wyoming line were now the

of the U.S. Eighth Army.

uncharacteristically fierce resis-tance and was stalled almost threemiles from its final objective, andthe Chinese still controlled theHwachon Dam.

This situation became seriouswhen the enemy opened some ofthe dam's sluice gates on 8 Aprilsending a massive wall of wateraround the river bend and onto theChunchon flood plain. Luckily, thelow level of water within the reser-voir and the fact that not all thegates were opened kept the dam-age to a minimum. Only onebridge was knocked out, althoughseveral other pontoon bridges hadto be disconnected until the risingwater subsided. In the end, thisman-made flash flood only raisedthe river level about a foot down-stream. Still, the pent-up waters ofthe reservoir represented a poten-tial threat to future operations.Accordingly, seizure of the damitself or destruction of the gate

machinery became a high priority.Unfortunately, several Armyground attacks and a night raidfailed to achieve that goal. The lat-ter was a water-borne raid byArmy rangers paddling rubberassault boats, not an amphibiousassault as is sometimes claimed;and, contrary to some sources, noMarine units were involved ineither the planning or execution.Failure to take or knock out theHwachon Dam meant its captureunexpectedly became the nextmajor Marine task for OperationDauntless.

The Marines began arriving atthe Kansas Line as scheduled on10 April, but not all units were inplace until two days later whenKorean Marines relieved the lastelements of the 1st CavalryDivision. Seizing the HwachonDam as well as securing the mainsupply route leading north toKumhwa and reaching the

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Wyoming Line were now theobjectives for an expandedOperation Dauntless. With this inmind, General Smith assigned hisdivision an intermediate phaseline. The Quantico Line includedthe heights overlooking theHwachon Dam and the hills northof the village of Hwachon, whilethe exact positions held on theMarine left flank were to be tied tothe advances made by the 6th ROKDivision. This was the plan whenthe 1st Marine Division deployedalong the line of departure. Then,Operation Dauntless was suddenlypostponed.

Although a time of general tran-quility on the Central Front, thebreak between operations was oneof international tumult. Its rootcause was President Harry S.

Truman's decision to relieveGeneral MacArthur of command.This unexpected announcementwas greeted for the most part bystunned silence in Korea, but cre-

considerable statesideknown as "the great

ated auproardebate."

General Ridgway was namedthe new commander of UnitedNations forces and was in turnreplaced as Eighth Army comman-der by Lieutenant General James A.Van Fleet, USA. A former footballcoach, 59-year-old "Big Jim" VanFleet was an aggressive leader whofavored expending fire and steelinstead of men. A veteran of bothWorld Wars and the general officerwho had seen the most frontlinecombat in the European theaterduring World War II, Van Fleet hadrecently served with the JointMilitary Aid Group that savedGreece from Communist insur-gents. Like-minded Generals VanFleet and Ridgway made a goodteam. This was fortunate becauseRidgway had planned OperationDauntless, but Van Fleet was goingto have to carry it out. Obviously,

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A131342

Generals meet along the central Korean fighting front. Pictured from left areMajGen Oliver P Smith, USM LtGen James A. Van Fleet USA, and MajGenWilliam M. Hoge, USA. LtGen Van Fleet replaced Gen Ridgway as commander

the new commander needed a fewdays to "snap in" before leading anew offensive.

Van Fleet was greeted withsome ominous news. In the wakeof Operation Ripper intelligenceofficers began to grasp that anoth-er Communist offensive was near,the fifth such major effort since theCCF intervened in Korea the previ-ous fall. Prisoners of war reportedthe attack could begin within oneweek, and captured documentsclaimed the ultimate goal was toeject U.N. forces from Korea afterthe Communists celebrated MayDay in Seoul. To this end morethan 700,000 CCF and NKPA troopshad been amassed. The enemy'smain force, 36 Chinese divisions,gathered inside the Iron Triangle.About half of the NKPA divisionswere also poised to strike in theeast. Although the time and placeof the expected offensive had beengenerally deduced, an unforeseendevelopment—a deep penetrationof South Korean lines far from theenemy's planned main effort—unexpectedly placed the Marinesof the 1st Division in the center ofthe action, and the period fromlate April until mid-May featured a

series of desperate fights and someintricate maneuvers that kept theenemy at bay until the ChineseSpring Offensive lost its momen-tum.

CCF Spring Offensive

Spring finally arrived in mid-April. The days were generallywarm and sunny with the temper-ature reaching into the mid-60s.The nights were mostly clear andcool, but there was no longer theneed for heavy winter clothing orarctic sleeping bags. All of thesnow had melted, and patches offlowers were sprouting up amongthe scrub pines. And, althoughthere were still a few April show-ers, the heavy rains let up and themud was finally drying out.

Thanks to the high-level turmoilcaused by the sudden change ofcommand, the 1st Marine Divisionspent 10 quiet days on the KansasLine before beginning OperationDauntless on 21 April. The IXCorps objective was the WyomingLine, but the Marines were alsogiven an intermediate objectivelabeled Quantico Line, whichincluded the Hwachon Dam and

381

the meandering Pukhan River aswell as Route 17 and a line of hillsnorth and west of the village ofHwachon.

At 0700 on the 21st, the 1stMarine Division resumed theattack with the 7th Marines on theleft, the 5th Marines in the center,the Korean Marines on the right,and the 1st Marines in reserve. The5,000- to 9,000-yard advance, inthe words of one regimental com-mander, was "made into a vacu-um." Strangely, there was almostno sign of the enemy other than afew pieces of lost equipment andthe ashes of a few cookingfires—the flotsam and jetsam leftbehind when any large body oftroops moves out in hurry. KoreanMarines made the only significantcontact by killing one straggler andcapturing another. About the onlyreminder that an unseen enemywas lurking nearby was a greenhaze of deliberately set fires thathugged the damp earth.

The lack of enemy activity waswelcome, but it was also baffling.The front was eerily quiet, tooquiet for many wary veteranMarines who felt something bigwas about to break. LieutenantColonel John L. Hopkins, com-manding officer of 1st Battalion,5th Marines, thought this "strangeatmosphere of silence . . . wasmuch like the stillness which hadpreceded the first CCF attack onYudam-ni on 27 November." Thisnearly universal feeling of uneasealong the front lines was support-ed by several ominous signs. Aerialobservers suspected the enemywas up to no good, but could notbe specific because the area wasshrouded by smoke that maskedtroop movements. There wereunconfirmed reports of severalthousand troops on the move, butthe Marines spotted no actualenemy. Enemy prisoners of wartaken in other sectors indicated

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A7862

After 10 days of patrolling and preparation of defensive works on Line Kansas,the 5th Marines resumed the advance toward Line Quantico.

and two dozen wounded (20 U.s.and four Korean).

backbone of the defense.

that at least four CCF armies werepoised to take on IX Corps, andthey named 22 April as the date ofthe attack. A particularly disturbingbit of information was that the 6thROK Division on the Marine lefthad opened a 2,500-yard gap, andall physical contact with that unithad been lost. Numerous patrolsfailed to find the elusive SouthKoreans. Consequently, on the eveof what appeared to be a majorenemy effort the Marine westernflank was dangling.

