zach nixon's powerpoint of wellna chapter 5: the peace process in colombia and u.s. policy

8/14/2019 Zach Nixon's Powerpoint of Wellna Chapter 5: The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy

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Chapter written by Cynthia J. Arnson

Powerpoint by Zach Nixon

Chapter 5: The Peace Processin Colombia and U.S. Policy


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The Peace Process During thePastrana Years: An Overview

1998 Election: AndresPastrana vows to negotiatean end to the guerrilla-paramilitary violence inColombia. Pastrana meetswith FARC founder and

leader Manuel Marulanda,and, once elected president,and agrees to meet withguerrillas in Colombia.

January 1999: Pastrana

travels to the despeje tomeet with Marulanda, only tobe stood up by the leader.Consequently, paramilitarygroups carry out a brutalwave of violence. Formal

peace talks stall until


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The Peace Process During thePastrana Years: An Overview February 2000: Focusing on Colombias

socioeconomic structure, FARCcommanders travel to European capitals tosee European social democracy; leaders

also experience criticisms of their humanrights and drug trafficking records

March 2000: Members of Colombiasprivate sector travel to the despeje to meetwith FARC and discuss agrarian and socialpolicies.

In response, FARC promotes Law 002,which requires affluent Colombians to paya peace tax or face kidnapping.


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September 2000: Arebel prisoner escapesfrom jail, hijacks aplane and lands it inthe despeje.

February 2001:Pastrana andMarulanda sign anagreement to

accelerate peace talks. UN and many

European and LatinAmerican countriessend representatives

to the despeje to meetwith FARCUnited


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March 2001-February2002: Peace talkscontinue in theshadow ofparamilitary andguerrilla violence.Pastrana continuesto reauthorize thedespeje.

September 2001:FARC kills ConsueloAraujo Noguera;Colombians call for


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January 2002: Pastrana gives FARC 48hours to abandon the despeje; UN, foreignambassadors, and Catholic Church help tonegotiate a cease fire with a deadline of

April 2002.February 20, 2002: FARC guerrillas hijack

an airliner and take Senator Jorge EduardoGechem Turbay hostage.


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Possible Reasons for theFebruary 20th Hijacking The hijacking was an effort to sabotage

negotiations set for April 20th.

FARC was simply conducting businessas usualas if they had no bearing onthe peace process (140).

Consequence: Pastrana chastisesMarulanda for his arrogance and lies,and ends the peace process by sending

armed forces to take over the despeje.


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US Initiatives in Support ofPeacePolicy makers dealing with Colombia choose to

model their policies after their experience withwar and peace in El Salvador.

Strategy: Because a military defeat of

guerrillas look impossible, approachnegotiations by politically engaging insurgents.However, the US still pushed for

modernization and professionalization of the

military to catalyze the peace process. Why?


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US Initiatives for Peacei. Fostering dialogue among Colombians

over strategies for peace and policyreform (The Houston Process).

ii. Opening of direct contact with the FARCin December 1998

iii. Financing projects to give instant relief tocivilians throughout conflict zones (OTI,AID)


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The Houston ProcessWhat do the gringos really want?The answeralthough few may believe itis

that they are trying to help Colombians findtheir own solution to their problems using

their own resources (143).


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US Relations with the FARCDecember 1998: FARC and US State

Department Members meet secretly in CostaRica.

February 1998: Three U.S. activists are

kidnapped and executed; FARC claims at leastpartial responsibility.This ends American contact with the FARC.

I dont know if the political climate inWashington will ever change, absent changesin Colombia.

-A U.S. official in Bogot, when asked

whether US policy regarding contact with the


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AIDs Office of TransitionInitiativesOTI, answering requests from the

Colombian government, addressed theneeds of local areas of high conflict.OTI served to establish confidence that there are

institutions willing to work with people to help re-buildtheir lives, and restoring their faith that the peaceprocess can yield positive and tangible results. (146)

Washington withdraws OTI from

participation in a small project in thedespeje, showing the political limits tothe peace process.


