youth, politics and social youth, politics and social
TRANSCRIPT
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary IndonesiaNurman Nowak
Imprint©2021 Friedrich-Ebert-StiftungIndonesia OfficeJalan Kemang Selatan II No. 2 A | Jakarta 12730INDONESIA
Responsible :Sergio Grassi | Resident Director
Phone : +62-21-7193711Fax : +62-21-71791358Email : [email protected]: www.fes-indonesia.org
Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES.
About the author: Nurman Nowak has a Master in Southeast Asian Studies and is a PhD-candidate at the University of Göttingen, currently conducting field research in urban poor communities in Jakarta. Previously he worked for FES Indonesia where he participated in political education programs focusing on youth and has written extensively about the political and civil society development in contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany.The foundation is named after Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany. With an international network of more than 100 countries worldwide, it contributes to fostering the core of social democracy – freedom, solidarity and social justice.
FES established its Indonesia Representative Office in 1968 and since 2012 has been in cooperation with the Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture (Kemenko PMK) Republic of Indonesia in order to pursue social justice in politics, the economy and in the society as one of FES leading principles worldwide, FES Indonesia has been conducting various activities in recent years to support the Social Security Reform, Welfare State, and Social Economic Development in Indonesia as well as promoting Indonesia as a reference to other countries in the region and at the international level for democratization, socio-economic and peaceful development.
www.fes-indonesia.org
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
Imprint©2021 Friedrich-Ebert-StiftungIndonesia OfficeJalan Kemang Selatan II No. 2 A | Jakarta 12730INDONESIA
Responsible :Sergio Grassi | Resident Director
Phone : +62-21-7193711Fax : +62-21-71791358Email : [email protected]: www.fes-indonesia.org
Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany.The foundation is named after Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany. With an international network of more than 100 countries worldwide, it contributes to fostering the core of social democracy – freedom, solidarity and social justice.
FES established its Indonesia Representative Office in 1968 and since 2012 has been in cooperation with the Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture (Kemenko PMK) Republic of Indonesia in order to pursue social justice in politics, the economy and in the society as one of FES leading principles worldwide, FES Indonesia has been conducting various activities in recent years to support the Social Security Reform, Welfare State, and Social Economic Development in Indonesia as well as promoting Indonesia as a reference to other countries in the region and at the international level for democratization, socio-economic and peaceful development.
www.fes-indonesia.org
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
Content
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement
in Contemporary Indonesia .................................................1
Introduction .........................................................................2
The role and legacy of youth activism in Indonesia ........3
Youth activism and the emergence of new arenas of struggle ................................................................................4
Youth and student activism in the Jokowi-era: A polarized society ..............................................................7
Youth and formal politics in the Jokowi-era .....................8
Beyond formal politics – New forms and ways of participation ......................................................................10
Youth policies, the government and the corona crisis ... 13
Approaching a new juncture ............................................ 15
Bibliography ........................................................................... 17
List of Abbreviations ..........................................................20
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
1
Executive Summary:
▪ (IndonesianyouthmakeupaquarterofIn-
donesian society and youth development
is decisive for the country’s future socio-
economicdevelopmentas ademographic
bonusisreached.Theyarethedriverofthe
digitalizationofeverydaylife,asmorethan
80%areconnectedtothe internet.Social
media is widely used, mainly to connect
with their peers, but it also serves as an
importantsourceofinformationaboutthe
generalstateofaffairs.)
▪ Youth have played a decisive role at all
historical junctures of Indonesia’s politi-
cal development, especially the student
movement. Yet the transformationof the
politicalsystemintheearly2000sbrought
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
Nurman Nowak, University of Göttingen14 January 2021
about its decline intomarginalizationand
hascausedapolarizationdefinedbyacon-
servative Islamic right and a democratic,
liberal/progressive left that defined Indo-
nesian politics for the largest part of the
pasttwodecades.
▪ Thedemographicdominanceofyouthren-
ders thempotentially a decisive electoral
factoras theymakeupabout50%of the
electorate.Millennials andGenZhowever
areperceivedasreluctant inparticipating
in formal politics, despite being (or per-
haps because they are) better informed
aboutpolitics than anyother group.New
alternative forms of activism have since
emerged,betheypoliticalorsocial,online
andoffline,whichcounterstheclaimofpo-
liticalapathy.Theirengagement,however,
2
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
is limitedto the localaffairsandstructur-
alshortcomingsofIndonesiancivilsociety
hamperingthedevelopmentofinstitution-
alizedandinternationalcooperation.
▪ TheeffectsoftheCOVID19-pandemichave
imposeddevastatingeffectsontheyoung
generation.Youthhavebeen identifiedas
the most vulnerable group to unemploy-
ment and as internet access is unequally
distributed along social and geographic
(urban/rural divide) lines, the study-from-
home measures (closure of schools and
universities), will consolidate social in-
equalities and have long term effects for
the development of youths in underprivi-
legedpositions.
▪ In thepast two years, the studentmove-
ment has appeared to revive itself and
showssignsofovercomingthepolarization
of thepastdecadesas thegovernment is
beingcriticizedoffallingbackintoauthori-
tarianpatternsofgovernancewhichinturn
has brought about a new common cause
andmoralcallingtodefendthedemocrat-
ic and liberal achievements of the refor-
masi-movement. However, a momentum
of Islamic tinged right-wing populism is
threateningtoco-optthisrevivedstudent
andyouthagitationaugmentedbythede-
structiveeffectsofcorona-policies.
Introduction
The future belongs to the youth!isaphrase
often heard by politicians and activists and
indeed,aglimpseintothehistoryofthepast
let’ssay100yearsshowsthatiftheyouthor-
ganizesitsrebelliousenergyandtakesastand
intheaffairsofthenationoreventheworld,
unthinkablechangeispossible.Socialupheav-
als, technological progress, economic, and
politicaltransitionsandtherealizationsofuto-
piaareoftenunleashedandwelcomedbythe
young generation. Yet theymay also be the
firstat the receivingendof theirdestructive
side-effectsandcrisesthataredecisiveforthe
futureofacommunity,society,nationoreven
theworld.
