My Lewe en Strewe ................................................................................................................................. 26

Van Hugenoot tot Boer ............................................................................................................................ 27

1906 Bambatha Rebellion and 1907 Marengo-affair ............................................................................... 27

Bambatha Rebellion ............................................................................................................................ 28

Marengo-affair: Cape Police & CMR ....................................................................................................... 28

The Nongqayi .......................................................................................................................................... 29

Illustrious fighting past ............................................................................................................................. 29

1910: National Police for South Africa ........................................................................................................ 30

was. I could simply not believe it. We worked the same shift and later he also became a van driver, it was also the time that we “lost” Const Danie du Toit from our next-door police station, SAP Wentworth. See http://takemeback.to/01-November-1968

10

Conversation between Gen Louis Botha and Harry Trew ....................................................................... 30

1912 South African National Native Congress ........................................................................................ 30

1913: Training ......................................................................................................................................... 30

Gen Louis Botha: 1913 – SA Police ........................................................................................................ 31

1913 – SA Mounted Rifles....................................................................................................................... 31

The birth of the SAP & its later history .................................................................................................... 33

1913: Internal Security: Union of South Africa......................................................................................... 34

Internal Security: Some problems ........................................................................................................... 34

1913 Mahatma Ghandi - Satyagraha ...................................................................................................... 34

1913 Strikes ............................................................................................................................................ 34

1914 Strike - Martial law .......................................................................................................................... 36

1914 Rebellion ........................................................................................................................................ 36

The Foster Gang: May & Hamilton .......................................................................................................... 36

An Uneasy Anger: M Brien ...................................................................................................................... 38

1914: “Alles zal recht kom” ...................................................................................................................... 39

Report: Outbreak of the rebellion................................................................................................................ 40

Report Judicial Commission of Inquiry .................................................................................................... 40

World War I (1914-1918) ............................................................................................................................ 40

GSWA ................................................................................................................................................. 40

1916: SAP Springboks ............................................................................................................................ 42

1915: Internal Security: South Africa West Africa .................................................................................... 43

Between The Wars ..................................................................................................................................... 43

1919 ........................................................................................................................................................ 43

1920 ........................................................................................................................................................ 44

1920: A Civilian Central Intelligence Organisation (CCIO): War of the Mind ........................................... 44

1921 ........................................................................................................................................................ 45

1922 Rand Rebellion ............................................................................................................................... 45

Report & Photographs: Internecine Strife: Phil Beck ............................................................................... 45

1922 Bondelswart ................................................................................................................................... 48

1926 SAP Mobile Unit: Umtata ................................................................................................................ 49

1929 Communist Expansion ................................................................................................................... 50

Establishment of the Special Branch ............................................................................................. 50

1930’s National Socialism in South-West Africa ......................................................................................... 50

1938 Palestine Troubles ............................................................................................................................. 52

1939 Captain Jan Taillard in South West Africa ...................................................................................... 56

First Police Mortar Detachment at Windhoek .......................................................................................... 59

11

Symbol: Nazism & Ossewabrandwag ......................................................................................................... 60

Choices ...................................................................................................................................................... 61

Turmoil ....................................................................................................................................................... 62

WORLD WAR ll (1939-1945) ...................................................................................................................... 62

Brig FW Cooper, DSO: Architect of the SAP Brigade, 6th SAI .................................................................... 63

2nd Infantry Division (South Africa) ............................................................................................................ 64

History ..................................................................................................................................................... 65

Formation ............................................................................................................................................ 65

Deployment to Egypt] .......................................................................................................................... 65

Operations ............................................................................................................................................... 65

Bardia and the Western Desert ........................................................................................................... 65

"Fortress Tobruk" ................................................................................................................................ 66

Surrender ............................................................................................................................................ 66

The remaining Brigade ........................................................................................................................ 66

Order of battle ......................................................................................................................................... 66

Initial Operational Deployment: 2 December 1941 .............................................................................. 66

Order of Battle: The Fall of Tobruk ...................................................................................................... 67

Theatres of operation .............................................................................................................................. 68

Battles, actions and engagements .......................................................................................................... 68

Notes ....................................................................................................................................................... 68

Citations .................................................................................................................................................. 68

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ 68

SAP in North Africa: Kenya & Abyssinia ................................................................................................. 68

Kenya .................................................................................................................................................. 68

Some members of No1 Motor Cycle Company ........................................................................................ 69

Sgt-Maj Bill Joyner .............................................................................................................................. 69

Capt (Sub-Insp) Baseley ..................................................................................................................... 70

Abyssinia No1 Motor Cycle Company (Police): Lt-Col William Marshall ................................................. 70

The Police Brigade - 6th South African Infantry ........................................................................................... 71

The SAP Brigade in North Africa ............................................................................................................. 72

Scoreboard .............................................................................................................................................. 73

Force Numbers: UDF and SAP On Active Duty ...................................................................................... 74

SA Police as POW .................................................................................................................................. 74

Sgt Laurie du Preez ............................................................................................................................. 76

Oom Fred Geldenhuis ............................................................................................................................. 76

“Vlug na Vryheid” .................................................................................................................................... 77

12

SAP Holiday Camp: Port Edward ............................................................................................................... 79

Silent Prayer ............................................................................................................................................ 80

Introduction - 1945 Post war and the Apartheid years ................................................................................ 80

First the international arena ..................................................................................................................... 80

Preamble to the UN Charter .................................................................................................................... 80

Special Branch ........................................................................................................................................ 82

1948 – 1989 National Party comes to Power - Introduction: ....................................................................... 83

A factual book on Lt-Gen HJ van den Bergh? ......................................................................................... 85

1949 – Indian / Zulu Riots Natal ................................................................................................................. 85

Police reinforcements by air to Natal ....................................................................................................... 86

1950’s ......................................................................................................................................................... 87

Black Nationalism ....................................................................................................................................... 89

The Post War Pressure on the British Commonwealth ........................................................................... 90

The South African Communist Party ....................................................................................................... 92

1951 Malaya ............................................................................................................................................... 94

1951 Korea ................................................................................................................................................. 95

1952 Malaya: Police Action ..................................................................................................................... 97

1952: SAP in Kenya ................................................................................................................................... 98

A quest for Strategic Intelligence: SA Police ........................................................................................... 98

1953 Kenya Action against Mau-Mau ....................................................................................................... 100

Gen ....................................................................................................................................................... 102

Police Commissioners of Southern Africa visit the SAP ........................................................................ 103

Sophiatown ........................................................................................................................................... 104

1955 Security Branch ............................................................................................................................... 104

1950 - Murder of Police on Mounted Patrol: 27 November, Witsieshoek: ................................................ 105

27 November 1950 ................................................................................................................................ 106

Tactful Approach ................................................................................................................................... 107

According to the Police Report .......................................................................................................... 107

1956 – Bergville ........................................................................................................................................ 107

1959 Saracens ......................................................................................................................................... 109

1958: Strongmen promoted to Commissioned rank .............................................................................. 110

1959:Mobile Unit in Transkei ................................................................................................................. 110

1960 SAP Mobile Unit: Mt Ayliff ............................................................................................................ 111

Military attaches .................................................................................................................................... 111

Cato Manor 23 January 1960 ................................................................................................................... 111

Police from the Congo ........................................................................................................................... 112

13

3 Feb 1960: “Winds of Change” ............................................................................................................ 112

The Speech as made to parliament on 3 February 1960 ...................................................................... 113

Western Powers ................................................................................................................................ 114

Communists ...................................................................................................................................... 114

Non-committed .................................................................................................................................. 114

Will they be drawn into the Communist camp? ................................................................................. 114

What is at trial? .................................................................................................................................. 114

Mr Harold McMillan and the Police in Soweto .......................................................................................... 115

Sharpeville - 1960..................................................................................................................................... 116

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 116

Judicial Commission ................................................................................................................................. 116

1. Vanderbijlpark ................................................................................................................................... 116

Organisers at work ............................................................................................................................ 116

Head-Constable Coetzee .................................................................................................................. 116

Threats of violence ............................................................................................................................ 116

March Orderly to Vanderbijlpark ........................................................................................................ 117

Crowd told to disperse ....................................................................................................................... 117

Reinforcements: Capt EG Cawood ................................................................................................... 117

Crowd warned force would be used .................................................................................................. 117

Dispersal order repeated: Tear Gas and Baton Charge .................................................................... 117

Police Chief molested: Shots ........................................................................................................... 117

Protest ends in this area .................................................................................................................... 118

2. Evaton ............................................................................................................................................... 118

Lt. van Eeden .................................................................................................................................... 118

SAAF ................................................................................................................................................. 118

3. SHARPEVILLE .................................................................................................................................. 118

Campaign Activity Expected .................................................................................................................. 118

Eve of Action: Sgt. Grobler .................................................................................................................... 118

Telephone cut.................................................................................................................................... 119

Baton Charge ........................................................................................................................................ 119

Police reinforcements arrive .................................................................................................................. 119

Intimidation by PAC ............................................................................................................................... 119

Next Phase of Intimidation by PAC in Seeiso Street ......................................................................... 119

Crowd increases - teargas used ........................................................................................................ 120

Police Commandant's order ignored ..................................................................................................... 120

Sgt Moses Nkosi ............................................................................................................................... 120

14

Baton charge and shots fired............................................................................................................. 120

Capt Coetzee ........................................................................................................................................ 120

Capt van der Linde ................................................................................................................................ 120

Capt Theron .......................................................................................................................................... 121

Capt Theron and Lt Visser .................................................................................................................... 121

Arrival: Security Police .......................................................................................................................... 121

Crowd hostile ........................................................................................................................................ 121

Security Chief interrogates leaders ................................................................................................... 121

Lt-Col Pienaar: Deputy Commissioner takes command ........................................................................ 122

SAP Strength ........................................................................................................................................ 122

Weapons and Ammunition .................................................................................................................... 122

Crowd unarmed ..................................................................................................................................... 123

Lt-Col Pienaar: No emergency instructions issued ................................................................................ 123

The police expected attack .................................................................................................................... 124

Detention Affected Crowd ..................................................................................................................... 124

Crowd burst through gates .................................................................................................................... 124

Police evidence ..................................................................................................................................... 124

Commissioner's Findings ...................................................................................................................... 125

Exhibit: Baton used at Sharpeville ..................................................................................................... 126

Rand Daily Mail ................................................................................................................................. 127

Exhibit: Tear Gas used at Sharpeville ............................................................................................... 127

Pondoland ................................................................................................................................................ 131

1960 - 1961 Pondoland ......................................................................................................................... 131

1962 SAP Mobile Unit: Transkei ........................................................................................................... 132

ANC, PAC AND SWAPO .......................................................................................................................... 132

RIVONIA 11 JULY 1963 AND RIVONIA TRIALS ..................................................................................... 133

Mobile Units: Col PJ ‘Pat’ Dillon ............................................................................................................... 134

A SA Police View of Terrorists .................................................................................................................. 134

East Block Involvement ............................................................................................................................ 135

Ongulumbashe / Ovamboland (1966) ....................................................................................................... 135

Rhodesia (1967-1975) .............................................................................................................................. 136

Fox Street Siege (1974) ........................................................................................................................... 136

Soweto (1976) ....................................................................................................................................... 137

COIN, Special Task Force and Security Branch ....................................................................................... 137

Task Force (1976) .................................................................................................................................... 138

Silverton Bank Siege (1980) ..................................................................................................................... 138

15

1979 Koevoet ........................................................................................................................................... 138

Selous Scouts ................................................................................................................................... 138

1989 Cold War ......................................................................................................................................... 139

Some examples of Propaganda ............................................................................................................... 139

SAP/SADF Cooperation ........................................................................................................................ 141

Unrest and the State Of Emergency (1984 - 1990) .................................................................................. 142

Prelude to Democracy (1990 - 1994) ........................................................................................................ 143

Elections and SAP .................................................................................................................................... 143

Some Books on the “Fighting Police of South Africa” ............................................................................... 143

Van Ovamboland tot Masjonaland: Louis Lubbe ................................................................................... 143

Spoor van die Heuningby: T Smit .......................................................................................................... 144

Koevoet: The Men Speak ......................................................................................................................... 146

Brewers, Beerhalls and Boycotts: P la Hausse ..................................................................................... 147

Zulu Zulu Foxtrot: A Durand .................................................................................................................. 148

Monthly Journal: Armed Forces ............................................................................................................ 149

Polisieavonture in Suidwes-Afrika: PC Swanepoel ............................................................................... 150

Really Inside Boss: PC Swanepoel ....................................................................................................... 151

Other useful books ............................................................................................................................ 151

Saturday’s soldiers: The Hunters Group: L Els ..................................................................................... 152

The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa ........................................................................... 154

Uit Nood gebore: PJ Wessels ............................................................................................................... 155

Van Depot tot Duitswes: Genl C Crafford .............................................................................................. 156

The Worlld’s Secret Police: B Quarrie ................................................................................................... 157

Storm & Sunshine in South Africa: Rosamund Southy .......................................................................... 158

Gallantry Awards of the South African Police: 1913 – 1994: T King ...................................................... 159

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 160

(A) State Police or a National Police ..................................................................................................... 160

(B) The Regional Police ........................................................................................................................ 161

Police view of Politicians .......................................................................................................................... 161

Soweto Police Chief calls it a day ......................................................................................................... 161

Some fundamental differences between the police and the Defence Force ......................................... 161

Conclusion iro the SA Police ................................................................................................................. 162

The thin blue dotted line ........................................................................................................................... 162

One of our SAP Veterans: Capt Martin Loubser................................................................................ 164

Groete / Greetings .................................................................................................................................... 164

16

Vir Die Grens Veteraan: Mej Hanlie van Straaten VIR DIE GRENS VETERAAN

Man, reg of verkeerd

Dit was oorlog

Die grens moes ons bewaak

Sodat selfs jy wat nou ‘n klip gooi

Saans veilig in jou bed kon slaap

Baie van ons was nog seuns

Met ‘n R1 aan die sy en bang

Maar dit was hel op die grens

Dit maak van ‘n seun ‘n man

Ons het geantwoord op die roepstem

Ons het geoffer wat dit vra

Want dit was oorlog op die grens

En ons was kinders van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika!

Ek vra niemand om verskoning

Ek het gedoen wat ek moes doen

Ek koester ook geen wrok nie

Ou vyande raak dikwels versoen

Maar jy wat vandag kyk na die grens veteraan

Met ‘n hart so vol van oordeel

Weet elke saak het twee kante

En die blaam sal ons maar moet deel

Want ook by ons was daar verliese

Van ‘n seun, man, broer of kameraad

17

Ja en ons harte ween ook oor ons makkers

Wat ons iewers op die grens moes agterlaat...

Hanlie van Straaten ©

Nigel.

22 Junie 2016.

A poem: For the Noble Course: Nico Moolman For the Noble Cause

I am what I am when I am dressed in Blue.

A Policeman with a mission ,

Always faithful to my country and to honour you.

I am hated by all criminals because I took an oath,

To serve and to protect. And I’m doing both.

It is a privilege for me to assist where I can

To help those in need, being it child, woman or man.

My heart cries when I have to knock on a door,

Telling those waiting what they never heard before.

Smiling from ear to ear if someone walks past me and say:

”Hello Officer, …Have a nice day”

The hurt stays with me when a slow march command:

Saluting a flag covered comrade to a lone bugle’s sound.

Building a career while serving the cause,

Is the reason I joined our noble Police Force.

In my old age

I am at peace and content.

18

Since all I ever met whilst serving

..........................................Became a best friend !!

Nico Moolman: 23rd July,2016.

Boodskap van Generaal M.C.W. Geldenhuys

Boodskap van Generaal M.C.W. Geldenhuys

(Kommissaris van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie, 1978-1983)

Manne, die spreekwoord lui: Oudword is nie vir sissies nie maar ek kan getuig dat polisieman wees

beslis ook nie vir sissies is nie!

Baie van u was maar pas uit die polisiekollege toe u die onbekende

moes in om deel te wees van die bosoorlog met sy muskiete en sy

uiterste toestande van te veel reën en versengende hitte en dan ook

die vyand wat iewers in die ruigtes wag met ʼn AK47 sekuur op u

gerig. Maar die ergste van alles was sekerlik die koue vingers van

vrees wat elke jong hart soos ʼn ystervuis omklem het en die

ongekende eensaamheid wat saans na sononder soos ʼn swaar

kombers oor u toegesak het.

Dit was hier waar die dood vir u ʼn werklikheid geword het toe ʼn

makker wat nog minute gelede met u geskerts het, deur ʼn vyandelike

koeël getref is – noodlottig!

Dit is hier waar u tragedie in sy uiterste vorm leer ken het, toe iemand

ʼn arm, ʼn been, ʼn oog verloor het in ʼn landmynontploffing. Ja en die

vrees wat nooit opgehou het om u te agtervolg nie se alewige influisteringe: Sal ek ooit lewendig

anderkant uitkom? Sal ek ooit weer my eie mense sien?

Ek wil vir u sê dat ek in my hart diep bedroef was elke maal as daar tydens ʼn militêrebegrafnis afskeid

geneem is van een van ons manne op die grens en ek bring hulde aan elkeen van hulle wat gesterf het

in die uitvoering van hul pligte as polisiemanne. Ek bring ook hulde aan elke polisieman wat sy lewe

verloor het in die handhawing van wet en orde. En ek salueer u, die veteraan polisieman wat op ons

grense en in die destydse Rhodesië geveg het en u wat ook binnelands wet en orde gehandhaaf het,

ten spyte van dikwels uiters moeilike omstandighede.

Vir my was dit ‘n Godgegewe voorreg om by so ʼn onverskrokke en gemotiveerde groep polisiemanne

soos u betrokke te kon wees.

God seën u.

Generaal Mike Geldenhuys, SED, SOO, SD, OO, SOE

19

Gen Mike Geldenhuys and Gen HV “Vic” Verster at the Volkskas-siege

Work in Progress

Work in Progress: Please note that that this edition focuses police action on the sub-continent of southern

Africa from 1652

“Why Police?”

The first and foremost question to ask is: “Why Police?”

Well, in South Africa it is not a strange question. I was once enjoying a quiet beer in the bar at the

Harcourt Hotel when I overheard two English speakers. They were speaking about the then war in

Vietnam. “Man, the Yanks should send a couple of SAP Brigades to Vietnam. The SAP will surely sort

those Vietcong’s out!” That was the perception of the Durban public about the SA Police and the

confidence they had in us. Silently in my corner I felt proud of the police. Those days the police were in

pound seats, we hit the headlines everyday with good work! Our Divisional Commissioner was Col CC

“Curt” von Keyserlingk and himself a War Veteran like his father.

The Problem “The problem started with the police force as long as the Police Brigade in World War 2. They always like the idea of military involvement ....” 7

What is the history? There are many examples, take the origin of the Natal Mounted Police. They were founded in 1874 during

or after the Langibilele revolution. It was found that police were cheaper to maintain than a standing army.

If you have police – let’s say state or colonial police – you could use them as police and when necessary

as soldiers. However it difficult to deploy soldiers as policemen, I am told.

When we look carefully at the history of our sub-continent we find that in the British Colonies and in the

Boer Republics a different kind of police existed than that of, say England. The Irish model of a

constabulary type of police has first set the example, first for Canada with the North West Mounted Police.

The model was then applied to the rest of the Britain’s colonies. We as South Africans and former

7 Gen Constant Viljoen quoted by Hilton Hamman: Days of the Generals, Zebra, 2001, page 9.

20

members of the British Commonwealth always look for examples in the English-speaking world. We never

look at the Continent where a much older system of policing existed.

For years I have thought of the concept of the difference between a police force or police service and a

constabulary.

Let’s examine what the police do: They have preventative, reactive and detection duties. They are

visible as symbols of decency, we trust them because they represent

authority and powers of the State; they are protectors of the public, their

mere presence is there to prevent crime, they maintain law and order

including the direction of traffic. By directing traffic we see in practice that it

is actually there that they proverbial “law and order” begins. (This is

something the SAP slowly delegated to the local law enforcement bodies.)

We find the police in cities but we also have village or parish constables

present throughout the country. If we take England as an example we see

that the police serve in a mainly homogenous society. In Britain’s early

history the British Army was brought in to subdue the riotous people. Since

1829 we find British Police doing their duty – unarmed - amongst the

people.

We can make a law which says: “the public at large determine the police

they would have.” In other word the public they serve determine the type of

police: We have city police, town police, water police and originally the foot

and traffic police. This model works for the town and cities in South Africa

however in the rural areas we needed the mounted police – they in contrast

to the civil police – were armed with rifles and some even had guns and machine guns. These police were

military or semi-miliary in nature.

