The Wiley Blackwell Companion to the Qurʾ an, Second Edition. Edited by Andrew Rippin and Jawid Mojaddedi. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Theology

Binyamin Abrahamov

In introducing the role of the Qurʾan in Islamic theology, this chapter will mainly focus on Sunnı medieval Islam, although references to sectarian groups and Shı ʿ ı Islam will be adduced. First, I shall examine the Qurʾan as a book containing theological ideas. Then the question of whether the Qurʾan serves as a stimulus to theological discus-sions will be dealt with. Approaching Islamic theology through its traditional and rational trends will serve to function as a preliminary section for discussion of the various appearances of the Qurʾan in Islamic theology. We shall see that the more rationalist a theologian is, the more he uses the Qurʾan as corroboration and not a departure for his proofs. On the other hand the traditionalist employs the Qurʾan as the basis for his theological theses, but often replaces the Qurʾan by traditions which come to the fore. The discussion here is not historical, but rather phenomenological; that is, I am outlining the place of the Qurʾan within the main streams in Muslim theology. However, one cannot escape the impression that at its beginning, Muslim theology dealt more extensively with interpretations of the Qurʾan, and in its later phases somewhat neglected the Qurʾan in favor of the sunna on the one hand, and reason on the  other. In  the present chapter I have concentrated on the role of the Qurʾan in theological discussions setting aside certain issues such as the Qurʾan as a miracle (iʿjaz al‐Qurʾ an), which may testify to the theologians’ estimation of the scripture but not to their true attitude to it as a theological device. Finally, the presentation here is not  exhaustive; it only indicates the main directions taken by Muslim theologians regarding the use of the Qurʾan.

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Theology in the Qurʾan

Prophets are not theologians; their teachings are not arranged systematically as are theological treatises (Goldziher 1981: 67). However, the Qurʾan contains many theological notions expressed both explicitly and implicitly. The main tenets of Islam are scattered throughout the Qurʾan in the long and short suras. These dogmas, as a rule, are stated rather than proved. The existence of God who created the world (Q 6:1) constitutes the foundation of the theology in the Qurʾan. God is depicted, inter alia, as Living (hayy), Eternal (qayyum), Omniscient (ʿalım), and Omnipotent (qadır) (Q 2:20, 29, 255). God acts for the benefit of human beings; He supplies them with sustenance and water and designs nature so that they can find their way in the earth (Q 6:95–9).1 God’s unity is stated in two ways: the positive (“He is God, the One,” Q 112:4) and the negative (“There is no god but He,” Q 2:163). Sometimes in the context of God’s unity the Qurʾan inserts a polemic against Christianity: “Those who say that God is the third of three, whereas there is no god but He, are unbelievers” (Q 5:73).

The Qurʾan applies expressions to God which when taken literally are anthropomor-phisms. God is described as sitting on the Throne (Q 20:5), as having a face (Q 55:27), hands (Q 38:75), eyes (Q 54:14), and as speaking to human beings (Q 2:253). Other verses, which contradict the anthropomorphic phrases, express the idea that there is no one equal to God (Q 112:4) and that “there is nothing like Him” (Q 42:11).

On the question of man’s free choice, the literal text of the Qurʾan is equivocal in the  same manner. On the one hand, man can choose his acts freely without God’s i ntervention, while on the other, he is strictly coerced to act because of God’s decree or predestination. Contrary to Q 18:29: “Whoever wills let him believe and whoever wills let him disbelieve” stands Q 76:30: “You will not unless God wills.” The notion that human beings are completely subject to God’s rule and power contradicts the notion of human responsibility based on man’s free choice. In addition to the idea of God’s omnip-otence and will to which human beings are subject, the Qurʾan speaks of God’s guidance (huda) and leading astray (dalal) in two different manners: Either God guides a man or leads him astray before he acts, which implies predetermination, or He does so after a man acts, meaning that He rewards or punishes him. These two terms and others, such as God’s giving sustenance (rizq) or sealing man’s heart (khatm) so that he cannot under-stand God’s admonitions and as a result disbelieves, together with ajal (the appointed time of death – Q 6:2), kasb (acquisition – Q 2:286), and ʿadl (justice – Q 16:90), play a great role in later theological discussions about free will and predestination (Watt 1948: 12–17).

Numerous instances of the verbs amana (he believed) and kafara (he disbelieved) and their derivatives occur in the Qurʾan. However, the Qurʾan provides us with no defini-tion of either belief (ıman) or disbelief (kufr). Only once are we told that a difference exists between belief and islam:

The Bedouins say: “We believe” (amanna). Say: “You do not believe, but say: ‘We surrender’ (aslamna), for belief has not yet entered your hearts.” (Q 49:14)

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Here the verb aslamna seems to convey the formal acceptance of Islam, whereas ıman (belief) is connected with a feeling of the heart. This feeling may increase owing to God’s acts (Q 3:173; 48:4; 74:31). The worst form of unbelief is to ascribe partners to God (shirk), which is a sin He will not pardon (Q 4:116).

The content of belief is mentioned many times. One must believe in God, His angels, His books, His messengers, and the resurrection (Q 2:62, 285). According to the Qurʾan the unbelievers will enter hell and the believers will enter paradise (Q 4:116–24). In this world, the believers must shun the unbelievers; they should not become the latter’s friends and they should fight against them (Q 3:28; 9:1–5, 36).

