'l'hrouglrout tlrc cra of uor, U.S. firms were heavily involved in Rhode-siir. I rr r 971. tltc loarnal of Cornrnerce, published in New York City, carried

tTtt it "lthoclesian page," advertising all of the wonderfi.rl investment oppor-Pollcy tunitics there.2e Though criticized sharply by opponents of Salisbury, it

was welcomed by those in the business community who recognized thatcheap African labor and the surcharges the sanctions-ridden regime oftenhad to pay meant that handsome profits could be made in Rhodesia.

The scholar Anthony Lake claimed that the Byrd Amendment actu-ally hurt the United States, in that Foore Minerals apparently failed toanticipate that the law could open the door for cheap imports of Rho-desian ferrochrome at a price that Foote's Ohio plant could not match.3oPlants in Calvert Ciry Kentucky; Woodstock, Tennessee ; Alloy,West Vir-ginia; Graham, West Virginia; Mariefta, Ohio; and other cities were alsoharmed.3r But Lake's voice was drowned out by those claiming that sanc-tions actually hurt Africans and that "engagement" with Salisbury was theproper way to bring change. By early 1974, the Hera)d was reporting thatU.S.-Rhodesian trade had tripled since 1965.32

The deals consrunmatedwere large and small. In 1974, Rhodesians solda "pedigree Brahman [slc] bulP'in the United States for g5z,ooo, a recordprice.33 In early 1975, when Scripto usa sold its faciliry to Scripto Rhode-sia, "the largest manufacturer of ball fpoint] pens" in Rhodesia and thirdlargest producer in South Africa, the Financi,al Tirnes reported that thedeal would "give Scripto in Rhodesia and South Africa access to inter-national know-how from overseas Scripto companies."3a Such deals werenot unusual. In a similar move, during the summer of 1975, Leo BurnettLtd., a firm with headquarters in the IJnited States and "one of Salisbury'slarger advertising agenciesl'was "'sold" to local investors.3s These wereamong the tactics taken to evade sanctions: setting up phony "front,, com-panies, asserting that there was no connection between a subsidiary inRhodesia and the parent corporation in the United States, and selling ata premium to local interests.

U.S. aircraft manufacturers were some of the busiest salesmen in Salis-bury. Military aircraft regularly found their way to Rhodesia, but Boeingand McDonnell-Douglas commercial aircraft could be found there too.National Aircraft Leasing Ltd. of Chicago, a subsidiary of Flying Tiger(whose vice president, Anna Chennault, had close ties to the Republi-can Party), was the intermediary for many of these deals. A t>

In 1972, the U.S. government prosecuted three men affiliated with rnrManagement, which since 1968 had been illegally shipping ammonia from

r8o Texas and Mississippi to Rhodesia: Edward Bartlett, tax commissioner inPohcy vermont and "officer of a Rhodesian chemical companyi sable chemical

Industries; conrad wysocki of ohio, an engineer; and David patterson, aFlorida businessman.a3 In early ry78 the u.s. government fined GardnerDenver Company Africa Ltd., a subsidiary of a U.S. company, $z5,ooofor selling mining and drilling equipment worth hundreds of thousandsof dollars to Rhodesia.aa

These were not isolated incidents. Harvey ward, a leading Rhodesianpropagandist, wrote a novel about evading sanctions that he claimed waslargely true. A central character aiding Rhodesia was a rogue crA agenr,described as follows: "[His] face was heavily lined, and bore the tell-talemarks of suffering. He had fought in vietnam with the Green Berets andspent eight monrhs as a prisoner of the vietcong. His home was in Tirlsa,Oklahoma, where he had a wife and three boys in their early teens.,'Ac-cording to the plor, in the early r96os the united states and Rhodesiadiscussed establishing a military base in Rhodesia: "when the Rhod.esianrepresentative to the united Nations was in washington we talked aboutit. . . . Meanwhile our military had made several visits to the area, . . .but when the new party came to power in Rhodesia in rg6z,Washing-ton approached their prime minister,winsron Field, who had farms nearMarandellas. He agreed to the United States having a long-range bomberbase at Bromley. The deal was to keep an eye on the Indian ocean andSoviet movements in the area."as

Though the book was fictional, its larger point rang true : there wereinfluential interests in the united states who felt that the existence ofRhodesia dovetailed with larger anti-soviet interests and that, as such,salisbury should receive support-even if this meant evading sanctions.Particularly after rgTs and the cuban intervention in Angola, washingtonwas desperately worried about communist advance in southern Africa, aregion that was awash in strategic minerals and oil.