Indonesia lawUU no. 40 of 2009 defines
youthasIndonesiancitizensbetweentheage
of16and30years.Contemporarydiscourses
divide them into the millennial generation,
bornbetween1981and1997andGenZ,born
between1998and2010.Accordingtoofficial
numbers,thereare64,19millionyouthsincon-
temporaryIndonesiaasdefinedbythestate,
one quarter of the entire population (BPS
2019).ThefateofIndonesia’sfuturedevelop-
ment restson their shoulders, aspopulation
developmentisapproachingtheso-calledde-
mographic bonus,ademographicconditionin
whichtheproductivepopulationoutnumbers
thenon-productiveone.Ifmanagedproperly,
thisdemographicbonuscanbringaboutposi-
tiveeffectsforsustainedeconomicgrowthbut
itrequiresgreateffortsintermsofeducation
andemploymentopportunitiesbythestateto
createfavorableconditionsforthistohappen
(BPS2019).Inthemeantime,itisthecommer-
cialsectorthatisgoingtogreatlengthstowin
consumersfromthisgroupwithconsumerism
being rampant, especially amongurbanmid-
dleanduppermiddle-classyouth.Asthefirst
digitalnativesinhistory,youtharethedriving
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
3
forcebehindthedigitalizationofeverydaylife.
AccordingtothelatestyouthreportofAlvara
Institute 88,4% of millennials and 93,9% of
GenZareconnected to the internetwith the
latterspendingmorethansevenhoursonline
everydaygivingevidencetotheclaimthatIn-
donesianyouthareutterlytechsavvy(Aliand
Purwandi2020).
This article is, however, concerned with
the role of Indonesian youth in politics and
civilsociety.Theupcomingchapterswillshed
lightonthepoliticaldevelopmentof Indone-
siafromayouthandstudentperspective.As
we shall see, their contributions have been
decisiveinbringingaboutthecurrentstateof
politicalaffairsandduetotheirdemographic
mass,theyarepotentiallyapowerfulpolitical
force. Challenging the claim that millennials
andGenZareapathetictopolitics,newforms
andways of political and social engagement
willbepresentedandfinally,theeffectsofthe
coronapandemicinconjunctionwiththenew-
estpoliticaldevelopmentswillbeputforward.
The role and legacy of youth activism in Indonesia
The famous IndonesianwriterPramoedya
AnantaToeroncestated that the“historyof
theworld is thehistoryof its youth”and in-
deed, youth and students have played a de-
cisiveroleatimportanthistoricaljunctionsin
thecountry’spoliticaldevelopmentasaback-
dropfromthesocialandpoliticalchangesthey
experienced.
Itwasyouthwhowereattheforefrontof
the nationalist movement that emerged in
theearly20thcenturytoresistandeventually
overcomecolonialism.Inameetingin1926in
Batavia, today’s Jakarta, theyouthfulattend-
eespledged loyaltytothe IndonesianNation
based on the principles of one unified land,
one nation andone language. Every year on
28th October the so-called sumpah pemuda
(youth pledge) is commemoratedwith a na-
tionalholiday.17years later inAugust1945,
theJapanesegovernment,whosetroopsoccu-
pied the Indonesian archipelago at thetime,
surrenderedtotheallies.Withtheoccupying
forcedefeated and the former colonialmas-
ters still away, a nationalist euphoria broke
out. Fanatic radical nationalist youth-groups,
the Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth),
were at the forefront to demand immediate
independence. Impatient towait any longer,
agangofpemudakidnapedSukarno,thepre-
eminent leader of the nationalist cause, to
force him to finally proclaim independence
thenextmorning,the17thAugust1945.Inthe
subsequentIndonesian revolutionyouthfrom
all backgrounds formed thebackboneof the
armyoftherepublicofIndonesiathatfought
British andDutch forces.General Soedirman
himselfwasonly29yearsoldwhenvotedinas
commanderinchief.Thepemudaareseenas
theprimaryactorsinIndonesia’snationalrev-
olutionandheraldedasheroesinthegeneral
publictothisday.
Twenty years later, in 1965 another junc-
ture of Indonesian history was reached in
whichyouthfulprotagonistswouldplayakey
role, prompting the emergence of the most
important youth movement in Indonesia –
thestudentmovement.Inthemid-1960sthe
4
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
politicalclimateinIndonesiawasatatipping
point as President Sukarno and the commu-
nist party of Indonesia (PKI) grew ever clos-
er which worried the conservative sections
of themilitary and the Islamic-oriented part
of society. Tensions eventually escalated in
1965 and prompted anticommunist students
tofoundtheIndonesianStudentActionFront
(KesatuanAksiMahasiswaIndonesia–KAMI)
thatorganizedmassprotestsdemanding the
banofthePKI,apurgeofleftistsfromcabinet
and eventually the dismantling of the Sukar-
no-government.
Whatfollowedintheupcomingyearswas
the establishment of an authoritarian state
withthemilitaryasitsmainpillarandgener-
alSuhartoasPresidentatitshelm.Basiccivil
rightswere scrappedand anypolitical agita-
tion outside strict government-controlled in-
stitutions was suppressed, though with one
exception:Oncethecampuseswerecleansed
of leftist elements, the studentswhohelped
toset-uptheNewOrderregimewerealmost
exclusivelytheonlygroupinIndonesiansoci-
etybestowedwiththeprivilegetoopenlycrit-
icize the government. A newnotionwas de-
velopedthatwouldframestudentactivismto
thisday:thestudentsasamoral force. Inthis
understanding,politicalagitationbystudents
is “motivated bymoral principles and ethics
uncontaminated by the dirty and corrupting
world of politics” (Aspinal 2012). Students
maytakeactiontosavethenationattimesof
crisisandassuchstudentactivistspositioned
themselvesasstaunchbutloyalcriticsofthe
Suharto regime,demanding integrity,criticiz-
inguncheckeddestructivedevelopmentalism
withtheaimhowevertostabilizetheregime
theyhadhelpedtobringintopower.
