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The Geography of Land-Locked States: Presidential Address Author(s): W. Gordon East Source: Transactions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers), No. 28 (1960), pp. 1-22Published by: on behalf of Wiley The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British

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THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAND-LOCKED STATES*

Presidential Address

W. GORDON EAST, M.A.

(Professor of Geography, Birkbeck College, University of London)

I INTRODUCE my topic with a quotation from that strange yet engaging novel called Tristram Shandy by Laurence Stern which was first published in the 1760s. Corporal Trim is in conversation with Uncle Toby:

The King of Bohemia, an' please your honour, replied the corporal, was unfortunate, as thus - That taking great pleasure and delight in navigation and all sort of sea affairs ... and their happening throughout the whole kingdom of Bohemia, to be no sea-port town whatever ... How the duce should there- Trim? cried my uncle Toby; for Bohemia being totally inland, it could have happened no otherwise ... It might, said Trim, if it had pleased God ...

Uncle Toby was right: except perhaps for a short time when the Czechs em- braced the Hussite heresy and expanded their territory, the kingdom of Bohemia never had a coast. Indeed, for so long has it been normal for independent States to have a seaboard that it is not surprising that Shakespeare, who in any case was more interested in dramatic settings than in geographical facts, should have placed Scene III of Act V of The Winter's Tale in 'Bohemia. A desert Country near the Sea'. Nearness is indeed relative, and geography is scarcely an exact science, so that Shakespeare was perhaps not wrong. You may remember, too, the delightful story of Queen Victoria which, unfortunately, is probably untrue. She is said to have ordered a man o' war to be sent to Bolivia 'to demonstrate her shocked displeasure off the Bolivian coast', because the British Minister Plenipotentiary had fallen foul of the Bolivian President and had been run out of the capital La Paz, naked and seated upon an ass.1 Bolivia, unlike Bohemia, once had a coast, but it had no coast then: nor has it now.

Of the independent or sovereign States of the world, which number over ninety, fourteen lack coastlands on either sea or ocean.2 By and large, independent States (and dependent ones too) enjoy windows to the sea, if not to the ocean, and include, too, under their jurisdictions varying breadths of 'territorial sea': these are facts so obvious that they tend to escape the attention of geographers which they deserve. Since the beginnings of maritime navigation in prehistoric times, the seas, with their opportunities for exploitation, trade and travel, and for exploration, conquest and colonization at long range, have

* Owing to Professor East's absence abroad, this Presidential Address breaks tradition by not having been read to the Institute during its Annual Conference.

1


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2 THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAND-LOCKED STATES

clearly exerted a compelling attraction. So normal and so desired is this direct access to the seas and oceans that some at least of the independent States, which now find themselves without coasts of their own, feel themselves deprived and in some degree inhibited. Their consciousness of this gave them common ground when, early in 1958, on the initiative of Switzerland," they met at Geneva to discuss their special problem in advance of the United Nations conference on the law of the sea. I shall turn briefly to these legal discussions later, but must first indicate which are the land-locked States and how they are

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FIGURE 1-The location, extent and distribution of independent land-locked States.

(Projection by courtesy of the Cartographical Department of the Clarendon Press.)

located and distributed. In the course of this address I hope to discover to what extent they may claim to have a distinctive geography, why they have come to lack coasts, what problems arise for them from this deficiency and, lastly, what remedies exist.

My address, as you will have guessed, falls within the field of 'political geography' which Dr. Carl O. Sauer, the least orthodox of American geographers, long ago called the 'wayward child of the geographical family'.' We need not be put off by this stricture, yet it reminds me that I should make clear a few technical terms which I shall use and also the scope of my inquiry. Note first that I shall limit my discussion to States which are wholly independent or sovereign, i.e. to those which have full control of their own affairs. I shall thus exclude a large number of States which are in varying degrees politically



THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAND-LOCKED STATES 3

dependent: such are, for example, the member states of federal States like the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and many colonies, protected states and Trust Terri- tories. It is geographically convenient to distinguish between the terms 'seas', which are all to some extent land-locked, and 'oceans' which they join. Further, I shall not include independent States which figured historically as land-locked but do so no longer, although such cases invite attention for the very reason that they have successfully overcome this former limitation. Two such States are Ethiopia and Poland. Ethiopia had no territory of its own on the

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FIGURE 2-The land-locked independent States of Europe.

Red Sea until 1952 when Eritrea, formerly Italian, was federated with it as a self- governing unit. Poland, too, at certain periods of its history, had access to the Baltic only through other States. The case of Tibet may be recalled: after 1912 it was a land-locked State independent of China, but has now been absorbed by the Chinese People's Republic and organized as the Tibet Autonomous Region. With these explanations and reservations, consider Figures 1 and 2 which relate to the land-locked sovereign States today.

The Land-locked States and their Geographical Characteristics Figure 1 shows merely the location, extent and distribution of the present

fourteen land-locked States. They are mainly but not exclusively in the Old World: in the continents of Europe and Asia, but also in South America. In Africa the self-governing Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, if it achieves




independent status, will be added to the list. Eight of the fourteen States lie in Europe, five of them making up a compact group in Central Europe, while, of the rest, one is in Western Europe and two are in Italy (Fig. 2). Four of the Central European group --all except Liechenstein --have territories within the Danube Basin. Only three of the fourteen States - Bolivia, Paraguay and Laos - are located wholly or partially within the Tropics. In the States

TABLE I

The land-locked sovereign states

Density of Land use Political Date of Area Population* population arable and

Name of State status independence (sq. miles) (millions) (per orchard sq. mile) (per cent)

In Europe CZECHOSLOVAKIA People's Republic 1918 49,354 13.5 260 43.2 HUNGARY People's Republic 1949 36,000 9.9 280 62.1 AUSTRIA Republic 1919 32,000 7.0 220 21.1 SWITZERLAND Federal Republic 1648 15,944 5.2 325 10.8 LUXEMBOURG Grand Duchy 1839 1,000 0.32 320 30.1 LIECHTENSTEIN Principality 1866 62 0.015 240 - SAN MARINO Republic 1631 38 0.014 370 VATICAN CITY Papal 1929 0.17 0.001 590 -

In Asia AFGHANISTAN Kingdom 1747 250,000 12.0t 48 3.9 NEPAL Kingdom 1769 54,000 8.9 165 22.0 MONGOLIA People's Republic 1945 600,000 1.01 3 0.05 LAOS Kingdom 1954 91,400 1.7? 18 4.0

In South America BOLIVIA Republic 1825 416,000 3.3 8 2.8 PARAGUAY Republic 1811 150,500 1.7 11 1.3

TOTALS 1,696,298 64.55

*Population figures are taken from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1958 (1958). tEstimates for Afghanistan range between 8 and 15 millions. lThis is the lower U.N. estimate for Mongolia. A maximum estimate is 2.1. ?This U.N. estimate for Laos is probably low. An estimate of 2.5 millions has been given by a Times correspondent.

which lie farthest from the sea - Paraguay and the Mongolian People's Re- public - the capital cities stand less than 800 miles away from it as the crow flies.

Table I assembles some basic facts about the land-locked States. Three of them are 'miniature' or 'micro'-States - interesting, if odd, historical survivals: the Principality of Liechtenstein, set in the Alps and by the upper Rhine on the border of Switzerland and Austria; the Republic of San Marino, a political




inlier in Italy which was, as recently as 1957, a Communist outlier in the West; and the Vatican City, only 109 acres in extent, all that remains of the Papal States which once stretched across the Italian peninsula from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Adriatic. Of these micro-States, two - San Marino and the Vatican City - are technically 'international enclaves',5 i.e. their territories lie entirely within that of another State (Italy). The fourteen land-locked States assume small importance both in respect of territory and of population numbers: they occupy 3.4 per cent of the inhabited earth but support only 2.3 per cent of its population. While, therefore, as a whole, they have less than the world average of population, they reveal individually a wide range from the very low densities of Mongolia, Bolivia, Paraguay and Laos to the relatively high densities (220-370 per square mile) of the European States. The density of 165 per square mile for the Himalayan State of Nepal may appear surprisingly high, while that for the Papal State, equivalent to nearly 600 per square mile, compares with those of Japan and Formosa.

This table might well suggest that the land-locked States are a motley assemblage with perhaps nothing in common except their anomalous detach- ment from the sea. But this premature conclusion must be tested by considering comparatively the various geographical features which they reveal. Clearly they differ sharply in area as in population numbers. Do they tend to relate to specific physical environments? Do they relate to regions of minimal accessi- bility ? Did they spring up at any particular period of history ?

On the simplest basis we recognize that some of the land-locked States occupy mountainous regions: Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Austria have territories in the Alps, Czechoslovakia in the Tatra, Bolivia in the Andes, while Afghanistan, Mongolia and Nepal intrude into the lofty mountain system of High Asia. In contrast, Hungary, Luxembourg, Paraguay and Laos have largely low-lying lands, while more than half of Bolivia is lowland, tropical at that. The physical environments of the land-locked States, therefore, show no simple common denominator, while the same is true if the uses of the land are considered. The proportions of State territory which are cultivated (Table I) show a wide range, from below 1 per cent in Mongolia to 62 per cent in Hun- gary. The figure is strikingly low in some of the countries which contain considerable lowlands - notably Paraguay, Bolivia and Laos - yet high or fairly high in some of the more mountainous States, notably Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Nepal.

Do the geographical positions of the land-locked States show a high degree of inaccessibility? Inaccessibility may, of course, be due essentially to physical factors - of extent, altitude, relief, climate and vegetation cover - but it may also reflect a low degree of social control of the environment. Figure 3 shows broadly what access to railways some of these States possess. Here again the position shows contrasts: between the considerable railway provision enjoyed by the European States, the moderate facilities available to Bolivia, Paraguay and Laos, the very slender provision for the vast Mongolian territory and for

B




Nepal, and the complete absence of railways in Afghanistan. We are aware of great contrasts here in the social impact which has been made on physical environment and thus in the stages of development which have been reached: this is notably so in Switzerland as compared with Afghanistan, although we keep in mind the great difference in territorial scale of these two countries.

The largest of the land-locked States - Mongolia, Bolivia, Afghanistan and Paraguay - face formidable difficulties in respect of internal transport. It is true to say of all of them that it is easier to reach a neighbouring State than to reach some parts of their own territory. These difficulties spring from their great size, from their landforms, from climate, and (in South America) from vegetational obstacles; they spring, too, from the low densities of population

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FIGURE 3-The areas of the four Asian land-locked States which lie more than 100 miles from a railway. The areas

are enclosed by the solid line.

which mean that these countries lack the capital with which to undertake public works on an adequate and necessarily costly scale. It is in these countries that the concept of 'effective national territory', as distinct from total national territory, fittingly and revealingly applies. Large parts of Bolivia and Paraguay, for example, lie virtually inaccessible and beyond the control of the governments of these States: Preston E. James has mapped such areas in South America.6 Figure 4 suggests how the Andean ranges, the Altiplano, and the interior, tropical, forested lowlands of Bolivia present staggering difficulties to circulation.

Look next at the column in the table which lists the dates when the land- locked States acquired independent statehood. Does this show, for example, that these States are survivals of States organized long ago when trade and travel were more local and when maritime commerce lay in the hands of a few seaboard countries? Only in part. Austria and Hungary are historic States which have assumed in the past many territorial shapes and included sea-coasts. Switzerland and San Marino can claim over three centuries of independent




statehood, while Afghanistan and Nepal, too, are relatively old-established States. The rest, however, in their present forms at least, are products of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Bolivia and Paraguay were colonial territories of Spain; Luxembourg acquired independence only in 1839; Czecho- slovakia, and Austria and Hungary in their reduced forms, are 'successor' States of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which collapsed in 1918. The Mongo- lian People's Republic, Moscow's satellite, formerly part of China's 'outer territories', and Laos, formerly part of French Indo-China, are creations of

SLAND 3000to 6OOO ft.

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recent years. The land-locked States differ in their political status: some are kingdoms, others republics, Soviet or Western in kind, while one is a grand duchy, another a principality, and the Papal State is unique. All but five of them are members of the United Nations Organization. The exceptions include the three micro-States, which clearly lack the means of honouring the responsi- bilities of membership: Liechtenstein was refused admission on this ground. Switzerland, which prefers to remain outside, the better actively to pursue its neutral role in international affairs, has not sought membership. Lastly, the Mongolian People's Republic has tried, but so far has failed to secure entry.




