zunjic, bob - concluding unscientific postscript, lecture

3/28/15, 13:32Concluding Unscientific Postscript

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Introduction toPhilosophyCriticalThinkingLogicAncientPhilosophyEthicsModernPhilosophyAestheticsExistentialismThe Balkans:Past andPresent

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Value ofPhilosophyEuthyphroRepublicMetaphysicsA1-2Physics A, BNicomacheanEthicsSermon on theMountDedicatoryLetterMeditation IMeditation IIMeditations III-VILeviathanStandard ofTasteProlegomenato Any FutureMetaphysicsPreambleGroundwork of

PHL 346Instructor: Dr. Bob Zunjic

SREN KIERKEGAARD:CONCLUDINGUNSCIENTIFICPOSTSCRIPT

The Subjective Truth

An Outline

Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments is probably the mostphilosophically "laden" of all Kierkegaard's writings. It marks the pinnacle of his pseudonymousauthorship which was carried out in the mode of "indirect communication" (as opposed to thedirect, non-pseudonymous authorship of his religious works). The initial title in outlines was"Logical Issues", but Kierkegaard eventually changed this neutral heading to a more humorousversion (see explanation below). In accord with this change the two subtitles now read "AMimical-Pathetical-Dialectical Compilation, An Existential Contribution". The work waspublished under pseudonym (alias) Johannes Climacus in 1846.

I DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Title Parts: The title is a composite that could be best explained in areversed order of its components.Postscript (PS): An addendum to something previouslywritten, in this case to Philosophical Fragments (1844). Asthe addendum exceeds five times its base, it is obvious thatKierkegaard is making fun of his own urge to complementhis previous "pamphlet" (also a self-ironizing term) with a"compilation" of prolonged after-thoughts on speculativephilosophy.

Unscientific: This adjective clearly indicates that forKierkegaard existing is not a science or a speculativereflection upon the vicissitudes of human life.Consequently, it is not something that could be thought,obtained from others or transmitted to others. It issomething very simple and individual. As there are nopartnerships in faith, by the same token there are noschoolmasters in the art of existing. No philosophicalsystem or speculative construction could replace first-handexperience and passion. "In relation to existing there is forall existing persons one schoolmaster - existence itself."(Journals, iii 2809, 2823) Note: This statement is directed against Hegel and abstractphilosophizing in general, but should not be understood as a repudiationof thinking and reflection tout court. Kierkegaard is a thinker himself,



the Metaphysicof MoralsCritique ofJudgmentAnalytic of theSublimeDeduction ofTasteUtilitarianismFear andTremblingConcludingUnscientificPostscriptThe BrothersKaramazovTwilight of theIdolsBeyond Goodand EvilBeing AndNothingnessExistentialismIs a HumanismExistrentialismis aHumanism2

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and misology was the last thing he would subscribe himself to. As weshall see below, he only wanted to distinguish between essentialknowledge pertaining to existence and accidental knowledge pertainingjust to our learning and social roles.

Concluding: With this adjective Kierkegaard announcesthe end of his activity as a literary author. This is the reasonwhy he signed the book with the pseudonym Climacos (TheLadder) indicating that he has reached the final point in hisliterary career. He planned to continue writing but onlyunder his real name and in the form of criticism or religiousauthorship. However he soon found himself enmeshed inseveral polemics which prevented him from terminating hisliterary activity and so the Postscript became rather theturning point between his aesthetic and religious oeuvrethen the final end of indirect authorship.

Subtitle: Kierkegaard uses the expression "mimical" to suggest that the workappropriately imitates ("mimes") the emotions and thoughts discussed bythe author. As H. and E. Hong point out, it may also refer to a gatheringof all the earlier "mimed" (pseudonymous) works as the backgroundmaterial for this "concluding" work. The "pathetical" means simply"pathos-filled" and refers to Kierkegaard's poetical rendering ofClimacus. The "dialectical" denotes Kierkegaard himself in the capacityof a thinker. Thus the author (Climacus) is all at once: an imitator, a poetand a philosopher (the whole formula could be also a reference to variousstages in life and respective transitions in thought or existence).

Motivation: What is "true" existence? In Fear and TremblingKierkegaard has already suggested that authentic existencedoes not consist in the comfortable conformism of regularcivic life. On the contrary, its characteristics are feelings ofuncertainty, fear, trembling, distress, anxiety - all stemmingfrom the absolute relationship with the Absolute.