In the 1970s, massive student protests
swept through the streets which provoked
the enactment of the campus-life normal-
ization acts (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus
- NKK) that suppressed political agitation on
university campuses. This policy did curtail
any studentactivism fora considerabletime
but it also pushed themore outspoken and
radicalstudents intotheundergroundwhere
they developed clandestine structures. In
themeantimeeconomicconsolidation led to
theexpansionoftheIndonesianmiddleclass
whoseyouthflockedtothecampuses.While
therewere about 255.000 students in 1970,
this number rose to 1,6million in 1990 and
thento3,6millionstudentsbythelate1990s
(Aspinall 2012) making university students a
considerable socialmass.With this increase,
theclandestinestructuresofstudentactivism
eventuallyexpandedinthelate1990s.When
theAsianfinancialcrisisof1997hitthecoun-
try, another decisive historical junction was
approached. Student activists mobilized the
studentmassesandsetthescenefortheen-
suingpopularuprising–thereformasi move-
ment-thatdemandedandeventuallyrealized
ademocraticIndonesia.
Youth activism and the emergence of new arenas of struggle
Civil rights among others the freedom of
press,speech,assemblyandassociationwere
restoredandthefirstfreeandfairparliamen-
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
5
tary elections with 48 participating parties
tookplacein1999.Thesubsequentfiveyears
saw tremendouschangewith the implemen-
tation of a decentralization of power from
thenational to thedistrict level.While 1998
–2001sawthreepresidentscomingandgoing
i.e. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wa-
hid(1999-2001)andMegawatiSukarnoputeri
(2001-2004),aphaseofrelativecalmensued
with the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yud-
hoyono(2004-2014),thefirstdirectlyelected
presidentinIndonesianhistory.
Itwasin1999-2004,theperiodwhenpow-
erstructureswerebeingreorganized,thatthe
studentmovementshowedsignsofdissolution
astherealizationtookholdthattheideaofa
unified student movement solely motivated
bymoralprinciplesisamyth.AsYatunSastra-
midjajapointedout,thesuccessofthestudent
movementtogarnersupport fromthewider
populationintopplingtheSuhartoregimewas
the result of its ideological diversity thereby
making itpossible to reachout toallmilieus
of Indonesian society (Sastramidjaja 2019a).
Once the unifying cause vanished, ideologi-
cal differences and personalized loyalties to
politicalelitescametothefore,whichpitted
studentsgroupsagainsteachother,causinga
processoffragmentationthathaslastedever
since. Themaindivisions canbe roughly de-
finedastwopolitico-culturalstreams,the Is-
lamicstreamandthestudentleft.
Many researchers of Indonesia’s transi-
tion to democracy agree that it was main-
ly the activist work of the student left that
eventuallybroughtaboutthefalloftheNew
Order as theywere the first to demand the
abolishmentofthemilitary’spreeminentpo-
sitionandtheresignationofPresidentSuhar-
tohencedepartingatleastpartiallyfromthe
moral force-notion. Their ideological outlook
is based on (neo-)marxist ideas of the New
Left, the Frankfurt school of philosophy and
otherleftistschoolsofthought.Aselsewhere
intheworld,thestudentleftisandwasalways
ideologicallydivided,buttheyshareagener-
alvisionfortheircountryi.e.anopensociety
with a just distribution of wealth, a cultural
andpoliticalsystemthatisinclusivetoallcit-
izens irrespectiveof religions,ethnicity, class
etc. anddemocratic structures in all spheres
of government and the economy.Numerous
leftist student organizations existed in the
yearsofthelongtransition(early1989–2004)
yetsplinteringandthedepartureofimportant
activistnetworksintoformalpoliticshaveled
toitsdeclineintomarginalization(ibid).
Yetthisisbynomeanstheendofprogres-
sive youth structures in Indonesia’s political
landscape. The democratization of the Indo-
nesian system led to amassive increase and
expansion of an independent civil society in
whichactorsareoperatingatallspheresfrom
thedistrictstothenationallevel.Whilesome
activistsbecamepoliticians,manyothersen-
teredor foundednewCivilSocietyOrganiza-
tions(CSO)inthefieldsofhumanrights,legal
aid,thefightforlandrightsoftheindigenous,
farmer’s, urbanpoor, theworker’s, theenvi-
ronmentalist movement, women and youth
empowerment etc. These structures are viv-
idandattractiveforstudentsandyouthwith
a progressive leaning and idealistmindset in
6
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
contemporaryIndonesia(ibid).
Theseorganizationsareoftenlooselycon-
nected to eachother in the formof person-
alizedactivistnetworks i.e.manyknoweach
other from campus or conferences, yet in-
stitutionalized cooperation is hampered by
structural weaknesses such as competition
for funding and affiliations to opposing pa-
tronage-networks.WhilemanyCSOsarepart
of international networks and their agendas
refertotheUN-SDGs,mostofthemfocuson
issuesoflocalsignificance(Aspinall2012).
The other side of the spectrum is domi-
natedbypolitical Islamwhichhasever since
beenan importantpillar in Indonesia’s polit-
ical and socio-cultural landscape,andgained
a renewed tractionwith the so-called Islam-
ic awakening i.e. the increaseof religiouspi-
ety among youth and the wider society. Its
emergence was sparked by the agitation of
studentsreturningfromthemiddleeastwho
wereinspiredbydakhwa-groups(Islamicmis-
sionarygroups)theyencounteredthere.They
preached in communities throughout the ar-
chipelago and found receptive audiences as
religionprovidesfororientationinthefaceof
fundamentalsocialchangessparkedbyrapid
development and rampant urbanization. Is-
lamic organizations are among themost ac-
tiveandsociallyinfluential.Todaytheycanbe
divided into a mainstream and conservative
camp,andbotharerepresentedbynumerous
student and youth organizations, off and on
campus.
The mainstream Islamic camp is among
others represented by the HMI (Himpunan
MahasiwaIndonesia–IslamicIndonesianstu-
dent association) that finds its roots in the
pre-NewOrderandhasa followingof about
500.000 students. HMImaintains links to all
Islamic parties in the current post-reformasi
erabutinsistsonbeingindependent.Itsalum-
niaretobefoundinpowerfulpositionsinthe
civilservice,parliamentandcivilsociety(Inter-
viewFajarIman).TogetherwithotherIslamic
organizationsitremainsthemainprotagonist
ofdakhwa-activities(Islamicmissionaryactiv-
ities)oncampus.
