Sensors at Sea

Written by: Norman Friedman on June 8, 2011 Categories: Naval, Programs & Tech Tags: C4ISR, Research and Development, Submarines, Surface Sh...

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The German Sachsen-class frigate Hessen (F 221) and USS Normandy (CG 60) participate in Exercise Neptune Warrior off the coast of Scotland on May 1, 2007. Hessen uses a high-frequency active phased array radar (APAR) forward, and long-range target detection radar aft, while the Aegis cruiser employs the SPY-1 passive phased array. U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Michael Starkey

Surely the most spectacular recent advance in naval sensing has been the rise of unmanned vehicles – air, surface, and underwater – carrying sensors, whose output they can record or transmit back for analysis.

Moving sensors off board can greatly expand the footprint of a ship or submarine (or naval airplane). For example, to navies such as the United States Navy, submarines are invaluable for electronic reconnaissance because they are, in effect, invisible in most places. Thus the locals do not know that their signals are being intercepted, and they tend not to shut down equipment and communications. Since more and more of the world now relies on cell phones – on radios – for routine communication, reconnaissance can now scoop up far more information than in the past, when so much traffic was

transmitted by landline. However, submarines are expensive, and they cannot be in more than one place at a time. A few years ago, the U.S. EDO Corporation displayed a drawing of an unmanned submarine-launched vehicle carrying intercept antennas. A submarine could, at least in theory, launch several of them and thus monitor a considerable area off a country’s coast. Moreover, the submarine, which was processing what they obtained, did not have to come close inshore.

Unmanned vehicles are to be the basis of the mission modules conceived for the littoral combat ship (LCS). For this purpose, they may exploit another advantage. In many cases it is vital that whatever carries a sensor has a carefully controlled signature. An anti-submarine ship, for example, should be as silent as possible. A minehunter should have the smallest possible magnetic and acoustic signatures, so that it does not set off mines it is trying to detect. Putting the sensors in devices that operate well away from the LCS itself dramatically reduces the need to control LCS signatures, hence considerably reduces the cost of the LCS itself. There is also another advantage, similar to that a submarine deploying unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) might enjoy. A ship with a sensor, such as minehunting sonar, in her hull can be in only one place at a time. She must go through a narrow swath of a minefield, one mine-like object at a time. However, there is no reason why the same ship cannot release multiple mine-detection UUVs that can separately examine swaths of the supposed minefield. The Royal Norwegian Navy has been operating the Hugin mine detection UUV from its minecraft for several years. Although typically a Norwegian minehunter employs only a single Hugin at a time, the concept certainly has the potential to support multiple ones. Mines detected by Hugin are to be destroyed by mine-killing mini-torpedoes sent to the positions of those mines.

Much the same might be said of an LCS operating multiple unmanned surface craft, each supporting its own sonar. A ship with a hull or towed sonar can be in only one place at a time, but multiple devices can cover a much wider area.

There are, of course, issues to be resolved. To make standoff sensing effective, the unmanned vehicle has to know where it is. That is not difficult for an unmanned surface craft, such as the projected anti-submarine module for the LCS. It is far more difficult for an unmanned underwater vehicle, which has no way of maintaining contact with, for example, the satellites that provide so much of the world with GPS navigation. A linked issue is propulsion. UUVs tend to be slow – but they operate for very long periods at that slow speed. The combination of power level and endurance is not easy to maintain, and probably new types of power plants, such as fuel cells, will ultimately be needed. If – a big if – a really compact plant offering high power and long endurance can be created, new kinds of underwater vehicles become

possible, such as anti-submarine craft that might trail hostile or potentially hostile submarines out of their ports.

Unmanned surface craft certainly are easier to power, because they have access to air, but it is difficult to imagine operating craft small enough to be affordable (in numbers) in sea states that much larger ships find difficult. That may ultimately mean that even the surface ship sonar role must be filled by an underwater vehicle (i.e., one not subject to rough seas) – with all the problems of the underwater vehicle. Possibly a semi-submersible with a more or less permanent snorkel will be used. Alternatively, the problem may be seen as so difficult that instead of giving the LCS an off-board anti-submarine module, she will have an on-board processor and a towed sonar (to keep the sonar free of the motion of the LCS herself in a seaway). In that case, it is not clear to what extent the towed sonar will suffer from the noisiness of the LCS, which was accepted both because it seemed irrelevant (if separate unmanned sonars were used) and in order to keep LCS affordable.

There are also questions about how effective entirely unmanned sensors can be. Minehunting often requires a human operator’s judgment, to decide whether a possibly mine-like object is really a mine. In recent years, some manufacturers have claimed that advances in sensing and in processing what the sensor obtains have made automatic mine detection feasible. At the least, UUVs can conduct mine reconnaissance, determining that an area of interest does or does not appear to be mined. If there is enough sea room, and if an enemy’s mine stocks are limited, that may be enough to keep a fleet out of trouble. It is not, of course, enough to clear a mined area through which traffic must pass.

All of this is aside from the use of unmanned air vehicles to extend a ship’s horizon using existing kinds of sensors. Many navies are currently interested in unmanned shipboard helicopters for exactly that purpose, in some cases also with weapons on board.

The mast of the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle, part of the littoral combat ship (LCS) mine countermeasures mission package, is visible during underwater operations. The mine countermeasures mission package provides LCS platforms the capability to detect, identify, and neutralize sea mines. The Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle was embarked aboard the Office of Naval Research vessel Seafighter, which acted as a surrogate for the LCS platform. Perhaps the most spectacular recent advance in naval sensing has been the rise of unmanned vehicles. U.S. Navy photo David Sussman

The unmanned vehicles can also strew fixed sensors on the sea bottom, which may be particularly important in shallow littoral waters. Conventional sonar performs very poorly in such places, particularly when the water is warm. However, a simple array on the seabed, looking up, can function perfectly well, using what is called the reliable acoustic path (RAP). A submarine passing over such a sensor will be detected. A line of sensors can form a fence, and an array of fences strewn over the bottom will indicate a submarine’s course and speed. Since the entire system is passive, the submarine is unlikely to be aware of having been detected, and will probably continue on its course and speed. A system monitoring the arrays can use that data to predict the submarine’s future position, and to arrange an attack.

The U.S. Navy has been interested in exactly this approach to shallow-water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) for some time. At least in theory, the combination of unmanned vehicles planned for the LCS is the ideal way to distribute the arrays while making sure they are in known positions (so the tracking can work). Again, in theory, tracking and prediction can be precise, so an ASW weapon dropped on the submarine’s predicted position need not spend much of its time searching for its target. That is the basis of current U.S. interest in an ultra-lightweight 6.75-inch torpedo (which will also function as an anti-torpedo weapon).

For radars, the great development in the past decade has been the rise of relatively inexpensive active-array radars. New fighters already have active electronically scanned (radar) arrays (AESAs); this is the naval equivalent. In many applications active arrays are superseding passive ones like the antenna array of the U.S. SPY-1 radar used in the Aegis system. Both kinds of array consist of a large number of separate elements, each of which transmits and receives radar signals. Each small element creates a broad beam, which by itself provides little or no information on the direction to a radar target. However, if the signals passing through the elements are properly timed in relation to each other, they add up into a radar beam. Since the timing (phasing) can be computer-controlled, the direction of that beam can also be controlled. Instead of swinging about as a mechanically scanned antenna turns, the beam moves as desired. In SPY-1, for example, the radar

registers a target its beam detects. It then quickly generates beams around the last known target position, to find the next target position and hence to calculate target speed and course.

