youth & conflict · democracy, conflict, and humanitarian assistance (dcha) of the united...

YOUTH & CONFLICT

A TOOLKIT FOR INTERVENTION

Key Issues

Lessons Learned

Program Options

Monitoring and Evaluation

Resources

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Conflict can be an inherent and legitimate part of social and political life, butin many places the costs and consequences of conflict, crisis, and state failurehave become unacceptably high.Violent conflict dramatically disrupts tradi-

tional development, and it can spill over borders and reduce growth and prosperityacross entire regions. Although development and humanitarianassistance programs are increasingly implemented in situations ofopen or latent violence, unfortunately, most still do not explicitlyincorporate a sensitivity to conflict in their design or execution.

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in the Bureau forDemocracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) of the United StatesAgency for International Development (USAID) was established to provide technicalleadership on conflict to USAID Missions and our Washington based regional andpillar bureaus.The vast majority of our field missions and staff are currently workingin areas that are either in conflict, coming out of conflict, or are at high-risk forviolence. A central objective of the office is to integrate or "mainstream" bestpractices in conflict management and mitigation into more traditional developmentsectors such as agriculture, economic growth, democracy, education, and health.Where appropriate, CMM will be an advocate for stable change.

As Director of CMM, I am pleased to introduce this document on youth and conflict.I hope that readers will find the information contained herein thoughtful, innovative,and useful. CMM will release additional toolkits in the near future, and I trust thateach one will bring its own unique value to discussions about development andconflict.We consider these toolkits to be "living documents" and would welcomeyour comments and observations to help us improve future iterations.

Elisabeth KvitashviliDirectorOffice of Conflict Management and MitigationBureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian AssistanceU.S. Agency for International Development (USAID

FROM THE DIRECTOR

This toolkit is part of a series that explores how development assistancecan address key risk factors associated with conflict. One area that isreceiving increasing attention is the relationship between young people

and violence. Recent studies have found a significant correlation between largeyouth cohorts and political instability and violence. A large pool of young peopledoes not need to be destabilizing, however if young people — particularly youngmen — are uprooted, intolerant, jobless, and have few opportunities for positiveengagement, they represent a ready pool of recruits for ethnic, religious, andpolitical extremists seeking to mobilize violence.

This document: 1) examines key issues related to youth participation in violence;2) discusses lessons learned in developing programs for at-risk youth; 3) presentsa range of program options; 4) includes illustrative monitoring and evaluationtools; and 5) identifies relevant USAID mechanisms and partners.Together, theelements of this toolkit are designed to help raise awareness about the linkagesbetween young people, development aid, and conflict; and to help officersintegrate a conflict perspective into their development programming.

The toolkits in this series explore individual risk factors in depth. They do notidentify all relevant factors linked to violence. As such, they are designed toserve as companion pieces to conflict assessments. Conflict assessments providea broad overview of destabilizing patterns and trends in a society. Using theConflict Assessment Framework, they sift through the many potential causes ofconflict that exist and zero in on those that are most likely to lead to violence(or renewed violence) in a particular context.While they provide recommenda-tions about how to make development and humanitarian assistance moreresponsive to conflict dynamics, they do not provide detailed guidance on howto design specific activities.The toolkits in this series are intended to fill that gapby moving from a diagnosis of the problem to a more detailed discussion ofpotential interventions.Together, the assessment framework and toolkits aredesigned to help Missions gain a deeper understanding of the forces drivingviolence, as well as to develop more strategic and focused interventions.

This document was initially authored by Jack Goldstone, Professor of PublicPolicy at George Mason University. It was subsequently revised with substantialinput from officers in USAID Missions and in Washington, experts on youth, andmembers of the NGO community. Comments, questions, and requests for addi-tional information should be directed to the Office of Conflict Management andMitigation.

Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM)

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

United States Agency for International Development

KEY ISSUES 2

LESSONS LEARNED 12

PROGRAM OPTIONS 16

MONITORINGAND EVALUATION 20

RESOURCES 28

STEERING YOUTH FROM VIOLENT CONFLICT:A TOOLKIT FOR PROGRAMMING

2 YOUTH AND CONFLICT, 2005

This can be extremely positive inmany places young people havebeen a powerful force for construc-

tive change. In Serbia, young people playeda key role in toppling Milosevic, and wereinstrumental in producing democratic revo-lution in Slovakia, Georgia, and the Ukraine.However, this same power can also servedestructive purposes if, for example, youthare exploited by proponents of violent ide-

ologies or seek to improve their situationby dominating others.

Although a large pool of young people isnot inherently destabilizing, there is astrong correlation between large youthcohorts and political violence.When youngpeople — particularly young men — areuprooted, jobless, intolerant, alienated, andhave few opportunities for positive engage-

KEY ISSUES

In many developing countries, young people are coming of agein societies that lack stable government, economic growth, orbasic material and physical security. In such circumstances,youth often turn away from the authority and ideology of oldergenerations and seek to mobilize their own generation insearch of solutions.

When young people areuprooted, jobless, intoler-ant, alienated, and havefew opportunities forpositive engagement, theyrepresent a ready pool ofrecruits for groups seekingto mobilize violence.

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While some young people areforced into violence, others chooseto participate in conflict. Economicincentives can be a strong motivatorfor participation in violence.Youngpeople often join militant groupsbecause violence offers opportuni-ties for economic gain throughlooting or banditry, because conflictpromises to open up longer-termeconomic options, or quite simplybecause they are they are paid to doso. From Sierra Leone toUzbekistan, young people often joinmilitant groups because they aregiven cash or promised futurefinancial gain, such as small miningconcessions.

Few opportunities for constructivepolitical engagement are open toyoung people in the developingworld, particularly for those wholack personal connections.All toooften, political parties and othersocial movements have used youngpeople to intimidate rivals, destabi-lize opponents, and collect moneyfor political campaigns. In Haiti, abroad range of political parties hasrelied on violent youth gangs toprotect political turf and intimidateopponents.

Inadequate public services, especiallyeducation, also play a role. Manygroups espousing violent ideologieshave reached out to young peopleby providing access to education andother key services. More important,they have provided young peoplewith a sense of community andpurpose in a setting where these arescarce commodities. In places asdiverse as Nigeria and Pakistan,failing school systems have allowedradical groups to reach poor, mar-ginalized young people.

ment, they represent a ready pool ofrecruits for groups seeking to mobilizeviolence.

Whether or not they participate directly inarmed combat, youth are victimized bywidespread violence.The attention of theinternational community has tended tofocus on child soldiers. However, adoles-cents are far more likely than youngchildren to be forcibly recruited intomilitias and to suffer the attendantproblems of trauma, sexual abuse, and aloss of educational and economic opportu-nities.

To create stable societies, we need tocounter the traumatizing and destructiveexperiences that war-affected youth haveundergone. More broadly, we need tocreate conditions for positive and con-structive roles for youth in developingcountries, so they will not turn to violencein an attempt to satisfy their needs. Animportant way to avoid future conflict is todraw on the energy and capacities ofyouth as the leaders of tomorrow'ssocieties.

DEFINING YOUTHAll youth are not the same, nor is theirexperience, and the concept of youth isitself debated: Some favor biologicalmarkers, in which youth is the periodbetween puberty and parenthood, whileothers define youth in terms of culturalmarkers, a distinct social status with specificroles, rituals, and relationships. A youngZimbabwean offered a particularly com-pelling perspective, defining a youth as"Someone who is starting to enjoyfreedom for the first time." (Role of YouthSurvey 2003)

For the purposes of this study, youth aredefined as having reached the stage in lifewhere they are physically capable ofassuming adult roles but would generallynot be expected to make decisions orprovide support for others.That is, theyhave left behind childhood but have notyet assumed the responsibilities ofadulthood.The youth age range usually fallsbetween 15 and 24, although somesocieties frame this differently. Indeed, insocieties subject to crises or upheaval, theconcept of youth may radically alter asboys and girls are forced to take on adultresponsibilities at a very young age.

Definitions may also vary for men andwomen.

YOUTH COHORTS AND DEMOGRAPHICBULGESSeveral studies have found that a dispro-portionately large youth cohort relative tothe rest of the population — a trend thatleads to a 'bulge' in a country's demo-graphic structure — is linked to thepotential for violence (Goldstone 1991,Fuller and Pitts 1990).There are severalreasons why this can be the case: First,there is strength in numbers — an excep-tionally large youth cohort is oftenconscious of itself as a larger force than itselders. Second, a large, youthful populationmay place heavy strains on schools, healthcare, housing, and other public services —strains that can overwhelm fragile institu-tions and erode support for governmentauthorities.Third, youth cohorts who arenot given the opportunity to integrate intocommunity and social structures are lessable to acquire the skills they need forpeaceful and constructive adult lives. Adeprived, frustrated, or traumatized youthcohort, if left without help, can continue tofoment violent conflict for decades.