TheIslamicawakeningalsogaverisetocon-
servativeIslamicgroupsofwhichdakhwa tar-
biyahisthemostimportantprotagonist,culti-
vatingaformofstudyand interpretationsof
theholyIslamicscripturesinaliteralmanner,
thetheologicalfoundationofreligiousfunda-
mentalism.AdherentsoftheEgypt-basedbut
transitionally oriented Muslim brotherhood
infiltrated Indonesiancampuses in the1980s
and 1900s through the tarbiyah’s channels,
popularizing teachings of Islamist thinkers
likeSayydQubt.In1998,activistsfromthese
networks in unison with other conservative
oriented student groups founded KAMMI
(Kesatuan AksiMahasiswaMuslim Indonesia
–IndonesianMuslimaAction’sfront).KAMMI
maintainsstronglinkstoPKS(PartaiKeadilan
Sejahtera) a conservative Islamist party and
offshootoftheMuslimBrotherhood(Laskow-
ska2019).
In contrast to the student left the Islamic
movement has developed a strong ideolog-
ical foothold in Indonesia with representa-
tioninparliamentthroughPKSandlong-term
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
7
strategies of political agitation based on de-
cades-longideologicalsocializationsof itsse-
niorandjunioradherers.Islamicconservative
organizations are themost popular and suc-
cessfulorganizationsamongMuslimstudents
representedby amyriadof organizationson
and off campus (Sastramidjaja 2019a).Many
maintainaninternationaloutlookintheircalls
ofIslamicsolidaritye.g.bysupportingthePal-
estinian intifadaor theUighurs in China and
hold meetings with Islamic groups in other
countries.
The power of the conservative Islamic
movement ledbyyouthfulactivists isbest il-
lustratedbytheirsuccessfulconquestofhege-
monyinIndonesianIslaminthemid-2000s.At
theendofthe20thcentury,IslaminIndonesia
hadareputationofbeingexceptionallytoler-
antasaresultoftheinfluenceofliberalmind-
ed Islamic intellectualswho led the twopre-
eminentIslamicmassorganizationsNahdlatul
UlamaandMuhammadiyah.Theywereeven-
tuallysidelinedasanewgenerationofyoung
Islamicactivists,socializedandgroomedinthe
conservativetabliya-networks,weresuccess-
ful in installing conservativeUlamas (Islamic
scholars) in strategic positions. Soon fatwas
i.e. non-binding legal opinionswere enacted
statingthatpluralism,secularismand liberal-
ism are incompatible with Islamic teachings,
a heavy assault on the progressive develop-
ments since reformasi ushered in (van Bru-
inessen2012).
The effect of this “conservative turn”
(ibid) in Indonesian Islam led to increased
intolerance, persecution and in parts vio-
lent actions against religious and sexual mi-
norities. Discourses emerged that suggested
thatitisagainstIslamicteachingsforwomen
and non-Muslims to exert power overMus-
limmajority populations in high offices. This
conservative Islamic movement represents
acountermovement that intends todoaway
with the progressive achievements since the
fallofSuharto. It couldstriveand impose its
influence on Indonesian society also due to
the laissez-faire and inclusive approach of
theSBY-administration(2004-2014), thatwas
moreco-optingthanconfrontingconservative
forces. And like its progressive antipode this
illiberal countermovement finds a large part
ofitsmembershipamongstudentsandother
youthsinthewiderIndonesiansociety.
Youth and student activism in the Jokowi-era: A polarized society
Thispolarization isan importantdriverof
politicalagitationincontemporaryIndonesia.
When this countermovement is plotting an-
other assault onprogressive institutions, the
othersidewillmobilizeitsadhererstodefend
the achievements they have fought for and
vice-versa.
In2014thispolarizationwouldreachafirst
climaxinthecontextofthepresidentialelec-
tions. Islamist groups joined forceswithPra-
bowoSubianto,ex-soninlawofSuharto,for-
mer general of the Indonesian armed forces
deemed responsible for the violence against
the reformasi movement and now presiden-
tialcandidate.HiscontenderwasJokoWido-
8
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
do (or Jokowi),whomaintained an image as
a progressive newcomer, untainted by the
corruptionthatremainsnotoriousamongthe
politicalelite,theradicalantipodetotheNew
OrdergeneralPrabowo.In2012,hewonthe
Jakarta-elections,makinghimgovernorofIn-
donesia’s capital before the PDI-P party em-
bracedhimaspresidentialcandidatein2014.
The 2014 presidential elections were
deemeddecisiveforthefutureofIndonesia’s
politicaldevelopment,whichmobilizedmany
formerreformasi-activistsofthestudentleft.
Theywould unite behind Jokowi and form a
network called Seknas Jokowi. This network
succeededinmobilizingthousandsofyouthful
volunteersfromamyriadofprogressivesocial
movementsthatwouldboostJokowi’syouth-
ful, corruption-free image which turned out
decisive inpersuadingvotersofthemillenni-
algenerationinJokowi’sfavor.(Sastramidjaja
2019b)
TheJokowierathatlaststothisdaywould
turnouttobeatumultuousoneandconsol-
idatethepolarizationwhichescalated in late
2016whenthebiggestdemonstrationsinde-
cadeseruptedinJakarta.Hisformervice-gov-
ernor Basuki Tjahja Purnama (or Ahok), a
Chinese Indonesian and Christian, had since
taken over the governor-office once Jokowi
becamepresident.InSeptember,avideowith
doctoredsubtitlesbecameviral showinghim
allegedlyinsultingIslaminaspeech.On2Dec.
2016massprotestswith500.000participants
underthenotionbela islam(defendIslam)led
bythecontroversialulamaRizieqShihabwere
unleashed demanding Ahok’s prosecution
(GrassiandNowak2017).Manyofthedemon-
stratorsweremembersofthemillennialgen-
eration,seniorpupilsof Islamichighschools,
university students and independent youth
following the call to “defend their religion”.
ThisIslamist-tingedanti-Ahokmovementhad
asoursideeffectastheeventsposedachal-
lenge to Indonesia’s pluralist and inclusive
national culture. This then sparked counter
demonstrations with thousands of partici-
pants,mainlyfromtheurbanmiddle-andup-
perclassinfavorofAhokandindefenseofthe
pluralistandinclusivenarrativeofIndonesia’s
nation-building.Buttheiractivismwasinvain.