In the Aegis radar, the radar signal, with its pulse structure, is generated by a single power tube deep in the ship. The elements in the array apply the desired timing. The array is called passive because it does not create the signal. The radar creates a single, powerful radar beam that can be maneuvered electronically to detect fast-moving targets. However, that single power tube cannot create multiple beams, doing different things, simultaneously.

The next step, the active array, consists of elements that produce their own signals. As in the passive array, they receive timing commands, but unlike the passive array, an active one does not have a single source of radar power. Instead, normal electric power is fed in, and radar signals emerge. Such an array can create a number of different beams, with different signal structures, simultaneously. It can also be set to ignore (null out) a jamming signal, something a passive array apparently finds much more difficult.

An active array also offers the advantage of scalability: It is much easier to make larger or smaller than a passive array. To make the array more powerful, the producer has merely to add more panels. A passive array can certainly add elements, but in order to add power it has to change power tubes, because that is where the power originates. This kind of scalability may be of particular importance for ships intended for ballistic missile defense. Dealing with such distant targets requires both a different waveform (which is not a great problem) and a great deal more power in the beam.

There are, to be sure, problems to overcome. First, the active array produces heat, which has to be dissipated. Thus when the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force adopted a rotating (single-face) active array some years ago, it had an attached radiator. Photographs of the demonstration version of the current Chinese active array showed water pipes; indeed the presence of the pipes helped indicate that the radar was an active rather than a passive array.

Second, the different elements of the array had better be precisely matched, or the beam will not point in the desired direction. For example, all of them had better radiate at exactly the same power, pulsing in the same way.

A third problem is building small enough array elements (transmit/receive elements) at the desired frequency. The higher the frequency, the shorter the wavelength, and the easier to build usable elements. That is why active fighter arrays, which operate at higher frequencies, are more common than warship

active arrays. For a ship, lower frequency is associated with longer range. The multi-function active phased array radar (APAR) arrays on Dutch and German frigates, for example, operate at higher frequency than SPY-1, which is why these ships (but not most U.S. Aegis ships) have separate long-range target detection radars. The British Sampson, on Type 45 destroyers, does operate at SPY-1 frequencies, but its elements are massive enough that instead of using fixed arrays it uses a rotating two-faced array.

Raytheon’s SPY-3 is to be the first U.S. active-array radar. It was conceived for the Zumwalt-class missile destroyer and was successfully tested at sea in May 2006. These ships were designed to combine several radars, operating at different frequencies, with a single back-end processor. Thus the short-wavelength SPY-3 was intended to work with Lockheed Martin’s longer-wave active-array Volume Search Radar. The latter was later canceled to reduce the cost of the Zumwalt program, but a new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) is planned. It may revive the earlier combination.

Several manufacturers in different countries are now working on active arrays. Two examples seem to be worth mentioning. Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) developed a four-face fixed active array specifically to upgrade the Israeli Eilat-class corvettes. The radar also found an export customer. Like many array radars, it uses a configuration in which the individual transmit-receive elements are grouped, the groups receiving computer commands. When Israeli patrol boats began to suffer attacks from anti-tank missiles, IAI was able to provide a quick solution because each of the groups could function as a full-blown radar, albeit with a rather broad beam. There was obviously no great hope of shooting down the approaching missile, given limited time, but if the missile could be detected in time the boat could launch decoys and evade. IAI therefore produced a four-face radar, each face of which was a single group taken from the larger radar it had originally developed. This was downward scalability.

Thales Naval Nederland (formerly Signaal), the Dutch arm of the multinational Thales Group, developed the multifunction active radar operated by the Dutch and German navies some years ago. It proposed a single-face version for patrol ships. However, it has actually sold something different: a fixed mast with four radar array faces. The mast also carries higher-frequency arrays for navigation and surface search, electronic search sensors, and communications arrays. This arrangement solved a serious real estate problem. Normally the performance of all the electronics on board a surface ship is limited because superstructure elements, carrying other electronic arrays, block each array in some direction. Even if blockage is not obvious, signals reflect off the metal in the ship in complex ways, which cost performance. For years the U.S. Navy built expensive copper models of its

ships specifically to measure and to solve, if possible, interference problems. The single mast appears on the new Dutch Holland-class patrol ships.

There are also attempts to cut the cost of active arrays. The most prominent seems to be the Australian CEA Technologies company, whose tile arrays are currently being installed on board ANZAC-class frigates in a kind of mini-Aegis configuration.

Another important line of radar development has been attempts to develop stealthy radar. There are two complementary requirements. One is to make the radar signal itself difficult to detect. The other is to make it difficult for an enemy radar to pick up reflections from the radar antenna, which (in a non-phased array) must be a reflector focusing radar energy for itself.

For the first requirement, the trick is to stretch out the radar signal. The most extreme example is the Thales Scout, a surface-search radar that operates, in effect, at FM rather than AM – it radiates continuously at a low power level, changing its frequency. The broad-band receiver associates frequency with time the way a normal radar associates the pulse of radar energy with time (hence range). Many radars use a less extreme version of this technique – pulse compression. Search receivers generally require energy above a threshold to trigger them. Stealthy radar works because radar detection depends not on the power at any one moment (peak power) but on average radar power, which is much lower. Scout in effect operates at average power all the time; pulse compression radars produce more power, but not as much as simpler pure-pulse sets.

Radars whose antennas are difficult to detect are a more recent development. It is possible to tune materials so that they pass only signals within a narrow bandwidth. If a mast is tuned to the frequencies at which the radar turning within it operates, that radar can look out but nearly all radars looking in are blocked by the mast. For example, the new Franco-Italian FREMM frigate will have its main radar inside its stealthy mast. Other navies have followed much the same approach.

The Seawolf-class attack submarine USS Connecticut (SSN 22) transits in front of USS George Washington (CVN 73) while an SH-60F Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the Chargers of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 14 flies overhead. A program of Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion made it possible to provide the smaller Virginia-class submarines with the Seawolf-class submarines' sonar capabilities. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John M. Hageman

The other side of radar is the interception of radar signals – electronic support. Probably the most important development is the ability to recognize – to fingerprint – particular radars, rather than radar types. At least in theory, a radar’s fingerprints ought to be related not only to the kind of signal produced, but to physical features such as nicks in a waveguide. Fingerprinting seems increasingly important in a world in which many navies (or others) use either the same type of radar or very closely related types. It also deals with an expanding problem. At one time radar signals were all generated by specialized tubes, such as magnetrons, whose dimensions and shapes determined the sort of pulses they produced. It therefore made excellent sense to associate particular patterns of pulses with particular radars. However, many modern radars use computer software to create their waveforms, which are then amplified by broadband devices such as traveling wave tubes. This sort of operation makes radar inherently multipurpose, with different kinds of signals for different purposes. The first such radar in naval service seems to have been the AWG-9 of the F-14 Tomcat, which had both air-to-air and surface-attack modes. When a French-built Iraqi Mirage attacked the USS Stark using a surface-attack radar, her electronic warfare operator thought the radar signal he saw had come from an Iranian F-14 operating in surface-attack (or search) mode. At that time, 1987, the flexibility of the AWG-9 radar was quite exotic. It no longer is. Software-controlled waveforms make it far more difficult for anyone to rely on a dictionary of radars embedded in an electronic countermeasures system. That is aside from the problem of selecting appropriate jamming signals.