If we look at the second occupation of the Cape Colony, Inspector King was brought out from Scotland

Yard to police Cape Town and environs. It was found that this model was unsuitable for rural areas.

Mounted and armed police had to deal with stock theft, faction fighting, revolts, rebellions and incursions.

This gave rise to para-military police or the semi-military army detachments. Examples are the Cape

Mounted Rifles, the Frontier Mounted and Armed Police and the South African Mounted Rifles.

Being a policeman is tough (and varied and interesting). If you were a member of the former South African

Police i.e. a state or national policeman, one never knows what going to happen next? You could be sent

away on a moment’s notice to fetch a prisoner, in say Australia or pack your kit and leave on detached

duty somewhere or be sent to Rhodesia.

21

“No Nonsense Police Generals” and SADF Admirals & Generals

General confessed that it was very difficult when general Mike Geldenhuys became Commissioner of

Police. General Malan said Mike Geldenhuys was really hardegat. His feeling was: what did we [the SADF]

know? We were just weekend soldiers. The police would see everything right.” 8 This author knows various

police generals in the photograph:

Gen MCW “Mike” Geldenhuys: Many of us know the General for many years, yes he is hardegat! He was a brilliant detective, went back to uniform, became regional commander of the Security Branch in the Eastern Cape, later head of the Republican Intelligence, and deputy head of the Bureau for State Security. He came back to the SA Police as head of the Security Branch and later Commissioner of Police. Operation Koevoet was formed on his watch at the request of Gen Magnus Malan9. See book: Van Kaalvoetseun tot kommissaris.

Lt-Gen FLC “Frikkie” Engels: He knows the hard side of combating faction fighting in Natal & Port Natal. Later he was the OC of the Port Natal Mobile Unit. He saw the first action at Ongulumbashe op 26 Aug 1966. He as academically very well qualified.

Lt-Genl CF “Ziets” Zietsman: Head of Security Branch & CID. He is also an old “Durban policeman”. (To the press he is known as Christie.)

Gen PJ Coetzee: Head of the Security Branch and later a Commissioner of Police. He was academically well qualified and a true gentleman. He is called a “master spy.” After service in the SA Police he had a position in Foreign Affairs and attached to the SAP Academy in Graaff-Reinet.

8 Hamman, H: Days of the Generals, Zebra 2001

9 In a personal conversation between General MCW Geldenhuys and Brig Hennie Heymans

22

Lt-Gen HV Verster: World War 2: Veteran, who saw service in SAAF. He saw service in Europe and when peace came he joined the SAP and followed in his father’s footsteps. He was seconded to the Bureau for State Security, came back to the SAP and later became head of Counter-Insurgency. A brilliant officer! (He is the son of Lt-Col Frank Verster, Deputy Commissioner for the Transvaal and OC of the SAP Squad who invaded SWA, detained the Nazi’s, prevented a putsch and they also took over the SWAP.

Maj-Gen Laubscher: As Senior Staff Officer at Head Office he has a very responsible portfolio, in other words he is the general officer responsible for many tasks attached to the Commissioner’s office and at Head Office. At that stage nominally the head of the Uniform Branch. He also decides which officers would be transferred, promoted and which officers would be nominated for various courses including Staff Courses at the SADF.

The Servamus dated October 1980 pose the question: “Is ons generaals ongenaakbare heersers?” [Are our generals hard-line (ie difficult, awkward, mighty) rulers?] To be at the head of a tough organisation one needs tough and hard leaders – that how we grew up! It would also seem as if our Defence Force Generals had their problems with the boys in blue? Generally the police and the army sit on opposite sides; I have found they do not understand one another clearly. There are various problems: When to use the defence force against your own people? Do you want a civil war? Should the police arrest “guerrillas” or should the defence force fight them in battle? Should the Defence Force have “invaded” Rhodesia? Is the current crime situation in South Africa a legacy of the SA Police? The SA Police in my view placed internal stability and security above everything else. Today we have lost the art of classical policing.

23

Some notes on the Fighting Police of South Africa

From Horses to Casspirs

Introduction Anyone interested in low intensity conflict, irregular warfare and counter-insurgency supported by good

field intelligence will be interested in para-military police of Southern Africa. The roots of the former South

African Police Force are to be found in various military and semi-military forces in Southern Africa, such as

the Frontier Mounted and Armed Police, Cape Mounted Rifles, Cape Mounted Police, Natal Mounted

Police, Natal Police, British South Africa Police (of Rhodesia) and the ZARP’s (Zuid-Afrikaansche

Republiek Politie) and the South African Mounted Rifles. Major HG Moore who was seconded to the

Frontier Mounted and Armed Police was the first person in Southern Africa to be awarded the coveted

Victoria Cross.

Most Police in Southern Africa were ‘fighting police’ and in many cases the local, first line of defence. The

role of the British Army, the North West Mounted Police of Canada – later the world famous Royal

Canadian Mounted Police and the Royal Ulster Constabulary has also moulded the former South African

Police Force into a well disciplined fighting force.

I think it is fair to state that “your public decides the type of police they would like to have”. In highly

civilised densly populated areas you will find the “Bobby on the Beat” or in the East the “Community Police

Stations”. In tough area the police will be armed to counter the threat facing them, from a hidden baton to a

firearm.

Anglo Boer War (1899-1902) In the beginning the Colonial police forces in Southern Africa consisted mainly of former soldiers and

recruits from England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland. However when the South African Constabulary was

established during the Anglo-Boer War to police the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Swaziland they

had recruits and members from various police forces in the British Commonwealth. The South African

Constabulary with the founder, Major-General RS Baden Powell, had many members of the North West

Mounted Police in their ranks as well as Australian Bushmen and Irishmen. Tough men, men who could

ride, fight and focus on their set goals. They always tried to get their man!

We know of at least one Red Indian tracker in the South African Constabulary and later in the Transvaal

Police, Constable William Eagle. He died in the Elim Hospital during 1908 in an encounter with a lion at

Fort Edward (formerly Boer fort, then called Fort Hendrina) in the Spelonken area of the Northern

Transvaal.

24

Anglo Boer War: Photos from the collection of MC Heunis. War dictates that that armed police play an

important role in national security.

On the conventional side the ZARP’s of President Paul Kruger fought well in Anglo-Boer War at places like

Colesberg and stood firm at the last conventional battle at Berg-en-Dal also known as Dalmanutha). Many

Canadians, Australians and Irishmen who fought on the British side against the Boers stayed in South

Africa. Many of these men became officers in the police like Col Sam Steele, Lt-Col HF ‘Harry’ Trew and

Lt-Col RS Godley.

Both Lt-Col Godley and Maj-Gen Bobby Palmer of the SA Police first served in the BSAP of Rhodesia –

like the British Spy-master; Sir Percy Sillitoe.

25

Lt-Col Godley, OBE, KPM Maj-Gen Bobby Palmer, CVO,

KPM, DSO

Lt-Gen Lord RS Baden Powell,

GCVO, KCB

Cmdt GMJ van Dam. Photo: Dr

Arnold van Dyk

Lt Hart – hardened fighter.

Photo : Mr Z du Plessis.

Col (later Maj-Gen) Steele, SA

Constabulary former NW

Mounted Police (Canada)

26

My Lewe en Strewe

27

Van Hugenoot tot Boer

A very interesting book on “police history” and covers the “Special Police”, the “Transvaal Police” and the

South African Police in the early days – HBH.

1906 Bambatha Rebellion and 1907 Marengo-affair Police in South Africa fought in many campaigns before and the Anglo-Boer War and before Union e.g. in

the Bambatha Rebellion of 1906 and the 1907 Marengo-affair. Kaiser Wilhelm II granted a German

medal to men of the Cape Mounted Police and Cape Mounted Rifles, for their work under

28

Major Elliot of the Cape Mounted Police against the notorious rebel, Chief Marengo, who

crossed with his party from South-West Africa into Cape Colony in 1907 and there met his fate.

Bambatha Rebellion

1906 Mapumulo Gaol: The “Rebel” Chiefs Meseni and Ndhlovu Ka Timuni

Marengo-affair: Cape Police & CMR

29

Photo the Nongqai 1946-07-825.

The Nongqayi

Illustrious fighting past The former South African Police Force and its predecessors on British and Boer side has had an illustrious

fighting past. Broadly speaking, the police in the British Colonies and Boer Republics developed as forces

that were largely used to safeguard the vital interests of the state; protect the white populace in cities,

dorps and also in outlaying farms, trading posts and to prevent faction fighting amongst the various

belligerent tribes (e.g. the Umtata Mobile Unit, Cape Mounted Rifles & SA Mounted Rifles) and stock theft.

Take into account Tribal Police and their support to the then Bantu Affairs Commissioner

30

1910: National Police for South Africa

Conversation between Gen Louis Botha and Harry Trew I then asked him why at Union the control of the police had been put in the

hands of the Central Government, and not entrusted to the Provincial

Authorities.

He said, “I had read about the Civil War in the United States between the

Federal and Confederate States over the Negro question; some day I am

afraid there is going to be grave trouble between the north and south in

South Africa over native policy.

If that day comes, I do not want any of the provinces to have any armed forces at their disposal.10,11

The South African Police Force was a tough semi-military force based on the lines of a military

constabulary or gendarmerie. The focus was on discipline, riding, shooting and drill. Not only was the

South African Police Force responsible for normal police duties but it was used to safeguard the vital

domestic national security and interests of the country.

The police gathered political information that affected the internal stability. They acted accordingly to

preserve the internal stability of the Union of South Africa and later the Republic of South Africa. In some

cases the Police was used to fight the political battles’ of both British and South African nationalists.

For a while, following the formation of the Union of South Africa on 31 May 1910, the various pre-existing

colonial police forces continued to operate independently, each under their own commissioner.

1912 South African National Native Congress The forerunner of the African National Congress, the South African National Native Congress established

during 1912 in Bloemfontein, later became a target of the SA Communist Party, which was founded in

Cape Town during 1921.

1913: Training “For over a year, courses of instruction had been held at the Depot of the Transvaal Police in Pretoria, and

at the School of Musketry at Tempe, near Bloemfontein, under the aegis of the Imperial Government, in

order to train both Officers and selected N.C.O.s required as a nucleus for the new Military

Establishments—both for the Permanent Force and for the Active Citizen Forces. A number of Military

Districts had been created and staffs had to be selected for each. This caused a further heavy drainage

from the pre-Union Police Forces as all those selected were allocated to the South African Mounted Rifles

irrespective of where their permanent station happened to be.”12

10

Trew 1936: 74

11 This conversation took place during 1915 in German South West Africa – Hennie Heymans.

12 Brig FW Cooper 1963 Justitia

31

Gen Louis Botha: 1913 – SA Police However, the concept of local and provincial police forces was later discarded by General Louis Botha in

favour of a single national police force. The South African Police Force was established on 1 April 1913.

Although the South African Police Force was the first national police force, it initially only operated in

certain parts of the Union of South Africa.

Fortunately we have Col Trew as a witness, who tells us that gen Louis Botha wanted a national police

force instead of regional or provincial police. There were no objections to local borough police forces.

(I think the model of the South African Constabulary that policed the former Boer Republics and Swaziland

up to 1908 was the model chosen by Gen Both and his assistant Gen JC Smuts. This model came in

handy because as a national police force they could be applied anywhere even outside the borders of

South Africa.)

1913 – SA Mounted Rifles Another force, which policed the densely populated black areas of South Africa, in

terms of Section 12(4) of the Defence Act, was the South African Mounted Rifles

(SAMR), which fell under the Department of Defence. They were Permanent Force

Police. The reasoning was that an armed force would better serve the interests of

the country, and would better be able to suppress faction fighting and prevent stock

theft. The Criminal Investigation Department in these traditional black areas

remained under the control of the Commissioner of the South African Police Force.

This force never excelled as a police force because soon after being established

they went off to war and the newly established SAP/ZAP had to fill the void left by the SAMR. One should

also take into account that the whole police force of Natal was transferred to the UDF in 1913 as well as

some police in the Cape.

32

33

The birth of the SAP & its later history

34

1913: Internal Security: Union of South Africa As far as intelligence gathering from black areas was concerned, each tribal district had a magistrate who

liaised with the various chiefs and headmen and with government, via a chief magistrate, who was

responsible to the Minister of Native Affairs. On ground level little happened that escaped the attention of

these fine administrators of the rural native areas. In most cases the government, SAMR or South African

Police Force was able to act pro-actively because of the quality of the information at their disposal and

thus advert tribal wars.

One of the main reasons why, from its inception, the Commissioner of Police had a budget vote for secret

service work is because the Police are responsible for the preservation of internal security. The Police was

responsible for domestic intelligence in the whole of the Union of South Africa.

Internal Security: Some problems Even before the formation of the Union a difficult security situation existed. It had started in Kimberley,

when thousands of European fortune hunters flocked there after the discovery of diamonds. Threats from

trade unions, subversives and rising Black Nationalism faced South Africa. Later trade unionism,

Bolshevism, Communism, socialism and Marxism gained a foothold on the Witwatersrand Goldfields and

in some large cities and towns. These conditions were exacerbated by an influx of Russian Jews,

Lithuanians and other East European immigrants, well disposed towards Communism and Socialism

because of the conditions prevailing in their countries before the Russian Revolution of 1917. Once again

the Police was engaged in surveillance and other quasi-political action.

The Law and the Police became the government's quick-fix solution to labour and political problems. (Back

to: “Why Police?”)

After the Anglo-Boer War some poor-white Afrikaners also became Communists and trade unionists as did

some well-educated Afrikaners, such as Dr Edward Roux and Adv Bram Fischer. Poor white women, who

were employed as garment workers after the Anglo-Boer War, were also exploited and therefore some

were drawn to Communism.

1913 Mahatma Ghandi - Satyagraha During November 1913 Mahatma Ghandi promoted passive resistance, called Satyagraha, amongst his

Indian followers. (He was by now known to the Natal Police and the Durban Borough Police.) This

campaign alarmed the State: when Ghandi and approximately 2 000 followers illegally crossed the Natal

border into the Transvaal, the Police had to act.

Mr Mahatma Ghandi and General JC Smuts were involved in personal talks. A Commission was appointed

to investigate their grievances.13

1913 Strikes During 1913 strikes took place and the South African Police was the “cure” prescribed by government.

Policemen were sent from all over South Africa to the Witwatersrand. Nothing did more to form a single

unified force than the two deployments on the Witwatersrand during 1913 and 1914. Men also quickly

bought the new SAP-uniforms although they were permitted to wear their former uniform.

Brig FW Coopers tells us that the SAP had not had time to get used to the amalgamation before the 1913

mine strikes occurred on the Witwatersrand. “In June of that year it became necessary to mobilize the

SAMR and the S.A. Police and, finally, to seek the aid of the Imperial troops still in garrison,” he said. 13

Dippenaar 1988: 19

35

Policemen joining the SA Police from pre-Union Forces were allowed twelve months in which to wear out

their old uniforms of different patterns. He says although many had changed into that of the SA Police as it

became available from stores, others hung on to the old pattern.

Once again the public and the circumstances dictate the police you would use - HBH

Photo credit: The Nongqai July 1946: 826

36

Brig HF Trew says the arrival on the Witwatersrand of policemen from all over the Union thus created quite

a stir! It was something which could be better imagined than described.

To the Witwatersrand trainload after trainload of pPolice came up, bringing men from every corner of the

Union, including Natal, which was policed by the SAMR. The SAP in Natal sent their quota which included

the CID and the Water Police.

Many of the newly established police districts in the Cape included half a dozen different magisterial dis-

tricts. Each of these magisterial districts had their own little Police Force, and each such Force its own

particular uniform.

The new SAP Standing Orders had, at that time, not yet been published. Consequently most District

Commandants in the absence of Standing Orders had their own ideas of organisation, etc.

When thousands of policemen were brought together for the first time their appearance was quite

bewildering. Brig Cooper tells us the astonishment of the Deputy Commissioner in Johannesburg was

great. Men arrived with beards and side-whiskers, whilst numbers of them could have used hairpins to

help keep their untidy locks in order.14

1914 Strike - Martial law Martial law was declared during the 1914 strike. Police seized documents and a safe belonging to the

strikers. Strict censorship was enforced. Some of the labour leaders were, on the instructions of

government, illegally deported by the Police: this was one of the first covert special operations performed

by the Police after Union15. The man chosen for this task by Justice Minister De Wet and Defence Minister

Jan Smuts was Major HF “Harry” Trew.

1914 Rebellion During the 1914 Rebellion the South African Police Force provided the government with the information

they received from their agents and other sources. Police also obtained information that there was a plot to

kidnap the Prime Minister, General Louis Botha and he was given an armed Police guard. When General

Botha went to do battle in German South West Africa during 1915 the guard was increased to a hundred

men. They served under the command of Major HF Trew.

Some former Anglo-Boer War generals and their followers still awaited their opportunity to seek freedom

from Britain, at an opportune moment. This moment came when Britain declared war on Germany. At this

time Trew had a detective permanently on duty at the Pretoria station to note arrivals and departures, who

reported to Trew that Boer-Generals Beyers and De la Rey had arrived in Pretoria.

During this unstable period the there was the accidental shooting of General De la Rey by the Police. The

two Generals refused to stop at a roadblock while the Police were trying to apprehend the Foster Gang.

General de la Rey’s companion in the car, General Beyers asked the Commissioner of Police what he

(Beyers) was going to be charged with. The generals thought that the Police were spying on them and

believed, erroneously, that the Police wanted to arrest them. Malicious rumours were spread to the effect

that the Police were indeed spying on the former Boer Generals.

The Foster Gang: May & Hamilton Interesting about the Foster Gang and the Rebellion.

14

Brig FW Cooper 1963 Justitia 15

Time and space does not allow the inclusion of this great, but highly illegal, order by gen Smuts and Adv De Wet. I think one day I should publish this story? – Hennie Heymans

37

38

An Uneasy Anger: M Brien

Did the SAP spy on Gen Koos de la Rey in Sunnyside? Why did he not stop at a police roadblock?

Would he have joined the Rebels?

39

1914: “Alles zal recht kom”

40

Report: Outbreak of the rebellion

Report Judicial Commission of Inquiry

World War I (1914-1918)

GSWA

41

During World War I more than 2 000 German internees were moved from Pretoria to Pietermaritzburg,

where they were guarded by the Police; owing to the magnitude and spread of the Rebellion it was

considered advisable to move them. Anti-German riots, which occurred mainly in Durban, Pietermaritzburg

and Johannesburg, were also monitored by the Police.

Apart from the Bodyguard of General Louis Botha, a serving police officer, Major H. H. Hartigan, was given

permission to raise Hartigan’s Horse. This unit consisted of South African Policemen, amongst them the

holder of a VC earned in the Anglo-Boer War. After the Germans were defeated in South-West Africa

Hartigan’s Horse were sent to German East Africa as 7 SA Light Horse.

42

Maj HF Trew and artillerymen in police service

Seventy-three artillerymen in police service were seconded to the Union Defence Force.

1916: SAP Springboks

Source.16

As the Police had to fill the gaps left by the SAMR in the rest of the Union of South Africa, the

Commissioner refused his men permission to join up for war service. Many policemen deserted from the

Police to join the Army and were subsequently arrested and sentenced because of desertion from the

Police. In many cases a hat was sent around in court and the fine of the patriotic policeman paid by public

subscription!

One the most famous ‘deserters’ happened to be Corporal RJ “Bobby” Palmer of the South African Police

Force in Bloemfontein. He deserted the Police and joined the Army. After being returned to the Police he

went to England with permission where he joined the Royal Flying Corps where he became a pilot. After

the war he went back to his old beat in Bloemfontein. During the Second World War he became Brigadier

“Bobby” Palmer DSO & 2 bars. He was the first Commissioner of South African Police Force who started

as a Constable and reached the rank of Major General. For many years General ‘Bobby’ Palmer was the

only policeman to sport his ‘wings’ on his police tunic.

16

The Nongqai 1916 page 213 – HBH.

43

1915: Internal Security: South Africa West Africa Although it was never stated implicitly, the South African Police took over the internal security of the former

German Colony of

Southwest Africa – now

Namibia.

Between The Wars Threats and subversion

increased over the years and

the Suspect Staff of the

Criminal Investigation

Department, as the

forerunner of the Security

Branch was initially known,

practised surveillance of

subversives and suspicious

or criminal persons.