In the upcoming gubernatorial elections of
February2017AniesBaswedan,whohassince
been embraced by PKS and Prabowo’s party
Gerindra, won by harnessing religious senti-
mentswhile Ahokwas soon after sentenced
toatwo-yearjailterm.
Youth and formal politics in the Jokowi-era
TheIndonesiandemographicdevelopment
hasbestowedanotherstrategicpositiononIn-
donesianyouth–thedecisivenessoftheyouth
vote that representsalmost50%of theelec-
torateinpresidentialelections.
The 2014 elections are generally consid-
eredthefirstIndonesianelectionswithaspe-
cial onlineelection campaign catering to the
youthonsocialmediaandYouTube. In2019,
both camps spentmillions of dollars for on-
linecampaignsonmultiplesocialmediaplat-
formsandwouldgotogreatlengthstocreate
a youthful imageof their respectiveelection
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
9
candidates(Sastramidjaja2019b).
When president Jokowi entered the Stadi-
umtoopenthe2018AsianGames,herode in
onabigchopperbike,wearingaDenimjacket
andwhitesneakers-hiselectioncampaignout-
fit.Soonafter,hepresentedhisadministration’s
infrastructuredevelopmentachievementsinthe
samevein,bytouringPapuaonamotorbikewith
somemembersofhiscabinet.Instagram,Twit-
terandFacebookfeedswouldsoonbeflooded
with thesepicturesandvideos, impressing the
millennialsandGenZasthecommentssuggest.
The Prabowo-team on the other hand picked
SandiagaUnoastherunningmate,apolitician
inhis40swhomadehisfortuneasabusiness-
man in theUS andwould soonmodel his im-
age after prominent entrepreneurs like Elon
Musk–thenewrolemodelsofthemillennials
andGenZ.Influencerswithmillionsoffollowers
werehiredtospeakupinhisfavorcontributing
to the #gantipresiden-campaign (change pres-
ident-campaign). And both camps would urge
theirsupporterstobecybertrooperswhowould
comment,sharepostsandcreatememes.How-
ever,besidesthissymbolism,therewaslittlethat
correspondedwith the actual problems youth
arefacingi.e.education,affordablelivingaswell
as improving “youth facilities’’ in public places
(Irwanto2020)
Whilethe2014presidentialelectionswere
deemed decisive for the direction of Indo-
nesia’s future political development and the
young votewasidentifiedasthekeyforJoko-
wi’svictory,oneshouldnotehoweverthatless
than50%of themactuallycasted theirvote.
Andwhilethegeneralelectionparticipationin
2019reachedanewhighwith80%,theyouth
votewasagainrelativelylow.
This gives evidence to the claim ofmany
youth studies that millennials and GenZ are
apathetictoformalpoliticswhileatthesame
timebetter informedthananyothergenera-
tionalgroupabout thepoliticalaffairsof the
day (ChenandSyailendra2014,Tumenggung
and Nugroho 2005). Political news typical-
lypopsup inFacebook,Twitteror Instagram
feeds somewhere between cat videos and
selfies.Apathy,however,doesnotnecessari-
lymeandisinterest. In2019, vloggerVincent
Ricardo’sfactcheckingvideoabouttheclaims
madeintheelectiondebatesearnedhimmil-
lionsofviews (Insani2019).Hencemanyob-
servers suggest to interpret this apathy as a
reactiontothedirectionthedemocratictran-
sitionhastakenofwhichyouthareverywell
aware.
Whilenominallythetrackrecordofdemoc-
ratizationseemsimpressive,anumberofstud-
ieshavecometotheconclusionthatthenew
democratic institutions have been captured
byoldeconomicandpoliticalelites.Manyof
thenewpoliticalpartiese.g.representpoliti-
calvehiclesofformercroniesclosetotheSu-
harto-familywhoreestablishedthemselvesas
powerfulinfluentialfigures(RobisonandHad-
iz 2004). Politics is considered anelite affair,
wheretheinterestsofthecommongoodtake
abackseat.Arelatedissueisthenotorietyof
corruption scandals. Just recently a cabinet
memberwas arrested for his involvement in
a graft case related to COVID19 relief goods
(Fachrinasyah2020).Corruption,collusionand
10
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
nepotismare as rampant in the new system
astheywereintheoldandagainstthisback-
groundtheyounggeneration’sapathytofor-
malpoliticsiscomprehensible.
Asoneresponsetothis,anumberofjour-
nalistsandformeractivistsfoundedthePartai
SolidaritasIndonesia(PSI)in2013,aself-pro-
claimedmillennialparty“nolongerhostageto
oldpolitical interests,bad track records,his-
toricallegaciesandbadimagesfromprevious
parties”.Toobtainandholdoffice,onecannot
beolderthan45yearsoldand50percentof
partyofficialsneedtobefemale.Theiragen-
da comes in a progressive anti-intolerance,
anti-corruption andpro-pluralist rhetoric yet
themembershipofindividualsknowntohave
beeninvolvedincorruptioncasesandtransac-
tionalpoliticsandtheunconditionalsupportof
controversial law-enactments have tarnished
thisimageconsiderably(Sastramidjaja2019b).
Student organizations at campuses that
are linked to youthwings of political parties
havesincetriedtomarketthemselvesinmore
un-political non-partisan ways as a study
about students’ organizations at Universitas
Indonesia shows. The Gerindra-linked (Par-
bowoparty)TIDARe.g.promotesa“fivelove
philosophy”basedon“self-love,mutuallove,
love for learningand love for thegoodman-
neredandloveforIndonesia’’whilethePDI-P
(Jokowi-party)-linkedGMNIhasa“non-parti-
san, non-conformist appeal to studentswho
are secular-minded, into indie-rock and con-
cernedabouttheindigenousstateofaffairsof
therepublicatthegrassrootslevel”(Chenand
Syailandra2014).