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US Concerns With and Approachesto the Colombian Peace Policy Cancellation of OTI project in the despeje showed U.S.

was afraid of being perceived as tacitly acceptingguerrilla participation in US-funded initiatives (147).

U.S. was unwilling to offer incentives for negotiations tothe guerrillas.

U.S. wanted to increase pressure on FARC to negotiatevia military pressure Tactical defeats suffered by the government security

forces at the hands of the FARC in recent years hasemboldened the FARC and provided little incentive for

the to engage in meaningful or substantive peacenegotiations with the GOC.General Charles Wilhelm


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oncerns an pproac esto the Colombian Peace Policy(cont.)

U.S. policy makers were concerned with economicgains the FARC was making via connections withnarco-trafficking. If the FARC was earning $200 million a year, what were

the incentives to throw in the towel and become potatofarmers? (149).

Two perspectives blended together during the

Clinton administration to form policies inColombia: the strengthening of Colombiansecurity forces, as well as an emphasis oncounternarcotics to weaken the guerrillas andparamilitaries.These perspectives came together in Plan Colombia.


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Plan ColombiaThe focus of this chapter could leave the

impression that the Clinton administrationpolicy toward Colombia had as its centralorganizing principle the peace process.

Nothing could be farther from thetruththe only issue in Colombia that wasportrayed as directly affecting vital U.S.interests was drugs (149).


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Plan ColombiaDuring the first four years of his

administration, Clinton resisted pressuresfrom war hawks to provide Colombia withmore sophisticated equipment.

As coca cultivation expanded by 50%between 1996 and 1998, however,pressures for modernization of Colombianarmed forces grew.


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Key Points Regarding ClintonsPlan ColombiaU.S. administration officials called for a

strategies addressing Colombias multiplecrises, not just drugs. This idea helpedpolicies gain leverage in Congress and

Colombia.U.S. involvement was not simply limited to

a Latin American Marshall Plan.Despite this, however, Plan Colombia was

defined by its spending on militaryassistance.


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Key Points Regarding ClintonsPlan Colombia (cont.)


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Reactions to Plan ColombiaPastrana to the Washington Post: the aid

package the United States [proposes] is nota military package; its an anti-narcoticspackage (151).

Other nations took offense to the U.S.bilateral plan; Non-U.S. contributions toPlan Colombia were a third of what wasexpected.

In response, European governmentsincreased diplomatic involvement in thepeace process.


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Bush Administrations Plan ColombiaPolicy

Until the terrorist attacks of September 11changed the tone and focus of U.S. policy inColombia, the Bush administration largelystayed the course set by President Clinton(153).Bush redressed the gap between economic

and military aid to Colombia, but by less than2%.

Source: http://www.ciponline.org/facts/0512eras.pdf

(In Millions) 2000 2002

Military/Police 765.49 401.93

Economic/Social

214.31 120.30Percentage Military 78.12% 76.96%
http://www.ciponline.org/facts/0512eras.pdfhttp://www.ciponline.org/facts/0512eras.pdf


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Bush Administration PolicyFollowing September 11, 2001[FARC ] is the most dangerous international

terrorist group based in this hemisphere

-State Department for CounterterrorismFrancis X. Taylor

Were not going to engage in counter-insurgency in Colombia because there is noinsurgency in ColombiaWhat you have is

three terrorist groups that operate asorganized crime familiesthese are notinsurgents. These are criminals. These areterrorists.

-Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich


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Whither the Peace Process2002: lvaro Uribe takes

office in Colombia.U.S. Intelligence

concludes that, whileMarulanda [was] tellingthe truth, Pastranaallowed paramilitaryforces to double in size,giving them political

power throughoutColombia (155).U.S. must focus on all

non-state armedactors, left and right,

not just the battle


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The Fate of ColombiaA future, comprehensive peace process will

only function if:The Colombia government combats violent

actors on both the left and right.

The United States:combats paramilitarismpursues economic policies to expand the economy

beyond alternative developmentis willing to engage FARC politically and

diplomaticallySupporting agrarian and tax reform, not just drug

reform

zach nixon's powerpoint of wellna chapter 5: the peace process in colombia and u.s. policy

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