As a consequence, the lJnited states was not only quite concerned withthe fate of the Rhodesian tobacco industry but it also could not be in-different to the fact that this medium-sized African nation also containedlarge stores of phosphate, nickel, coal, gold, iron ore, gemstones, cesium-pollucite, lithium, wolfram, tungsten, platinum, copper, asbcstos-andmore. At a time when therewas a movement among dcvckrPing rrirtiorrs-particularly those in Africa-to band togethcr irr grorrPirrgs llkc tlrc orga-Irizatiott

would be protected. This perception was not invalidated when KennethRush, a former uc executive, was appointed to the powerfrrl post of

r82 undersecretary of state in rg7z.52Policy The healy influence of corporations like uc on the White House and

the State Department guaranteed that the United States would be viewedwidely as a significant supporter of Salisbury. This also guaranteed, as theEconornist put it, that the United States, along with Portugal and SouthAfrica, was "among the world's most obvious violators of the UnitedNations'policy of sanctions against Rhodesia."53 Properly buoyed, UnionCarbide's fellow supporter of dre Byrd Amendment, Foote Mineral Com-pany, vowed that it "had no intention of selling its chrome interests inRhodesia," which by r97o were estimated as constituting a significant por-tion of the gs6 million U.S. investment in that nation.sa In 1974, the Smithregime gave uc an "exclusive prospecting order . . . to prospect for as-bestos, copper, gold, silver and nickel in the Gwelo mining district."ssNeither company evinced concern about the fact that this investment wasaccompanied by an appalling rate of accidents involving African miners.56Of course, they were not alone in lusting after raw materials in Africa.In late 1923, asubsidiary of Reynolds Metals Company pleaded guilty toillegally importing Rhodesian minerals.sT

Union Carbide and Foote were the prime non-tobacco companies fromthe United States with holdings in Rhodesia. By ry76, uc acknowledgedthat its subsidiaries owned two chrome ore mines and one ferrochromesmelter in Rhodesia. This business was in league with the Salisbury gov-ernment, which had "administered" these enterprises since r967.5s UnionCarbide, which had roo,ooo employees globally, enjoyed a 29.6 percentincrease in profits in the fourth quarter of 976, and by the early r98os hada net income of $3ro million, based on revenues of over gg billion.se

As the third largest U.S. chemical company-behind Du Pont and Dow

-uc may have had its bottom line in mind, and not its employees, whenit pushed for passage of the Byrd Amendment. So charged anti-Rhodesianactivist Edgar Lockwood, during congressional testimony in 1973.It re-quired 2.5 tons of chrome to produce r ton of ferrochrome, and the importof the latter produced by forced labor at smelters in Africa was to dev-astate the U.S. industry, causing massive layoffs. Lockwood told of oneIJ.S. executive who complained about the huge wage differential betweenRhodesian and U.S. workers. Pointing out that Rhodesia paid wages of$r a day' the executive said plaintively, "I have to pay Amcricarr blircks inSor.rth Carolina gz4 a day. Will you explain to nrc how I crrrr kccp orr tloirrgfl1'11)"tttt Appirrcntly, ur; hntl n() c()l'llpuncti

ingly, support from these giants was an essential cog in the machine back-

ing Ian srnith. Nevertheless, the smith regime would have fallen much

r84 earlier but for its continued ability to imPort oil-the lifeblood of itsPolticy economy-in the face of sanctions.