1919 Black trade unionism was

started in the Union by

Clements Kadalie, a man

from Malawi. The Industrial

and Commercial Workers

Union was founded in Cape

Town during 1919 by

Kadalie. This movement was

also targeted by the

Marxists.

The police were never

interested in bona fide trade

union, or political, or other

legal activities but only in

information that pointed to

transgressions of the law

and/or the disturbance of the

peace. In the final analysis

Police-work is usually

preventative and detection of

crime is court-directed,

through due process of Law.

[The police don’t punish –

the court’s do, however the Police are mandated to use (minimum) force if the vital national security

interests are threatened or public safety is endangered.]

44

1920 The Police assumed the policing function of the SAMR during 1920 and became responsible for the

policing of the entire country.

1920: A Civilian Central Intelligence Organisation (CCIO): War of the Mind

Make no mistake South Africa is in the sights of the USSR and the

South African Communist Party. A careful study of the history of

subversive activities make its imperative that South Africa establish

an own CCIO, or did we rely on British intelligence. It was during the

two wars that the need began to arise for an own CCIO to deal with

African, Afrikaans, Nazi and Communist activities.

The duty of the defence department is to defend the country and the

police’s information is for court directed operations and

administrative tasks. Such an organisation would have rendered

excellent work and would be ready to face the daunting task from

1950 to 1994. We lost the political war hands down! It still amazes me that two highly intelligent people,

Field Marshall JC Smuts and Dr HF Verwoerd missed the opportunity to establish a CCIO.

In the case of Field Marshal Smuts there is no excuse, he founded the “Geheime Politie” of the Zarp’s

before the 2nd Anglo Boer War. He was later to face the Nazi’s in SWA, the OB, the Stormjaers, Robey

Leibbrandt and the wrath of the Broederbond and in 1947 his first attack in the UN from Pandit Nehru.

1960 was a very, very difficult year for Dr Verwoerd and South Africa – a proverbial watershed year. He

faced Sharpeville, he faced the fury of the UN and he ignored Mr Mandela’s request to talk before

establishing a (white) republic.

We won the physical battle, but lost the ‘metaphysical’ political war to the SACP-ANC-Alliance.

The use of Intelligence and Information is far too important to be left to generals and senior staff officers

alone! The best brains in the civilian world must be employed to skilfully to counter your opponents in the

“war of the mind”!

The “war of the mind” is all about controlling and directing the will of the people! As simple as that!

Comments by Hennie Heymans: I was attached to the Security Branch and I worked amongst other

subjects also the Communist Desk. My experience shows that we had far too much work to do any

meaningful research on the SA Communist Party. There were one or two officers and one or two clerks.

We only looked superficially and fragmentally at the SACP.

It was no prerequisite to have a degree in Political Science in order to qualify to serve on that desk. I

found, and I say this with a smile on my face and a tear in the eye, that senior officers in the Security

Branch did not have the foggiest idea what communism was! The only senior officers, in my personal

experience, who knew anything meaningful of the communist ideology, were the later Police

Commissioner and Head of the Security Branch, General Johan Coetzee and Lt-Gen (Dr) Stan Schutte.

Gen Schutte worked on the Communist desk a few years before my section took the SACP activities on.

I had as a clerk, Sgt XXX, – name withheld – who had a MA-degree and whose special interest was

communism. I went to the Commissioner’s Office to see if the SA Police were prepared to promote him to

45

Commissioned Rank. (I mean one does not kick out an expert on communism behind any bush.) My

contact was a family friend of many years standing and I could speak to him in confidence. He told me in

Afrikaans: “If he wants to leave the Force let him go!” I pointed out the National Intelligence would snatch

up! “If he wants to go to National Intelligence let him go!” and that’s the reaction from a family friend.!

To prove my point in a conversation I showed Anemari Jansen (authoress) that a tried and tested police

officer who on his own admission said he hated the “communists” could not even name two points out of

10 points, why he “hated” communism with such a passion.

And now you want to tell me we did not need a CCIO then. One has to build up a corporate memory about

these matters and it takes years to gather the information on to be au fait with their modus operandi.

(When I joined the SA Police it was not even necessary for “whites” to have matric. Now if I compare what

I know of members attached to MI5 & MI6 (I have a large library on British Intelligence) and I compare

them to myself (and my colleagues) all I can say is: I am a policeman, trained in law enforcement, had to

know for e.g. the Liquor Act in toto and the Suppression of Communism Act (Act 44/1950) and the

Terrorism Act and the Terrorism Act No 83 of 1967.

Now you the reader can see why we lost the political war. Even so-called experts made fools of

themselves in court on these matters, if you don’t believe me, ask George Bizos.

1921 Special events calling for the attention of the Police were the Militant tribesmen called the “Israelites” that

clashed with the Police and Army at Bulhoek near Queenstown.. Members of the Israelite Sect attacked a

Force of 700 men strong and 163 members of the sect were unfortunately killed.

1922 Rand Rebellion Various strikes and labour unrests culminated in the Red Revolt on the Rand during 1922. This was one

of the most violent white-on-white clashes in the history of South Africa.

This took some heavy fighting to subdue and 72 soldiers and Police died while 219 were wounded.

There are masses of information on this subject available:

Krikler, J: The Rand Revolt – The 1922 insurrection and racial killing in South Africa, 2005

Oberholster, AG: Die Mynwerkerstaking, RGN, 1982.

Herd, N: 1922: The Revolt on the Rand, Blue Crane Books, 1966.

Report & Photographs: Internecine Strife: Phil Beck Peter Wood who has been researching some of the history of the 1922 Strike wrote a rather telling

account of some of the infamies he had read about. The strike came about when, in order to reduce

running costs and maintain profits, the Chamber of mines came to a unilateral decision to dismiss a large

number of white miners, lower the hourly pay rate and employ black labour for posts previously held

exclusively by white miners.

“The strikers organized Commandos who drilled and patrolled the streets and took action against ‘scabs’.

This was a time when local workers gathered outside the Boksburg Gaol and sang ‘The Red Flag.’ At one

stage the strikers were in control of Benoni and Police Captain Loftus was forced to flee when members of

the Putfontein Commando pinned the policemen down in their barracks in Bedford Street.

The Brakpan Commando was drilled by Bob Waterson and was commanded by John Garnsworthy when

46

they attacked the Brakpan Mine. The mine manager, Charles Brodigan, 20 armed mine officials and 12

special constables with Lt Vincent Brodigan tried to defend the mine property. In the melee that followed a

total of eight of the officials and constables including Lt Brodigan died. They were either shot or clubbed to

death. When peace eventually returned to the mines a monument was erected to ‘Victims of violent

internecine conflict.’”

(Peter believes that a member of the Brakpan Commando, Gerhardus Gravett, was probably a nephew of

the very able General Gravett who commanded the Boksburg Commando, known as “Gravett se Tarentaal

Koppe”, during the Boer War)

As the violence escalated the Prime Minister, General Smuts, had no alternative but to call upon the Union

Defence Force to quell the violent insurgency throughout the Witwatersrand. “Several soldiers from the

Transvaal Scottish Regiment were killed in action against the strikers at Dunswart when they were en

route for Benoni by train from Boksburg. Equipped with De Havilland DH9 fighter planes the fledgling

South African Air Force were ordered to strafe and bomb Fordsburg on the West Rand and Benoni in the

East. During the Benoni raid Lt Carey Thomas, an observer and bomb-aimer, was shot dead by a bullet

fired by striker ground fire”. Peter said: “My father, a primary school boy at the time, remembered seeing

aeroplanes flying over the Benoni West Primary School in an attempt to bomb the Worker’s Hall in Market

Street. He remembered seeing an unexploded bomb lying on the vacant stand opposite Bank’s

Pharmacy.”

Sad but true, but will mankind ever learn from the mistakes of the past – I think not!

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1922 Bondelswart During May 1922 a Police contingent of officers and men were despatched to the border with South West

Africa to deal with the uprising of the local Bondelswart tribe.17 (They went by boat from Cape Town to Port

Nolloth.)

17

For more particulars of this great Police adventure, see Cooper, Brig WF: The Nongqai June 1947 pages 739 – 741.

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1926 SAP Mobile Unit: Umtata

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1929 Communist Expansion The Police was also concerned about Communist expansion. During early 1929 Colonel IP de Villiers, the

then Commissioner of the South African Police, went on a two-month study tour to England and Europe to

discuss the Communist threat with his European counterparts. He was surprised to learn that the South

African Police knew more about Communism than his European counterparts did.

Establishment of the Special Branch On his return from Europe, Colonel De Villiers gave instructions for the establishment of a Special Branch,

to study and monitor Communism. The branch was then called the Political Branch and consisted of an

office with a staff of three. This step has been regarded as the beginning of the Security Branch. The

Suspect Staff transferred their files on subversives and people of security interest to the Political Branch.

1930’s National Socialism in South-West Africa

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Hitlerjugend in Southwest Africa

1934, Landesjugendtreffen, Windhoek,

Since 1932 Nazism had been in evidence in South-West Africa, a former German colony. The situation in

South West Africa was aggravated by the local German speakers who applied the principals of Hitler’s

National Socialism in their daily lives. During July 1934 the South African Police Force raided the Nazi

headquarters in Windhoek and confiscated various documents that clearly demonstrate how the local

Germans were subverting the South African administration in the area and how they were organising the

Nazi Party in South Africa and South-West Africa.

During 1936 the Van Zyl Commission of Inquiry was appointed to investigate the circumstances in the

mandated territory. As the territory had its own police force, the South African Police was then not overly

apprehensive about the situation in South-West Africa.

Mr Justice Van Zyl established that ‘the German element… is organised into a Nazi entity and … takes the

oath of allegiance and obedience to the leader of a foreign State through the organised hierarchy’. Taking

cognisance of the conclusion of the Van Zyl Commission, Colonel De Villiers established a special unit of

the Criminal Investigation Department to keep an eye on the situation in South West Africa. This South

African Police Force unit from the Union operated in the mandated area. Its duties were to gather

underground information and to monitor Nazi activities among the local German population.

After the publication of the report of the Van Zyl Commission, the Acting Governor-General of the Union of

South Africa issued a proclamation prohibiting aliens from membership of political organisations or public

bodies in South-West Africa. The local Nazi section in South-West Africa urged local Administration not to

declare the Deutsche Bund a political body. They made this plea in spite of the revelations and criticism of

the inner workings of the Bund. The local Germans claimed that if the constitution of the Bund were

amended in certain respects, it could be converted by a stroke of the pen into a cultural-social-economic

body. At the same time the local Germans warned the Administration that the Bund had to remain the

buttress of local Germanism. However, the Administrator of South-West Africa dissolved the Bund and the

Bund Fuhrer was forced to resign with many of its office bearers and members who were not naturalised

British subjects.

Confidential reports of the ‘special unit’ that reached the Police Commissioner in Pretoria showed good

reason for disquiet. The members of the South African Police Force noticed that flags bearing the swastika

were openly displayed at certain German residences. Swastika pennants were also displayed on the

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bonnets of cars. German residents were also hostile to Afrikaners and Jews who lived in the territory. The

South African Police Force took notice of secret nocturnal meetings where participants swore allegiance to

Chancellor Adolf Hitler. Closed meeting were held and the Hilter Jugendbund stood guard at these

meetings.

Mr Benjamin Bennett, a famous South African crime reporter, went to South West Africa to investigate the

situation and he confirms that nocturnal meetings were held, which were guarded by smart Pfadfinder

sentries ‘to give warning of prying police or other unwanted visitors’. The Germans in South West Africa

nightly tuned into the German radio stations and these Germans ‘shut themselves up with official

documents on mail day and summon meetings for the nights, attendance compulsory. They organise

camps and picnics miles from the towns and in the desert where there are more harangues and secret

messages from Berlin are passed on.’ There is no doubt this blatant show of defiance by Germans in

South-West Africa was due to the effects of subversion from German agents of influence and to continued

radio propaganda transmissions from Radio Zeesen which kept the German populace in South-West

Africa at a high level of Nazi bigotry and chauvinism.

Rumour mongering also seriously affected the stability and the security situation in South-West Africa. One

rumour that circulated in the territory was that a German troop carrier with 2 000 soldiers aboard was on its

way to Swakopmund to annexe the territory for Germany.

This was more or less the strategic situation in South-West Africa faced by the South African Police during

1939. South West Africa was a large country with a relatively small community. One difficulty facing the

South African Police was to infiltrate the close-knit German community in the territory.

1938 Palestine Troubles Not only South West Africa was restless, Palestine had troubles of its own and during 1938 the South

African Police Force was again called upon to assist. With the new British Military authorities taking

command in Palestine the pace was quickening. A curfew were imposed on the Old City of Jerusalem,

other curfews were imposed in the remaining areas at given times.

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55

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Eight tracker dogs were deployed to assist in tracking down the “Assabi” or brigands. Two detective dog

masters with their dogs were sent from South Africa to assist in British Army in these endeavours. These

two detectives of the South African Police Force were Detective Sergeant Kitching and Detective Lance

Sergeant Pretorius. Police armed with rifles, camera and tracker dogs were on the tail of the “Assabi”

brigands. Once again Police were requested to assist the military authorities to track down those who were

terrorising the community.

The Police have another view: They regard any terrorist or guerrilla as a mere common – but trained -

criminal!

1939 Captain Jan Taillard in South West Africa During January 1939 Colonel IP de Villiers dispatched Captain Jan Taillard, SA Police, who was fluent in

German and married to a German-speaking wife, to South-West Africa as an

under-cover police agent. Part of Captain Taillard’s legend was that he was a

Transvaal farmer who wished to sell his farm and acquire a new farm in

South-West Africa. Like a typical farmer of that time, Captain Taillard was

clad in khaki trousers and a shirt. He in travelled in a dilapidated motor car

set out for South-West Africa and then continued his journey by train, where

he happened to share a compartment with a Dr Blumers from Warmbaths,

with whom he became good friends.

Captain Taillard established that a certain Dr Blumers was the Nazi leader of

the southern part of South-West Africa. Once again he told his story of want-

ing to acquire a farm in South-West Africa, adding that in view of rumours of

war and that Herr Adolf Hitler intended annexing all former German colonies,

relocating to South-West Africa might be dangerous. Herr Hitler might even

deport all Afrikaners. Dr Blumers assured Captain Taillard that Afrikaners

would not be deported and that Herr Hitler would wholeheartedly welcome all

farmers to settle South-West Africa. Having gained Dr Blumers’s confidence, he received a letter of

introduction to Mr Hans Denk, the chief Nazi organiser in South-West Africa.

On arrival in Windhoek Captain Taillard was able to pick up valuable snippets of information by spending

time in the bar, pretending that he did not speak German. He also steamed open the letter of introduction

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to Mr Denk, which stated that Captain Taillard had the 'right approach' and could be trusted. He was made

welcome by Mr Denk, who asked about the possibility of recruiting more Afrikaners to support the Nazi

ideology in the territory. Captain Taillard then found a pretext to travel to the northern parts of the territory

at Tsumeb where he discovered that the Nazis operated through a cell system in South-West Africa as

well as in the Union.

At the beginning of April 1939 Captain Taillard had completed his mission and arrived back in Cape Town,

where he delivered a comprehensive report on Nazi developments in South-West Africa confirming the

suspicions of the Commissioner and General J. C. Smuts that the Germans were planning a putsch in the

territory on Herr Hitler’s birthday, 20 April 1939. The object of the German exercise was to overthrow the

local government and administration by force and then present South-West Africa to Herr Hitler as a

birthday gift. Such an exercise could easily have been executed since the nominal strength of the South-

West African Police was only 423 officers and men, spread out over the entire South-West Africa. As a

force they were too small to take effective action against a few thousand Nazis who were determined,

capable and well organised.

Captain Taillard could also explain why information previously received from South-West Africa was not

necessarily reliable. Ten days after arriving in Windhoek the Captain had been provided by his new

German ‘friends’ with the names and addresses of every man in the Special Unit gathering information on

behalf of the South African Police Force regarding the underground activities. The Captain had been

warned to be aware of the ‘police’ spies.

On 13 April 1939 Major HC ‘Manie’ du Preez and a Detective Sergeant Botha, both members of the

Special Unit of the South African Police in South-West Africa, paid a visit to Colonel De Villiers in Cape

Town and confirmed Captain Taillard’s information, including the plans for a putsch on 20 April 1939 –

Herr Adolf Hitler’s birthday. The Police had confirmed information about a week before the planned putsch.

The Police had to act on the following substantiated information and German reasoning. Should the putsch

be successful, the South African government would be forced to send troops to South-West Africa. These

South African troops would support the legal government in South-West Africa. This move will afford Herr

Hitler the opportunity of accusing South Africa of 'aggression' and he would then be ‘forced’ to send

German troops to recapture the territory for Germany. Colonel De Villiers then held urgent discussions with

the Prime Minister, General Hertzog and General Smuts who was then Justice Minister.

On 17 April 1939 a task force consisting of Lieutenant Colonel FJ “Frank” Verster, ten officers and 315

non-commissioned officers and men from all over South Africa departed for

South-West Africa and arrived, after travelling non-stop, in Windhoek early

in the morning of 20 April 1939. In a show of force the South African Police

Force Contingent marched down Kaizerstrasse (now Robert Mugabe

Avenue), the main street of Windhoek, to the show grounds, where they set

up a police camp. They then ripped down and destroyed swastikas, Nazi

flags and banners. Shop owners were instructed to remove hostile slogans

and propaganda from all walls and windows. By noon all signs of the Nazi

flags and propaganda that had blemished the capital for months had been

removed. The majority of the inhabitants returned home quietly.

The South African Police Force, under command of Lieutenant Colonel

Verster, “liberated” South-West Africa without a shot fired in anger. Reading

the memoirs of SWAP-officers even they admitted being ‘afraid’

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(apprehensive) of the South African Police! The pre-active measures by the SA Police were of immense

strategic importance to South Africa and a prelude to the Allied war effort. Due to the efforts and

intelligence work of Capt Taillard about 2 800 Nazis and German speakers in South-West Africa were

interned.

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The Commissioner of Police, Maj-Gen IP de Villiers paid a visit to the SAP Windhoek with ZA-AJL.

First Police Mortar Detachment at Windhoek

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Captain Jan Taillard returned to Pretoria where he was instructed by General Smuts’ office to leave the

South African Police and become a “special undercover agent”. Not even the acting Commissioner of

Police, Brigadier George Baston, was aware of this fact. The unsung hero, Captain Jan Taillard, surfaces

later once again as we will see in the Leibbrandt-case and saves General Smuts from an assassination.

Symbol: Nazism & Ossewabrandwag

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Choices

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Turmoil

WORLD WAR ll (1939-1945) The political role of the South African Police increased steadily over the years especially in the events

leading up to World War II, during which the Special Staff, or the ‘Political Detectives’ as this Branch was

known, in conjunction with Military Intelligence, played an important role in safeguarding the vital and

vested national interests of the Union. In Johannesburg an Aliens Branch was establish to establish the

bona fides of foreigners in the Union. Wartime conditions prevailed and in the interests of the national

security civil liberties were suspended for the duration of the war.

The Special Staff also had to take action against members of the Police and other organisations who were

not favourably disposed towards the then government of General Smuts. Some Afrikaners, for example

Advocate B. J. Vorster and Detective Sergeant (later General) H. J. van den Bergh, were strongly against

the war with Germany. German-speaking South Africans were also interned. Members of the

Ossewabrandwag, Stormjaers, Gryshemde and Broederbond were kept under surveillance. Amongst the

right-wingers the Special Staff had their informers; some of them were influential leaders of their respective

movements.

German-trained parachutist Robey Leibbrandt, a former member of the Union Defence Force, South

African Police and South African Railways Police, was part of a German Operation Weissdorn, and was

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arrested on the instructions of General Smuts through the efforts of a ‘special secret agent’, Captain

Taillard. Stormjaer-saboteurs were arrested, detained and convicted while other suspects were interned.

Baviaanspoort had many German nationals. Zonderwater was the world’s largest Italian POW camp and

there were many Afrikaners and German-speakers interned at places like Leeuwkop, Koffiefontein and

Ganspan. When Russia joined the Allied Forces, the Communists in South Africa supported the war effort

and started with their recruitment campaigns.