The verb fasaqa ʿan means to transgress God’s orders, meaning to sin. Satan was ordered to prostrate himself before Adam and “he transgressed God’s command (fasaqa ʿan amr rabbihi)” (Q 18:50). The derivatives of this verb are sometimes related to belief and unbelief: “Is the believer (muʾmin) like the unbeliever (fasiq)? They are not equal” (Q 32:18). Two types of sins are mentioned in the Qurʾan: minor sins (s aghıra; plural s aghaʾ ir) and grave sins (kabıra; plural kabaʾ ir – Q 18:49; 42:37). Also here we do not know what sins are subsumed under either kabaʾ ir or saghaʾ ir. As in other theological notions and terms, this lacuna is expanded by the theologians.

The Qurʾan as Stimulus to Theological Discussions

Besides the above‐mentioned list of theological ideas and terms in the Qurʾan, two addi-tional factors have motivated the development of theology in Islam.2 The first is the polem-ics between God and human beings and between prophets and their peoples. God provided Abraham with an argument so that he could refute his people. “That is our argument. We gave it to Abraham against his folk” (Q 6:83). Likewise, a debate occurred between Muhammad and his people: “And those who argue [against the prophet] concerning God3 after he [the prophet] has been known [as prophet], their argument is invalid in God’s eyes” (Q 42:16). The notion that human beings cannot refute God after His sending of messengers to mankind is best exemplified in the following verse: “[We have sent] messen-gers to announce [God’s reward for the believers] and to warn [them of God’s punishment to the evil‐doers] in order that human beings might have no argument against God after [His sending of] messengers” (Q 4:165). Moreover, Muhammad is ordered to call people to the religion by certain means including disputation: “Call to the way of your Lord by [using] wisdom, good exhortation, and dispute with them in the better way” (Q 6:125). In like manner, he must dispute the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) in the better way (Q 29:46).

Having spoken in general of the Qurʾan’s use of arguments, we now proceed to some specific arguments. One of the most repeated themes in the Qurʾan is the resurrection (called, among other names, al‐qiyama: see EI2 2004: “kiyama”). The Arab pagans believed that God created the heavens and the earth (Q 29:61), but did not believe in the resurrection. They asked: “Who shall restore us to life? Say: ‘He who created you at the first time’” (Q 17:51). Here the Qurʾan uses an a fortiori argument, namely, if the pagans believe in the greatest work of God, that being the creation of the world, then they should believe

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in a lesser work of God, that is, the resurrection (cf. Q 75:37–40). Similarly, a syllogism is made between God’s revivification of the earth by water and the resurrection (Q 35:9).

In opposition to the pagans and Christians (according to the Qurʾan the latter believed in three divinities), the Qurʾan puts forward an argument later known as dalıl al‐tamanuʿ (the argument from mutual hypothetical prevention – see below) to prove God’s unity. It reads: “If there were in the heavens and the earth gods other than God, they [the heavens and the earth] would be ruined” (Q 21:22). In another formulation of this argument clearly directed towards the Christians, the Qurʾan states: “God has not taken to Himself any son, nor is there any god with Him, [if it were so], then each god would take off what he created and some of them would rise up over others” (Q 23:91). Thus the state of a stable world proves its being ruled and directed by the one God.

Every Muslim unquestioningly regards the Qurʾan as the realization of the absolute truth. However, contradictions in central issues discussed above, such as anthropomor-phism vis‐à‐vis its negation, urged Muslims to find solutions to these inconsistencies which might impair the perception of the Qurʾan’s perfection. The arguable condition of the Qurʾanic text has been one of the major internal stimuli for the emergence of Islamic theology and the attempt to create through interpretation and theological dis-cussion a coherent doctrine.

To sum up, the Qurʾan provides Muslims with theological notions, terms, forms of arguments, and models of debates. To some extent, these elements have affected the Qurʾan’s position in Islamic theology.

Types of Theology

The role of the Qurʾan in Islamic theology can be best apprehended through examina-tion of the different theological trends in Islam. The categorization of this theology as it relates to reason and the sunna may lead us to lucid conclusions, because Muslim theo-logians naturally cite Qurʾanic verses which affirm their position vis‐à‐vis these two sources of knowledge. Along broad lines, it is possible to differentiate between rationalist and traditionalist theologians. By rationalist theologians I mean thinkers who rely on reason as their sole argument in theological discussion and who prefer reason to the Qurʾan in cases of contradiction between the two. (In the broader context of rationalism versus traditionalism, we may add to the Qurʾan the sunna and ijmaʿ, the consensus either of religious experts or of all Muslims.) Of course, a purely rationalist theologian, that is, a theologian who employs only rational arguments without any reference to the Qurʾan, cannot be reckoned as a Muslim; therefore, when I speak of rationalist theologi-ans I mean those who base their theological arguments, mainly but not exclusively, on reason. In Islamic theology the most radical of the rationalists were the Muʿtazila.4 The traditionalists, on the other hand, rely first and foremost on the Qurʾan, the sunna, and the consensus as their basis of theology. Here we can distinguish between pure traditionalism, which means sole dependence on these sources, and other forms of tra-ditionalism which move from the extreme towards reason. However, reason cannot serve them as a point of departure, but only as corroboration (Abrahamov 1998: vii–xi).