Apathytopoliticsisalsoapparentintheex-
tra-parliamentarysphere,perhapsbestillustrat-
edbythemarginalizationofthestudentmove-
ment. Andwhile there is indeed a strong par-
ticipationof youth inother socialmovements,
betheyconservative,progressiveorotherwise,
this is not representative of Indonesian youth
in general. Additionally, these movements are
notyouthmovementsintheliteralsensei.e.de-
mandingrightsandairinggrievancesforandof
theyounggenerationsuchasFridays for Future
intheWest,butrepresentparticularisticorsec-
tionalinterestsinwhichyouthagitatealongside
activistsfromothergenerations.
Asfarasthemarginalizationofthestudent
movementisconcerned,therearealsostruc-
turalfactorsthathavetobetakenintoconsid-
erationthathaunttheentiresociallandscape.
Arenewedtrendofprivatizationinthepolicies
ofhighereducationexcludesyouthofunder-
privilegedbackgroundsfromuniversitieswho
cannotaffordthefeeswhichhamperpolitical
agitation.Studentscomplainoftightersched-
ulesandhigherworkloads,theaccompanying
features of such policies leaving little time
and space for social engagement. Likewise,
campusauthoritieshavebecomeincreasingly
intolerant with student activism on campus
(Sastramidjaja2019a).
Beyond formal politics – New forms and ways of participation
Youthapathytopoliticshoweverdoesnot
meanthatthereisageneralrejectionofsocial
engagement.Whenever another catastrophe
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
11
hitsthecountry,studentsandyouthorganize
donationsandfundstosupportreliefefforts.
Thereisalsoastrongdemandforvolunteering
activitiese.g.asteachersinNGO-runschools
for underprivileged children, often based in
so-called urban kampungs, the dwellings of
the urban poor or at places further away in
neglected districts and townswhere the so-
cial infrastructure of government is absent.
Thereliefeffortstocounterthesocialeffects
of the corona crisis is another case in point.
Forseveralmonthsyouthandstudentswere
seen to give out food, hand sanitizers and
masks.Theyassistedinorganizingandsetting
upmake-shifthandwashing sinks and creat-
ed online fund-raising campaigns to finance
their efforts. These forms of social engage-
menthoweverareoftenreferredtoas‘charity
activism’andconsideredbeyondthepolitical
sphere(Sastramidhaja2019b).
Theclaimthatyouthareapoliticalbecomes
evenmorefragileonceonelooksbehindthe
distinctions of the formal and informal. In
fact,lessthan7%ofyouthareactuallyofficial
membersofanorganizationofanysort(Dewi,
2020). Dr.Muhammad Faisal, founder of the
YouthLabIndonesiaandhisteamofcommit-
tedresearchershaveextensivelystudiedIndo-
nesianyouthinanethnographicapproach.
His narrative of contemporary youth en-
gagementstressestheconjunctionofpolitical
activism with independent alternative youth
culture. Beginning in Bandung in the early
2000s, a movement took hold that blended
activismwithindierockmusic,popcultureand
certainfashionstylesthatwassoonpickedup
byyouthinotherIndonesiancities.Anexam-
pleofthiskindofyouthactivismis thepunk
rockbandSuperman ís deadfromBaliandits
huge fan community. In 2015, the band de-
clareditssolidaritywithcoastalcommunities
whowouldlosetheirlivelihoodcausedbyrec-
lamation projects on the Bali coast for new
types of luxurious hotels and resorts. They
wereinvolvedintheattemptstoformasocial
movementunderthenotiontolak reklamasi!
(stop reclamations!) forwhich thebandpro-
videdthesoundtrackofresistanceaswellas
themobilizationof thousandsof youth from
Baliandbeyond.Suchindiepop-cultureinter-
twinedwith (sporadic) activism is ubiquitous
in Indonesian cities and happens in informal
ways, often around musicians and bands in
the underground. The networks and friend-
ship-ties thatdevelop in thesecontexts then
roam the streets if a political issue catches
theirattentionorinamorehands-onactivity,
supporte.g.thecreationofanurbangarden-
ingprojectintheneighborhoodorthefound-
ing of coffee shops that sell the local coffee
(Interview,November2020).
Online activism is another form in which
themillennialandGenZgenerationaredomi-
nant.Althoughfrequentlyreferredtoas‘click-
tivism’withoutanyrealimpactinreality,this
formisoftenconsideredpseudo-activism,yet
thislabelismisleading,astheeffortsbymany
youthe.g.insettingupfact-findinginitiatives
thatdebunkandexposefake-newsisamean-
ingful and important contribution to online
literacy.
Theseexamplesshowthatmuchofthepo-
12
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
liticalandsocialagitationbytheyounggener-
ationgoesunnoticedasithappensininformal
waysoftenlinkedwithotherspheres.
Aselsewhere in theworld,politicalyouth
activism is dominated by members of the
middleclass.Andwhilestudentshaveindeed
become a considerablemass in themillions,
they make up only about 10 percent of the
youthpopulation(BPS2019).Thispointstoa
problemwiththegeneralnotionof‘youth’as
that termbrushesaside thecomplexdiversi-
tythis(quasi-)groupentails.Youtharedivided
byplace(urbanandrural),gender,socialclass,
ethnicity and religion which influences not
only ideological orientation and identity but
alsoinfacttheircapabilitiesofparticipation.
IntheurbanworldofJakarta,socialinequal-
itymanifestsitselfinsocialsegregation.While
theyouthofthemiddleclassspendmuchof
their time in the many shopping malls, the
younggenerationoftheurbanpoorloitersin
theurbankampungsandthestreetsofthecity
insearchofemploymentintheinformalsec-
tor.Themembersofthisyouthgroupwhose
numbersarenotexactlyknownbutreachthe
millions in e.g. greater Jakarta, are a target
forrecruitmentofsocalledpremanorganiza-
tionslikeForumBetawiRempug(FBR–Betawi
BrotherhoodForum)orOrmas like theFront
PembelaIslam(FPI–IslamicDefenderFront).
In the absence of state power, these groups
controlpartsof the informalworld i.e. infor-
mal streetmarkets andbus terminalswhere
they charge protection money from street
vendors and control parking lots. The FPI is
notoriousforitsassaultson“immoral”estab-
lishments like alcohol parlors andbars. Both
organizationshavebeen“hired”inthepastas
streetmusclebyinvestorsorpoliticiansinthe
contextof conflictsover thecontrolanduse
of urban land, and during elections they of-
tenserveasvotingbanksinwhichthehighest
bidder canbuy thousandsofballotsandcan
provideprotestersforstreetdemonstrations.