)orge Jardim was a major business figure in Mozambique and a former

head. of the chamber of conunerce in Beira, Rhodesia's chief oudet to the

sea; he was close to the leadership of fascist Pornrgal and served as con-

sul for Malawi in Mozambique from 196+ to rg7+. From 1969 to rg7+,he

was chairman of the Commercial Bank of Malawi and publisher of a num-

ber of major newspapers in Mozambique . From dris vantage point he was

able to witness the machinations that allowed Rhodesia to continue im-

porting oil and concluded, "In the struggle against sanctions [Rhodesia]counted on the active co-operation of the British, American and French

oil companies, which came to exceed all expectations." Mobil and caltex,

along with Shell and Total, were the prime culprits. He added, "The sup-

port given by the international oil companies was undoubtedly the most

decisive factor. Without their encouraging assurance, it is improbable that

unr would ever have been declared."65Part of this scandal emerged when Lonrho, a major multinational cor-

poration with vast holdings in Africa, filed a lawsuit against a number of

oil companies-with Mobil being the worse transgressor-charging that

they were in breach of contract by sending oil to Rhodesia via south

Africa instead of the Beira pipeline owned hy Lonrho. Other companies

named in the suit were shell, British Petroleum, and caltex. These oil

giants were also sued by Zambia,which claimed that it suffered billions

of dollars in damages when, beginning in the mid-r96os, the companies

deprived Lusaka of oil in order to build up stocks in Rhodesia. In re-

sponse, Mobil argued that it was not in total control of its Southern Afri-

can subsid.iaries-though rePatriating Profits to corporate headquarters in

the United States seemed to present no major logistical or financial prob-

lems. Moreover, Mobil claimed that relevant regulations did not bar the

corporation from dealing with Rhodesia as long as u.s. personnel and

products of U.S' origin were not involved'

This lawsuit also revealed inferentially the tensions London and wash-

ington faced in coordinating policies. Lonrho, a London/Rhodesian com-

bine, was the creation of one R. "Tiny" Rowland, a former troop leader

in Hitler,s Youth before his family's move to Britain in r93+. According to

news reports, Rowland "worked for British intelligence in post-colonial

Africa" and was th

the same way they looked at, say, socialism. In the fall of 1962, Robert

July of the foundation acknowledged that he considered Shamuyarira to

186 be "an excellent person" and added that he "would like to be able to bePolicy of assistance to him."75

Just as U.S. mining companies hedged their bets by funding the edu-

cation of Africans, the Rockefeller Foundation was not above flirtingwith African nationalism. It funded the Rhodesian stay of U'S. profes-sor of government I. Leo Cefkin, who objected strenuously to the "anti-

American feeling" he encountered among Rhodesians in Salisbury. "Gen-

erallyi' he wrote, "they like to drape Soapy Williams around your neckl'

referring to the then lJ.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa, who had

developed a reputation for being symPathetic to the nationalist aspira-tions of Africans. Writing on the day that uDr was proclaimed, Cefkin

concluded with disdain, "These people just want a docile African laboring

class which will indefinitely accept white man's privileges, and it clearlydoes come down to that?'76

The Rockefeller Foundation took an ambivalent view of unr. It hadfunded a number of scientific projects in Rhodesia and worried drat they

would be jeopardized by the rebel regime ' In December 1965, E. L. Hust-

ing of the Department of Anatomy at the University College of Rho-desia soothingly reassured foundation executives drat uor had brought"surprisingly little obvious discontent." In fact, he reported, "Most of the

Africans I encounter are in very good humor and very friendly," although

he admitted that "unemployment has increased and some businesses de-

pending on foreign trade have collapsed."77 Husting's reassurances were

for naught, as the foundation decided not to "forward any more funds"

for his research.Ts This may not have been due to the pressure of sanc-

tions, for Rockefeller continued funding other Projects' One beneficiary

of their bounteousness reported brightly, "Our scientists are still traveling

freely. . . . Conditions in Rhodesia are as sunny and peaceful as ever-"7e

In an apparent aftemPt to evade actual and pending sanctions' Rocke-feller arranged to pay funds for dris project into accounts held by Roth-