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Traditionalist theology

Among the traditionalists a distinction is made between the speculative theologians, who are called mutakallimu5 ahl al‐hadıth (the speculative theologians of the people of the hadıth; Ibn ʿAsakir 1984: 105), and those who do not employ speculative theology. The latter sometimes prefer the tradition (sunna) to the Qurʾan. I shall now introduce examples showing how the Qurʾan was utilized among these previously mentioned groups. As I have said, the materials are not arranged historically but phenomeno-logically. The discussion here begins with the traditionalists and ends with the rationalists.

First, it is important to realize that the traditionalists were aware of the Qurʾan’s inadequacy to supply believers with both legal and theological solutions. The tradition-alist theologian al‐Ajurrı (d. 360/970) declares one who accepts only what is found in the Qurʾan an evil man. All God’s ordinances are known only through the messenger’s traditions. The Qurʾan’s status is equal to that of the sunna, a comparison that is proved through Q 4:59: “If you dispute about any matter, refer it to God and the messenger.” A tradition brought forward by al‐Ajurrı explains that “to God” means to God’s book, while “the messenger” means to the messenger’s traditions. Here, a Qurʾanic verse legit-imizes the equal status of the sunna and the Qurʾan (al‐Ajurrı 1983: 49–53; cf. Abrahamov 1998: 3–4).

Notwithstanding the comparison between the Qurʾan and the sunna, the Qurʾan is elevated to the position of uncreated being (al‐Qurʾ an ghayr makhluq), because it is God’s speech (kalam) or knowledge (ʿilm), which are God’s eternal attributes (al‐Ajurrı 1983: 75–6). In the chapter dealing with this issue, most of the materials cited by al‐Ajurrı are traditions, and the few Qurʾan verses he quotes are interpreted according to traditions. One of these few is Q 7:54: “Verily, to Him belong the creation and the command.” The creation is interpreted to mean God’s created things, and the command is the Qurʾan itself, which is not reckoned among the created things.

When the Qurʾan provides verses supporting the author’s thesis, he cites them all. Al‐Ajurrı expresses the usual traditionalist dogma concerning the elements of faith. Faith is composed of three principal parts: (a) the belief in the heart (al‐tasdıq biʾ l‐qalb); (b) the affirmation of God’s unity and Muhammad’s mission by uttering the shahada; and (c) carrying out God’s precepts. Al‐Ajurrı refutes those who hold only the first two roots of faith,6 by citing fifty‐six verses which prove that fulfilling God’s commands is a requisite for faith. The verses are quoted almost without comment, which creates the impression that the author regards the Qurʾan as a theological source that needs no interpretation. In this case, al‐Ajurrı is right, for these verses connect belief with the doing of good deeds; see, for example, Q 4:57, 122; 7:42; 14:23; 18:30; and 20:82.

However, in contradistinction to his treatment of faith, when dealing with the problem of predestination and free will, al‐Ajurrı is very careful to select verses which fit his doctrine of predestination, which is very probably dictated by the traditions. Here (al‐Ajurrı 1983: 149–68) we cannot speak of Qurʾanic theology, but rather of a theol-ogy that seeks corroboration from the Qurʾan. Thus, verses which teach that God puts a seal on one’s heart, ears, and eyes so that one is unable to hear God’s message and hence

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unable to believe are cited (Q 2:6–7; 4:155; 5:41). Likewise, the author cites verses deal-ing with God’s guidance and leading astray (al‐huda, al‐d alal  –  Q 4:88; 6:39, 149; 7:186). In his view, God guides and leads human beings astray from the beginning; thus, whomever God leads astray is incapable of believing in Him. Conversely no attempt is made to interpret other verses (Q 2:26; 14:27; 40:74) which suggest God’s leading astray as a punishment for man’s unbelief or evil‐doing. For example, Q 14:27 reads: “God leads astray the wrong‐doers,” which may imply that leading astray is a reaction to transgression of the laws. Like many other traditionalists, who base their theology on the Qurʾan, al‐Ajurrı holds that everything depends on God’s will, even man’s will: “You do not will unless God wills” (Q 81:29).

Some theological dogmas are plainly dictated by the Qurʾan, and the relevant traditions are cited in support of these. This is the case with man’s seeing of God, regarded by all Muslims as the highest reward that God will give human beings in the hereafter (al‐Ajurrı 1983: 251–76). The cornerstone of this doctrine is Q 75:22–3: “On that day (on the resurrection) faces shall be luminous looking at their Lord” (ila rabbiha nazira). This verse is accompanied with other less lucid verses and with many traditions to the same effect. Contrary to his treatment of predestination, here, al‐Ajurrı willingly refers to a verse whose plain meaning may refute the present doctrine: “The eyes [literally: the glances – al‐absar] do not perceive Him, and He perceives the eyes” (Q 6:103). Rationalist thinkers, such as the Jahmites7 and the Muʿtazilites, use this verse to claim that it is impossible to see God. Al‐Ajurrı, however, interprets the verb “he perceived” to mean “he encompassed a thing by seeing,” meaning “he saw the whole thing,” just as one says “I saw the sea,” but he did not see the whole sea (al‐Ajurrı 1983: 276). Accordingly, the Qurʾan teaches us that one cannot see God as a whole, but only part of Him. Here, the author uses a lexi-cal device to interpret a verse and hence to solve a theological problem.