Issues: But there are some unresolved questions about the veryidea of truth and its place in life:(A) What is truth? (B) Where does truth lie? (C) How an individual can be "in truth"?The first question is a general philosophical issue, thesecond is more specifically an epistemological one, thethird is an existential (soteriological) problem.Note: Kierkegaard understands fully the nature of logical andepistemological issues surrounding the philosophical analysis of truth.Common charges against him to the effect that he was simply ignoringthe epistemological foundation of truth while espousing his "wildrelativism" and "subjectivism" are as superficial as unjustified.

Conformity: It seems that Kierkegaard accepts the correspondencetheory of truth ("conformity") as the adequate answer to thefirst question about truth. According to this theory, astatement is true if it corresponds to that what it refers to.Or as Aristotle puts it: "to say of what is that it is, or whatis not that it is not, is true." (Metaph., 1077b 26) Note: All other theories of truth are rather elucidations of certain aspects



or criteria of truth than a straightforward answer to the question: "What istruth?"

Two Faces of Conformity:Idealism vs.Empiricism Kierkegaard conceives correspondence between thoughts

and objects as symmetrical and transitive both ways.Objects could be true if they correspond to the idea, orideas could be called true if they correspond closely toobjects.For German Idealists being or reality must agree withreason as expressed in thoughts. For British Empiriciststhought is true when it agrees with the real.In both cases we have a "reduplication" of thought andreality, the only difference being in the direction of this"doubling".

Two Types of Conformity:(1) Empirical Thought conforms with Being

(2) Idealistic / Normative Being conforms with Thought

What Matters: In both cases two things are of utmost importance:(1) to understand "what is meant by being" (reality), and(2) not to get lost into "the indeterminate" (an abstractbeing, "a phantom").As to (1) Kierkegaard distinguishes between being in anabstract sense and a concrete being in existential sense.The former is at best ideal, the latter is real and actual,although it could be degraded into something abstract. Ifthat happens (2) the subject becomes a "phantom"residing within the "fantastic realm" of tautologies likethose of Parmenides: one is one, being is being or theobject knowing itself. A knowing subject dissolved intoan abstraction can easily conform to an abstract being(A=A), but this identity is empty. Appropriatecomparisons here are those with "a fantastic rendezvousin the clouds", or "an unfruitful embrace" (like Axion's).

Existence: "The knowing spirit" is a Hegelian phrase for individualexistence involved in the cognitive process ("theinquirer").

Two Approaches:

(I) Objective Reflection: It leads to the "objectivetruth" allegedly unaffected by our subjectivity andwithout affecting it itself. In order to accomplish this



ideal of chemically pure knowledge it "makes thesubject accidental, and thereby transforms existence intosomething indifferent". Its hailed neutrality makes up its"objective validity". This type of objective truth occursequally in mathematics and historical sciences. In bothcases "abstract thinking" as exemplified in "objectivereflection" leads "away from the subject" whose realstatus and interests become irrelevant. However, bymaking the subject indifferent objective reflectionparadoxically makes the truth itself indifferent becausewhat is in itself is not "interesting" (for the subject)(II) Subjective Reflection: It turns inwardly to thesubject and attempts to find the truth in the inwardnessof subjectivity or, as Kierkegaard puts it, "to realize thetruth" in "intensification of inwardness". The ultimategoal in this approach is to reach "the subjectivity of thesubject". Conversely, in affirming "the subjectivity ofthe subject" subjective reflection suppresses objectivityas a "vanishing factor". The constant memento insubjective approach remains that the subject is "anexisting individual" who cares for the truth and isaffected by it.

Insight: Existence is "a process of becoming", never somethinggiven and finished. (Sartre will build upon this in hisphilosophy of freedom.)

Consequences:

(1) The correspondence theory of truth loses ground inthe realm of human existence: the notion of identitybecomes "a chimera of abstraction" if both thought andbeing are constantly changing. If the knower is anexisting individual, an individual who lives in time, thisnotion is inapplicable. Fichte's formula "I am I" is suchan abstraction, an example of "fantastic realism" thatdoes not speak anything to a "particular individual".Speculative philosophy leads to abstract formulaswithout explaining how they relate to particularindividuals.(2) The only meaningful truth for a particular individualbecomes the one that expresses temporal expectationsand current approximations. If the object of self-knowing constantly supersedes itself then no stage in theprocess of becoming is final and thus no statement couldbe the final truth about it. Concrete beings can never beadequately and definitely cognized - our ideas aboutourselves are always "subject to correction andimprovement". Therefore the "I-am-I" point is non-existent as is any geometrical point.

Finality andCompleteness:

Speculative philosophy professes to provide thecomplete and the final truth about human existence. This



truth is allegedly objective precisely because it iscomplete. To be able to view the whole world fromwithout speculative philosophy invents a kind ofMunchausen's ladder (lift) that leads beyond and outsideindividual existence. To remain complete the world ofobjective thinking becomes the world of theParmenidean finite sphere which does not allow comingto being or passing away: "From the abstract point ofview everything is and nothing comes into being."Being clings to being, unmovable and unchangeable,totally fettered in the perpetual present.

Conditions: The truth about oneself could be "final" and "complete"only if an existing individual were able to get out of hisown skin and assume a position outside himself. Godpossesses such a complete and final knowledge of theworld. God sees reality as a system. But such a positionis not possible for humans, because the moment onetranscends himself "objectively" one loses himself as aparticular individual. In their inductive efforts humanscan attain only approximations, while logicalconstructions offer only idealizations. Theseidealizations capture the truth only at the price ofmaking it entirely un-informative as is the case inanalytic statements whose truth is in advance securedthrough the relation of the subject and predicate term.

Emptiness: The "I-am-I" is an empty mathematical formula (A=A)which does not denote any real identity. Real identitybased on the equasion A=A is not possible simplybecause human existence is a tension between the finiteand the infinite. The "I-am-I" is not a real identitybecause both I's are fantastic products of abstraction.Within it a correspondence between thought and being isquite possible, but this correspondence is one of emptyforms, a sheer tautology, a being dissolved into abstractthought or into being and thought conceived as one andthe same thing. The real practical meaning of the "I-am-I" formula is therefore equal to a suicide, a particularindividual reduced to a corpse.

Transcendence: All philosophical attempts to entice man to transcendhimself "objectively" are doomed to fail. A concrete,particular human existence could be transcended only inthe unity of the finite and the infinite. The only situationwhen a unity of the finite and the infinite is possiblewithin human existence occurs in the moment ofpassion. Only in passion I can become "infinite" in theeternity of imaginative representations, and still remainmyself. Passion is therefore "the culmination ofexistence for an existing individual". But this self-realization of unity is only temporary and so the ensuingtranscendence of human existence occurs only



momentarily.Passion: Note 1: "Modern philosophy holds passion in contempt." This does

not hold true for many great thinkers, including Hegel, who becamerenown for his claim that nothing great happens in history withoutpassion. Lessing took passion as the most fundamental characteristicof being human. In the same vein Feuerbach asserted that "onlypassion is the mark of existence" and "only what is an object ofpassion really is". Without acknowledging his debt to this traditionKierkegaard agrees that passion is the ultimate source of personalintegration. Only through passion can a person begin to collectherself and acquire a direction that unites otherwise dissipated lifeplans and inclinations. The decision to adopt certain life-style isnever just an intellectual decision based solely on some objectivecognitions. It is always ultimately rooted in what a person cares aboutand deeply values, i.e. in passions. Only through passionintellectually conceived possibilities could be transformed intoactualities. The individual synthetizes the eternal and the temporal byreduplicating timeless ideals and norms in time and concreteexistence. In this respect passions are much more important thanintellectual insights or ideas. It is possible to imaginatively conceivemany possibilities and to be able to think them through without everhumanly existing.

Note 2: Passion reveals interest in existence, that is, the care for Selfwhich is the engine of all individual strivings. To have a passionmeans to care for something or someone, as opposed to theindifference of the objective attitude. If I care about something I donot regard it as valueless. The object of passion is always consideredby passion as worthy of the caring passion. Thus we speak aboutbeing passionate about something in the sense of being enthusiastic.This usage of the term stresses the active moment of passion which isregarded as the source of free action. Kierkegaard rejects the notionthat passion is just an irrational and involuntary emotion that takescontrol over us from without, as if we are only passive object of itsunpredictable and unaccountable force (for instance, "he murderedher in a fit of passion"). He recognizes that passion possesses amoment of passivity, since we cannot induce a passion deliberately.For instance, it is not possible to decide to have a love or religiouspassion (passions are not intentionally created), but they could bedeveloped and cultivated. In that sense the individual is responsiblefor them as his own state of mind. The individual also bears a creditfor having a creative passion, artistic, teaching, or religious.Possessing a passion is what makes someone better than a person ofthe same occupation or activity, not physical abilities or the intensityof desire.

Two Types of Knowledge: Definitions: (A) Essential Knowledge - the knowledge which has an

inward relation to existence. The essential relationmeans that there is an essential relationship between theknowledge and the knower which is an existingindividual (the Latin root esse in "essential" issemantically linked to the existential as it means to be,to exist). "Only ethical and ethico-religious knowledgehas an essential relationship to the existence of the



knower." - because it involves the subject. In practicallife and religion it does not make sense to speak aboutproving the conformity between being and thought asembodied in objective truth. Note: The quality of being essentially related should not be confusedwith either idealist or realist identity between thought and being.

(B) Accidental Knowledge - the knowledge which doesnot inwardly relate itself to subjective existence in thereflection of inwardness (it comes along coincidentally).This type of knowledge is characteristic for all objectiveand descriptive sciences that require an absolutedisengagement (detachment) of the knowing subject.

Speculative philosophy diffuses this distinction byclaiming that man is basically a mediation, that is to say,always related to something.

Contradictions: Mediation presupposes movement, but it is beingclaimed by objective abstract thinking which bringsmovement to a permanent halt in its effort to capture thetotality and present it in the final picture.Objective knowledge may have the existent for itsobject, but the knowing subject is an existing individualin the process of becoming.

Mediation: How a particular subject is related to a knowledge ofmediation as proclaimed by speculative philosophy?Where is he in it, how he enters into it, miraculously orby virtue of oblivion ("abracadabra" or forgetfulness")?Mediation is a "mirage" if it is conceived abstractly.How could it be a man? Only by disregarding theunderlying relation to it from the part of an existingindividual. Before we decide whether there is amediation or not we need to ask a plain question "whatit means to be a human being"?

Reversal: Contrary to the process of objectification that transformsthe knowing subject into a "fantastic entity" and thetruth into a "fantastic object", passion reaffirmssubjectivity as the real core of individual existence.Subjective reflection plunges into inwardness which inturn culminates in passion. Passion attests that one caresfor his own existence. In response to this transformationwithin the subject the truth becomes a paradox preciselyby virtue of establishing a relationship to an existingsubject.

Philosophical Lexicon

Tautology, from the Greek to auto legein = to say the same. In linguistics, apleonasm, a redundant phrase like "a young boy". In logic, explicating in thepredicate term what is already contained in the subject term ("Bachelors are



unmarried males."). The truth of tautologies is established either through thelogical form of the expression (A=A) or through the meanings of the involvedconcepts. Experience cannot falsify tautologies.Speculative Philosophy, literally, the philosophy that "mirrors" the existingconsequences unto their invisible first causes; therefore it is "theoretical" andabstract; Kierkegaard uses the expression either to denote German Idealism orany philosophy that curtails thinking from its existential ground and socreating "tautologies", "fantastic beings" and "phantoms" of abstraction.Analytic Statements, statements that are necessarily true either by their formor by their meaning (A=A, "I am I", or "All mothers are women" and "Allobese people are fat").Reduplication, the term used by Kierkegaard to denote the reality "doubling"of what we think, that is to say, it refers to the realizion or "putting intopractice" that "how one thinks one ought to live". To be able to "be what onesays" one needs both the ability of subjective self-reflection and the strenght tocarry out the insights into existence.Mediation, (in German Vermittlung) the term used by Hegel to oppose theview that our knowledge of phenomenal and supernatural reality is direct (F.Jacobi). Hegel was convinced that unrelated existence is not possible andtherefore the process of understanding reality consists in establishing linkswith the pertinent factors and instances of reality (nature, society, language).For Hegel, these connections and mediations already exist; the question isonly to become aware of them and thus to overcome the illusion of immediacythrough an insight into the mediated immediacy. For Kierkegaard, individualexistence could be mediated only through negation of its individuality.Subjectivity, a whole host of concepts denoting inwardness: Ego, I, Self,consciousness, existence, spirit. For Kierkegaard it is the place of existentialtruth, which is defining for an individual. The term thus refers to the processby which an individual existentially appropriates what he thinks.

II THE QUESTION OF TRUTH

Two Ways of Asking About Truth:

Objectively: What is the truth about X?

(1) Truth is reflected upon objectively as an objectrendered accurately ("O is T").(2) The subject relates himself to what is true as an object.(3) The subject is in the truth if the content taken as object("what") is true.

Subjectively: How do I relate to the truth about X?



(1) Truth is reflected upon subjectively as a relation tosubjectivity (S-T)(2) The subject relates himself to the relation.(3) The subject is in the truth if the relation ("how") istrue.

Relations: There are at least four different uses of the word "relation"in Kierkegaard's discussion of truth.R1 = P:X (a proposition relating to the things or events)R2 = S:P (a subject term relating to a predicate term)R3 = S:R2 (a knowing subject relating to a true propositionas truth)R4 = S:R3 (an existing subject relating to his relationregarding the truth)

Only the 4th is existentially true. Two Truths:

Kierkegaard makes a sharp distinction between two kindsof truth: (I) Objective and (II) Subjective.

(I) ObjectiveTruth:

Is the "what" (object), "what is said", "what is stated" withregard to an indifferent object.

PropositionalAccidentalIndiferent

I am objectively in truth when I know what the things are,pronounce it and agree with it. (In fact I am detached fromthe truth.)

(II) SubjectiveTruth:

Is the "how" of the relation toward the truth ( the "what").

EssentialAdverbialExistential

I am in truth if I relate myself toward what I understand astrue by actualizing this truth in my actions. (Commitmentto truth is preserved even if the subject relates himself tountruth.)

existence = essence = substance(I) In the first case the knowing subject relates himself to the

propositional truth in the sense of recognizing theconnection of the subject and the predicate term as true.Truth is a feature of propositions, something objective.Propositions are true when they correspond to a state ofaffairs (facts). The subject relates himself to it as knowingit, stating it or admitting it.

(II) In the second case, the knowing subject relates himself tohis relation toward truth. For Kierkegaard, truth does not lie



in the system of true propositions but in a lived existentialrelation. Human existence possesses content and could bematched with the idea or reality much more than a sheerproposition. Existence provides the only adequate form forthe realization of the truth that essentially concernshumans.

Essential truth is opposed to accidental (knowledge) whichdoes not bear on existence essentially. Existence is thedouble movement in which the individual conceives ofideas and then reduplicates those ideas in reality. When thetruth is existentially realized (lived, actualized in time) theindividual is in the truth.

Subjectivism: Kierkegaard's subjective truth is not equal to subjectivismor relativism. Kierkegaard does not preach wildirrationalism or arbitrariness in the sense of "anythinggoes" or "what I think is true for me, and what you think istrue for you." Subjective truth is not an inference, asummation from the realm of objective truth. It is theanswer to the question: How should I believe that what istrue?

Subjective thinking = appropriative thinking.Something objectively uncertain could be subjectivelyassured by active appropriation.

III WHERE THE TRUTH LIES?

Knowledge of God

Direction ofRelation Personal Position

ObjectivelyWhat is reflectedupon is thestatement that thisis the true God.

I am in truth if myknowledge is about theobject (O) which is thetrue God (R1).

Subjectively

What is reflectedupon is that theindividual relatesitself to an object(O) which is God.

I am in truth if I relatemyself to the object insuch a way that thisrelation is "in truth aGod relation" (R2).

Question: Now, on which side is the truth (of God)? ObjectiveAnswer:

Truth is always a characteristic of true propositions,therefore the truth about God lies in true beliefs about God.We ask when our knowledge of God is true? For this weneed to know what is God? And we need to relate to "thetrue God"(0). This is at best what I believe about God.



ExistentialObjection:

God is infinite and eternal. God is not an object like a rockto be defined the way we determine the nature of otherthings. We can have only approximations about God. Butthe process of approximations is endless, and thus the truthwe are looking for is not achievable in all eternity.

The "objective person" seems not be worried about thisdifficulty. He sets on the long road of approximations as ifhe possesses all the time of the world. But: (a) he can die tomorrow before the immense task has beeneven started and so he could miss both the opportunity andthe objective that justifies the whole undertaking. (b) he cannot take God at his convenience along the way(why then be bothered?) because God could be taken onlyat all risk, not as a comfortable gadget. To regard God asone commitment among other means not to regard God asGod.

SpeculativeAnswer:

On neither side separately. Truth should be both somethingin itself and for us. Truth must be rocognized andappropriated, but it is not something subjective. Therefore,truth resides only in mediation, as the unity of identity anddifference (Hegel).

ExistentialObjection:

Kierkegaard concedes that this answer is superblyformulated, but he objects that it is not possible for anindividual to be in a state of mediation. It is just anotherembellishing delusion for a deluded "I am I". (a) To be in mediation as a subject means to be finished.But existence is open, becoming, not something final - onlyas dead could it be defined. (b) An existing person cannot be in two places at the sametime and that is precisely what the formula about the unityrequires. It is a physical and logical impossibility to be boththe subject and the object.

Passion: Kierkegaard allows that an individual comes close to the

unity of the subject and object (to be near is not the same asto be identical though), but contends that this proximity ispossible only momentarily, in passion. Passion unites theindividual with the object of passion as in metaphysicalstrivings or in playing. In that sense passion is a union ofthe temporal with the eternal. But Kierkegaard reminds thatpassion itself is the highest pitch of subjectivity. Note: To exist truly for Kierkegaard means to imbue existence withconsciousness. When reflection penetrates existence (the ultimateachievement we can hope for) then passion starts to be generated.

Questions: What to do given the impossibility of being at once thesubject and the object, which means given the impossibilityof seeking at the same time both the objective truth ("theapproximate truth") and following "an infinite concern" for



his own relationship with the truth?How can the individual come to exist truly, to be in thetruth?How can the truth be realized in existence?

What kind of life is true? Am I in truth? Am I true? SubjectiveNeed:

Even if I possess a true belief about God I am still not "intruth", I am still not the true myself. Only when I relatemyself to something, whatever that may be, whichdetermines the way I am (how I believe) I could be in a true(God) relation, I could be myself (S). In other words, Godis not an idea, a proposition, an objective truth, but how oneinvolves themselves with Him. "God is a subject" (not anobject) - hence he exists only for subjectivity andinwardness.

Urgency: The existing person who chooses the subjective wayunderstands the problem: it would take a lot of time to findGod objectively, perhaps unlimited time to establish thetrue S-O relation. But he needs God immediately, and at allcosts. If he does not get God he is wasting his time.Therefore God becomes a postulate for him: I need God, Ibelieve in God. Thus he obtains God by virtue of theinfinite passion of inwardness (not by virtue of collectingdata or "objective deliberation" about God).

Seeking God Seeking the

true Godobjectively

Needing God with infinite passion

Pursuingtheapproximatetruth of theGod-idea

Feeling an infinite concern for his ownrelationship to God in truth

Praying

Going to the house of the true GodLiving in anidolatrouscommunity

Having the true conception of GodLooking uponthe image ofan idol

Praying in a false spiritPraying withthe passion ofthe infinitive

Immortality Investigating Embracing immortality with an



immortality objectively infinite passionBeing on the path ofapproximations Struggling with uncertainty

More Truth: The answer to the question "where there is more truth" is

obvious for everyone who is not "botched by scholarship" -it is on the side of a person who is infinitely concerned thathe in truth relates himself to God. The answer is easy sinceexistence is not thinking but acting. Someone who praysuntruly although with the true idea of God is less in truththan someone who prays with all the passion of infinityalthough he is looking at an idol. The latter prays in truth toGod although he is worshiping an idol, the former prays inuntruth to the true God and is therefore worshiping an idol.

The Life-Prevalence of Existential Truth

Community/Knowledge Quality ofWorship/RelationTruthValue

True Religion(Christendom) False Spirit

Less Truth(Idol)

False (Idolatrous)Religion True Spirit

More Truth(True God)

Thinking existentially does not suffer discrepancies like these:

Sitting at a desk(thinking) and

writing about what one hasnever done.

Writing about universaldoubt

and be credulous as anysensuous man.

Embracing Uncertainty

Immortality Reaction Mode State Truth,CertaintyMendelsohn(?)

Providesproofs

ObjectiveInquiry

Lack ofEnthusiasm Apodictic

Socrates Stakesown lifeSocraticIgnorance

InfinitePassion Problematic

IV TRUTH IS SUBJECTIVITY

Proofs: Philosophers and theologians provide proofs ofimmortality, but they do not set their lives accordingly. Sothey in fact provide a counter-demonstration of what they



purport to prove - their acts are the most convincingrefutation of immortality. Kierkegaard compares them withwedded matrons who have been subjected to manyexpressions of (erotic) love but never enjoyed love itself (aspassion). Socrates is in that respect like a girl who stakeseverything on the weak hope that (s)he is beloved (byimmortality).

Ignorance: Socrates stakes his life on the condition that the soul isimmortal, but he does not possess any certainty about it. Heputs the question of immortality in a "problematic manner":If there is an immortality. Thus he is cognitively a doubteror an ignorant. But nobody was more in truth (in paganism)than Socrates while in his ignorance. Ignorance is theadequate expression of the relationship between the eternaltruth and the existing individual. The eternal truth which isnot paradoxical in itself becomes paradoxical by beingrelated to an existing person. This relation must remain aparadox as long as the individual exists. But in risking hisentire life he provides a more effective proof of immortalitythan anything one can derive from philosophical assertionsabout the nature of the soul. The certainty of immortality isrooted in subjectivity and the quality of existentialappropriation (reduplication).

Distinction: In contrast to logic and epistemology, which are interestedonly in the thought content and the content of ourutterances, existentialism focuses on the relationshipsustained by the existing individual. "The objective accentfalls on WHAT is said, the subjective accent on HOW it issaid."

Integrity: Kierkegaard is convinced that the "how" is morefundamental than the "what". When the "how" isscrupulously rendered, the "what" should follow. That thequality of our existential stature is crucial for theassessment of our veracity attests the principle whichplaces integrity over orthodoxy. In the light of this principleit is easy to understand the saying that what is "in itselftrue" may become untrue in the mouth of such and suchperson. This personal moment of truthfulness is an essentialpart of what Kierkegaard calls the "how" of utterances orthe "mode of the relationship". The "how" refers to thepassion of inwardness, i.e. subjectivity (Kierkegaard's "allthe passion of infinity" is what we call "inner integrity").This is why it matters who speaks, almost as much as whatthe person is saying, and much more than the demeanor ofthe speaker, his expression or the modulation of his voice.

Dissemination: In ancient times only a few knew the truth by virtue of theirindividual readiness to take the risk of infinite engagement. In modern times everyone knows the truth, simply becauseit is being transmitted and proclaimed as somethingobjectively available.



But the inwardnes of the truth appropriation stands in theinverse relationship to the extent of its dissemination withinChristendom.

Limited Value: The infinite passion of subjectivity that sincerely putseverything at risk possesses "more truth" than the entireSystem of Philosophy which lacks enthusiasm and personalcommitment. The adjective "more" (truth) indicates in factthat Kierkegaard does not renounce the objective truthentirely and does not treat it as worthless. But it has itslimits, especially if separated from our subjectivity. Livingtruthfully is man's primary task in life. Having right beliefsfollows from this as a matter of course.

Deficiences: The ideal of objective truth is in itself deceptive. Objectivetruth is not achievable and if achieved it remainsobjectively uncertain despite its assertoric formulations. Inthat respect the objective uncertainty of subjective truth isno argument against it. The truth about God is not gained through detachedtheoretical inquiry, but through the proces of existing. Tobelieve in objectivity as such, based on what the others say,is like laughing at a joke because someone said it wasfunny.

Insanity: These defects of objective truth do not mean that it isirrelevant what a person believes. Kierkegaard wants to sayonly that proper objective beliefs are existentially worthlesswithout the involvement of our subjectivity. In themselvesthey could lead to insanity even when presented as adisinterested commitment to pure truth and objectivity. Adetached assistant professor is not less crazy than apassionate character who is out of touch with reality - infact he is more pitiable (the president of the Plato societywho does not believe in Plato's doctrines). The pervasiveextension of scientific objectivity to the whole of life isridiculuous and insane (causes a lack of emotional andhuman interest).

Appropriation: Only when appropriated by a single individual, that is tosay, when they penetrate the life-world, true propositionsbecome existentially relevant. Truth can only exist in andthrough individual apprehension of it. On the other hand,proper subjectivity is not worthless even when it is notbacked by proper beliefs. Why? Because it is possible for aperson to be better than his beliefs. A preson with confusedor even wrong moral ideas can act morally. BertrandRussell disclaimed any cognitive distinction between goodand bad and proclaimed it to be just a matter of emotions ortaste. But still he was a great humanist in his life and anactivist for peace and human dignity.

Fork: Either take the comfortable route of objectivity or theuncertain route of subjectivity. Where the "the way swings



off" cannot be determined in advance and for everyindividual. It must be decided by the individual himself.

Decisiveness: Objectivity lacks existential decisiveness. Only insubjectivity there is the decisiveness that realizes theuntruth of the accepted obsession with objectivity. This iswhat makes up the "decisive passion of the infinite".In this manner subjectivity and the subjective "how"constitute the truth. The definition of truth must reflect thisantithesis to objectivity which is now being suspended.

Definition: Truth is an objective uncertainty held fast in anappropriation process of the most passionate inwardness.

This definition indicates the resilience of the inwardness,which is not intimidated by objective uncertainty. It stayswithin the the paradoxical position of linking objectiveuncertainty with subjective certainty.

Signs: There are many signs of divine omnipotence and wisdom inthe worls. The order and regularity of the universe(teleology) nourish the hope of finding a God.On the other hand, the sufferings of the innocent and manyimprefections in the design gve rise to doubts, and speakagainst the idea.The outcome is "an objective uncertainty". The more so itmakes sense to compensate for it with "the entire passion ofthe infinite". An objective uncertainty + the greatness of inwardness =faith.

Parallels: There is an analogy between this definition of truth and thenature of faith. Faith is "precisely the contradiction betweenthe infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and theobjective uncertainty". Without risk no faith. Socraticignorance is an analogue to the category of the absurd. Theabsurd contains even less objective certainty thanignorance. as the ignorance of inwardness overcomes therepulsion of not knowing with certainty so the inwardnessof faith overcomes the repulsion of the absurd.

Condition: It makes sense to believe precisely because I cannot graspGod objectively. If I can apprehend God objectively I donot believe. I do not then need God. But because I cannotdo this, I must have faith. Otherwise I lose the relationtoward eternity.

The Fork of Existential Choice:

To be in Truth State of Knowledge(A)Type of Existence(B)

ScienceLecturersDescartes



Objectively (I) Philosophy of Reason HegelMoses Mendelson

Subjectively (II) FaithPassionAbrahamSocratesDon Quixote

Fervor: This is a very special concept of truth: truth as subjectivity

or subjectivity as truth. But it does not mean that everytruth claim is based only on the fervor with wich somethingis being asserted, that if I believe something truly itbecomes automatically true and that it does not matter whati believe as long as I am adamant about it. Subjectivity isnot a matter of sheer taste or our volatile inclinations.

Untruth: In the religiosity A (the religiousness of immamence) truthwas conceived as residing within man. Subjectivity isideally the truth but actually existed as untruth in paganism.This is why Climacus says that the "higher" expression for"subjectivity is the truth" begins by regarding subjectivityas untruth.

Eternity: Truth is not individual's eternal possession that ensues oncewe examine ourselves thoroughly. It is something that mayor may not be acquired in time (moment). It is not aproduct of relating toward ommanent moral and religiousconsciousness, but toward god outside the individual.Existence could be constructed only around eternal values.The person who has not acquired the capacity for caringdeeply for his existence can never recognize the eternal.

Depth: The Christian principle that subjectivity is untruth, whencombined with the claim that subjectivity is the truth,provides a "higher view". It is higher because it secures adeeper subjectivity. Note: Evans thinks that all this is a reference to John 14:6: "I am the way,the truth, and the life." Jesus is the truth by being life (existence).

The peculiarity of Christianity is that the founder himself isthe truth, while in all other religions the founder merelyproclaims the truth or witnesses to it.

In Christianity God enters the world from without and socreates a paradox by fusing the infinite and the finite, theeternal and the temporal.

Objectivity's Repulsionagainst Uncertainty.

Subjectivity's Resilience insustaining Ignorance.

Objectivity's Repulsion Subjectivity's Resilience in



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against Incomprehension. sustaining the Absurd.

zunjic, bob - concluding unscientific postscript, lecture

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