Brig FW Cooper, DSO: Architect of the SAP Brigade, 6th SAI

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2nd Infantry Division (South Africa) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia

2nd South African Infantry Division

Active 23 October 1940 – 21 June 1942

Country South Africa

Allegiance Allied Forces of WW2

Branch South African Army

Type Infantry

Size Division

Battle honours Clayden's Trench (Sollum): Jan 1942, Gazala: Jun 1942, Tobruk: Jun 1942

Disbanded 21 Jun 1942

Commanders

First From 23 Oct 1940: Major General IP de Villiers

Second From 26 Jul 1941: Brig FH Theron (acting)

Final From 5 Sep 1941: Major General IP de Villiers and from 14 May 1942: Major

General HB Klopper

Insignia

Identification

symbol

The South African 2nd Infantry Division was an infantry division of the army of the Union of South Africa during World War 2. The Division was formed on 23 October 1940 and served in the Western Desert Campaign and was captured (save for one brigade) by German and Italian forces at Tobruk on 21 June 1942. The remaining brigade was re-allocated to the South African 1st Infantry Division.

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History

Formation

The division was formed on 23 October 1940 with its divisional HQ at Voortrekkerhoogte, South Africa. On 21 June 1942 two complete infantry brigades of the division as well as most of the supporting units were captured at the fall of Tobruk.

Deployment to Egypt]

Operations

Bardia and the Western Desert

The Division capture of Bardia was part of the Libyan campaign against Rommel's Afrika Corps from November 1941 to January 1942. They defeated a numerically superior Axis force in a strongly fortified position with a combined infantry and tank force.[1]

Order of Battle

21 September 1941[1]

3 S. A. Inf Bde. -

Comd. Brig. C. E. Borain, MC, VD

Tps.

1 I.L.H.

1 R.L.I

1 KAFF R. (under comd from 1000 hrs 25 Dec. 41)

B & C Coys D. M. R.

2 S. A. Fd Coy less one sec.

One Sec 10 S. A. Fd Coy.

One Pl 4 Bde Sig Coy. Under comd from 1000 hrs 26 Dec.

5 Bde Sig Coy less one pl.

3 S. A. Bde 'Q' Services Coy.

Three dets 14 S. A. Fd Amb. (Under comd from D.-1)

with in support:

One Regt 1 Army Tank Bde.

Arty as arranged by C. R. A.

Task.

To attack Bardia through perimeter defences as described in Para 6 (a) and in Operation Instruction No. 21 (Appx 'A').

NORTHFORCE

Comd. Lt. Col. J. Butler-Porter, VD, 1 RDLI

Tps.

1 RDLI

Sec 2 S. A. Fd Coy.

Pl 5 Bde Sig. Coy.

Det 16 Fd Amb. Under comd from 1000 hrs 26 Dec.

with in support:

NZ Div Cab Regt, less one sqn.

Tasks.

To contain and demonstrate against enemy forces within the perimeter along the gen line of enemy defences from incl 51143960—incl 51554030, in accordance with Operation Instruction No. 22 (Appx 'C'). [5]

KINGFORCE

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Comd. Lt. Col. W. Kingwell, MC, D.M.R.

Tps.

D.M.R. less B. C. & D. Coys and one pl A. Coy.

Two Pls 7 S. A. Armd Recce Bn.

Det 4 S. A. Fd Coy (Under comd from 1000 hrs 26 Dec.).

with in support:

One Sqn N. Z. Div Car Regt.

Task.

To contain and demonstrate against enemy forces along the gen line of the perimeter defences from incl 51973860—excl 51143960, in accordance with Operation Instruction No. 23 (Appx 'D'). [5]

SOUTHFORCE

Comd. Maj. P. J. Jacobs, 7 S. A. Armd Recce Bn.

Tps.

7 S. A. Armd Recce Bn, less one Coy and two pls.

Det 4 S. A. Fd Coy

Det 14 S. A. Fd Amb. (Under comd from 1000 hrs 26 Dec.)

Task.

To contain and demonstrate against enemy forces along the gen line of perimeter defences from incl MARSA ER RAMLA 52423868—excl 51973860, in accordance with Operation Instruction No. 24 (Appx. 'E'). [5]

RESERVES

Comd. Lt. Col. R. J. Palmer, 1 S. A. P.

Tps.

One Regt 1 Army Tank Bde.

1 S.A.P.

Sec 4 S. A. Fd Coy.

Det 14 S. A. Fd. Amb.

"Fortress Tobruk"

Surrender

MajGen. HB Klopper, Commander 2nd SA Inf Div at the surrender of Tobruk. (South African National War

Museum)

The remaining Brigade

Order of battle

Initial Operational Deployment: 2 December 1941

On 18 September 1941 the Division was re-allocated from X Corps command to falling under General HQ command and were responsible for protecting the railway and water supply lines between Alexandria and Mersa Matrut. On 11 October, the Kaffrarian Rifles were detached from the division and deployed to protect the landing fields in the Daba-Fuka-Bagush area. On taking over responsibility for the Frontier area on 2 December 1941 the divisional order of battle, as part of the 8th Army was:[2]

HQ 2nd Infantry Division (Maj-Gen I.P. de Villiers)

One Squadron 6t h South African Armoured Car Regt

Braforce (Brig. Medley)

2nd South African Infantry Brigade [a] (Brig WHE Poole)

4th 2nd South African Infantry Brigade (less one battalion) (Brig AA Hayton)

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4th Field Regiment, S A Artillery

One Battery, 5th Field Regiment, S A Artillery

One Troop, 67th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery

One Troop, 68th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery

C and D Companies, Die Middelandse Regiment

3rd South African Infantry Brigade (Brig CE Borain, MC, VD):

Imperial Light Horse

1st Royal Durban Light Infantry

Rand Light Infantry,

5th Field Regiment, S A Artillery (less one battery)

6th South African Infantry Brigade (Brig FW Cooper):

2nd Transvaal Scottish

1st South African Police Battalion

2nd South African Police Battalion

1st Field Regiment, Cape Field Artillery

Railhead Force (Lt Col GEL L'Estrange VD):

Umvoti Mounted Rifles

Die Middelandse Regiment

Detachment TDS (approx 30 "I" Tanks[b])

10th Field Company, South African Engineering Corps

5th New Zealand Infantry Brigade Group

Order of Battle: The Fall of Tobruk

Order of Battle as at 20 June 1942[4]

Division Troops

Die Middelandse Regiment (Machine-gun battalion)

7th South African Reconnaissance Battalion

2nd Field Regiment, Natal Field Artillery, South African Artillery

3rd Field Regiment, Transvaal Horse Artillery, South African Artillery

6th Anti-Tank Battery, South African Artillery

2nd Light Anti-aircraft Regiment, South African Artillery

4th & 10th South African Field Companies, S A Engineers

4th South African Infantry Brigade

2nd Royal Durban Light Infantry

Umvoti Mounted Rifles

The Kaffrarian Rifles

Blake Group (a composite battalion ex 1 SA Div)

6th South African Infantry Brigade

1st S.A. Police Battalion

2nd S.A. Police Battalion

2nd Transvaal Scottish Regiment

Note: After the capture of the rest of the division, 3rd South African Infantry Brigade and the 1st Field Regiment of the Cape Field Artillery became part of the South African 1st Infantry Division.

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Theatres of operation

The theatres that the division served in were as follows:

South Africa: 23 October 1940 to 20 April 1941

At Sea: 20 April 1941 to 6 June 1941

Egypt: 6 June 1941 to 22 March 1942

Libya: 22 March 1942 to 21 June 1942

Battles, actions and engagements

The division took part in the following battles, actions and engagements:

Bardia: 31 December 1941 to 2 January 1942. Some 8,000 Allied prisoners of war were freed and some 6,000 Axis prisoners were taken.

Clayden's Trench (Sollum): 11 January 1942 to 12 January 1942

Gazala: 26 May 1942 to 21 June 1942

Tobruk: 20 June 1942 to 21 June 1942. The number of South African prisoners taken at Tobruk has been recorded as 10,772[5]

Notes

1. Jump up^ This brigade was attached to the 1st South African Division after the loss of the 5th Infantry Brigade at Sidi Rezeg. [3]

2. Jump up^ Infantry support tanks

Citations

1. ^ Jump up to:a b U.S. War Department, WWII (25 July 1942). "The British Capture of Bardia (December 1941 - January 1942): A Successful Infantry-Tank Attack". Lone Sentry. Washington, DC: Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 21. p. MID 461. Retrieved 27 December 2014.

2. Jump up^ Orpen 1971, p. Appendix 2.

3. Jump up^ Klein 1946, p. 110.

4. Jump up^ Agar-Hamilton & Turner 1952, p. Appendix B.

5. Jump up^ Agar-Hamilton & Turner 1952.

Bibliography

Agar-Hamilton, John Augustus Ion; Turner, Leonard Charles Frederick (1952). Crisis in the Desert, May July, 1942. [With Plates.]. Cape Town.

Klein, Harry Lt-Col (1946). Springbok Record. Johannesburg: White House.

Liddell Hart, B.H. (Ed.) (1953). The Rommel Papers. London: Collins.

Orpen, Neil D. (1971). War in the desert III. Cape Town: Purnell.

SAP in North Africa: Kenya & Abyssinia

Kenya Elements of the South African Police Force also served in north-east Africa before the 6th SA Division was

deployed ‘Up North”. These policemen served in Abyssinia. Their unit was described as Tank Corps (Motor

Cycle) Police. The men operated under police officers and their Sergeant Major was WB “Bill” Joyner – later

Detective Head-Constable and the founder of the Johannesburg Murder and Robbery squad which later

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became known as the Brixton Murder and Robbery squad. Detective Head-Constable Bill Joyner was also a

recipient of the King’s Police Medal.

Kenya: Members of 1 SA Motor Cycle Company (Police).

Some members of No1 Motor Cycle Company

Sgt-Maj Bill Joyner

Bill Joyner as soldiers and detective

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Capt (Sub-Insp) Baseley

Abyssinia No1 Motor Cycle Company (Police): Lt-Col William Marshall Remarks by HBH Sgt Fӧlscher – is the author of “Vlug na Vryheid”; Detective Head-Constable Bill Joyner later Murder & Robbery, Marshall Square; Pte Ashburner (father-in-law of Jac Kloppers, Attorney at Law, Welkom) and L/Cpl Cox (father of Capt Billy Cox).

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The Police Brigade - 6th South African Infantry When war was declared by South Africa on 4 September 1939, the existing Defence Act did not make

provision for members of the Union Defence Force to fight outside the borders of South Africa. Thus

volunteers had to be called for. The first volunteers were recruited from the ranks of the Union Defence

Force and civilians. They were then required to sign an oath, the so-called Africa Oath or Red Oath, stating

that they were prepared to fight anywhere in Africa. Such members wore red tabs on their shoulders. At

the end of 1939 Colonel De Villiers was asked by the Chief of the South African General Staff, General Sir

Pierre van Ryneveld, to provide a Police Brigade to serve on the battlefield.

Lieutenant Colonel FW “Freddy” Cooper, the Quartermaster of the South African Police, was instructed to

put together three infantry units under capable officers. At this point the Africa Oath was made applicable

to members of the South African Police. Members of the Police Force who did not wear the red tabs were

suspect. Lieutenant Colonel Cooper constituted the Police Brigade with 1 SAP under the command of

Lieutenant Colonel RJ “Bobby” Palmer; 2 SAP under the command of Lieutenant Colonel HC “Manie” du

Preez; and the remaining battalion consisting of the 2nd Transvaal Scottish under the command of

Lieutenant Colonel W. E. Dalrymple, and a unit of the 14th Field Ambulance.

Lieutenant Colonel Cooper was then promoted to Brigadier and appointed Commander of the Police

Brigade (6th South African Infantry Brigade). On 17 June 1940 the Police Brigade was assembled at the

Police Training Depot in Pretoria West, and training commenced. Colonel De Villiers was promoted to the

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rank of Major General during October 1940 and was appointed Supreme Commander of the 2nd South

African Infantry Division, of which the Police Brigade formed part. On 6 July 1941 the Police Brigade left

Durban for North Africa on the Mauritania.

The SAP Brigade in North Africa In North Africa the Police Brigade fought with distinction. They figured prominently in the battles at Bardia,

Sollum, Halfaya and Fig Tree Wells. German and Italian troops were forced to surrender at Bardia, Sollum,

and Halfaya. At Bardia and Halfaya the German and Italian commanders surrendered in person to De

Villiers. Major General Schmidt was captured by members of the Police Brigade at Bardia, the first German

general to be captured during World War II. During the first two weeks of 1942 the Police Brigade captured

nearly 14 500 POWs.

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Later the Police Brigade saw service in the 1st South African Division on the Gazala line. During this

period Palmer was promoted to brigadier and appointed Commander of the 3rd Brigade, to replace

Brigadier HB Klopper, who then took command of the Division. This promotion meant that Palmer was one

of the few South African policemen who escaped the monotony of a POW camp.

An eyewitness told me of a member of the Police Brigade who shot down a German fighter with his .303

rifle. During the campaign in North Africa a train with a large balloon at both ends of the train was attacked

by a German Fighter. A policeman said: “Watch how I shoot down this plane!!” He fired at the plane and it

fell to the ground with a crash! Lucky shot? Maybe...

The Police Brigade dug in at Tobruk and on 26 May 1942 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel began his

successful counter-offensive. The result was that Tobruk collapsed and on 21 June 1942 Klopper

surrendered to Rommel. With the exception of a handful of men the entire Police Brigade were among the

roughly 30 000 Allied POWs caught at Tobruk and 1 138 policemen spent the majority of the war as POWs

in Europe.

Those policemen fortunate enough to escape being taken prisoner remained on active duty. After German

and Italian troops had been driven from North Africa, the UDF’s forces were formed into the new 6 th

Armoured Division and sent to Italy. Palmer commanded one of the brigades in the Sixth Division.

Interesting yarns are documented about the exploits of the policemen during war. One policeman was

Michael John “Mickey” Dillon – brother of PJ ‘Pat’ Dillon who was also an officer in the SAP Brigade and was

also seconded to the British Army. (On 26th August 1966 the same Pat Dillon, later a General and charge of

Counter-Insurgency, was the police officer in charge at the first armed clash with SWAPO terrorists which

took place at Ongulumbashe in Northern South West Africa.)

Mickey Dillon was well known “as the policeman, the soldier, the rugby player and the farmer (all) will

testify to his enduring integrity. After leaving school in Harrismith his prowess on the rugby field took him

into the N.E. Free State team and later into the S.A. Army team in North Africa during WW 2. At the

outbreak of war Mick enlisted with the S.A. Police Brigade and saw active service in both East and North

Africa. He later transferred to the 2 Natal Carabineers, first as a despatch rider and later as driver of

armoured cars. Among his exploits in the Western Desert, at Tobruk he was responsible for the shooting

down of two Me 109 fighter-bombers with, would you believe, a Bren gun! The German aircraft used to

drop their bombs on Allied shipping in Tobruk harbour, then "strafe" the ground troops. It was during a

"strafing" raid that Mick armed only with a Bren gun, was able to down two of the intruders. His extended

tour of duty ended when his unit was returned home for a much needed rest.”

Scoreboard The officers and men of the Police Brigade fought with distinction in the deserts of North Africa.

36 policemen received decorations for gallantry

41 were mentioned in dispatches

69 gallantry decorations and mentioned in despatches were awarded to men of the Third Battalion

(Transvaal Scottish and 14th Field Ambulance)

74 policemen lost their lives

32 were wounded in action

11 sustained other injuries

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Force Numbers: UDF and SAP On Active Duty Policemen who served in the South African Forces are easily traced because of the prefix SAP that

precedes their Defence Force numbers. Members of the SA Police who joined the so-called Police Brigade

were issued with new UDF force numbers. Their UDF force number had SAP as a prefix, as the SA Police

took responsibility for their salaries, making some of them the highest paid (Commonwealth) privates in the

war.

SA Police as POW Some policemen were captured during WW2.

75

Many policemen escaped and experienced high adventure. RSM Fred Geldenhuys knew Robbey

Leibbrandt and while Liebbrandt trained as a paprabat RSM Geldenhuys after one of his escapes was

asked to go back and join the partisans behind enemy lines. He received his parachute training in an office

and he made it! He was the first SA policeman to be a parachutist.

76

Sgt Laurie du Preez

Oom Fred Geldenhuis

Left: WO Fred Geldenhuis: RSM 2 SAP & Brig LG ‘Louis’ (or behind his back: ‘Vingers’) Snyman who was

RSM 1SAP. Right: Gen Jannie Geldenhuys and Oom Fred Geldenhuis. He told the General about his

77

WW2 exploits and after retiring from the SAP he joined the SADF & became RSM of Prince Alfred’s

Guard. Oom Fred met Princess Anne twice – he has photos to prove it. All I can say is: “What a man!”

“Vlug na Vryheid” Another policeman to escape from a POW camp was Sgt J Fӧlscher, here is his book:

78

79

SAP Holiday Camp: Port Edward When the wartime policemen with their “Red Tabs” all became POW’s “Up North” money that had been

collected for the “SAP POW Gifts & Comforts Fund” was “surplus to requirements”. After the war all this

money that was collected for the Gifts & Comforts Fund” was used to purchase the Holiday Camp.18

18

Justitia: 19630443

80

Silent Prayer So, next time when you are at Port Edward, take a minute and think of the horrors our men experienced in

the German and Italian POW Camps in Africa and in Europe. Whilst in captivity some were brutally

murdered such as Const Gold, other were executed after being recaptured. Many went on the “Great

March” from the east to west, rushing before the Russians. [We have reported on the murder of Const

Gold.]

So, for whatever reason our fathers went to war and wore “Red Tabs” please remember them! Once again

history is full of irony: Gen JMB Hertzog was defeated on a “major issue” in parliament and had to resign.

Gen Smuts was asked to form a cabinet and South Africa happily went to war during September 1939!

So also say thanks to destiny!

It was through Field Marshall Smuts that we went to war and eventually we collected the money which was

used for the SAP Holiday Rest Camp as it was known.

Introduction - 1945 Post war and the Apartheid years One has to take account of the “new world” after the Second World War. For easy reference this post-war

section is roughly divided into two parts:

The international and African dimension, and

The South Africa dimension.

First the international arena We see the rise of America as the world’s policeman and this is the beginning of the “Cold War” with the

dividing of Europe into two major parts – the “Free West” and Eastern Europe and Asia behind the so-

called “Iron Curtain” under the tight grip of Stalin and Mao Tse Tung.

The Second World War was fought against tyranny and for freedom. The British Empire began to crumble

and India was the first to gain her independence with African Colonies following suit during the 1960’s.

Locally Britannia still ruled the waves. The world renowned South African Field Marshall and Prime

Minister, JC Smuts, went to San Francisco where he wrote the preamble to the Charter of the United

Nations. In the new United Nations assembly it was India that attacked South Africa (and ironically the

policies of Field Marshall Smuts) vehemently exactly a year later. The international stage was set in the

United Nations against South Africa.

Preamble to the UN Charter WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to regain faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

81

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.19

Here for interest sake a copy20 of the draft:

19

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preamble_to_the_United_Nations_Charter - accessed on 29 Jul 2016 – HBH. 20

https://www.google.co.za/search?q=Preamble+UN+Charter&rlz=1C1ASRM_enZA560ZA560&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjwjJzX9MzNAhVLI8AKHUbgBAIQ_AUICCgB&biw=1536&bih=879&dpr=1.25#imgrc=zaY254CH3rekcM%3A – accessed on 29 Jul 2016 – HBH.

82

Special Branch

In South Africa after World War II a new Special Branch under the

command of Major HJ du Plooy [photo] was re-established at the

instance of General Bobby Palmer, then the newly appointed

Commissioner of Police.

General Bobby Palmer was concerned about the large increase

in membership of the Communist Party [logo] of South Africa,

including many civil servants, members of the Union Defence

Force and even a Communist in Parliament. The Communists

and the African Nationalists were set on an African Republic in

South Africa.

83

1948 – 1989 National Party comes to Power - Introduction: In 1948 the National Party [logo] rose to power and took even a stronger

stance against Communism and subversion than the Smuts-government

had. Various Acts were promulgated, including the Internal Security Act of

1950, the Suppression of Communism Act of 1953, the Riotous Assemblies

and Suppression of Communism Amendment Act of 1954, the Riotous

Assemblies Act of 1956 and later the General Laws Amendment Act of

1964.