TheFPIe.g.,playedavitalroleintheorgani-
zationof theanti-Ahokprotestsof2016.Yet
these organizations are also known for their
involvement in charity and community relief
efforts,andmayprotecturbankampungshit
bydisasters from lootingorare soughtafter
asmanpowerinattemptstorebuilddestroyed
urbankampungsafterevictions.Formanyim-
poverished youths, these organizations offer
employmentandawelcomedistractionfrom
thedailystrugglestheyfaceandtheirengage-
ment in relief effortsmay also receive some
appreciation and respect (Ian Wilson 2019).
More importantly though, Habib Rizieq, the
founderandleaderoftheFPIhasrisentobe-
comeapoliticalactor,aligninghimselftothe
anti-Jokowi camp with the result that most
of the urban-based preman and community
organizationsandnetworks linked to theFPI
now represent an oppositional force. They
are howevermore thanmere objects in the
political game of their patrons. In personal
conversations,membersofsuchorganizations
put forward comprehensive and legitimate
reasonsfortheirinvolvement,statingthatthe
movementisgivingthemachancetoairtheir
grievancesagainstthegovernment. Youthful
membersthenbecomeactorsinthepolitical
arenaandthecivilspherethemselves,not in
allinstancesunconsciouslyandattimesdeci-
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
13
siveinthepowerstrugglesthatprevail1.
Youth policies, the government and the corona crisis
Ithasbecomeclearthusfarthatinthepro-
cess of the consolidation of elite politics, is-
suesconcerningthecommongoodhavetaken
abackseatandneoliberalagendasthatfavor
theinterestsofbigbusinessremainthenorm.
Thisalsobecomesevidentintheimplementa-
tionofthegovernment’syouthdevelopment
programs although official state policies and
laws stress the importance of youth for the
futuredevelopmentoftheIndonesiannation.
Thepoliciesofthelasttwodecadesstress
youthentrepreneurshipandthepromotionof
micro,smallandmediumenterprises(UMKM
–Usahamikro,kecildanmenengah)asastra-
tegicfieldtoimprovethewelfareofyouthin
the face of stagnating industrialization that
wouldallowadifferentapproach.Onthe lo-
callevelthemunicipalinstitutionsconcerned
withUMKM-coordination(DinasUMKM)offer
amyriadofeducationalprogramsandfunding
schemes to realize this policy. This policy is
likewiseprettymuch in linewith youthaspi-
rationsasmanystudieshaverevealedthatbe-
coming anentrepreneur is themostpopular
desired occupation of millennials and mem-
bersofGenZ(Faisal2019).
Thepressing issuesamongyouth,howev-
er, are education, (reproductive) health, em-
ployment, food security and the spread of
1 Field Research, Jan. 2020 – Dec. 2020
extremistideology.AsummarybyTheSMERU
ResearchInstitute (Dewi 2020) regarding the
current state of youth (2018/2019) revealed
amongotherthingsthatthequalityofeduca-
tionisinadirestateininternationalcompar-
isonwith Indonesia reaching 72nd place out
of 78 participating countries in the 2018 PI-
SA-study.Intermsofunemployment,thesta-
tisticsshowthatthreeoutoffourunemployed
citizensareyouthdespitemostof themhav-
ingat leastahighschooldegree.Stunting,a
healthconditionthathamperstheearlydevel-
opmentofchildrenduetoimpropernutrition
anddiet remains rampant,which is not only
aproblemoffoodsecuritybutcontributesto
theimpairmentofeducation,anissueparticu-
larlycommonwithyouthfulmothers.
AccordingtoaUNESCO-coordinatedstudy
from2013(Ramadhan2013)thereisnocoor-
dinatedpolicy implementationastherewere
eight different programs coordinated by dif-
ferentministriesdefiningdifferent intentions
and even following different definitions of
youth.ThisconditionaccordingtoFajarIman
Hasanie, a youth researcher fromMerial In-
stitute has not considerably improved since
then (Interview, November 2020) despite a
presidential decree in 2017 that defines this
aim.TheUNESCO-reportfurtherlamentsthat
youth, despite their inherent diversity, are
regarded as a homogenous category which
ignoresproblems thatarespecific forpartic-
ular sub-groups such as teenagemothers or
youthwithspecialneeds.Manyyouthpolicies
hencedonotaddresstheproblemsthatpre-
vailsufficiently.Anotherreasonforthisisthe
insufficientinclusionofyouthorganizationsin
14
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
thedraftingof lawsandpolicydevelopment.
Thefewyouthleaderswhowereconsultedre-
portedthattheirvoicesinthemeetingswere
notheardorignored,alegacyofacultureof
paternalismoftheneworderera,inwhichso-
cietywasseenasabigfamilyinwhichchildren
oryoutharetoobeytheelderlyi.e.thesenior
civilservants,andarenottodemandconces-
sions nor air grievances. The report further
acknowledgestheworkandsuccessfulimpact
of NGOs and youth organizations, especially
thosewhoconsiderthespecificconditionsof
thelocalorsectoralenvironment,butcriticiz-
es thatmany of them are not eligible to re-
ceivefundingfromyouthprogrambudgetsas
theseorganizationsoftendonotqualifytobe
recognizedasyouthorganizationsasdefined
byanoutdatedregistrationprocessprovision.
Theseproblemshoweverrepresentedthe
statusquobeforethecoronapandemichitthe
country. In thetimeofwriting,earlyDecem-
ber2020,therehavebeenmorethan586.000
positive corona cases and 18.000 have per-
ished - and counting. While youth are less
pronetoseverecasesofthediseasetheyare
affectedbythepandemicinotherways.
Asabackdropfromtheviruscontainment
measures,theIndonesianeconomyhassince
tumbled into a recession causing the loss of
2,76 Million jobs. In total, 9.77 million peo-
plewereunemployed inAugust 2020, upby
37.61percent fromAugust 2019as reported
inearlyNovember(Akhlas2020a).Youthhave
been hit considerably harder than any oth-
ergenerationalgroup.According tostatistics
bytheministryofmanpower,67,7%ofyouth
agedbetween15and19,27,7%agedbetween
20 and24 years andfinally 11,65%agedbe-
tween 24 and 29 have lost their jobs (Dewi
2020).Thesefiguresonlyshowthesituationin
theformalsector.Theinformalsector,where
most of theurbanpoor youthsfindemploy-
menthasbeenhitevenharder.