At 0830 on the morning of 22April, preceded by low-flyingobservation aircraft and jeep-mounted ground reconnaissanceunits, the 1st Marine Division pro-ceeded up the Chunchon Corridorwest of the Hwachon Reservoir.Unlike the day before, however,this time the enemy harassed theMarine advance with small arms,automatic weapons, and mortarfire. Captain Robert L. Autry'sReconnaissance Company, aidedby a tank detachment, entered

Hwachon village under intermit-tent fire. They found more than adozen badly wounded men leftbehind by the Communists andspotted several dozen more fleeingnorth. The 7th Marines, command-ed by pre-war China veteran andWorld War II artilleryman ColonelHerman Nickerson, Jr., who hadrelieved the ailing Colonel HomerLitzenberg, advanced several mileson the left flank with only oneman wounded. Air strikes hit sus-pected enemy assembly areas andpossible field fortifications. The5th Marines moved up Route 17and occupied the hills on eitherside of a slender valley encom-passing the village of Hwachonagainst moderate to heavy fire.Korean Marines seized theHwachon Dam and the heightsprotecting it, but were then pinneddown for a while by accurateenemy indirect fire. Total losseswhen the Marines reachedQuantico Line were five men (twoAmerica and three Korean) killed

382

At the end of the day, the 1stMarine Division was at theQuantico Line arrayed on a nearlystraight line north and west of theHwachon Reservoir with the 7thMarines, 5th Marines, and theKorean Marines from left to right.Two tank companies (B and C, insupport of the 5th and 7th Marines,respectively) were forward de-ployed. The 11th Marines, rein-forced by corps artillery (includingthe 8-inch guns of the 2 13th and17th Field Artillery Battalions andthe 155mm howitzers of the 92dArmored Field Artillery) was set upin the flat land just behind the frontline troops. The Army guns werepositioned near the west flank sothey could reinforce either theROKs or U.S. Marines as needed.Artillery ammunition trucks andprime movers jammed the narrowroad making resupply and over-land travel difficult. The 1stMarines was in reserve severalmiles away across the PukhanRiver at Chunchon.

Enemy resistance seemed to bestiffening, but there was no reasonfor alarm as the Marines settled inon the night of 22-23 April. Theevening promised to be crisp andclear with a full moon. At about1800, General Smith issued instruc-tions for the 1st Marine Division tocontinue its advance to seize theWyoming Line at 0700 the nextmorning. These orders, however,were overcome by events three-and-a-half hours later. Althoughunrealized at the time, nearly350,000 enemy troops were push-ing silently forward betweenMunsan-ni in the west and theHwachon Reservoir in the east.The CCF Fifth Phase Offensive wasunderway just as the enemy pris-oners had predicted. Furious mor-tar and artillery barrages struckUnited Nations lines all across the

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51

By 22 April the Marines had seized and held Line Quantico. To the north ChineseCommunist Forces were poised to attack and the lx Corps zone was to be the tar-get area for the attempted breakthrough. Heavy machine gun teams were the

front before midnight. The firstblows on IX Corps' front were notdirected at the Marines, but at theshaky 6th ROK Division on theirleft, which was hit full force. Thathapless unit simply evaporated asits frightened soldiers fled the fieldof battle. Facing only token resis-tance, the CCF 40th Army was onits way south in full gear by mid-night. Soon, a 10-mile penetrationwas created and the 1st MarineDivision was in serious jeopardy.Some of the toughest fighting ofthe Korean War marked the next60 hours, and the magnificentdefenses of Horseshoe Ridge andHill 902 were reminiscent of simi-lar heroic Marine stands at LesMares Farm in World War I andGuadalcanal's Bloody Ridge duringWorld War II.

The dull mid-watch routine atthe 1st Marine Division commandpost was interrupted when theduty officer was informed at about2130 that the Chinese had pene-trated South Korean defenses andwere headed toward Marine lines.Not long after the message arrivedthe vanguard of a long line ofdemoralized South Korean armysoldiers began filing in. By mid-night, the ReconnaissanceCompany and Captain Donald D.Pomerleau's Military PoliceCompany were rounding up strag-glers and placing them underguard at the ferry site just south ofthe 5th Marines' command post.These dejected remnants of the 6thROK Division reported their unitwas in full retreat and furthernoted that thousands of enemytroops were rapidly moving south.Despite attempts to reconstitutethe division as a fighting force, the1st Division's liaison officer calledand said: "to all intents and pur-poses, the 6th ROK Division hadceased to exist." This was alarmingnews because the Marine left flankwas wide open, and the division's

main supply route and all crossingpoints of the Pukhan River were atgreat risk.

The first U.S. troops to confirmthe disaster on the left were can-noneers from Army artillery unitsthat earlier had been sent west toshore up the South Koreans.Elements of the battered 987thArmored Field Artillery came pour-ing back into the American lines

383

after being ambushed. The ill-fatedartillery unit had lost about half ofits 105mm howitzers to theambush, and the 2d RocketArtillery Battery lost all of itsweapons when its defensive posi-tion was overrun. As LieutenantColonel Leon F. Lavoie, command-ing officer of the 92d ArmoredField Artillery Battalion acidlyobserved: "there had been more

CCF Offensive Starting 22 Apriland Subsequent Marine Withdrawals

Miles

_________________

Private First Class Herbert A. Littleton

O n the night of 22 April1951, radio operatorH rb rt A. Littleton erving

with an altillery fOlwarel ob erverteam of Company C, 1 t Battalion,

th Marine, a .ifi eI hi life tosave the lives of his team memb r .

Born in 1930, in Arkan a , heattended high sch 01 in turgis,

outh Dakota, where he playedfootball and basketball and thenworked for Electri al Applicati nC rporation in Rapid ity. hortlyafter hi eighteenth binhday, heenli teel in the Marine Corps,re eived re ruit training at MarineCorps Recruit D pot, an Diego,and additional training at CampPendleton befor being ent toKorea with the 3d R placem ntDraft in December 1950. Hi Medalof Honor citation read, in pan:

tanding watch when awell-con eal d and numerically superior enemy forcelaunched a vi lent night attackfrom nearby po itions again, thi compan, Private Fir, tCia Littl ton qui kly al nedth forward ob ervation teamand immediately moved intoan advantag ous po ition toassist in ailing d wn artiJlelYfire on th hostile force.

When an en my handgr nade was thr wn into hivantage point, shortly after th

artillery lost in Korea up to thatpoint than there was lost in thewhole of the European theater inthe last war by American forces."