Externally as well as internally the stage was set for conflict: The Cold War raged and locally the African

populace sought their freedom – and in this local internal conflict the World’s Super powers played for the

grand stand. The South African Police Force after the War did not have time to settle down and to focus on

classic policing and the investigation and prevention of crime. No, with the Union Defence Force

demobbed the South African Police Force stood alone – it had to focus on the internal dimension of

national strategy. It had to build up its semi-military character, its “iron fist” and it had to increase its

intelligence capabilities. Police intelligence capabilities were expanded and the SA Police entered the

international arena. British Intelligence was responsible for the defence of the realm – however after the

Second World War the South African Government relied more heavily on the intelligence capabilities of the

Special Branch and Foreign Affairs.

The stage was now set and the South African Police Force was called upon to act – to maintain Law and

Order and to safeguard the internal safety of the State. As far as the “Iron Fist” was concerned the Force

and the Government could depend on experienced and battle hardened officers like Major–General Pat

Dillon, Lieut-General Vic Verster, Brigadier CC von Keyserlingk, Major Jerry Van der Merwe, and Major

Olaf Kjelvey to name a few.

As far as the sub rosa aspects of intelligence gathering were concerned the South African Police Force

was also well equipped with suitable men – officers like Major (later Major-General) HJ du Plooy, Det/Sgt

(later General) DA Bester, Captain George Cloete Visser (later Lieutenant-Colonel), Major Gabriel

Diedericks and Captain Jan Taillard.

A few of the wartime Special Branch officers were rewarded with the King’s Police Medal – however

officers like Captain Jan Taillard and many others who performed sterling work, were never decorated or

received recognition for their excellent work.

Then a former SAP-member who rejoined the SA Police after the

Nationalists came into power during 19948 rose to prominence

during the 1960’s, he was General Hendrik van den Bergh

(photo). Detained with Adv John Vorster during the Second World

War they formed a formidable team when Vorster became Justice

and Police Minister! Vorster and Van den Bergh had practical

experience of detention without trial, etc, etc and put their

experience to good effect to counter the SACP, PAC, SWAPO and

ANC.

Gen Van den Bergh rejuvenated the Security Branch. He

established the “Republican Intelligence Service” – a covert police

84

intelligence unit with the blessing of Dr HF Verwoerd. This covert Police Intelligence Unit with Head Office

in Johannesburg was under the command of Major Mike Geldenhuys. Gen van den Bergh was the

founder of the Bureau for State Security during 1969, later called the Department of National Intelligence

and finally known as National Intelligence. Once the Bureau had to function internationally they had the

necessary trade craft! They earned their spurs during the turbulent decade of the 1960’s.

Comments by Hennie Heymans: Allow me to

digress. This is a fascinating story! And faction it is!

And that’s all!

I have found that intelligent and learned people

have asked me if the contents are true.

The short answer is: NO

Let me quote from the Afrikaans version: “Die

lang generaal. Die duistere politieke sluipmoorde

van die ou Suid-Afrika. Alan D Elsdon. Hierdie werk

is fiksie gebaseer op historiese feite en gebeure.

Behalwe vir gebeure en uitsprake op openbare

rekord is die optredes en uitsprake wat aan alle

karakters toegeskryf word denkbeeldig.

Dedication: “Vir die paar grootmoediges wat die

hoogste prys betaal het, en vir hul geliefdes.”

Mr Elsdon is a former colleague and was too young

to have worked with General Van den Bergh.

Gen Van den Bergh was a fantastic police officer

who saved this country between 1963 and 1968

when he left the police to take over the Bureau for

State Security. The debt we, as South Africans, owe

him is great!

85

A factual book on Lt-Gen HJ van den Bergh?

An objective, historical, book on Gen Van den Bergh is long overdue. He has a proven track record;

even before he joined the Security Branch. His work as a detective during the 1960 Revolt in Pondoland

was a shining example of good police work! Most of his critics are jealous of his good work and his proven

track record. I still have to see what his critics have done for this country!!!

Like any other high, or low, official he also made mistakes, but he deserves a better legacy. I have some of

his utterances on tape which have been transcribed – he was no Gestapo, he was even quiet liberal in

outlook.

He was also against assaults on prisoners and the public: The records speak for themselves. I find some

of his critics have not done their homework. I smile at his many critics because not only is the situation

ironical but comical, and very, very sad! Tragic indeed.

For the record his first wife was English speaking and they spoke English in the house until she died.

From a virtual “Police State”21 under Adv John Vorster the country made an 180o turn under Mr. PW

Botha’s leadership. Mr PW Botha was a former Defence Minister, the SA Defence Force, the Military

Industrial Complex and the Securocrats (State Security Council and National Security Management

System) de facto governed South Africa in order to combat the onslaught by means of a “Total Strategy”

and “Total War”.

Increasingly the national politics became militarised and most young men and some older men were

subject to military service. As South Africa became more isolated we became greater friends with Israel,

Taiwan and certain states in South America. In order to survive in South Africa covert diplomacy and

sanctions busting became a fine art.

In the interim the police were holding the “baby” – a difficult and problem-child! When the “child” was

naughty and was disciplined the police, who were in the daily contact situation, were charged that they did

not understand the struggle and/or political warfare! The situation was acerbated by an unfriendly and

hostile media – heavily infiltrated by “media terrorists” in their midst. The Police could virtually do nothing

right in this struggle!22

1949 – Indian / Zulu Riots Natal As Harvey Tyson, a former editor so eloquently puts it: “Violence came to the apartheid state long before

the ANC took up arms.” The first terrible outbreak of rioting had nothing to do with black versus white; but

never the less it was racial riots: Zulu versus Indians! On 13 January 1949 in Durban an Indian bus

conductor slapped an African child and immediately rioting broke out.

It took three days for the rioting to be brought under control. Police reinforcements had to be flown by

SAAF Dakota’s from Pretoria to Durban. (One of the young men sent to Durban by air was Constable JJ

Viktor. Later we will read more about this policeman who retired as a Lieutenant-General in the Ciskei.)

Zulus attacked Indian shops and homes and their occupants were attacked by Zulus who burnt and

pillaged properties. More than 136 people died in the riots. The Natal Indian Congress blamed the new

Nationalist Government for the rioting in the Durban-area.

21

A police state has nothing to do with the number of policemen in a country – HBH. 22

You are referred to Anthea Jeffreys books, especially People’s War – HBH.

86

Police reinforcements by air to Natal

87

1950’s Successive repressive legislation from the 1950’s onwards banned the SA Communist Party, various other

Black Nationalist groupings and other ‘democratic’ groupings. By banning them and declaring the

members 'illegal' the Government and the Police were, as they saw it, adopting the moral high ground.

88

89

Black Nationalism

Major PC Swanepoel, later head of research at National Intelligence, knew Mr Luthuli well. Mr Luthuli was

against violence, he was a Christian and a remarkable man, Mr Robert Kennedy came from the US to visit

him. Mr Swanepoel says Mr Luthuli was a “good leader”. We know that he was against the founding of

Mkonto weSizwe which was founded on the 16th of December 1961 by a group of white communists and

Mr NR Mandela. The MK could be perceived as the armed wing of the SA Communist Party. They chose

90

the violence instead; while Mr Luthuli and Dr Mangusuthu Buthelezi chose co-operation and negotiation.

(Mr Luthuli refers to the SA Police without malice; his passing was a great loss to future negotiations.)

The Post War Pressure on the British Commonwealth The British Empire came under post-war pressure. India is the first to gain independence. With renewed vigour, across the globe, the communists were pursuing their quest for world domination after the Second World War, to expand they also required raw material. in this regard note the following quote regarding to continued communist pressure23:

23

Little Lenin Libray, Vol 24: LENIN AND STALIN ON PROPAGANDA, Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, 1942: 9

91

This booklet (above) cost 9 pence (71/2 cents) and was distributed by the SACP in South Africa during

circa 1952. The communists fought us when and where possible. They were brilliant and fought in a

spectacular fashion with all the means at their disposal. They could not beat us in the field, i.e. physically;

but they subverted everything and harnessed local and foreign organisations, churches, boycotts et al to

reach their set and declared goals. The police had even to be particularly vigilant during the Van Riebeeck

Festival. Pages 9 & 10 from the above book:

92

The South African Communist Party

After the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley and the discovery of gold at various places in the “old”

Transvaal various vagabonds, criminals, petty thieves, illicit diamond and gold buyers, smugglers, whores,

and various socialists, trade unionists, bolshevists and communists flocked to “bright lights’. The old

93

Cape Police and the Zarps took notice of these activities. Indirectly the discovery of gold and diamonds

ultimately lead to war in 1881 and 1899. We have the second oldest Communist Party in the world. Off

course they had the backing of the USSR.

94

1951 Malaya

Source24

24

Nongqai 19540186

95

1951 Korea

US General Commanding in Korea: Lt-Gen Matthew B Ridgeway, then new GOC United Nations Unified

Command in Korea.25 By implication GOC South Africa’s forces in that country. Lt-Gen Denis Earp, Maj-

Gen (ds) Doempie Cloete and Sgt Des Welthagen were veterans of that war. These articles on the wars

were there for policemen to read and to know what to expect in future – HBH.

25

Nongqai July 1951 Cover & page i.

96

97

1952 Malaya: Police Action

Nongqai: 1952 04 348

98

1952: SAP in Kenya

Police see “terrorists” as criminals, plain and simple, read the above. Source: 26

A quest for Strategic Intelligence: SA Police In a strategic intelligence move the Commissioner of South African Police Force sent an officer of the

Security Branch, Captain JH du Plessis, to study and report on the Mau-Mau question facing the British in

Kenya. Here he also met Sir Percy Sillitoe, head of MI5, in Kenya. The Captain learnt interesting facts

about the Mau-Mau terror campaign adding to the corporate memory of the Special Branch of the South

African Police Force. What make the book “Diamonds are Dangerous” so fascinating is the fact the Capt

JH du Plessis was a former SAP Intelligence operative. He proves it by furnishing us with a photograph in

his book about where commonwealth intelligence officers met.

26

Nongqai: 195302197

99

100

Cassel had also published a book in the same series by Sir Percy Sillitoe, a former policeman who served

in Africa, who eventually became head of MI5, under the title “Cloak without Dagger”.

1953 Kenya Action against Mau-Mau Soldiers and policemen saw action against the Mau-Mau in Kenya. We, as South Africans, learnt from

them, especially as far as pseudo ops were concerned. As the winds of change blew southwards; aided

and abetted by the communists, our brothers in arms learnt their lessons which invariably were passed on

to us. The police and army in Northern Rhodesia were on the Congo-border and we learnt from them. We

learnt from the Portuguese in Africa, we had men in Luanda and in Mozambique, later in Salisbury,

Rhodesia. I remember reading the secret files at SB HQ on the Mau-Mau and saw Kenya Police

photographs of people murdered by the Mau-Mau. One terrible murder was of a little white boy killed next

to his tri-cycle. The realisation set in that we were going to face problems in the future.

101

102

Gen

Our Rhodesian colleagues received in-service training while

serving in Malaya and in Kenya.

The South African Police left their carbon tracks in Palestine,

Kenya and in other countries in the sub-continent. [Many

former South African policemen served in places like Palestine

e.g. Col Harry Rice formerly from SAP Brooklyn.]

My research shows that the SA Police were in contact with

various police forces on the sub-continent and had liaison with

military attaches from all over the world. There was also a

splendid relationship with the military attaché of the United

States.

SA Policemen also visited Scotland Yard and MI5 for training

purposes after the second world war. Our Commissioners

visited overseas: America, England, Algeria and Austria.

Especially during the Smuts-era we as South African were

welcome were ever we went, however when the “Nats” came

to power the doors were slowly closed in our faces.

103

Police Commissioners of Southern Africa visit the SAP

Sourece27

27

The Nongqai 1955101083

104

Sophiatown Prevention of crime is a police function. Here armed police

are visible when people were moved from Sophiatown to

what was to be called Soweto (South Western Townships).

The poor ruling party is in trouble when it does something

and is in trouble when it does not do something. In this case

Sophiatown was a cesspool of crime, squalor and poverty.

The National Party did try its best in conjunction with city

council to build houses for the poor; one must take into

account that Johannesburg and the Reef were swamped with

people flocking to “bright lights” during the war. These people

were needed and employed in South Africa’s growing

industry for war purposes, now after the war they had

become permanent townsmen.

From a socio-economic point of view water, lights, schools

and hospitals had to be built by the various forms of

government. Provision had to be made for sport, recreation

churches and shops.

A person is usually the product of his environment, government is there for the betterment of man!

1955 Security Branch By 1955 the Special Branch had officially become the Security Branch. In some quarters the Security

Branch were incorrectly referred to as the Security Police, a name that has stuck,

even to this day.

The onslaught against the South African government intensified. Before South

Africa became a republic and was part of the British Commonwealth, British

Intelligence furnished South Africa with strategic intelligence however the Police

was responsible for domestic intelligence. As far as the South African Police was

concerned the Internal Stability of the South Africa was based on police

intelligence and police operations.

The following important events in the history of the South African Police Force finally built up to the low

intensity warfare of the 1960’s right up to the 1990’s:

105

1950 - Murder of Police on Mounted Patrol: 27 November, Witsieshoek: On 19 February 1950, the following report appeared in the Sunday Times, a Johannesburg newspaper:

TROUBLE THREATENED IN OFS RESERVE. NATIVE TRIBESMEN IN UGLY MOOD. The small European community in the Witsieshoek Native Reserve near Kestell is living under threat of attack from armed tribesmen. Whipped into an ugly mood by agitators, several [10] hundred members of the Bape1e and Baklokoa tribes are threatening violence if an official catt1e poll, a preliminary to weeding out scab stock, is carried out at the mountain kraal of Tsesseng on Monday. Trouble has been simmering for some months. It began to come to the boil early this month when Government officials were prevented from branding cattle in poor condition by a band of about 350 horsemen. 'They rode down on the cattle that had been brought in for examination', said an eye-witness with whom I spoke today. 'We had not a chance. The men, egged into action by their womenfolk, swept down and drove the cattle away'. That was on February 7. Since then, angry tribesmen have visited the Native Affairs Department headquarters several times and threatened that further efforts to carry out Cattle examinations will be resisted. Apart from the police post, where one sergeant and two constables are stationed, there is little protection for the Europeans in the reserve."

On 29 September 1950, it was announced that the Government had appointed a Commission of Inquiry to investigate and report upon recent disturbances in the Witsieshoek Native Reserve -Natal Daily News.

Since beginning of the year 1950 there were signs of unrest amongst the traditional Africans living in the

Witiseshoek Reserve. The root cause was the removal of their infected cattle in terms of a government

scheme. Police received information that employers of the Trust area would be attacked if they continued

with their preventative measures.

As a preventative measure a contingent of policemen under the command of Maj IPS Terblanche, District

Commandant of the Police at Bethlehem moved to the

area. As no incidents were recorded the police were

gradually withdrawn. On 30 July 1950 a number of

Blacks again threatened Trust employees. Again Police

reinforcements were sent out to the reserve. Once again

nothing happened and the Police withdrew.

A Commission of Enquiry was appointed to investigate

the sporadic outbreak of violence in the area. The

Commission began its proceedings at Witsieshoek on 1

November 1950. On the 10th of November when some

Blacks who were opposed to the trust system, were due

to give evidence before the Commission a large groups

of Blacks assembled at Witsieshoek and posed a

threatening attitude to members of the Commission. The

Commissioners were compelled to request Police

106

protection in order to continue with their enquiry. The Police presence made it possible for other Blacks

who were willing to testify to do so without fear of intimidation or attack. As a preventative measure all

meetings in the reserve was banned by proclamation and a strong police presence was maintained to

prevent trouble.

27 November 1950 On 27 November 1950 the secretary of the Commission handed four summonses to Major Terblanche to

be served upon four local male inhabitants. These witnesses had already been sworn in to testify before

the Commission.

At 1400 on the same day history was made. The last mounted police patrol of the 20th century, based on

the classic British mounted infantry model, came under severe and fatal attack by tribesmen: was this

patrol!! It was the last fatal attack on Mounted Police in South Africa as the Police became more

mechanised after World War Two.

Here is an extract from an official Police Report:

On 27 November 1950, the commanding officer, two other officers and 33 other ranks set out on horseback to patrol the Witsieshoek Native Reserve and to effect service of the subpoenas at the same time. At about 4 p.m. the patrol arrived at sub-chief Mopedi's kraal where an unauthorized gathering of about 600 natives had assembled. When the patrol halted near the gathering, one of the natives called to the police and requested them to disclose their errand and not to come any closer to the gathering. The commanding officer named the persons he was looking for and at the same time warned that the meeting was illegal and that they had to disperse. The messenger left to report back to his compatriots. The only response shown was shouts of "NO! NO!" and retorts of 'You are breaking the Law'. The major in charge of the patrol instructed his men to line up. The natives immediately pretended that they were ready to disperse and started to move in the direction of their horses. The patrol also moved closer in order to see where the four men were on whom the subpoenas had to be served. This brought the patrol and the tribesmen into close contact. Suddenly the ululation of women filled the air and the men launched a spontaneous attack on the police. Policemen were pulled off their horses, stoned, struck with keries and several shots were fired at them, having become separated by the fighting, certain members managed to shoot their way out, to re-group and to open collective fire on their assailants who then scattered to the mountains. Two policemen were killed and 13 others suffered serious injuries. The police also lost 4 horses and 3 revolvers, 13 natives lost their lives in the encounter.

107

Tactful Approach Although the Police under Major Terblanche were tactful in their approach they came under severe attack

and Lieutenant JP Jonker – a veteran of the Police Brigade - and a Constable HP Erasmus were fatally

injured in this violent attack by tribesmen. The Officer’s body was badly mutilated. So came to an end the

famous large scale mounted patrols that operated from the time of the white man. Horses were not

indigenous to Africa and even the old Romans never ventured into Africa because of horse sickness.

Once again the South African Air Force assisted the Police by sending out Harvard aircraft to act as

spotters for the Police in the mountainous terrain. The tribesmen who murdered the Police were

apprehended and sentenced.

General Jannie Geldenhuys, a former Chief of the South African Defence Force was then a scholar in

Bethlehem and he told me that he and the Lieutenant Jonker’s daughter were in the same class at school.

The murder of an Officer and a Constable sent shock waves through South Africa and the Minister of

Justice attended the funeral of both. The public and the press condemned the senseless killing of the

Police.

According to the Police Report:

“The police had misjudged the mood of the gathering otherwise they would never have allowed a situation to develop in which they could be encircled and overwhelmed”.

1956 – Bergville

108

The next pinnacle in the violent history of South Africa occurred in Bergville during 1956. This took place

not very far from Witsieshoek and in the same Drakensberg-area. General Pat Dillon – then a Captain -

was the District Commandant of Police at Ladysmith. After receiving reports from his Station Commander,

Sergeant Smith, at Bergville that the local tribesmen were growing dagga for resale in his district, he sent

out a squad of 21 policemen, under

command of the popular Sergeant SJD de

Lange – a Zulu linguist - to Bergville to

assist the local Police with the operation.

He was a local hero and was known by the

Blacks as “Sergeant Shorty”.

The Police split up in various working

parties. After the Police had pulled out 11

000 dagga plants and cleaned the area and

made arrests, a fire was build to destroy the

dagga plants. An impi of Zulu warriors

approached the Police working party and

made their famous half circle. Sergeant De

Lange, a Zulu linguist, spoke to the

tribesmen. At the same time the tribal

women started ululating and chanting war

songs. Sergeant De Lange explained the

duties the Police had to perform. In the

interim some of the warriors threw

knobkerries at the police. Constable Kruger

shot a man dead but was never the less

struck by a knobkerrie. Other members of

the Force were also disabled. The small

Force was surrounded and they had a fight

to death! Off one group, only Sergeant

Langa, Constable Kruger and Constable

Mbense were spared. The Force suffered

the following casualties:

- Sergeant SJD de Lange - Lance Sergeant JMJ Koorts - Constale P Xaba - Contable ZE Nkabela or Gabela - Contable A Sithole The men that fell, were either hacked or

clubbed to death. After a full police

investigation 23 Tribesmen were

condemned to death. 28

28

As a young boy I can remember reading the story in the press and in the HUISGENOOT, the Huisgenoot had a photo of a police cap sliced by a panga (machete). Years later I saw the cap in the police museum. As stated elsewhere there is no museum for the old SAP - HBH

109

1959 Saracens The struggle became fiercer and the Government and Police hierarchy was thinking along the lines of

armoured personnel carriers like the British were employing elsewhere in the world, eg Suez, Aden,

Ireland and Singapore. The Minister of Justice announced that the South African Police force would obtain

its own Saracen Armoured Personnel Carriers. The object was to transport members safely to hot spots.