The presence of a demographic bulge isneither a necessary nor sufficient conditionfor violence.Youth bulges have only beenstatistically linked to conflict and statefailure when they coincide with poor gov-ernance, a declining economy, or stateswith a high degree of ethnic or religiouspolarity. Indeed, a large number of youngpeople can be a tremendous asset todeveloping societies. However, if youngpeople find that opportunities for employ-ment are absent or blocked, that familiescannot offer support, that authoritiescannot protect them or offer justice, andthat hard work and education offer fewbenefits, some may turn to extremistgroups or rebel leaders who promise abrighter future or immediate rewards.

YOUTH EDUCATIONAND UNEMPLOYMENTThe great European revolutions of the17th, 18th, and 19th centuries were allpreceded by a vast expansion in secondaryand higher education that far exceededemployment opportunities (Goldstone

Photo opposite page: Children playingwith a discarded bazooka.

WHY DO YOUNG PEOPLEPARTICIPATE INVIOLENCE?

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1991; Gillis 1974; Jarausch 1974). Morerecently, unemployed university graduates,often educated abroad, have been at theforefront of armed or extremistmovements, from anti-colonial struggles inAfrica, to anti-authoritarian movements inthe former Soviet Union, to radical ethnicand religious movements in Asia.

These examples demonstrate an importantpoint: education per se is not always aforce for stability. In many countries, thefailure of the government to provideadequate education has led students toturn to ethnic or religious alternatives,alternatives that often strengthen factional-ism and intolerance and rarely provide theskills necessary to find jobs. Furthereducation can fill time, but unless it leadsto employment, the result can be frustra-tion and alienation. Job availability is alsocritical. Even effective education may breeddiscontent and violence if students arebeing prepared for jobs that do not exist.Typically, youth unemployment is overthree times as high as adult unemploymentin developing countries and, in countrieswith stagnant economies, that proportioncan be far higher (ILO 2002). For example,it is five times higher in Sri Lanka and sevenin Egypt.

Unemployment is an importantcomponent of the risk associated with thisage group.Young people often participatein violence because membership inextremist organizations provides immediateeconomic benefits, because violence itselfoffers opportunities for economic gainthrough direct payment or looting, orbecause conflict promises to open uplonger term economic options, forexample, through patronage if "their" ethnicor religious group captures power. Severalstudies of the Balkans, for example, showthat the chance to earn an income throughtheft, smuggling, and banditry was often amore important motivation for the youngmen who joined militia groups thanappeals to ethnic solidarity (Woodward,1995; Mueller, 2000).

Thus, providing targeted job training andemployment is a critical element indampening incentives for young people toparticipate in violence. However, waiting forthe broader economy to create appropri-ate jobs may not work.Youth should beencouraged to identify and create theirown opportunities, for example, throughentrepreneurship training and/or small-

scale credit.Whether they are engaged insimple repair work, craft and construction,or trade, youth should be encouraged tothink of themselves as work providers,rather than merely job seekers.

Preparation for work involves more thanacquiring job-specific skills; it must alsoentail learning certain "life" skills, such asdiscipline, teamwork, and feelings of prideand self-worth.These can be obtainedthrough community work, such as infra-structure development (e.g., building orrehabilitating roads and schools) andservice projects (e.g., caring for the ill andelderly).This work also helps to rebuild tiesbetween young people and their communi-ties, an important and constructive form ofsocial engagement. Although not conven-tional employment, such activity meets realneeds for youth and community develop-ment.

Because personal contacts are soimportant, education and work programsshould connect youth with the broadercommunity, particularly adults who maywant to employ them. Mechanismsproviding such linkages include mentoring,community service, apprenticeships, intern-ships, and visits to offices, factories, or otherwork-sites. Partnerships between youthprograms and business associations canhelp provide pathways to employment andbenefits to employers as well as youth.

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND YOUTHPARTICIPATIONIn many parts of the world, political partiesand other social movements use youngpeople to intimidate rivals, destabilizeopponents, and fill campaign coffers.This isoften the only form of political participa-tion open to young people, particularlythose with little education or few personalconnections.The recent debate on youthparticipation in violence has tended tocenter on economic motivations.These areimportant, but it is critical to recognize thatyoung people are drawn to militantmovements for a very complex set ofreasons.

Young people often recognize that they area powerful force for political change.Yetmost young people in the developingworld are shut off from constructivepolitical participation. Political parties are

Youth who are never integrated into communityand social structures, orwho never acquire the skillsneeded for peaceful andconstructive adult lives, areat high risk.A deprived,frustrated, or traumatizedyouth cohort, if left withouthelp, can continue tofoment conflict fordecades.

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often dominated by powerful (older) per-sonalities, and are vehicles for the politicaland economic ambitions of party leadersand their close associates. Party leaderstherefore have little incentive to openpolitical structures to new entrants. In theabsence of legitimate avenues for participa-tion, young people may either opt out ofpolitical participation completely, or bedrawn to movements that operate outsideof, and often seek to overthrow, traditionalpolitical structures.

Similarly, in many parts of the world,leaders use negative ethnic and religiousstereotypes to mobilize political violence,stereotypes that are often reinforced inschool, by family members, and in themedia. A number of programs, both insideand outside the formal school system,attempt to build tolerance and give youngpeople the skills they need to manageconflict in a non-violent way.

EXTREMISM AND YOUTHTerrorists originate from a wide range ofeconomic, educational, and religious back-grounds. Most studies since the 1980s

suggest that the vast majority of newrecruits into terrorist and other extremistorganizations are young people betweenthe ages of 15-29; and are generally of alow-to-middle economic background.However, the upper ranks of extremist orterrorist organizations are often filled byolder, better-educated youth, who serve asinternational operatives and managers. InIndonesia, for example, Laksar Jihad recruitsyoung university students, while the so-called "Taliban" movement in northernNigeria was spearheaded by unemployeduniversity students. Conversely, poorly-educated youth tend to become followersof extremist groups. Moroccan suicidebombers in Casablanca all came from thesame slum neighborhoods, shared a similarlower-middle class background, and hadlimited access to the outside world. Lastly,it is important to recognize that not allextremists are men: secular organizationslike the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Al-AqsaMartyr's Brigade are known to recruitwomen for suicide attacks.

Several factors appear to pre-disposeyoung people toward extremism: a lack ofeconomic opportunity and political expres-

Youth searching a garbage dump for foodor anything of value.

When youth are shielded-from social and economicstresses, and can participate in decisionsthat affect their lives, theyare more likely to pursuepeaceful change.

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Members of a youth militia group. sion, accompanying feelings of humiliationand the peer respect associated withmembership in extremist organizations.Youth lacking economic opportunities haveless to lose by joining an extremist group,and humiliation — from abuse or discrimi-nation — is often cited in interviews withterrorists as the main draw into extremistactivity.

Additionally, some extremist organizationsdeliberately target children for indoctrina-tion into terrorist activity; in Pakistan,Lashkar-e-Taiba reportedly began "training"children as young as eight years old foreventual recruitment. Lastly, young peoplewilling to accept the risks of extremistactivity may enjoy the support of theirpeers and society, as seen in the "martyr'sposters" that lined the streets of Shi'aregions of Lebanon and Palestinian refugeecamps. One study of thirty-five secular andreligious Middle Eastern extremists, forexample, cited peer influence as a majorfactor in joining a terrorist group.(Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003)

To reduce the risk of young people joiningextremist organizations, missions shouldassess which of the above are most

relevant to a particular country's circum-stances. Addressing root causes, such asyouth unemployment, political exclusion,discrimination, and abuse, through youth-specific programs is one approach.Youthleaders and other positive role modelscould be engaged to steer young people inpositive directions. Similarly, youth groupsand associations could be tapped to reachout to alienated peers, helping to counterthe sense of humiliation that leaves youthsusceptible to recruitment. Given thesocio-economic profile of recruits, suchprogramming should not limit itself to thepoorest, but focus on lower- and middle-class youth as well.

CHILDREN ORPHANED BY AIDSRising numbers of children are losing oneor both parents to HIV/AIDS, resulting inan expanding cohort of under-educated,traumatized, and stigmatized youth whosepotential for recruitment into gangs ormilitias may pose risks for conflict-pronecountries.While there are no cases to datein which children orphaned by AIDS playeda decisive role in a conflict, orphaned

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At least one poll has found thebacking of terrorism stronger among

a better-educated group: A surveyof 1,357 adults in the West Bank and Gaza found that support forterrorism against Israeli citizens

was greater among professionalsthan laborers, and among

secondary school graduates thanamong illiterate respondents (Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2001).

