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” Cannon Law ” : French Power Politics in the BidasoaBorder and the Crisis of the Customary Law of Nations

in the Time of the Politique des réunions,Fernando Chavarría-Múgica

To cite this version:Fernando Chavarría-Múgica. ” Cannon Law ” : French Power Politics in the Bidasoa Border and theCrisis of the Customary Law of Nations in the Time of the Politique des réunions,. to be published in:Violet Soen (ed.), Barriers and Borders in the Habsburg World: A transregion.. 2017. <hal-01584971>

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“CannonLaw”:FrenchPowerPoliticsintheBidasoaBorderandtheCrisisoftheCustomaryLawofNationsintheTimeofthePolitiquedesréunions

[Violet Soen (ed.),Barriers and Borders in the HabsburgWorld: A transregionalperspective,Brepols,Turnhout(inpress)]FernandoChavarría-Múgica*IPRI,UniversidadeNovadeLisboaI.

The so-called time of the politique des réunions is considered a momentousperiod in the long reignofLouisXIV. Itmarked theapparentlyunstoppable riseofFrancetoEuropeanhegemony,butalsoitsfallintohubris.Thestoryiswellknown.In1679thePeaceofNijmegenhadputanendtotheFranco-DutchWar,butLouisXIVdidnotfeelsatisfiedwiththeoutcomeofthenegotiations.Thusafterthesigningofthetreatyhetookadvantageofhissuperiorpowertoproceedtotheannexation(réunion)ofcertainterritoriesonthenorthernandeasternbordersofhiskingdom.Inordertogiveanappearanceoflegitimacytowhatbasicallywereactsofarbitraryaggression in peacetime, he established a number of special courts (chambres deréunion)withtheonlypurposeoffabricatinglegaljustificationsfortheoccupations.ThisdisplayofforceendedupalienatingmostEuropeanpowers.TheresultwasthecompletediplomaticisolationofFrance.TheNineYearsWar,alsoknownastheWaroftheLeagueofAugsburg(1688-1697),madetheSunKingreturntoamoreprudentforeignpolicy.Inthissense,thepolitiquedesréunionsmarkedthepeakofhispowerbutalsohislimit.

Thepolitiquedesréunionshaspuzzledhistorians fora longtime. It isgenerallyacknowledgedthat itwasamilestoneintheincreasinglyassertiveforeignpolicyofLouisXIVsincethebeginningofhispersonalrulein1660.However,contrarytotheremarkableachievementsoftheFrencharmiesonthebattlefield,theréunionscouldhardlybeamotiveforcelebration.Theannexationsthemselveswereproblematictosaytheleast.Theywerenottheresultof legitimatesuccessionrightsorspoilsofajust war,1but rather of chicanery and aggression executed in peacetime. On theother hand, in spite of its initial success the politique des réunions ended up infailure.LouisXIV’spowerpoliticsprovokedalong,costlywarattheendofwhichhewascompelled to renounce thevastmajorityofhis territorialacquisitions. It isnocoincidenceifresearchershavededicatedmuchmoretimetoitscondemnation(or

*BolseirodePós-doutoramentoFundaçãoparaaCiênciaeaTecnologia,IPRI,UniversidadeNovade Lisboa. This research has been possible thanks to various grants awarded along the years,particularlyaMarieCurieIEFellowshipatCNRS-EHESS,France,andaEURIASFellowshipattheUniversity of Cambridge sponsored by CRASSH/Clare Hall and the European Commission 7thFramework Programme - COFUND Action. I am very grateful to RuthMackay for reviewing apreliminarydraftofthispaper.1James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and theMaking ofModernWar(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,2012),p.95-132.

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justification)thantothestudyofitsrealhistoricalimplications.Formanyhistoriansit remains themost intriguingandembarrassingepisodeofLouis’sXIVreign. If forBluchetheréunionswereunproblematic,2forLosskytheyweretheconsequenceofsomekindofstateoftransitorymentalconfusion;3forsometheywereasortofwarcrimes,4while forothers itwasmoreaquestionofmanners thanof legitimacy.5Inan attempt to save the king’s reputation some authors have opted to blamesomebodyelseforwhatwasabrutalanddishonourablestrategythatendedbadly.This is the origin of the French historiographical obsession with attribution ofresponsibility. Louvois, the minister of war, and Croissy, the minister of foreignaffairs,aretheusualsuspects.6ButsinceLouisXIVtookpartinallrelevantdecisionsandapparentlyalltheseissueswerewidelydiscussedamonghigh-rankingministersandsenioradvisors,thesejudgementsadpersonamseemquitepointless.7

Beyondthismoralisingapproachtherehavebeensomeattemptstoexplaintheréunionsonmoregroundedbases.Militaryhistoriansconsideredthemaby-productof the stratégie de cabinet –that is, the tight control and central planning of allmilitarymatters from the French court.8Themost widely accepted explanation isthatitwasadefensive(evenifaggressive)policyintendedtoimposesomeorderonthe,supposedlychaotic,northernandeasternfrontiers.9InthissensetheréunionsseemlinkedtoVauban’sdoctrineoftheprécarré–theplanenvisagedbyLouisXIV’s 2FrançoisBluche,LouisXIV,(Paris:Fayard,1986),p.412-429.3AndrewLossky, “The IntellectualDevelopmentof LouisXIV from1661 to1715”, inLouisXIVandAbsolutism,ed.byRagnhildHatton(London:Macmillan,1976),101-29(p.114-15and117-18)4JohnB.Wolf,LouisXIV, (London:VictorGollancz,1968), see chapter25: “Apolicyofviolenceandterror”.5WilliamF.Church,“LouisXIVandReasonofState”,inLouisXIVandthecraftofKingship,ed.byJohnC.Rule(Columbus:OhioStateUniversityPress,1969),362-406(p.388-89)6 Camille Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire depuis la paix de Nimègue, 4 vols. (Paris: Didier et Cie, 1861-1863; 1863), I, p. 1-6. Émile Bourgeois, “Louvois et Colbert de Croissy (les Chambres de réunion)”, Revue historique, 34 (1887), 413-18. Gaston Zeller, “Louvois, Colbert de Croissy et les Réunions de Metz”, Revue historique, 131 (1919), 267-275. LouisAndré,LouisXIVetL’Europe, (Paris:AlbinMichel,1950),p.188-190. Interestingly,according tothis author Croissy was responsible for the plan, while Pomponne and Louvois were theexecutors. André Corvisier, Louvois, (Paris: Fayard, 1983), pp. 437-44, also acknowledged the indirect participation of Vauban. 7 Nowadays it is generally accepted the shared responsibility of Louis XIV, Louvois and Croissy, with the indirect participation of other senior officials, like Vauban and Chamlay. A recent reappraisal of this question in Jean-Philippe Cénat, Le roi stratège: Louis XIV et la direction de la guerre, 1661-1715, (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010), p. 127-128, see also his appreciation on the responsibility for the ravaging of the Palatinate, p. 146-148. About Louis XIV’s personal involvement in all decisions concerning war and foreign affairs see: Lossky, “The Intellectual Development of Louis XIV”, p. 106, and also: John C. Rule, “Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate”, in Rule (ed.), Louis XIV and the craft of Kingship, 3-101 (p. 28-30). 8Cénat,Leroistratège,p.127andfollowing,andontheoriginofthe“stratégiedecabinet”p.99and110-11.AcriticaldiscussionoftheconceptinGuyRowlands,TheDynasticStateandtheArmyunderLouisXIV.RoyalServiceandPrivateInterest,1661-1701,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),p.286-295.9Building on a remark by Rousset, Corvisier defined the politique des réunions as “défenseagressive”, Corvisier, Louvois, p. 435 y ff. Although Corvisier’s interpretation is generallyaccepted, some historians preferred the expression “paix armée” to refer to the samephenomenon,Bluche,LouisXIV,p.412, followedbyLucienBély,LesrelationsinternationalesenEurope,XVIIe-XVIIIesiècles,(Paris:PUF,1992),p.276.

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chiefmilitaryengineertosecuretheterritoryofFranceconsistingofasimplificationof its borders and an overhaul of its defences (the famous ceinture de fer).10However,assomeauthorshavepointedout,weshouldnottakethispretensionofrationalitytoofar.11Theannexationswerenotcarriedoutconsistently,andinsomecasestheyprovedcounterproductive. Inanycase,sincetheywere implemented inpeacetimeanddidnot involve theclashof largearmies theyhavebarely receivedanyattentionbydiplomaticandmilitaryhistorians.Asexpected,theirapproachhasprivilegedthestudyofmilitaryadministrationandwarfareoverthelessformalised,low-scaleformsofaggressionthatprevailedduringthe1680s.

One of the reasons for this lack of attention may have been the alleged“pettiness”of theseaffairs.Historiansareoftenperplexedbythedisproportionatedisplayofviolenceoftheréunions inrelationwiththeirminusculestrategicaims.12Theseactsofaggressionandintimidationwerealwaysimplementedinveryspecificgeographicalspaces.Thisisprobablywhythereisnomoderncomprehensivestudyon thepolitiquedes réunions. Besides, sincemostof the réunions endedupbeingephemeral, researchershave focusedmainlyon those casesof special significancefor the narrative of the formation of the national territory ofmodern France (i.e.Alsace).13Asaresulttheréunionshavebeenstudiedmainlyasregionalphenomenain which borders are treated as mere landmarks in the process of nation-statebuildinginsteadofscenariosofcomplexinteractionsatdifferentlevels.14Afterall,itwas at borderswhere rival polities clashed, loyaltieswere tested, and sovereigntyturnedproblematic.Noneofthese“local”questionscanbedismissedas“petty”.Onthecontrary,theywereatthecoreofthepoliticalconcernsofthetime.ThatiswhytherealandmostrelevantimplicationsofLouisXIV’saggressivepoliciesduringthe1680sarebetterunderstoodfromtheborderthanfromtheking’scabinet.

This regional focus has diverted attention from other forms of aggressionimplemented all along the French borders that did not necessarily lead to formalterritorialannexationsandcannotbeeasilyexplainedbythedefensiverationale.In

10MichèleVirol,Vauban.Delagloireduroiauservicedel’état,(Paris:ChampVallon,2003),p.93-105.11AndrewLossky,“MaximsofStateinLouisXIV’sForeignPolicyinthe1680s”,inWilliamIIIandLouisXIV.Essays, 1680-1720,byand forMarkA.Thomson, ed. by Ragnhild Hatton and John S.Bromley(Liverpool:LiverpoolUniversityPress,1968),7-23.12Andrew Lossky, LouisXIVandtheFrenchMonarchy, (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers UniversityPress,1994),p.172.13See for example: George Livet, L’intendance d’Alsace sous Louis XIV 1648-1715, (Paris:Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l’Université de Strasbourg, 1956). The origin of thistraditional focusonAlsace,andparticularlyonStrasbourg, isdirectly relatedwith the “Alsace-Lorrainequestion”between the finaldecadesof theXIXand thebeginningof theXXcenturies,Arsène Legrelle,LouisXIVetStrasbourg.EssaisurlapolitiquedelaFranceenAlsace,d’aprèsdesdocumentsofficielsetinédits,(Paris:Hachette,3rded.1883),“Avant-propos”,p.VII.14See for example:NellyGirardd'Albissin,Genèsedelafrontièrefranco-belge.LesvariationsdeslimitesseptentrionalesdelaFrancede1659à1789, (Paris:A.& J. Picard,1970).Ultimately, thisapproach is rooted in theold and currentlymuchdiscredited ideaof the “natural frontiers”ofFrance,aboutthissee:GastonZeller,“Lamonarchied’AncienRégimeetlesfrontièresnaturelles”,Revued’histoiremoderne,t.8,nº9,(1933),305-333,PeterSahlins,“NaturalFrontiersRevisited:France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century”, AmericanHistorical Review, v. 95, nº 5,(1990),1423-1451,andDanielNordman,FrontièresdeFrance.Del’espaceauterritoireXVIe-XIXesiècle,(Paris:Gallimard,1998).

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fact, the politique des réunions embraced but was not limited to the réunionsthemselves.Inthissenseitisbetterunderstoodasaformofpowerpoliticsthanasaformofmilitarystrategy.ThepolitiquedesréunionswasawaytoimposeLouisXIV’sviews by force in particular contexts, instead of by established peacefulmeans. Itimpliedtheuseofdirectviolenceinvariousdegreesbutalwayslimitedinscaleandscopeinordertoavoidtheoutbreakofwar.Itisimportanttonotethatthisstrategywaseffectivepreciselybecause itwasappliedata localscaleandinvariousplacessimultaneouslyonweakertargetsthatcouldnotaffordanopenconfrontationwiththekingofFrance.ItiswhatSchwarzenbergercalledaStatusMixtum,anundefinedstate in-between peace and war that could be prolonged as long as the victimcontinuedtomaintainpeacefulrelationswiththeaggressor.15Theaimofthisformofpowerpoliticswasnot limitedtoobtaininganadvantagedefacto (i.e.occupyaterritory)butwasaimedatimposingbycoerciveforcetheacceptanceofnewtermsandconditionsdejure (i.e.compellingyouropponentto“voluntarily”renouncehisterritorial rights),without theuncertaintiesandcostsofa full-fledgedwarandtheconstraintsinherenttopeacetalks.

In thispaper Iwill try togivesome insight intothedisturbing implicationsthatthisformofpowerpoliticshadnotonlyforborderaffairsbutalsomoregenerallyfortheruleofiusgentium.Mypaperhoweverwillnotfocusonthenorthernoreasternborders where the chambres de réunion were formally established. Instead, myattention turns to the southwest, particularly to the French-Spanish border in theBasque-speakingBidasoaRiver regionsituatedbetween theGulfofBiscayand thewestern Pyrenees.Unlike Flanders, Alsaceor the Franche-Comté, theBidasoawasfarfrombeingastrategicpriorityforLouisXIV.Infact,militaryactivityintheregionwas consistently low during the whole period. The Sun King never attempted toinvade Castile –the heartland of the Spanish Monarchy, like the latter used tomenaceParis fromtheLowCountries.This ismorestriking ifwetake intoaccountthatthePyreneanborderwasfrequentlyilldefended.Onthecontrary,thekingevengavepermissiontohisvassalstoestablishtreatiesofamityorbonnecorrespondanceduringwartime.As a consequence, FrenchandSpanishneighbouring communitiescould continue to enjoy peaceful relations and trade even when their respectivesovereigns were at war. The reason alleged for this permission was the extremepoverty of those provinces,whosepopulation could only survive by the import offoodstuffs. For the same reasonmaintenance of a large army on these territoriesresulted toocomplicated froma logisticalpointof view.Forall these reasons, thekingsofFranceandSpainweremore thanhappy toaccept the“neutralisation”oftheBasqueborderinordertoconcentratetheirwareffortsonotherfronts–liketheLowCountries.16

Inspiteofallthis,duringthe1680stheBidasoasufferedthebrutalconsequencesof French power politics just like other strategic border regions. Far from being

15GeorgShwarzenberger,“JusPacisacBelli?ProlegomenatoaSociologyof InternationalLaw”,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,v.37,nº3(1943),460-479.16FernandoChavarríaMúgica, “Por codicia o necesidad: la exención aduanera vascongada y elsistemafronterizodeconversasafinalesdelsigloXVII”inLosámbitosdelafiscalidad:fronteras,territorio y percepción de tributos en los imperios ibéricos (siglos XV-XVIII), ed. by Luis SalasAlmela(Madrid:InstitutodeEstudiosFiscales,2011),77-105.