There will likewise be long term effects
in youth development in the years to come.
In June 2020 the government decided a
COVID19-stimulusbudgetof695,2 trillion In-
donesianRupiah(Rp.)(ca.49,3billionUS-Dol-
lars)tosupporttheeconomyandfundsocial
reliefprogramsandmedicaltreatments(Akh-
las 2020b). The reshuffling of the state bud-
get to finance this endeavor required costs
inotherministry’sbudgetswhichwillhavea
lastingeffectontheimplementationofpolicy
programs,includingthosethatcatertoyouth.
In thecapitalandsomeareas throughout
Indonesia,schoolsanduniversitieshavebeen
shut for weeks if not months with students
urgedtostudyfromhome.Structuraldispari-
tieswillwidenthegapbetweentheprivileged
andtheunderprivilegedevenfurtherasinter-
netaccessisunevenlydistributedwhilestudy
conditionsathomedifferconsiderably,posing
achallengeforpoorerandruralyouthtokeep
up.
Approaching a new juncture
The Jokowi government, despite being
busy in dealing with the corona situation,
has since continued to implement its invest-
ment-friendlyagendainrecentmonthsinthe
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
15
guise of the so-called omnibus-bill, a reform
designedtoattract foreign investment.How-
ever,ithasbeencriticizedbecauseitcutsback
worker’srightsandenvironmentalprotection
measures.
InOctober 2020, once the second partial
shutdown in Jakarta ended, a seriesofmass
demonstrationsusheredintoprotesttheup-
coming Omnibus-bill enactment. The mobi-
lized crowd represented theentire spectrum
of Indonesia’s extra-parliamentary political
landscape.Tradeunions,membersof theur-
ban social movement and environmentalist
groupsmarchedalongsideIslamicgroupsofall
leanings,revivingthestudentmovementthat
was prominently represented not the least
by6000membersoftheBEMSI(All Indone-
sianExecutiveStudentBody–BadanEkseku-
tifMahasiswaSeluruh Indonesia), theofficial
non-partisan, secular and politically neutral
studentaffairs institutionpresentatall Indo-
nesiancampuseswhoroamedthestreetswith
fellowstudentsfromtheleftistaswellasthe
Islamiccamp(InterviewwithChairmanofBEM
SI,December2020,FieldResearchNotes).
Therevivalofaunifiedstudentmovement
is a trend that became obvious in Novem-
ber 2019whenafirstwaveofmass student
demonstrations swept through the country
protesting a number of highly controver-
sial laws thathadbeenenacted:A reformed
criminalcodethatmadecriticismofstatein-
stitutions and the president punishable, and
curbed thepowerof the corruptioneradica-
tion commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Ko-
rupsi-KPK),anewOrmas-law(massorganiza-
tionlaw)thatgivesthegovernmentthepower
todissolveorganizationsdeemedthreatening
tonationalunityandthesocalledElectronic
Information and Transaction law (EIT) which
allows prosecution of criticism aired online.
These lawswereofficially justified todefend
democraticinstitutions,curbhatespeechand
the spread of fake-news online and offline,
butcriticshavesinceinterpretedtheseenact-
ments as a revival of state authoritarianism
(AmnestyInternational2019).Anumberofac-
tivistswhoused socialmedia tomobilize for
the demonstrations and criticism have been
prosecuted under the stipulations of these
new laws (Warburton 2019, Aspinall 2020).
Additionally, Jokowi’s cabinet became reflec-
tiveoframpantelitepoliticswhentheconser-
vativeUlamaMa’arufAminwhoplayedanin-
famousroleinthestirringofanti-Ahoksenti-
mentsbecamevicepresident,andevenmore
sowhenPrabowoSubiantowasco-optedand
giventhedefenseministerpostafterthelast
elections.Thisnotonlyestrangedprogressive
supportersbutdeprivedtheconservativeop-
positionofitsleadingfigure.
The widespread anti-authoritarian senti-
ment brought about a new common cause
andrestoredthenotionofstudentandyouth
activismasamoral callingwhichhasat least
partly overcome the polarization of the past
decade.Thishasthepotentialtobringabout
a new social movement demanding social
justice,freedomandintegrity.Moreover,the
youthcouldturnouttobeadecisiveactoras
theyrepresentahugesocialmassaugmented
bytheeconomicimpactofthecoronacrises.
16
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
It could be a window of opportunity for
progressiveyouthandstudentstouniteonce
againtodefendthedemocraticachievements
former generations have fought for. Yet a
momentumof Islamictinged right-wingpop-
ulism is threatening to co-opt this revived
student and youth agitation augmented by
thedestructiveeffectsofthecorona-policies.
Indeed, it seems thatanother juncture in In-
donesianhistoryisbeingapproachedinwhich
theyouthandthestudentmovementcanplay
adecisiverolebyfollowingitsmoralcalling–
whatdirectionwillittake?
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
17
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20
Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia
List of Abbreviations
BEM – SI Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa – Seluruh Indonesia Student Executive Body – All Indonesia
BPS Badan Pusat Statistik The Central Bureau of Statistics
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat People’s Representatives Council
FBR Forum Betawi Rempug Betawi Brotherhood Forum
FPI Front Pembela Islam Islamic Defenders Front
Golkar Partai Golongan Karya Party of Functional Groups
GMNI Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National Student Movement
HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia Islamic Indonesian Student Association
ITE Electronic Information and Transaction Law
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021
21
KAMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia Indonesian Student Action Front
KAMMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia Indonesian Muslim Student Action Front
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Corruption Eradication Commission
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NKK Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus Campus Live Normalisation
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan Democratic Party of Indonesia – Struggle
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia Communist Party of Indonesia
PSI Partai Solidaritas Indonesia Party of Solidarity of Indonesia
PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Prosperous Justice Party
UMKM Usaha Mikro, Kecil dan Menengah Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises