your thing is pwnd - security challenges for the internet of things
DESCRIPTION
The growth of Internet connected devices is hard to comprehend. From health monitoring gadgets to Home Automation systems. The real world is getting Internet connected. Lots of these devices are built on 8-bit microcontrollers. Often they use unencrypted radio comms or networking, and default passwords. Do we care? Maybe they are too simple, too uninteresting to hack? Visit examples of hacking Things, why we should care and how to fix it. If you are building a Thing, using an internet connected Thing, or working with data from Things, come along to find out what you should know about securing them.TRANSCRIPT
Your Thing is pwndSecurity Challenges for the
Internet of Things
Paul FremantleCTO, WSO2 ([email protected])
PhD researcher, Portsmouth University([email protected])
@pzfreo#wso2
#solidcon@oreillysolid
Firstly, does it even matter?
“Google Hacking”
My three rules for IoT security
• 1. Don’t be dumb
• 2. Think about what’s different
• 3. Do be smart
My three rules for IoT security
• 1. Don’t be dumb– The basics of Internet security haven’t gone
away
• 2. Think about what’s different– What are the unique challenges of your device?
• 3. Do be smart– Use the best practice from the Internet
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/26/smart-homes-hack/
http://freo.me/1pbUmofhttp://freo.me/1pbUmof
So what is different about IoT?• The fact there is a device
– Yes – its hardware! – Ease of use is almost always at odds with security
• The longevity of the device– Updates are harder (or impossible)
• The size of the device– Capabilities are limited – especially around crypto
• The data– Often highly personal
• The mindset– Appliance manufacturers don’t always think like security experts– Embedded systems are often developed by grabbing existing chips, designs, etc
Physical Hacks
A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic: http://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Attack.MIFARE.pdf Karsten Nohl and Henryk Plotz. MIFARE, Little Security, Despite Obscurity
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-630.html
Hardware recommendations• Don’t rely on obscurity
Hardware recommendations• Don’t rely on obscurity• Don’t rely on obscurity• Don’t rely on obscurity• Don’t rely on obscurity• Don’t rely on obscurity• Don’t rely on obscurity• Don’t rely on obscurity
Hardware Recommendation #2
• Unlocking a single device should risk only that device’s data
The Network
Ubertooth
http://ubertooth.sourceforge.net/https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot13/workshop-program/presentation/ryan
Crypto on small devices• Practical Considerations and Implementation Experiences in
Securing Smart Object Networks– http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-aks-crypto-sensors-02
ROM requirements
ECC is possible (and about fast enough)
Crypto
Borrowed from Chris Swan: http://www.slideshare.net/cpswan/security-protocols-in-constrained-environments/13
Won’t ARM just solve this problem?
Cost matters
8 bits$5 retail$1 or less to embed
32 bits$25 retail$?? to embed
Another option?
SIMON and SPECK
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/07/simon_and_speck.html
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
• UDP based equivalent to TLS• https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4347
Key distribution
Passwords• Passwords suck for humans• They suck even more for devices
Why Federated Identity for Things?
• Enable a meaningful consent mechanism for sharing of device data
• Giving a device a token to use on API calls better than giving it a password– Revokable– Granular
• May be relevant for both– Device to cloud– Cloud to app
• “Identity is the new perimeter”
MQTT
MQTT and OAuth2(demo at the WSO2 booth)
What I haven’t covered enough of
Are you setting up for the next privacy or security
breach?
Exemplars• Shields• Libraries• Server Frameworks• Standards and Profiles
Summary• 1. Don’t be dumb• 2. Think about the differences• 3. Be smart • 4. Create and publish exemplars
WSO2 Reference Architecture for the Internet of Things http://freo.me/iot-ra