The 'State Idea' of the Land-locked States

My analysis thus far has proved very negative: land-locked States appear to have nothing in common save their aloofness from the sea. Yet one geographical characteristic might appear, in some measure, common to all of them other than the three micro-States. They might all appear to be 'buffer States'. This assertion needs justification.

The concept of the 'buffer State' merits attention by political geographers - more than I can give it here. In the present context 'buffer' by analogy relates to familiar apparatus at railway stations or on motor cars, and has the sense of 'shock absorber'. The definition of 'buffer State' given in the Concise O.E.D. is hardly satisfactory: 'A small State between two large ones diminishing the chance of hostilities.' For 'small' we should substitute 'weak' or 'relatively weak'. Indeed perhaps the most classical case of a 'buffer State' in modern history is the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire which was certainly weak and no less certainly large. The crux of the idea implicit in the buffer State was clearly expressed more than two hundred years ago by Montesquieu in his Esprit des lois.' I quote his short paragraph in translation:

When one has as a neighbour a State that is decadent, one must be very careful not to hasten its ruin, because, in this respect, one is in the happiest condition that one could be in, there being nothing so convenient for a prince than to be near another who receives for him the blows and outrages of fortune. And it is rare that, by conquering such a State, he increases as much in real power as he loses in relative power.

In short, the buffer State, whether or not it is decadent, is a militarily weak State but a useful shield to the strong States which lie around it. Let us consider the relevance of this concept to the eleven larger land-locked States. This will involve a passing glance at their diverse origins and case histories.

You may think that it is almost inevitable that some States should lie wholly inland, given the nature of the continents and their relation to the encompassing oceans. Consider the theoretical case of a continent circular in area and surrounded by ocean (Fig. 5). The several nations of the continent, as they organize and consolidate their State territories, make sure to include a stretch of coast because of its manifold and manifest utility." But note that, if there is no inland State, a curious and embarrassing convergence of boundaries occurs at the centre of the continent. The existence of one land-locked State, with its lands lying around the centre of the continent, has an obvious convenience to all the seaboard States for defence and for administration.9 The simple historical case of this is found in ancient Greece where States, City States, appeared early. In the Peloponnesus, which is almost an island, you will find (Fig. 5) Arcadia, 'land of bears' and of woods, of shepherds and huntsmen, which was established within a ring of mountains in highland country where many rivers had their sources: and it was wholly cut off from the sea. This was



THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAND-LOCKED STATES 9 a country of small account in its cultural and economic life :10 well rated for hospitality but not for intelligence, well known for its export of asses and mer- cenaries, and providing sites for many battles. Arcadia, too, was clearly a backward State and a weak one, though it was not small relatively. Clearly also it was useful to the marginal seaboard States as a shock absorber or buffer.

The land-locked State, then, appeared early in Europe and you may well think that there is a certain inevitability about its occurrence. You may also think that it would tend to have more neighbours than a seaboard State, but if you so think, you are wrong. The range is actually from one to seven neighbours, while only two are found around four of the land-locked States. Two have only one neighbour, San Marino and the Vatican City which, we have

5 LAND- 2 ARCADIA LOCKED

..... STATE

4 3

CITY STATES The larger circle represents a IN continent surrounded by sea: PELOPONNESOS states with coasts c. 500 B.C. O MILES S.0 are numbered 1 to 5

FIGURE 5-The location of Arcadia c. 500 B.c. and a theoretical case of a land-locked State.

noted, are 'international enclaves'; and the country which enjoys, or suffers, the maximum number of neighbours is Austria, with seven. But to continue my main argument: can we conclude that, although they differ in nearly all respects, the eleven larger land-locked States of today share one other common characteristic, namely that they are, in varying degrees, buffer States ? In considering this hypothesis, we may inquire also about what certain American political geographers have called the 'State idea' to see whether this concept helps our investigation.

The 'State idea' goes back to Ratzel. It has been revived by R. Harts- home," and Preston E. James has applied it to South American States. It is best defined as the raison d'etre or justification of a particular State, or as the pecu- liar purpose or purposes for which it stands that distinguish it from other States. Such purpose or purposes are presented to the people of the State and acknowledged by them. This concept, it is claimed, should engage the interest of the




political geographer as an essential target of analysis and thought. The concept is not necessarily applicable to all existing States nor is it necessarily at all easy to apply in particular cases. Although we may be willing to formulate on the spot what is the 'State idea' of, let us say, Israel or of the Soviet Union, we might well pause before speaking confidently about the State idea of either the United States or the United Kingdom. My analysis of the cases before us can be only provisional and my answers tentative.

The case of Switzerland is familiar. Three small mountain cantons, inhabited by German peasants and so placed as to control the northern approach to the St. Gotthard and Furka passes of the Alps, won independence of their feudal overlords in the later Middle Ages. To this core area other cantons attached themselves by stages and found increased strength through political association and democratic institutions of government. They formed the Swiss Confederation which was formally recognized as an independent State in 1648, thus breaking its former link with the Holy Roman Empire. In 1815 Switzer- land re-emerged as an independent State, enlarged by the incorporation of three cantons in the west - Geneva, Vaud and Neuchatel. Moreover, its perpetual neutrality and territorial integrity were then solemnly guaranteed by the Great Powers.12

What can be deduced from these bald facts, together with those we know of the Swiss physical environment, including its geographical position athwart routes which connect three relatively powerful States - France, Germany and Italy? Clearly Switzerland was strategically placed, as Julius Caesar first showed. We may note what Machiavelli wrote in 1513: 'The Swiss are well armed and enjoy great freedom.' But clearly Switzerland was small and weak as compared with its great neighbours. The Great Powers in 1815 definitely recognized that their own interests, as well as those of all Europe, were best served by the exclusion of a small State from participation in future conflicts, as has indeed happened. Switzerland is a buffer State and a neutral State as well: these considerations mainly characterize its State idea. Indeed, in the security of their neutrality and of their mountains, the Swiss, far more enter- prising than the Arcadians, have exploited their resources with marked success, basing their economy on their well populated area (or oecumene) which we call the Swiss Plateau, the Germans call the 'Swiss Mittelland', and the French call 'Les Collines Suisses'. Nor has the lack of a sea-coast curtailed Switzerland's commercial activity, as we shall see. The advantages to the neighbours, and indeed to the rest of the world, of Swiss neutrality are so continually in evidence, alike in peace and in war, as to need no elaboration here.13

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, whose small area within the Rhine massif is surrounded by Germany, France and Belgium, has a long history as part of the Holy Roman Empire and later of the German Confederation. In 1815 it was attached to the kingdom of the Netherlands. Formally recognized as an independent State in 1839, it retained dynastic links with Holland until 1890 and long remained part of the German customs union, the Zollverein. In




1867 the Great Powers collectively guaranteed its perpetual neutrality. In 1922 it established an economic union with Belgium and in 1948 joined with Belgium and the Netherlands in the so-called Benelux Customs Union. In its constitu- tion of 1948 it renounced its 'perpetual neutrality' which had been violated in both World Wars, and became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion and, in 1950, of the European Coal and Steel Community. More recently it became part of the Common Market. In the light of these facts note the essential political character of Luxembourg. It is a small and militarily weak State, with an old fortress city as capital, situated on the border of two powerful States, France and Germany, and also alongside Belgium. It was clearly another instance of the buffer State as conceived by Montesquieu which the Great Powers found advantageous to preserve and to neutralize.

Austria, after the First World War and the collapse of the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire, emerged as a small Alpine and Danubian State, nationally homogeneous, but a mere rump. The wheel of history had turned and the new Republic of Austria was territorially not unlike the original Ostmark or frontier buffer which the Emperor Otto created against the Magyars (Hungarians) in the tenth century. Austria was cut off from Trieste, the seaport which it had built for its own use in the eighteenth century. After its political integration with Germany under Hitler and the military occupation which followed the Second World War, it recovered full independence and neutral status by the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. Note Austria's strategic position between the head of the Adriatic Sea and the middle Danubian basin, and note, too, its position, with other small States, between the Soviet Union and the West. As with Switzerland and Luxembourg, so with Austria, the Great Powers found common interest and advantage in according neutral status and it fits into our general scheme as a land-locked State which is a buffer.

Hungary, we have noted, is also a successor and residual State of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, within which, as the Hungarian Kingdom, it retained its own parliamentary institutions, national identity and a considerable territory which included a window on the Adriatic Sea, notably at Fiume. At its inception as an independent and Catholic kingdom as early as A.D. 1001 Hungary was an inland State but its territorial extent has changed continually throughout history. The Hungary which emerged in 1919, and that too which reappeared after the Second World War, was greatly reduced in area, wholly inland yet nationally more homogeneous, for the mainly non-Magyar areas of the old kingdom had been lopped off. Hungary is clearly an historic 'nation State' rooted to its homeland into which the Magyars first penetrated as long ago as the ninth century. It is no less a Danubian State lying, like Austria, astride the navigable Danube which gives access to the Black Sea. As a People's Republic so-called, it is ringed around by the territories of other Communist States - Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., Rumania and Yugoslavia - except to the west where it adjoins neutral Austria. Thus, while Hungary differs from Switzerland and Austria in being committed to one of the two opposed political




camps of Europe, it is clearly one of a number of States which collectively insulate the U.S.S.R. from the West. In the inter-war years, it was similarly regarded as one of a tier of States, oriented to the West, which was conceived as a buffer between Germany and the U.S.S.R."1 Its State idea would appear to reside in its long national history, its distinctive language, and its adherence to the Roman Catholic Church. A Communist geographer, however, would doubtless find a newer and compelling State idea in its organization as a People's Republic.

I turn next to Czechoslovakia which best illustrates the theoretical case, to which I referred earlier, in that, within the truly peninsular Europe at least, it occupies a middle position, in so far as an area so shaped can be said to have a middle. Most of what has been said already of Austria and of Hungary here applies. Czechoslovakia was created in 1918 from lands of the former Austro- Hungarian Empire and may be regarded as the modern equivalent of the old Bohemian kingdom. Its interior position is reflected in the number of its neighbours - the two Germanies, Poland, Austria, Hungary and the U.S.S.R. This is a composite 'nation State' of Czechs and Slovaks with its own language and its core area in the Polabe within the upper Elbe (Labe) basin. Czecho- slovakia looks seawards in three directions: down the Elbe to the North Sea, down the Oder to the Baltic, and down the Danube to the Black Sea from its river port of Bratislava. The Moravian Gate gives easy access to Poland. Finally note that the Czechoslovak People's Republic falls into line with that of the Hungarians as part of a broad buffer zone between the U.S.S.R. and the West. The remarkable strategical position of Bohemia, with its route focus at Prague, needs only be mentioned here. While Czechoslovakia is one of the two strongest of the U.S.S.R.'s satellites, it is relatively weak as compared with its principal neighbours, the German Federal Republic and the U.S.S.R.

I turn now to Asia where the Mongolian People's Republic, whose nominal independence was recognized by both the Chinese People's Republic and the U.S.S.R. in 1950, occupies an enormous area of desert plateaux and of mountains. More than 85 per cent of this country stands above 3000 feet, and doubt about its population numbers is expressed by estimates which range from 0.9 to 2.1 millions.15 Here on a large scale is a 'frontier of separation' presented by nature, occupied by nomadic and other pastoral peoples who are clearly making some advance towards settled life, which includes mining and some railway provision. Note its striking geographical position athwart the shortest rail route from Moscow to Peking, via Irkutsk. The U.S.S.R. sought to create in Outer Mongolia a spacious shield against the Japanese who, in the 1930s, were established in Manchuria and Jehol and were controlling Inner Mongolia. As things now stand, the Mongolian People's Republic is a Russian satellite, made up of territory detached from the old China. So long as amity lasts between the two Soviet giants, Mongolia becomes a bridge, rather than a buffer; yet it retains potentially this property.18

Afghanistan, set within its lofty mountains and high plateaux, especially




from the time of railway building in India and in Russian Central Asia (i.e. around the mid-nineteenth century) was a conveniently placed and weak Moslem State, occupying territory little integrated and difficult of access, between the Empire of the Tsars and that of Britain in India. This convenience was broadly recognized by both sides as is attested by the many agreements made between Russia and Britain and by the efforts which were directed to delimiting and even to demarcating the boundaries of Afghanistan.17 Under present conditions, when the defence of the old North-west Frontier of India falls primarily on Pakistan (like Afghanistan a Moslem State), the value of Afghanistan as an obstacle to the U.S.S.R.'s expansion to the Arabian Sea, and thus to the Indian Ocean, clearly remains. The interest of the U.S.A. and of the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan is strong and evident and that of the latter is becoming entrenched there. 1 Here is another land-locked buffer State: but what is its State-idea?