BETTER EDUCATEDMORE LIKELY TO

BACK TERRORISM?

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Urbanization concentrates precisely thatdemographic group mostinclined to violence: unat-tached young males whohave left their familiesbehind and have come tothe city seeking economicopportunities.

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children in general are at greater risk thanothers for recruitment, regardless of thecause.The potential threat, therefore, isreal.

The scope of children orphaned by AIDS isalarming. By 2003, over 15 million childrenhad already lost one or both parents toAIDS, a number expected to rise to over18 million in Sub-Saharan Africa alone by2010. Other regions are similarly at risk:although 82% of all AIDS orphans live inSub-Saharan Africa, populous states in Asia— such as India and Pakistan — couldwitness a substantial rise in the number ofAIDS orphans.While countries in LatinAmerica have witnessed an overall declinein the number of orphans, states with ahigh-prevalence of AIDS, such as Haiti haveexperienced an increase in the number ofchildren orphaned by AIDS.

The loss of one or both parents to AIDSexacts a heavy toll on children as theytransition through youth to adulthood.Subject to trauma and left with few oppor-tunities, such children may be more likelyto join gangs and commit violent crime asthey become adolescents. Older childrenin particular are more likely to sufferproblems with education, work, and psy-chosocial health. While a UNAIDS studyfound that 90% of all children orphaned byAIDS are taken in by extended familymembers, they are nevertheless muchmore vulnerable than they had been priorto being orphaned. Families with an AIDS-infected member experience a decline infamily income as great as 40-60%. A studyin Côte d'Ivoire found that family healthcosts can rise as much as 400% when afamily member is afflicted by AIDS(Richter).The stigma of AIDS can also drivechildren from school as taunting by fellowstudents or even teachers becomesunbearable. Children exposed to cumula-tive or sustained adversity are more likelyto grow into maladjusted adults; overall, upto one-third of such children may developpsychosocial disorders, leaving some evenmore prone to violence.

SOCIAL DRIVERS FORYOUTH RECRUITMENTTO VIOLENCEWhere youth cohorts face no majorupheavals or are relatively small, thus givingthem more interaction with adults, radicalor violent youth mobilization seldom

occurs. Under these conditions, youthfocus on activities that prepare them foradult lives, including education, training orapprenticeships, competition in sport andother forms of achievement, and socialevents.These activities tend to be solidlyrooted in institutions-the families, schools,religious organizations, sports teams, clubs-that guide youth, reinforce their identity asmembers of a broader society, and shieldthem from recruitment to violent groups.Such activities provide the opportunity todevelop leadership, social, and work skillsthat will prepare them for adult life, whilealso providing a sense of achievement andrewards for gaining these skills.

Social stresses-such as urbanization, faction-alism, forced migrations, refugee crises, andunemployment-can cause the breakdown,ineffectiveness, or absence of such"shielding" institutions.Youth then seekother avenues to obtain skills, rewards, andidentity within a group. Alternatives, such asgangs, criminal organizations, or evenarmed rebel groups, become attractive.Young women as well as young men takepart voluntarily, or are abducted intoancillary activities, such as smuggling andprostitution.These organizations provide asense of empowerment, shared identity,and access to material and sexual rewardsthat youth find (or believe) are unavailablein more conventional institution activities.

Some conventional institutions can alsorepresent a social order that young peoplereject as failing or unjust, making alternativesocial groups more appealing. For example,South African black youth in the 1980s lefta working school system identified withapartheid to join anti-apartheid groups —many of them violent — with the slogan"First liberation, then education." Whereruling regimes are seen as corrupt, ineffec-tive, betraying nationalist principles, orhostile to certain ethnic, religious, regional,or class groups, youth may seek alternativesthat promise to usher in a new system ofauthority or rewards.

URBANIZATION AND YOUTHUrbanization concentrates precisely thatdemographic group most inclined toviolence: unattached young males whohave left their families behind and havecome to the city seeking economic oppor-tunities.The rapid growth of cities has fre-


quently been a factor in popular mobiliza-tion for riots and protests, while urbanmigration helped provide the manpowerfor revolutionary or armed movements incountries such as Lebanon and Iran(Gugler 1982; Farhi 1990).

In many developing countries, urbanmigration has often been fueled by peopleseeking shelter from violent conflicts ordrought, while others are responding toeconomic opportunity or the desire forthe relative freedom and modernity of citylife.The urban world offers a different setof challenges, temptations, and opportuni-ties than those found in rural communities,ranging from access to a more diversepopulation to opportunities for entrepre-neurship and self-definition.This makesurban centers particularly attractive toyoung people.

The urban informal economic sector alsoprovides opportunities to youth, especiallywhere growth in the formal sector hasbeen held back by poor policies.Whilesome of this activity is criminal, involvingpetty smuggling, theft, prostitution, andextortion, much of the informal sectorserves as a creative response to economichardship and involves the provision ofservices, small manufacturing, repair work,and transportation.

Urban communities may provide moreexcitement and opportunities for youth,but whether the eventual result is stablesocialization or violent behavior dependson the institutions available to youth inurban settings.Where government orprivate enterprise provides housing,education, entertainment, and opportuni-ties for advancement, youthful energies aregenerally channeled into productive outlets.However, where the urban economy(formal and informal) cannot absorb newentrants, and where there are few otherinstitutions that provide support, violencebecomes more likely.

Urbanization has a powerful pull, andprograms to address urban youth need tobuild on that appeal, not seek to counter it.The goal should be to help make cities,where youth are often concentrated,centers of opportunity for positive andconstructive socialization, rather thanarenas of unrestrained competition forsurvival.

FACTIONALISM AND YOUTHOne result of urban migration is ethnic andreligious mixing. In some countries, such asKenya, urban centers have become foci ofcooperation among diverse ethnic groups(Kahl 1998). However, this interaction alsoconstitutes a risk. Often, in the absence ofintegrative institutions, youth turn to ethni-cally, religiously, or regionally exclusive com-munities.This does not automatically leadto conflict. However, if certain ethnicgroups feel that political, economic, andsocial institutions are closed or hostile tothem, youth may rebel against them or optout, seeking to develop their own ethnicallybased organizations to meet their needs.Youth gangs and criminal organizations thustypically draw on minority ethnic groups— whether recent immigrants or long-established groups — who have facedpersistent discrimination and exclusion.

At the extreme, youth may be socializedby peer groups or their elders to perceivethemselves as targets of attack, andtherefore entitled to be aggressive indefense of their community. An educationthat stresses violations, threats, and dangers(as occurred in Hutu and Tutsi communi-ties in Rwanda and Burundi, and in manyIslamist madrasas throughout the Islamicworld) can predispose youth to mobilizefor violent self-protection or aggression.This may lead to glorification of violenceand of attacks on enemies.The groomingof warriors is nothing new. However, ifyouth have few other outlets or institutionsfor solidarity, advancement, and achieve-ment, the attractions of the warrior life canbe so compelling as to preclude otheroptions.

In general, the more hardened ethnic (orother) lines of division are in a society, thegreater the attraction of confrontationalorganizations and violence as a means ofassuring one's goals.Young people haveproven to be particularly susceptible torecruitment into organizations that providepersonal and ethnic pride by instilling con-frontational ethnic hatreds.Where faction-alism has been a major part of youthexperience, special programs — such as"peace education" — may be important incountering that experience (Sommers2001).

When youth demobilizefrom armed conflict, theyneed more than jobs, food,and medical care. Criticalpsychosocial needs - likegaining acceptance in theirfamilies and communities,and obtaining treatmentfor trauma - must also bemet.

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FORCED MIGRATION,REFUGEE CRISES,AND YOUTHPerhaps no place emphasizes feelings ofpowerlessness and exclusion more thanrefugee camps and camps for internallydisplaced populations (IDPs). By definition,these are places for people whose normalinstitutional anchors have been destroyed;this effect is even more pronounced foryoung people. In addition, where refugeeshave been created by conflict and discrimi-nation, camps can become prime places forthe brewing of ethnic or group hatreds. Itis not surprising that refugee and IDPcamps have proven to be fertile recruitinggrounds for extremist or militant groups,with Afghanistan and Chechnya offeringtwo compelling examples.

Like cities with high youth migration,refugee communities have especially acuteneeds with regard to youth services. Mostactivities tend to center on basic survival.However, few institutions exist that addressthe full range of youth needs, includingbasic education, recreation, structuredsocial events, training for jobs andeconomic self-support, and training in lead-

ership and self-governance. In additionyouth may be concentrated and adults lessnumerous, particularly adult males, reducingresources for supervision and guidance ofyouth.

YOUTH NEEDS INREGIONS EMERGINGFROM CONFLICTSo far, the discussion has focused onreasons why young people participate inviolence. Consideration must also be given,however, to the needs of young peoplewho have been subjected to violence.Many conflict situations have particularlydevastating effects on youth who havebeen victims of forced labor, recruitmentinto militias, and child prostitution. Manymore are displaced, separated from theirfamilies, or orphaned, and must undertakea long, painstaking process to rebuild theirlives after war. Unless the special needs ofwar-affected youth are met during thedemobilization, disarmament, and reintegra-tion (DDR) process, they will likely fall backinto street life, prostitution, and/or crime,or be recruited as mercenaries for thenext conflict.

Children in a refugee camp sitting on apiece of abandoned military hardware.The detritus of war has become aplaything for generations of children inmany countries.

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Overwhelmingly, youth inpost-conflict situationsidentify security andeducation as their top twopriority needs.


Adolescence by its very nature is a time ofrapid transformation, involving somedegree of confusion and risk-taking asyoung people try on new roles andresponsibilities. In the midst of conflict, orits aftermath, such confusion is multiplied;the social fabric is torn, expected pathwaystoward adult status are lost, andemergency needs take precedence.Whilechildren find themselves heading house-holds, unemployment is rampant and tradi-tional livelihoods are disrupted.Youngpeople who experience war often lose thetime, support and opportunities typicallyavailable to their age group in non-conflictsettings, such as attending school, feelingpart of a community, and growing intoadult responsibilities gradually. In post-conflict situations, young people often feelthat they want to roll back the clock andmake up for what they missed.

While young people often form a corepart of fighting forces, youth needs arerarely met sufficiently during the process ofdemobilization, disarmament, and reintegra-tion (DDR). If they are not associated withan adult, for example, they aresometimes,prevented from accessing

services. Additionally, young combatantsoften spontaneously demobilize and meltinto the wider population, thereby missingout on needed services.Youth, especiallyfemale youth, are also more vulnerable tobeing stigmatized and rejected by theirhome communities than adult combatants.In addition to these challenges, questionsconcerning youth's culpability in wartimeatrocities are very complex. Similarly, a con-tinuing concern in the post-conflict periodis the potential for the "re-recruitment" ofyouth into militia groups. Because problemsfaced by young people in post-conflict situ-ations are so pressing, a youth rightsadvocacy perspective is required alongsideprogram development efforts.

Minimally, youth require a DDR processthat not only meets their nutritional andhealth needs, but also their psychosocialneeds, including the need to re-establishself-approval and acceptance within theirfamilies and communities. Not surprisingly,a high percentage of child soldiers haveexperienced physical and/or sexual abuseas well as ideological indoctrination, as inSierra Leone and Sri Lanka. Many youngpeople have been separated from their

Ex-soldier at a demobilisation camp

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families or have witnessed the killing orinjury of family members.The need fortrauma counseling is critical. However,Western psychological models have notalways been entirely successful in manydeveloping countries, since they aresometimes perceived locally as leading to"admitting craziness." Western models mayneed to be adapted or supplemented withindigenous forms of healing andcommunity reconciliation.

Increasingly, practitioners are recognizingthe need for structured education, training,and recreation for youth as part of theDDR process. Overwhelmingly, youth inpost-conflict situations identify bothsecurity and education as their top twopriority needs. Education enables youth torecover some degree of normalcy, psycho-logically, and begins to help them rebuildtheir lives economically.There are manychallenges, including the fact that manywar-affected youth have been out ofschool for long periods of time, and thatmany have responsibility for supportingfamily members. Nevertheless, informaland/or accelerated schooling should beprovided.

Virtually all youth displaced by war will

need to work to support themselves andtheir families, and DDR programs need tohelp youth develop viable livelihoods. Manypast DDR operations have been criticizedfor failing to train ex-combatants for theactual range of employment opportunitiesavailable, and this is especially true foryoung people. Microfinance programstypically serve young people (age 18-24) ifthey have had some prior business experi-ence, even marketplace hawking.Youthwithout such experience, however, may bebetter served by entrepreneurial skillstraining in conjunction with microfinance.

As peace becomes a possibility in regionsexperiencing violence, planning for theneeds of youth should begin immediately.While the needs of youth associated withthe fighting forces — both male andfemale — should be addressed, theyshould not be segregated from otheryoung people if possible. If former combat-ants are offered services and educationalopportunities that are denied other youngpeople, a perverse economy of entitlementmay be established in which participationin war is rewarded. For this reason, theemphasis should be on social integrationand meeting the needs of all youth, since,in fact, the effects of conflict spare none.


Allocating resources efficiently requiresidentifying concentrations of at-risk youth.While this varies by country, good placesto start are cities with large populations ofnew migrants, IDP or refugee camps, andareas where there is evidence of religiousor ethnic extremism. It is vital to be awareof different challenges faced along gender,age, ethnic and religious line as they mayvary substantially.

Once at-risk youth are identified, the nextstep is to identify the mix of institutionsand opportunities that are missing. Perhapssome have access to basic education, butothers (women, certain ethnic groups, orthe poor) do not. Some groups may haveeducational opportunities, but lack recre-ation or social outlets. By identifying what ismissing from the full range of youth needs,programs can supplement or create institu-tions that can provide the missingelements.This goes far beyond the normaltendency to target those youth with

LESSONS LEARNED

Excellent programs address a wide range of youth issues inboth developing and developed countries.The following lessonsfor building effective youth programs are based on practitionerexperience and academic findings.

Program goals must includeintegrating at-risk youthinto society and not merelyaim at compensating youthfor current disadvantages.

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11IDENTIFY,BUT DO NOTISOLATE, AT-RISK YOUTH

services, such as employment training,which can have the effect of furtherisolating at-risk young people. Such anarrow focus has even had the unintend-ed consequence of rewarding participa-tion in violence. For example, in the NigerDelta, the tendency of oil companies toprovide resources to the most violentyouth groups has reinforced the practiceof turning to violence for economic gain.

Thus, program goals must include inte-grating at-risk youth into society, notmerely compensating them for currentdisadvantages.This may involve organizingprograms that bring together youth fromboth inside and outside the target group.Where possible, training should embraceall youth who could benefit, not just themost at-risk or marginalized. At-risk youthshould be encouraged to aspire topositions of community leadership. Suchskills create a powerful resource for thefuture, and their cultivation is essential forcommunities to build the strength theyneed to meet future crises on their own.Good programming also creates viableoutlets for youth to participate incommunity, regional, and national society,giving them true platforms for theirvoices and including them in significantdecision making on issues that affectthem. This is key to forging partnershipsbetween youth-led organizations andadult leaders.

22BUILD COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMS

Precisely because so many of the needsof youth are group and social needs,community-based programs are critical.Youth service institutions need to providegroup-based activities (sports, communityservice, education) that provide positiveidentity, group empowerment, and acqui-sition of leadership, teamwork, and self-governance skills under adult supervision.They need to provide safe and structuredarenas for competition, for peer bonding,and male-female relationships. Meetingindividual needs is important as well,though this is usually best accomplished inthe context of positive relationshipsdeveloped within the program andbetween the youth and the largercommunity.

33YOUTH LEADERSHIP AND OWNERSHIP

Most successful youth programs havebuilt-in structures for youth leadership.When youth have a direct role in creatingand maintaining their own programs, theyparticipate more regularly and theydevelop critical leadership skills.Implementers need to plan for youthinput into program design from theoutset. Also, they will need to offer thenecessary training for youth to be able tocollaborate productively and meaningfullywith adults.This training could includepractical citizenship skills, such as publicspeaking, negotiation, advocacy, budgeting,and so forth.

44FEMALE YOUTH

Gender must be kept in mind in workingwith youth for both program design andevaluation.While young men are morelikely to participate in violence thanyoung women, there are importantexceptions in places like Nepal and SriLanka. Moreover, young men and youngwomen often have quite different reasonsfor participating in violence.

In most developing countries, youngwomen have the greatest burden interms of meeting the daily subsistenceneeds of families and face significantobstacles to full participation.Consequently, young women are muchless likely to participate in educationaland occupational training programs,recreational programs, or political eventsbecause they lack the time, or areexcluded on other grounds.

Program designers must be sensitive tothis reality and design programs that areflexible (in terms of time, place, andcontent) to meet girls' needs. Programevaluations should also disaggregate bygender to capture the usefulness of theprogram for male and female participants.

13

If services only targetdemobilized or at-riskyouth and neglect others,then youth are de factorewarded for violence.The emphasis should beon social integration andmeeting the needs of allyouth, since the effects ofconflict spare none.


55HOLISTIC PROGRAMMING

Youth have a wide range of needs as theyprepare for adult roles.They need todevelop skills for economic self-reliance.They need citizenship skills, such asteamwork, leadership, discipline, communi-cation, and social responsibility.They needarenas in which they can identify and testtheir talents and develop healthy relation-ships.Thus, programs that provide oppor-tunities for growth in more than one areatend to be more useful. Programs shouldconsider a mix of job training and jobcreation; political participation; sports andrecreation; leadership; and health training.In high-risk regions, conflict resolutionshould be built into all of these activities.

66PLAN TRANSITIONS FOR YOUTH

Youth is a period of transition and prepa-ration.Therefore, youth programs must gobeyond serving immediate needs toreadying youth for a healthy transition intoadult roles. Ideally, programs should bedesigned as "feeders" into political,economic, and social institutions for adults.Cooperative relationships with larger insti-tutions (such as schools, churches,mosques, and community service organiza-tions) allow youth to interact with andlearn from adults and to plan concreteoptions for their adult lives. Mentoring ofyouth by responsible adults in thecommunity helps youth widen theirhorizons and build pathways toward thefuture.

Special attention must bepaid to young women andyouth leadership ifprograms are to be far-reaching and sustainable.

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Education can transform youth into productive community participants.

15

WANT TO KNOW MORE?

SSoommee ddeemmooggrraapphhiicc ttrreennddss aarree ddeessttaabbiilliizziinngg.. In Bare Branches: the Security Implications ofAsia's Surplus Male Population, Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer argue that dispropor-tionately large, disenfranchised populations of young men are linked to domestic instabilityand inter-state war. In another take on the topic, the authors of "The SecurityDemographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War" show that high birth anddeath rates can be destabilizing whereas small, healthy families improve a state's prospectsfor long-term stability. www.populationaction.org

YYoouutthh uunneemmppllooyymmeenntt hhaass sskkyyrroocckkeetteedd ttoo aallll--ttiimmee gglloobbaall hhiigghhss,, according to theInternational Labor Organization's Youth Employment Network.Young people who haveno access to legitimate employment are more likely to be drawn into exploitative or illicitactivities, including conflict. www.ilo.org

OOvveerr 330000,,000000 cchhiillddrreenn ffiigghhtt aass ssoollddiieerrss iinn ccuurrrreenntt ccoonnfflliiccttss.. Under the Children's RightsSection, Human Rights Watch has a range of publications on where child soldiers areused, why they are so often preferred as recruits, and the consequences to both childrenand society. www.hrw.org Even more children (estimates are over ten million) havebeen psychologically scarred by the trauma of conflict through abduction, detention,sexual assault and the murder of family members. The Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency has made child protection one of its top social development priori-ties. www.acdi-cida.gc.ca and www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca

AApppprrooxxiimmaatteellyy hhaallff ooff tthhee wwoorrlldd''ss 3355 mmiilllliioonn rreeffuuggeeeess aanndd iinntteerrnnaallllyy ddiissppllaacceedd ppeerrssoonnss aarreeuunnddeerr tthhee aaggee ooff 1188,, according to the Women's Commission for Refugee Women andChildren.The Commission's study, "Untapped Potential: Adolescents Affected by ArmedConflict," outlines best practices in adolescent programming and underscores the importance of youth participation in program design.www.theirc.org/resources/index.cfm

FFoorr gguuiiddaannccee oonn ddeessiiggnniinngg,, iimmpplleemmeennttiinngg,, aanndd eevvaalluuaattiinngg yyoouutthh eedduuccaattiioonn aanndd pprrootteeccttiioonnpprrooggrraammss iinn ccrriisseess,, consult the many resources of the Inter-Agency Network forEducation in Emergencies (INEE). www.ineesite.org

MMaannyy iinnnnoovvaattiivvee yyoouutthh pprrooggrraammss iinn tthhee UUSS ccaann bbee aaddaapptteedd ttoo ddeevveellooppiinngg ccoouunnttrriieess..Public/Private Ventures (P/PV) www.ppv.org is a national nonprofit organization that hasdone extensive work on mentoring, youth employment, community service, faith-basedinitiatives, and youth violence-prevention. Best practices in youth employment and development programs are recorded at PEPNet, a project of the National YouthEmployment Coalition. www.nyec.org/pepnet/index.html

Mentoring of youth byresponsible adults in thecommunity helps youthwiden their horizons andbuild pathways towardthe future.


• In the West Bank, the IT4Youthprogram enhances education andemployability for Palestinian youth inrural areas through information technol-

ogy (IT) centers. A joint effort ofUSAID West Bank and Gaza, theWelfare Association, and theInternational Youth Foundation, itfeatures 14 state-of-the-art schoolcomputer labs and an IT center. It trainsteachers, parents, and youth in Internetskills and improves interest in education

PROGRAM OPTIONS

The following programs are examples of innovative attemptsto engage at-risk young people.The nexus between youthdevelopment programs and conflict is a new area, and toolsare still being developed to measure their impact. However,many of these programs have shown promise in reaching outto young people who often are left behind in more traditionaldevelopment efforts.

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11JOB TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT

and employability, increasing jobs andadding to regional stability.www.it4youth.org

• A young man, George Onyango, whogrew up in Nairobi's slums, in 1996founded SIDAREC-Slums InformationDevelopment and Resources Centres.Its services for at-risk urban youthinclude recreational activities, computertraining, HIV/AIDS-prevention training,basic business skills, and start-up loansfor small enterprises. SIDAREC servesapproximately 350 young people.www.sidarec.or.ke

• In the United States,YouthBuildcomprises 200 community-basedprograms that target unemployed andundereducated 16 to 24 year olds, whohelp build affordable housing-learningconstruction skills and working towardGEDs.The program emphasizes leader-ship, community service, and a positivecommunity committed to success.Workshops and retreats teach decision-making, group facilitation, publicspeaking, and negotiating skills.YouthBuild participants share in thegovernance of their own programthrough an elected policy committee.www.youthbuild.org

• In southern Sri Lanka, Jobsnet linksunemployed youth with local business-es, curbing unemployment and fosteringlabor market transparency. By increas-ing the number of gainfully employedyoung people, Jobsnet reduces the like-lihood that Sri Lanka's youth cohortwill be drawn to anti-peace politicalconstituencies. www.jobsnet.lk

• In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, an NGO,Viva Rio, organizes peace campaigns toovercome violence and social exclusionin urban slums. In addition to jobtraining and employment placement,Viva Rio conducts voluntary weaponscollection programs through churches,provides citizenship classes, andorganizes social activities such asboxing, concerts, and mural creation.Free concerts feature artists whosemusic discourages involvement incriminal gangs and the use of guns.www.vivario.org.br

22CONSTRUCTIVEPOLITICALPARTICIPATION

• In Sierra Leone, urban youth, oncemobilized by politicians as thugs tointimidate voters, were trained in voterregistration and election monitoring,giving them a stake in the process.Search for Common Ground broughttogether youth (ages 16-35) to create anational youth network.Whileeducating marginalized populationsabout voting, the youth also held eventschallenging politicians not to use youthas a destabilizing force. www.sfcg.org

• Democracy Learning-YouthParticipation program, building on thestrength of young people's critical rolein the pro-democracy movement thattoppled Serbia's Milosevic, supportsthe work of youth NGOs by equippingthem to engage in democratic partici-pation.The program explicitly encour-ages tolerance for differences, and isfunded by the Balkan Children andYouth Foundation (part of theInternational Youth Foundation).www.iyfnet.org

• A project in Yemen promotes youthparticipation in decision-making andcivic responsibility.The Al-Mocha YouthAssociation in Taiz emphasizes thepositive role that youth can play in thedemocratic process through publicationof a newsletter that discusses youthissues and issues related to democracy,direct participation in elections forassociation leadership, and sporting andcultural events.

• In Angola, a project of USAID'sDisplaced Children and Orphans Fund(DCOF) provides training andeducation to young people so that theycan actively take part in the nationalreconciliation process. ChristianChildren's Fund implements theBuilding Resilience in Angolan Childrenand Communities project for 160,000beneficiaries.The target group includesuniversity students, political andcommunity youth groups, and internallydisplaced youth and returnees.The aimis to strengthen community systems ofsolidarity and to promote reconciliationat the grassroots level. www.usaid.gov

Photo opposite page: Youth building awheel chair. Occupational training is acritical element in dampening incentives for young people to participate in violence.

17

Programs that provideopportunities for growth inmore than one area tendto be more useful.Programs should consider amix of job training and jobcreation, political participation, sports andrecreation, leadership, andhealth training.