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consideredaminorquestion,itwastheobjectofintenseandpersistentattentionbyLouis XIV's foreign service.17My research makes evident that the politique desréunionswasnotdirecteduniquelytohighlystrategicpositions,andconsequentlyitwasnotmotivatedbydefensiveconcernsonly.Furthermore,itshowsthatthebrutalmethodsappliedinthenorthandtheeastwereactuallycommonpracticeallalongtheFrenchborders, implyingacoordinatedeffortfromthecourt.Finally, Ihopetodemonstrate that even if every aggression was justified by opportunistic ad hocarguments,Frenchpowerpoliticswereinformedbyamoregeneralpoliticaldoctrinethatintendedtolegitimatethesovereign’sarbitraryuseofforce.Theresultwasthedebasing of both the rule of border customary law and ius gentium in general,includingtraditionalwaysofsettlingdisputesbetweenbordercommunities.

I will begin explaining briefly the legal and cultural background of borderrelations in the Bidasoa. Secondly, I will expose the devastating effects of Frenchpowerpoliticsduringthe1680s.Finally,IwillanalyseFrenchjustificationsandtheirconsequences in thebackgroundof thecrisisofauthorityof theLawofNationsattheendoftheseventeenthcentury.II.

DespitebonnecorrespondancetheBidasoaregionwasfarfrombeingapeacefuloasis.Asinmanyotherlocalcontextsthereweresomedeep-rootedtensionsamongneighbouringcommunities.Inourcasethemainissuewasthedominantpositionofthe Spanish “city” of Fonterabie over the river Bidasoa itself.18Traditionally, itsjurisdictionembracedtheentirecourseoftheriverfromthelimitsoftheKingdomofNavarretoitsmouthintheGulfofBiscay.Thatincludednotonlyitsownshore,butalso the opposite side of the river (that is, the “French” shore) and any islet inbetween. In practice, this meant that Fonterabie could impose very restrictiveconditions on navigation, trade, building, and access to natural resources on theBidasoa to the inhabitants of neighbouring villages, including the people from theFrenchvillageofHendayeontheothersideoftheriver.Itsrightswerefoundedonthe“rightoffirstoccupant”becauseFonterabieclaimedhisfoundationwentbacktoRomantimeswhile thesmallvillageofHendayeexistedonlysince the lateMiddle

17TheBidasoaaffairwasa recurrent themeon thecorrespondancebetweenLouisXIVandhisambassadors inMadrid,AnaÁlvarezLópez,Lafabricacióndeunimaginario:losembajadoresdeLuisXIVyEspaña, (Madrid: Cátedra, 2008), p. 121; AlfredMorel-Fatio (ed.),MarquisofVillars,Mémoiresdelacourd’Espagne,de1679à1681,(Paris:Plon,1893),p.137and217-18.18PhilipIVofSpaingrantedthetitleof“city”toFonterabieasarewardforitsheroicresistanceduringtheFrenchsiegeof1638.InspiteofthishighlyregardedtitleFonterabiecontinuedtobeacommunityofmodestsize,wealthandinfluencecomparedwithothertownsintheprovinceofGuipúzcoa, Susana Truchuelo, Larepresentacióndelascorporaciones localesguipuzcoanasenelentramadopolíticoprovincial(siglosXVI-XVII), (San Sebastián:Diputación deGuipúzcoa, 1997).Nevertheless Fonterabie’s jurisdiction embraced a relatively extense territory from the riverBidasoatotheeasternbankof theestuaryofPasajes,comprisingvillages like Irún-Iranzu(justfewkilometersuptotheriverBidasoa),aswellastheportofSanJuanandthesmallvillageofLezo(bothintheestuaryofPasajes).Fonterabiemaintainedseriouscontroversiesnotonlywiththe French village of Hendaye but also with the communities under its direct jurisdiction,particularly with Irún-Iranzu. See Marta Truchuelo García, Irún y Hondarribia: dos entidadeslocalesdurantelaEdadModerna,(Irún:AyuntamientodeIrún,2004).

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Ages.19These claims were partially sanctioned at the beginning of the sixteenthcenturybyacross-bordercommissionentitledtoclarifythesituationafteraseriesofclashes between the two border communities.20Fonterabie was also powerfulenough to enforce its claims due to the intimidating presence of its fortress andpermanentgarrison,evenifsmall.

AlthoughFonterabie’shegemonyovertheBidasoawasnotseriouslychallengedformorethanacentury,rightsovertheuseoftheriverwereofcoursearecurrentsourceoftensionsbetweenthetwobordercommunities.Settingmorefishingtrapsinprohibitedplacesorcultivatingalongtheriverbanksorontheisletswerecommoninfringements.Navigatingtheriverinforbiddenvessels(thatis,anyshipwithakeel),buildinganykindofstructureontheshore,orskippingthecompulsorydisembarkingofmerchandiseonFonterabie’sdock(andpaymentofthecorrespondingfees)weremoreseriousfaults.Inanycase,thetransgressionsthatcausedmostconcernwerethosethatcouldhavelastingandperniciousconsequencesforFonterabie’sclaimsintheBidasoa.21

Inmoreexceptionaloccasions, the threatcamenot fromformal transgressionsbut from highly symbolic performances intended to question and, when possible,erodethestatusquo.22Defiancecouldeasilyleadtoviolentclashes.Infact,violenceplayedavery important role in theassertionorcontestationof rights.That iswhythese kinds of confrontations were far from being spontaneous or uncontrolled.Theywerestrictlyregulatedbycustomandfollowedaprecisescript.Violencehencewasnotonlylimitedbutalsohighlyritualised.Inmostcasesitwasmainlysymbolicrather than purely physical. It was also communal. No matter how many peoplewere involved (a few fishermen or a hundred townsmen), in this kind of conflictswhatwasatstakewastherightandhonourofthecommunityasawhole.Theaimoftheseviolentactswastheenforcement,assertion,orcontestationofrightsandnotplunder,conquest,orannihilation.Fatalencounterswererareandseriouswoundsinfrequent.Theseizureandritualdestructionoftoolsandvesselsweremuchmorecommon.Escalationwasofcoursestillpossible.Thisisaninherentrisktoanyviolentexchange.Butbordercommunitieshad incentives toprevent spiralsofaggression.Afteralltheywereneighbours.Theywerecompelledtolivesidebysideandtoshare 19AboutthisseeHugoGrotius,Dejurebelliacpacislibritres,(TheClassicsofInternationalLaw,ed.byJamesBrownScott,CarnegieEndowmentofInternationalPeace,2vols.,Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1913), v. I, lib. II, cap. III: “De acquisitioneoriginaria rerum, ubi demari et fluminibus”,particularlynºXVIII.FonterabieclaimedthattheOiasso,OiasonaorOiarsoquotedbyPtolomy,Strabo, and Pliny, was actually his direct Roman predecessor. However the neighbouringcommunities of Irún-Iranzu, San Sebastián, and the valley of Oiarzun claimed the very samething.Nowadays,thescientificconsensusisthatOiassowasactuallyIrún.20Acopyoftheprovisorysentence issuedbytheFrenchandtheSpanishcommissioners inSt.-Jean-de-Luz,10April1510inAHN[ArchivoHistóricoNacional,Madrid],Estado,libro659,f.4-7.About these early, provisory negotiations: Théodoric Legrand, Essai sur les différends deFontarabieavecleLabourdduXVmeauXVIIImesiècle,(Pau:J.Empérauger,1905),p.3-23.21For example, if for some families cultivating along the riverbankswas away to assure theirsurvival,fromthepointofviewofthecommunitythemereactofharvestingcouldbeusedasavalidlegalargumenttoclaimpossessionoverlandconsideredabandoned.Itwasmainlyforthislegalreason,andnotforeconomicinterests,thatdestroyingHendaye’scropsalongtheBidasoawasimportantforFonterabie.22Seeforexample:AMF[ArchivoMunicipaldeFuenterrabía],E-6-VI-6-16:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,1July1598.

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(even if unequally) spaces and resources. Despite the frequent conflicts, thiscontributedtomaintainthestatusquo.23

There was a specific way to deal with each of these issues, but the generalprinciplewasthattheywerelocalaffairsthathadtobemanagedbylocalauthoritiesfollowinglocalcustom.Consequently,itwasexpectedthatallagentsinvolvedinthiskind of border affair had to be locals. This is not to say that border communitiesactedwithoutatleasttheimplicitconsentofroyalofficials.TheKingofSpainhadaparticularinterestinfavouringthestatusquo.Fonterabieheldasmallgarrisonpaidfor by the royal treasury and a fortress that constituted the first line of defenceagainsttheenemyincaseofinvasion.Fonterabie’sdominantpositionintheBidasoahindered the possibility of a surprise attack or any other unexpected threat fromacrosstheborder.Thiswas importantbecausetheBasqueborderwasmuchmoreclose to the Spanish heartland than it was to the French political core. Royalinterference in border affairs was not entirely precluded, but it remained quiteexceptional.Eveninthesecasesroyalauthoritiespreferredtokeepalowprofiletoprevent escalation and avoid any undesired engagement. Ordinarily, themanagement, enforcement, contestation, and eventual negotiation of rights inborderspacesremainedinthehandsoflocalauthorities.24

Incertainoccasionssovereignsinterferedinborderaffairsunintentionally.Sincetheendof the fifteenthcentury theBidasoahadbecomeaplaceofencounter fortheSpanishandFrenchmonarchs.Duringthisperiodtheriverwasthescenarioofvariousmeetingsandexchangesbetweenkings,queens,andothermembersoftheruling families of Spain and France. In such occasions the ordinary jurisdictionalborderbetweenterritorieswastransformedintoaceremonialborderbetweenroyalcourts. In principle, the selection of the Bidasoa as themost appropriate place tostage these extraordinary events was motivated by practical reasons that hadnothingtodowiththelocalcontext.However,sincethepresenceofthesovereignwasanactofsovereigntyinitself,25thewayinwhichcourtceremonieswerestagedand performed was extraordinarily important for the assertion or refusal of anyjurisdictional claim.26That could be the case even if the purpose of the king'spresence at the borderwas completely different from the one envisaged by local 23As one inhabitant of Hendaye said in 1663: “más querían mucho menos de voluntad deFonterabiequemuchomásqueselespudiesedarporotravía,puesasíseobligaríaycumpliríamejoryentiempodepazyguerratendríantodacomunicación,sinlaqualconfesóyrepitiónopodíanvivir”,AGS[ArchivoGeneraldeSimancas],Estado,leg.K-1670,nº53.24Thiswas a common feature of border communities, see FernandoChavarríaMúgica, “En losconfinesdelasoberanía.Facerías,escalasdepoderyrelacionesdefuerzatransfronterizasenelPirineoNavarro(1400-1615)” inLessociétésdefrontièredelaMediterranéeàl'Atlantique(XVIe-XVIIIesiècle), ed. byMichelBertrand andNatividadPlanas (Madrid: CasadeVelázquez, 2011),193-217, and Fernando Chavarría Múgica, “El ‘ruido’ de los confines de Navarra: servicio,reputaciónydisimulacióndurantelanegociacióndelintercambiodeprincesas(1609-1615)”,inServiralreyenlaMonarquíadelosAustrias:Medios,finesylogrosdelservicioalsoberanoenlossiglosXVIyXVII,ed.byAliciaEstebanEstríngana(Madrid:Sílex,2012),227-259.25Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees, (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1989),p.27-28.26SeeMaríaJosédelRíoBarredo,“Imágenesparaunaceremoniadefrontera.Elintercambiodelas princesas entre las cortes de Francia y España en 1615”, in La historia imaginada:ConstruccionesvisualesdelpasadoenlaEdadModerna,ed.by JoanLluísPalosandDianaCarrió-Invernizzi(Madrid:CEEH,2008),p.153-182.

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communities.ThatwasexactlywhathappenedduringthefamousnegotiationofthePeaceofthePyreneesin1659.TheplenipotentiariesofthekingsofSpainandFrancemet during several weeks on an islet in themiddle of the Bidasoa. The islet wasappropriately prepared not only tomake themeetings as comfortable as possiblebut also to represent an exact symmetry between the two monarchies. Theseprotocolaryarrangementswere intendedtosignifytheequalstatusofthekingsofSpain and France. In order to reinforce this idea the islet itself was declared“neutral”. Thus nobody could allege a position of superiority over the other partyduring the negotiations. By thismeans the islet became a pure ceremonial spacewhereordinaryterritorial jurisdictionwastemporarilysuspended.27Orat leastthatwastheinitialintentionofthetwomonarchs.

Ofcourse, localshadadifferentopinion.Fromaceremonialpointofview, theencounter of the two plenipotentiaries (or the sovereigns themselves, as wouldhappenin1660)onanisletinthemiddleoftheriverseemedveryconvenient.Butthisinsistenceonsymmetrybetweenmonarchieshadadisturbingeffectonbordercommunities. It constituted a potentially dangerous precedent for Fonterabie’sclaims over the whole river. On the other hand, for Hendaye it was an excellentopportunitytopushforrenegotiationoftheconditionsofuseoftheriver.Followinganestablishedprinciple, theplenipotentiariesnegotiatingapeace treatyonbehalfof their respective sovereigns did not get involved in a local quarrel completelyunrelatedwith thewar that theywere trying to finish.They limited themselves toactingasmediatorsbetweenthe twoparties.TheBidasoaaffairwasneverpartofthe official agenda. However it seems that Hendaye was persuasive enough toengageCardinalMazarininthedefenceofitsrights.28

At the very end of the negotiation the French plenipotentiary pushed for theintroductionofasecretclauseexpressingthewillingnessofbothsidestoreachanamicablesettlementofanydisputebetweenbordercommunitiesontheBidasoa.Bythis means the plenipotentiaries enabled the Lieutenant General of Guyenne, inFrance,andtheCaptainGeneralofGuipúzcoa,inSpain(thehighestroyalofficialsatprovinciallevel)toencourageapeacefulsolutionbetweenHendayeandFonterabie.Only inthecaseofnoagreementbetweenthetwobordercommunitieswouldtheFrenchandSpanishroyalofficialshavetoagreetoanappropriatesettlement“afterhearingtheclaimsofbothparties”.Thecontentofthesecretclausewasinlinewithcustomary doctrine. In principle, it respected the distinction between local affairsand the superior sphere of sovereignty. Itwas expected that border communitieswouldarriveatsomekindofagreementfollowingcustomaryarrangements.Theroleofroyalofficialswaslimitedtomediationand,inthelastinstance,co-arbitration.29

27BNF[BibliothèqueNationaledeFrance],Occid.,Ms.Français7156,ff.26-27vand34:MazarinotoLeTellier, Saint-Jean-de-Luz,30 July1659, and4August1659, respectively. See alsoDanielSéré, LaPaixdesPyrénées:Vingt-quatreansdenégociationsentre laFranceet l’Espagne (1635-1659),(Paris:HonoréChampion,2007),p.450-455.28AdetaileddiscussionofthisepisodeinFernandoChavarríaMúgica,“Lafronteraceremonialyla frontera real: El tratadode losPirineos y la reavivacióndel conflictopor el dominiodel ríoBidasoa (1659-1668)”, in Del tractat dels Pirineus a l'Europa del segle XXI: un model enconstrucció?,ed.byOscarJanè,(Barcelona:Museud'HistòriadeCatalunya,2010),75-86.29ThetextofthesecretclausebothinSpanishandFrenchinJoséAntonioAbreu,Coleccióndelostratados de paz, alianza, neutralidad, garantía, protección, tregua, mediación, accessión,

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Still,theintroductionofaclauseofthiskindinatreatyoftheimportanceofthePeace of the Pyrenees was an unexpected entanglement of sovereigns in anapparently petty jurisdictional affair. Thus the quarrels between Fonterabie andHendaye in theBidasoaslid intothesphereofdiplomacyandhighpolitics. In fact,afterafewunfruitfulattemptsatmediation,royalofficialsdecidedtoresorttotheirrespectivemasters.At this stage localauthoritiesofbothborder communities losttheleadroleinfavourofhigh-rankingministers.ThequestionwasreviewedattheSpanishcourtbypetitionoftheFrenchambassador.Fromthebeginningitbecameclear that the positions of the two sides differed sharply. On the one hand, theSpanishwerewilling to hearHendaye’s accusations against Fonterabie for allegedabuses in the Bidasoa and, if necessary, to correct anywrongdoing. On the otherhand, the representative of the King of France wanted to initiate an open-endeddiscussionaboutjurisdictionontheBidasoaitself.ThatwasofcoursearedlinefortheSpanish.TheFrenchbegantotreattheaffairnotasaconventionalcontroversybetween townsfolk but as amatter of State. This shiftwas particularly dangerousbecause Louis XIV could then feel justified to intervene directly in the Bidasoa indefence of his sovereignty. The Spanish alleged that this approach violated thecontentofthesecretclause,andtheBidasoaaffairwasredirectedagaintothelocallevel.

Twocommissionerswerethenappointedtodealwiththematterontheground.During the followingmonths French and Spanish representativesmet at the sameislet in themiddle of the Bidasoa as the royal plenipotentiaries during the peacenegotiations,butinamuchlessglamorousfashion.However,thepositionofthetwocommissions was so distant that not only was agreement impossible, but furtherborder tensions were actually encouraged. In fact, infractions became so obviousandtheFrenchcommissionerssolenienttowardsthemthattheSpanishsuspectedtheywereactuallyencouragedfromabove.ThissuspicionseemedtobeconfirmedbythereluctanceoftheFrenchcommissionerstoleavethenegotiationsentirelyinthe hands of the locals, as was first proposed by the Spanish. The building of afortifiedtowerinHendayetosurveythetractoftheriverclosesttothevillagewasanotherclearsignalthatthenegotiationswerecondemnedtofailurefromtheverybeginning. Instead of a common arbitration each party ended up proclaimingseparatelythelegitimacyoftheirrespectiveclaims.SometimeafterwardsanewwarbrokeoutbetweentheFrenchandSpanishmonarchies.

In the following years the status quo remained the same and Fonterabiecontinuedtoenjoyadominantpositionontheborder.Nonetheless,developmentsaround the secret clause had other serious even if subtle consequences. Bydeclaration of the French commissioner, confirmed by Louis XIV in January 1668(that is,when theWarofDevolutionwasalreadydeclared), theking reserved therighttoretaliateagainstFonterabieifitobstructedHendaye’sallegedjurisdictionon

reglamento de límites, comercio, navegación, etc., hechos por los pueblos, reyes y príncipes deEspaña [...]Reinadodel señorD.Felipe IV.ParteVII, (Madrid: Antonio Marín, Juan de Zúñiga yviudadePeralta,1751),p.258-259.

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theBidasoa.30Althoughthethreatdidnotmaterialiseatthattime,itunderminedafundamental valueof customaryorderon theborder: trustbetweenneighbouringcommunities.Forthisreason,thistimeFonterabiewasveryreluctanttoparticipatein the customary treaty of bonne correspondance negotiated by provincialrepresentatives fromboth sides of theborder. Even if Louis XIVnever questionedthevalidityofthesetraditionalagreements,implementationofpowerpoliticsontheBasque border disrupted this traditional mechanism of mutual obligation thatprevented violence between neighbouring communities andmade possible cross-border cooperation during wartime. Eventually, pressures by provincialrepresentativesandroyalauthoritiesconvincedthemtojoinin.

LouisXIV’sproclamationofhisretaliatoryrightswasmadeduringwartimeand,inprinciple,itceasedbeinginforceafterthesigningofthePeaceofAix-la-ChapelleinMay1668.However,theKing’sdeclarationmadeclearthathedidnotrenouncedirect interventioninborderaffairs. Infact,heorderedhisnewambassadoratthecourtofSpaintoreinitiatenegotiationsatthehighestlevelaboutjurisdictionontheBidasoa.HisproposalwasbasedontheassumptionthatsincethepeaceagreementexplicitlyconfirmedthecontentoftheTreatyofthePyrenees(includingthesecretclause on the Bidasoa) it was legitimate to treat it through diplomatic channelsinsteadofthroughlocalcustomaryarrangements.ButthistimetheSpanishrefusedtodealwiththequestionatall.TheycontinuedtoencourageFonterabietoenforceitsrightsasusual,alwaystakingcaretonotcompromisethehonouroftheKingofSpain.31Inanycase,afewyearslaterthepeacebrokedownagainandanewtreatyof bonne correspondance was established on the Bidasoa border. But theseagreementswereonlyvalidaslongasthewarlasted.Oncethewarwasoverayearlaterbordertensionsre-flourished.

Knowing about the unprecedented violence deployed by the French in theBidasoaduringthe1680s,itmaybeeasytoacknowledgethatFonterabie’smistrustwaswellfounded.ItcouldbearguedthatinLouisXIV'sattitudeduringtheseyearsitwaspossibletogetaglimpseofwhatwasabouttocome.ThereisnodoubtthattheunprecedentedinclusionoftheBidasoaaffairintheTreatyofthePyrenees,eveninthe discrete terms in which it was done, gave the King of France the excuse totransformalocalborderaffairintoadiplomaticincident.However,thetruthisthat,ingeneralterms,untilthatmomentLouisXIVhadfollowedestablishedformalities,conventions, and procedures. His policy towards the Bidasoa may have beensurprisinglyboldbutitwasnotnecessarilyillegitimate.AfterthePeaceofNijmegeneverythingchanged.III.

ThePeaceofNijmegen(1679)betweenSpainandFrancewastobesealedbyaroyalwedding.AgainacourtlyrepresentationattheBidasoaRiverpreparedanewmeeting between the twomonarchs and the delivery of PrincessMarie-Louise of

30AHN, Estado, libro 655, f. 187-88: [Print] Sentence on the Bidasoa affair by the Frenchcommissionersd’ArtagnanandSt.Martin-Barrez(issuedin26February1667,andconfirmedbyLouisXIVin25January1668)31AGS, Estado, leg. K-1411, nº 90,Mariana ofHabsburg, RegentQueen of Spain, to Fonterabie(Madrid,16February1669)[draftletter]

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OrleanstothekingofSpain.32Aswehavealreadyseen,theseextraordinaryeventspresented numerous opportunities to challenge the status quo in the border.Wecannotforgetthat,thoughtheeventwasplannedtoitsminimaldetailattheroyalcourts,thepeopleinchargeofthepreparationswerelocals.ThatiswhyFonterabiewas particularly attentive that events preceding the ceremony not be used as anexcuse for undermining its jurisdiction. There were of course various incidentsbetweenthetwobordercommunitiesduringthepreparations,butcarewastakentonottodisturbthedevelopmentoftheofficialceremony.33

In the weeks following the royal meeting, border tensions mounted rapidly.Hendaye'sactsofdefiancebecamenotonly frequentbutalsomuchmoreserious.TheSpanishweresurprisedtoseehowtheirfishmongerswerebeaten,theirvesselsshot, and their fish traps destroyed. Hendaye even dared to capture one of theirboatsandsenttheiroccupantstothecityofBayonneasprisoners,“mistreatedlikein wartime”.34These acts went well beyond customary usage at the border. Thesuddenescalationofviolence intheBidasoaandrenewedpressuresbytheFrenchambassadorconvincedSpanishauthoritiesthatthesetensionswereencouragedonpurpose “by superior order”.35According to the Council of State inMadrid, LouisXIV's aim was to provoke a violent response from Fonterabie in order to have apretexttoresumehostilities.ThissuspicionwasnotfoundeduniquelyintheBidasoacase but more in general in “French restlessness and in what they attempteverywhere” (“inquietud de franceses y de los tentativos que hacen por todaspartes”).36In fact, the exacerbation of local tensions all along the French borderswassocharacteristicofthepolitiquedesréunions.

32ThedeliveryoftheprincesstookplaceintheBehobiapasson3November1679,AGS,Estado,leg.K-1636/37,nº88.33For instance,onedayaFrenchboatentered into theriver fromthesea.Apparently theboatcamefromthenearbyportofSaint-Jean-de-Luztosurveytheworks. Ithappenedthattheboathadakeel–aforbiddenvesselfortheFrenchintheBidasoa.Consequently,Fonterabieseizedit.In accordance with customary practice the boat had to be set publicly on fire on the shore -otherwisetheseizurecouldbeinterpretedasanactofpiracy.Theaimwastheenforcementofjurisdictional rights, not plundering. However, in order to avoid any disruption of the royalceremonyauthoritiesdelayed theperformanceof thispunishmentuntil courtiersofbothsideshad left the border.Once the ceremony finishedFonterabie could finally show that, nomatterwhat, its jurisdiction over the Bidasoa continued to be in force, AHN, Estado, libro 628, f. 21:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,13January1680;Frenchministersaccused laterFonterabieofhavingburnedtheFrenchroyalbannertogetherwiththeboat,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.139-41.Otherincidentsduringthepreparations:AGS,Estado,leg.K-1636/37,nº82.34AAE[ArchivedesAffairesÉtrangères],CP[CorrespondancePolitique],Espagne,nº63, f.84r-113r, 117r-118v, 133r-v, 134r-138r, and 151r. AHN, Estado, libro 628, f. 13-14. The Spanishprotestedthroughordinarydiplomaticchannels,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.59r-60v:MarquisoftheBalbasestotheMarquisofVillars,Madrid,6April1680.35AHN, Estado, libro 628, f. 22: D. Diego de Portugal (Captain General of the Province ofGuipúzcoa) to thesecretaryGerónimodeEguía,SanSebastián,26February1680.TheSpanishpresentedanofficialcomplaintbeforetheMarquisofVillars,FrenchambassadorinMadrid,andtheCouncilofStateorderedtodothesamethroughtheSpanishambassadorinFrance,theDukeof Jubenazo, AGS, Estado, leg. K-1646, nº142 (5 December 1679), and nº 147b (Madrid, 11December1680)36AHN,Estado,libro628,ff.13-20:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,23March1680.

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Initially, themain concern of the Spanishministers inMadridwas to avoid anapparently minor incident being used as a casus belli. 37 Consequently theyconcentrated their efforts on preventing any violent response against Hendaye'sprovocations.38They asked Fonterabie to enforce its jurisdiction in a “moderate”manner.39Moreover,anyinvolvementofthegarrisonandthelocalauthoritiesintheconflict was explicitly prohibited. Nonetheless, the increasing hostility of Hendayeand soldiers' willingness to help their friends and relatives in town made theseinstructionsdifficult to implement.40Eventually the soldiery and the royal officials,who could be directly accountable, were compelled to obey but, as the CaptainGeneral of Guipúzcoa warned, the same could not be imposed on the commonpeople.41The ministers were alarmed to learn that townsfolk deployed pieces ofartillery on the dock to stop any attempt by Hendaye to recover seized vessels.42ThesedisturbanceswereenoughforLouisXIVtoaccuseFonterabieofveryseriouscrimes,includingthedestructionofhousesandevenachurch,committedallegedlyto prevent partition of the river decreed by him. The King of France, through hisambassador inMadrid, theMarquisofVillars,andhisministerof foreignaffairs inParis, Colbert de Croissy, demanded exemplary punishment for the damagessufferedbyHendaye.43Thedemandwasbackedbymilitarythreats.Vauban’splantorenew the fortificationsof thecityofBayonne, theprovincial capital, included theconstruction of new defences for Hendaye with the explicit purpose ofcounterbalancingFonterabie’spowerintheBidasoa.44Atthesametime,anunusualamountoftroopsconcentratedinthesouthwestofFrance.45Infact,thecommanderof this contingent threatened retaliation if the King’s demands were not met.46 37Thisfearwasnotlimitedtoborderaffairsonly,seeforexamplethedeclarationoftheMarquisofLosBalbases,SpanishambassadorinFrance,onthecustomarysaluteamongroyalnavies,AGS,Estado,K-1646,nº57(Paris,25June1679).38“Que no se recelava tanto de las hostilidades de franceses, como del ardor de los deFuenterrabía,quepretendíanelauxiliodelosmilitaresyqueestuviesenasuarbitriolaspuertasy usan la artillería”,Consulta of theWar Council,Madrid, 26 January 1680, AHN, Estado, libro628,f.16.39“Quenosedisputeconlasarmasestenegocio,aunquemotivenaellofranceses,sinoquelosdeFuenterraviasevalgandelosactosyprotestasjurídicoshaciendosiempreestacausapropiadeentre los vezinos de una y otra frontera, sinmezclarmi authoridad, nombre, ni armas”, AHN,Consejos,Castilla,leg.7119,nº103:TheKingofSpaintotheGovernoroftheCouncilofCastile,Madrid,18April1680.AHN,Estado,libro628,f.21:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,13January1680.40AHN, Estado, libro 628, f. 3-4: D. Diego de Portugal to the King of Spain, San Sebastián, 5January1680.41According to the Captain General of Guipúzcoa: “esto con la gente del pueblo no se puedereducirarazón”,refusinganyliabilityfortheriotousbehaviorofthecommonpeople(“algunasresolucionesquetumultuariamentetomaronlosvecinosdemenosobligaciones”),AHN,Estado,libro628,f.137-8:D.DiegodePortugaltotheCouncilofState,SanSebastián,5May1680.42AHN,Estado,libro628,f.139-141:MemorandumpresentedbytheMarquisofVillars.43AHN,Estado,libro628,f.25-28:MemorandumpresentedbytheMarquisofVillars.44AHN,Estado,libro628,f.127v.VaubanhimselfvisitedHendaye,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.125(news from Bayonne, 4 May 1680). About Vauban’s plans for the defence of the province ofLabourd see PierreHourmat,HistoiredeBayonne.DesoriginsàlaRévolutionfrançaisede1789,(Bayonne:Sociétédessciences,lettresetartsdeBayonne,1987),p.357-8.45AHN,Estado,libro628,f.48-56:CouncilofState,Madrid,27April1680.46AHN,Estado,libro628,f.88:MaréchalLamberttoD.AlonsoJordán,GovernorofthefortressofFonterabie,Hendaye,28April1680.

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Rumours were heard that Louis XIV would send warships to Fonterabie with thesamepurpose.47

RumoursbecamerealityatthebeginningofMay1680withthearrivalofthreewarbrigantines in frontof Fonterabie. From thebeginning the commanderof theFrenchflotillamadeclearhismission:hiskingorderedhimtoseizeanyvesselsailingin or out of the Bidasoa until receiving reparations for damages caused byFonterabie.48Theymet the threats some days later, capturing a boat and sendingtheir occupants to Bayonne as prisoners. A maritime blockade was formallyestablished.Fromthispointon,Fonterabiecouldonlybesuppliedbyland.Thiswasnotaminorissueforatownthatdependedonseatradeforaffordablefoodstuffs.At firstsight theFrench flotillawasnotparticularly impressive: fewbrigantines (or“smallfrigates”)supportedbysomepinnacesandarmedboats.Infact,thepeopleofFonterabieaskedforpermissiontooustthemattheirexpense.49WecannotforgetthattheSpanishtownwaswellknownforitscorsairactivity.50Theyhadthepowerandtheexperiencetodoit.Nevertheless,theproposalwaskindlyrejectedbecauseit would certainly have put an abrupt end to the peace so recently signed –andsealed with a royal wedding! Instead they decided to satisfy French demands byappointingajudge-commissionertoinvestigateand,ifnecessary,punishtheallegedcrimesagainst (in thesayingof theFrench) thedefencelesspeopleofHendaye, intheconfidencethatLouisXIVwoulddothesamewithhissubjects.51

After some weeks of investigation the Spanish judge-commissioner concludedthatall theallegedaccusationsagainstFonterabiewere simply false.Of courseheacknowledged that there had been some quite violent quarrels andmaybe someabuses,buttherewerenobombedhousesorburnedchurchesastheFrenchsaid.On the contrary, if somebody had to be accused it should be Hendaye for itsnumerous infringements in the Bidasoa.52Louis XIV did not think the same. Heactually sent a commissioner to theborder but hismissionwas not to investigate 47AHN,Estado,libro638,f.24(newsfromBayonne,24February1680),andf.89-90(newsfromFonterabie,28April1680).48“Memoireinstructifausr.duRivaucapitainedefrigatelegerecommandantlesquatrepinassesqueleRoyfaitarmerauportdeBayonne”,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.65-66.AHN,Estado,libro628,f.126.However,RivauwassubstitutedbyRouxjustdaysafterbeingappointedbecausethekingwasinformedthathewasaHuguenot,ANF[ArchivesNationalesdeFrance],Marine,B242,f.198r(“Billetalamain”6May1680)49AHN,Estado,libro628,f.260r-v:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,22August1680.50Enrique Otero Lana, Los corsarios españoles durante la decadencia de los Austrias. El corsoespañol del Atlántico peninsular en el siglo XVII (1621-1697), (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa,1992). José Ramón Guevara, "El corso Hondarribiarra (1690-1714)", Boletín de Estudios delBidasoa, 15, (1997), 35-116. The French described the people of Fonterabie as “pirates sansquartier”,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº67, f.69r:LespesdeHureaux toCroissy, fromtheriverpass,7May1681.51The appointed judge-commissioner was Fernando Ramírez de Alcántara, oidor of theChancilleríaofGrenade,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.111-17:CouncilofState,Madrid,12May1680.ThedecisionwasimmediatelycommunicatedtotheFrenchcourt,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.176-77:TheKingofSpaintotheDukeofJubenazo,ambassadorinFrance,Madrid,31May1680.52“Yúltimamente[…]nohabersearruinadotemplos,nicasasdelosdeAndayanimuertoningúnhombre,antesbiensehahalladoquelospromotoresdeestosenquentroshansidosiemprelosdeAndayayquelosdeFuenterrabíanohanmovidosinoesprecisadosdelanaturaldefensadesusvidasyhaciendas”,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.180-3:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,4June1680.

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anywrongdoing,butrathertoclaimreparationsfortheallegeddamagessufferedbythe people of Hendaye.53The disparity of their respective missions made anyagreement impossible, but the Spanish hoped that establishment of some sort offormalcontactsbetweencommissionerswouldatleastrelaxFrenchpressureontheborder.54Needlesstosay,theSpanishmisreadLouisXIV’sintentions.

TheviolenceintheBidasoadidnotdiminish.Themaritimeblockadewasinplaceformorethanthreeyears.Thewarshipsonly left theirpositionstogetsuppliesorwhenbadweathermadesailingextremelydangerous–as in thewintermonths. Inthe meantime few boats from Fonterabie ventured to fish in the surroundingwaters.55Hendaye had gained full control of the Bidasoa. Things got even worsewhenonemorningthecorpsesofeleveninhabitantsofHendayeappearedclosetoFonterabie.56They were the occupants of a boat that had visited the Frenchbrigantines the day before. Apparently it seemed a shipwreck –not an infrequentaccidentintheturbulentwatersoftheGulfofBiscay,butFrenchauthoritiesaccusedthe people of Fonterabie of murder. 57 As was expected they demandedextraordinary punishments. They even used this episode as a diplomatic tool,presenting the case in foreign courts as an example of the unjust treatment thatFrancewas receiving fromSpain.58Unsatisfiedwith theexplanations fromMadrid,LouisXIVorderedretaliation.Immediatelytheflotillaextendeditsrangeofactiontothe nearby port of Pasajes, which was also under the jurisdiction of Fonterabiethough not in the mouth of the Bidasoa. They captured more fishermen andsailors.59

The situation for Fonterabie was unbearable. The border city was underextraordinarypressure.Itsufferedawar-likemaritimeblockadeandhadlostcontrolofitsownjurisdictionintheBidasoa.However,whatwasmosthumiliatingwasthepassivityforcedonthembytheirownauthorities.Notonlydidthekingnotprotectthem,heevenprohibitedrespondingtoanyaggression.60Theywerealsoaccusedofhorrendouscrimes.Whatwasworse,theyweretreatedwithsuspicionbytheirown 53The commissioner appointed by the French to deal with the Bidasoa affair was Joseph deLespesdeHureaux,lieutenantgénéraldusénéschalofBayonne,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.76-77.54AHN, Estado, libro 628, f. 233-4: Fernando Ramírez de Alcántara to the King of Spain,Fonterabie,20 July1680,and f.250-2: thesame to theMarquisofCanales,Fonterabie,30 July1680.55The sardine fishery was very important for the local economy, particularly for the poorestpeople, AAE, CP, Espagne, nº 67, f. 35v-36v: Lespes de Hureaux to Croissy, from the pass ofBehobia,12Mach1681.AHN,Estado,libro628,f.309:D.DiegodePortugaltoJuanAntoniodeZárate,SanSebastián,20August1680.AgeneraloverviewoninshorefishingintheBasquecoastinXabierAlberdi,"Lapescaenel litoraldeGipuzkoadurantelaEdadModerna",ItsasMemoria:RevistadeEstudiosMarítimosdelPaísVasco,3,(2000),99-129.56Initially, Francisco Ramírez de Alcántara left the case in the hands of the ordinary justicesystem,buttheViceroyofNavarreinformedtheSpanishcourtthatFrenchauthoritiesdeniedthepossibility of an accident “and they have sent false reports to theMost Christian King”, AHN,Estado,libro629,f.70,and72v-73v:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,17May1681.57AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.98v-99r:LouisXIVtotheMarquisofVillars,Versailles8June1681.58See for example: BNF, Ms. Occ., Clairambault 589, f. 317: Croissy to d'Estrades, Versailles,French ambassador in Savoy, 6 June 1681. By that time, the Spanish government had alreadyinstructedhisambassadors inRome,Germany,England,andHolland,AHN,Estado, libro628, f.371v-372r:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,11October1680.59AHN,Estado,libro629,f.251-2:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,18June1681.60AHN,Estado,libro628,f.260r-v,and389.

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people.61Representatives of Guipúzcoa, the province in which Fonterabie waslocated,wanted the border city to attend to all French demands to avoid furtherretaliation.62The King of Spain sent a second judge-commissioner endowed withspecialpowersto investigateandpunishtheallegedmurders intheBidasoa.63Thiswasanextraordinarymeasurethatwasonlyappliedagainstpublicmalefactors,andthat could be interpreted as a presumption of culpability.64But again, hewas notabletofindanyevidenceofthecrimes.Afterthat,thecourtsentamemberoftheCouncilofCastile(themostprestigiousjudicialinstitutionoftheSpanishmonarchy)as new judge-commissioner with identical results.65The Spanish ministers wereafraid of losing complete control of the situation. In seeking to appease Louis XIVtheypushedFonterabietothebrinkofopenrebellion.66

TheonlywaytoappeaseLouisXIVwasofcoursebowingtohisdemands.Inspiteofhiscomplaintsforthelackofextraordinarypunishmentshismaininterestwasnottofindtheculpritsoftheallegedmurders.Infact,hisdemandsremainedthesamebeforeandafter this incident: recognitionofHendaye’s right to fish,navigate,andtrade freely in the Bidasoa, and complete jurisdiction over his own shore. Hisargumentationdidnotchangeeither.TheFrenchKingaccusedFonterabieofvariousviolent crimes and abuses ever since 1679. Every single border incident, past andpresent,wasinterpretedasanarbitraryaggressionagainstthe“defenceless”peopleof Hendaye. “The affair of the drowned men” (as the Spanish authorities put it)reinforced the rhetoric of victimisation at the core of the French strategy in theBidasoa.Itwasalsousedtojustifystrengtheningtheretaliatorymeasuresalreadyinplace,namelythemaritimeblockadeandthecaptureofprisoners.

The criminalisation of Fonterabie was instrumental for the legitimation of theFrench claims on theBidasoa. Since armed intervention in a common controversybetween local communitieswashardly justifiable inordinary legal terms LouisXIVresortedtoargumentstakenfromotherspheresoflaw.Partofhisjustificationwasbasedontherightofreprisal.67Inprinciple,areprisalwasalegalmeasurebywhichauthoritiesgavepermissiontoaprivatepersontoseizepropertyandhostagesfromthecountry fromwhichhe failed toobtain justice,as compensation forhis losses.French authorities presented themselves as enforcers of Hendaye’s compensation 61AAE,CP,Espagne,nº67,f.161:LespesdeHureauxToCroissy,Bayonne25June1681.62AHN,Estado,libro628,ff.91-92:D.DiegodePortugaltotheKingofSpain,1May1680.63The new judge-commissionerwas José Rodríguez Portocarrero y Silva,Marquis of Castrillo,alcaldedecasaycorte (that is,memberof theRoyalHighCourt ofMadrid),AHN,Estado, libro629,f.294-98:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,24August1681.Meanwhile,theFrenchKing sent the intendant Faucon de Ris to Hendaye in order to find the culprits of the allegedmurders,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.137yss.64Juan de Hevia Bolaños, Curia filipica, primera y segunda parte, (Madrid: Imprenta Real porMateoLlanos,Madrid,1684;firstpublishedinLima,1603),partetercera,p.134.65The third judge-commissionerwasaveryrespected jurist,D. JuandelCorral,memberof theCouncilofCastile,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.142andfollowing:MarquisofVillarstoLouisXIV,Madrid,11July1681;theFrenchambassadordescribedhimas“ministrefortintegre”(f.148r-v)66See forexample,AHN,Estado, libro629, f.375-9:Consultaof theCouncilofState,Madrid10November1681.67AAE, CP, Espagne, nº65, f. 20r-v: LouisXIV to theMarquis ofVillars, St. Germain, 30 Janvier1680[draft letter].Ageneraloverviewonthisaspect fromthepointofviewofthetheoristsofthe time in Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History, (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity,2008),p.76-82,and122-126.

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claims. As they said, they were compelled to intervene directly because Frenchvillagers were not powerful enough to defend themselves against the abuses ofFonterabie.Thisargumentationwasseriously flawedforseveral reasons.Resort totherightofreprisalwasonlylegitimatewhenitwasnotpossibletoobtainjusticebyothermeans,andthatwasnotthecase.Afterall,thekingsofFranceandSpainwereat peace. They even sealed their alliance with a royalmarriage. According to theterms of the Peace of Nijmegen, any dispute among the vassals of the twomonarchies had to be settled by amicable means, as was explicitly stated in thesecret article on the Bidasoa of the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) and confirmedagain in the latest negotiations.68Besides, Louis XIV had no reason to doubt thegoodwilloftheSpanishking–atleastfromaformalpointofview.Infact,thekingofSpain sentnotonenor twobut three judge-commissioners entitled topunishandrepair any wrongdoing. Furthermore, French claims remained extremely vague.Reprisalswereonly legitimate if thevalueof the seizedgoodsdidnot surpass theclaimant'seconomic losses,andnoattemptwasmadetoquantifythevalueofthedamages. Finally, certain aggressivemeasures like themaritimeblockade, treatinghostages like prisoners of war, or the violent exclusion of Fonterabie from theBidasoacouldhardlybejustifiedasactsofreprisalintendedtoobtaincompensation.Infact,thedirectinterventionofthekingofFranceinanordinaryquarrelbetweenbordercommunitiesweremorelikelytobeperceivedasanactofwar.69

SincetherightofreprisalwasinsufficienttojustifytheFrenchactsofhostilityinthe Bidasoa, Louis XIV resorted to other legal arguments, namely the right ofretaliation. Unlike reprisal, there was no ambiguity in retaliation: it was anunequivocalactofaggressionandassuch itwassubject tothe lawsofwar.Whilereprisalsweremainlycompensatory,retaliationwasaboutpunishmentofaseriouswrongdoing. The final aimhoweverwas todeter theoppositeparty fromharmfulactionconsideredunacceptable.Inordertobeeffectivethetargetoftheretaliatoryacthad tobe clearly statedand theaggressionhad tobeproportional to theonepreviouslyenactedbytheenemy. Inthissenseretaliationwasa limitedactofwarwith a limited purpose: re-establishment of a certain status quo ante. Retaliatory

68ThePeaceofNijmegensignedbetweenSpainandFrancedidnotmakeanyexplicitmentiontotheBidasoaaffair,butthetreatyexplicitlystatedthatthePeaceofthePyreneescontinuedtobein force(Art.XXVI),Abreu,Coleccióndelostratadosdepaz[…]ReynadodelseñorreyD.CarlosII.ParteII,(Madrid:AntonioMarín,JuandeZúñigayviudadePeralta,Madrid,1752),p.347-8.TheSpanish negotiatiors at Nijmegen were specifically instructed to not permit any change withrespect to the statusquo in theBidasoa,AGS,Estado, leg.K-1670,nº152:minuta “Relacióndelprincipio que tuvieron las diferencias […] sobre el uso del río Vidasoa […] hasta el tiempopresenteconloqueSuMajestadharesueltoseobreenellaporlosplenipotenciariosdelapazenconsultade11deenerodeesteañode1676”.69Interestingly, according to theFrenchminister ofmaritimeaffairs, themissionof the flotillawas precisely “faire la guerre aux habitants de Fontarabie”, ANF, Marine, B 2 43, f. 200r-v:SeignelaytoMauclerc,St.Germain,14April1680.Thisapproachcausedsomeinitialconfusiontothe commander in charge of the maritime blockade, who was seriously reprimanded foracceptingthevalidityoflicencesandpassportsissuedbytheSpanishroyalauthority:“LeRoyaesté fortsurprisd'apprendrequevousayez laissépasser leschaloupesetbarqueschargéesdemunitions et vivres pour Fontarabie sous pretexte que les patrons estoient porteurs despasseportsdugouvernerdeGuipuscoa[…]nemanquezdoncpasd’executerponctuellementlesordersquevousavezreçueetnevousmeslezjamaisdelesinterpreter”,ANF,MarineB243,f.281v:SeignelaytoRoux,Fontainebleau,4June1680.

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actswere intendedtoceaseassoonastheenemystoppedhisharmfulbehaviour.Needless to say, French authorities' resort to this kind of justification wasproblematic.Ontheonehand,LouisXIVwasnotinterestedinthere-establishmentoftheoldorder intheBidasoa,but inthe impositionofanentirelynewonemorebeneficialfortheFrench.Fromalegalpointofview,therightofretaliationcouldnotbeusedtojustifysuchpretensions.Ontheotherhand,retaliationwasbydefinitiona response to a previous aggression –it presupposes a state of war or at least ofopen hostility.70That contradicted Louis XIV’s official declarations of friendship totheSpanishmonarchy.

Infact,itwasnotcleartowhichaggressionexactlyLouisXIVwasresponding.Hewasrathervagueinthisrespect.Eversince1679theFrenchaccusedFonterabieofcontinuouswrongdoings,abuses,andaggressionsbuttheywererarelyspecified. Itseemsthateveryincidentwasusedasapretextforretaliation,includingcustomaryenforcement of fishing and navigation rights. Since ordinary quarrels betweenborder communities could hardly justify such a disproportionate response, it wasnecessary topresentFonterabie’sactionsasarbitrarilyviolentand in factcriminal.AstensionsmountedthereweresomespecificcircumstancesthathelpedtheFrenchtojustifytheirharshtreatmentoftheSpanishbordercity.Themostseriousofthemwas the deployment of artillery. The use of “cannons” against the people ofHendaye, as the French put it, was considered an illegitimate aggression thatrequiredamilitaryresponse–that is, retaliation.71Needlesstosaytheaffairofthe“drowned men” was used as a confirmation of the criminal condition ofFonterabie,72but it is worth bearing in mind that the maritime blockade and thecaptureofprisoners,nottomentionaggressionsinotherfrontierterritories,beganwell before this incident.73The retaliatory argument was credible only insofar asFonterabie was presented as a cruel and powerful aggressor. Otherwise Frenchhostilitywouldbenothingmorethananarbitrarybreachofpeace.