During 1959 a total of 96 policemen were trained at Potchefstroom at the Artillery and Armour School of

the Union Defence Force. When I was stationed at Wentworth Police Station we had a few Saracens. The

Police used the Saracens up to the middle 1960’s.

110

1958: Strongmen promoted to Commissioned rank During 1958 Vic Verster passed 2nd in

the examination from Head Constable

to Lieutenant. He would later serve as

head of Counter Insurgency and Riot

Control.

Source29

1959:Mobile Unit in Transkei

1959 Poqo revolt: Lusikisiki – photo JU Bell

29

The Nongqai 19580761 (Vic Verster)

111

1960 SAP Mobile Unit: Mt Ayliff

Photos: Col Ben Mouton

Military attaches

A photo, to mark the visit of the French Military Attaché Southern Africa, Cmdt Muguet, to the SAP

College.30

Cato Manor 23 January 1960 New information regarding Cato Manor has been received from two sources; otherwise we have nothing

new to report. All information on Cato Manor has been published before.

30

The Nongqai 19591251

112

Police from the Congo

3 Feb 1960: “Winds of Change” “The wind of change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact.”

On the 20th of January 1960 Dr Verwoerd announced the final steps for South Africa to become a

republic.31

Mr Harold McMillan had during the beginning of 1960 “come to announce, unbeknown to our government,

the parting of the ways between Britain and South Africa that his countrymen could no longer afford to be

seen as fellow-travellers of apartheid, much as they could afford to trade with South Africa.”32

Mr Harold McMillan33 did nothing to allay our fears in these trying times, but rather set the ball rolling and

increased the tension with his afstootlike34 “Winds of Change”-speech in Parliament on the 3rd of February

1960.35 He did not have the “curtsey”36 to give the Prime Minister, Dr HF Verwoerd, a copy of his speech

beforehand. 37However Dr Verwoerd replied to his speech to the satisfaction of all (then) right-thinking

South Africans. Mr McMillan also visited the Police in Soweto, at Meadowlands, and this was favourably

reported on in the Police magazine.

31

Barnard, F: 13 Jaar in die skadu van dr Verwoerd, Voortrekker Pers, 1967, p 77. 32

Kenny, H: Architect of Apartheid, Dr HF Verwoerd – An appraisal, J Ball, p177. 33

I have a picture of McMillan visiting a police station. 34

Barnard, F: 13 Jaar in die skadu van dr Verwoerd, Voortrekker Pers, 1967, p77. 35

See also: Schoeman, B: Die Sluipmoord op dr Verwoerd, Strydpers, 1975 p 147. 36

Mr McMillan was Dr Verwoerd’s personal guest. His behaviour suggests that he was determined to cause sensation. Normal rules of courtesy were flouted. He failed to give Dr Verwoerd an advance copy of his speech, see: Kenny, H: Architect of Apartheid, Dr HF Verwoerd – An appraisal, J Ball, p177. 37

Marais, J: Die era van Verwoerd, self uitgegee deur mnr Marais, 1992: p 3.

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The Speech as made to parliament on 3 February 1960

“It is, as I have said, a special privilege for me to be here in 1960 when you are celebrating what I might call the golden wedding of the Union. At such a time it is natural and right that you should pause to take stock of your position, to look back at what you have achieved, to look forward to what lies ahead. In the fifty years of their nationhood the people of South Africa have built a strong economy founded upon a healthy agriculture and thriving and resilient industries. No one could fail to be impressed with the immense material progress which has been achieved. That all this has been accomplished in so short a time is a striking testimony to the skill, energy and initiative of your people. We in Britain are proud of the contribution we have made to this remarkable achievement. Much of it has been financed by British capital. … As I've travelled around the Union I have found everywhere, as I expected, a deep preoccupation with what is happening in the rest of the African continent. I understand and sympathise with your interests in these events and your anxiety about them. Ever since the breakup of the Roman Empire one of the constant facts of political life in Europe has been the emergence of independent nations. They have come into existence over the centuries in different forms, different kinds of government, but all have been inspired by a deep, keen feeling of nationalism, which has grown as the nations have grown. In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the war, the processes which gave birth to the nation states of Europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived in dependence upon some other power. Fifteen years ago this movement spread through Asia. Many countries there, of different races and civilisations, pressed their claim to an independent national life. Today the same thing is happening in Africa, and the most striking of all the impressions I have formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of this African national consciousness. In different places it takes different forms, but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it. Well you understand this better than anyone, you are sprung from Europe, the home of nationalism, here in Africa you have yourselves created a free nation. A new nation. Indeed in the history of our times yours will be recorded as the first of the African nationalists. This tide of national consciousness which is now rising in Africa, is a fact, for which both you and we, and the other nations of the western world are ultimately responsible. For its causes are to be found in the achievements of western civilisation, in the pushing forwards of the frontiers of knowledge, the applying of science to the service of human needs, in the expanding of food production, in the speeding and multiplying of the means of communication, and perhaps above all and more than anything else in the spread of education. As I have said, the growth of national consciousness in Africa is a political fact, and we must accept it as such. That means, I would judge, that we've got to come to terms with it. I sincerely believe that if we cannot do so we may imperil the precarious balance between the East and West on which the peace of the world depends.

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Western Powers The world today is divided into three main groups. First there is what we call the Western Powers. You in South Africa and we in Britain belong to this group, together with our friends and allies in other parts of the Commonwealth. In the United States of America and in Europe we call it the Free World.

Communists Secondly there are the Communists, Russia and her satellites in Europe and China whose population will rise by the end of the next ten years to the staggering total of 800 million.

Non-committed Thirdly, there are those parts of the world whose people are at present uncommitted either to Communism or to our Western ideas. In this context we think first of Asia and then of Africa. As I see it the great issue in this second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the East or to the West.

Will they be drawn into the Communist camp? Or will the great experiments in self-government that are now being made in Asia and Africa, especially within the Commonwealth, prove so successful, and by their example so compelling, that the balance will come down in favour of freedom and order and justice? The struggle is joined, and it is a struggle for the minds of men.

What is at trial? What is now on trial is much more than our military strength or our diplomatic and administrative skill. It is our way of life. The uncommitted nations want to see before they choose.”38

38

http://africanhistory.about.com/od/eraindependence/p/wind_of_change2.htm - accessed on 29 June 2016 – HBH.

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Mr Harold McMillan and the Police in Soweto

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Sharpeville - 1960

Introduction During 1960 the African village of Sharpeville was situated two miles outside the town of Vereeniging. The approximate population of Sharpeville was 36,361 people. Evaton, 12 miles away from Vereeniging was another African village which had a population of about 50,000. Nearby is the town of Vanderbijlpark with two African villages, known as Bopholong and Boiphatang. The Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark industrial complex is part and parcel of the wider Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging or PWV-Industrial Complex39, with many other African towns and villages nearby. Of all the African Villages in the Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark district, Sharpeville was the only one having a police station. On a national level, on that particular day, there was a shortage of (white) policemen. Non-White policeman were in terms of Government policy not armed with firearms.

Judicial Commission A judicial commission investigated events that occurred in the townships near Vereeniging. The official findings of the Commission’s report were submitted to State President. These findings will be discussed in order to grasp what happened at Sharpeville on the 21st March 1960.

1. Vanderbijlpark It was known to the police and municipal officials that pamph1ets had been distributed in the Bopholong and Boiphatang Locations before to 21 March 1960 and the and the situation was had been watched.

Organisers at work At approximately 01:00 on Monday, 21 March 1960, Africans in the two locations were seen to be summoning inhabitants from their homes. The inhabitants were instructed to fall into groups with the object of marching to the (only) police station at Vanderbijlpark. On arrival they were to invite arrest.

Head-Constable Coetzee

Head-Constable Coetzee40,41 spoke to a number of these Africans who informed him of their purpose. No steps were taken by the police to stop them [47]. Mr Coetzee pointed out that no hostility to the police was shown. He and other policemen moved between Bopholong and Boiphatang, watching the position carefully.

Threats of violence The evidence presented by Mr. Knoetze42, the Manager of the non-European Affairs Department of the Vanderbijlpark municipality, to the Commission established that the organisers resorted to threats of violence by compelling the inhabitants to join in this protest. At about 07:00 the crowd at Bopholong had gradually grown to about 3,000 people while in Boiphatang, a crowd of only about 250 had gathered. According to Mr. Knoetze’s evidence, the crowd at Boiphatang first started showing signs of hostility at approximately 07:00. The Boiphatang crowd was moving towards the Vanderbijlpark. 12 policemen made an attempt to stop the crowd.

39

Today the PWV-area is more or less the new province of Gauteng. 40

Does anybody have the personal particulars of this police official – HBH. 41

A civilian rank equal to Warrant-Officer Class1 – HBH. 42

We need more information on this person – HBH.

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Head-Constable Coetzee appealed with avail to Mr Sidwell Kaza43, vice-Chairman of the Bopholong branch of the PAC, to stop the march. At 07:15 the crowd was already marching on the Golden Highway on their way to Vanderbijlpark police station. As there was a shortage of policemen no attempt was made to stop them.

March Orderly to Vanderbijlpark The march proceeded in orderly fashion and at 08:00 the crowd took up their positions at the police station. Although noisy the crowd, when requested by the police to move, moved to open piece of land to the west of the police station. Mr Kaza and other leaders moved up and down in front of the crowd shouting: “AFRIKA!”

Crowd told to disperse Head-Constable Coetzee came and addressed the crowd. He used Mr Kaza as an interpreter. Head-Constable Coetzee told them their grievances had been noted and that they should disperse. The crowd refused to disperse. They got more excited. [49]

Reinforcements: Capt EG Cawood At about 08:00 Capt EG Cawood44 arrived with reinforcements. In addition a number of armed civilians had gathered in the neighbourhood of the police station. Capt Cawood asked Mr Kaza again to address the crowd and instruct them to disperse. Mr Kaza refused to adhere to the Captain’s request and was then arrested. A number of Africans then came forward and said they would disperse if Mr Kaza was freed.

Crowd warned force would be used Mr Kaza was freed. Again the Police used him as an interpreter. The crowd was warned and instructed to disperse. Unless they adhered within five minutes, force would be used. The crowd refused to disperse. They became more restive and, according to Capt Cawood, a dangerous situation started developing. Some Africans climbed the police fence and others challenged the police to shoot. Information was received that protesters from Bopholong were approaching. A possible clash between armed civilians and the crowd could not be ignored.

Dispersal order repeated: Tear Gas and Baton Charge Capt Cawood repeated his dispersal instructiol1s several times and then resorted to the use of teargas-bombs. He also ordered a baton charge. Police action was not totally successful. The majority of the crowd fled however smaller groups offered resistance and shots were fired; presumably by members of the civilian force.

Police Chief molested: Shots On the Golden Highway, a group of approximately 150 young Africans attempted to encircle Cawood’s motor car and they started throwing stones. The leader of this hostile group was shot by Cawood. [50]

43

We need more information on this person – HBH. 44

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Protest ends in this area Capt Cawood then returned to the police station. Here he met the Boiphatang protesters who had decided to return home. On his instructions they left immediately. This was the end of the protest gatherings by the Bopholong and Boiphatang inhabitants.

2. Evaton Evidence showed that at about 07:00 small groups of Africans began to gather in the African Township. Considerable pressure by the organisers of the PAC had been brought to bear upon the inhabitants. These groups joined forces. At approx 09:30 they marched to the Evaton police station. There was no evidence that they were armed. Their estimated number was between 15,000 and 20,000.

Lt. van Eeden Lt. van Eeden45 of the SA Police was approached by three or four protesters. They informed him that they had lost their passes. They invited him to arrest them. They were told to wait as the police were busy. After 15 minutes they repeated their invitation to be arrested.

SAAF This Lt van Eeden had meanwhile called for reinforcements. At about 10:30 while the crowd was getting restive and whilst van Lt van Eeden was still talking to the four protesters, aircraft of the South African Air Force arrived. The SAAF aircraft dived towards the crowd. The SAAF-action bad the desired effect on the crowd. The crowd dispersed.

3. SHARPEVILLE According to the evidence of Mr Thomas More, vice Chairman of the Sharpeville branch of the PAC their branch was established during July 1959. The Superintendent of Sharpeville was a Mr Labuschagne46. He said in evidence that from September 1959 onwards he had received complaints from the locals in Sharpeville relating to the activities of the PAC [50].

Campaign Activity Expected By the 18th March 1960 it was already known that a campaign was organised for Monday the 21st. Copies of these pamphlets were in possession of the police and municipal officials. The position was being carefully watched. Special police reinforcements for Sharpeville were not possible, because it was expected that the campaign would be nation-wide.

Eve of Action: Sgt. Grobler At about 11:15 on the night of the 20th, the station commander of Sharpeville, Sgt. Grobler47, received information that groups of Africans were moving from house to house instructing the occupants to leave their reference books at home and to join the protesters. The information received was that these groups were not hesitating to use threats of violence. As a result of this information, Sgt Grobler and others under the command of Capt. Cawood moved to Sharpeville.

45

Personal particulars unknown – HBH. 46

We need more information on this person – HBH. 47

Personal particulars unknown – HBH.

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Telephone cut There it was established that the telephone communications between Sharpeville and Vereeniging had been cut. At the Sharpeville police station, Capt Cawood found a number of Africans who complained to him that they had been threatened with violence if they did not join the protesters. Shortly thereafter he met a number of hysterical women and children in the street. They complained that their husbands were being forced under threats of violence to join the protesters. Two women complained of damage to their homes.

Baton Charge Captain Cawood then met a group of 100 young Africans armed with sticks and kierries. This group he dispersed by way of a baton charge. Next saw a group of 500 Africans a1so carrying sticks and kierries. They seemed to be marching on their way to a row of houses. A number of warning shots were fired into the air; this crowd dispersed. Several other groups of Africans were dispersed. Capt Cawood was then compelled to return to the police station. A report reached him that a crowd had gathered at the Police Station. [51]

Police reinforcements arrive At 03:00 of the 21st of March 1960 Major van Zyl48, the District Commander, arrived with reinforcements. The police were divided into two groups. Major van Zyl patrolled the southern area while the other group under command of Capt Cawood patrolled the northern area of Sharpeville. At 05:00 the position was reasonably quiet. Small groups of Africans had gathered at bus stops in Seeiso Street49; their apparent intention was going to work as normal.

Intimidation by PAC Apart from police evidence; there was independent and corroborative evidence from various inhabitants relating to intimidation by groups of Africans visiting their homes on the night of the 20th and to damage done to their property. The Commissioner was convinced by this evidence that members of the PAC and their cohorts had done everything in their power to ensure as big a gathering as possible. It was clear that the prestige of the PAC, as well as the continuance of the campaign, was at stake. The Commissioner took the view that the scheme was originally only to include men, however the possibility arose that women and children would join the gathering. There was no evidence that during the campaign that violence was an official policy. However there was not the slightest doubt that on the night of the 20th March 1960: violence and threats of violence took place. Violence was especially directed towards inhabitants who were reluctant to participate in the campaign.

Next Phase of Intimidation by PAC in Seeiso Street The next phase of the campaign started at dawn and was mainly limited to the vicinity of Seeiso Street. It is also the route taken by buses carrying commuters to Vereeniging. At 05:00 groups of commuters had gathered to catch their buses in order to go to work. No busses arrived. The result that groups of commuters increased in size and number. The police received reports that commuters at the various bus stops were being molested and assaulted by passing cyclists. Commuters were also warned that they would be assaulted on their return from work. Police were sent to protect them. Soon it became apparent that [53] the buses driven by African drivers would not be available. Arrangements were made for white bus drivers, under police protection, to drive the buses. A bus that entered Sharpeville was stoned. Frequent incidents of stone throwing took place from 08:00 to 09:00. Stone throwing was not only directed at police vehicles, but at any vehicle about to enter or leave Sharpeville.

48

Personal particulars unknown; it might be “Rooi-baard” van Zyl – HBH. 49

This is the main street of Sharpeville.

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Crowd increases - teargas used The crowd increased in Seeiso Street. The impression gained was that a march to Vereeniging was being contemplated. The crowd at that stage was estimated to be between 5,000 and 7,000. Many in the crowd were armed and noisy. Stone throwing continued. Efforts were made to push the crowd back. The few Police were unsuccessful in this effort. Capt Cawood got worried. He resorted to the use of teargas50 however this also little effect. The size of the crowd kept on increasing.

Police Commandant's order ignored At 08:00 Capt Cawood left for Vanderbijlpark. Sgt Moses Nkosi51 was left in charge of the police station. Sgt Nkosi was approached and asked by Mr Tealo, of the PAC, to arrest all the protesters gathered round the police station for failing to have their reference books on them.

Sgt Moses Nkosi Sgt Nkosi said that at that time, the police station was already surrounded. The crowd was armed, noisy and excited. In the meantime Major van Zyl who returned to the station and considered that as far as order was concerned; affairs had taken a serious turn for the worst. He decided that he would not allow any further deterioration in the situation. He walked towards the crowd and told them to disperse within five minutes. This order was met with derision. He then appealed to the leaders. He warned them that if they refused to listen, they would get hurt. They requested Maj van Zyl to release two Africans prisoners in a police van. This he refused to do. They threatened to release the prisoners themselves.

Baton charge and shots fired Major van Zyl then ordered a baton charge. The response was met by stone throwing. The result was the protesters fell back. They ran into side streets. Some shots were fired, both by [53] the protesters and the police. The Police were not instructed not to fire. No injuries resulted from the firing. The stone throwing now was serious, injury being caused to persons and damage to property. After approximately half an hour the crowds regrouped but increased in size. The Africans became restive and challenging. Major van Zyl proceeded to Vereeniging to obtain reinforcements and returned at approximately 10:00.

Capt Coetzee At 10:20 Capt Coetzee52 arrived with 13 European and 6 Black policemen. They took up their positions in Seeiso Street. At that stage the estimated crowd consisted of 8,000 to 10,000 people. Capt Coetzee instructed those under his command to load their rifles. Capt Coetzee then joined Major van Zyl who decided to inform the Deputy Commissioner of the position. According to Major van Zyl, Capt. Coetzee asked for aircraft and, against instructions, mobilised the Vereeniging 'Skietkommando' as he believed that a bloodbath was inevitable.

Capt van der Linde At 11:15 Capt van der Linde53 arrived with two Saracens, each manned by a crew of five. Capt van der Linde says that he saw an enormous crowd marching down Seeiso Street towards the police station. Whilst the crowd were marching, the SAAF flew over the police station in aircraft. He positioned one

50

The application of the teargas was primitive in those days – HBH. 51

We need more information on this person – HBH. 52

We need more information on this person – HBH. 53

We need more information on this person – HBH.

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Saracen in the area of the police station. With Major van Zyl, he returned in the other Saracen to the administrative buildings at the entrance of the township.

Capt Theron At 11:45 Capt Theron54 arrived with further police reinforcements. According to Capt Theron, he met numbers of rowdy Africans in Seeiso Street. Their thumbs were in the air as they shouted: “AFRIKA!” The sight, that met him at the police station itself, came as a shock to him. Thousands extremely noisy Africans men, women and children were gathered around the police station. Other Africans [54] were still coming up to join the throng. Although aircraft were flying over the police station, the crowd was in no way influenced or inhibited by this display!

Capt Theron and Lt Visser Capt Theron discussed the situation with Lt Visser55. They decided that it would be dangerous to disperse the crowd. The crowd was excited and resorted to threats. The African females spat in the direction of the police station. The throng was pressing against the wire fencing and pushing the fence back. At that stage there was no incident of violence. The atmosphere however remained inflammable. Capt Theron communicated by radio with Major van Zyl. The latter was then at the Municipal Offices. Capt Theron made one effort to talk to the crowd, but his impression was that because of rowdiness, no one heard him or took notice of him.

Arrival: Security Police Just before 13:00 Col Prinsloo56, Col Spengler57, Capt Willers58 and Sgt Wessels59 (all of the Security Police), together with Capt Brummer60 and Lt Freemantle61, who had with them three Saracens, arrived at Sharpeville Police Station. Capt. Brummer positioned his Saracen inside the fenced-off area on the western side. There were now four Saracens at the police station, together with the Saracen brought in earlier by Capt. van der Linde.

Crowd hostile The general effect of the police evidence is that the crowd was extremely hostile. Abuse was hurled at the police. Threats were made. The crowd on the western side were armed with sticks and kierries. Reference to “Cato Manor” were made by the crowd. Capt Brummer then tried to talk to the crowd through a loudspeaker. It was evident that he made no impression on the crowd. Lt Freemantle confirms the hostility of the crowd. He said that the police were being constantly abused with remarks such as "police dogs” and "today you will die here”.