For sonars, the most important lesson the U.S. Navy learned after the Cold War was that it could dramatically improve performance by upgrading processing. At the end of the Cold War, U.S. submarines were losing their edge against their Soviet rivals. The Russians were finally effectively silencing their submarines. The normal reaction would have been to develop a new generation of sonars, with larger (for higher gain) new arrays. That began with the Seawolf class, which had a massive new bow sonar and a new flank sonar. With the end of the Cold War, sonar funding collapsed; no massive new sonar was likely to appear. The new Virginia-class attack submarine was smaller than a Seawolf, hence could not accommodate its new bow array (it could be fitted with the flank sonar).

Analysis suggested a way out. Existing sonar processing and post-processing (the stage at which sonar data is assembled to form meaningful patterns) was relatively primitive, often using fairly old computers. U.S. civilian computers were far more powerful, and they were developing very rapidly. The U.S. Navy mounted a new program of Acoustic Rapid COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) Insertion, A-RCI. Submarine sonars’ data were fed into a new fiber-optic bus that could be connected to enclosures in which commercial computers were installed. The A-RCI program envisaged a rolling program of hardware and software upgrades: new hardware every four years, new software every two. The hardware would not be “state-of-the-art,” because that was not yet reliable. Instead, it was “state of the practice.” Existing enclosures could be re-used again and again because new computers were generally smaller than their predecessors. A-RCI has proven remarkably effective; the edge has definitely been reclaimed and substantially extended. The idea has been extended throughout the U.S. fleet.

As submarines operated more in littoral areas, moreover, it became clear that the classic division between acoustics (sonar) and other sensors was unproductive. For example, a submarine hearing a surface ship might best identify that ship using her periscope or her electronic search receiver. In the Virginia class, all the ship’s sensors are tied to the same fiber-optic bus, their outputs available at all the combat system workstations. This development in turn was tied to the adoption of electro-optic periscopes in place of the usual purely optical ones.

An electro-optical periscope replaces the human eye of the operator with a camera or, more usually, with several cameras, including infrared ones. Instead of standing at the eyepiece, the observer uses a computer console. From a submarine designer’s point of view, the most dramatic effect of this development is that the periscope is no longer a tube that must be led into the submarine’s attack center. Thus the attack center need no longer be in the upper part of the hull directly under the submarine’s sail. In the Virginia class,

it is lower in the hull, where the hull is wider and there is much more space. For that matter, the periscope no longer must penetrate the submarine’s pressure hull; only a cable need do that. Hull penetrations such as periscope openings have been a major structural problem in the past, limiting submarine diving depth, for example.

Perhaps the operational effect of such periscopes is even more radical. Exposing a periscope endangers a submarine, so in the past, submarine officers were trained to make a quick scan and instantly to understand the tactical situation. An electro-optical head can make a quicker scan but it can also send what it gets to a workstation at which the image is captured for review and analysis – and for comparison with other information the submarine may be collecting, such as that from sonars and electronic search sensors. It may even be possible to place the electro-optical sensor in a pod that floats off from the submarine, so that an enemy seeing it cannot know exactly where the submarine is.

The modern emphasis on relatively shallow-water operations against quiet diesel submarines has changed sonar. Although they may be quiet, nuclear submarines necessarily run their machinery constantly. For decades, NATO anti-submarine operations were based on using passive sonar, which was designed to pick up the constant sounds of Soviet nuclear submarines against the random shifting sounds of the sea. A diesel submarine is very different, because it has three distinct modes of operation: snorkeling on diesel power, running on its battery, and sitting on the bottom (a nuclear submarine will not bottom because it runs the risk of sucking mud into its condenser and thus being put out of action). The diesel submarine cannot be altogether silent, but on battery it is probably as quiet as a very quiet nuclear submarine, with much less regular noise to recognize. On the bottom it can indeed be silent.

The obvious answer is active sonar: If the submarine does not emit sound, then the hunter can produce a sound to echo off it. However, a submarine may well locate the pinger before she is located, and she may be able to attack before she is detected. Hence considerable interest in recent years in different forms of standoff active sonar. Initially that often meant using a small explosive charge to create the ping and existing passive arrays or sonobuoys as receivers, a technique called Enhanced Echo-Ranging or Explosive Echo-Ranging. It recalls a Cold War technique called Julie, adopted when it seemed that the Soviets would trump passive sonars by silencing. In modern form, it uses multiple receivers and powerful computer processing to solve problems like reflection off the bottom. This technique can produce an image of bottom topography good enough to show a bottomed submarine. The receivers may be towed arrays on board ships or they may be sonobuoys; the principle is the same in either case.

Small explosions are useful, but their sounds are somewhat irregular. The next step is a more controlled sound source, an example being Ultra’s ALFEA.

Another way to use active sonar is to ping from a distance at very low frequency, a method the U.S. Navy has used successfully from a sonar

Transforming War at Sea Through Disruptive Technologies

New weapons are energizing the maritime

battlespace

Written by: Edward Lundquist on May 21, 2011 Categories: Naval, Programs & Tech Tags: Military News, Research and Development, Surface Ships,... + Comments: No Comments

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A future maritime laser weapon system could radically lower the cost exchange ratio in defending against missiles or small boats, but the beams would not likely be visible as they are in this conceptual imagery. Artist rendering by Northrop Grumman

Investments in science and technology today are shaping the battlefield of tomorrow. The Navy is conducting exciting research into futuristic and exotic weapons such as lasers, electromagnetic railguns, and hypersonic weapons. These weapons expand the range and reduce the time to target while reclaiming battlespace to counter high-speed, maneuverable threats.

While some of these systems may seem like science fiction, the research and development of such weapons means they may be ready sooner than many people think.

That’s why the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is investigating high-risk, high-payoff game-changing technologies that are disruptive in nature. “We may develop a material technology, or some software, or electronic warfare innovations that would then go into a program of record to be produced for future delivery to the fleet or the Marines,” said Rear Adm. Nevin P. Carr, Jr., chief of naval research.

Innovative Naval Prototypes (INPs), such as ONR’s electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), are examples of such disruptive technologies.

“INP efforts are often discontinuous, disruptive, radical departures from established requirements and operational concepts,” said Carr. “The goal is to prove the concepts and mature the technology within four to eight years, allowing informed decisions about reductions in technological risk to govern transition into an acquisition program.

Charles Garnett, left, Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division Electromagnetic Railgun project manager, briefs Vice Adm. Kevin McCoy, commander of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Brian Persons, NAVSEA deputy commander, and Rear Adm. James Shannon, commander of Naval Warfare Centers, following the world record-setting 33-mega-joule shot of the Office of Naval Research railgun. The railgun is being developed for use on a wide range of ships, whether the vessel has an integrated power

system, such as DDG 1000, or a non-integrated power system, such as DDG 51. U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams

Carr continued, “It’s not enough just to do interesting science. What matters is transitioning the products of that science to the warfighter.”

“The electromagnetic railgun is a totally different way of launching projectiles. It works off electromagnetic force. It’s extremely powerful. It does not involve any energetics in the projectiles, so you move all of the explosives out of the magazine,” said Carr. “Because of the way this technology works, we can accurately launch projectiles over 200 miles that arrive in about 6 minutes. The projectile leaves the barrel at about Mach 7 and arrives on target at about Mach 5, and its destructive power is based on that kinetic energy. The mass of a projectile is important, but it’s the square of the velocity that delivers far more destructive potential. The railgun may also have some applications for missile defense that we’re studying very closely, as well as long-range surface fires.”