The resort to reprisal and retaliationwas hardly justified but they weremorethan opportunistic pretexts for brute force. The criminalisation of FonterabiewasinstrumentalnotonlyinprovidingtheexcuseforarmedinterventionbutalsofortheadvancementofFrenchclaimsintheBidasoa.Frenchlegalargumentationwasbasedon the idea thatFonterabie’s jurisdictionwasunlawfulbecause itwas foundedonnakedforceonly.Thanksto itsmilitarysuperiorityFonterabiewouldhaveimposed

70Neff,WarandtheLawofNations,p.123-124.71AHN,Estado,libro628,f.16:ConsultaoftheWarCouncil,Madrid,26January1680,andf.139-141:MemorandumoftheMarquisofVillars.AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.238:ReportofLespesdeHeureauxontheBidasoaconferencesof23and26November1680.72“Jevousdespeschececourierexprespourvousinstruiredelaplusnoireetdelaplushorriblecruatutéquiaytjamaisestéexercéepurlesnationslesplusbarbares”,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.87r:LouisXIVtotheMarquisofVillars,Versailles17May1681.TheformalprotestoftheFrenchambassador in: AHN, Estado, libro 629, f. 99-100.His successor at the embassy, LaVauguyon,was specifically instructed by Louis XIV to demand an exemplary punishment for the culprits“d’unebarbariesiénorme”,AlfredMorel-Fatio,RecueildesinstructionsdonnésauxambassadeursetministresdeFrancedepuislesTraitésdeWestphaliejusqu'alaRévolutionFrançaise.XI.Espagne,(Paris:FélixAlcan,1894),t.I,p.312-3.73As the Duke of Osuna said, “que en Flandes no les han muerto ningunos vasallos y estánobrandoloqueobran”.Interestingly,OsunabelievedthatFonterabiewasactuallyguilty,AHN,E,libro629,f.216-238:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid2July1681(f.224r-v).

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its terms and conditions on the Bidasoa, while Hendaye and other bordercommunitiesweretooweakandtooscaredtocontesttheirclaimseffectively.Thisreasoning was not entirely new but it had never been used before as a legalargument. A French memorandum written at the beginning of the seventeenthcenturyconsideredFonterabie’spossesionoftheBidasoaillegitimatebecauseitwassupported only “by mere force and the law of arms” since the “Spanish” had“usurped” thewhole province ofGuipúzcoa from the king ofNavarre in 1200.74Italso refers to the threat of the Fonterabie and Behobia fortresses (the latterdemolishedacenturyearlier)fromwhichtheSpanishfiredtheircannonsagainstanyFrenchwhoapproached invesselswithakeel.Theauthorwasparticularly ironicalabout this point. According to him, the Spanish based their rightsmore on canonthan on civil law, due to the continuing gunshots (“continuelle canonades”) firedagainst the French –making puns with the French homonym words “cannon”(artillery) and “canon” (Church law).75Thememorandum seemed to bewritten toencourageHenry IV of France to take action in the Bidasoa at amomentwhen adeclaration of war against Spain seemed imminent. 76 A partial copy of thismemorandumwas among the papers of the historian François Eudes deMézeray(d.1683).77Thesameargumentwastimidlyre-proposedbytheFrenchambassadorduringthefailednegotiationsthatfollowedthePeaceofthePyrenees.78SomeyearslaterLouisXIVwouldbasehis strategy in theBidasoaonthesameprinciple.Fromthis point of view, retaliation against Fonterabie was justified not only by recenteventsbutalsobycenturiesofviolentoccupation.

FromastrictlyjuridicalpointofviewtheFrenchauthorities'reasoningremainedweak. In principle, rights of reprisal and retaliation were limited to obtainingcompensation for incurred losses and the restoration of a status quo ante. LouisXIV'saimsdidnotfitwellintothisdefinition.Apparentlyhispurposewassimplytojustify his right to the use of force to impose a new order instead of defendinglegitimateclaims ina lawfulmanner. In fact, theFrenchexplicitlyavoidedenteringinto any legal controversy. This approach caused some confusion to Lespes deHeureaux, the French commissioner sent to the Bidasoa.79As a loyal subject hesurelyhadnoreasontodoubthismaster'srightfulintention.ThisispreciselywhyhewaswillingtosupportLouisXIV’sclaimsonsolidlegalgrounds.MuchtohissurprisehereceivedaseriousreprimandforhavingagreedwiththeSpanishcommissionertoreview theproceedings andother legal instruments frompast negotiations.80Thatwas, of course, ordinary practice. Instead Lespes de Heureaux was specifically 74About this historical episode: Angel Canellas López, "De la incorporación de Guipúzcoa a laCoronadeCastilla",EnlaEspañaMedieval.EstudiosenmemoriadelProfesorD.SalvadordeMoxó,(Madrid:UniversidadComplutense,1982),II,p.11-20.75BNF, Ms. Occ., Ms. François 15846, f. 97-116: "Memoire touchant la Riviere de Bidasso quiseparelaFrancedancel’Espagne".76Antonio Eiras Roel, “Política francesa de Felipe III: Las tensiones con Enrique IV”,Hispania:RevistaEspañoladeHistoria,n°118(1971),245-336.77BNF,Ms.Occ.,MsFrançais20771,f.222r-224v:"RivièredeBidasso".78ChavarríaMúgica,“Lafronteraceremonial”,p.82.79AAE,CP,Espagne,f.185r-186v.80AAE, CP, Espagne, nº65, f. 201r-204r: Lespes de Heureaux to Croissy, Urrugne, 9 and 10October1680;f.226:D.FernandoRamírezdeAlcántaratoLespesdeHeureaux,Fonterabie,17November1680;and,f.233:LespesdeHeureauxtoCroissy,Urrugne,23November1680.

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instructedtosimplypresenttheFrenchdemandstotheSpanishauthoritiesandwaitfororders.81

LouisXIVdidnotpresentanyvalidprooftobackuphisclaims.ThatcouldpartlybeexplainedbytheinconsistencyofFrenchlegalarguments.Thetruthisthatmostof themwouldnot standup to scrutiny. Thatwasexactlywhathappened in1661when Francisco Ramírez de Prado, a respected jurist of the Council of Castile,demolishedtheallegationspresentedbytheformerFrenchambassadorinMadrid.82TheonlylegalinstrumentallegedbyLouisXIVtolegitimatehisactionsintheBidasoaduring the 1680s was the sentence dictated by his commissioners in 1667 andconfirmed by himself at the beginning of the following year once the War ofDevolution had already broken out. The sentence, however, was not a valid legaljustification because the jurisdiction of French judges did not extend to foreignterritory. In fact, Spanish commissioners had dictated a similar sentence assertingtheirownrightsthat,inturn,couldonlybeeffectiveintheirownterritory.Thiswascommonpracticeinbordercontroversies. Itwasawayofdeclaringthatbothsideswererightandthatneitherwouldrenouncetheirrespectiveclaims–inotherwords,itmeant that the border conflict remained unsettled. The only case in which theFrench sentence couldhave any legal effect over the Spanishwouldbe if, for anyreason,Spainfailedtoissueitsownsentence.AnexplicitrenunciationoftheSpanishcouldthenbeinterpretedasimplicitrecognitionoftheFrench.AndthatwasexactlyLouisXIV’slineofargument.Accordingtohim,Spanishcommissionershadfailedtodictatetheirsentenceindueform.83Thatwas,ofcourse,false.ThefinalstageoftheBidasoa negotiations of the 1660s was characterised by a lack of communicationbetween the respectivecommissioners,but thatdidnotprevent theSpanish fromactuallydictating theirownsentence.Obviously, theFrenchministersknewthat.84ThatiswhytheyprohibitedLespesdeHeureauxfromreviewingtheproceedingsofthe formercommissioners.85Otherwise theonly legal instrumentpresentedby theFrenchinsupportoftheirclaimswouldbeimmediatelyinvalidated.86

The same could be said with respect to the alleged violent possession of theBidasoa–whattheFrenchironicallycalled“cannonlaw”.Itistruethatenforcementof Fonterabie’s rights requireda certaindegreeof violence.Along the years therewere numerous acts of defiance by the people of Hendaye. Sometimes tensionscould leadtoviolentclashes.However,aswehaveseen,all these limitedconflictsweremanagedaccordingtocustomarylaw.ThetruthisthatFonterabie’sjurisdiction

81“SaMajesténevoulanpasquevousentrezdansladiscutiondesdroitsdepossessiondeceuxd’Andaye qui sont suffisament confirmez par le dit jugement duquel sa majesté ne veu passousbirquelsoitdonnélamoindreattente”,AAE,CP,Espagne,f.170-171v:CroissyaLespesdeHeureaux,Versailles,29September1680,andf.180y181:FaucondeRistoLespesdeHeureaux,Paris,5October1680.82ChavarríaMúgica,“Lafronteraceremonial”,p.80-82.83AAE, CP, Espagne, nº65, f. 20r-21v: LouisXIV toMarquis ofVillars, St. Germain, 30 January1680,[draftletter]84“MemoiredesaffairesqueleroyarecommandéesasesambassadeursenEspagneetquilsonttraitéesencettecourdepuislapaixdeNimeguejusqu’àlarupturaarrivéeaumoisdemars1689a l’exception de celles qui regardent le commerce”, AAE, CP, Espagne, nº 63, f. 165r-188v:“PeschesetnavigationdanslarivieredeBidassoa”,f.178v-181v.(“cahier”,p.26-30).85AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.128:LouisXIVtoLespesdeHeureaux,Calais,21July1680.86AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.209r-v:LespesdeHeureauxtoCroissy,Urrugne,19October1680.

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was not seriously questioned for a very long time. Obviously the relative Spanishmilitarysuperiorityattheborder(thankstoitsfortressandartillery)playedapartinthat.Buttheirpowerwasbackedbystronglegallegitimation:theyhadthewrittenconsentof theFrench.The rightsof Fonterabie in theBidasoawere foundedonaseries of bilateral settlements between the French and the Spanish established atthebeginningofthesixteenthcentury.Inotherwords,formorethanacenturyanda half the French had voluntarily accepted Fonterabie’s jurisdiction.87That is whypresentingallegationsbasedon theseagreements couldbe counter-productive. InthiscontextFonterabie'sactsofviolenceintheBidasoacouldonlybeinterpretedintwoways:aslegitimateenforcementofitsrights,orasabusiveenforcementofthesamerights.TheformerweresupposedlyprovokedbyHendaye’strespassing’s,andthe latter may have led to a right to compensation, but in neither case couldFonterabie’s right to enforce its jurisdiction be questioned. Only a systematicallydisproportionate and arbitrary use of force could delegitimize its status in theBidasoa. And that seems to have been the rationale behind Louis XIV’scriminalisationofFonterabie.IV.

TheescalationofLouisXIV’saggressionsandhisuseofthelanguageofreprisal,retaliation, and absolute sovereign power seemed to be a prelude to an officialresumptionofhostilities.CertainlyitwasnotonlytheBidasoathatwasatstake.Aswe have already said at the beginning of thiswork, French strategic priorities layelsewhere.Actually, thevastmajorityof LouisXIV’sactsofaggressionsduring thisperiod, includingsystematicpillage,violentoccupationsandunilateralannexations,werecommitted intheSpanishLowCountriesandtheRhineland.88Theargumentsused to justifyall theseaggressionswerenotverydifferent fromtheonesused intheBidasoa.89Reprisal,retaliation,andabsolutesovereignpowerwerethecommonlanguageofthepolitiquedesréunions.Thesentencesfromthechambresderéunion 87A fact acknowledged even by the French commissioner himself: “cette pernicieuse sentenceprovisionelledel'an1510laquelleadiugeaauxespagnolsl'usagedelariviereetnavigationavectoute sorte de vaisseaux et aux nostre seulement avec des batteaux sans quille”, AAE, CP,Espagne,nº67,f.9r-v:LespesdeHureauxtoCroissy,Urrugne,25January1681.88AccordingtoJeanmougin,justintheregionbetweentheMeuseandtheMosellerivers,around8,000squarekilometresofterritorywereannexed,hometotensofthousandsofinhabitants.Injust1680and1681the infamouschambrederéunionofMetz, themostactiveof thesespecialcourts, issued around fifty orders of annexation of different territories mostly in the Empire,includingthecountyofDeux-Ponts(Zweibrücken)belongingtotheKingofSwedenhimself,butsometimesalsointheSpanishLowCountries,likeinthecaseofthecountyofChinyintheduchyof Luxembourg. But some of the most remarkable annexations, like the réunions of the“Décapole” of Alsace and the annexation of the imperial city of Strasbourg (September 1681),took place by order of the Sovereign Council of Besançon. In other cases annexations wereconducted without recurring to any particular formality, a general overview in BertrandJeanmougin,LouisXIVàlaconquêtedesPays-Basespagnols.Laguerreoubliée,1678-1684, (Paris:Economica,2005).89“SongeromareparertouteslesviolencesquilsontexercéestantauxenvironcedeFontarabiequedansleLuxembourgmaiscommej’aydesjadonnélesordresnecessairespourmefairefaireraison sur cette derniere affaire je n’atendre aussy que le retour du Courier que je vous aydespeschépour faireressentirauxhabitansdeFontarabie lapeintequemerite leshostilitezetlescruautésquilsontexercécontremessujets”,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.293r-v:LouisXIVtoMarquisofVillars,St.Germain,7December1681.

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had the same functionas thedeclarationof theFrenchcommissioners in1667. Inboth cases these formalities were used as pretexts to trigger direct, armedintervention cloaked as regular enforcement of rulings by ordinary justice. Theywerealsobasedonthesamemethodsandthesameprinciples–onlyonadifferentscale.The judicialpronouncementattributedtheobjectofcontention (determinedbytheFrenchauthoritiesthemselves)totheKingofFrance(orhisvassals),whowasthenentitledtotakepossessionofthesaidterritoryandrightsclaimed.AtthispointLouisXIVwas“legitimised”tomakecompleteuseofhisabsolutesovereignpowertoenforce his authority and defend his rights against any “rebellious” or “foreign”interventioninaterritorythatwasnowformallyconsideredpartoftheKingdomofFrance.Whennecessary, thesameprinciplewasapplied to the implementationofthePeaceofNijmegen.Inthatcase,abiased,unilateral interpretationwasenoughtoresorttounilateralannexationofterritoriesor,ifdemandswerenotimmediatelymet,toreprisals.

The violence of the politique des réunions was not only juridical it was veryphysical too. The réunions were always conducted under threat of expropriation,imprisonment, and pillage. In all cases threats were backed by military force.Sometimesbullyingwasenoughtoforcefeudallordsandtownauthoritiestochangeallegiance. But frequently, as in the territories under sovereignty of the King ofSpain, feudatories and provincial governors refused to bend to French demands.However, in the face of superiormilitary forces and the explicit threat of generalreprisals they had no other option than to give up. Needless to say, formalprotestationsandjudicialallegationswerecompletelyuseless.Onthecontrary,anykind of resistance to French demands (which, as we have said, were formallypresentedassentencesorenforcementoftreatyclauses)wereutilisedtolegitimatefurther reprisals. When the General Governor of the Low Countries refused an“amicable”proposaltoexchangetherecentlyannexedcountyofChinyforanotherSpanish territory of “equivalent” value, Louis XIV responded by ordering theestablishmentofafulllandblockadeonLuxembourgthatlastedfortwoyears.90

Oddlyenough,LouisXIVcontinuedhisaggressionswithouteverdeclaringwar.91On thecontrary,hecontinued toaffirmhisgoodwill,hismoderatebehaviour,andevenhisloveforpeace.Obviously,hisactionscontradictedhiswords.Theescalationandspreadofhostilityalong theFrench frontiers seemed to indicatean imminentwar.92Infact,assoonasthespringof1680SpainsignedanalliancewiththekingofEngland.At theendof the sameyear theEstatesGeneralof theUnitedProvincesbegantoreconsidertheirpositionofneutrality.ThekingofSweden,offendedbythe

90Jeanmougin,LouisXIVàlaconquête,p.77-88.91AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.293r:LouisXIVtoMarquisofVillars,St.Germain,7December1681,and again, f. 302r-v: Louis XIV to Marquis of Villars, St. Germain, 4 January 1682: “comme laguerrequ’ilscroyentinevitableenFlandresn’estfondéequesurl’apprehensionqu’ilsenpeuventavoir, je sçauray bien aussy sans la recommencer punir les lieux coupables des violences ethostilitéscommisesetlesfairerepentirden’avoirpasdonnélajustesatisfactionquevousavezdemandédemapart”.92“On ne parle icy sire que de guerre, et l’on ne doute pas que la paix n’aye esté rompue enFlandres”.InthesamelettertheFrenchambassadoracknowledgesthereceptionofthenewsoftheannexationsofStrasbourgandCasale,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.261r-v:MarquisofVillarstoLouisXIV,Madrid13November1681.

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réunion of Deux-Ponts, abandoned his traditional alliancewith the French to signanotherwiththeDutch(October,1681).InFebruaryandMayof1682theEmperorand the King of Spain joined them.However, in spite of all this frantic diplomaticactivitythealliancefellapartquickly,victimofdomesticunrest,disparateinterests,andthe fearofFrenchretaliation (as in thecaseof theUnitedProvinces,England,and the German principalities), or major external threats (as in the case of theEmperor). In fact, the siege of Vienna by theOttomans and theHungarian revolt,secretlysupportedbyLouisXIV,divertedattentionfromtheFrenchfrontier.93WhentheinternationalsituationreachedadangerouspointtheSunKingsuddenlyrelaxedthepressure,creatingevenmoreconfusionamongtheallies.InMarch1682heputan end to the land blockade of Luxembourg and the maritime blockade ofFuenterrabía and announced the submission of all his claims to the arbitration ofKingCharlesIIofEngland.94TheSpanishpretendedtoaccepttheproposalbuttheyactuallyconsidered itanotherruse.After fewmonthstemporising,Croissygaveanultimatum tomeet hismaster’s demands. In the summer of 1683 a French armyagainenteredFlanders.Thistimetheydemandedanexorbitant100,000florinsfromthe local communities to avoid being ransacked. When the Spanish militaryauthorities began to authorise raids in reprisal, the French responded with newretaliatorymeasures.LouisXIVorderedattacksonSpanishstrongholdstopunishthestubbornoppositionoftheSpanishtohisofferings.Finally,theGovernorGeneralofthe Spanish Low Countries declared war on the King of France on 11 December1683.95

Thedeclarationofwarwasmotivatedbydesperationandsenseofhonourmorethanbyanymilitaryconcern.Theresultwascompletedisaster.Abandonedbytheirallies, the Spanish alone could not cope with French military superiority. For theFrench however, the War of the Reunions was the shortest and most successfulmilitary campaign of Louis XIV’s reign. The French concentrated their efforts onLuxembourg,whichwasfirstbombedandthenbesieged.AftersomeresistancethePrince of Chimay, governor of this important stronghold, was compelled tosurrender. Interestingly enough,war also extended to the distant Bidasoa border.This time, there was no agreement of bonne correspondance. As soon as thedeclaration of war was confirmed the military governor of Fonterabie fired hisartillery against the new fortifications that the French were building in Hendaye.Much to his surprise, the French responded with a massive shelling with mortarbombsthatdestroyeda largepartoftheSpanishcity.96It isworthbearing inmindthat therewasadifference in intentionbetweenthe twokindsofbombardments.

93 PhilippeRoy,LouisXIVetleSecondsiègedeVienne(1683),(Paris:HonoréChampion,1999).94AAE,CP,Espagne,nº68,f.29-30:LouisXIVtoCountofLaVauguyon,St.Germain,15February1681.Seealso:AAE,CP,Espagne,nº69, f.71,84,and105.OnthecontinuationofFonterabie’sblockade,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº68,f.137r-138v:LouisXIVtoLaVauguyon,21June1682.95Jeanmougin,LouisXIVàlaconquête,p.138-169.96Adescriptionof thebombingofFonterabie from thebeginningof theeighteenth century in:ANF,leg.M/658,nº63:"Fontarabie.RenvoisoumemorieabregésurlavilledeFontarabierelatifaudeuxplansdecetteplace”(maplegend:“50.Redoutteoufortd'Andayebastyen1682”).Seealso:SerapioMúgica,MonografíahistóricadelavilladeIrún, (Irún:ViudadeB.Valverde,1903),p. 148-9, and Carlos Rilova,MarteCristianísimo:guerraypazen la fronteradelBidasoa(1661-1714),(Irún:AyuntamientodeIrún,1999),p.50-1.

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While ordinary artillery was designed to fire horizontally against walls or specifictargets,mortars(whichdevelopeddramaticallyduringthisperiod)werespecificallyconceived to fire explosive or incendiary bombs in a parabolic manner.97Sincemortarbombswerefiredfrommuchlongerdistancesandtheywerenotasaccurateas ordinary artillery, from a strictly military point of view they were not veryeffective against walls and fortifications –at that time their main purpose was tocause thegreatestdamageandspreadhavocamong thepopulation.98As it iswellknown,duringthisperiodtheFrenchmadeextensiveuseofthiskindofweapon.InamatterofmonthstheSpanishwereforcedtosignadishonourabletruce.

The Truce of Ratisbon was signed in 15 August 1684. French demands wereaccepted unconditionally.99 The terms were harsh. As expected, the strategicstronghold of Luxembourg remained in Louis XIV’s hands by right of conquest.Moreover,theKingofSpainwasforcedtorecognisealltheréunionsmadebefore30August1683–inpractice,almostthetotalityofthem.Fromalegalpointofviewthisfactwasofveryseriousconsequence.Itwasnotonlyaboutterritoriallosses.BythismeansthearbitraryjustificationsandviolentmethodsusedbyLouisXIVtoadvancehis claims became legitimised. In practical terms the politique des réunions wasequatedtoiusvictorium–therightofconquestthatawaitedthevictorofajustwar.Accordingtotheagreement,fromthenonwardstheréunionswouldbeconsideredlegal and honourable territorial acquisitions just as if they were taken from theenemyduringwartime insteadofbeing snatched froma friendbycoercivemeansduringpeacetime.FortunatelyfortheSpanishmonarchy,theagreementwasonlyatruce,meaningitwasonlyaprovisoryagreementintendedtolastfortwentyyearsthatdidnothavethesamelegalstatusasaformalpeacetreaty.

ThetrucehoweverdidnotsatisfyallFrenchclaims.TheBidasoaaffairremainedunsettled.ToFonterabie’sdismay,withthearrivalofthespringanewFrenchflotillaanchored in front of its harbour.100After some days of tense expectation a newviolent incident triggered a newwave of reprisals.101The French ships tookmore

97About the technological development of mortar bombs in this period: Michel Blay, "LedeveloppementdelabalistiqueetlapratiquedujetdebombesenFrancealamortdeColbert"inDelamortdeColbertalarevocationdel'editdeNantes:unmondenouveau?,ed.byLouiseGodardde Donville (Marseille: CentreMéridional de Rencontres sur le XVIIe siècle, 1985), 33-51, andJeanPeter,L’artillerieetlesfonderiesdelamarinesousLouisXIV,(Paris:Economica,1995).98Chevalier de Saint-Julien,Laforgedevulcainoul'apareildesmachinesdeguerre, (TheHague:GuillaumedeVoys,1710),68-69and77-78. Seealso:Guillaume leBlond,L’ArtillerieraisonnéecontenantlaDescriptionetl’Usagedesdifférentesbouchesàfeu,aveclesprincipauxmoyensqu’onaemployés pour les perfectionner, la Théorie et la Pratique des Mines, et du Jet des Bombes, etl’Essentieldetoutceque l’Artillerieadeplus intéressantdepuis l’inventionde laPoudreàcanon,(Paris:Charles-AntoineJombert,1761),p.157-8and221-3.99Jeanmougin,LouisXIVàlaconquête,p.177-188.100AHN, Estado, libro 630, f. 1-8: Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid, 18 May 1685. Theflotillawas composedby three small frigates (36cannonsand150crewmen), and itwouldbereinforced with four ships “que llaman travesones”, and several pinnaces and armed boats(chalupas),AHN,Estado,libro630,f.176-177:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,19June1685,andf.264-271:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,30June1685.101AHN,Estado,libro630,f.23-41:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,29May1685,andf.94-95:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,25May1685.

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prisoners and re-established the maritime blockade.102The people of Fonterabie,humiliatedandbadlydamagedbytherecentbombings,wereincompletedespair.103UnderthiscircumstancetheSpanishministershadnootherchoicethantobowtoLouisXIV’sdemands.104Asamatteroffact,theSpanishministershadalreadybeenthinking about giving up for some time.105In the Autumn of 1680 Croissy hadproposedliftingthemaritimeblockadeiftheSpanishagreedtodiscusspossessionoftheBidasoa.106HisonlyconditionwasthatthepeopleofHendayeenjoyedtheriverfreely during the duration of the negotiations. The Spanishministers realized thattheonlywayofrelaxingthepressureoverFonterabiewasacceptingCroissy’soffer,eveniftheyknewthat“negotiation”wasaeuphemismfor“concession”.Themajorconcernswerehowtominimisethelegalconsequencesoftheagreement.ItwasinthiscontextthattheCouncilofState,thehighestpoliticalinstitutionoftheSpanishmonarchy (where major decisions were taken), asked the Council of Castile (thehighestjuridicalinstitutionoftheSpanishmonarchy)foradvice.Thejurists'answerwas verydisappointing: they limited themselves to re-affirmingFonterabie’s rightsbasedonthelegalargumentsalreadyknown.Accordingtothem,sincethelawwasonthesideoftheKingofSpainnootheranswerwaspossible.107WhattheCouncilofCastileseemednottounderstandisthatthekinghadbeenforcedtorenouncehisexclusive jurisdiction in theBidasoaandbadlyneededaconvenient justification topresenthisdecisionpublicly.Itwasnotaboutbeingrightanymore,butaboutsavingtheking’shonour. The twodisparateapproachesof theCouncilofCastileand theCouncilofStatearesymptomaticofthestateofconfusioncreatedbythepolitiquedesréunions.

Atthattimenofinaldecisionwastakenbecausewarseemedimminent.108Inthespringof1685thesituationwascompletelydifferent.TheSpanishwerefinallyreadytomakeconcessions,buttheystillraisedmanyobjections.109Croissytriedtospeed

102AHN,Estado,libro630,f.119-120:“Extraictd’uneletterdeM.deBoufflersdeBayonnele24eMay1685”103Again the major concern was to prevent a violent, desperate reaction by the people ofFonterabie,AHN,Estado,libro630,f.9-12:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid22May1685.However,Fonterabieacknowlegedhisimpotence,AHN,Estado,libro630,f.176-7:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,19June1685.104“Razonamiento desynteressado”,memorandum presented by the French ambassador, AHN,Estado, libro 630, f. 474, and the consulta of the Council of State,Madrid, 28 Julio 1685, AHN,Estado,libro630,f.340v-341v.105AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.42r-43r:MarquisofVillarstoLouisXIV,Madrid6Mars1681.106AHN,Estado,libro628,ff.522-526:ReportoftheMarquisofLaFuente,Spanishambassadorin France, for theKing of Spain about hismeetingswith Colbert de Croissy, Paris, 13October1680.107AHN,Estado,libro629,f.449-454:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,2December1681.ThecommissionerFernandoRamírezdeAlcántarawasalsoagainstanyconcessiontotheFrenchintheBidasoabecauseitwouldcauseirremediabledamagetoFonterabie’srights,AHN,Estado,libro629,f.13-18:FernandoRamírezdeAlcántaratotheKingofSpain,Fonterabie,12January1681.108AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.296v-299v:MarquisofVillarstoLouisXIV[encripted]109Oneofthemainconcernswasthataneventualdivisionoftheriverintwohalveswouldleavethe symbolically important isle of Pheasants (the islet in which the royal ceremonies werestaged) on the French side, opening the door to a retrospective interpretation of the royalencounterof1660asanactofsovereignassertionbytheFrench,AHN,Estado,libro630,f.460-

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up theprocess by threatening “with accustomed force and exaggeration” (“con lafuerzayexageraciónacostumbradas”)tothrow“fourorfivethousandbombs”overFonterabieiftheycontinuedtorefuseLouisXIV’sdemands.110TheFrenchdemandeda formal declaration in writing officially confirmed by the twomonarchs –that is,somethingverysimilartoanofficialtreaty.EveniftheSpanishcouldnotrefusethisrequest,theymadeeverypossibleefforttoavoidjuridicalterminologyandformalityinordertomaketheagreementappearasunofficialaspossible.ThiswasnotwhattheFrenchintended.111AfterlongnegotiationsattheFrenchcourt,thefinalversiontooktheformofanamicableagreementvalidfortwentyyears,justliketheTruceofRatisbon. 112 Border communities were practically absent of the negotiationprocess.113In fact, Fonterabie refused any contact with Hendaye if not directlyordered by the King himself.114In the end, Louis XIV obtained exactly what hewanted–atleasttemporarily.HendayegainedaccesstotheriverinequaltermswithFonterabie. Inspiteof itall, it isnotveryclearwhatadvantageLouisXIVobtained,apart from humiliating the Spanish monarchy. The new French fortificationcontinued to be too modest to constitute a real military threat. The situation ofHendayeitselfseemednottohavechangedsignificantly.Itcontinuedtobewhatitalwayshadbeen:asmallfishingvillage.

As a matter of fact reprisals continued in other border contexts, like in themountains of Navarre, not far away from Fonterabie. 115 However during the 1:VoteoftheDukeofAlbaintheCouncilofState,Madrid7October1685;similarconcernswerepreviouslyexpressedbyD.VicenteGonzaga,Madrid,28July1685,f.321-27.110AHN,Estado,libro630,ff.593-594:ReportoftheMarquisofLosBalbasestotheKingofSpain,Paris7October1685.111Significantly,theFrenchversionoftheBidasoaagreementwasprintedandlaterincludedonthe official diplomatic collection of Frédéric Léonard, Recueil des Traitez de Paix, de treve, deneutralité,deconfederation,d'alliance, etdecommerce, faitspar les roisdeFrance,avec tous lesprinces,etpotentatsdel'Europe,etautres,depuispresdetroissiecles, (Paris:Léonard, imprimeurduRoietdeMonseigneurleDaufin,1693),IV,s.f.:ConventionfaiteentreleMarquisofFeuquieres,et leMarquisofLosBalbazes.Pour la libertéde laPesche, etde laNavigationdans laRivieredeBidassoa, en faveur des Sujets de SaMajesté, et de ceux du Roi d'Espagne, avec toutes sortes deVaisseaux,sansdistinction(datedin1683insteadof1685–obviouslyatypo).Ontheotherhand,theSpanishversionoftheagreementwasneverprinted.112A preliminary agreementwas achieved bymid-October, AHN, Estado, libro 630, f. 543-550and 558-560; however, the French introducedmany corrections, AGS, Estado, leg. K-1652, nº117,119-122,133,and135.113AHN, Estado, libro 628, f. 130: Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid, 12May 1680. TheCountofChinchóndisapprovedtheagreementbecausehethougtitwouldprovokeFonterabie’srebellion, AHN, Estado, libro 630, f. 317-327, Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid 28 July1685. However, Fonterabie accepted the agreement with few minor objections, AHN, Estado,libro630,f.686-7,ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,24November1685.Aftertheofficialapprovaloftheagreementthetwobordercommunitieswereorderedtodiscussonthegroundthe implementationofsomeminor issues like there-deploymentof fishing-traps, "ArtículosdelosvezinosdeEndayaydelosdeFonterabieconbenidosamigablementeentresíparaentretenerenadelanteunabuenayntelijenciaenexecussiondeltratadoechoenMadridentrelascoronasdeEspañayFrançiaparaelusodelríoVidasoadevajodelbuengustodelosreyesysinperjudiciaraldichotratadonialderechodelascoronasnialosderechosdelosparticularesdelaunayotrapartequepuedanpretenderytodosloscapítulosseandeentenderdurantelatregua”,signed"inthemiddleoftheBidasoariver”,20December1685,AHN,Estado,libro630,f.831-2.114AHN,Estado,libro630,f.301-8.115AAE,CP,Espagne,nº69,f.285:“CopiedestroismémoiresdonnézaM.deLosBalbases,le23fevrier1686”.

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following years there was no significant violence in the Bidasoa, even if tensionspersisted. Some incidents in particular sparked strong protests by the Frenchambassador.116Nonetheless, this time Louis XIV reacted withmoderation. At thatmomentamuchmoreimportantissuedemandedhisattention.ThealreadydelicatehealthofKingCharles IIofSpainwasworseningandeverything suggested thathewould die without an heir. That made of Louis XIV a plausible candidate for thesuccession to the Spanishmonarchy. Thenew scenario required a newdiplomaticapproachtoSpain,butdespitesomeeffortsinthisdirectiontheFrenchkingdidnotdevelopaconsistentstrategypracticallyuntiltheendoftheNineYearsWar.117V.

As we have already said, the period after 1679 is traditionally considered aturning point in Louis XIV’s reign. The réunions are normally presented in anambivalentwayasevidenceofthegreatpowerachievedbytheSunKingbutalsoofhisarrogance.ItwasthenwhenplansweremadetoimplementalargecoalitiontoopposeFrance'sbidforEuropeanhegemony.However,this“grandalliance”,knownastheLeagueofAugsburg,didnotmaterialiseuntilafterLouisXIV’sexpulsionoftheHuguenots fromFrance in1685, anddidnotopenhostilitiesuntil 1689,when theFrench had already occupied and ravaged the Palatinate. Nine years later, after alongandcostlywar,thePeaceofRyswick(1697)re-establishedthestatusquoante.Louis XIV was compelled to renounce all réunions and past conquests –with theimportantexceptionofStrasbourg.Fromthisperspective,themainconsequenceofthepolitiquedesreunionswastheencouragementofpreliminaryrealignmentsandrapprochementsamongtheEuropeanpowerstokeepnewFrenchambitionsatbay.Nonetheless, there were also other repercussions at a deeper level that wentbeyond the contingent world of diplomatic relations. After all, there was nothingparticularly exceptional in the formation of alliances to counter the rise of athreateningpower.ItcouldbesaidthatthiswasactuallyanintrinsiccharacteristicoftheEarlyModernEuropean“international”system.Inourviewthedisturbingeffectsof Frenchpowerpolitics during the 1680s cannot beproperly understandwithouttakingintoaccountitssubtlerlegalimplicationsatvariouslevels.

Asamatteroffact,thepolitiquedesréunionsallowedforthecontinuationofalow-profilewarwithoutthecostsandrisks inherenttoageneralconfrontation–as

116Therewere two serious incidents.The first almostput an abrupt end to thenegotiations: arogue-shot fired from the Spanish side almost hit commander Boufflers while accompanyingVauban along Hendaye’s riverside, AHN, Estado, libro 630, f. 687v-689, see also: the Duke ofCanzanototheDukeofCanales,SanSebastián,20October1685,AHN,Estado,libro630,f.708-709;Marquisof theBalbases toCrispínBotello,Madrid,1December1685,AGS,Estado, leg.K-1652,nº131;and,ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,14February1686,AHN,Estado,libro631,f.117-121.OnemoretimetheKingofSpainwascompelledtosendajudge-commissionertoinvestigatethisincident(againwithnoresult),AntoniodeArgüellestoCrispínGonzálezBotello,Fonterabie3February1686,AHN,Estado, libro631, f.130-1.Thesecondserious incidentwasprovokedbythedivisionoftwowhalesin1688,AGS,Estado,leg.K-1657,Nº60-61,84,and99.117ThebombingofFonterabiewasofcourseindeepcontradictionwithLouisXIV’saspirationtobeelectedsuccessortotheSpanishcrown,Lossky,LouisXIV,p.178-9.AbouttheargumentsandstrategiesusedbyFrenchdiplomacytoconvincetheSpaniardsseeAlvarez,Lafabricacióndeunimaginario.

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LouisXIVhadexperiencedduringtheDutchWar.118However,italsojeopardisedthefundamentaldistinctionbetweenwarandpeace.Thisdistinctionwas judiciallyandpoliticallyrelevant.TheSunKingwasalreadystronglycriticisedforhisdubiouslegalarguments in favour of declaring theWar ofDevolution against Spain in 1668; hewas again criticised for declaring war against the Dutch Republic without evenprovidinganylegalpretext.119However,inspiteofitallnobodycoulddenytheKingofFrance'srighttomakewarindefenceofwhathethoughtwererightfuldemands–even ifhis justificationswere feeble.Warwasa sovereignprerogative reserved torulerswhodidnot recognizeanyearthly superiorandhencecouldnot resort toahigherauthoritytodecidetheirdisputes.Ofcourse,itwasexpectedthatajustandChristian king would defend his rights by amicable means and well-foundedarguments.But ifdiplomacy,arbitration,andformalprotestfailedhehadtherightto resort to war – which in the earlymodern period continued to be consideredsimplyas“thecontinuationoflitigationbyothermeans”.120Ifwarwasconductedin“due form” the victorious side was entitled to claim attribution of the object ofcontention (by lawof conquestor ius victorium). Everybodyagreedon that.Whatwas unprecedentedwas Louis XIV's hybrid combination ofwarlike hostility duringpeacetime, coercive diplomacy, legal arbitrariness, and a complete disdain forcompromise,reciprocity,andproportionality.Byrefusingaformaldeclarationofwarwhile carryingout continuous actsof aggression, Louis XIVwasprecludinghimselffromthepossibilityoflegitimatinghisannexationsbyiusvictorium.Instead,inorderto maintain the appearance of peace he was compelled to justify his continuedresort to force with dubious legal arguments that make him appear as a tyrant.Ironically,thedesperatedeclarationofwarofSpainattheendof1683allowedtheFrenchtoformallylegitimise(atleasttemporarily)theirusurpationsintheTruceofRatisbon.

Themost scandalous aspect of the politique des réunions was not the use ofviolence per se, but the abuse, fabrication and sophisticated manipulation ofestablished legal principles, conventions, and customs to justify the arbitrary,unilateral advancement of Louis XIV’s claims by force during peacetime. In fact,French power politics was not only a threat for European peace, as is commonlyacknowledged, but also for the very concept of ius gentium –that is, theinternational legal order as understood by EarlyModern statesmen. Thepolitiquedes réunions consciously ignored or debased basic principles established by bothcustomary law and formal conventions that regulated relations among sovereignprincesinbothwarandpeace.

Louis XIV debased the legitimacy of negotiation, arbitration or litigation asordinarywaystosettledisputesoratleasttofindworkableagreementspeacefully.When required, he complied with the established custom of appointingcommissioners to deal with foreign homologues concerning local controversies or 118Carl J. Ekberg, The Failure of Louis XIV’s DutchWar, (Chapel Hill: The University of NorthCarolinaPress,1979).119Paul Sonnino, LouisXIVandtheoriginsoftheDutchWar (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1988)120JeremyBlack,EuropeanWarfare,1494-1660,(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2002),p.22.Wagingwarwas actually a key concept in the articulationofKingship, Joël Cornette,LeRoideguerre.EssaisurlasouverainetédanslaFranceduGrandSiècle,(Paris:Payot,1993).

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the implementation of specific peace clauses on the ground.121 However, heimmediately emptied these conferences of any content, like in the case of theFrenchcommissioners in theBidasoaand theconferenceofCourtrai following thePeace of Nijmegen of 1679.122Louis XIV’s refusal of any amicable settlement wasgenerallytheresultofaskewed,unilateralinterpretationofclausesandclaimsthatmade compromise pointless. The French ministers substituted negotiation with avery disturbing mix of explicit threats, continuous ultimatums, and expedientmethods with the only purpose of forcing immediate recognition of Louis XIV’sclaims.Thismethodwasusedindistinctlyagainstroyalofficialsandlocalauthorities.

This attitude was ordinarily accompanied by an exalted interpretation of thesuperiorityoftheabsolutesovereignpowerofFrenchmonarchs.Thisalsohaddeeplegalimplications.Ontheonehand,thesentencesofannexation(arrêtderéunion)werebasedpreciselyontheprinciplethatsovereigntywasimprescriptiblenomatterthecircumstancesorthelapseoftime,evenifthatimpliedaninfringementofothermonarchs' absolute sovereign power. On the other hand, total superiority ofsovereign power was also used to justify direct intervention in local affairs, thusdebasing legalborderorders largelybasedoncustomaryarrangements.LouisXIV'sviolentimpositionofaneworderintheBidasoaunderminedunderlyingprinciplesoftrust, reciprocity and mutual recognition that prevailed between bordercommunities.ThatbecameparticularlyevidentwiththereluctanceofFonterabietoparticipate in the agreements of bonne correspondance of 1668 and 1674, itscomplete refusal in 1684, and the many restrictions imposed by the Spanishmonarchybetween1690and1694.123

Clearly, there was something troubling about Louis XIV’s policies that wentbeyond ordinary diplomatic and military concerns. His continuous, arbitrary, anddisproportionate aggressions were an invitation to other powers to act the sameway. 124 Even more troubling was Louis XIV’s systematic exploitation andmanipulationofexistinglegalcontradictions,uncertainties,andloopholesatvariouslevels.Although,Frenchministersavoidedanyformofformal litigation,theymadeanextensiveuseofjudicialreasoning.Theiraimnonethelesswasnottobuildwell-foundedargumentstobacktheirclaims,butmoresimplytofindpretextstopromptunilateral, and frequently violent, action –as in the case of the criminalization of 121About the role of these “micronégociations” in the diplomatic practice of the time: LucienBély,L’artdelapaixenEurope.Naissancedeladiplomatiemoderne,XVIè-XVIIIèsiècle,(Paris:PUF,2007),p.328-333.122Jeanmougin,LouisXIVàlaconquête,p.21-24.123ChavarríaMúgica,“Porcodiciaonecesidad”.124That is exactly what happened during the Nine Years War when the so-called “maritimepowers” (England and theDutchRepublic) extended theirmaritime blockade on France to allneutralorevenalliedvesselsthatmaintainedanytradewiththeenemy,allegingthatLouisXIVwasdoingexactlythesame.AspartofthisstrategytheypressuredtheSpanishgovernmentintoforbiddingthecustomarytreatiesofbonnecorrespondanceattheBasqueborderregion.Thiswasofcourseaseriousbreachingofthelawofnationsnotonlybecauseitimpliedtotreateveryoneasanenemy,butalsobecause it supposed the infringementof formalorcustomarynavigationtreaties,thearbitraryinvalidationofpassportsandlicences,andevenseriousprejudicestoownvassals. From the Basque point of view it was also a breach of natural law since the initialpurpose of bonne correspondance was guarantying an affordable supply of basic foodstuffs(generallyimportedfromFrance).ForallthesereasonstheSpanishMonarchyrefusedtoadheretothisstrategy,ChavarríaMúgica,“Porcodiciaonecesidad”.

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Fonterabie,orthemanyjudicialrulings issuedbythechambersofréunionofMetzand the Sovereign Councils of Brisach and Besançon justifying the annexation ofparticularterritories inFlandersandtheRhineland.Frenchministersmadea loose,arbitraryuseoflocalcustoms,feudallaw,antiquarianism,andgeneralprinciplesofius commune when convenient, but they were always ready to neglect them atwill.125Ultimately, itwas force thatmadeprevail Louis XIV’s rights. In doing sohedebasedtheestablishedpracticeofformallitigationbasedonthepresentationandvalidationofwrittenlegalinstruments.

At the heart of the French attitude lay an interpretation of the lawof nationsthat contradicted well-established conventions. In this sense the argumentationgivenbyCroissy,LouisXIV’sministerofforeignaffairs,totheSpanishambassadorinaseriesofconversationsheldintheautumnof1680isveryrevealing.126WhentheMarquis of la Fuente asked him to stop coercive measures in order to permitcommissioners to settle the Bidasoa dispute peacefully, “it being impossible thatjustice and violence concur at once” (“siendo imposible concordar a un mismotiempolajusticiaylaviolencia”),hesimplyansweredthathewoulddosoassoonasthe Spanishmet all his demands. Clearly, he was not interested in seeking a fairsettlement or entering into negotiations, but in imposing a diktat. Moreinterestingly, he elaborated a justification for the use of force to explain recentdevelopmentsintheBidasoa–andpresumablyalsointherestofEurope.AccordingtoCroissy,incontroversiesasoldastheoneabouttheBidasoaborder,whereitwaspracticallyimpossibletopresentunquestionabletitlesofpossession,theattributionof rights was based uniquely on the dynamic relation of forces between the twoopposite sides over time. If until that moment Fonterabie enjoyed a privilegedposition it was precisely because for a long time its superiority could not becontested.ButsincetheFrenchwerenowunquestionablymorepowerful,theywereentitledtoimposenewtermsandconditionsintheBidasoa.Interestinglyenough,insaying this the minister subverted the meaning of the “cannon law” argumenttraditionally used to delegitimize the Spanish side. In his view, Fonterabie’s rightswere illegitimate not because of his violent possession but because of his lack ofstrength tomaintainhis hegemonicposition. This answerwentbeyond the crude,cynical views ordinarily attributed to Croissy and Louvois.With this statement, hewas declaring null the established legal order between nations, the ius gentiumbased entirely on customs and conventions as was practised by statesmen, andreplaceditwithasortof“mechanistic”stateofnature.Apparently,inCroissy’sviewtherewasnocontradictionbetweenjusticeandviolence.

Vauban,thechiefengineerandseniormilitaryadvisorofLouisXIV,hadalreadyformulatedthedoctrinethatmilitarysuperioritywassufficienttolegitimateFrenchclaims,manyyearsbeforeCroissydidso.InaletteraddressedtoLouvoisinAugust1668hewholeheartedlyrecommendedignoringtherecentlysignedPeaceofAix-la- 125Interestingly, Lespes de Hureaux recurred to the same kind of pseudo-legal, antiquarianargumentation used by the chambrederéunions of Metz to justify an eventual réunion of theprovince of Guipúzcoa (or, at least part of it) alleging some rights supposedly enjoyed by theancientsViscountsofLabourdintheXIcentury!,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº67,f.395v-396v:LespesdeHureauxtoCroissy,Bayonne,31December1681.126AHN,Estado,libro628,ff.522-526:ReportoftheMarquisofLaFuentefortheKingofSpain,Paris,13October1680.

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ChapelletotakethetownofCondé,thusopportunisticallyprolongingthelegalityofthe laws of war to peacetime.127Once the town was captured, the enemy'sallegations would be of no consequence because the object of contention wouldalready be in the king’s hands (“vous plaiderez mains garnies”). Vauban used asophisticated metaphor to justify his proposal. According to him, there were nomoreequitablejudgesforhisrightfulclaimsthanthecannons,becausetheydidnotlose time and could not be corrupted. If the kingwanted to obtain swift and fairjusticehe shouldnominate themasarbiters.He shouldnot trust anyother judge.This was a strong statement for various reasons. Traditionally just wars wereconsideredakindofarbitrationtodecidedisputesbetweensovereigns.Inthissensebattlegroundswerelikecourtsofjusticepresidedoverbythemost“equitable”ofalljudges:Godhimself.Theoutcomeofadecisivebattleorsiegewasequivalenttoajudicial ruling issuedbyDivineProvidence–or, inMachiavellian terms,byFortune,an equally uncontrollable and hence “equitable” force. Vauban substituted theinscrutablejudgementofHeavenwiththelargelypredictablejudgementofcannons.By denying the validity of an officially approved peace treaty, he extended thejurisdiction of cannons beyond the battlefield. Vauban’s ideas had very disturbingimplications.Theelevationofcannonstothesuperiormoralcategoryofjudges,bothinpeaceandwartime,impliedthatmilitarysuperioritywasenoughtolegitimatetheuseof forceatany time.From thispointof view,and for the same reason,peacetalks and negotiations, inwhich therewas no place for judge-cannons,were seenmoreashindrancestojusticethanaslegitimatewaystosettledisputes.

Vauban’spositiveconsiderationof“cannons”isparticularlysignificantbecauseitmarkedadeepcontrastwith the traditional viewofartilleryasan intrinsicallyeviland dishonourable, even if useful and necessary instrument of war. Loathing theinventionofartillerywasacommonthemeinRenaissanceliterature.128However,bythe end of the seventeenth century this perception had changed dramatically.Thanks to the new prestige acquired by the natural sciences and the mechanicalphilosophy, cannons and other war machines began to be considered inventionsworth of praise.129This was due partly to the development of the study ofballistics.130Artillerybegantobeseennotasmerepracticalactivitybutasascience

127"Prenons Condé sans faire tant de cérémonies: quinze jours de temps en feront l'affaire, etaprèscela,vousplaiderezmainsgarnies. Iln'yapointde jugespluséquitablesque lescanons,ceux-làvontdroitaubutetnesontpointcorruptibles;faitesqueleroilesprennepourarbitres,s'ilveutavoirbonneetbrièvejusticedesesjustesprétentions.Dansl'étatoùilest,tousautresjugesluidoiventêtresuspects.",VaubantoLouvois,[s.l.]13August1668,inRousset,HistoiredeLouvois,vol.I,p.158-9.128See for example the entries “Arcabuz” and “Artilleria” in SebastiándeCovarrubiasHorozco,Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española, (Madrid: Luís Sánchez, 1611), f. 83r-84r and 93v,respectively.129Saint-Julien,Laforgedevulcain,p.1-2.Seealsotheentry“Artillerie”inDenisDiderotandJeanle Rond d’Alembert, Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et desmétiers,(BernandLausanne: SociétésTypographiques,1781),p. 561and563.On the considerationofmachines in general see Gérard Simon, “Les machines au XVIIe siècle: usage, typologie,résonancessyboliques”,RevuedesSciencesHumaines,v.LVIII,nº186-187(1982),9-31.130Domenico Bertolini Meli, Thinking with Objects: The Transformation of Mechanics in theSeventeenthCentury,(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2006),pp.202-204.

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thatcouldbesystematisedfollowingtheprinciplesofphysicsandgeometry.131Thenew prestige of the artillery can be assessed in Louis XIV’s appointment of theengineerandmathematicianFrançoisBlondelas instructorof theGrandDauphinewiththespecificpurposeofteachinghimmathematicsandgeometry.Blondelwastheauthorofafamoustreatyonbombshelling(L’artdejetterlesbombes,Langlois,Paris, 1683), which he dedicated to the Sun King. In fact, during this period theFrencharmedforces,bothbylandandbysea,excelledinthe“artofshelling”,andLouisXIVrecurredfrequentlytothisexpedientwhenhewantedtopunishanenemycity–asFonterabieexperiencedinhisownflesh.

Interestingly, French power politics addressed in practical terms some of thephilosophical and moral concerns at the core of seventeenth-century intellectualdebates. In particular, there were two major legal questions that sparked vividdebateamong contemporary thinkers.On theonehand, theunclear statusof thecustomary ius gentium in relation with the ius naturale, and on the other, theambiguous relation between the concepts of law, justice, and force. It iscommonplaceincurrenthistoriographytoapproachthesetopicsthroughthestudyof a short list of canonical texts. In many respects, our knowledge of the EarlyModernlawofnationscontinuestobearticulatedaroundagenealogicalnarrativeofintertextual references with little connection with the actual political, legal, andculturalpracticesofthetime.132Thatexplainstheenduringdividebetween,ontheone hand, practitioners of Political and Military History, and on the other hand,historiansofEarlyModernPoliticalandLegalThought.Iamnotgoingtodiscussherethemany complexities of this issue.What I would like to stress instead it is thatauthors like Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, or Leibniz were trying to respond to thedeepcrisisofauthorityinwhichthetraditionalconceptofiusgentiumhadfallen.133That means that a correct understanding of the Law of Nations during theseventeenthcenturyshouldbeginwiththeanalysisoftheroleplayedbyimportantagentslikeLouisXIVindefiningandchallengingcontemporarycustomarybehaviouramongsovereigns–insteadoftheotherwayaround.ThisseemstohavealsobeentheopinionofsuchrelevantfiguresasLeibnizandPufendorf,sincetheydedicatedalargepartoftheirintellectualeffortstowritelibelsandotherpoliticalworksintheserviceoftheirrespectivemasters–someofthem,aswehaveseen,withtheexplicitpurposeofcounterLouisXIV’sambitions.

The author who betters explained the serious consequences of Louis XIV’sdoctrine of power politics was one of his most fervent critics: G.W. Leibniz.134A 131F.Blondel,L’artdejetterlesbombes, (Paris:NicolasLanglois, 1683),premierepartie, livre I,chapitreIII,p.7-9.M.Virol,Vauban,p.42-48.132ArecentexampleisNeff,WarandtheLawofNations.Aboutthisseethebook-reviewbyDavidA.BellinTheJournalofModernHistory,80,2,(2008),380-2.133JanSchröder, “TheConceptof (Natural)Law in theDoctrineofLawandNaturalLawof theEarly Modern Era”, in Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis (eds.), Natural Law and Laws ofNatureinEarlyModernEurope.Jurisprudence,Theology,MoralandNaturalPhilosophy,(Farnham:Ashgate, 2008), 57-71. Randall Lesaffer, “Peace treaties from Lodi toWestphalia”, in Lesaffer(ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in European History from the Late Middle Ages toWorldWarOne,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),9-44.134 PatrickRiley,Leibniz’UniversalJurisprudence:JusticeandtheCharityoftheWise, (CambridgeMA: Harvard University Press, 1996); André Robinet, Lemeilleur desmondes possibles par labalancedel’Europe,(Paris:PUF,1994).

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philosopherby vocation, anda juristbyeducation,hewasalsodeeply involved inthe political affairs of the time at the service of different potentates of the HolyRomanEmpire,includingtheEmperorhimself.LeibnizwasalsofullyacquaintedwithFrench affairs.Hismajor philosophical treatises arewell knownbut he alsowroteotherkindofworks,likelibelsandmemorandawithspecificpoliticalpurposes.Asinthe case of other contemporary thinkers, his varied intellectual interests and hisexperience of worldly affairs went hand in hand.135Leibniz exposed the seriousjuridical implications of thepolitique des réunions in a famous libel entitledMarsChristianissimusAutoreGermanoGallo-Graeco,OuApologiedesArmesduRoyTres-Chrestien Contre Les Chrestiens, written before the end of the siege of Vienna of1683,andpublishedthefollowingyearinCologne.136Thelibelisaparodypresentedasanapology,areductioadabsurdumofLouisXIV’s justificationsforthepolitiquedesréunions.InthetextLeibnizimpersonatesananonymous“Gallo-GreekGerman”– that is, one of the traditional allies of the Frenchmonarchy in the Holy RomanEmpire.Theauthor intendstodemonstratehowLouisXIV’sblatantlyunlawfulandarbitraryaggressionswereactually justandChristian.Hismainargumentwas thatsincepropheciesandmiracleshadclearlyshownthattheKingofFrancewasdivinelyelectedasGeneralVicarofGodonearth,ordinarynotionsofjusticedidnotapplytohim.Hissovereignpowerwasnotsubjectedtoanylaw,jurisdiction,convention,orvow.Atthecontrary,hiswilldefinedwhatwasjustandunjust.TheSunKinghadtheright to enforce whatever came to his mind as far as it served to enlarge hisgrandeur, and consequently whatever he did in this respect was just by default.Fromthisperspective,thelibelironicallyconcluded,ithadtobeacknowledgedthatLouisXIVactedverymoderately.

Accordingtothelibelthis“newjurisprudence”(thatseemsprettysimilartothe“cannon law” doctrine sketched by Croissy and Vauban) contradicted establishedprinciples of ius commune. That explainswhy it was so difficult for the French tojustify Louis XIV’s policies with ordinary legal arguments. For this reason, thesmartestamongthempreferredtolimitthemselvestotalkas“politiques”insteadofentering into any legal dispute. In any case, litigation was pointless because thegreatnessoftheKingofFranceprevailedovereverylawandvow.Thatwasofcoursea matter of much concern for his enemies. The libel describes the disturbingconsequencesofthis“newjurisprudence”.Ifanyannexationcouldbejustifiedwithimaginaryrightsfromaremotepast,therewouldbenoneedofnegotiatingtreatisesliketheonesofMünsterorNijmegen.IfLouisXIVfailedtorespecthisownpromisessoeasilyandsoblatantlyitwouldmakenosensetogiveanycredittotheruleoflawandhonesty. Ifviolencewastobeexercisedsoarbitrarily, thengoodfaithandthelawofnationswereuseless.

Leibniz’stargetaudiencewasnotLouisXIVentourage,butthereal“Gallo-GreekGermans” –that is, the princes of the Holy Roman Empire that in spite of allcontinuedtobealliedwithFrance.Eventually,eventhosewouldchangetheirminds.

135Tetsuya Toyoda,TheoryandPoliticsoftheLawofNations:PoliticalBiasinInternationalLawDiscourseofSevenGermanCourtCouncilorsintheSeventeenthandEighteenthCenturies, (LeidenandBoston:MartinusNijhoff,2011),p.XII,andparticularlyonLeibnizseechapter4.136TranslatedinEnglishas“MarsChristianissimus(MostChristianWar-God)”inLeibniz:PoliticalWritings,editedbyPatrickRiley,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1988),pp.121-145.

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Itispossibletoseethisshiftinthewritingsofanotherprestigiousjuristofthetime:Samuel von Pufendorf. Like Leibniz, Pufendorf was deeply involved in politics. Heservedascounsellor, jurist,andofficialhistoriographeroftheKingofSwedenuntil1688, when he accepted an invitation of the Elector of Brandenburg to move toBerlin. Initially, both Pufendorf’s masters were supporters of France and fierceopponents of the Habsburgs. In his Introduction to the History of the PrincipalKingdoms and States of Europe, Pufendorf still considered Louis XIV in a positivemannerasthemostpowerfulkingandactuallythearbiterofEurope.137Hisopinionwas in line with the traditional protestant view of France as a necessarycounterbalance power against the Catholic hegemony of the Habsburg dynasty.However,hisdissertationstoppedatthePeaceofNijmegen,thatis,beforethefullimplementationofthepolitiquedesréunions.Bytheendof1680,Pufendorf’sviewshave changed. He wrote for the king of Sweden De occasionibus foederum interSueciametGalliametquamparumillaexparteGalliaeobservatasinttojustifytherupture of his traditional alliance with France. Some years later Pufendorfdenounced the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in his De habitu religionischristianaeadvitamcivilem,inwhichheinvitedPrince-ElectorFriedrich-WilhelmofBrandenburg to severe his opportunistic alliance with France in order to lead aProtestantcoalitionagainsttheunholytyrannyofLouisXIV.138Itisfairtosaythatallthese writings were part of propaganda campaigns orchestrated by Louis XIV’senemies.139Andyet, theyweremorethan libels.BothLeibnizandPufendorfhadagenuine intereston theargumentbeyond thepolitical agendasof their respectivemasters.140VI.

Inmany respects thepolitique des réunions was the confirmation of the deepcrisisofauthority inwhichthecustomary iusgentiumhadfallenbytheendoftheseventeenth century. At the core of this issuewas the problem of legal certainty(certitudo).141Thatwasparticularly truth in thecaseof customary legalorders likethelawofnations,inwhichtherewerenoclearobligationtoadheretoestablishedrules.Thislackofconfidenceonthetraditionaljuridicalculturewassharednotonlyby Louis XIV’s ministers but also by an increasingly number of jurists. Leibniz,Pufendorf, andother contemporary authors, hoped to overcome legal uncertainty

137First published in German as Einleitung zur Geschichte der vornehmsten Staaten Europas,Frankfurt, 1682, as a response to a previews unauthorised version of 1680 based on lecturenotestakenbyhisstudents.WequotefromtheEnglisheditionbyGilliflowerandNewborough,London,1697.138David Saunders, "Hegemon History: Pufendorf's Shifting Perspective on France and FrenchPower", in Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder (eds), War, the State and International Law inSeventeenth-CenturyEurope,(Farnham:Ashgate,2010),211-230.139Jean Schillinger, Les pamphétaires allemands et la France de Louis XIV, (Bern: Peter Lang,1999)140PeterSchröder,“Unpolitiquepeutdirecequ’unprincedevroitfaire.Lesconceptsdepaixetd’équilibre dans la pensé politique de Leibniz”, in Lucien Bély, Bertrand Haan, and StéphaneJettot (eds.),LapaixdesPyrénées(1659)ouletriomphedelaraisonpolitique, (Paris: ClassiquesGarnier,2015),109-132.141HeinzMohnhaupt,“Lexcertaandiuscertum:TheSearchforLegalCertaintyandSecurity”,ininDastonandStolleis(eds.),NaturalLawandLawsofNatureinEarlyModernEurope,73-88.

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by applying to natural law a “scientific” method comparable to the one used innatural sciences inorder toestablish clear, universal legalprinciples (the so-calledmore geometrico).142In particular, Louis XIV’s power politics prompted Leibniz toproposeauniversaljurisprudencebasedontheideaof“justiceasthecharityofthewise” thathesignificantlystated for the first time in the introductiontohisCodexjuris gentiumdiplomaticus (Hannover: Samuelis Ammonii, 1693) –a compilation ofdocumentsreunitedinresponsetoFrenchréunionsandterritorialclaimsintheHolyRoman Empire. But even him acknowledged that the law of nations was nothingmorethanacollectionofformalitiesdeprivedofintrinsicmoralsensethatchangedthroughouthistory,as itcouldbeeasily learnt fromreadingancientpeacetreatiesand other official documents.143In a world of continuous competition amongsovereignsinwhichthelawofnationstendedtobeequatedwithnaturallaw,fearofGod did not work as a deterrent anymore –thus vows and promises lost theirtraditional value. In such a world the responsibility of keeping an ambitious andpowerful ruler as Louis XIV at bay lay on a society of sovereign peers (and inPufendorf’s opinion, particularly protestants)144willing to punish any breaching ofthe established order. In this sense, the challenge of the politique des réunionspushed for a refashioningof theolddoctrineof thebalanceofpower as theonlyviableway to re-establish ifnot legal certainty,at leastpolitical stability inEuropeafterLouisXIV’sdeathin1715.

142AlfredDufour,“L’influencedelaméthodologiedessciencesphysiquesetmathématiquessurles Fondateurs de l’Ecole du Droit naturel moderne (Grotius, Hobbes, Puffendorf)”, in Dufour(ed.),Droitsdel’homme,droitnaturelethistorie,(Paris:PUF,1991),93-110.KlausLuig,“Leibniz’sConcept of jus naturale and lex naturalis -defined ‘with geometric certainty’”, in Daston andStolleis(eds.),NaturalLawandLawsofNatureinEarlyModernEurope,p.183-198.143AnEnglishtranslationoftheprefaceinLeibniz:PoliticalWritings,165-176.144As we have already mentioned in the case of his De habitu religionis christianae ad vitamcivilem;anargumentthathewoulddevelopfurtherinhisposthumousJusfecialedivinumsivedeconsensuetdissensuProtestantium,(Lübeck:A.S.R.,1695).