By 2224, the impact of the disaster on the left was apparent, soall plans to attack the next daywere abruptly canceled. Unitsalong the forward edge of the battlefield were placed on full alertwith orders to button up tight.Commanders hurriedly sent outcombat patrols to locate the enemyand to try fix his line of march,

o pallmenll of Defense photo n't'lC) A~6967

arri al of the remainder of thteam, he unhe. itatingly hurl dhim elf on the deadly mi 'ile,ab orbing its full, shatteringimpact in hi own body. Byhi prompt action and heroicspirit of elf-sacrifice, he savedthe other members of hi' teamfrom 'eri u injury or deathand enabled them to carryonth vital mi ion that ulminated in the repulse of the ho tileattack.Private First Class Littleton '. hero

ic actions were lat r m mori::Jlizedat Camp Pendleton by a marksman'hip trophy, a baseball field, and astreet, all nam d in hi' honor.- apwin John . Chapin, C '.\1 R (Ret)

while the Marines at the main lineof resistance dug in deep and nervously checked their weapons. Inaddition, Smith ordered ColonelMcAlister to send LieutenantColonel Robley E. West's 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, up fromChunchon to tie in with theartillery and tanks located in thevalley on the far west flank. West'sbattalion was soon on trucks headed for its new position, but theconvoy could only creep alongover roads choked with panic-

384

stricken South Korean soldiersescaping the battle zone. CaptainJohn F. Coffey's Company Bledthe way. At about 0130, while still1,000 yards short of its assignedposition, the long column of vehicles stopped at the tight perimeterformed by the 92d Armored FieldAltillery Battalion, which a shorttime before had established a roadblock, collected more than 1,800South Koreans, and attempted bymachine gun and bayonet with little success to deploy them to slowthe Chinese advance. Moving west,Coffey's company assisted in theextricating the 987th Artillery's10Smm howitzers that were stuckin the mud. After as many guns aspossible were freed, Coffeyreturned to friendly lines wherethe 1st Battalion was manning awooded semi-circular ridge withCaptain Thomas J. Bohannon'sCompany A on the right, CaptainRobert P. Wray's Company C in thecenter, and the 81mm mOltars ofFirst Lieutenant Wesley C. Noren'sWeapons Company on relativelylevel ground in the immediate rear.Company B was promptlyassigned the battalion left flank.

The enemy began probingMarine lines around 2300 on 22April and then mounted an all-outassault to turn the Marine flanksabout three hours later. The 7thMarines on the left was the hardesthit U.S. unit. Enemy mortar, automatic weapons, and small arms firebegan at about 0200 on the 23d.This reconnaissance by fire wasfollowed by a very determinedground assault an hour later.Shrieking whistles, clanging cymbals, and blasting bugles Signaledthe onslaught. Up and down theline grizzled veterans of the ChosinReservoir walked the lines to settledown young Marines who had notyet experienced a terrifying"human wave" ground assault.Noncommissioned officers force-

fully and profanely reminded theircharges not to use grenades untilthe enemy was close at hand, andmore than one of them tried tocalm the new men by remarkingabout the frightening cacophony:"Those guys sure could use somemusic lessons!"

At least 2,000 enemy troops hitMajor Webb D. Sawyer's out-manned 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,full force. That attack by the CCF358th Regiment, 120th Division,primarily directed at CaptainEugene H. Haffey's Company Cand Captain Nathan R. Smith'sCompany A, was repulsed byhand-to-hand fighting that lastedalmost until dawn. Private FirstClass Herbert A. Littleton, aradioman with the forward observ-er team attached to Company C,was standing the mid-watch when

tainous terrain.

the enemy appeared. He soundedthe alarm then moved to anexposed position from which headjusted supporting arms firesdespite fierce incoming machinegun fire and showers of enemygrenades. Forced back into abunker by enemy fire, Littletonthrew himself upon a grenade tosave his comrades in that crowdedspace at the cost of his own life.He was awarded a posthumousMedal of Honor for his selflessactions that night. Heavyfighting—much of it grenade duelsand close quarters combat—lastedseveral hours. Enemy mortar fireand small arms continued through-out the night and into the next day.As always, supporting arms were acritical Marine advantage. The 11thMarines ringed the endangeredposition with a wall of steel, and

385

Marine tanks successfully guardedthe lowland approaches.

In the division's center, Chineseinfiltrators silently slipped throughthe 5th Marines' outpost line tooccupy Hill 313. A futile counterat-tack was quickly launched, butdespite tremendous heroism (threeMarines received the Navy Crossfor their actions) the assault pla-toon was held in check and suf-fered heavy casualties. It was notuntil the next morning that ele-ments of the 1st and 2d Battalions,5th Marines, retook the hill. Ataround 0300, Korean Marines onthe right came under heavy attackin the vicinity of Hill 509. The stal-wart Koreans threw back succes-sive enemy attacks throughout thelong night and had ejected theenemy by the next morning.Particularly hard hit was a single

Near the Quantico Line a Marine 75inni recoilless rifle crewopposes the Chinese Communist attack on 23 April.Recoilless rifles provided long-range pinpoint accuracy, but


were light enough to be carried up and down Korea's moun-

rifle company of the 1st KMCBattalion holding the left flank.The 150-man company wasreduced to only about 40 menready for duty by daylight.

The timely arrival of the reserve1st Battalion, 1st Marines, easedthe pressure on Major Sawyer's 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines, and solidi-fied the division west flank, butfierce fighting continued into thenext morning. The Chinese, wellaware that they would be poundedfrom the air during the day, hur-riedly retreated as the first rays oflight began to creep over the hori-

386

zon. Eight Marine Corsairsswooped over the battlefield guid-ed onto their targets by aerialobservers flying vulnerable OYobservation aircraft; Marine FighterSquadron 323 flew in support ofthe 5th Marines while MarineFighter Squadron 214 worked overthe Chinese in the 7th Marines'zone. The retreating enemy wasslaughtered by this blitz fromabove. Enemy casualties by allarms were estimated to he wellabove 2,000 men. By noon on the23d, it was obvious the Marineshad won the first round, hut it wasalso obvious that the fight was farfrom over. For his skillful andaggressive leadership in securingthe division's vital flank, MajorSawyer, the recipient of two SilverStars for the Chosin Reservoir cam-paign, was awarded a Navy Cross.

Although the Marines held fastand remained a breakwater thatstemmed the onrushing Red tide,the Chinese were still pouringthrough South Korean army lines."The position of the 1st MarineDivision was beginning to appearto some persons," noted MajorMartin Sexton, "very similar to thesituation at the Chosin Reservoir."On the Marine left a deep envel-opment threatened. As a resultGeneral Hoge ordered the 1stMarine Division to fall back.Consequently, General Smithpassed the word for his units toretire to new defensive positionson the Pendleton Line at 0935. Thiswould be no small feat. The enemythreat was so great that Smith wasforced to place the entire 1stMarine Division on the highground north of the ChunchonCorridor to protect the vital Muj onBridge and several ferry crossings.This was a bold move because theMarines would have an unfordahleriver at their back and there wasno division reserve in place. It alsorequired a complex set of maneu-

on 902, and Subsequent23-25 April

lOpO 2OpO

and the attached 1st Battalion, 1st

tion.

vers whereby the Marines wouldhave to defend the Pukhan Riverline, and at the same time moveback to Chunchon. General Smithwould have to carefully coordinatehis supporting arms as well aseffect a passage of lines under fire.Air and artillery would keep theenemy at bay while armor and thedivision's heavy weapons protect-ed the avenues of approach andthe river crossings. Smith's planwas to give ground rapidly in thenorth while slowly pulling back inthe south, letting his westernmostunits alternately pass through aseries of blocking positions.Engineers would finally blow thebridges once the rear guard madeit over the river. A key elementwas the Marine aviators whosefighter-bombers would be guidedonto their targets by airborne spot-ters to delay enemy pursuit. Allhands were called upon to con-tribute during this fighting with-drawal. Cooks, bakers, and typ-ists—-even a downed pilot—-were

soon shouldering Ml rifles or car-rying stretchers under fire. Just asat the Chosin Reservoir, the creedthat "every Marine is a riflemanregardless of his military occupa-tional specialty" saved the day.