• World Education's youth leadershipproject in Senegal's Casamance regiontrains youth association members inleadership development, including dis-seminating information to their commu-nities. After participatory training, youthcollaborate on self-selected projects tobenefit the community, utilizing theirnew leadership skills while promotingpeaceful reconstruction of their villages.www.worlded.org

33CONFLICTRESOLUTION AND COMMUNITY DIALOGUE

• The Youth Project of Search forCommon Ground's intergenerationaldialogue workshops in Burundibrought together young men — "theGuardians," armed by the military toprotect their villages — into construc-tive dialogue with elders active in a tra-ditional conflict resolution institution,bashingantahe.The Guardians learnedhow to draw upon traditional peace-making methods, strengthening their

skills to intervene without violence andhelp resolve conflicts.Workshops alsofacilitated participant discussions abouttheir experiences in the war.Theseintergenerational relationships fostersresiliency among young people andgives them adult allies in preventingcrises. www.sfcg.org

• In Macedonia, Common GroundProductions developed a project calledNashe Maalo (Our Neighborhood).Thisgroundbreaking television series forchildren (7-12) was created by an inter-ethnic team of television and conflict-resolution professionals. It promotesunderstanding, conflict prevention, andconflict resolution.

• In response to Colombia's alarmingrate of violence, USAID/Colombia andChildren International have piloted aprogram, Hope for Colombia'sChildren, to train 100 youth in multiplelevels of conflict resolution: individual,family, and community conflict.They aimto produce a youth-oriented guide toconflict resolution techniques, and tohave youth train their peers in theircommunities. www.children.org

In response to Colombia'salarming rate of violence,USAID/Columbia andChildren International havepiloted a program, Hopefor Columbia's Children, totrain 100 youth in conflict resolution.

Jamaican students with placards urgingpeace at a funeral of a teacher who waskilled after a wave of gang violence.

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• In Burundi, young Hutu and Tutsi ex-combatants jointly developed aprogram that reaches out to schoolchildren to talk about the personalcosts of violence.The Youth Project ofSearch for Common Ground and alocal youth association (JAMAA)developed cartoon books that showedhow elites recruit youth to engage inethnically motivated violence. It is usedby the Ministry of Education and is onnational television. UNESCO awarded itan honorable mention (March 2003)for excellence in peace literature.www.sfcg.org

• To help prevent conflict in refugeecamps in Kenya, a UNHCR PeaceEducation Program (PEP) emphasizesdeveloping locally meaningful resourcematerials, including posters, role-playscenarios, proverb cards, booklets ofpoetry, and stories that illustrate both

challenging and hopeful issues forreflection and discussion. Programsuccess led Kenyan police to call on aprogram graduate to facilitate anagreement between two disputingclans. A group of program graduatesalso formed a group to resolve dailyconflicts in camp affairs.www.unhcr.ch

• The Balkan Children and YouthFoundation (BCYF), founded at theheight of the conflict under the auspicesof the International Youth Foundation,aims to improve the conditions andprospects for young people throughoutthe Balkans’ region. Early projectsfocused on bringing young peopletogether across ethnic divisions to par-ticipate in social activities such asdrama, music, and films. Post-conflict ini-tiatives have expanded to include dis-cussions about globalization, unemploy-ment, the media, the public schoolsystem, and civic engagement.www.iyfnet.org

In Burundi, young Hutuand Tutsi ex-combatantsjointly developed aprogram that reaches outto school children to talkabout the personal costs ofviolence.

44EDUCATION ANDTOLERANCETRAINING


MONITORING & EVALUATION

The following monitoring and evaluation tools have beendeveloped specifically for gauging the effectiveness of programsthat incorporate both youth and conflict: those that seek tobetter young peoples' economic, social and political conditionsin order to help improve their lives and remove the factorsthat can drive youth toward conflict.

The framework, indicators andillustrative activities have beendeveloped from several USAID

programs and monitoring plans, withsignificant input from a panel ofexper ts and USAID mission staff. Assuch, these should be viewed asgeneral models that must be adaptedto a countr y's specific context. Pleasenote that the CMM Office plans to

update and revise this M&E section asits understanding evolves, andwelcomes your comments as par t ofthis process. If you have any questionsabout these tools, please contacteither Zachary Rothschild or ElizabethMar tin in the CMM Office. For addi-tional guidance and resources onmonitoring and evaluation, please visitUSAID's Evaluation site athttp://www.dec.org/partners/evalweb/.

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Children in refugee camp. No placeemphasizes feelings of powerlessness andexclusion more than refugee camps.

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USAID/CMM ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

GOAL: DRIVERS OF YOUTH VIOLENCE MITIGATED1,2

SUB GOAL: CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGE YOUTH TOPROMOTE PEACE

1. In this document youth are defined as having reached the stage in life where they are physically capable ofassuming adult roles (i.e., have passed puberty), usually between ages 15 and 24, although different societiesframe this differently. Definitions may vary for men and women. Indicators should be disaggregated by youthage groups.

2. Youth and communities at risk for engaging in violence should be targeted, where appropriate, based uponan assessment. For discussion on identifying at-risk youth refer to the Youth & Conflict Toolkit, LessonsLearned, Section 1.

• % youth employed in targeted areas• % change in incomes from constructive employment • % youth perceiving more optimistic view of future

(economic, self-image, effectiveness)• % of businesses started by youth still in operation one year later

IR 1.1 BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENT BETTER ABLE TO EMPLOY YOUTH

• % business or institutions employing youth• increased advocacy by local, regional and national youth groups

1.1.1 Economic and social incentives to employ youth increased

• % business or institutions responding to incentives for at-risk/marginalized youth

1.1.2 Youth organizations and businesses' institutional capacities developed

• % increase in skill levels of youth-owned businesses• % increase in equipment quality in youth-owned businesses

1.1.3 Credit opportunities for youth expanded• % of youth being approved for small loans• % of youth using loans to start small businesses

IR 1. 2 YOUTH BETTER EQUIPPED TO ENTER MARKETPLACE• %/# of schools offering vocational/technical training specifically for

young men and women• % of trained youth obtaining employment

1.2.1 Applied academic skills for job success improved• % increase in youth literacy and numeracy rates from training

programs • % special groups (IDPs, refugees, young ex-combatants, women)

secondary school graduation rate (disaggregate by gender, otherrelevant social cleavages)

1.2.2 Market-driven vocational, business, and professionalskills developed

• % of youth with access to training• % apprenticeships/internships filled by youth• # of courses incorporating basic work-business ethics

OBJECTIVE 1: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH INCREASED

The illustrative indicators should beviewed as generalmodels which must beadapted to a country'sspecific context.



• % youth organizations capacity increased (e.g. effective management of resources)

• social outlets which include multi-ethnic/racial/religious youthincreased (sports, clubs, scouts)

• % of eligible youth involved in electoral process• # and quality of youth consultations in peace processes (index)

IR 2.1 GOVERNMENTAL AND COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE YOUTH IN CIVIC AND POLICY PROCESSES

• % of target CSOs engaged in civic action programs that involveyouth (human rights education, civic dialogues, accountability, trans-parency)

• % of youth citizens reached by civic and political action programsundertaken by CSOs/CBOs satisfaction index (CSO/CBO/youth)

IR 2.2 YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIC AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS INCREASED

• proportion of youth in community-based organizations (CBO), orCSOs leadership positions (measured over time)

• increase in youth-led advocacy

IR 2.3 MEDIA COVERAGE OF YOUTH CONCERNS IMPROVED• increase in articles/advertisements with positive messages about

youth in newspaper/radio/TV• increase in media resources devoted to raising community awareness

of youth issues

OBJECTIVE 2: CIVIC/POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF YOUTHINCREASED

• #/% ex-combatants reintegrated into their community (index)• community-based program participation by young female

war-participants• local government resources ($) directed toward conflict-affected

youth & communities

IR 3.1 SPECIAL HEALTH NEEDS MET• % of conflict affected youth with special needs met

3.1.1 Access to trauma and psychosocial support for conflict-affected groups increased

• % of sexual gender based violence victims (SGBV) receiving assis-tance (psychosocial, medical, legal, other support)

• % of victims able to access services

OBJECTIVE 3: IMPROVED RESPONSE TO NEEDS OF CONFLICT-AFFECTED YOUTH AND COMMUNITIES

A 13-year-old gang member shows off hisgun for the camera.

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3.1.2 Reproductive and other key conflict-related healthneeds addressed

• % of conflict affected youth receiving key health services• increased awareness about HIV/AIDS • increased prevention of unwanted youth pregnancies

IR 3.2 COMMUNITY HEALING PROMOTED• # of multi-racial/ethnic/religious community-based (CBOs/CSOs)

healing initiatives underway (including traditional, transformational)• #/% youth engaged in community healing activities

3.2.1 Tensions between youth war-participants and victims alleviated

• more equitable access to critical resources (water, housing, land)• more inclusive participation in community events• community dialogue including youth ex-combatants enhanced .• # community groups with members who are former adversaries

3.2.2 Reintegration of ex-combatant youth facilitatedthrough community-based support

• % ex-combatants with self-sustaining forms of employment• % ex-combatants adopting civilian identity

(e.g. enhanced civic interest, voting, membership in organizations, personal relationships, ambitions, etc.)