schilds, since, a foundation associate wrote, "they already bank for us in

London."so The foundation also made arrangements with a bank in Salis-

bury to provide funding for its projects.8r One of these projects main-tained close ties with U.S. government laboratories in Beltsville, M*y-land, throughout the early days of unr.82 The director of one of these

projects, Dr. Shirley Nash, found Rhodesia so engagiug rhirt shc 1;ot utar-

ricd tlrcrc, thus iucrclsing thc synrpathctic irtli'ctiorr ttt'stttttc Atttcricirtrs

lirr ltlrotlcsiit.si

,,,rt* --^---

These Rockefeller-supported projects were not all oriented toward sci-

ence and agriculture. One grant made during the unr period was for a"comparative study . . . of the contribution made by manufacturing in- r87dustry to economic development in Southern Africa and East Africal'84 TheUnlike a good deal of Africa, the southern cone had a well-developed Business

industrial base that could only expand, given the existence of adequate of War

universities, a more than capacious supply of cheap labor, and vast raw

materials. U.S. corporations could not remain indifferent to this domain.

But as time passed, the Rockefeller Foundation could not withstand the

political pressure exerted by opponents of Rhodesia;by rg6g,foundation

officials were forced to acknowledge that sanctions had undermined itscontinued presence in Rhodesia.8s

The Rockefeller Foundation did not oPerate in Rhodesia as a counter-

weight to U.S. corporations but instead supplemented their activity, by

funding helpfirl research on manufacturing and agriculture. The founda-

tion's behavior in the early days of uor was consistent with drat of manyU.S. corporations throughout this period: that is, it did not contest thestatus quo but instead accommodated itself to it. As such-and despiteprotestations to the contrary-it sustained the Smith regime.

Businessmen generally proved to be reliable suPPorters of the Smithgovernment. They were particularly influential in lobbying Southern sen-

ators, who-in any event-were predisposed to be favorable toward Salis-bury. Typical was A. K. Tigrett-who identified himself as "President of

Cottonseed Oil Company with a refinery and a mill at Savannah, a millat Augusta and one at Tifton as well as mills in Mississippi and Texasl'

Early in 1966 he wrote his senator, Eugene Thlmadge of Georgia, to ex-

press support for Salisbury.86At times, such support was governed not by the bonds of whiteness

or anticommunism but by simple self-interest. In 1968, R. P. )ackson, ofthe Rome Plow Company of Cedartown, Georgia, told Senator Richard

Russell of Georgia that he had just received an order from Barlows Tiactor

and Equipment of Rhodesia for"$+,zsz worth of replacement parts. He

had applied for an export license that he did not receive, and he was quite

displeased, though not with his brethren across the sea. IIe wrote, "In the

past three years, Senator, I have made three trips to Southern Rhodesiaand there are a lot of fine people in this country."87 His sentiments were

echoed by Charles Crisp, chairman of the Bank of Commerce of Ameri-

cus, Georgia. Itr t97o, as his hometown was enduring the pains of racial

clcscgrcgltiort, ltc ttrl4ctl thc lifting of sanctions and the resumPtion of

trrrdc witlr l(lu rrlcllir. "'l'ltc irttitudc of

r88

Poli.cy

is unwarranted and shamefrrlj'he added.ss He was in a position to draw

clear parallels between the necessity to resist the demands of Africans on

both sides of the Atlantic.

Robert J. Small, president of Dan River Mills in Greenville' SouthCarolina, told his senator, l. Strom Thurmond, that he had "business asso-

ciates who have substantial interests in Rhodesia" and that they all found

U. S. policy "reprehensible." 8e In a letter backing Ian Smith, Iohn Laverge'

chairman of the executive committee of l]niversal Leaf Tobacco in Rich-

mond, Virginia, reminded his senator, Harry Byrd ]r., of the close ties he

had had for many years with Rhodesia "both in a business and personal

way."so E. H. Lane, chairman of the board of the Lane Companr told

Senator Byrd that even his "workmen" were oPPosed to sanctions against

Salisbury.er Theo W. Kelley, a principal in fulius Straus & Sons, an insur-

ance company in Richmond, confessed,"[This] represents the first time

that I have written my rePresentative in Congress," and it was concernabout Rhodesia that drove him to do so'e2