There remain in Asia for review the land-locked States of Laos and Nepal. Laos, the boundaries of which abut China, Vietnam, Siam and Cambodia, was from the 1880s part of French Indo-China. After the Second World War it was made an Associated State of the French Union, but with the collapse of French power under Communist military pressure, it was set up as an independent and virtually neutralized State by the Geneva Conference of 1954. Clearly it is a weak State with a powerful Communist neighbour and its geographical position is recognized by the eight SEATO Powers which (in their treaty of 1954) agree that an attack on Laos (as on other designated States) would endanger their peace and safety. 'It is in everybody's interest', wrote The Times Bangkok correspondent on 21st June 1958, 'to keep Laos as a buffer State'.

Nepal,19 poised in the Himalayas between India and Tibet, now finds itself also a neighbour of the Chinese People's Republic. It is a remarkable case of a people and State which for centuries preserved considerable seclusion, especially from Europeans - a policy no longer possible. It escaped the Moslem conquest of India, as also the British conquest. It contains the birthplace of Buddha - and Mount Everest. Its intermediate position between China and India, despite the difficulties of access from Tibet, is reflected in the racial character of the Nepalese, who are largely Mongoloid, in their religious associa- tions (Buddhism and Hinduism), in their architectural styles, and in their languages. The peasants speak Tibeto-Burman languages, while the official language, Nepali, is related to the Hindu branch of the Indo-European language family. Like Switzerland, Nepal exported soldiers, the famous Gurkhas. Easiest access to the heart of Nepal, the valley around Katmandu the capital, is from India, but there are only 58 miles of railway. It is within the orbit of India that Nepal lay and lies, witness their common interest in the Chatra dam for the Kosi multi-purpose project. Clearly, in relation to its great neighbours, India and China, Nepal is weak, vulnerable, indeed indefensible; this very fact may ensure its survival. Its State idea would seem to reside in its national traditions and cultures.



14 THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAND-LOCKED STATES The Republics of Bolivia and Paraguay, whose territories meet in the Gran

Chaco, illustrate the general principle (Fig. 6) that land-locked States may be expected towards the middle of continents. Together they stretch through a length of (at most) 1250 miles and a breadth of 1100 miles, lying to the south of the centre of South America. They occupy interior parts of former Spanish colonial territory, in particular parts of the Viceroyalties of La Plata and Peru. Bolivia neighbours Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina and Paraguay, while the last-named lies between Brazil and Argentina, borders also Bolivia but not Uruguay. Formidable obstacles check internal circulation: in Bolivia, sheer

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FIGURE 6-The location and extent of the land- locked States of South America.

extent, the Andean cordilleras and their contained Altiplano, plateaux in the south-east, and rain forest in the upper basin of the Amazon; and in Paraguay the extensive forests of the Chaco lowlands. These conditions, together with the paucity of population, help to explain why these two States remain immature despite their independence since the early nineteenth century. One difficulty is that, as railway building proceeds, parts of their territories are drawn into the orbit of neighbouring countries.

The core area of Paraguay lies around Asunci6n, which Spain founded in 1537 as the capital of its colonial outpost among the friendly and virile Guarani.




(Fig. 7). In this core area, which occupies only 5 per cent of the national territory, live 60 per cent of the Paraguayans, who are of mixed Guarani and Spanish descent. Similarly, in Bolivia, three-quarters of the population live in one-fifth of the total area - separated valleys and basins within the bleak, east Andean Highlands, while large areas of potentially good arable land lie remote and largely undeveloped. Difficulty of access, too, doubtless lies behind the back- wardness and poverty of Bolivia and Paraguay, where are found the lowest income levels and the highest degrees of illiteracy in South America. Yet the concept of 'underdevelopment' applies to both, and most clearly to Bolivia, 'a

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beggar sitting on a Chair of Gold', as experts still believe.20 And we should remember that Andean Bolivia formed part of the Incan Empire which achieved the highest pre-Columbian civilization of South America.

At its inception in 1825 and until 1879 Bolivia held 250 miles of coast, edging the Atacama Desert, rich in nitrates and copper ores, and the seaports of Antofagasta, Mejillones and Cobijo, all of which are now in Chile. Access to the sea was, however, inevitably difficult for Bolivia because of physical geography. Bolivia lost its sea-coast to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-83), much larger areas of tropical lowland to Brazil (in 1867 and 1903), and parts of the Gran Chaco to Argentina and Paraguay, as well as other land to Peru, in 1938 after a war with Paraguay which aimed at securing an outlet to the Atlantic




by way of the Paraguay river. Indeed, Bolivia is believed to have lost to its five neighbours no less than 492,000 square miles of territory, i.e. more than it now retains (Fig. 8). Note that the boundaries of Bolivia and Paraguay, as now delimited and indeed demarcated, include several 'triple points'. Paraguay, no less hedged in by more powerful States lost, too, part of its original holding to Brazil and Argentina during the war of 1864-70 with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, in which it also greatly reduced its male population.

Even though it lacks territorial and economic integration, Paraguay is clearly a nation State, with a broadly homogeneous mestizo population of Guarani descent and Guarani language. It has been characterized more by emigration than immigration, so that it retains its Indian character (cf. the

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'white' republics of Argentina and Uruguay). While Bolivia is also an Indian State, its Indian population (of Aymaras and Quechuas) differs little from Peru's, and its national cohesion, distinctness and consciousness are less clear. How- ever, enough has been said to justify my conclusion that both Bolivia and Paraguay may be rated weak States, alike politically, economically and militarily. Like Uruguay, they lie between powerful neighbours, and their survival, as buffer States, little though they may appreciate this role, has obvious advantages for the peaceful development of South America.

To sum up my discussion thus far: the eleven larger land-locked countries are all militarily weak buffer States, the security of which is inevitably connected with that of their maritime neighbours. They occupy positions of strategical




importance, less today than formerly; this applies notably to Luxembourg, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary in Europe, and to Afghani- stan, Laos and Mongolia in Asia. Two of the eleven States are neutralized, i.e. they retain only modest military means for defence and they stand apart from alliances. Three, in contrast, two in Europe and one in Asia, are aligned with the Communist bloc. Of the rest, Laos is neutralist between East and West, while Afghanistan may be falling into complete dependence on its neighbour, the Soviet Union. The two South American land-locked countries fall within the framework of Western hemisphere defence organized and led by the United States. In the main the land-locked States are 'nation States', although a few of them are doubtfully so classified. Several of them, too, show marked signs of political immaturity and of economic underdevelopment. They might too appear to be characterized by emigration rather than immigration, but this aspect requires investigation.

Access to the Sea

I turn lastly and briefly to the special problems which have arisen because one-sixth of the sovereign States of the world lack access to the sea through their own territories. Of course, beyond every inland State lies the sea or ocean: there are always a sea-coast and a seaport to which any inland area can be related in so far as it needs the facility of maritime intercourse and wishes to enjoy its acknowledged right to use the 'high seas' which in international law are res communis, i.e. free and available to all. Further, progress in the means of transport have been especially helpful to land-locked States. Problems, and not always difficulties, arise simply because the land is politically comparted and because nations, like individuals, do not relish being wholly beholden to their neighbours, the Joneses, especially when, as in this case, the Joneses are better off. The problems which arise necessarily have a juridical aspect and a psychological aspect; financial and economic considerations, too, are involved.

The psychological aspect is clear. Land-locked States are conscious of their disability, even when, as is commonly the case, no serious practical difficulties arise in their access to the sea. 'The one platform on which all Bolivians are politically united is their demand for an outlet on the sea and the lack of a seaboard is the country's most vociferous grievance.'21 Similarly, the representative of Paraguay, speaking in the United Nations Assembly (12th session), said: 'The country's most serious problem, from its earliest days as an independent nation, has been that it is land-locked.' It is significant that one of the Com- mittees of the U.N. Assembly is specifically concerned with the land-locked States and that at the U.N. Conference on the law of the sea, which was held at Geneva from 24th February until 27th April 1958, thirteen of the eighty-six States represented were land-locked; and one of the committees set up by the Conference was concerned with 'access to the sea of land-locked countries'.22

Available reports"23 of the discussions held at Geneva throw light on the




existing arrangements which govern the access to the sea of inland countries and on the desire held by some of them that their rights of access should be written into, and guaranteed by, international law. It is noteworthy that while some States, notably Afghanistan, Nepal, Czechoslovakia and Bolivia, pro- posed this, others, notably Switzerland and Austria, were content with the status quo. Indeed Switzerland was at pains to prevent the formation of a bloc of land-locked States.

To the legal aspect of these problems I can only allude. Among international lawyers there is a fundamental division of opinion between those who believe that the right of passage to the sea is an inescapable obligation - a 'State servitude' imposed on countries seaward of land-locked ones, and those (the majority) who believe that such a facility may be established only by inter- State agreements.24 Certainly much progress was made by the Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit25 agreed at the Barcelona Conference of 20th April 1921 when the States represented recognized the right of land-locked countries to transit through surrounding countries with equality of treatment, and specified the means for settling any disputes which arose therefrom. Further, a solemn Declaration,26 made at this Conference, agreed to recognize the flag of vessels of a land-locked State, provided they were registered at a specified place within its territory. Use of this right is made by Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Paraguay, Hungary and Austria.27 The main legal aspect of our problem con- cerns 'adequate transport facilities in promoting international trade'. This need - of what is nicely known in international law as the right of 'innocent passage' - is met in practice as a matter of courtesy, and it is usually catered for in bilateral treaties. Note that innocent passage, to be effective, must include passage of the territorial seas of the seaboard State.

As illustrations of these bilateral arrangements inscribed in treaties we may note that Laos, by a treaty with Siam in 1955, is granted transit rights in Siam to Siamese ports; that Nepal, by a treaty with the Indian Union of 31st July 1950, has 'full and unrestricted right of transit', including that of civil aircraft, through Indian territory where its goods are exempted from excise and import duties; that Afghanistan similarly enjoys such facilities in the U.S.S.R. (Agreement of 28th June 1955) and in Pakistan to reach Karachi, and that under more recent agreements28 (in 1958) transport and port facilities are to be improved, with American financial help, to facilitate Afghanistan's access to the sea.

For purposes of customs, as also for mere convenience, an inland State needs to have its own share of one at least of its neighbour's seaports and this is usually made available on a clear legal footing by the provision of a so-called 'free port', i.e. a specified port area is assigned to the control of the inland State. Another arrangement which was devised and applied as early as 1815 to the river Rhine, rested on the legal concept of the 'international river'. Thus the navigable section of the river Rhine was made legally available to the vessels of all nations, and not merely to those of riparian States, so that Switzerland, in




pre-railway days, enjoyed, as of right, river access to the sea from Basel.29 The principle of the international river was later applied to other important Euro- pean rivers which indifferently passed through the territories of several States, notably to the Danube (in 1856) and to the Elbe and Oder (in 1919), but since the Second World War it has been abandoned in respect of these rivers.30 Even so, it appears that the European land-locked States enjoy in fact the facilities which they need for the conduct of oversea trade. Thus Czechoslovakia has access to and from Hamburg, Stettin and Gdynia-Dansk, where it has its own customs-free zone and, like Austria and Hungary, can ply its own vessels on the

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Danube. Austria has a 'free port' at Trieste (Agreement of 3rd February 1956) while Luxembourg's needs are amply covered by its membership of the Benelux customs union and the Common Market.

In Bolivia, the settled Altiplano and the capital La Paz have access to the Pacific and free transit by three single-track railways, all built in this century, which carry Bolivia's mineral exports. These connect La Paz to Arica and Antofagasta in Chile, and to the Peruvian ports of Mollendo and Matarani. Bolivia has also treaty rights to 'free ports' in these four Pacific ports. Relatively new railways, which connect Santa Cruz with Corumba in Brazil and with the Argentine railway system, provide, at some distance, outlets to Atlantic ports from the eastern lowlands of Bolivia (Fig. 9). But facilities at the Pacific ports are deemed inadequate for Bolivia's needs.




