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Disputat ion, Deception, and Dialect ic:Plato on the True Rhe toric { haedrus2 6 1 - 2 6 6James S. MurrayIn Phaedrus261a-266b Plato analyzes the workings of rhetoric asthe art of influencing the sou l.' The bulk of traditional scholarshipdoes not find in Plato's treatment of rhetoric in general anythingimportant for his larger philosophical project. And thus it hasconsidered Plato's true, or "reformed," or "scientific" rhetoric tobe at best a useful means of crowd control catering to humandeficiencies^ and at worst a clear demonstration ofitsown impossi-bility due to the excessivelyrigorousdemands made uponitspracti-tioners.' The communis opinio conceming Plato's discussion ofrhetoric atPhaedrus261a-266b in particular has interpreted it aslittle more than a way of underlining the importance of the dialecti-cal methods of collection and division.'' For Plato's purpose in thepassage, so the interpretation posits, is to demonstrate nothingbeyond the fact that the claim to an art of rhetoric which ignoresthe need for knowledge is an empty one.'

Recently, however, some students of Plato's rhetorical theoryhave been moving more orlesssteadily in another direction. Therehas been an increasing tendency to treat seriously the Platonictheory of a true rhetoric having statusas abonafideand philosophi-cally significant art.*In the main, I believe this tendency has brought us closer to theintended meatiing of the Platonic text, and I wish to make the casefor true rhetoric even stronger by looking again atPhaedrus261a-266b in the light of recent work done on the sophistic movement.For, though we have aclueved a more interesting insight into theteachings of the Sophists, the results of such studies have not beenclearly applied to our understanding of Plato's rhetorical theory.And since it has been, in no small measure, the supposed un-

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28 0 JAMES S. MURRAYand apate strengthens immeasurably the case to be made for arhetoric with philosophical and paedogogical importance of thefirst rank. T hus, I wish to argue that Plato could, and actually didin the Phaedrus, envisage a true philosophical rhetoric whichworked by means of "disputation" and "deception" and yet wasuseful in leading men to knowledge oftheForms.Socrates introduces the consideration of rhetoric with the follow-ingdefinition:

The rhetorical art is a certain influencing of the soul by means ofwords, not in law courts only and in other such public meetings, butalso in private gatherings, the same coticeming both small and greatmatters, atid no more esteemed wheti done r i ^ t coticeming seriousthings than concem ing trivialthings.(261a-b2)''

By this description Socrates reconstitutes the terms of the discus-sion. Up to this point in thePhaedrus, rhetoric had been seen as anart defined in terms of extemal issues and contextsfor example,rhetoric is an art which deals with legal matters in lawcourts.Now,however, Socrates discounts extem als (public and private, m atterssmall and great, serious and trivial) and tums our attention tointemal dispositions and how to effect them^for example, rheto-ric is an influencing ofsouls.M oreover, it is an influencing which isachieved through some sort of disputation (dvtiAoYixr|, 261dlO).Here we meet thefirsthurdle in the way ofmysuggestion concem-ing the true rhetoric.Traditionally, avrLXoytxTi has been viewed as a "rhetorical art ofdeception, ignorant of tmth and going in chase of mere beliefs."*This opinion of avxiXoYixri is reflected in what G . B . Kerferd calls"a long tradition in Platonic studies" of treating dvTiJurytxTi andeeioTixTi as "simply interchangeable."' Within this tradition, theworkings of rhetoric, as they are described by Socrates inPhaedrus261c-161c, have been seen as a competition for the dialecticalprocesses of collection and division (265d-26Sj). Thus, for Plato

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PLATO ON THE TRUERHETORIC 281can be used simply for eristic purposes. On the other hand if it isclaimed as a sufficient path to truth it also meets Plato's condemna-tion . But in itself it is for Plato simply a technique neither good norbad ."

This suggested understanding of Plato's view of dvciXoyixri opensa way for an interpretation positing a union of dialectic and rheto-r i c . "My contention concem ing Phaedrus 261c-262c is tha t Pla to isportraying in this passage a sort of dvTiloYixf| which can be art-fully employed, but, as it will tum out, only by the rhetor who candialectically collect and divide.'^ The essential feature of thisdvTiXoyixTi, according to Kerferd, is "the opposition of one logosto another either by contrariety or contradiction." ' ' ' He writes:

It follows that, unlike eristic, when used in argument it cotistitutes aspecific and fairly definite technique, tiamely that of proceedingfrom a givenlogos, say the positioti adopted by an opponent, to theestablishmetit of a contrary or cotitradictorylogosin sucha waythatthe opponent must either accept both logoi,or at least abandon hisfirst position.'*Described in this way, dvxiXoYLXfi would be the last thing thatPlato would reject. '* Formulated as Kerferd has it , "disputation"seems reasonably equivalent to the Socratic elenchus, and I agreewith Kerferd when he writes that "the process of elenchus is forPla to a nec essary p ar t of the process of dialectic (cf. Phaedo 8 5 c -d ,RepuWic 434b -c) ." '^

Claimed as a sufficient path to right living and to right thinking,dvxiAoYixTJ surely is in error. This is precisely one of Plato's great-est difficulties with the sophistical rhetoricians whom he will bst abit later in the dialogue. But applied in a context Hke Socraticelenchtis, and seen for what is isa technique, not a completephilosophyavTiX.O7ixr| can, I admit, have a role to play in Plato'sthought . Thus Phaedrus 261c-262c does not need to be taken asthe po rtrayal of a rhetorical m ethod which is being displayed onlyfor the purpose of being rejected with the advent of the twin pro-

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2 8 2 JAMBSS.MURRAYof the tme rhetoric. How could the true rhetoric involve decep-tion? Would not Plato appear guilty of something morally repre-hensib le if he we re int er pr ete d as m ak ing dTcdrr) an integra l part ofa way of tm th and kn ow ledg e? ' '

One solution to the dilemma over deception in true rhetoric issuggested by recent studies in the fragments of Gorgias. As ex-pressed in his Encomium on Helen, the logos deceives the soul(TTJV ijn)XT)v djEOTTieag, DK 82b 11, 8).^ For Gorgias, it is sug-gested, the tme nature of things is beyond our p-asp (DK 82b, 3,77;BUa, 35 ), and thelogos, de nie d a role as a reflection of things,^'is essentially fiction and falsehood.^^ Kerferd brings his interpreta-t ion of Gorgias ' On Nature (DK 82b Ua) to bear on the descrip-tion of the d ecep tivelogos and sum m arizes as follows:

It follows that Gorgias is introducing a radical gulf between logosand the things to which it refers. Once such a gulf is appreciated wecat) understand quite easily the sense in which every logos involvesfalsification of the thing to which it has referenceit can never,according to Gorgias, succeed in reproducingasit wereinitself thatreality which is irretrievably outsideitself. To the extent that itclaims faithfully to reproduce reality it is no more than deception orapate.Yet this is the claim which all logos appears to make. So alllogc isto that extent Deception, . . .^

Here we have then a special notion of deception introduced {viaGorgias) into the fabric of fifth-century rhetorical theory. It is notsimply a description in the nontechnical, everyday, moral sense ofa deliberate and evil falsification of an otherwise communicabletmth.2*Such rhetorical d eception is not to be interpreted in m oralt e rms ; it is a matter of epistemoiogical limitations.^ TTius W. J.V erdenius can write (of Gorgias) th at

. . . persuasion is a form of deception . . . ,bat this does not implythat the original thoughts of the audience were more right and truethan the feelings induced by the orator. Hie t^m djidirri originally

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PLATO ONTH TRU RHETORIC 283made inPhaedrus261c-262c? In general, note that the passage isformally a discussion of rhetoric. Granted the definition includesunder the rubric of rhetoric much more than Phaedm s has heard inthe reports of the existing tradition. Nevertheless the explication of^X oytwyia as dvTiXoyia, far from unsettling Phaedm s' traditionalunderstanding, is a basis for comprehending other types of dis-course under the same classification. What we are given in thepassage is an analysis of persuasive speech in general, in termsarising out of the traditional theory. Inasmuch as there is a strikingresemblance between Phaedms' "reports" and the Gorgian theoryof rhetoric," it would not be unexpected to discoveriat&tx\carry-ing the sort of technical "rhetorical" notion outlined above.^Pushing a bit further, how might this sense of ditdxri find aplace within Plato's philosophy? The account of "reality," andman's ability to know it, out of which this notion of deceptionarises, differs only in part from that of Plato. For Gorgias, man isconfined to the realm of 66|a; knowledge of reality is impossible.For Plato, man is not necessarily limited to 66|a, but the vastmajority of individuals do live their lives with nothing better.Indeed, all men are bom without knowledge (in a state of forget-fulness); even the man who eventually becomes a knowledgeablephilosopher must be "converted" from the realm of 66|a to therealm offerticrcfJuTi.If it is the man of opinions (66^ai) who canbe "deceived," then Plato would have no problem in finding aplace for "rhetorical" dradtT). This very sort of thing is promi-nentiy displayed in the "Myth of the Metals" {Republic 414).Men are "helped" by means of a falsehood; their lives are im-proved morally (they do not grasp for more than is their due) andbenefitted by the resulting harmonious relations of the parts ofthe dty. The philosopher, who has knowledge of the tmth, mustact discriminantly among the untaught, and so does not alwaysstate "the tmth." Consider also the men chained in the Cave oftheRepublic514-521; they could not receive the direct presenta-tion of the ttuth about things. They would think the man who

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2 8 4 JAMES S. MURRAYBooks three and four of the Republic indicate the necessity andpropriety of teaching children myths which are put aside later inlife.^'This traitiing reflects the same lesson as tlie Allegory of theCave. The deception of the tm e rhetoric (to iBe a phrase applied toGorgias by V ersenyi) "reveals something more fundamental thanwhat is open to everyday human insight; . . . in this sense, . . . allsuch deception really undeceives. ^ The technical, or "rhetorical,"notion of dn drrj, as leading one away from current opinions, maywellfinda placeas par t of Plato's tme rhetoric.The priacipie eventually agreed uponbySocrates and Phaedrusisthatwecanbe"deceived" whentwothings aresosimilar that we areunable to perceive the difference between them.'^ Intermsof every-dayexperiencethis istme: for example, a manmaymistakenly wearnavy blue socks though he wanted to wear black ones. Of course,some colors are quite different; no one can be led to believe thatwhite socks are black, unless heistrying to tell the difference in thedark. Slocrates, however, does not deal with colors, which are forthe most part readily discemible one from the other. He recom-mends subjects to the rhetor about which there is no widespreadagreement (Socrates' examples are 6ixaiOD f| dyadou, 263a6-b5)due to men's ignorance about them. The man who has no knowl-edge of the forms of the just and the good can be mistaken abouttheir likenessesinthe world of opinion.It is at 262c5 that Socrates suggests an examination of thespeeches of Lysias andhimself in order to illustrate the notion ofdeception by means of similarities within the disputational context.He d isc ove r two glaring faults in Lysias' effort and puts a questionto Phaedrus in which he pinpoints both of them .

DidLysias,in beginninghisdiscourse on love, compel us to acceptit as a certain "something" with his own meanitig? And did heorganize the whole of the speech which followed along this line?(263d4-e2)

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PLATO ON THE TRUE RHETORIC 28 5define in a way that is acceptable to ail, 236a9-10). It is just suchthings, says Socrates, about which men are more readily deceived(evooiaTTjxoTEJroi Eojiev, 263b3, picking up the earlier analysis ofrhetoric as dnidxT), 261e6-7) and by which the rhetorical art canmost powerfully flex its muscles (363b3-4). The fact is, however,that while Lysias is to be congratulated for choosing the right sortof term (a good rhetormustbe able to , 263b6-c5), his delinquencyin properly defining it effectively nullifies any advantage gained.Love (EQCO^) is a word which means "all things to all men," so tospeak, and so the fact that Lysias has not stopped to define it is anobvious flaw in his approach. By neglecting to offer a definition,Lysias allows each member of his audience to use his or her ownunderstanding of the word. Accordingly, each listener hears thespeech in terms of his own estimation of 690)5. In this case therhetor does not have the ability to guide his audience down thepath he wants them to take. He may "move" them, but he hasallowed them to move along their own road, as it were. And evenhis ability to "move" them is hampered since, not knowing fromwhat point they are starting (each one with his own definition), heis less capable of deceiving them by using likenesses. He does notknow to what he should make his portrayal similar, for each lis-tener has his own understanding oflove.

Socrates then turns to the second of the deficiencies in Lysias'speech: a lack of proper arrangement. I cannot agree with Hack-forth that Plato is here {Phaedrus264 a-d) making a rather insig-nificant statement about xd^ig. " Actually he is elaborating uponone result of Lysias' ignorance, which is evident from his speech.Affer failing to begin with a proper definition, the remainder ofLysias' speech flounders. The speaker seems to be "swimming onhis back upstream" (264a4-7). ln Socrates' eyes, the end comes atthe beginning and vice versa. See how this would qualify as badrhetoric as outlined at 261c-262c. The object there stated for therhetor was to makeaappear to the audience asnot-aby moving ahttle at a time, and thus deceiving his hearers. Here Lysias is

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286 JAMESS MURRAYwill not be deceived. Lysias' speech then displays his ignoranceboth in its beginning and initsorder.Itisno accident that whenwecome to the discussion of Socrates'speeches we find demonstrated the two procedures which, whenapplied to speaking, cure the ills of sophistic rhetoric. It may sur-prise us, how ever, when we see how readily the dual processes of"collection and division" fit into the rhetorical framework of thedvTiXoyia as explained in 261c-262c. Rhetoric is not portrayed asthe natural antagonist of these dialecticalprocesses,norisit shownto be excluded by them. On the contrary, rhetoric demonstrates itsstatus as art, as psychagogy, onlywhen the rhetor speaks from aknowledge gained by collection and division."One thing mistaken for another" is, for Plato, the key to thepsychagogic ar t. The rhetor attempts to displace one view (held byhis listeners) with a second relying on the audience's inability todistinguish one from the o ther. He looks for a notionwhich,on theone hand, supports his case, and on the other, is similar to (but ofcourse not exactly like) the thoughts of his listeners. Lacking thediscemment which would expose the dissimilarities between therhetor's proposed notion and their opinion, the audience is led toaccept the rhetor's conclusions. He is best equipped to convince,argues Socrates, whoisbest able to discem similarities.The usefulness ofdiairesisin the task of determining similaritiesseems obvious. The gathering of kinds (or in^ances) under onegeneric form and the division into species according to naturalkinds can reveal to the rhetor those forms which are most similarand can be used in deceiving his listeners. Forms taken under thesame genus will have similarities by virtue of the fact, but eachform need not be like enough to each other to accomplish thedeception of one's audience. In general, a clear view of divisionsgives the rhetor clarity in his own speaking, as well ts a tool tounravel the rhetoric ofhisopponentbycatching him usinganotionwhich wrongly conflates two separate and distmct things. By hav-

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PLATO ON THE TRU E RHETORIC 28 7and divisicHi, with an adequate knowledge of similarities and dis-similarities. ITie rhetorwhocan "m ap out" the realm of true being,relating things by collection and division, will then be familiar withthe relationship between these things. On this basis the pair ofprocedures which Plato attributes to dialecticians becomes themeans by which one may attain to the tm e art of rhetoric. Just suchan art Thrasymachus etal. missed by not having the knowledgewhich comes from dialectic (26 6c l-7).DepartmentofClassicsandAncient HistoryUniversityof NewBrunswickNotes

1. It is not my intention to deal with the second part of his analysis, whichcorKems the rhetor's awareness of types ofsoulsand the arguments suited to each{Phaedrus266c-274b).2. See, for exam ple, W. H. Thompson,The PhaedrusofPlato(London: Whitta-ker&C o. , 1868), xvii; E. Zeller,Plato and the OlderAcademy, trans. S. F . Alleyneand A . G oodwin (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962 reprint) 514-15 ; C. Ritter,Platan: Sein Leben, Seine Schriften, Seine Lehre (Muenchen: C. G. BeckscheV erlagsbuch-handlung, 1923), II,39-41; G. Morrow, "Plato's Conception of Per-suasion,"Philosophical Review62(1953): 239,243;J. B. Skemp,Plato s Statesman(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), 86, n. 38; E . Black, "Plato's V iew of Rh eto-ric,"QuarterlyJounuil ofSpeech44 (1958):373;W. J. Kelley, "Rhetoric as Seduc-tion,"PhilosaphyandRhetoric6(1973): 79.3. See, for example, G. Grote,Platoand the OtherCompanions of Socrates,vol. Ill (London: John Murray, 1865), 249-50; E. L. Hu nt, "Plato and A ristotle onRhetoric and Rhetoricians" inStudiesinRhetorica ndPublicSpeaking ed. A. M.Dnimmond (New York, 1925), 42; W. Jaeger, Paideia, vol. Ill, trans. G. Highet(New York: Oxford Universi^ Press, 1963 reprint), 195;O . Brownstein, "Plato'sPhaedrus:D ialectic as the Genuine Art of Speaking,"QuarterlyJouma l of Speech51 (1965): 398; P. J. Schakel, "Plato's Phaedrus and Rhetoric, Southem SpeechCommunicationJoumal32(1966):131;R. Burger,Plato sPha edrus: ADefense ofaPhilosophicalArt ofWriting(University, AJa.: The University of Alabama Press,1980),71,76,84,89.4. A typical way of removing rhetoric from the discussionisseen in Guthrie. H esuggests that "true rhetoric is coextensive with philosophy" (A History ofGreekPhilosophy, V ol. HI [Cam bridge: University Press, 1969J, 177). By tbis he meansthat the proper art oflogoiisthe practice of dialectic which Plato describes meta-phorically inPhaedms276-277, and that this proper art is to be distinguished fromtheamilogikidescribed in 261a-266b. Plato, he says, is just "pretending to take itfi.e., rhetoric] seriously" (IV , 413). See also G. Bouchard, "L'antimodfele pla-toniden de la nouvelle rhdtorique," Canadian Joumal of Philosophy11 (1981):

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28 8 JAMES S.MU RRAY6. See, for example, P. Plass, "The Unity of the Phaedrus,"Symbolae Osloensis43 (1968): 7-38; F. D. Anderson and R. L. Anderson, "Plato's Conception ofDispositio, TheSouthern SpeechJoumal36 (1971): 195-208; D . S. Kaufer, "TheInfiuence of Plato 's Developing Psychology on His V iews of Rhe toric ,"Quarterly

Joumal ofSpeech64 (1978): 63 -78 ; J. W. Hikins, "Plato's Rhetorical Theory: OldPerspectives on the Epistemology of the New Rhetoric," Central States SpeechJoumal32 (1981): 160-76; J. L. Golden, "Plato Revisited: A Theory of Discoursefor All Seasons" inEssaysonClassical andModemDiscourse, eds. R. J. Cormors,etal.(Carbondate,111.:Southem Illinois University Press, 1984), 16-36.7. Translations throughout are my ownimless otherwise noted.8. F. M. Comford, Plato andParmenides (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, n.d.reprint), 68, and A . E . Taylor,VariaSocratica,First Series (Oxford: Parker, 1911)92,98. The same estimation ofAvriXoyixTiis cited by G. B . Kerferd,The SophisticMovement(Cambridge: University Press, 1981), 61-62, as the "traditional" view.9. G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movem ent, 62. He cites E. S. Thompson,"Excursus V ", The Meno of Plato (London: MacMiUan, 1901), 272-85, as aprime example of early discussions of these two terms which took them as inter-changeable. To this one may add W. K. C. Guthrie,A History ofGreekPhiloso-phy,V ol. Il l (Cam bridge: University Press: 1969), 177-78.10. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, Chapter 6: "Dialectic, antiiogic, anderistic."U. Ibid.12. So long asdyxikoyiKr\ was considered equivalent to eristic, and was thussubject to Platonic censure, scholars worked to make Zeno fit into the pattemwhich their idea of avritoytxTi determined for the passage. Thus Comford,Platoand Parmenides,67 , could write: "M odem writers regard Zeno 's argument assubtle and profound and valid against the position he was attacking. But Platoseems to have though t of him as a m ere sophist." (Cf. A. Dies, Parmenide, Bud^series (Paris: 1923), 14-19). Comford goes on to citeasproofPhaedrus261d and topoint out that Zeno is "Classed as a controversialist (dvTiJ.c(yt)t65 with the dema-gogue and the forensic orator . . . ," and then to give the traditional view of4vTiXo7ixf|which Kerferd has questioned. Corrective for Comford's view of Zenomay be found in G. V lastos, "Plato's Testimony concerning Zeno of Elea,"JoumalofHellenic Studies 95 (1975): 136-62 and in R. E. Allea, Plato's Parm enides,(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 67-69.

13. Of ayxtXcr/mi) in Phaedrus261d, Allen, Plato's Parm enides , 68, writes:"Comford roundly declares that, 'the whole is condemned as an art of deception'(PTK 177). But that is not so. The art of deception is said to require ability torepresent, o r misrepresent, one thing as like another (261e), which requires in tum ,if the art is to be properly practiced, knowledge of the truth about how thingsresemble and differ from each other (262 a-b )."14. Kerferd, TheSophisticMovement 63.15. Ibid.16. P. Plass argues that Plato usesivTiKorfVKr\ in his ^jeeches. "The Unity ofPhaedrus, Symbolae Osloensis43(1968):19.17. Kerferd, TheSophisticMovement 65.18. J. McCumbercomes close to this view when he writesofPhaedrus361that thereader must not " . . . be led to think that Platoiscon tra sti ^, rather than assimilat-

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PLATO ON THE TRUE RHETOR IC 28 9Such an interpretation goes in exactly the wrong direction because it assumes anontechnical sense for djidTti.20. H. Diels,D ieFragmenteDerVorsokratiker rev. Walther Kranz, 17th print-ing (Berlin: Weidmann, 1974),11,290, 15. Cf. 66 |ii5 diiaxtinaTO, 82b 11, 10 (II,291,4 ). References to others fi-agments will be made in the text using the standardabbreviation D K.21. T. S. Rosenmeyer comm ents on the work of Gorgias that "for now for thefirst time it is dear ly recognized that speech is not a reflection of things, not a m eretool or slave of description, but that it is its own master ." "G orgias, Aeschylus andApate, American Joumal of Philology 76 (1955): 231. Cf. C. J. Qassen , "TheStudy of Language Amongst Socrates' Contemporaries" in Sophistik, ed. C. J.Classen (Berlin, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 229-30.22. See Kerferd, TheSophisticMovement 80-81, and C. Sega), "Gorgias andthe Psychology of the Logos," HarvardStudies inClassical Philology 66 (1962):109-10.

23. Kerferd,The SophisticMovement 81.Cf. Rosenm eyer, "Gorgias, Aeschylusand /Ipate ". 232.24. Deception may even be considered a positive good in Gorgias' view, if wemay accept DK 82b 23 (II, 305, 26-306, 2) as genuinely Gorgian. As Guthriewrites: "Even when deceptive, deceit may be a just one and the deceived go awaywiser than before, as happens with the fictions of tragedy, which to Gorgias wasonly rhetoric in verse." A History of GreekPhilosophy, III, 180-81. Classen re-gards djidxTj as "technical term in the theory of rhetoric . . . as well as of poe try.""The Study of Language Amongst Socrates' Contemporaries," 229,n. 48.25. In a study of the epistemological basis of Gorgias' rhetoric, R. L. Enosconcludes, among other things, that "the deception of persuasion is no wrong initself nor does it necessarily evoke a false or misleading attitu de." "The Epistemol-ogy of Gorgias' Rhetoric: A Re-examination," Southern Speech CommunicationJoumal 42 (1976): 49. Along the same lines compare Segal, "Gorgias and thePsychology of the Logos,"112;L. V ersenyi,Socratic Humanism(NewHaven:YaleUniversity ftess, 1963), 45 -46 ; and M. U ntersteiner, The Sophists, trans, by K.Freeman (Oxford: Basil BlackweU, 1954), 109-10.26. W . J. V erdenius, "Go rgias, Doctrine of Deception," in Sophistik, ed.C. Qasse n, 116. E . J. H unt adds that even given the demand that the rhetor knowthe truth, "this cannot be interpreted as an injunction to speak truth at all times.""Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians" in Studies in Rhetoric andPublicSpeaking ed. A . M. Drummond (New York,1925),37.27. Hackforth,Plato sPhaedrus, 121,and G. J. de V ries,ACommentaryon the Phaedrus ofPlato(Amsterdam: H akke rt, 1969), 216.28. A "technical term ," according to Classen, "The Study of Language AmongstSocrates' Contemporaries,"229,n. 48.29. Says Plass, "The Unity of the Phaedrus .29.30. F. D. Anderson and R. L. Anderson, "Plato's Conception ofD ispositio,TheSouthemSpeechJoumal36(1971):197.G . Kennedy speaks ofthe"use of lies"in training.TheArt ofPersuasioninGreece(Princeton: University P ress, 1963), 79.31. Republic388-38 9,413, 459;Laws663-666. For the same thought see Black,"Plato's V iew of R hetoric,"QuarterlyJoumal ofSpeech AA (1958):373,and P lass,TTieU nity ofthePhaedrus," 28-30.32. V ersenyi,SocraticHumanism,49-50.

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