Another example of a disruptive technology is directed energy. “The directed energy we’re focusing on right now is the Free Electron Laser [FEL],” Carr said. “You can tune it to wavelengths in the atmosphere that are less absorbent, and you can also scale it up to very high levels of power. So the FEL is an example of a disruptive technology that can change a lot of the way we do things, from sensing and tracking to countermeasures to kinetic defense and destruction of incoming targets.”

In congressional testimony last year, Carr stated, “The FEL INP will enable the Navy to fight at the speed of light by bringing high-power laser technology to sea for ship defense. This project will develop a laser for use in the maritime environment, consistent with Navy plans for an all-electric ship. The FEL provides intense beams of laser light tuned to atmosphere-penetrating wavelengths, allowing us to assess the potential of laser-based shipboard defense strategies.”

An FEL requires a linear accelerator. There has been significant research into nuclear physics and accelerator technology at various national laboratories such as Jefferson Labs in Newport News, Va., which conducts basic research of the atom’s nucleus at the quark level; Los Alamos National Laboratory, which conducts basic and applied research in accelerator and particle physics, space experimentation, nanotechnology, and materials; and the 2-mile-long Stanford Linear Accelerator in Menlo Park, Calif., which conducts astrophysics, photon science, accelerator and particle physics research; and at the Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island and the Oak Ridge

Electron Linear Accelerator Pulsed Neutron Source in Tennessee. The challenge for the Navy is to put a linear accelerator inside a ship.

Even the fastest interceptor missiles take seconds to minutes to reach their targets, but a laser beam can focus on a target almost instantly.

“We invest in science and technology so that we will have the best weapons in the world,” said Dr. Quentin Saulter, directed energy program manager for the Office of Naval Research. “We want to have the ability to have speed-of-light engagements of targets, anytime, anyplace.”

The threat is real, and it’s growing. Agence France-Presse reported on Feb. 7, 2011, that “Iran is mass producing a new ballistic missile that can travel at more than three times the speed of sound and hit targets on the high seas.”

Press reports state that a Chinese Dong-Feng 21 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) travels at Mach 10 and can reach targets 1,200 miles away in less than 12 minutes.

Despite superior capabilities today, the United States and its allies might lose a war of attrition. “We have $15 million missiles that can shoot down $5 million ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles],” said Under Secretary of the Navy Bob Work. “We’re on the wrong side of that equation.”

“The ‘cost exchange ratio’ – the cost of the attacker’s weapon compared to the Navy’s marginal cost per shot for countering that weapon – currently often favor the attacker, sometimes very significantly,” said Ronald O’Rourke, a naval analyst with the Congressional Research Service in a December 2010 report to the Congress.

With lasers, a low marginal cost per shot could permit the Navy to dramatically improve the cost exchange ratio. “Converting unfavorable cost exchange ratios into favorable ones could be critical for the Navy’s ability in coming years to mount an affordable defense against adversaries that choose to deploy large numbers of small boats, UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and ASBMs for possible use against U.S. Navy ships,” he said.

Electric weapons cost considerably less, basically the cost of fuel to generate the electricity to charge up the weapon. The power for the Navy’s December 2010 33- megajoule (MJ) electromagnetic railgun shot at Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Va., came from the local power utility, and cost about $7.00.

Carr said how you manage that energy, move it around the ship, switch it, and have it available becomes very, very important. “Sometimes you need a very large amount of energy in a short amount of time – as in launching a projectile – or sometimes you need lower amounts of energy over longer periods of time. So how you design and build that kind of environment in a ship is an area that requires some of our best and brightest research.”

“Compared to existing ship self-defense systems, such as missiles and guns, lasers could provide Navy surface ships with a more cost-effective means of countering certain surface, air, and ballistic missile targets,” O’Rourke said. “Ships equipped with a combination of lasers and existing self-defense systems might be able to defend themselves more effectively against a range of such targets. Equipping Navy surface ships with lasers could lead to changes in naval tactics, ship design, and procurement plans for ship-based weapons, bringing about a technological shift for the Navy – a ‘game changer’ – comparable to the advent of shipboard missiles in the 1950s.”

The Maritime Laser Demonstration (MLD) system, an ONR program that was tested last year at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Port Hueneme, Calif., was able to track surface targets such as swarms of small, fast boats at long ranges in a marine environment.

Launch of a new Standard Missile (SM)-6 from a U.S. Navy destroyer. The SM-6 pairs an extended range booster with the active seeker from an Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). This allows the SM-6 to engage targets out of radar "sight" of the launching ship, a truly transformational capability. Photo courtesy of Raytheon

“Such lasers would complement other defensive systems to address certain threats more effectively and at lower cost than traditional weapons,” said Steve Hixson, vice president of Space and Directed Energy Systems for Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, the MLD contractor.

Lasers are ultra-precise and can be used as both a sensor and a weapon. They offer unlimited magazine depth to defend ships against challenging threats such as hyper-velocity anti-ship cruise missiles. Because of their level of precision, targets can be engaged with minimal collateral damage, and the power output can be adjusted so that Navy ships can deliver nonlethal or lethal force to targets as appropriate. Power can be adjusted depending on range and size of the target and the desired effect.

“Precision” is a system concept, and laser systems (not just the lasers themselves) have their challenges when it comes to precision. A laser generates power, but that energy has to be sent through an optical system that must focus the beam on a small, distant target for several seconds to achieve its kill. This optical train is on a flexible structure, itself on a flexible ship that is indeed flexing in a moving sea. Also, atmospheric disturbances distort and move the beam around. “Because of these challenges, today’s lasers and those projected for intermediate term tactical application are best suited to slower moving, ‘soft’ targets such as UAVs and small boats,” said an industry source.

Unlike a weapon with a finite number of bullets, lasers have a “bottomless” magazine – as long as you can generate power, you can shoot. Because railgun projectiles have no propellant and no explosive warhead, a ship can carry many more of them in less sophisticated magazines. But what goes up must come down, so a bullet or missile that doesn’t destroy a target has to land somewhere. If over the ocean, it poses less of a problem, but over populated areas it can be an issue.

Solid state lasers (SSLs) are common in factories where they are used for cutting and welding metal, and they can be adapted for military purposes, as well.

The Navy is testing an SSL prototype called the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), which shows promise for soft and hard kills. (A “hard kill” involves destroying the target, while a “soft kill” usually confounds or neutralizes the target without permanent damage. Jamming an attacking aircraft’s radar so it has to turn back would be a soft kill.)

Another kind of laser is the chemical laser, like the system on the Airborne Laser Test Bed, a modified 747, where chemical reactions produce the energy. But when the chemicals are expended, the ship must be resupplied.

Research continues to develop lasers that have higher power levels and improved beam quality, as well as managing the large amounts of power required. The temperatures involved will require special cooling. For the weapon to be practical, it will need to be fully integrated into the combat management system and the battleforce network.

All naval weapons must operate in a harsh environment, and that presents challenges for lasers, too. Using lasers in a marine environment must take into consideration the waves, sand, smoke, dust, water, and salt and other atmospheric effects in the air that can diffuse, scatter, absorb, or defocus a beam of light. Surface targets are harder to hit because of these factors.