Geographically, as well as historically, the best settled areas of Paraguay are part of the hinterland of the La Plata estuary and this 'riverside nation' depends almost completely on the Paraguay-Parand rivers for the transport of freight. Asunci6n, Paraguay's chief river port, which is accessible (except during the season of low water from January to May) by vessels of up to 12 feet draught, may in a small degree be reckoned a seaport, in that a few small vessels of 800 tons deadweight actually reach it directly from European ports. The bulk of its trade, however, is by way of Buenos Aires and, to a much smaller extent, via Montevideo. Paraguay enjoys bonded warehouse facilities at Buenos Aires and Rosario. Goods traffic carried by water between Asunci6n and Buenos Aires and Montevideo are handled respectively by Argentine State-owned vessels and by a Brazilian company. Whether rail or river transport is used, Paraguay has to face the delays and the charges imposed by others, and freight charges have been at times higher between Buenos Aires and Asun- ci6n than between England and Buenos Aires."3 Remember, however, the distances involved: Asunci6n is 938 miles from Buenos Aires by rail, and farther by river. But Paraguay will soon enjoy another approach to the sea and a free port on the Brazilian coast at Paranagua, since Brazil is building an international highway to make this access feasible.

Conclusion

The fourteen land-locked countries, to which I have drawn your attention, reflecting the arbitrariness with which the Earth's surface and its resources are politically shared, get along in their international affairs without any very evident practical difficulties through their lack of coasts. Some of these countries are acutely aware of their deficiency - their under-privileged status; others are not, like Switzerland, which emphasizes that transit is a two-way traffic and that reciprocal relations between countries with and without coasts can be settled sensibly around the conference table. However, relations between neighbours are not invariably cordial: the Afghan delegates at Geneva, according to the Pakistan newspaper Dawn," gave the impression that Pakistan was 'strang- ling a poor land-locked country like Afghanistan'. It may be recalled that during its war with Paraguay in the 1930s Chile and Peru denied the shipment of arms to Bolivia through their ports, a restriction which has since been removed by treaties. Liechtenstein has long escaped isolation by joining the Swiss customs union, while Luxembourg is showing that a small country can survive and prosper by merging its economic life with that of other, larger States. This policy may find followers. Thus the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 'thinking aloud'33 in the summer of 1958, mooted the idea of a customs union or even federation with his Moslem neighbours, Afghanistan and Iran. The larger land-locked States, we have found, are all buffers in varying degree and, as such, have value to their greater neighbours and thus contribute to international stability.



THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAND-LOCKED STATES 21 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author acknowledges the help given by the Publications Fund, Birkbeck College, University of London, towards the cost of the illustrations.

NOTES Note: Among the available United Nations publications used are the following: Comments by

Governments on the Articles concerning the law of the sea prepared by the International Law Com- mission at its eighth session (23rd October 1957) and United Nations Conference on the law of the sea, Official records, vols. ii and vii (Geneva, 1958).

1 See HAROLD OSBORNE, Bolivia: a land divided (1954), 1. 2 The figure of 'over ninety' should now (October 1960) be revised to 'over one hundred' because

of the creation of many new (mainly African) States. The number of independent States has more than doubled since the beginning of this century. Their enumeration today raises various difficulties. Ukraine S.S.R. and Byelorussia S.S.R. are not here included as independent States, although they are members of the United Nations, nor certain land-locked States which are not wholly independent, notably Andorra, Bhutan and Sikkim.

3 Switzerland confined its invitations to those land-locked States which were among the eighty-seven U.N. members called to the conference on the law of the sea, and accordingly invited Afghanistan, Austria, Byelorussia, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Laos, Luxembourg, Nepal, Paraguay, San Marino and the Vatican. This, with the host country, makes thirteen. Note the omission of Liechten- stein and the Mongolian People's Republic, which are not members of UNO, and the inclusion of one member state of the Soviet Union, which is. Attempts by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Byelorussia and Hungary to have Mongolia invited failed (The Times, 12th February 1958).

4 Cited by R. HARTSHORNE, The nature of geography (1939), 203, from CARL SAUER, 'Recent developments in cultural geography', chap. 4 of E. C. HAYES (ed.), Recent developments in the social sciences (1927), 154-212.

5 C. D'OLIVIER FARRAN, 'International enclaves and the question of state servitudes', Inter- national and Comparative Law Quarterly, 4 (1955), 294-307. There are also 'international exclaves', of which West Berlin is a notable example: see G. W. S. ROBINSON, 'Exclaves', Annals of the Associa- tion of American Geographers, 49 (1959), 283-95.

6 W. G. EAST and A. E. MOODIE (eds.), The changing world (1956), 889. 7 Book IX, chap. X, 'De la faiblesse des Etats voisins', in Esprit des lois (Paris, 1872), 113.

This work was first published at Geneva in 1748. I thank my colleague Dr. D. Dakin for drawing my attention to this passage.

8 Carl Ritter believed that a high proportion of coastline to unit area of land was a sign that a country would be advanced and prosperous.

9 Compare the so-called 'triple points' in South America, where 'antecedent' boundaries of astronomic or geometric type converge. At such points the jurisdictions of three States converge. Note also that the Soviet Union and Canada meet at the North Pole. On the Canadian aspect of this, see N. L. NICHOLSON, The boundaries of Canada, its provinces and territories (Ottawa, 1954).

10 Cf. H. F. TOZER, Lectures on the geography of Greece (1873), 291: 'But the position of Arcadia, though it developed the physique of its inhabitants, did not tend at the same time to awaken their energies, or provide them with a career in life. Being removed from the sea, it had no traffic of its own, and thus all those interesting influences were cut off which arise from communications with foreign nations.'

11 R. HARTSHORNE wrote ' ... each state must seek to present to its people a specific purpose, or purposes, distinct from the purposes formulated in other states, in terms of which all classes of people in all the diverse areas of the region will identify themselves with the state that includes them within its organized area. This concept of a complex of specific purposes of each state has been called the "state idea" by various writers following Ratzel, or by others the raison d'etre, or justification of the state.' P. E. JAMES and C. F. JONES (eds.), American Geography: inventory and prospect (1954), 195.