Security Chief interrogates leaders At this stage the police decided to act. Col Spengler approached Mr Tsolo and asked him what he wanted. According to Col Spengler Mr Tsolo turned to face the crowd and said: “I represent them! When asked why

54

We need more information on this person – HBH. 55

WA Willers – HBH. 56

WCE “Sampie” Prinsloo – HBH. 57

‘At’ Spengler - HBH 58

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We need more information on this person – HBH. 60

We need more information on this person – HBH. Kan dit Hans Brummer wees? 61

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the crowd would not go home, Mr Tsolo answered: "We will not call this [55] off unless Mr Sobukwe has spoken". Col Spengler took Mr Tsolo into the police station and asked him for his reference book. He later questioned him about the protest gathering. It appears that Mr Tsolo accompanied him willingly. This incident did not evoke any particular reaction from the crowd. Mr Tsolo joined the crowd again after the firing. Shortly thereafter Mr Thomas More was noticed and Col Spengler spoke to him. Col Spengler asked him what he wanted. Mr More’s reply was: “I represent these people, we want our freedom!' Mr More willingly accompanied Col Spengler into the police station. Mr More did not return to the crowd either. He was inside the station when the shooting incident occurred. As in the case of Mr Tsolo, there was no noticeable reaction by the crowd.

Lt-Col Pienaar: Deputy Commissioner takes command Shortly thereafter, Lt-Col Pienaar62 arrived with further reinforcements. He took command of the police at the station. On his way to Sharpeville he was joined by Lt Claassens63 and approximately 29 European and 14 African policemen. At the Sharpeville Municipal Offices he found Lt-Col Holmes64 and Major van Zyl. Lt-Col Pienaar described his arrival at the Sharpeville police station in the following terms: "As I turned off the main road, on the road to the Station, I saw this large crowd there. I estimated it to be between 20,000 and 25,000. Prom a point of about 300 yards from the station, they were massed together. The first thing I saw was in the middle of the road, a small car which had been battered and was being pulled about. I could not see then properly what was happening. It was surrounded by a dense crowd. I instructed the driver to circumvent that portion of them mob on the pavement. On the way I could see the prancing around, giving the “AFRIKA sign” and kerries were swinging in the air". Lt-Col Pienaar also stated in his evidence that his police car was struck by sticks and other objects. There was also an attempt to obstruct him from entering into the police camp. His impression of the situation when he entered the police station appeared to have been the following: - [56] "When I landed inside the yard that morning, from all I had seen and been told, and what I'd personally experienced, I was satisfied that the mob was ready for anything. The mob was in a frenzied state and I feared an attack on the Police at any moment."

SAP Strength On Lt. Col. Pienaar's arrival, there were now 130 White and 77 African Policemen at the police station while 29 White and 59 African police in Zwane Street. The police were armed with rifles whilst the African policemen had SAP-issue assegais’, kierries and batons. Total white armed policemen: 159 Partially armed police: 136

Grand total: 295 policemen facing a hostile crowd.

Weapons and Ammunition The .25 pistol is carried by the detective branch, while the uniformed branch carried a .38 revolver.

62

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We need more information on this person – HBH. 64

We need more information on this person – HBH.

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The Stengun is automatic and of 9 mm calibre with a magazine of 25 to 30 rounds. It fired at a speed of 500 rounds per minute.

The Browning machine gun mounted on each Saracen could fire 450 to 500 rounds per minute. The ammunition issued was of the ordinary ball type.

No other type of ammunition available in South Africa for this calibre of arms. The insinuation that the police used ammunition which was calculated to cause maximum destruction, such as for example, dum-dum bullets, was repudiated as utter nonsense was the finding of the Commissioner who made this statement to dispel an apparent rumour that the police had used special ammunition and that, therefore, serious and unnecessary injury was caused. All the evidence showed that the policemen were experienced and that until the arrival of Lt- Col Pienaar, nothing was done by the police to evoke hostility from the crowd. It should, however, be taken into account that a number of the policeman had already been involved in incidents during the previous night and the early morning which may have affected their judgement and perception. There could be no doubt, too, that the policemen on this occasion had in mind the Cato Manor-incident where the police were slain. It was impossible to give an accurate estimate of the crowd. According to the Commissioner it could not have been less than 10,000. In regard to an assessment of the mood of the crowd, the Commissioner found the following important probabilities:

It seemed that a large number were [57] there because they were prevented from going to work.

Amongst the crowd were PAC members, sympathisers, the inquisitive, and others who were their fortuitously,

The suggestion was rejected that the crowd was there merely to provoke the police.

Although the majority present were law-abiding. It has to be taken into account that for all of them, it was an important day.

Since the previous day, a number of protesters had been involved in incidents which had affected their mood. The events in Seeiso Street were not calculated to improve their tempers. At 11:00 the group of younger Africans who moved from Seeiso Street to the police station were in fighting mood! Their long wait at the police station exacerbated this mood.

The call for aircraft and for reinforcements, including the 'Skietkommando' (Citizen Force) and the cutting of wires indicated that in the police view, an ugly situation had developed.

The evidence that there was no real hostility by the crowd could not be accepted.

Crowd unarmed Insofar as the carrying of arms by the crowd was concerned, a consideration of all the evidence justified the conclusion that the crowd could not have been regarded as an armed one, although kierries, sticks and a few firearms were noticed. Insofar as the situation was inflammable, this was due not to the weapons carried by the crowd, but to factors such as the size and mood of the gathering and their physical proximity to the police.

Lt-Col Pienaar: No emergency instructions issued Lt-Col Pienaar positioned the men under his command as follows: 70 White policemen took up positions behind the fence on the western side, armed with .303 rifles and a few sten guns. The majority of them were Constables. No apparent method was used in the Police Line - for example, no Constables were placed under the command of an officer or [58] sergeant. Other than the instruction not to fire, they were not told how to act

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in the event of an emergency. The Saracens were under the command of Capt Brummer and it was left for Capt Brummer to decide whether the circumstances warranted the use of machine guns. Shortly thereafter, Lt-Col Pienaar ordered that the .303-rifles should be loaded with five rounds of ammunition. He did this purposefully, he says, because at a certain stage, stones were thrown at the police. He saw Col Spengler at the gate with Sgt Miller65 holding Mr Tsolo, and both were flung back into the yard. Some Africans went after them, but they retreated. At that stage he expected an immediate attack on the police and gave orders to load in the hope that it would have a sobering effect on the crowd. He again warned the men not to shoot without orders.

The police expected attack The general gist of the police evidence was that the situation was extremely tense. The noise was great! The orders of the officers could only be heard at short distances. The Africans on the western side of the police fence pressed against the fence and bent it. This was the position when the loading of the .303-rifles was ordered. The loading of the rifles had no visible effect on the crowd! Several police witnesses testified that they expected an attack at any moment. At this time, Lt-Col Spengler and other members of the Security Branch went to the gate. They opened the gate in order to detain a PAC leader, Mr Molefi.66 According to the Commissioner the breaking point was nearer than Lt-Col Speng1er thought.

Detention Affected Crowd The evidence presented convinced the Commissioner that the detention of Mr Molefi by Lt-Col Spengler did affect the temper of the crowd. It encouraged the crowd to go nearer to the police gate and to press against the fence. Tension then mounted. The general expectancy was: Something would happen. Even Mr Labuschagne who lived under the Africans for years and knew the Africans well, said in evidence that for the first time he became afraid and worried. [59]

Crowd burst through gates Suddenly simultaneously different incidents took place which within a few milli-seconds forced a decisive turn in events. Lt-Col Pienaar said: "Then three things happened simultaneously. I Saw Lt-Col Spengler again at the gate and I suddenly saw him stagger backwards and the crowd bursting through the gates. Two shots were fired from the mob and a strong shower of stones fell amongst the police. Almost at once after that, two shots were fired on the left flank from the police and then the whole line started shooting". Lt. Col. Pienaar declared that he had not given orders to fire. His evidence was substantially corroborated by Lt-Col Spengler and Lt-Col Botha.

Police evidence The gist of the police evidence was:

The noise had reached a climax.

The crowd was pressing against the fences in a manner which suggested that they wanted to push it down in order to reach the police.

Two shots fired from the mob

There was a sudden flooding of Africans to within one or two yards inside the gate.

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The police opened fire because they considered that their lives were in danger. They thought so on account:-

The numerical superiority of the crowd. The continuous references to “Cato Manor “ and other threats from the crowd, The war-cries, spitting and noise, The determination exhibited since the previous night to disregard police orders, baton

charges, tear-gas or even warning shots. The falling of Lt-Col. Spengler at the gate when stone throwing commenced, and the

charging through the gates by the mob.

Commissioner's Findings [60]

An analysis of all the evidence which led the Commission to the following conclusion as to what occurred that fateful day: It was probable that the crowd nearest the gate had focussed their attention on the events at the gate. Others, who could not see properly, but who knew something was happening, pressed forward. Meanwhile, the crowd were singing repeatedly emitting political war-cries and shouting obscene remarks at the police. As a result of pressure from behind, the fence was leaned on by those in front consequently they pushed the fence over. From where the police stood, it could have seemed that the crowd was incensed by the incident in which Mr Molefi had been concerned. This appeared from the loud protests and the throwing of stones at the police, in particular Lt-Col Spengler. Orders were then given by Lt-Col. Pienaar to load. Protests became louder. The crowd immediately in front of the gate pressed forward. Lt-Col Spengler was knocked over; stones were thrown at the police. Somebody in the crowd fired two shots or there was an explosion that sounded like rifle fire. No orders were given by Lt-Col. Pienaar to fire, but the word 'SHOOT' was used by someone and this coincided with the firs shots by the police. Then all the police started firing. The time was 13:40. According to the Commission the firing lasted from 10 to 30 seconds. According to the police, firing stopped when it became apparent that the crowd was on the run. It must be remembered that the masses were acting vague and conflicting orders emanating from leaders with who they were not in direct contact. On account of wild promises that a future Utopia was going to be created, everybody was milling about, wanting to be present when this miracle was performed. As the hours sped by, their excitement, kindled by uncertainty, culminated in exuberant war-cries and tribal dances. The police experienced difficulty in determining the mood and strategy which were changing from one moment to the [61] to the other. Even though the situation was extremely tense, it came as, a complete surprise when the crowd burst through the gates and advanced on the police line. Things had now taken an unexpected and ill-fated turn. “It was idle", said the Commissioner presiding at the Commission of Enquiry “to speculate on all that would have happened if no shots at all had been fired, when they were. It is possible that no loss of life at all would occurred; on the other hand, it is possible that a worse bloodbath than ever could have taken place.” On 24 March after the Langa, Sharpeville, Evaton and Vanderbijlpark riots, but before disturbances had abated in other areas, the Government banned all public meetings of all races in 24 of the Union's 265 magisterial districts.

Three members of the South African Police lost their lives and 59 were injured.

Who were they?

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Exhibit: Baton used at Sharpeville

Photo: Hennie Heymans

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Rand Daily Mail

Exhibit: Tear Gas used at Sharpeville

(Primitive) Tear gas used at Sharpeville – photo Hennie Heymans

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129

130

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Sharpeville was the most cataclysmic event in our modern South Africa – it’s repeated often, even surpassing the Church Street Bomb explosion in infamy.

Pondoland

1960 - 1961 Pondoland During 1960 unrest broke out in the Pondoland. Once again the Pondoland-situation affected members of

the South African Police Force and their families. Police reinforcements from all over South Africa were

sent to Pondoland – also the famous-to-be, General Hendrik van den Bergh, and then a Lt-Col in the

newly reorganised Security Branch. The South African Air Force and the Union Defence Force as part of

“Operation Swivel” assisted the South African Police Force in Pondoland. Police from all over South Africa

were drafted to assist in quelling the troubles.

The Durban policemen were sent by train from Durban to Kokstad and were deployed from Kokstad by

road to various points in Pondoland. One of the policemen sent to Pondoland was my father; Sergeant AF

“Abie” Heymans from Durban and Constables Ben Mouton and Manie Odendaal67. This researcher was

fortunate to spend December 1960 and January 1961 with his father, mother and other siblings in Mt Ayliff.

He went on many patrols with his father and was eyewitness of events that took place in Pondoland. (See

Colonel Ben Mouton’s story of their exploits at Brook’s Nek and Mt Ayliff.)

1960 - Dr HF Verwoerd and the long cherished dream of an Afrikaner Republic

In all fairness when looking at history one has to look objectively at all the evidence available. During the

Peace of Vereeniging during 1902 the Africans were excluded by the Boers and the British. The same

happened during 1910 resulting in the formation of the ANC. Lt-General JG Dreyer68 tells me of an incident

which he read in our Security Branch files: “Just before we became a Republic the ANC with Mr

Nelson Mandela and Co had a meeting at Edendale near Pietermaritzburg. One of the resolutions

was that before a Republic was declared Dr HF Verwoerd and the Government should talk to the

ANC about the future of South Africa. The Government refused to talk to the ANC - the result was

that Mr Mandela left for further military training, I think in Algeria.” General Dreyer asked the question

that had we negotiated then, what settlement would be have got.

Political war, terrorism, insurgency etc, ala Von Clausewitz, is also the continuation of politics by other

means! So we had to go through the full circles from 1902 to 1910; 1910 to 1961; 1961 to 1991: before we

could negotiate a new South Africa! What deal would we have got had we negotiated back then?

67

We need more information on this person – HBH. 68

He was OC SB Natal – HBH.

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1962 SAP Mobile Unit: Transkei

ANC, PAC AND SWAPO In the mean time the populace was mobilised and well organised. In the penumbra of the violence,

sanctions and unrest the armed wings of the Pan Africanist Congress – Poqo and of the African National

Congress – Mkontho and Plan of South-West African People's Organisation became active and slowly the

armed resistance began - like in the Belgian Congo, Angola, Portugal, and Rhodesia. The winds of change

have arrived in Southern Africa – but the South African Police Force was ready and slowly the South

African Defence Force and South African Military-industrial complex was activated to meet the threat.

Huge demonstrations took place in Cape Town, Langa, Sharpeville and elsewhere and even in small

places the populace was activated by instruments like Radio Freedom.

During 1960 the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress were declared banned

organisations69. Terrorism and sabotage became more frequent while internal instability increased. South

Africa found itself in a low-intensity conflict with armed insurgents.

69

On 8 April 1960 the Governor-General signed a proclamation declaring the ANC and the PAC to be unlawful organizations for a period of one year.

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RIVONIA 11 JULY 1963 AND RIVONIA TRIALS70 During the 1970’s I was fortunate to work with Brigadier Willem van Wyk71. In the Police Brigadier van Wyk

was first known as “Biesiesvlei” van Wyk; but after his successful raid on the Lilliesleaf homestead at

Rivonia his nickname in the Police and particularly in the Security Branch changed to “Rivonia” van Wyk.

19 ANC-leaders were arrested at Lilliesleaf, a small holding owned by Arthur Goldreich, in Rivonia by then

Lieut Willem van Wyk and his men. These men were charged for 221 acts of sabotage with the intention of

overthrowing the then South African government. Lilliesleaf was used as a covert ANC-base, arsenal and

weapons factory.

Arrested were ANC, Trade Unionists and Communists: Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Andrew Mlangeni, Elias Motsoaledi, Ahmed Kathrada, Billy Nair, Denis Goldberg, Lionel "Rusty" Bernstein, Bob Hepple, Arthur Goldreich, brothers-in-law Harold Wolpe and James "Jimmy" Kantor and others.

ANC leaders, including Nelson Mandela, were prosecuted in the Rivonia Trail. The trail started on 26 November 1963. Some of the accused were found guilty and imprisoned – others were found not guilty. At that time Nelson Mandela was already in the Fort – a well-known Johannesburg prison where he was serving a five-year sentence for leaving the country illegally and inciting workers to strike.

Student–Constable Leon Wessels was our troop leader; he and I were in the same mounted troop in the Police College while the trail took place. Verdict in the Rivonia Trail was delivered on 12 th of June 1964 and we passed out on the 4th of July 1964 as fully fledged policemen and we went to our various police stations.

In 1996, on the 26th anniversary of the Sharpeville shootings, Nelson Mandela chose Sharpeville as the site to announce the signing of the new democratic constitution – he asked the same Leon Wessels – now Dr Wessels to accompany him to the public signing of the Constitution at Sharpeville! The 21st of March is now commemorated as South Africa's Human Rights Day and it is the day on which the new state of Namibia is formed.

The second legal onslaught on the ANC's leadership and organizers continued with a trial known as the “Little Rivonia”-trail. In accordance with international laws on terrorism other ANC members were also prosecuted. Amongst the accused in this trial was the chief of MK, Wilton Mkwayi who was sentenced to life imprisonment alongside Mandela and the other ANC leaders on Robben Island.

Goldreich and Wolpe escaped from the police cells at Marshall Square by promising their police guard a bribe which they incidentally never paid to the poor fellow! Illustrious legal minds attended to the Rivonia Trail: The presiding judge was Dr. Quartus de Wet, then judge-president of the Transvaal, Dr. Percy Yutar, then deputy attorney-general of the Transvaal prosecuted while the defence team was lead by Adv Bram Fischer, the distinguished Afrikaner lawyer, assisted by Harry Schwarz, Joel Joffe, Arthur Chaskalson, George Bizos and Harold Hanson.

Charges were: [I have the charge sheet]

recruiting persons for training in the preparation and use of explosives and in guerrilla warfare for the purpose of violent revolution and committing acts of sabotage

conspiring to commit the aforementioned acts and to aid foreign military units when they invaded the Republic,

acting in these ways to further the objects of communism

70

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rivonia_Trial 71

We need more information on this person – HBH.

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soliciting and receiving money for these purposes from sympathizers in Algeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Tunisia, and elsewhere.

In his opening address, the prosecutor Dr Yutar said that their production requirements for munitions for a six-month period were sufficient, to blow up a city the size of Johannesburg! The Rivonia trial was condemned by the United Nations Security Council and nations around the world and in some case leading to international sanctions against the South African government.

Originally the death penalty had been requested, but was changed because of world-wide protests and skilled legal maneuvers on the part of the defence team. Harold Hanson was called upon to argue in mitigation. He compared the African struggle for rights to the earlier Afrikaans struggle, citing precedents for temperate sentencing, even in cases of treason. Eight defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment; Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Motsoaledi, Mlangeni, and Goldberg were found guilty on all four counts. The defence had hoped that Mhlaba, Kathrada, and Bernstein might escape conviction because of the skimpiness of evidence that they were parties to the conspiracy, although undoubtedly they could be prosecuted on other charges. But Mhlaba too was found guilty on all counts, and Kathrada, on one charge of conspiracy. Bernstein, was found not guilty. The Security Branch rearrested him, he was released on bail and placed under house arrest. Later he fled the country.

Denis Goldberg went to Pretoria Central Prison instead of Robben Island (at that time the only security wing for white political prisoners in South Africa) where he served 22 years. Nelson Mandela would spend nearly thirty years in prison as a result of the trial. He was released on 11 February 1990 by President F.W. de Klerk.

Mobile Units: Col PJ ‘Pat’ Dillon Police Mobile Units were reactivated on a national level and Colonel Pat Dillon was placed in charge.

Initially the Police managed to handle the insurgency threat, but later the South African Defence Force

became involved. South Africa faced a multi-dimensional onslaught involving cultural, sporting, weapons

and economic boycotts. Once again the Communists fully supported the African National Congress and

South-West African People's Organisation insurgents by supplying weapons, training and moral support to

them. More and more laws were enacted to combat the onslaught. The South African Police Force was

ready when called upon and served initially in South West Africa and Rhodesia. The first policemen

serving on the border, without proper combat uniforms, vehicles and other accoutrements except the

ubiquitous “tap-tap” or Uzzi their only automatic weapon, did a fine job. They not only had to face danger

from terrorists but elephant, lion, mamba and buffalo and various tropical diseases were also threatening

members of the Force – however it was nothing new as their predecessors of the South African Mounted

Rifles also served in Ovamboland under trying circumstances during the early part of the 20th century!

South Africa under the national Party rule became not only drawn into the Cold War but also in the post-

Colonial conflict raging in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. At

all costs a buffer zone had to be created across the continent stretching from Southern Angola in the west,

through Botswana, Rhodesia and Mozambique in the east.