• community-generated activities involving ex-combatants increased

3.2.3 Community and personal security improved• youth perceptions about security, violence and crime (index)• measurable crime rates

(e.g., violent incidents, reported rapes, thefts)• % of threatened population with access to safe havens available

3.2.4 Individual, institutional, and local government peacecapacities built

• CSO/CBOs/individuals able to effectively participate in peace process• % CSOs/CBOs/schools with effective peace education programs• % of communities with peace-building, conflict resolution/opportuni-

ties for out-of-school youth• proportion of local government committees that use traditional or

community-based mechanisms for resolution of conflicts

IR 3.3 GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY CAPACITY TO DELIVER SERVICES IMPROVED

• # of community services available• % change in a customer satisfaction index

OBJECTIVE 1

EconomicOpportunities for Youth Increased

OBJECTIVE 3

Improved Response toNeeds of Conflict-Affected Youth and

Communities

11..11..11 Economic and social

incentives toemploy youth

increased

11..11..22.. Businesses and youth

organization'scapacitiesdeveloped

11..11..33 Credit opportu-

nities for youthexpanded

11..22..11Applied

Academic Skillsfor Job Success

Improved

11..22..22 Market driven

vocational,business, and

professional skillsdeveloped

33..11..11 Access to traumaand psychosocial

support forconflict-affectedgroups increased

33..11..22 Reproductive

and other keyconflict relatedhealth needsaddressed

33..22..11 Tensions between

youth war participants andvictims alleviated

33..22..22Reintegration ofex-combatants

facilitated throughcommunity-based

support

33..22..33 Community and personal

security improved

33..22..44 Individual,

institutional, andlocal government peace capacities

built

11..22 Youth better

equipped to enter marketplace

33..11 Special health needs

met

33..22 Community healing

promoted

33..33 Government and

community capacityto deliver services

improved

11..11 Businesses and

government betterable to employ youth

22..22 Youth involvement in

civic and political institutions increased

22..33 Media coverage of

youth concernsimproved

22..11 Economic

Government &community

institutions engageyouth in civic & policy

processes

GOAL:Drivers of Youth

Violence Mitigated

SUB GOAL:Constructively Engage Youth

to Promote Peace

OBJECTIVE 2

Civic/PoliticalParticipation of Youth Increased

USAID/CMM ILLUSTRATIVE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

24

25

OBJECTIVE 1

EconomicOpportunities for Youth Increased

• Youth participation in assessment ofeconomic opportunities

• Chamber ofCommerce or othergroups advocate infavor of youth employment asgood for businessand development

• Network buildingbetween employersto promote youthemployment

• Public work opportunities foryouth (infrastructure development, roadrehabilitation,service work, etc)

• Mentorships/training of trainers

• Workshops• Retreats• Media advocacy• GED assistance

offered• Youth working

through Chamber ofCommerce, otherCBOs

• Entrepreneurshipsdeveloped (repair work, crafts,construction, trade)

• Partnerships withyouth entrepreneurs

• Small scale creditfor businessespurposes

• Foreign assistanceloan programs foryouth

• Literacy, numeracytraining (formal: schools;informal: CBOs, onthe job training;other local initiatives)

• Accelerated formaland informaleducation programs

• Upgrade curriculum for trade schools,universities

• Entrepreneurshiptraining (repair work, crafts,construction, trade)

• Apprenticeships• Mentoring• IT training• Basic business skills

training• Link programs with

business/institutions• Job finding skills-

clothes, travel,demeanor

• Language skillstraining

• Life skills, copingskills trainings

11..11..11 Economic and social

incentives toemploy youth

increased

11..11..22.. Businesses and youth

organization'scapacitiesdeveloped

11..11 Businesses and gov-ernment better able

to employ youth

11..22 Youth better

equipped to enter marketplace

11..22..11Applied

Academic Skillsfor Job Success

Improved

11..22..22 Market driven

vocational,business, and

professional skillsdeveloped

11..11..33 Credit

opportunities for youthexpanded

ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES


OBJECTIVE 2

Civic/PoliticalParticipation of Youth Increased

• Connect youth with adultdecision makers

• Civic education• Engagement of youth in

developing/sponsoringcivic events

• Dialogue sessions• Town hall meetings• Peace benefit understood

and promoted• Provision of outlets such

as sports event, develop-ment of clubs(male/female)

• Support to youth societynetworks

• TA, training to govern-ment on how to engageyouth

• Youth voter registration• Involve youth in election

monitoring leadershippositions

• Youth congress• Youth-led research

projects, advocacy• Provide high profile

outlets for youth voices• Hosting community and

cross community events• Student government• Peer-to-peer mentoring

• Support platforms foryouth voices in media

• Youth-led and producedmedia

• Peace journalism skillstraining

22..11 Economic

Government &community institu-

tions engage youth incivic & policy

processes

22..33 Media coverage of

youth concernsimproved


22..22 Youth involvement incivic and political insti-

tutions increased


26

OBJECTIVE 3

Improved Response toNeeds of Conflict-Affected Youth and

Communities

33..11 Special health needs

met

33..33 Government and

community capacityto deliver services

improved

• Safe havensesp. forfemales

• Sports forrehabilitation

• Assistance todisabledyouth

• Parent-childmentoring

• Assist SGBVcases, linkwith healtheducation

• HIV/AIDStrainingawarenessprograms

• Reproductivehealtheducation,services

• Advocacycampaigns

• Dialoguegroups

• Safe havens/houses

• Providealternativesto 'power ofthe gun'

• Communitywatch

• Communitypolicinginvolvingyouth

• Training onconventionalconflict resolution

• Revitalizationof traditionalmethods ofconflict management

• Conferences• Ctudy tours• Dissem-

ination ofmodelmaterials

• Story-telling

• Technical,financialsupport toserviceproviders

• TA for communica-tion and MIS

• Outreachand mobileclinics

33..22 Community healing

promoted

33..11..11 Access to traumaand psychosocial

support forconflict-affectedgroups increased

33..11..22 Reproductive

and other keyconflict relatedhealth needsaddressed

33..22..11 Tensions between

youth war participants andvictims alleviated

33..22..22Reintegration ofex-combatants

facilitated throughcommunity-based

support

33..22..33 Community and personal

security improved

33..22..44 Individual,

institutional, andlocal government peace capacities

built


• Youth/adultsengage incommunity sensitizationabout 'out-groups' or 'other'

• Traditionalcleansing

• Youth hotlinewith mutualsupport groups

• Truth and recon-ciliationprocesses

• Radio soapOperas modelingtrust and inter-dependence

• Social opportuni-ties for non-issuebased interac-tions

• Attend 'others'rituals, celebra-tions

• Youth involvement inprotection(escort/guide& other activi-ties)

• Family reunification

• Communityprovides rolemodels, esp.for males

• Educationopportunities,esp. for war-combatantfemales

• Communityforums

• Communityself help andsupport activi-ties


27


EQUIP3/YOUTH TRUSTLEADER WITHASSOCIATES AWARDMECHANISM (EGAT/ED)This cooperative agreement helps toprepare out-of-school children and youthfor their roles in work, civil society, andfamily life.The project engages out-of-school and disenfranchised youth aspartners and resources in addressing thesocial service and economic developmentneeds of their communities, while helpingthem acquire the skills needed for produc-

tive futures. Prime Recipient: EducationDevelopment Center. Sub-Recipients:International Youth Foundation; Academyfor Educational Development; NationalYouth Employment Coalition. AssociateOrganizations: Catholic Relief Services;International Council on National YouthPolicy; Opportunities IndustrializationCenters, Inc.; Partners of the Americas; PlanInternational; Sesame Workshop; StreetKidsInternational;World Learning.www.equip123.net

RESOURCES

USAID CONTRACTING MECHANISMS FOR YOUTHAND CONFLICT PROGRAMMING

PHO

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AN

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DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCECIVIL SOCIETYSTRENGTHENINGCOOPERATIVEAGREEMENT(DCHA/DG)This agreement may be used to implementprograms targeting youth to increase theirparticipation in political processes and civilsociety activities.The two lead agencies are:the Academy for Educational Development(AED) and Pact, Inc. Under AED, affiliateswith experience programming for youthare: Mercy Corps International and Searchfor Common Ground; and under Pact:TheCenter for Civic Education; Children'sResources International, and WorldEducation.www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/ug.pdf

BEPS provides assistance in improving thequality, access, equity, and efficiency ofeducation, particularly basic education."Education in Crisis Situations" is one areaof expertise, as well as longer-termimprovement of basic education throughpolicy support and technical assistance.Creative Associates International is theprimary agency, with sub-contractors:CARE, GroundWork, and The GeorgeWashington University.www.beps.net

INTERNATIONALYOUTH FOUNDATIONCOOPERATIVEAGREEMENT(EGAT/PR/UP)This cooperative agreement aims toincrease the employability of youth throughlife skills, vocational, information and com-munications technology (ICT) and entre-preneurship training ("holistic employabilitytraining").Youth also are provided withmentors, coaching and counseling, intern-ships, and job placement in urban areas.Prime Recipient: International YouthFoundation Sub-Recipients: Alliance for

African Youth, Lions Clubs International,Youth Development Trust of South Africa,and Nokia. Contact:Vicki [email protected].