C. A. Carr, president of Dibrell Brothers Leaf Tobacco in Danville,

Virginia, told Senator Byrd, "Our comPany has over a million dollars

invested in Rhodesia and the total investment of Virginia leaf tobacco

firms I imagine would approach five million dollars with universal Leafof Richmond having the largest investment. Our dividends from Rhode-

sia . . . exceeded $roo,ooo which of course helps our balance of payments

problem."e3 Obviously, Carr expected his senator to do the right thing

and back Rhodesia. His words were echoed by Orrin Atkins, president of

Ashland Oil;ea Blair Bolles, vice president of Colt Industries;es and other

leading lights in the South's business community.

Even as the war escalated, business leaders persisted in their support for

Salisbury. Late in t974,Janes Knight, chairman of the executive commit-

tee of Knight Newspapers, informed Senator Byrd about his "magnifi-

cent trip" to Rhodesia and his "delightful visit" with Ian Smith, who, he

told Byrd, "was most complimentary to you for your action in removing

sanctions)'on chrome. Despite this victory, Knight said, "I cannot quitedismiss the thought that the noises I hear are Communist footstepsi'e6J. Clifford Miller of Miller Manufacturing of Richmond was also pleased

with the removal of sanctions on Rhodesian chrome brought about by

the Byrd Amendment. "If there is a real threat to repeall'he told SenatorByrd, "please let us know, as our group would certainly try to do any-

thing we can to see that this is not repealed."eT P. D. Kcrr, cxcctltivc vice

prcsiclcnt of thc Southcrn Furniturc Manutitcttrrcrs Assoelittkrrr rlf HighPrlint, Nrlrth (lrtr

r90

Policy

desia and was upset that he could not; he was resentfrrl that London con-

sortedwith Havana while "the good people of Cuba are treatedlots worse

dran the blacks of Rhodesia"los

These anguished and impassioned words from caPtains of industry

could not be ignored by *y elected official who preferred to remainin office. As L. E. Wooten had hinted, campaign donations might not

flow to those who were hostile to Rhodesia, and in states like North

carolina, campaign donations came overwhelmingly from the corPorate

sector. Moreover, Harvey Ruffin's example showed that there were by-

products of the u.s. engagement with Rhodesia that were not trivial: the

hard currency brought by Americans' travels to Salisbury'

unfornrnate ly for zimbabweans, solid support for Ian smith was not

solely in the U.S. south. )ust as the rising Republican Party was establish-

ing a base of support in the South, it was doing the same thing in the Far

west. senator Frank church of Idaho had raised Republican hackles when

he led an investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency that had forced

the secretive agency to unveil the "family jewelsi'covert actions drat some

would have wanted to have kept hidden. This was a gift to the Soviets, itwas said, and now Church was under extreme Pressure from his constitu-

ents to show his true grit by backing Rhodesia. "To hell with Russia and

communism,,' snarled william B. Knipe |r. of Boise in a letter to President

Ford, adding reassuringly, "We have nothing against black people per se,

[but] we sure as hell believe in aiding and protecting whites and white

capitalism anylvhere ." 106 This message was typical of the correspondence

received by church, a liberal senator in a conseryative state, who was pr-

petually concerned with political survival. A. J. Buckman, chairman of the

board of Buckman Laboratories Inc.-a transnational corporation with

holdings in )apan, Australia, and Europe as well as southern Africa-told

church that it was a ,.gross oversimplification to project majority rulej'

and argued, "This is as unsound for blacks as it is for whites." Buckman

did not want the ..source of essential minerals" to "fall into communist

hands,'ro7 Many of the senator's correspondents on this question were

not above hurling racist invective . fohn Lienemann of Estate and Business

Planning Consultants in Edina, Minnesota, displayed his wizardry with

words by merging the red and black scares in his reference to Mugabe and

the "soviet backed" Nkomo as "Marxist gorillas." ro8

These executives backed up their words of support by concrcte action:

frequent travcl to Southern Africa. Totrrism ;rr