A SA Police View of Terrorists As one Senior Police officer explained the combating of the revolutionary onslaught to me: “We were

dealing with criminals in this case.” As a result of driving the Communists and the Black Nationalists

underground, the South African Police Force became involved in fighting subversion, terrorism and

insurgency in Southern Africa. The refusal of the Western powers to support the Black opposition to the

National Party government served as a rationale for them to seek help from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and

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the German Democratic Republic and other Warsaw Pact governments, as well as South Africa's

neighbours in the so-called “Front-Line States.”

East Block Involvement As a senior Security Police officer to SNASP, in Mozambique, explained: “We asked Britain for help

against our Portuguese oppressors. Britain refused and said that Portugal were their oldest allies. We then

turned to the East Bloc countries for help.”

As the onslaught and the mobilization of the masses gained momentum after the 1976 Soweto Riots and

in order to maintain internal security, the numerical strength police was increased, the Security Branch was

enlarged and adapted to meet the threat. (The African National Congress was fast to claim the momentum

of the riots as their doing.) The strength of the Counter-Insurgency and Riot Squads (later the Internal

Stability Unit) and the Special Task Force was also increased to combat “struggle movements” (or as we

called them: terrorist organisations) such as the African National Congress, their soldiers were known as

Umkhonto we Sizwe or MK, the Pan Africanist Congress their fighting wing was called Poqo and later

APLA as well as the South-West African People's Organisation while their soldiers were called PLAN

(People’s Liberations Army of Namibia). Training in the South African Police Force was adapted to meet

the needs facing the police. All policemen were trained in counter-insurgency and in the combating of

unrest. This shifted the focus away from classical policing.

During PW Botha’s tenure as prime minsiert and state president the South African Police Force took part

in the activities of the State Security Council, the Secretariat of the State Security Council and the National

Security Management System. The country was beleaguered from all sides facing a multi facetted

onslaught – on the psychological-, political-, economic- and security power bases of the State. South

Africa even experienced a cultural and sport boycott.

Along with the South African Police Force the South African Defence Force was also employed to combat

terror and to assist other groupings in Southern Africa who were the enemies of our enemies. Turning

back to South West Africa/ Namibia; the South African Police Coin Units were withdrawn from the territory

from 1973. This withdrawal of the South African Police Coin Units was the result of a Government

discussion taken in 1973. The South African Police then rendered normal ‘civil’ policing duties, crime

detection and Security Branch by members stationed in South West Africa/ Namibia.

However the security situation in South West Africa slowly deteriorated and during 1977 large groups of

South-West African People's Organisation’s PLAN-soldiers infiltrated and operated in groups of 60 - 100

insurgents. It became increasingly difficult for South Africa to successfully perform counter insurgency

because a lack of operational intelligence or combat intelligence. However without combat intelligence

South Africa could not effectively eliminate the threat facing them. The operational area became a “no-go”

area after dark and SWAPO ruled supreme.

Ongulumbashe / Ovamboland (1966) Elements of the Security Branch of the South African Police from Pretoria and Windhoek were deployed in

the area to gather information regarding armed SWAPO cadres that infiltrated the area. These cadres

were known to the police as “returning saboteurs”. Captain TJ Rooi-Rus Swanepoel and his team of

Security Branch officers were deployed in the area as engineers and surveyors from a Company called

“PASCO”. They supplied the information for the attack on the base at Umgulambashe when the SA Police

mobile units under Col Pat Dillon and elements of the SADF attacked SWAPO in their base camp. This

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was the first attack on a SWAPO base and soon the elements of the SA Police were deployed in the north

of the territory.

Rhodesia (1967-1975) Rhodesia was a small landlocked country and both South African and Rhodesian dissidents began

infiltrating into Rhodesia from the so-called frontline states. As elements of the South African ANC were

also active elements of the South African Police were sent to Rhodesia to assist. The choice fell on the

South African Police to assist in Rhodesia. Most of the ANC-terrorists were in any case known to the

Security Branch of the SA Police. Rhodesia had declared itself unilaterally independent from Britain and to

send troops could mean trouble for both Rhodesia and South Africa. However it was known that elements

of the SADF entered Rhodesia as members of the SA Police.

As sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia some countries were known as “sanctions busters” and Britain

deployed their intelligence services and Navy. The South African Police arrested a senior member of the

British MI6 on the South African/Rhodesian border. This officer claimed that he held the rank equal to a

Major-General in the British Army. He was not charged for espionage and after being detained in a

Pretoria Prison for a while was released.

Most of the SA Police enjoyed the fighting in Rhodesia; however the relationship with the Rhodesia

Security forces were not always a very happy relationship. The SA Police also sent members of the

Security Branch to assist in ground coverage and intelligence gathering. Many SA Police officers asked for

an own area of operation with own commanders and own Security Branch members. For understandable

reasons this request could not be denied.

One could also understand that while the SA Police assisted by element of the SAAF were gaining

valuable combat experience, the SA Army lost out in this exercise. However it was an open secret that

they assisted in technological and electronic warfare and served in certain units.

Fox Street Siege (1974) With hindsight the Fox Siege may be called a “storm in a teacup” but it showed that the South African

Police lacked a Special Task Force to deal with real terrorist hostage dramas and special covert

operations. My friend and colleague, then a Captain, later a major general, SJ “Black-Jack” de Swardt of

Security Branch Head Office had for some time trying to convince the Police Command that a Special

Task Force was a necessary! He and the “Bliksems” as his band of volunteers had been called had been

in training for some time. The “Bliksems” had meetings with and had received some training from “The

Hunters” an ACF unit of the SADF under the command of Cmdt Kerckhoven.

The Commissioner granted approval for the establishment of the SA Police Special Task Force and Black-

Jack was one of the foundation members of this elite squad.

The Hunters could in a sense be viewed as the “father” of not only the Recces, the Bliksems but also the

Special Task Force of the SAR Police. The Hunters were at that stage the pioneers of combat fighting and

irregular warfare and for special warfare. Cmdt Kerckhoven and his Hunters and Captain Black-Jack de

Swardt should be credited for their farsightedness.

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Soweto (1976) Soweto erupted on the 16th of June 1976. I remember the day clearly as I was stationed at Security Head

Quarters in Pretoria. About midday I received an urgent telephone call from Mr Charles More, senior

official at the South African Department of Information, requesting information on what was happening in

Soweto. He told me they had received information that Soweto was burning and that a doctor had been

killed by the mob and that and that the police had fired on school children. At that stage our section had

not yet heard. Soon I found out that police reinforcements had been sent.

A friend from Pretoria, Captain Gustav Dey of SAP Kameeldrift, had been sent on the 16th of June 1976

and he was away from his station for a week – dressed only in his winter tunic. They went without food,

great coats, blankets or any comforts. Initially the police was ill-prepared for the rioting in Soweto but as

the rioting spread the police received permission to wear their camouflage uniforms. The wearing of the

camouflage uniforms was far more comfortable and warm. They could be slept in, however the uniform

was not conducive to law and order nor did the camouflage uniform calm the rioters down!

Only much later did the police receive blue field battle dress.

COIN, Special Task Force and Security Branch As the onslaught increased in velocity, the Police responded with a well trained COIN Force. The police

training centre at Maleoskop was developed into a modern facility to train both counter—insurgency as

well as riot control. Fully equipped and modern Riot Squads were established in each Police Division while

a National Reserve Unit, Unit 19 was established to be deployed at any flash Point in South Africa.

Police were trained in counter-insurgency for SWA/Namibia, Rhodesia and for the South African borders.

The South African Police took over border control duties on dangerous border posts and patrolled the

border.

To augment the relatively small police force the South African Police established a force of Special

Constables – the press was very quick to dub these men Instant-Constables. In any counter-revolutionary

onslaught police are needed to maintain peace and stability. Men are needed on the ground to keep an

eye on the community and on the agitators.

Without ground coverage and information the police cannot function, threats cannot be perceived,

operations cannot be planned, and the maintenance of law and order, peace and stability in society comes

under threat. The Security Branch of the South African Police was increased in number and in quality. The

“secret fund” was enlarged in order for the police to pay the necessary rewards for information. Rewards

were paid for bringing in certain weapons and for the capture of armed insurgents. Southern Africa

became a hive of activity as the police captured enemy arms caches and killed many terrorists in their

hideouts before departing to South Africa.

Special Police Units like the Special Guard Unit etc were established to thwart attacks on senior

politicians, Parliament, Union Buildings other Government offices, their houses at Acacia Park, Bryntirion,

Pelican Park and such places.

Security Forces is the independent and national states were beefed up, trained and helped in any way

possible. The influence of the South African Police was also projected to our neighbouring states like

Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi.

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In a sense the Security Forces of South Africa maintained stability and managed the change is such a way

that an evolutionary process was started and a revolutionary revolt was suppressed eg Operation Vula.

The De Klerk-Government was empowered by the Security Forces to act from a position of strength. A

great debt is owed to the Security Forces who managed the change.

Task Force (1976) The origin of SAP Special Task Force goes back to the early 1970’s when (then) Captain SJ de Swardt

and a few men called the “Bliksems” commenced training at the Baviaanspoort Prison farm. (I watched a

few excersises) only later did the police accept Capt De Swart’s recommendation for a special task force.

Silverton Bank Siege (1980) This subject has been covered.

1979 Koevoet The bottom line why Koevoet – or more correctly “Operation K” was founded was initially to supply the

SADF with tactical or combat intelligence. General Magnus Malan approached to the then Commissioner

of Police, General MCW Geldenhuys, who after consultation with the Head of the Security Branch,

Brigadier Johann Coetzee, appointed Lt-Col JG “Sterk-Hans” Dreyer for the task. In theory the “Operation

K” would gain tactical intelligence for the Recce’s and other SADF units to act upon. In practice there are

huge cultural differences between the police and the army and very soon “Operation K” devolved into

intelligence gathering, tracking and fighting. “Operation K” was the first SA Police units to receive the

Casspir72 which was deployed in the north of the then Southwest-Africa.

This security situation in South West Africa lead to talks during 1978 between General Magnus Malan of

Defence and the Commissioner of Police, General MCW “Mike” Geldenhuys. The original plan was to

deploy specialists from the Security Branch with elements of the Recce’s to form a special unit along the

lines of the Selous Scouts of Rhodesia. General JG ‘Sterk-Hans’ Dreyer - a Colonel then - visited

Rhodesia to study their methods. After his return from Rhodesia the South African Police Force and the

South African Defence Force agreed that a secret special operation – ‘Operation “K”’ – would be

established within the Security Branch of the South African Police.

This unit, from humble beginnings, started to operate on 11 January 1979 and it record stands as a proud

achievement to the South African Police Force.

Selous Scouts Operation “K” or Koevoet as well as Vlakplaas which operated within South Africa was initially based upon

the Selous Scouts experience. In fact the Rhodesian Selous Scouts gave rise to three South African

“sons”: Koevoet, Vlakplaas and the South African Recces.73 Koevoet as it became known was a Security

Branch intelligence operation with a ready-mix fighting capability. In order to survive they were good, well

trained, armed and fit and as tough as nails. They were resourceful men who regularly acquired

‘government property’ to suit their operational and fighting needs. In order to appreciate their effectiveness

one may choose to compare their kill-rate to their casualty rate. That these men could at times break loose

72

Acronym Casspir is derived from the CSIR and SAP. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and the SA Police developed the Casspir from Police funds. 73

The role played by North West Mounted Police and its trackers from Canada during the Anglo-Boer War had by now faded from the

corporate memory of the Security Forces.

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is no understatement, but under the circumstances they deserved it. There was not always time for the

conventional niceties of military etiquette as they placed a high premium on counter-insurgency.

Elements of the South African Police Force, including Koevoet- and Vlakplaas members, took the battle

from to the enemies chosen battlefield back the border and beyond. The South African Police Force pre-

empted the enemy even hitting then as far as London!

1989 Cold War During 1989 the Cold War in which South Africa was involved unofficially came to an end with the fall of

the wall in Berlin. (We all remember President Reagan on TV: “Mr Gorbachev brake down this wall!”)

However terror and instability continued even after the fall of Berlin.

Some examples of Propaganda

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141

SAP/SADF Cooperation

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Unrest and the State Of Emergency (1984 - 1990) President F. W. de Klerk believing that Communism no longer posed a threat that he could safely allow

free political debate and activities in South Africa. After the famous 2nd of February 1990 speech of the

State President FW de Klerk the South African Police and the Security Forces continued to maintain law

and order under trying circumstances. In spite of Mr de Klerk’s sincerity the opposition forces – like Swapo

- continued with their intimidation, mobilisation and attacks on informers and policemen. The ANC’s

“Operation Vula” serves as a case in point.

The South African Police Force and the other Security Forces began to manage the transition in South

Africa to democracy. The public of South Africa owe a huge debt to the South African Police Force for the

way in which they managed the change in South Africa.

Margaret Thatcher writes in her memoirs, The Downing Street Years iro South Africa that “1985 was one

of mounting crisis for South Africa.” During the South African state of emergency foreign banks refused to

renew South Africa’s credit while the RSA Government declared a four month freeze on the repayment of

principal foreign debt. International pressure on South Africa was mounting. She tells us that even

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President Ronald Reagan of the USA who, like her was opposed to sanctions, “introduced a limited

package of sanctions to forestall pressure from Congress.” 74

Prelude to Democracy (1990 - 1994) Work in Progress: To be covered in detail.

Elections and SAP Work in Progress: To be covered in detail.

Some Books on the “Fighting Police of South Africa”

Van Ovamboland tot Masjonaland: Louis Lubbe

74

p 514

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Without doubt this is the best book on the “Bush War” I have read!

Spoor van die Heuningby: T Smit

145

146

Koevoet: The Men Speak

147

Brewers, Beerhalls and Boycotts: P la Hausse

148

Zulu Zulu Foxtrot: A Durand

149

Monthly Journal: Armed Forces

150

Polisieavonture in Suidwes-Afrika: PC Swanepoel

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Really Inside Boss: PC Swanepoel

Other useful books

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Saturday’s soldiers: The Hunters Group: L Els

The Hunters, members of the Citizen Force, under the command of Col Kerkhoven, did sterling work

before there was a SA Police Special Task Force or any Recce’s. Some of his instructors trained some

members of the “Bliksems” at Baviaanspoort – HBH.

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154

The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa

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Uit Nood gebore: PJ Wessels

This is a good book and sets out the internal struggle that faced operators in the field.

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Van Depot tot Duitswes: Genl C Crafford

157

The Worlld’s Secret Police: B Quarrie

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Storm & Sunshine in South Africa: Rosamund Southy

About virtually unknown police forces (eg Natal Border Police) in Vryheid and Utrecht after the two ZAR

districts were added to the Colony of Natal. It also covers the history of the Nongqai and the Natal Police.

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Gallantry Awards of the South African Police: 1913 – 1994: T King

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Conclusion The Police were always ready to perform any task with vigour, enthusiasm and good cheer! However after

years of serving in the police, I came to the conclusion that we should have two types of police in South

Africa; State Police and Regional/Metro Police.

(A) State Police or a National Police

State Police or a National Police that deal with the vested interests of the State. In short a gendarmerie or

armed constabulary, they are the “fighting police” although they are peace officers they have semi-military

role. Under their ambit should fall:

a) counter insurgency,

b) border control,

c) border protection,

d) coast guard, (Remember we still may face a threat from pirates.)

e) national security branch and intelligence,

f) special task force,

g) guarding of VIP’s i.e. VIP protection

h) guarding national key points,

i) transport police on national roads, air marshals etc

j) international police liaison,

k) training & national standards,

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l) national detectives,

m) national criminal records, and

n) national forensic laboratories

The State Police (or National Police) should have jurisdiction in the whole country. They carry military type

ranks.

(B) The Regional Police The Regional Police (‘Soft Policing’ or plain and simple Civil Police like in the UK) for towns, urban and

farming areas. They should perform the duties of a peace officer:

a) Visible policing, (including 10111)

b) Traffic Police, (also for ceremonial and state occasions.)

c) Highway Patrol,

d) Crime prevention, (i.e. beat duty and patrols in suburbs and townships.)

e) Water police, (Dams, rivers where you find anglers, tourists and campers.)

f) Mounted Police, (also for ceremonial and state occasions.)

g) Air wings,

h) Alien & illegal immigrants,

i) Crime investigation,

j) Drug enforcement, and

k) Search & rescue.

These policemen do not serve outside their jurisdiction. They have civilian ranks! We are experiencing high levels of crime because we neglected classical policing! Since the 1800’s the police have been used in various roles and was seen as the first line of defence. The

police was more cheap to maintain and were in many cases “rough and ready” (or “rough and tough” and

self-reliant) and soon adapted to any task in good or adverse weather conditions. Police served under

harsh conditions without the luxury of field kitchens etc.

Police view of Politicians

Soweto Police Chief calls it a day A quote from the Sowetan: “He said he thought of politicians as “slow thinkers” and he regarded Pretoria

as the capital of slow thinkers”.

All I can say is that some politicians are plain cowards, they did not stand up for their police and defence

force officers, instead they delivered them like lambs to be slaughtered to former adversaries and in a way

I respect some SACP-ANC politicians; for the stand they took at the way the NP treated their Security

Forces and they even sympathised with us.

[This must be another bizarre record where the former reigning politicians accept no blame. If you are

responsible for a port folio YOU are liable and accountable!]

Some fundamental differences between the police and the Defence Force 1. Crime is a police task! That includes subversion, sabotage, terror or insurgency. No objection if the

Defence Force assists the police. (Anybody between 16 and 60 had a legal duty to assist the police.)

Cooperation and understanding of the various sub-cultures are of paramount importance.

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2. If you use your troops against the people you have a civil war!

3. In the first instance the police apply the Criminal Procedure Act; and also their knowledge of the

Common Law and the Statue Law and local ordinances. Police results are judged in open court through

due process of Law; i.e. the Rule of Law applies. Police do not need the Geneva Convention, when they

are busy with the investigation of crime they instead apply the Judges Rules when they make arrests.

4. As far as police involvement in Rhodesia, SWA and Angola it was for technical reasons difficult to use

the SADF in Rhodesia – it was at that time a Rebel British Colony how can the RSA “invade” Rhodesia?

Southwest Africa was an UN-mandated area. The SA Police were given permission in the 1960’s to enter

Anglo when in hot-pursuit.

5. When things escalate into war it is a job for the Defence Force and the Military Police should take over

police duties in the operational area north the Red Line. No police should be in the operational area.

6. Police need intelligence to act upon; to perform their lawful duties. Crime intelligence is NOT military

intelligence NOR is Crime intelligence National Security Intelligence. Crime intelligence is only a very small

part of National Security Intelligence. Police/Crime Intelligence is tested in court when presented as

evidence in court – tested by cross examination is low level court directed

7. The Defence Force, as its names suggests is there to protect the country. [We also keep Lt-Gen CA

“Pop” Frazer’s ideas in mind.]

8. Police should in NO WAY be involved in any covert action (read criminal acts!) This is rather a job for

people who are covertly connected and suitably situated - rather something for Special Forces and

intelligence people. Police must not have an evil mind and should come to court with clean hands,

Conclusion iro the SA Police I salute all former colleagues who were called to higher service whilst in the service of South Africa and the

South African Police Force! We will remember them; they did not die in vain! Salute!

The thin blue dotted line Die dun blou stippellyn - hordes van kriminele en terroriste sal ons nie oorweldig of uitwis nie! Ons is die 'penicillin' van die gemeenskap. Ons is met die Goddelike swaardmag beklee en in die eerste plek dienaars van geregtigheid, wet en orde - maw ons is daar vir jou (Of so moet dit wees!)

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Thousands line the streets for funeral of British police officer Police officers from all across North America and the UK came out to pay their final respects to Constable Daniel Woodall, 35, who was shot dead in the line… DAILYMAIL.CO.UK 27 Errol Massey-Hicks, Netti Botha en 25 ander Opmerkings

Eiras Vermaak Sarie Jacobs Wow. Indrukwekkend ! Mooi beskryf Hennie. !!

Johann Fouche Saluut!

One of our SAP Veterans: Capt Martin Loubser

Groete / Greetings Baie groete aan al ons lesers en baie, baie dankie vir u insette waarsonder hierdie uitgawe nie kon klaar

kom nie. Ons het baie interessante inligting mbt Cato Manor ontvang. Ons volgende uitgawe: “So onthou

ons die SAP” / “This is how we remember the SAP” is in die pyplyn, hierdie een was bietjie moeilik om

saam te stel.

Hennie Heymans No 43630