General Smith wanted to form asemi-circular defense line thatarched southwest atop key groundfrom the tip of the HwachonReservoir west for a few miles thenbending back along the highground abutting the Pukhan Riverand over looking the ChunchonValley. To do this he immediatelyordered the rest of the 1st Marinesforward from Chunchon to holdthe hills in the southwest while inthe north he instituted a "swinginggate" maneuver whereby theKorean Marines anchored the farright, the 5th gave ground in thecenter, and the 7th Marines pulledback in echelon to link up with the1st Marines

Fighting continued throughoutthe day. In the west, the 7thMarines had its own 3d Battalion

387

Marines, to cover the retrograde.The hard-hit 1st Battalion pulledback covered by fires from the 2dBattalion. Major Maurice E. RoachJr.'s 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,seized some fiercely held highground while Lieutenant ColonelRobley E. West's 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, fought off repeatedenemy probes that lasted untilnightfall. Units of the 1st Marinesheld the southernmost positions.The remaining two reserve battal-ions had moved Out of their assem-bly areas that morning, crossed thePukhan River, then occupied a pairof hills protecting the main supplyroute and several crossing points.Actually, the arrival of the 2d and3d Battalions, 1st Marines, was aclose run thing. The Marines hadto virtually race up the hills to beatthe Chinese who were also on theway to take what was obviouslythe most important terrain featurein the area. Hill 902 (actually a4,000-foot mountain top) dominat-ed the road to Chunchon and pro-tected the concrete Mojin Bridge aswell as two ferry sites. Its defensebecame the focal point of theMarine retrograde. In the center,Colonel Richard W. Hayward's 5thMarines moved back under scat-tered small arms and mortar fire,but encountered no enemy groundunits. On the division right, KoreanMarines pulled back and then dugin just before being ranged byenemy mortar and artillery fire.Unfortunately, the 1st MarineDivision's line was fragmented, notcontinuous, with units of the 1stand 7th Marines holding widelyseparated battalion-sized perime-ters located atop key terrain. The11th Marines, reinforced by severalArmy artillery battalions, was busyregistering defensive fires as nightfell on 23 April.

That day also marked the firstmass helicopter medical evacua-

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-429642

A Bell HTL—4 light helicopter waits for a badly wounded Marine to be loaded onboard for a trip to a rear area hospital. These bubble-top aircraft saved lives bycutting the amount of time it took seriously wounded men to get to medical atten-

lion in history. All of VMO-6's BellHTL-4 "bubble top" helicopters(able to carry two litter cases andone man in the observer seat)were airborne at first light. Fiftycritically wounded men wereflown out by these Marine "egg-beaters" between 0600 and 1930. Atotal of 21 sorties (22.6 flighthours) were made from Chunchonto the front lines then back to the1st Medical Battalion collectingand clearing station. Every flightencountered some type of enemyfire, but there were no losses ofaircraft or personnel. CaptainDwain L. Redalin logged 9.7 flighthours while carrying 18 woundedmen to safety. First LieutenantGeorge A. Eaton accounted for 16more evacuations. The final flighthad to be guided in with hand-held lights because the airfield hadbeen officially blacked out.Ground personnel and flying offi-cers alike were formed into provi-sional platoons and assigneddefense sectors in case the enemybroke though, and all excess mate-rial and equipment was loaded ontrucks for movement back toHongchon that night.

On the night of 23-24 April, the1st Marines caught the brunt of theCCF 120th Division attack. In thenorth, the 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, still under the operationalcontrol of Colonel Nickerson's 7thMarines, was dug in on HorseshoeRidge. This was a key positionwhich, if lost, would split the 1stMarine Division wide open andallow the enemy to defeat it indetail. Farther south, the 2d and 3dBattalions, 1st Marines, mannedseparate perimeters on Hill 902overlooking the flat lands of theChunchon Corridor. These posi-tions constituted the last line ofdefense, and if they were lost thedivision would be surrounded andcut off. In short, the situation thatnight was as desperate as any in

Born in 1921, in Birmingham,Alabama, Harold E. Wilsonenlisted in the Marine Corps

Reserve and was assigned to activeduty in April 1942. During WorldWar II, he served 27 months over-seas stationed on Midway Island. Inaddition to his Pacific service, hewas stationed at Parris Island, SouthCarolina; Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina; and Portsmouth, Virginia.Sergeant Wilson was honorably dis-charged in 1945.

Recalled to active duty in August1950, he was assigned to CompanyG, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, andparticipated in the Wonsan landingand was wounded during theChosin Reservoir Campaign. InMarch 1951, he was awarded aBronze Star Medal for "fearless anduntiring leadership" of his platoon.While serving as a platoon sergeant,his bravery on the night of 23-24April 1951 brought an award of theMedal of Honor, with a citation thatread, in part:

Wilson braved intense fireto assist the survivors back intothe line and to direct the treat-ment of casualties. Althoughtwice wounded by gunfire, inthe right arm and the left leg,he refused medical aid forhimself and continued to moveabout among his men, shout-ing words of encouragement.After receiving further woundsin the head and shoulder asthe attack increased in intensi-ty, he again insisted uponremaining with his unit.Unable to use either arm tofire, and with mounting casual-ties among our forces, heresupplied his men with riflesand ammunition taken fromthe wounded.

After placing the reinforce-ments in strategic positions inthe line, [he] directed effectivefire until blown off his feet bythe bursting of a hostile mortar

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A46634

round in his face. Dazed andsuffering from concussion, hestill refused medical aid and,despite weakness from loss ofblood, moved from foxhole tofoxhole, directing fire, resup-plying ammunition, renderingfirst aid and encouraging hismen.Following the April 1951 action,

Wilson was evacuated to theYokosuka Naval Hospital in Japanand five months later returned to theUnited States. He was awarded ameritorious promotion to mastersergeant in 1951 and commissionedas warrant officer in 1952. After anumber of assignments, he assumedthe post of Adjutant, Marine CorpsEngineer Schools, Camp Lejeune, inDecember 1962, and a year later,was assigned to Force Troops, FleetMarine Force, Atlantic, serving asadjutant and personnel officer of the2d Tank Battalion.