12 On 'collective guarantees', see International Congresses, Foreign Office Handbook (1920), 134-40. Switzerland's neutrality was reaffirmed in the Treaty of Versailles, 1919.

13 See JAQUELINE BERLIN, La Suisse et les Nations Unies (New York, 1956). While Switzerland joins only international organizations which have humanitarian and technical functions, it adopts a policy of active neutrality. In 1960 it joined the European Free Trade Area of the so-called 'Outer Seven'.

C



22 THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAND-LOCKED STATES 14 Cf. H. J. MACKINDER, Democratic ideals and reality (1919), 120-1. 15 ERICH THIEL, Die Mongolei (Miinchen, 1958), 192-7. 16 The extension in 1956 of the Soviet broad-gauge railway from the Mongol capital Ulan Bator

to Peking, while shortening rail distances between Moscow and Peking, has encouraged a flow of Chinese settlers into this Russian satellite. 'The Mongols are beginning to take advantage of being a buffer-state, and of the chance that gives them to play off one country against the other' - not least in the matter of getting credits. See KLAUS MEHNERT, 'Soviet-Chinese relations', International Affairs, 35 (1959), 417-26.

17 See W. G. East and O.H. K. SPATE, The changing map of Asia (1950), 132-4 and Figure 13. 18 Rouble and dollar gifts and loans to Afghanistan and the visits there of Khrushchev and

Eisenhower testify to the interest of the two world protagonists in this buffer country between con- tinental and oceanic power. Considerable material changes are being made - new highways, air- fields, electricity plants have been built and projects include irrigation works and a tunnel through the Hindu Kush to give direct access to Kabul from the Soviet frontier. The Afghan army and air force are supplied with Soviet equipment and clearly Soviet developments have made the stronger and more visible impression. Afghanistan's 'Pakhtunistan' policy, which seeks to win from western Pakistan some two million Pathans living there, undermines good relations with this neighbouring Moslem State. It might seem that only the discovery of petroleum, which has so far eluded pros- pectors, would give the Afghan government, which is Pathan, any degree of independence of its mighty Soviet neighbour. See ANDREW WILSON'S article in The Observer, 6th December 1959.

19 On the geographical background of Nepal, see 0. H. K. SPATE, India and Pakistan (1954), 405-21.

20 L. A. LEPAWSKY, 'The Bolivian operation', International Conciliation (March 1952), no. 479. 21 H. OSBORNE, op. cit., 38. 22 See the reference to United Nations publications preceding note 1 on page 21. 23 The Times, 10th February 1958 and 13th February 1958. 24 See C. D'OLIVIER FARRAN, article cited, and OPPENHEIM, InternationalLaw (ed. H. Lauterpacht),

I, Peace (ed., 1955). 25 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vii, nos. 1-3. 26 Ibid., 73-5. Before 1921 inland States had to register their ships at some foreign port under a

foreign flag and subject to foreign mercantile law: Brig.-Gen. Sir Osborne Mance, Frontiers, peace treaties and international organizations (1946), 23.

27 Advantage has been taken of this facility, notably by Switzerland which has a merchant fleet of 150,000 tons, more than half of which is registered at Basel, the rest mainly at Panama. Reference to Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1956-7 suggests further that Czechoslovakia has at least three ships, totalling 17,217 tons, registered at Prague; that Paraguay has four, totalling 2516 tons, registered at Asunci6n; and that Hungary has a new motor vessel of 1181 tons registered at Budapest. By a decree of 15th September 1951 the Vatican made rules governing navigation under the flag of the Holy See, as did Austria by a Federal Act of 17th July 1957.

28 Pakistan News (London), July 1958, no. 17. 29 The Rhine can carry barges of over 1500 tons capacity from the North Sea to Rheinfelden,

13 miles above Basel. See W. G. EAST and A. E. MOODIE, op. cit., 227. 30 Use of the Danube waterway is now governed by the Convention on the Danube of 1948. 31 G. PENDLE, Paraguay: a riverside nation (1954), 73. 32 20th April 1958. 33 Pakistan News, 1st September 1958.



Article Contentsp. 1p. 2p. 3p. 4p. 5p. 6p. 7p. 8p. 9p. 10p. 11p. 12p. 13p. 14p. 15p. 16p. 17p. 18p. 19p. 20p. 21p. 22

Issue Table of ContentsTransactions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers), No. 28 (1960) pp. i-xi+1-276Front Matter [pp. i-xi]Transactions, 1960 [pp. v-vi]Editor's Note [pp. vii-viii]ObituaryGeorge Joseph Cons [pp. ix]Walter Willson Jervis [pp. ix-x]

The Geography of Land-Locked States: Presidential Address [pp. 1-22]Erosion Surfaces, Cyclic Slopes and Drainage Systems in Southern Scotland and Northern England [pp. 23-38]The Erosion Surfaces of the South-Western Lake District [pp. 39-54]The Landforms of Parts of Southern Essex [pp. 55-74]The Shingle Complexes of Bridgwater Bay [pp. 75-87]The Bearing of Superficial Deposits on the Age and Origin of the Upland Plain of East Devon, West Dorset and South Somerset [pp. 89-97]Late Quaternary Changes in Climate, Vegetation and Sea-Level in Lowland Lonsdale [pp. 99-117]The Regional Pattern of Emigration during the Great Irish Famine, 1846-51 [pp. 119-134]The Lancashire Cotton Industry in 1840 [pp. 135-153]The Location of the Clothing Trades in London, 1861-1951 [pp. 155-178]Crop and Livestock Changes in the Chilterns 1931-51 [pp. 179-198]The Geographical Distribution of Cancer Mortality in Wales, 1947-53 [pp. 199-214]The Communications of Watford Gap, Northamptonshire [pp. 215-224]On Not Controlling Subdivision in Paddy-Lands [pp. 225-235]The Dairying Industry in South Africa [pp. 237-252]The Alluvial Morphology of the Indo-Gangetic Plain: Its Mapping and Geographical Significance [pp. 253-276]

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