Another means used by the traditionalists to understand a Qurʾanic verse is called istinbat (literally: finding, discovery). Here, the interpretation of a verse is based on r eason (al‐Jurjanı 1978: 22). One of the most often cited verses in the long‐running dispute over the creation of the Qurʾan8 is Q 36:82: “His order, when He wills a thing, is only to say to it ‘be’ and it is.” Everything is created through the creation word “be” uttered by God. Now, if this word is also created, it follows that there will be an endless chain of creations, which is an absurdity. Hence, “be,” God’s speech, is not created, which proves that the Qurʾan, God’s speech, is uncreated (al‐Lalakaʾı 1990: I, 217–18). I call this process an act of rationality, to be differentiated from rationalism, since the theological conclusion or proof is derived on the basis of the Qurʾan, but only with reasoning. In rationalism the basis is reason, and the Qurʾan, if it is involved in the pro-cess, plays only a role of corroboration.

Another theology dominated by traditions is that of the Shafiʿite traditionalist theologian al‐Lalakaʾı (d. 418/1027). Although he uses istinbat, his theology is largely dominated by traditions. His discussion of predestination (al‐Lalakaʾı 1990: II, 577–8) begins with a list of relevant verses and a few interpretive notes, but the whole section is devoted to traditions. Sometimes, for example, in the section treating the Murjiʾites (al‐Lalakaʾı 1990: III, 986–1007), there are no quotations from the Qurʾan, though the author could have cited some relevant verses. Thus the Qurʾan is replaced by traditions.

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In his al‐Radd ʿala al‐zanadiqa waʾ l‐jahmiyya (“The Refutation of the Heretics and the Jahmiyya”), Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855), after whom the Hanbalite school is named, refutes Jahm b. Safwan by using Qurʾanic verses through the method of tafsır al‐Qurʾ an biʾ l‐Qurʾ an, meaning the interpretation of Qurʾanic verses by other Qurʾanic verses. One may assume that this form of argumentation is employed because his adversary uses Qurʾanic verses to support his own theses. Hence, our author is forced to use the same weapon. In the above‐mentioned work Ibn Hanbal’s theology is expressed through the plain meaning of the Qurʾan. This attitude can be best summarized by Ibn Hanbal’s sentence, which is brought after introducing certain verses (for example, Q 2:255; 7:54; 16:50) regarding God’s abode: “This is God’s report in which He informs us that He is in the heaven” (al‐Nashshar and al‐Talibı 1971: 93). Also in al‐Ikhtilaf fı ʾ l‐lafz waʾ l‐radd ʿala ʾ l‐Jahmiyya waʾ l‐mushabbiha (“The Controversy Concerning the Utterance [of the Qurʾan]9 and the Refutation of the Jahmiyya and the Anthropomorphists”) written by the traditionalist theologian Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889), the dependence on the Qurʾan in the refutation is dictated by the Qurʾanic arguments of the opponent (al‐Nashshar and al‐Talibı 1971: 233).

In his al‐Radd ʿala al‐Jahmiyya (“The Refutation of the Jahmites”), the traditionalist theologian Abu Saʿıd al‐Darimı (d. 280/893) discusses the Qurʾanic verses in a rational way. Rejoining to the Jahmites’ dogma that God is everywhere, meaning that He rules every place, al‐Darimı asks what is then the meaning of God’s particularization of the throne among all other places, to which the Jahmites have no answer. This proves their doctrine to be untenable. An argument from disjunction which follows shows that al‐Darimı may be considered among the speculative theologians in the traditionalist circles (mutakallimu ahl al‐hadıth). Notwithstanding, he asks the Jahmites to prove their dogma in the following order: first, proofs from the Qurʾan, then from the tradition, and then from the consensus of the Muslims. The Jahmites claim that they seek to argue on the basis of Qurʾanic verses alone without resorting to the exegetes’ interpretations, to which al‐Darimı responds that they should pay attention to the whole verse and not only to phrases taken out of context. In doing so, the argument of the Qurʾan is deeper and clearer than other arguments (al‐Nashshar and al‐Talibı 1971: 268–70). Thus al‐Darimı plainly states that the Qurʾan furnishes the best argument in theological debates. A further development of this notion considered the Qurʾan the origin of rational arguments.

The approach regarding the Qurʾan as a source of both rational arguments and theological terms was further expanded among certain later traditionalists, mainly speculative theologians. The first was Abu ʾl‐Hasan al‐Ashʿarı (d. 324/935), the eponym of the Ashʿarite school of theology. Though first a Muʿtazilite thinker, he later converted to traditionalism and defended Ibn Hanbal’s theses through speculative arguments. His Risalat istihsan al‐khawd fı ʿilm al‐kalam (“An Epistle Concerning the Approval of Dealing with the Science of the Speculative Theology”; al‐Ashʿarı 1953: 87–97) refutes the claim that the Qurʾan and the sunna are devoid of speculative theology. Al‐Ashʿarı sets out the principle that the Qurʾan and the sunna contain the roots of this kind of theology in a general way. For our purpose we shall deal only with the Qurʾan.

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Al‐Ashʿarı refers to the four modes of being (kawn; plural akwan): movement (haraka), immobility (sukun), combination (ijtimaʿ ), and separation (iftiraq). These constitute a genus of accidents which must inhere in the substances (Peters 1976: 128–32; Gimaret 1990: 99–120). According to al‐Ashʿarı, it is possible to learn about the accident of movement from the story of Abraham (Q 6:76–9) who intermittently declared the star, the moon, and the sun to be his Lord, but after seeing their disappearances and being aware of their movements from place to place, he believed in God, because it is incon-ceivable for God to disappear and to move from place to place (al‐Ashʿarı 1953: 89).