During the Vietnam War, ChiefWarrant Officer Wilson served withMarine Aircraft Group 13 prior tobeing assigned as the 6th MarineCorps District's personnel officer inNovember 1968. He retired from theMarine Corps in 1972 and died inLexington, South Carolina, on 29March 1998.— Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

Technical Sergeant Harold E.Wilson

388

the history of the Marine Corps.The Marines were hit by

artillery, mortar, small arms, andautomatic weapons fire all throughthe night. The 1st and 7th Marineson the left flank were probed asChinese forces searched for crew-served weapons positions andweak spots in the line. The four-hour fight for Horseshoe Ridgebegan at about 2000. There, themen of the 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, managed to blunt anattack by the CCF 358th Regimentin savage hand-to-hand fighting.Farther north, the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, repelled enemy probes allnight long. As part of that action,the "Redlegs" of the Army's 92dArmored Field Artillery Battalionacquitted themselves well byrepelling a dawn ground attackusing machine guns and direct fireartillery to eliminate several hun-dred enemy troops, while continu-ing to deliver fire for the hard-pressed Marines on HorseshoeRidge. Marine M-26 Pershings fromLieutenant Colonel Holly H. Evans'1st Tank Battalion eventually

joined the hard-fighting can-noneers, scattering the enemy withdeadly flat-trajectory fire. Enemystragglers were cleared out by jointArmy-Marine patrols before theArmy artillerymen displaced tonew positions.

The enemy's main thrust thatnight, however, was directed far-ther south where the CCF tried toturn the open Marine flank butinstead ran headlong intoLieutenant Colonel Virgil W.

Banning's 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, atop Hill 902. A series offull-scale assaults began at aboutmidnight. The CCF 359th and360th Regiments repeatedlycrashed into the 3d Battalion'sexposed perimeter, but all effortsto eject the determined defenderswere unsuccessful. After enemymortars pounded Banning'sMarines for several hours a"human wave" ground assaultalmost cracked First LieutenantHorace L. Johnson's Company G.That this did not happen was atribute to the actions of TechnicalSergeant Harold E. "Speed" Wilson.

Despite being wounded on fourseparate occasions, he refusedevacuation and remained in com-mand of his platoon. Unable toman a weapon because of painfulshoulder wounds, Wilson repeat-edly exposed himself to enemy firewhile distributing ammunition anddirecting tactical movements eventhough he was hit several moretimes. Wilson was later awardedthe Medal of Honor for his stirringleadership that night. The Marinestook heavy casualties during fiercehand-to-hand fighting, but theChinese were unable to dislodgethem. At 0930 on 24 April, the bat-tered Marines were almost out ofammunition and their ranks hadbeen severely thinned, but theywere still standing tall. TheChinese plan to trap and annihilatethe 1st Marine Division had been acostly failure.

General Hoge ordered theMarines to pull back to the KansasLine as part of a general realign-ment of IX Corps. This would notbe an easy maneuver because itwould require disengaging underfire and making several river cross-ings. To do this, General Smithhad to restore tactical unity prior tomovement. The 1st Marines wasreunited on the morning of the24th when 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, which had been hotlyengaged while attached to the 7thMarines for the past few days,rejoined the regiment. Concur-rently, the 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, conducted a fightingwithdrawal protected by Marine,Navy, and Air Force air strikes andartillery fire by Marine and Armyunits. The battered 3d Battalionpassed through the 2d Battalionand then both units fought theirway back to the high ground cov-ering the river crossing. The regi-ment was under continuous fireduring the entire movement andsuffered numerous casualties

A Marine 105mm howitzer battery near Sapyong-ni fires on suspected enemypositions. The guns of the 11th Marines rendered outstanding fire supportregardless of time of day or weather limitations.


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enroute. At the same time, MajorRoach's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,set up farther south on Hill 696 todefend the Chunchon-Kapyongroad as well as the southern ferrysites. This key position, the south-ernmost high ground, dominatedthe Chunchon Corridor and thePukhan River and would be one ofthe last positions vacated. On theright, the 5th. Marines and theKorean Marine battalion pulledback harassed by only scatteredresistance. The resultant shorten-ing of the division front allowedSmith to pull the 7th Marines out ofthe lines and use it as the divisionreserve. By the evening of 24 April,the 1st Marine Division's linesresembled a fishhook with theKorean Marines at the eye in thenorth, the 5th Marines forming theshank, and the 1st Marines at thecurved barb in the south. The 7thMarines, less the 3d Battalion, wascharged with rear area security andits 1st and 2d Battalions were posi-tioned to protect river crossingsalong the route to Chunchon aswell as the town itself.

The 24th of April was anotherbusy day for Marine aviators aswell. First Lieutenant John L. Scottevacuated 18 wounded in his HTL-4 to become the high-rescue-manthat day. Another HTL-4, pilotedby First Lieutenant Robert E.

Mathewson, was brought downnear Horseshoe Ridge by enemyfire. Mathewson escaped unhurt,but had to wave off a rescueattempt by First Lieutenant HaroldG. McRay because enemy fire wasso intense. The downed pilot waspromptly given a rifle and joinedhis fellow Marines as they brokeout of the Chinese encirclement.Over the battlefield an OY obser-vation plane flown by TechnicalSergeant Robert J. Monteith, strucka Corsair in midair and crashed. Heand his artillery spotter, FirstLieutenant Roscoe F. Cooke, Jr.,

were both killed when their planespun out of control, hit the ground,and burned.

The 1st Marines again bore thebrunt of Chinese probes on thenight of 24-25 April, but accurateclose-in fires by 105mm and155mm howitzers kept potentialattackers at a distance. The 2dBattalion repelled an enemy com-pany in the only major action ofthe evening. But the Chinese werestill lurking in the west as becameevident when patrols departingfriendly lines in that area quicklystruck an enemy hornet's nest thefollowing morning. One suchpatrol was pinned down less than200 yards from friendly lines.Another platoon suffered 18 casu-alties and had to be extricatedfrom an ambush by tanks. On the

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other hand, 5th Marines andKorean Marine scouts ventured amile to the north without contact.Air and artillery plastered the west-ern flank, hut enemy machine gun,mortar, and artillery fire continuedto hit Marine positions. In the 1stMarines' zone Chinese gunnersfound the 3d Battalion commandpost, wounding Colonel McAlister;Lieutenant Colonel Banning; MajorReginald R. Meyers, the executiveofficer; and Major Joseph D.Trompeter, the operations officer.Banning and Meyers had to beevacuated, and Major Trompetertook over the battalion. ColonelMcAlister refused evacuation andremained in command of the regi-ment.

It was obvious the Chinese werebiding their time until they could


MajGen Oliver P Smith bids farewell to division staff officers before turning com-mand over to MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, center, on 25 April. BGen Lewis B.Pulle the assistant division commande would Jbllow Smith a month later.

move their large supply dumps.

gather enough strength for anothertry at the Marine lines. There wascontinual pressure, but the 11thMarines artillery harassment andinterdiction fires, direct fire byMarine tanks, and an exemplary airumbrella prevented a majorassault. Enemy action was limitedto only a few weak probes and ahandful of mortar rounds as theMarines moved back. The 1stMarine Division reached the modi-fied Kansas Line in good order.Despite suffering more than 300casualties in the last 48 hours, theMarines handled everything theenemy threw at them and still helda firm grip on the IX Corp rightflank when the Chinese FifthPhase, First Impulse Offensiveground to a halt.

During this very brief break inthe action a new division comman-der took over. Major GeneralGerald C. Thomas became the 1stMarine Division's commandinggeneral at a small ceremonyattended by the few available staffmembers on the afternoon of 25April. Thomas had been awarded abattlefield commission in recogni-

tion of his outstanding combat per-formance during World War I, thenpulled sea duty and fought in theBanana Wars between the WorldWars. His experience as a highlyrespected staff officer in the Pacificduring World War II prepared himto handle a division, and his post-war duties at Headquarters MarineCorps and Quantico gave him agood look at the "big picture" aswell. Despite the hurried nature ofthe command change and the factthat it occurred in the midst of acomplex combat action, the transi-tion was a smooth one that did nothinder operations.

The first order General Thomasreceived was one no aggressivecommander relishes. He was toldto pull the 1st Marine Divisionback to a new position whereKorean laborers were toiling nightand day to construct a defensivebulwark. The Marine movementwas no isolated withdrawal. Allacross the front, the United NationsCommand was breaking contact inorder to man a new main line ofresistance known as the No NameLine. This unpressured retrograde

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marked a radical change in U.N.tactics. As will be recalled, upontaking charge of Eighth ArmyGeneral Ridgway adopted mobiledefensive tactics to deal withenemy attacks. Instead of "holdyour ground at all cost," he insti-tuted a "roll-with-the-punches"scheme whereby U.N. units tradedground to inflict punishment. Todo this Ridgway insisted that histroops always maintain contactwith both the enemy and adjoiningfriendly forces during retrogrademovements. This time, however,General Van Fleet decided to com-pletely break contact. He opted topull back as much as 20 miles inplaces. There, from carefullyselected positions, his troops couldtrap exposed attackers in pre-planned artillery kill zones at thesame time air power pummeledever-lengthening enemy supplyroutes. In hindsight, this soundcombined-arms approach fully uti-lized United Nations Commandstrengths while exploiting enemyweaknesses, but at the time itbefuddled many Marines to haveto abandon hard-earned groundwhen there seemed to be no seri-ous enemy threat. Such was thecase when the 1st Marine Divisionwas told to fall back to a section ofthe No Name Line located nearHongchon far to the south.

This movement would be donein two stages. The first leg of thejourney was back to Chunchonwhere the rifle units would coverthe support units as they pulledout. When that was accomplishedthe combat units would continueon to the No Name Line. Luckily,there was no significant enemyinterference with either move. Theinitial departure began at 1130 on26 April. The 5th Marines andKorean Marines retired first, fol-lowed by 1st Marines, with 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, attached. Acurtain of close air support supple-

National Archives Photo (U5Mc) 127-N-A8362

Marine infantry and vehicles start the long haul back to Chunchon, where theywould defend along the south bank of the Soyang River until service units could

mented by rocket and artillery firesshrouded these movements. Allunits, except the rear guard, weresafely across the meanderingPukhan River before dark. The lastremaining bridge across the chest-deep river was blown up at 1900,forcing 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, towade across the chilly barrier inthe middle of the night. The move-ment back to Chunchon was com-pleted by noon, and the Marinestook up defensive positions alongthe southern banks of the SoyangRiver on the afternoon of the 27thwithout incident. The only enemyencountered during the pull-backwas one bewildered Chinese strag-gler who had inadvertently fallenin with the Marine column in thedarkness. Needless to say, he wasmore than somewhat surprised todiscover himself in the midst ofseveral thousand Americans whendaylight came.

On 28 April, the second phaseof the withdrawal began. TheMarine retrograde was againunpressured, but it took three daysto finish the move south due toserious transportation problems.Finally, on 30 April, the Marinessettled in at the No Name Line withthe 5th Marines on the left, the 1stKorean Marine Regiment in thecenter, the 1st Marines on the right,and the 7th Marines in reserve.

The month of April cost theMarines 933 casualties (93 killed,830 wounded, and 10 missing),most lost during the First Impulseof the Chinese Fifth PhaseOffensive. The enemy enjoyedsome local successes, but overalltheir attacks fell far short of expec-tations. The U.N. counteroffensivehad been stopped in its tracks, butwhat little ground the enemygained had been purchased at afearful cost; the CCF lost an esti-mated 70,000 men. The headlongU.N. retreat the Chinese expected

did not materialize. This time therewas no "bug out," to use a popularphrase of the day. Instead, mostbreaks in the line were quicklysealed, and the United NationsCommand was holding firm at theNo Name Line. By the last day ofApril, it was apparent to both sidesthat the Communists would not beparading through the streets ofSeoul on May Day as their leadershad promised.

The first days of May were soquiet that no Marine patrols madecontact. This temporary lull, how-

392

ever, was about to end because aSecond Impulse Offensive wasaimed at eastern Korea. To meetthis threat, General Van Fleet rede-ployed his command. As part ofthis reorganization the 1st MarineDivision was taken from IX Corpsand was once again assigned toMajor General Edward M.

Almond's X Corps (it will berecalled that the Marines landed atInchon, liberated Seoul, andfought their way Out of the ChosinReservoir as part of X Corps). Thiswas easy to do because the 1st

\ GROUND REGAINED DURINGLIMITED UN COUNTER

_______

OFFENSIVE 30 APRIL— 16 MAY

Marine Division was located on theIX and X Corps boundary. Thatimaginary line was simply shiftedabout 12 miles west, and only onebattalion of the 5th Marines had toactually move. Other than that theonly action required was to redrawthe grease pencil lines on tacticalmaps.

The next two weeks weredevoted primarily to improvingdefensive positions, but some tac-tical issues came to the fore.General Thomas was particularlydisturbed by two Eighth Armyorders. First, the 1st MarineDivision was told to establish an"outpost line of resistance" tomaintain contact with the enemy,provide early warning of a majorattack, and delay the enemyadvance as long as possible.Second, the 11th Marines wasordered to shoot a unit of fire eachday whether there were observedtargets or not. Thomas felt hecould adequately cover his zone ofaction using aerial observation andlong-range reconnaissance patrols,so he protested the placement ofan entire battalion outside of105mm artillery range. When toldthat the post must be manned,Thomas requested that an entireregiment be located at the exposedposition. When this request wasgranted, he sent Colonel

393

Nickerson's 7th Marines onto somehigh ground over looking theChunchon Valley with orders tokeep the road open and be pre-pared to fight its way out if theChinese came down in force.Thomas also protested that shoot-ing a unit of fire each day was awasteful practice, one that wouldsurely cause an ammunition short-age sooner or later. He was over-ruled in this case.

The expected Second Impulseof the Fifth Phase Offensive fellupon units of the Republic of

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A155669

A tank-i nftmntry patrolfrom 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, moves through the desert-ed city of Chunchon. The ebb and flow of Korean fighting ended when the UN.lines stabilized after the Marines reached the Punchbowl in June 1951.

Korea Army in the east on 16 May,and soon a 30-mile penetrationthreatened the U.S. 2d InfantryDivision on the Marine right. Thatnight Chinese forces entered theMarine zone in regimental strengthwhere the 5th Marines and theKorean Marines had several com-pany-sized patrol bases well northof the main line of resistance in theleft and center sections respective-1y. To the right, ColonelNickerson's 7th Marines hadLieutenant Colonel John T.

Rooney's 1st Battalion patrollingthe Chunchon Road, 2d Battalion(now commanded by LieutenantColonel Wilbur F. Meyerhoff, for-merly the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, commanding officer)manning the outpost, andLieutenant Colonel Bernard T.