BAE System’s John Perry said his company is teaming up with Boeing to offer a 10-kilowatt SSL that can be mounted onto the Mk. 38 machine gun currently used for surface ship force protection. For that reason, there is very low impact on the ship for power, weight, or space, Perry said. “You get speed-of-light delivery and a bottomless magazine, and whatever you point at you’re going to hit.”

For example, Perry said the laser can be aimed at a belt of 50-caliber ammunition on the deck of an attacking craft and cause the rounds to detonate on board.

The laser can be used to “burn the eyes out” of an anti-radiation missile, or burn out the engine control unit of an attacking vessel. The lethality can be increased by increasing power as needed.

“This is basically a COTS [commercial off-the-shelf] system, used in manufacturing. The automotive industry uses these lasers cutting steel 24/7,” Perry said.

In addition to lasers, other types of directed energy weapons (DEWs) include microwave weapons and millimeter-wave weapons. The Active Denial System (ADS) is a millimeter-wave electromagnetic energy transmitter that can be used for force protection. The millimeter waves heat up the surface of the skin. An individual who tries to get too close to a ship or structure protected by ADS will experience an incapacitating burning sensation that can only be reduced by turning around and moving away. ADS is non-lethal, and leaves no ill effects.

33-Megajoule JoltEMRGs are also disruptive technology in nature.

These weapons seem simple in principal. Grid power replaces gun powder. Electricity travels down a rail, passes through an aluminum armature and back down the other rail, creating an electromagnetic field pushing the projectile that propels it out the barrel.

“It uses electricity instead of gun propellant to fire a projectile from a naval gun,” said Roger Ellis, railgun program manager for the ONR. “Energy stored in a capacitor bank is released into a railgun in a matter of milliseconds, creating an electromagnetic field behind the projectile that pushes out at Mach 7, or 2½ kilometers per second.”

The Navy recently conducted a demonstration at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) at Dahlgren. The 33-megajoule test firing on Dec. 10 was a world record. An ambitious campaign is under way using the laboratory gun at Dahlgren to test different combinations of rails, projectiles, and other materials at that power level to learn what works best.

“Pulse power” allows the weapon system to store energy and then release it quickly enough to create the powerful force to propel the projectile.

The gun can be used as an offensive weapon to strike positions hundreds of miles away, and because the warhead is inert – meaning it doesn’t carry an explosive charge – collateral damage at the target can be minimized. But the lack of high-energy explosives in the warhead doesn’t mean the target will not be damaged. The kinetic energy of the projectile traveling at such high speeds is destructive on impact.

“The rounds can be guided and dispense fragmentation munitions just before hitting a target, such as ground forces, ships, or radar installations,” said Charles Garnett, the project manager at NSWC Dahlgren.

The railgun eliminates the gun propellant used to fire the projectile out of the barrel, and the high-explosive warheads as found on conventional guns. The rounds take up less space and do not require the same special handling or storage as explosives do.

There is still much to learn about railguns.

“The performance capabilities of a future railgun weapon system can be significantly improved through advanced material innovations and breakthroughs,” said Ellis.

“The same force ‘pushing’ the round down the barrel also wants to push the rails apart,” said Ellis.

Because launching projectiles from railguns involves such enormous amounts of electricity, the materials used for the power systems, rails, barrels, and projectiles are critical. For example, the ability to store power generated by the ship requires new battery technology, and the ability to discharge large amounts of power instantaneously requires sophisticated capacitors, all of which require new system interfaces between high-power loads and platform power distribution, and it all has to fit onto a ship.

“The launcher and pulsed power EM railgun system elements require high-conductivity, high-strength, low-density conductors, as they are subject to high heat and damage phenomena resulting from current concentrations,” said Ellis.

The Navy is studying extended service life for materials and components; high-strength, dielectric, structural materials; high-speed, high-current, metal-on-metal, sliding electrical contacts; compact pulsed power systems and power electronics; high-conductivity, high-strength, low-density conductors; and repetitive rate switches and control technologies.

Nanomaterials, composites, surface treatments, tailored alloys, and phase-change materials are example areas where recent technological advances may enable new methods of meeting these railgun challenges.

DDG 1000's planned Advanced Gun System will be fully automatic and use water cooling to sustain a high rate of fire. BAE Systems image

The test round looks different from a real railgun bullet. The “warshot” will have an aerodynamically shaped bullet surrounded by a sabot and an armature pushing from behind. The sabot falls away outside of the barrel as the bullet continues to the target.

“The projectile requires high thermal resistance, a low coefficient of thermal expansion, and erosion/ablation-resistant materials to deal with in-flight temperatures and heat flux experienced while traversing the atmosphere,” said Ellis.

ONR is studying aerothermal protection systems for the bullets – or flight vehicles – and high-acceleration tolerant electronic components and structural materials so they will survive the extremely high g-force.

Right now, each firing must be managed individually. ONR’s goal is to demonstrate the thermal and power management that will produce an auto-loading gun capable of a repetitive “firing rate of military significance,” which means the power system can charge the capacitors then discharge them quickly to fire the gun in a repetitive manner for multiple firings in a short period of time.

Tactical RailgunsThe high-power long-range railguns require a ship capable of generating, storing, and making available large amounts of power. The Zumwalt-class DDG 1000 guided-missile destroyer is such a ship, built from the keel up with the power for energy weapons, and the sophisticated power electronics needed to move power around where it is needed. Alternatively, an energy storage module can be used on ships with smaller amounts of prime power.

While an EMRG can be used as a long-range strike weapon from larger platforms like the DDG 1000, the concept can also be applied to smaller guns, and therefore smaller combatants. The goal is to test the laboratory EMRG at the 64- to 80-MJ power level, which will have the muzzle energy to achieve the desired 200-plus nautical mile range for naval surface fire support (NSFS) missions. The Navy is also looking for potential early transition of a smaller multi-mission system that could support missile defense, long-range strike, and surface warfare. ONR has funded both General Atomics (GA) and BAE systems to develop 32-MJ advanced composite railgun prototypes to be delivered to the government for testing and evaluation. Unlike the laboratory launcher, which is designed to facilitate testing, these guns look very similar to the gun mounts on combatants today.

BlitzerThe General Atomics “Blitzer” is a multimission EMRG system suitable for

smaller platforms. “Initial studies by GA indicate that a railgun system with a muzzle energy of 20 MJ can fit into the space presently occupied by the 5-inch gun on DDG 51-class of guided-missile destroyers,” said Thomas Hurn, director of advanced weapon launcher systems for General Atomics. “A 20-MJ EMRG is a very capable weapon system that can engage supersonic, sea skimming, anti-ship cruise missiles [ASCM] at the horizon as well as defend against ballistic missiles. In addition, this system can support offensive indirect fire missions such as anti-surface warfare and NSFS at ranges significantly farther than today’s gun systems – up to around 100 nautical miles.”

High-speed camera image of the Office of Naval Research electromagnetic railgun located at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, firing a world-record-setting 33-megajoule shot, breaking the previous record established Jan. 31, 2008. The railgun is a long-range, high-energy gun launch system that uses electricity rather than gunpowder or rocket motors to launch projectiles capable of striking a target at a range of more than 200 nautical miles with Mach 7 velocity. A future tactical railgun will hit targets at ranges almost 20 times farther away than conventional surface ship combat systems. U.S. Navy photo

Hurn says GA has collaborated with General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products (GD-ATP) in Burlington, Vt., experts in magazine and auto-loader systems. “We have determined that approximately 1,000 rounds can be stored for the EMRG we envision. “That’s about twice the number of rounds carried in the 5-inch gun magazine today.”