Likewise the proof from hypothetical mutual prevention (dalıl al‐tamanuʿ – see above) for God’s unity is founded on Qurʾanic verses (Q 13:16; 21:22; 23:91) which teach that the existence of more than one god would ruin the world. The possibility of the resur-rection is proved in the Qurʾan through verses (Q 7:29; 30:27; 36:79) that assert that if God was able to create the world from nothing, it is far easier for Him to vivify the dead (al‐Ashʿarı 1953: 89–91).

Those who denied God’s creation of the world and the second creation, namely, the resurrection, and believed in the eternity of the world, introduced a false argument against the resurrection. Basing themselves on the law of contradiction, they argued that life is characterized by humidity and heat, while death is defined by coldness and dryness. Thus how can these contradictory elements be brought together in one place? Al‐Ashʿarı admitted that two opposites cannot be combined in one substrate; however, they can exist in two substrates by way of vicinity. This he learns from Q 36:80, which reads: “God created for you fire out of the green tree so that you can kindle from it.” Consequently, it is proved that fire, which is characterized by heat and dryness, comes out of the green tree characterized by coldness and humidity. This further demonstrates that life may come after death (al‐Ashʿarı 1953: 91). It seems that here al‐Ashʿarı points to the fact not only that the Qurʾan puts forth theological arguments, but also that the Qurʾan anticipates the claims of the opponents of Islam.

Another principle, which pertains to the doctrine of atoms, states that every body has an end and that an atom (juzʾ )10 cannot be divided. This is proved on the basis of Q 36:12: “We have counted every thing in a clear register.” Al‐Ashʿarı concludes that it is impossible to count that which is endless or that which is divisible ad infinitum (al‐Ashʿarı 1953: 92–3).

In sum, al‐Ashʿarı turned the Qurʾan into the essential foundation of theological terms and speculative arguments and in so doing paved the way towards the elabora-tion of the notion that there is no contradiction between reason and revelation, for revelation includes the principles of the rational arguments.

A similar approach to rational arguments and hence to the Qurʾan was advanced by Abu Mans ur al‐Maturıdı (d. 333/944), a contemporary of al‐Ashʿarı and the eponym of the Maturıdite school of theology (on this school see EI2 2004: “al‐Maturıdiyya”). He states that religion is known through rational proofs (Abrahamov 1998: 86n.). For example, a man is recognized as a true prophet first by an examination of his character and then through sensual and rational proofs. For all these proofs, in al‐Maturıdı’s view, the Qurʾan supplies the Muslims with pieces of evidence (al‐Maturıdı 1970: 202–10).

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The Zahirı11 theologian, jurisprudent, and heresiographer Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064) also advocates the use of reason in religious matters including theology. But this use is subject to the teachings of the Qurʾan; otherwise, rational arguments are nothing but personal preferences of theologians and philosophers. The Qurʾan explains everything which pertains to religion, as Q 16:89 testifies: “We have revealed to you the scripture explaining all things.” Thus, for example, contrary to the Ashʿarites who derive some of God’s names from His characteristics, Ibn Hazm permits only the use of the names and attributes of God which occur in the Qurʾan (EI2 2004: “Ibn Hazm”). Clearly, the Qurʾan plays a central role in Ibn Hazm’s theology.

The Qurʾan also occupies a high place in al‐Ghazalı’s (d. 505/1111) Ashʿarite theology, although he introduced Greek logic into Islamic theology. How did he reconcile these two seemingly opposed sources of knowledge? Probably following al‐Ashʿarı, al‐Ghazalı con-tinues to elaborate the notion that the Qurʾan is the basis of rational arguments. In al‐Ghazalı’s view expressed in his al‐Qistas al‐mustaqım (“The Just Balance”), God is the first teacher, the second is Jibrıl (Gabriel, the conveyer of revelation), and the third is the mes-senger. By God and Jibrıl he means the teachings of the Qurʾan, and by the messenger, the teachings of the sunna. However, his treatment of the subject is more detailed, technical, and sophisticated than that of al‐Ashʿarı, for he seeks to prove that the three Aristotelian figures of syllogism and the two Stoic conjunctive and disjunctive syllogisms are found in the Qurʾan (Marmura 1975: 102; Abrahamov 1993a: 145). Each syllogism is called a “balance” (qistas) because by these devices one can weigh the true knowledge.

As an example let us take the first figure of syllogism in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, I, 3 (McKeon 1941: 68). Al‐Ghazalı calls it the “great balance of the equality balances” (al‐mızan al‐akbar min mawazın al‐taʿadul), and along with the middle balance (al‐mızan al‐awsat) and the small balance (al‐mızan al‐asghar), they constitute the three Aristotelian figures of syllogism. According to al‐Ghazalı, Abraham used this kind of syllogism when disputing with Nimrud, who declared that, like God, he gives life and causes death. Consequently, Abraham said to him: “God causes the sun to rise from the east, so bring it from the west” (Q 2:258). On the basis of this verse al‐Ghazalı builds his syllogism in the following way: (a) Every being which is capable of making the sun rise is God; (b) My god is capable of making the sun rise; and the conclusion is (c) My god is God. The first premise is known through the agreement of all people that God is able to do everything, including making the sun rise. We know the second premise by seeing that Nimrud and all other beings are incapable of making the sun rise (al‐Ghazalı 1996: 184–5). Thus, the Qurʾan appears in al‐Ghazalı’s teaching not only as a source of arguments, but also as a source of logic, as a balance through which one weighs the truth.

The famous Hanbalite jurist and theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) expresses a similar attitude towards the Qurʾan. In his view, ʿaqliyyat (proofs known through rea-son) can be derived from the Qurʾan and the sunna. The Qurʾan points at, draws one’s attention to, and explains rational arguments, although some rational proofs can be known through observation (Ibn Taymiyya 1979: I, 199f.; Abrahamov 1992: 267).

Later Ashʿarite mutakallimun reveal different approaches to the Qurʾan. In his Ghayat al‐maram fı ʿ ilm al‐kalam (“The Utmost Aspiration in the Science of Kalam”), the Ashʿarite mutakallim Sayf al‐Dın al‐Amidı (d. 631/1233), being greatly influenced by philosophy, almost ignores the Qurʾan. It is highly surprising to see whole chapters dealing with

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religious issues such as man’s seeing of God in the hereafter (al‐Amidı 1971: 159–78) or prophecy and miracles (al‐Amidı 1971: 317–40) accompanied by very few verses which serve only as support, not as a point of departure. However, in another kalam work, which is the basis of Ghayat al‐maram, entitled Abkar al‐afkar (“The First Thoughts”), he employs Qurʾanic proofs (al‐Amidı 1971: 16).

Contrary to al‐Amidı, Fakhr al‐Dın al‐Razı (d. 606/1209), an Ashʿarite theologian also known for his command of philosophy, continues to maintain the high place of the Qurʾan in his writings. However, Qurʾanic proofs occupy the secondary place in his dis-cussion, for example, on the issue of God’s creation of man’s acts,12 while rational proofs appear foremost in this discussion (al‐Razı 1987: IX, 19–198).

Al‐Razı substantiates his hierarchy of proofs stating that verbal proofs, meaning those which stem from the Qurʾanic text, do not provide us with certainty, and on the issue of who creates man’s acts one must have certainty. Hence, it is forbidden to base the resolution of this question on traditional proofs. He further explains that verbal proofs are based on ten matters and that each of these is probable; hence, that which is based on a probable matter is probable. The very characteristics of the language of the Qurʾan, states al‐Razı, prevent the possibility of attaining certainty. For example, the Qurʾan is full of omissions and concealed contents, thus a positive statement may turn into a negative one and vice versa. The absence of omissions and concealed contents is also probable. Probability also results from the possibility of various meanings of words.

Special attention should be paid to the question of the contradiction between Qurʾanic verses and reason. Al‐Razı illustrates one such contradiction by pointing to the anthropomorphic phrases in the Qurʾan.13 In such a case, one should use reason to overcome the sunna. Reason is the basis of the sunna, because one cannot believe in the sunna unless one uses rational proofs. In the present issue the solution is to figuratively interpret the anthropomorphic verses.

In sum, al‐Razı considers the Qurʾan a weak device for attaining certainty with regard to theological problems in general and on the issue of predestination in particu-lar. However, he disapproves of the claim that the Qurʾan is defamed because of contra-dictory verses regarding the issue of predestination (some of which defend man’s choice as opposed to others which defend God’s predetermination). The Qurʾan may contain plain meaning (haqıqa) as well as figurative speech (majaz), and the way to solve the problem of contradictory statements is to use majaz (al‐Razı 1987: IX, 113–33). Also he defends the division of the Qurʾan into self‐evident verses (muhkamat) and ambiguous verses (mutashabihat) as we are informed in Q 3:7, arguing that such a division moti-vates learning and the use of rational proofs and supplies all ideological systems in Islam with Qurʾanic support for their tenets (al‐Razı 1987: VII, 172).

Rationalist theology

It seems that like other later Ashʿarites, al‐Razı adopted the rationalist approach of the philosophers or of the Muʿtazila. The latter were the first adherents of rationalism in Islam. Their rationalism is expressed by the notion that God and the world can be examined through the intellect which God creates in human beings. One can know

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God’s existence, His unity and attributes, through reason. Likewise, one is capable of understanding the creation and structure of the world and man and his actions. Consequently, they hold that the world is directed according to rational rules and that even God is subject to these rules. Contrary to the traditionalists’ perception, the rationalist approach holds it quite possible to know God without the support of the Qurʾan (Abrahamov 1998: 32).

The Muʿtazilite ʿAbd al‐Jabbar (d. 414–16/1023–5) wrote a treatise entitled Fad l al‐iʿtizal wa‐tabaqat al‐muʿtazila (“The Superiority of the Muʿtazilites and their Biographies”) in which he expounds the rationalist approach. Surprisingly enough, but not uncom-mon, as we shall see, among the Muʿtazilites, he begins his discussion of man’s best way to knowledge by citing Q 6:153: “This is my straight path, so follow it and do not follow [other] paths lest they cause you to divert from His path.” Since, says ʿAbd al‐Jabbar, the straight path is not known through seeing, it is incumbent on man to follow proofs and to speculate on them in order to know. Following this verse, he states that there is only one way to true knowledge, while ignorance has infinite ways to express itself. Although our author is a master of rationalism, he bases his doctrine of one true path on the Qurʾan. However, the first proof in ʿAbd al‐Jabbar’s view is the rational proof, because through this form of reason one can distinguish between good and evil and know that the Qurʾan, the sunna, and the consensus are proofs. We know through reason, says ʿAbd al‐Jabbar, that God exists, that He is one, that He is wise, and that He sent messen-gers to mankind with miracles. Through this knowledge we know that the messenger’s statements are proofs, meaning that the sunna is right, and the sunna in turn legitimizes the consensus (ʿAbd al‐Jabbar 1986: 138–9).

Notwithstanding the placing of reason as the first proof, the Muʿtazilites did not neglect the Qurʾan as the base of their doctrines. Mankdım (d. 425/1034), a Zaydite14 commenta-tor of ʿAbd al‐Jabbar’s Kitab al‐usul al‐khamsa (“The Book of the Five Principles”), states in his Sharh al‐usul al‐khamsa15 (“The Interpretation of the Five Principles”) that, concerning the issue of seeing God, it is possible to draw conclusions from both reason and revelation (ʿaql and samʿ ), because the soundness of revelation does not depend on this issue. According to Mankdım’s rule, it is allowed to prove each theological issue through revela-tion provided that the soundness of revelation does not depend on this issue (ʿAbd al‐Jabbar 1965: 233). The soundness of prophecy (ʿAbd al‐Jabbar 1965: 563–6), for example, can-not be based on revelation, because this would entail a vicious circle.

The Muʿtazilites’ high estimation of the Qurʾan is further evidenced in their exhaus-tive treatments of the miracle of the Qurʾan (iʿjaz al‐Qurʾ an) and by their refuting of defamations of the Qurʾan (ʿAbd al‐Jabbar 1960). But it is worth noting that the Muʿtazilites were blamed at times for not referring to the Qurʾan in the formulation of their theological theses. Ibn al‐Rawandı (d. 245/860 or 298/912), who was first a Muʿtazilite but later became an adversary of the Muʿtazilites (Stroumsa 1999: 37–9), censured the Muʿtazilites for not basing their arguments for the knowledge of God’s exist-ence and His attributes on the Qurʾan and the sunna. In his rejoinder to Ibn al‐Rawandı’s accusation, the Baghdadian Muʿtazilite Abu ʾl‐Husayn al‐Khayyat (d. 300/913) plainly states that, according to the Muʿtazilites, one of God’s messages is the Qurʾan, and that “it is their argument against their adversaries in the subjects of God’s unity (tawhıd) and

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justice (ʿadl), the promise and the threat (al‐waʿd waʾ l‐waʿ ıd) and the order to do good and the prohibition to do evil.”16

Yet, despite the above, we find elsewhere an Ashʿarite reference to the Muʿtazilite use of Qurʾanic verses in their treatment of theological matters. Fakhr al‐Dın al‐Razı devotes some sections of his al‐Matalib al‐ʿaliya min al‐ʿilm al‐ilahı (“The High Issues of Metaphysics”) to a discussion on the use of the Qurʾan by the Muʿtazila in the question of free will and predestination, or more exactly, to the question of who creates man’s acts: Is it God or man? The first possibility implies predestination. According to al‐Razı, the Muʿtazilites draw the conclusion that the Qurʾan denies predestination not only from separate verses, which he cites and to which he responds, but also from the very structure of the Qurʾan. The Qurʾan deals with three main issues: (a) proofs for God’s unity, prophecy, and the hereafter; (b) commands and prohibitions, praising of the good‐doers and dispraising the evil‐doers; and (c) stories which urge man to obey God’s commands. The gist of the Muʿtazilite argumentation here is that if God created man’s acts, it would have been of no avail to bring forth the contents of the Qurʾan, for ought implies can; that is, if a man is prevented from creating his own acts, there is no benefit in teaching him obedience to God (al‐Razı 1987: 275–354). Thus the contents of the Qurʾan prove free choice.

Conclusion

Although we have not approached our subject along historical lines, we can safely state that, generally speaking and on most issues, the beginning of Islamic theology (the first–third/seventh–ninth centuries) is characterized by discussions of Qurʾanic verses among both traditionalists and rationalists (see, for example, the treatment in Schwarz 1972). Already in the third/ninth century we can discern an early tendency towards the use of traditions instead of Qurʾanic verses on the traditionalist side, and on the rationalist side reliance on speculative arguments in place of the Qurʾan. Thus the posi-tion of the Qurʾan in Islamic theology has been impaired, that is, diluted to some extent by both tradition and reason. However, as we have seen, there are other trends. Some traditionalist theologians regarded the Qurʾan as a source of rational arguments and terms and attempted to formulate theological ideas based on both reason and the Qurʾan. But whatever their approach, the mutakallimun, both rationalists and tradition-alists, have continued to consider the Qurʾan as the greatest miracle God did for Muhammad, and so defend it against all opponents’ contentions.

notes

1 The argument from design, which proves the existence of God through the wonderful design observed all over the world, is fully supported by the Qurʾan (Abrahamov 1990).

2 Naturally, other factors contributed to the development of Muslim theology, such as the influ-ence of Christian theology and internal political tensions, but these are beyond the scope of this chapter (cf. Cook 1980).

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3 They argue that God did not send Muhammad. 4 The Muʿtazilites are the first rationalists in Islam. They are so named because their alleged

founders, Wasil b. ʿAtaʾ (d. 131/748) and ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd (d. 144/761), adopted ascetic con-duct (iʿtizal) (Stroumsa 1990). The school of the Muʿtazila began its activity at the beginning of the second/eighth century or by the end of this century at the latest.

5 In Islam the speculative theology is named kalam (literally: speech or word), which means conversation, discussion, and controversy, and the practitioner of kalam is a mutakallim. The Muslim philosopher al‐Farabı (d. 339/950) considers the science of kalam “a science which enables a man to procure the victory of the dogmas and actions laid down by the Legislator of the religion, and to refute all opinions contradicting them.” This is done through using discursive arguments (EI2 2004: “kalam”). The kalam discussion is built by a mutakallim on a question–answer structure in which the questioner, that is, the theological opponent, is generally fictive (van Ess 1970).

6 These are the Murjiʾites. Their name derives from the verb arjʾa meaning to postpone or to repel. They held the view that judgment of the grave sinner must be postponed to the here-after. Alternatively, their name can be understood as those who refused to accept man’s acts as being part of the definition of belief. See on them EI2 (2004: “Murjiʾa”).

7 This school is named after Jahm b. Safwan (d. 129/746) and its members appear to be the forerunners of the Muʿtazilites on the issue of God’s attributes (Abrahamov 1996: 73–5, n. 42).

8 The Qurʾan is God’s speech, that is, one of His attributes. According to the Muʿtazilites, who deny the existence of God’s attributes as separate entities in God, because such existence would impair God’s unity and eternity, the Qurʾan was created by God (al‐Qurʾ an makhluq). The traditionalists who affirm God’s attributes as separate entities existing in God conse-quently claim that the Qurʾan was not created and it is eternal (al‐Ashʿarı 1963: 582–600; Bouman 1959).

9 Muslim theologians also disputed about the question of whether the utterance of the Qurʾan is created or uncreated.

10 Here Al‐Ashʿarı uses the term atom in a brief manner. Usually, the mutakallimun designate atom by al‐juzʾ alladhı la yatajazzaʾ u (indivisible part) or al‐jawhar al‐wahid (the single substance) (Pines [1936] 1997: 4). Al‐Ashʿarı’s statement that every body has an end is borrowed from Aristotle (Davidson 1987: 89, 409–11).

11 The Zahiriyya school of law and theology was so named because they relied exclusively on the literal meaning (zahir) of the Qurʾan and the sunna in their legal and theological discus-sions (EI2 2004: “Z ahiriyya”).

12 In the context of predestination, Muslim theologians have dealt mainly with the question of who creates man’s acts, God or man (Abrahamov 1990: 40).

13 If God had hands (Q 38:75) or organs such as eyes (Q 54:14), which means that He is composed of parts, He would be considered a created entity, because a composition of parts is characteristic of created things. Since God is the eternal Creator, it is inconceivable for Him to be created and produced in time. Thus, rational argument contradicts anthropomorphism.

14 The Zaydites accepted the Muʿtazilite doctrines beginning in the middle of the third/ninth century (Abrahamov 1990). Also the Imamiyya, the Shı ʿ ites who believe in the existence of twelve imams, accepted the Muʿtazilite theology in the fourth/tenth century (Madelung 1979). For an Imamı text influenced by the Muʿtazila see al‐Tusı (1986).

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15 This treatise was published by ʿAbd al‐Karım ʿUthman as a work of ʿAbd al‐Jabbar (1965) (Gimaret 1979; Abrahamov 1993b: 44).

16 These are four out of the five principles of the Muʿtazila. The fifth principle is the intermedi-ate position (manzila bayna ʾl‐manzilatayn) of the grave sinner between belief and unbelief. See al‐Khayyat (1957: 93 of the Arabic text).

Further reading

Abrahamov, Binyamin (1992) Ibn Taymiyya on the agreement of reason with tradition. The Muslim World 82, 256–72.

Abrahamov, Binyamin (1993a) Al‐Ghazalı’s supreme way to know God. Studia Islamica 77, 141–68.

Abrahamov, Binyamin (1993b) ʿAbd al‐Jabbar’s theory of divine assistance (lutf). Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 16, 41–58.

Abrahamov, Binyamin (1996) Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qurʾ an in the Theology of al‐Qasim ibn Ibrahım, Kitab al‐Mustarshid. Brill, Leiden.

Abrahamov, Binyamin (1998) Islamic Theology, Traditionalism and Rationalism. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

van Ess, J. (1970) The logical structure of Islamic theology. In: von Grunebaum, G. E. (ed.) Logic in Classical Islamic Culture. O. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, pp. 22–50.

Goldziher, I. (1981) Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law. Princeton University Press, Princeton (translation of Vorlesungen über den Islam, 1910).

Peters, J. R. T. M. (1976) God’s Created Speech: A Study in the Speculative Theology of the Muʿtazilı Qadı l‐Qudat Abu l‐Hasan ʿAbd al‐Jabbar ibn Ahmad al‐Hamadhanı. Brill, Leiden.

Stroumsa, S. (1990) The beginnings of the Muʿtazila reconsidered. Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 13, 265–93.

Stroumsa, S. (1999) Freethinkers of Medieval Islam, Ibn al‐Rawandı, Abu Bakr al‐Razı, and their Impact on Islamic Thought. Brill, Leiden.