Youth Business International (YBI), thePrince of Wales International BusinessLeaders Forum, is a UK-based businessNGO that assists youth from ages 18-35with starting a pre-microenterprisebusiness.YBI works with business peoplearound the world who share a similarcorporate social responsibility agenda,which includes transfer of their knowledgeand experience to potential young entre-preneurs to reduce unemployment, allevi-ating poverty and developing a healthyenterprise culture. It is important to notethat many of the youth in these activitiesare unable to obtain bank loans to start abusiness, and often are blue-collar workers,carpenters, painters, construction workers,and administrative support staff for healthtransport and kiosk businesses.The YBIprogram currently operates in 22countries, and has helped 70,000 disadvan-taged young people become entrepre-neurs, with over 60 percent sustaining theirbusinesses through the assistance of 8,000business volunteers. The current programsare also open to applicants working in allbusiness sectors.To qualify to receive help,youth applicants must: 1) have a viablebusiness plan; 2) be judged to have thepersonality to become an entrepreneur; 3)demonstrate that they have been unableto obtain help elsewhere. YBI will con-tribute to start-up costs of any newoperation. www.youth-business.org

Contact Person:GGeeoorrggiiaa SSaammbbuunnaarriiss,, [email protected]

Photo opposite page:Boy with ammunition belt.

29

CORPORATE SOCIALRESPONSIBILITY AND YOUTHENTREPRENEURSHIP,GDA COOPERATIVEAGREEMENT(EGAT/EG/EDFM)

BASIC EDUCATION AND POLICY SUPPORT(BEPS) IQC (EGAT/ED)


US GOVERNMENT AND DONOR CONTACTSUSAID field staff may wish to consult withother USG Agencies and donors thatsupport youth and conflict programming.Even though some of the contacts listedbelow focus primarily on children ratherthan youth, their work often encompassesyouth and conflict as well.While the listbelow is not comprehensive, it doesrepresent some of the most active donors.

USAID/Office of Conflict Management and MitigationZachary RothschildYouth and Conflict SpecialistRonald Reagan Building1300 Pennsylvania AvenueWashington, DC 20523

Phone: 202-712-5928E-mail: [email protected]

State DepartmentCarla Menares-Bury Coordinator for Trafficking in Persons Programs2201 C Street NW Washington, DC 20520

Phone: 202-312-9649 E-mail: [email protected]: www.state.gov/g/tip

Department of LaborMeg CroninInternational Child Labor ProgramInternational Labor Affairs 200 Constitution Ave., NWWashington, DC 20210


Open Society InstituteSarah Klaus Deputy Director of Children and Youth Network Programs400 West 59th St New York, NY 10019

E-mail: [email protected] or

Liz Lorant Director of Children and Youth Network Programs400 West 59th St New York, NY 10019

Phone: 212-547-6918 Email: [email protected]

World BankViviana MangiaterraYouth Advisor1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20433

Phone: 202-473-4502 E-mail: [email protected]

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)Natalie Zend Children's Rights, Human Rights andParticipation Division, Policy Branch 200 Promenade du PortageGatineau, QuebecK1A 0G4Canada

Phone: 819-994-7927 E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/child-protection

Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID)Phillip Ryland-JonesProgram Officer for Children Affected by Armed Conflict20 Victoria St. 5th Floor London SW1H0NF United Kingdom

Phone: +44 207 023 0066 E-mail: [email protected]

UNICEFManuel Fontaine Senior Advisor on Child Protection and Children and Armed Conflict 3 United Nations PlazaNew York, New York 10017U.S.A.


31

REFERENCESDemes, Pavol. February 2005. "TheStructure of Peaceful Civic Revolutions,"Presentation at the Woodrow WilsonCenter.

Eisenstadt, S.N. 1971. From Generation toGeneration: Age Groups and SocialStructure. New York: Free Press.

Esler, Anthony. 1972. "Youth in Revolt:TheFrench Generation of 1830" in ModernEuropean Social History, edited by Robert J.Bezucha. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.

Esty, Daniel et al. 1998. State Failure TaskForce Report: Phase II Findings. McLean,VA:Science Applications International, for StateFailure Task Force.

Farhi, Farideh. 1990. States and Urban-basedRevolutions: Iran and Nicaragua. Urbana andChicago: University of Illinois Press.

Fuller, Gary A. and Forrest R. Pitts. 1990."Youth cohorts and political unrest in SouthKorea." Political Geography Quarterly 9: 9-22.

Gillis, John. 1974. Youth and History. NewYork: Academic Press.

Gladwell, Malcolm. 2002.The Tipping Point.New York: Little, Brown & Co.

Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. Revolution andRebellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley:University of California Press.

Gugler, Josef. 1982. "The Urban Character ofContemporary Revolutions." Studies inComparative International Development17:60-73.

Hudson,Valerie M. and Andrea M. den Boer.2004. Bare Branches:The SecurityImplications of Asia's Surplus MalePopulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

ILO, 2002. Youth and Work: Global Trends.Geneva: International Labor Office.

Jarausch, K. J. 1974. "The Sources of GermanStudent Unrest," in The University in Society,vol. 2: Europe, Scotland, and the United Statesfrom the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century,edited by Lawrence Stone, pp. 533-570.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kahl, Colin. 1998. "Population Growth,Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence:The Case of Kenya,1991-93," International Security, 23: 80-119.

McClintock, Cynthia. 1998. RevolutionaryMovements in Latin America: El Salvador'sFMLN and Peru's Shining Path.Washington,D.C.: U. S. Institute of Peace.

McDaniel,Tim. 1991. Autocracy,Modernization, and Revolution in Russia andIran. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress.

Mannheim, Karl. 1974. "What is a SocialGeneration?" in The Youth Revolution:TheConflict of Generations in Modern History,edited by Anthony Esler, pp. 7-14. Lexington,MA: D.C. Heath.

Moshiri, Farrokh. 1991. "Iran: IslamicRevolution against Westernization," inRevolutions of the Late Twentieth Century,edited by Jack A. Goldstone,Ted RobertGurr, and Farrokh Moshiri, pp. 116-135.Boulder, CO:Westview Press.

O'Boyle, Lenore. 1970. "The Problem of anExcess of Educated Men in Western Europe,1800-1850." Journal of Modern History 42:471-495.

Pillar, Paul. Summer 2004 "Counterterrorismafter Al Qaeda," The Washington Quarterly,pp 101-113.

Post, J.M., E. Sprinzak, and L.M. Denny. 2003."The terrorists in their own words:Interviews with thirty-five incarceratedMiddle Eastern terrorists." Terrorism andPolitical Violence 15: 171-84

Richter, Linda. "The Impact of HIV/AIDS onthe Development of Children," Institute forStrategic Studies, Monograph 109.

Role of Youth Survey 2003.Taking it Global.

Sommers, Marc. 2001. "Peace Education andRefugee Youth," in Learning for a Future:Refugee Education in Developing Countries,edited by Jeff Crisp, Christopher Talbot, andDiana B. Cipollone. Geneva, UNHCR. 2003.

UNICEF, UNAIDS, USAID. "Children on thebrink 2004: a joint framework of neworphan estimates and a framework foraction," UNICEF.

United States Institute of Peace. July 2002."Islamic Extremists: How Do They MobilizeSupport?" Special Report 89.

Urbanization,War, and Africa's Youth at Risk.USAID/Basic Education and Policy Support(BEPS) Activity.

Victoroff, Jeff. February 2005. "The Mind ofthe Terrorist: A Review and Critique ofPsychological Approaches," Journal ofConflict Resolution,Vol. 49 No. 1, pp 3-42.

Women's Committee for Refugee Womenand Children. 2000. Untapped Potential:Adolescents Affected by Armed Conflict, aReview of Programs and Policies. New York

U.S.Agency for International DevelopmentOffice of Conflict Management and Mitigation

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NWWashington, DC 20523

Tel: (202) 661-5810Fax: (202) 216-3454

www.usaid.gov

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