Blitzer can be integrated with the existing combat management system to provide target queuing and tracking, Hurn said. “For direct-fire ship defense missions, the high muzzle velocity of an EMRG provides the rounds with fast times-to-target and longer ranges compared with conventional guns. These longer ranges require the use of guided projectiles in order to be accurate enough to defeat the threat.”

Hurn said GA and Boeing are collaborating on a system that uses command guided projectiles for ship defense missions. “The ship’s onboard sensors track the target and the outgoing EMRG projectile, and command the projectile to intercept the incoming threat. The per-round cost is kept lower, and the per-round reliability is kept higher using command guidance. The projectile would be an airburst round and deploy tungsten penetrators near the target to enhance the probability of kill. The command guidance required for this mission could be integrated into existing fire control systems.”

For precision strike missions over the horizon, the Blitzer round would be guided using GPS and Inertial Navigation System (INS), Hurn said.

Weapons EvolveSome tried-and-true weapons continue to evolve, as do ways to employ them. The Standard Missile family of missiles, which joined the fleet in the 1960s, now has new versions with range and capabilities far beyond anything its designers anticipated. Today, the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) can shoot down a ballistic missile in space. In fact, this weapon was used successfully to hit an errant satellite that posed a potential threat upon reentry. This remarkable ability was derived from the Aegis Combat System and the SM-3.

Another version of the Standard family, the SM-6, has range that exceeds the sensor range of the Aegis SPY-1 radar on the launching ship. The SM-6 carries an active seeker head and can acquire and home in on targets without guidance from the ship in flight. In fact, the Navy’s Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) combines the capabilities of Aegis and the SM-6 with Cooperative Engagement Capability and the new carrier-based E-2D Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, which can tell the SM-6 where to go to find its target, far beyond the ship that fired the missile.

The DDG 1000 has an entirely new gun, called the Advanced Gun System (AGS), that is planned to fire the 155 mm rocket-assisted Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP). The GPS-guided LRLAP can fly 63 miles and more and hit targets with precise accuracy. This Navy system benefited from technology leveraged from the U.S. Army’s 155 mm Excalibur round.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, speaking at ASNE Day 2011, sponsored by the American Society of Naval Engineers, mentioned the Navy’s centennial of Naval Aviation and pointed at some new technologies and systems that will be joining the fleet. He cited the recent first flight of the unmanned combat air system carrier unmanned attack aircraft and successful launch of a tactical aircraft from an electromagnetic launch system, which will replace steam catapults at sea. Roughead pointed to new aircraft like the P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft and the EA-18G Growler, which will

replace the EA-6B Prowler in the electronic attack role, and the E-2D Hawkeye. New unmanned aircraft such as Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), the Navy’s version of the Global Hawk, and the MQ-8 Fire Scout are also becoming operational.

The U.S. Navy: More Than 50 Years of Laser Technology

From scalpels to corrective eye surgery to weapons, laser technology has advanced from scientific curiosity to scientific fact since the first successful laser demonstration on May 16, 1960, by Theodore Maiman at Hughes Research Laboratory, Malibu, Calif. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored the Shawanga Lodge Quantum Electronics Conference that brought laser physicist-inventors together to brainstorm the technology in 1959.

The Office of Naval Research-funded Maritime Laser Demonstration program is developing laser-based, proof-of-concept technology to meet the specific survivability and self-defense capability requirements of U.S. Navy surface combatants for the defeat of small boat threats. U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams

ONR also invested in the maser, the precursor technology to the laser, in the late 1940s-1950s. Researchers sought a means of using short-wavelength radiation to investigate molecular structure. The result was the maser, or “microwave amplification by stimulated emission of radiation.” Once developed, researchers soon began work on the idea of replacing microwaves with light. The laser and its numerous commercial applications soon followed.

Researchers at ONR are applying laser technology in naval maritime defense. The Navy and Marine Corps’ science and technology provider is developing a laser that promises to change warfighting at sea.

This article first appeared in the Defense, Spring 2011 Edition.

surveillance ship. Powerful low-frequency signals can disrupt marine mammals, so at present the U.S. Navy finds itself limited in where it can train with the system. However, several NATO navies are experimenting with their own low-frequency (but higher frequency than the U.S. Navy’s) systems, such as the Royal Navy’s Type 2087.

This article first appeared in the Defense, Spring 2011 Edition.

World Naval Developments Update

Written by: Norman Friedman on April 28, 2011 Categories: Naval, Programs & Tech Tags: Issues, Programs, Surface Ships Comments: 2 Comments

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An artist's conception of the two future Royal Navy aircraft carriers in a scene unlikely to ever be viewed in reality: both at sea with full air groups. Image courtesy of BAE Systems

Because this overview is limited in length, it includes only highlights, and it cannot cover even most of the world’s navies. Many navies continue to be involved in anti-piracy operations off Somalia; for China, this has been the first extended out-of-area deployment, hence has probably been quite significant for further Chinese naval development.

Probably the most important naval development of the year was the outcome of the British Strategic Defence and Security Review. Faced with a need for drastic economies, the British government canceled plans to procure a vertically launched version of the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35). It also abandoned the Joint Harrier Force (Royal Navy and Royal Air Force). Without a fixed-wing airplane it could operate, the newly refitted fleet flagship, HMS Ark Royal, was ordered decommissioned and scrapped. However, plans for the two big new carriers are to go ahead, nominally because their contracts have been written in such a way that they are more expensive to cancel than to complete. The first ship, HMS Queen Elizabeth, will have no fixed-wing strike aircraft (because she has no catapults and arresting gear); her sister ship HMS Prince of Wales will have catapults and arresting gear, hence will be able to operate either the carrier version of the F-35 (F-35C) or some existing carrier fighter, such as the U.S. Super Hornet (F/A-18E/F) or the French Rafale.

The British decision matters because the U.S. Navy is also under intense budget pressure. Of the three versions of the F-35, the short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B is by far the most expensive. In the past, international involvement has saved many U.S. programs from cancellation, despite their high costs. With the major foreign participant gone, the only significant customer left is the U.S. Marine Corps, which badly wants the F-35B to supply direct support ashore, and which cannot rely on more conventional naval aircraft because they cannot operate from its big amphibious ships. Several foreign navies want F-35Bs to operate from their small carriers, but they are also being squeezed, and they would probably welcome an escape from the escalating cost of the airplane.

Ironically, there may be a relatively inexpensive way out. Many modern aircraft have such high thrust-to-weight ratios that they can fly off a long flat flight deck unaided by a catapult, or else off a ski-jump (if they are properly stressed). The Russians currently operate that way (using a ski-jump), and as long ago as the late 1970s, the U.S. Navy experimented with its own ski-jump for conventional fighters. Given a long enough takeoff run, such aircraft may even be able to fly from a flat deck (but their takeoff runs would interfere with deck stowage of aircraft). Any such aircraft would need arrester gear, but installation of such gear would be easier than cutting down a ski-jump and installing a catapult on a half-built ship. The flat-deck or ski-jump solution is not nearly as efficient as the usual combination of catapults and arresting gear, because it requires a relatively long deck run, and because the run-out of the necessary arresting gear would probably interfere with takeoffs. This solution was probably omitted from British calculations because its presence might have led to earlier withdrawal from the F-35B program. Now that the

British have withdrawn, the ski-jump or even flat-deck solutions may become attractive.

At present, no STOVL attack airplane other than the F-35B is in prospect. The British Harrier is no longer in production, and development of its engine ceased some years ago. Engine work might of course be restarted, but the market is probably too small (without the British) to be worthwhile.

Several navies either currently operate ski-jump ships (and Harriers) or appear to be vitally interested in doing so. India, Italy, Spain, and Thailand operate STOVL carriers, although the Indians are likely to progress soon to ski-jumps using non-STOVL Russian aircraft (the Chinese are apparently following that path). Australia is building two large amphibious ships with ski-jumps to a Spanish design, but the Royal Australian Air Force some time ago ruled out buying the F-35B.  That is likely to be unfortunate for Australian troops needing close air support.

Both Japan and South Korea seem to be close to building carriers that would have been suitable for the F-35B. Japan announced a pair of 19,000-ton ski-jump ships as successors to the two Hyuga-class “helicopter carrying destroyers,” which are actually small helicopter carriers. During 2010, there was a report that the 19,000-ton design (248 meters [813 feet] long) is being scrapped in favor of a 30,000-ton design, quite suitable for F-35Bs, which could be modified to take catapults. South Korea has built the big amphibious carrier Dokdo, and two more ships are planned. There is a report that the third ship will be stretched into true aircraft carrier capability. Some reports credit the design for the third ship with two catapults and a displacement of 35,000 tons.

USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109) during pre-commissioning sea trials in the Atlantic Ocean. With the end of the Zumwalt class, the U.S. Navy plans to procure Flight III versions of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, with a new

radar and ABM capability. Photo courtesy of General Dynamics Bath Iron Works

United StatesWith the demise of the Zumwalt class (DDG 1000), the U.S. Navy plans to order the first Flight III version of the Arleigh Burke class under the FY 16 program. This version will provide the anti-ballistic missile capability formerly associated with the abortive CG(X) cruiser. The Flight III designation was formerly associated with a stretched version of the Arleigh Burke incorporating a larger helicopter hangar.

Early in November, the U.S. Navy ended speculation about its choice of a littoral combat ship by announcing that it was buying 10 ships from each of the two contractors. There was speculation that the administration was reluctant to announce rejection of either contractor, for fear of the political consequences of deep job cuts at either yard. The Navy justified its announcement by claiming that both yards were offering exceptionally favorable prices. However, the real cost of the program will be known only once the mission modules – most of which either do not currently exist or are not yet satisfactory – have been bought. There must also be a real question as to whether it is economical to buy two quite different combat systems, the contractors having had complete authority over that choice. The true cost of this choice will be clear only when the Navy faces the cost of duplicate logistical and training pipelines. Also, as of late 2010, neither prototype had run anything like complete sea trials. It is not therefore entirely clear that either is altogether satisfactory. A cynic would conclude that the decision to order the ships now is an attempt to avoid admitting that the program is badly behind schedule.

CanadaThe Halifax-class Modernization (HCM)/Frigate Life Extension (FELEX) officially began late in September when work began on HMCS Halifax. The program is to be completed in 2017. It includes a new command and control system and sensor upgrades, such as installation of the Sirius infrared search-and-track device. This program does not include the expected conversion of some units to an anti-air warfare (AAW) configuration to replace the aging upgraded “Tribal” class (TRUMP), and construction of new ships is planned.

The Type 45 Destroyer HMS Diamond, the third in its class to be built, after being launched at the BAE yards in Scotstoun. While reduced numbers of the Type 45 are still being built, the frigate/destroyer force is being cut down to only 19 vessels. BAE Systems photo by John Linton

United KingdomThe British Defense and Security Review continued the trend toward a smaller Royal Navy without announcing any dramatic change in the service’s direction. Thus the Royal Navy continues to have some ability to show presence abroad, but with fewer destroyers and frigates (19 instead of 24 operational ships); the numbers are to be made up by a new Type 26 low-end frigate. Type 26 is the Future Surface Combatant, which has been under development for some time. It will probably be a modular ship, produceable in high- or low-end versions, and upgradeable.

The future attack submarine force will comprise seven Astute-class boats. Replacement of the four existing Vanguard-class strategic submarines is being deferred, and the choice to continue building Astutes for the moment is probably necessary to provide work for the Barrow yard where British nuclear submarines are built.

Perhaps the most striking outcome of the review was a new government policy that seeks economies by sharing assets and efforts with France; in November, the British signed a 50-year military alliance with France. The loss of the fixed-wing carrier capability was excused by claiming that the French would provide their Charles de Gaulle in an emergency. Critics pointed out that joint programs with France have generally ended with French companies taking over the technology in question (the current British government has said that it wants to reverse British de-industrialization) and that French and British foreign policies often do not coincide – as in Iraq.

The prototype of the French Scalp Naval superiority missile flew for the first time in April 2010. MBDA Solutions image

FranceWith its single aircraft carrier, the French navy lacks carrier capability about half the time, and there has long been interest in building a second ship. A French firm designed the new British carrier, and it was long expected that the same design would be adapted to French requirements. However, at this year’s Euronaval show in October, the French displayed their own carrier design, at least externally very different from that which the British have shown, with a single island rather than the two islands of the British ship.

This April, the prototype of the future French naval strike missile, Scalp Naval, flew for the first time. The missile will provide future French Aquitaine-class frigates and Barracuda-class attack submarines with a Tomahawk-like land-attack capability, albeit in far smaller numbers (per ship) than the U.S. Navy currently employs. Unlike Tomahawk, Scalp Naval uses terrain-matching midcourse guidance, on the grounds that the United States controls the GPS technology that Tomahawk uses for the same purpose, hence can exercise a veto over French use of the missile. The French expect their partners, such as the Italians and perhaps the British, to adopt Scalp Naval.

The first FREMM frigate, Aquitaine, was launched on May 4, 2010; she is to be completed in 2010. Two AAW versions of the class were included in the second batch (three ships) ordered this year. Of the 10 ships planned by industrial partner Italy, the first six have definitely been funded, but the last four may be delayed or even canceled (a decision is due after 2013). No new export customers were announced at Euronaval, but several countries, including Greece, are reportedly interested in buying FREMMs.

The K130 corvette Braunschweig, on sea trials. The class has experienced serious gearbox problems. Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems photo by YPS Peter Neumann

GermanyUnder severe budget pressures, Germany is reducing its fleet, eliminating units developed for Cold War service in the Baltic. Thus the submarine force has decommissioned the remaining Type 206A submarines, leaving only the longer-range Type 212As, and it is to dispose of its remaining fast-attack craft (Gepard class), leaving the big K130 corvettes (designed mainly for distant-water service). The frigate force is likely to remain more or less intact, because it is useful in the distant waters in which the navy now operates.

Work is proceeding on the F125-class frigate, envisaged as a long-endurance ship for tasks such as countering pirates off the Horn of Africa. F125 is to have a fixed four-antenna version of the TRS-3D radar, which currently exists as a rotating single-antenna radar. Construction of the four F125s is to begin in 2011. Armament will be quite limited, the object being to produce a very long-endurance ship. Thus it will comprise a lightweight 5-inch gun (with guided ammunition) plus light guns, Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) close-in anti-aircraft missiles, Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles, and probably lightweight torpedoes. The planned follow-on is the future frigate, concept work on which is to begin in 2011.

The K130 Braunschweig-class corvettes have encountered serious gearbox problems, but the decision has been taken not to rebuild them. They are to enter service as designed, presumably with some surveillance to avoid catastrophic failures (one of which has already occurred). Reportedly an alternative follow-on design (K131) is being considered. Work on K131 began in 2007 as a replacement for the surviving Gepard-class fast-attack craft; as of 2010, six units slightly smaller than the K130s were planned.

Denmark is retiring the last of its Flyvefisken-class STANFLEX ships, the model for the much-admired Absalon-class command and support ships, such as HDMS Esbern Snare shown here. Photo courtesy of HDMS Esbern Snare

DenmarkFor some years, Denmark has been moving from its Cold War coastal orientation to an oceanic orientation suited to crises such as those in the Middle East. This year the Danes announced that they were retiring the last of their Flyvefisken-class STANFLEX corvettes, the ships that first demonstrated the way in which modern digital command and control made modularity an attractive option. The Danes continue to demonstrate the same kind of modularity in their current multipurpose frigates and amphibious/command ships.

RussiaThrough 2010, the Russians continued to test their Bulava (SS-N-X-32) submarine-launched ballistic missile, usually with disappointing results. Bulava is essential to any continued Russian underwater deterrent, because existing strategic submarines are rapidly wearing out, and the new ones built and building cannot readily be rebuilt for alternative weapons. For some years, Russians have charged that the choice of design for the new missile was corrupt. Late in 2010, after a successful test, Bulava was declared operational, but the run of failures suggests that this was only public relations.

The Russians continue to negotiate with the French over construction of a modified Mistral-class amphibious ship (the expected four-ship order did not materialize at the October 2010 Euronaval show). In theory, the Russians want to have one ship built in France and three more built in Russia with French assistance. However, during 2010 they issued specifications, some of which suggested something more sophisticated and more suited to a flagship role. The circulation of new specifications during 2010 can be interpreted differently: The Russians are interested mainly in gaining access to Western designs and technology.

Overall, the Russian fleet continues to decline, the Black Sea Fleet having been demoted to a naval division rather than a full fleet. There is no sign that the Russians can resume construction of large warships.

A People's Liberation Army Navy Project 022, Houbei-class missile boat. As of mid-2010, China had 81 of the catamaran-hulled vessels built or building. Photo by Vinny Powell

ChinaDuring the year, considerable publicity was given to the Chinese DF-21D ballistic anti-carrier missile, which carries a bomblet warhead. The missile featured in the parades celebrating the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic (late 2009) and there was speculation that it would be declared operational during 2010 (that had not happened by early November). There must be some question as to whether the Chinese can track U.S. carriers precisely enough to attack them with such missiles, and the Chinese may see DF-21D more as a spectacular move in their war of nerves against Taiwan than as a real combatant capability. Moreover, the U.S. SM-3 anti-ballistic missile version of the Standard Missile, which the U.S. Navy currently deploys (and with which it shot down a satellite) would seem to be a realistic counter. The Chinese are continuing to build up a force of attack aircraft armed with missiles, including the supersonic Russian AS-17 (Kh-31), which is probably their main anti-carrier arm.

As of November 2010, it appeared that the first Chinese carrier, Shi Lang (the former Russian Varyag), would be ready for sea trials in 2012. Reportedly metal was cut in June 2009 at Shanghai for the first carrier of Chinese design (reportedly Project 048 or 089), which may be launched as early as 2015. As for aircraft, the Russians have been unwilling to provide carrier-capable aircraft, but reportedly the Chinese have their own carrier fighter, designated J-15, which made its first takeoff from a simulated carrier ski-jump on May 6, 2010. A concrete version of a carrier flight deck (with ski-jump) and island has

been built atop the 711 Institute at Wuhan. J-15 is apparently very similar to the Russian Su-33 (the Russians have protested Chinese copying of their designs for aircraft and for submarines). A 20,000-ton helicopter carrier (Project 081) is being built at Shanghai. She supplements the existing series of dock landing ships (Project 071).

The Chinese have been building Yuan-class submarines, apparently very similar to the Russian Kilo, but in September they suddenly launched a new submarine that has been described as a bulked-up Kilo copy. Some observers thought that it rode much higher in the water than a conventional submarine (others disagreed). The submarine may be a Chinese redesign of the Yuan/Kilo design using Chinese sensors and perhaps Chinese diesels. It is also possibly a one-off, intended to replace the old Russian-supplied Golf-class missile submarine, which the Chinese had used as a test platform for their ballistic missiles (the Golf has now been refurbished, apparently for museum display).

For many years, China has been unique in retaining a large force of coastal missile boats. As of mid-2010, 81 of the new Houbei-class (Project 022) catamaran missile boats were reported built and building.

IndiaOnly in 2010 were details of the Indian deal for the ex-Russian carrier Vikramaditya finalized: The price is likely to be $2.3 billion, and the ship is to be delivered four years late, at the end of 2013. Her MiG-29 aircraft are currently being delivered. Meanwhile, work is proceeding on the indigenous Indian carriers.

Work on the Indian nuclear submarine prototype Arihant continues, and after sea trials the Russian Akula-class submarine Nerpa is to be transferred to India, probably in March 2011. This submarine suffered a deadly accident last year when firefighting gas was accidentally released during initial trials.

JapanIn August, the Japanese announced that they would be expanding their submarine fleet in response to the growth of the Chinese navy. Since 1976, the Japanese submarine force has numbered 18 units, standard practice being to retire aging submarines as new ones are built. The future force will include more than 20 operational units plus the usual two for training.

Rear Adm. Hyun Sung Um, commander of the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) 2nd Fleet, and Rear Adm. Seung Joon Lee, deputy commander of ROKN 2nd Fleet, brief Adm. Patrick M. Walsh, commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, on the findings of the Joint Investigation Group Report of the ROKN corvette ROKS Cheonan (PCC 772). A non-contact homing torpedo exploded near the ship March 26, 2010, sinking it, resulting in the death of 46 ROKN sailors. U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jared Apollo Burgamy

KoreaOn March 26, 2010, the ROK corvette Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean torpedo, probably fired by a small submarine. Forty-six Korean sailors were killed. It appears that the sinking was in connection with a special operation the North Koreans were mounting near the border between the two Koreas. Initially there was speculation that the South Korean ship had been mined, but eventually large parts of a North Korean torpedo were recovered.

ArgentinaIn July, the Argentine minister of defense announced plans for a nuclear submarine, based on the TR1700 hull and a reactor developed by an Argentine company that currently designs and builds nuclear research reactors. He stated that the reactor would be installed on board an existing TR 1700 (Argentina has two in service, plus four incomplete hulls) in 2013 and that tests would be complete by 2015. The reactor involved (a type that currently exists) can generate 27 megawatts of electricity, equivalent to 36,000 horsepower (not nearly all of which would go into propulsion). The Argentine announcement was seen as a reaction to the current Brazilian program to develop a nuclear submarine, which has been ongoing (without much visible progress) for many years. The Argentine military services have faced severe funding problems for years, and the stated schedule is unlikely to be met.

This article first appeared in The Year in Defense, 2010 Review, Winter 2011 Edition.