Kelly's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,holding Morae Kogae Pass—-avital link on the road leading fromthe forward edge of the battle areaback to the main front line. Wellaware that whoever controlled the

pass controlled the road, theChinese made Morae Kogae a keyobjective. Under cover of dark-ness, they carefully slipped inbehind the Korean Marines andheaded straight for the pass, whichthey apparently thought wasunguarded. The assault forceunexpectedly bumped into thenorthern sector of the 7th Marinesperimeter at about 0300 and a furi-ous fight broke out. Within min-utes the 11th Marines built up awall of fire at the same time theinfantrymen initiated their finalprotective fires. Burning tracerrounds crisscrossed all avenues ofapproach and exploding shellsflashed in the night as Marineartillery pinned the enemy in placefrom the rear while Marine rifle-men knocked them down from thefront. In spite of the curtain of steelsurrounding the Marine positions,the quilt-coated enemy closed theposition. Amid the fierce hand-to-hand fighting First LieutenantVictor Stoyanow led a counterat-

tack to throw the enemy back outof Company I's lines. The criticalbattle for the pass did not end untildaybreak when the Chinese vainlytried to pull back hut were insteadcaught in the open by Marineartillery, mortars, and some belatedair strikes. The Chinese lost an esti-mated 530 men. By actual count,they left behind 112 dead, 82 pris-oners, and a wealth of abandonedweapons that included recoillessrifles, mortars, machine guns, andeven a 76mm antitank gun. Marinelosses in this one-sided battle wereseven dead and 19 wounded.

The following day, 18 May, the1st Marine Division performed avery tricky maneuver to readjustdefensive dispositions that allowedthe U.S. 2d Infantry Division tomove east to reinforce its rightflank which was bearing the bruntof the new Chinese offensive. The7th Marines pulled back to the NoName Line to relieve the 1stMarines which then sidesteppedeast to take over an area previous-ly held by the U.S. Army's 9thInfantry Regiment and the 5thMarines swung over from the farleft flank to relieve the 38thInfantry Regiment on the extreme

By noon on the 19th, all fourregiments (1st Korean Marine, 7thMarines, 1st Marines, and 5thMarines) were aligned from left toright on the modified No NameLine as the enemy's offensive lostits momentum. That same day,Colonel Wilburt S. Brown, anexperienced artilleryman knownthroughout the Marine Corps as"Big Foot" because of his largefeet, took over the 1st Marines.There was also a change at divi-sion headquarters. BrigadierGeneral William J. Whaling—anavid sportsman and Olympicmarksman who commanded regi-ments at Guadalcanal, New Britain,and Okinawa during World War

right.

Col Francis M. McAlister, left, extends congratulations to Col Wilburt S. Brown,as the latter assumed command of the 1st Marine Regiment.


394

Spring Offensive ended GeneralThomas remarked that he com-manded "the finest division inMarine Corps history."

Marine Air Support

reconnaissance missions.

Il—became the assistant divisioncommander on 20 May.

The final action of the ChineseSpring Offensive occurred at about0445 on 20 May when Major MorseL. Holladay's 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, caught elements of theCCF 44th Division in the open.The Marines on the firing lineopened up with everything theyhad as Major Holladay directedrockets, artillery, and air supportduring a five-hour battle that costthe enemy 152 dead and 15 pris-oners. This action marked the endof Marshal Peng's attempts to drivethe 1st Marine Division into thesea. The enemy, short of men andsupplies after the previous month'sheavy combat, had finally run outof steam and was now vulnerable.

With the Chinese Fifth PhaseOffensive successfully blunted,General Van Fleet was ready toshift back into an offensive modeto exploit what was clearly a dev-astating Communist defeat. TheUnited Nations Command hadcome through the last month withrelatively light casualties and forthe most part had only ceded terri-tory on its own terms. ManyMarine veterans of both cam-paigns, however, later recalled thatthe hard fighting to hold thePendleton Line was as desperate asany they encountered at the

Chosin Reservoir. The 1st MarineDivision not only weathered thestorm, it had given the enemy abloody nose on several occasionsand performed many complexmaneuvers well. Reiterating hisexperiences in Korea, GeneralSmith said that blunting theChinese counterattacks in April"was the most professional job per-formed by the Division while it

was under my command."Likewise, by the time the CCF

Major General Field Harris' 1stMarine Aircraft Wing comprised oftwo aircraft groups, ColonelBoeker C. Batterton's MarineAircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) andLieutenant Colonel Radford C.

West's Marine Aircraft Group 33(MAG-33), and flew more than adozen different aircraft types.Lieutenant Colonel "J" Frank Cole'sMarine Fighter Squadron 312(VMF-312), Lieutenant ColonelRichard W. Wyczawski's VMF-212,Major William M. Lundin's VMF-214, and Major Arnold A. Lund'sVMF-323 all flew "old reliable andrugged" propeller-driven Chance-Vought F4U-4 Corsair fighterbombers. Lieutenant Colonel NeilR. Maclntyre commanded the"hottest" squadron, VMF-311,which flew Grumman F9F-2B

National Archives l'hoto (USMC) 127-N-A133537

A Grumman F7F Tigercat armed with napalm flies over North Korea seeking asuitable target. The twin-engine, single-seat, carrier-borne Tigercats were pri-marily used as night fighters, but sometimes conducted bombing and aerial

A VMF-323 "Death Rattler" F4U armed with 5-inch rockets and napalm readiesJbr take of/from the Badoeng Strait (CVE 116). At least one Marine squadronwas on board an aircraft carrier at all times during the spring of 1951, as thisduty rotated among the Corsair squadrons.

Photo Courtesy of LtCol Leo J. Ihli, USMC

395

and Sikorsky H03S and Bell HTLhelicopters, was attached to the 1stMarine Division and did not comeunder the operational control ofthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. OtherMarine aircraft serving the Koreantheater but not part of the wingincluded Marine transport planessuch as four-engine Douglas R5DSkymasters and twin-boomFairchild R4Q Packets.

Normal operational relationships were disrupted by the CCFWinter Offensive, which forcedretreating UN. forces to close airbases at Yonpo, Wonsan, Seoul,Kimpo, and Suwon as they pulledback. The few airfields still in UN.hands in early January 1951 couldnot handle all United NationsCommand aircraft, and the resulting ramp space shortfall scatteredMarine air assets throughout Koreaand Japan. This unanticipated diaspora placed Marine squadronsunder several different controlagencies. The "Checkerboard"Corsairs of VMF-312 were in Japanat Itami Air Base on the island ofHonshu along with the wing rearsupport units. The other threeCorsair squadrons were carrierborne. The "Devil Cats" of VMF212 were on the light carrier USSBataan (CVi 29) under the operational control of combined TaskGroup 96.8 operating in the YellowSea near Inchon, while VMF-214's"Black Sheep" were on the USSSicily (CVE 118) and the "DeathRattlers" of VMF-323 were flyingoff the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE116) under the operational controlof US. Navy Task Force 77 in theSea of Japan. The only land-basedfighter squadron still in Korea wasthe "Panther Pack" of VMF-311operating from airfield K-9 atPusan. Unfortunately, the Pantherjets were temporarily out of servicedue to mechanical and electronicteething problems serious enoughto ground the entire squadron until

ured General Motors (TBM)Avenger single-engine torpedobomber radio relay planes, F7F-3Pand F4U-5P photo reconnaissanceplanes, Douglas twin-engine R4DSkytrain and SNB light utility transports. Major Vincent]. Gottschalk'sMarine Observation Squadron 6(VMO-6), flying Consolidated OYSentinel light observation planes

Attached to lsi Marine Di£lisiollMarine Observation 'quadran 6

1st .Harine Aircraft \ringJarine Aircraft Graup 33

Marine Aircr•.1ft ,quadron LMarine Wing Service Squadron IMarinc Ground antral Inter ept

'quadran 1Marine Fighter 'quadron 212

larine 'ight-Fighter quadran513

1st 90mm AAA Gun BattalionMarine 'i ht-Fighter quadron

542Marine Fighter quadran .323Marine ir ontral Group 2Marine Tactical Air Control

quadran 2Marine Gr und Control Inter ept

'quadron 3Marine Fighter 'quadron 21 I

Marine Fighter quadron 312Marine Fight r quadron 311Detachment, Marine Transport

quadran 152

Supporling Naml AirTra 11 ;pori erl.'ice

Marinc Transport, quadron 2'-12~larine Tran 'port quadron 152Marine Trant>porr quadran .3')2

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 1951

IMarine land-ba ed tacticaland ~upport aircraft,except for th ob. ervation

planet> and helicopter. attached tothe 11't (arine Division, comprisedthe 1st Marine ircraft Wing inKorea. The wing had twO aircraftgroups (I s -12 and -33) thatfle\\ more than a dozen differentaircraft typ s in 19-1. Tts mostfamou airplanes were '\ orld 'arlJ vinwge F'lU orsairs and brandnew F9F Panther jets, but alsoincluded in the ' mbat aircraft mi.were F F Tigercat and Fel -')."\

or air all-weather fightert>. Mostlarin land-based aircraft \yere

under the operational control ofthe .. Fifth Air Force, and theJoint 0p'rations enter coordinated most air operation.. Marin carrier-based aircraft. on the oth rhand, were under the operationalcontral of thc U.. 'avy taskforce to which their respectivecarriers w '1" assigned. A few utility aircraft (S Bs and TBMs) wereassign d to headquarters squadrons. The aircraft of \' 1 -6 ( Y", entinels," a. well a H03 andJITL helicopters) flew in dire tsupport of th 1st Marine Division.Marine R"Q Pack ts and parachutriggers f the 1st ir DeliveryPlatoon . upported the l.S. AirForce ombat argo Command.

Jarine tran port planct> (R'l 0,kytraint> and R5D kymaMers)n w in support of the 'aval irTransport ervi e and the ombatCargo Comman l.

Panther jets. Lieutenant ColonelDavid C. Wolfe led Marine Night(All-Weather) Fighter Squadron 513(VMF[N]-513) mounted in F4U-5NCorsair night fighters. The othernight fighter squadron, LieutenantColonel Max ]. Volcansek, Jr.'sVMF(N)-542, flew twin engineGrumman F7F-3N Tigercats. Wingheadquarters had specially config-

396

it could he pulled back to Japanfor maintenance. The two Marinenight fighter squadrons, the "FlyingNightmares" of VMF(N)-513 andthe "Tigers" of VMF(N)-542, werein Japan under the direct control ofU.S. Fifth Air Force flying airdefense missions as part of the314th Air Division. VMO-6 wasattached to and collocated with the1st Marine Division at Masan. TwoMarine transport squadrons sup-ported the Naval Air TransportService. Colonel William B.Steiner's Marine TransportSquadron 352 (VMR-352) shuttledbetween California and Hawaii,while Colonel Deane C. Roberts'VMR-152 flew two legs, one fromHawaii to Japan and the other fromJapan to Korea.

All four Marine fighter-bombersquadrons flew daily sorties duringthe first week of January. Theirmissions included close air supportfor the Eighth Army, combat airpatrols, armed reconnaissance,

Calling "Devastate Baker." A Marinepilot serving with a ground unit directsa close air support mission. Theassignment of Marine aviators toground units ensured proper ground-to-air liaison.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A9458

coastal surveillance, and interdic-tion bombing. By mid-month thewing administrative and serviceunits, the Corsairs of VMFs-214 and-323, and VMF-311's jets were tem-porarily ensconced at Itami untilfacilities at Bofu on Honshu and K-1 (Pusan West) in Korea were acti-vated. Wing headquarters stayed atItami, MAG-33 was slated to moveto Bofu once the airfield was oper-ational, and MAG-12 was tem-porarily assigned to K-9 (PusanEast) until all of its squadronsreturned to Korea.

This Japanese interlude was aperiod of transition for Marine avi-ation. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wingwas reorganized, some commandchanges occurred, and severalmoves were accomplished. As partof the wing reorganization,squadrons were realigned amongthe air groups. The 1st MarineAircraft Wing had to be realignedbecause its elements were going tobe split up, some operating fromair bases in Japan while otherswould be stationed in Korea, andone squadron would be afloat.

397

Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. Fontanareplaced Lieutenant ColonelRadford C. West as MAG-33's com-manding officer. New squadroncommanders included MajorDonald P. Frame (VMF-312), MajorStanley S. Nicolay (VMF-323),Major James A. Feeley, Jr. (VMF-214), and Lieutenant ColonelClaude H. Welch (VMF-212).Lieutenant Colonel James R.

Anderson took over both nightfighter squadrons (VMF[N1-5 13 andVMF[N]-542) in February, a uniquearrangement that lasted untilVMF(N)-542 returned to the UnitedStates in mid-March. Thesquadrons slated to move to Bofuwere assigned to MAG-33 and thesquadrons returning to Korea wereassigned to MAG-12. In addition,the night fighter squadronsreturned to Marine control.

This temporary turmoil was asource of irritation, but it was farless ominous than an emergingdoctrinal issue. The 1st MarineDivision and the 1st Marine AircraftWing were separated for the firsttime since they arrived in the Far

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A132120A Vought F4U Corsair from VIi'IF-214 is guided into position for take-off on itsway to a close air support mission. The bent-wing, single-seat, propeller-driven"Dash Fours"featured six .50-caliber machine guns.

East. Marine land-based aircrafthad been under the titular controlof the Fifth Air Force for months,but a verbal agreement betweenMarine General Harris and U.S. AirForce General Earl E. Partridgeallowed the wing to regularly sup-

A Sikorsky HO3S helicopter sits on a mountaintop landingzone while Navy Corpsmen prepare three wounded Marinesfor evacuation. In addition to standard command, liaison,

center. Leery veteran Marine avia-tors foresaw procedural and alloca-tion problems and, needless to say,there was great trepidation by all

and observation duties, these helicopters also often flewsearch and rescue missions behind enemy lines.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-439571

398

port ground Marines. As the wing the Fifth Air Force, and all missionspulled back to Japan, however, would be assigned by the Fifth AirHarris' de facto control of Marine Force-Eighth Army joint operationsair was lost and this agreementwent by the wayside. Thereafter,all land-based wing aircraft wouldbe under the operational control of

wyoming line were now the

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