WW II Myth - The British 6-pounder Was More Powerful than the US 57-mmBy Copyright 2015, J.D. Neal, All Rights Reserved

The worst thing about this sort of myth is that it continues to be continues to crawl around on the readily accessed internet.This is one of those bizarre, convoluted myths that seem to circulate due to such sources as a GI (in some interview or such) saying his men had the British 6-pounder and "the muzzle velocity was about 6000, giving us a greater advantage over the 57-mm guns the Americans usually used." (HINT: NO cannon used at the time had a velocity of 6000). Yet another GI toned this down to 3000 that is 3000 rpm. Given that rpm usually stands for revolutions per minute one wonders what they meant.Being a GI using the equipment does not make one learned. The USA paratroopers had the air-mobile version of the 6-pounder that the British developed for that use - lighter and easier to use than the standard 57-mm/6-pounder. Otherwise there was no difference in their gun and US guns.The USA adopted the 57-mm gun as their main towed anti-tank gun for infantry units to replace the feeble 37-mm. It was nothing but the British 6-pounder converted to USA manufacturing techniques and a few other changes. The British had contracted the USA to supply them with 6-pdrs and that is the gun the British received in return.When British started buying 6-pounders from the USA, the British factories lacked proper lathes to make long barrels with. As such, the British factories made cannon with shorter barrels (43 calibers long; 96). The USA never had a shortage of lathes and the weapons they manufactured always had long barrels (50 calibers long; 112). Thus, for a period of time, US guns were MORE POWERFUL than British 6-pounders. The difference, though, was very slight about 150 feet per second less, and given velocities of 2,650 to 2,950 f/s that was trivial.Eventually British industry caught up and began making the cannon with the same barrel length as the USA guns. At that point their ballistics were the same.Except for two points: (1) The British developed a high velocity APDS sabot round that could penetrate armor better than a standard AP round. You will find varying quotes but the standard is around 4.5-inches (115-mm), which gave it the ability to penetrate the frontal armor of a Panther tank with a good hit.According to the web page at http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74:6-pounder-anti-tank-gun&catid=40:anti-tank&Itemid=58the British produced 217,000 rounds of APDS ammunition in 1944. In 1945 they produced another 158,000 rounds. The USA helped out in this endeavor by producing 0 (zero; none) rounds in 1944; and increased their contribution 1,000 fold by producing 0 (zero; none) rounds in 1945.USA units who wanted said shot had to acquire it some way. The British seemed to be generous and some US gun units might have had as much as 8 or so APDS shot.(2) And the British issued a high explosive shell for the 6-pounder earlier than the USA did. The USA issued HE rounds later in the war. Again, US units who wanted an HE shell had to acquire one from the British.Some of the British ammunition was better than US ammunition, but the guns were otherwise ballistically the same.GIs are particularly unreliable concerning technology. They were there and knew what happened, but often hadn't a clue about why. GIs are often wrong when it comes to technical details and people who quote them for technical "facts" are often wrong.

The USA adopted the 57-mm gun M1 as their main towed anti-tank gun for infantry units to replace the feeble 37-mm. It was nothing but the British 6-pounder converted to USA manufacturing techniques and a few other changes. The British had contracted the USA to supply them with 6-pdrs and that is the gun the British received in return. So, the US began using it too lacking as they did a ready-made design of their own. They did have a 57-mm designed and prototyped; but it was not better at penetrating armor than the 6-pounder nor was it in the production loop. Setting up any weapon for production can take months or a year; the manufacturers have to make the tools needed and set up an assembly area, etc.Looking at the basic facts, British ground forces had a good deal of success with the 6-pounder. They often had fewer complaints than US forces. Or if they had them, they werent as publicized as much.There are two main factors here: (1) US Ground forces disliked towed anti-tank guns of any type. The little 37-mm was acquired and issued far less as an anti-tank gun than as an infantry gun, something easily pushed around by a squad of GIs for their use in immediate fire against a target.More effective guns were far more heavy. Thus, infantry commanders were want to prefer the job of anti-tank gun to be filled by mobile weapons. In US Anti-Tank Artillery 1941-45 (Zaloga; Osprey; 2005) the author points out a report that was tendered by VII Corps commander MajGen Manton Eddy to Washington on July 3, 1944 concerning conditions of the Normandy hedgerow fighting:

towed 57mm guns were virtually useless in the close country encountered. Such weapons assigned to the (regimental) anti-tank companies certainly should be some type of self-propelled mount and probably those assigned to battalions. The present gun cannot be placed in position sufficiently promptly, except along roads.

The Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes Offensive of 1944) highlit the failings of towed guns in stark detail. Zaloga points out that:

LtCol McKinley, commander of the 1/9th Infantry, lost more than half his troops defending the Lausdell crossroads on the approaches into Krinkelt-Rocherath, many when their trenches were overrun by German tanks. He noted quite bluntly: The 57mm guns have no place in the infantry battalion. You can't put them where you need them. In the last operation, the 57mm guns could not be moved on the roads available to me due to deep mud and direct observation by the enemy. A regimental officer noted, "Our anti-tank company and our regiment have lost confidence in the 57mm gun as an anti-tank weapon, but our people strongly favor the bazooka for anti-tank work."

A regimental anti-tank company commander noted, I believe that the regimental anti-tank company should have 90mm M36 SPMs {self-propelled mounts}. I want the self-propelled guns rather than the towed 3in guns because the towed guns are too heavy and sluggish. You can't get them up to the front. My orders have been in almost every case to get the guns up to the front-line troops. I just couldn't do it in the daytime with the 3in towed gun. I can get the 57s up pretty well, but you can always get self-propelled guns up better than towed ones. I have to take an open truck up under small arms and artillery fire, which is very rough.

Somehow these men expected the Army, backed up by the vaunted US military industrial complex, to do better for them. GIs were there to fight, not shove over-weight anti-tank guns around. There were self-propelled guns the M10, M18, and M36 gun motor carriages of the tank destroyer units and tanks were often assigned to support infantry units. What they wanted, then, was to replace the towed guns with motorized weapons.Someone might chime in with the idea that self-propelled weapons are far too expensive. The opposite is true: a single towed gun is cheaper than a tracked mount, but the towed gun requires more crew; prime movers and ammunition carriers; and more shipping space. The ground forces had learned this early on and had pressed for towed AT guns (or simply more tanks) but the only such weapons were tank destroyer units.And the Army Chief of Staff General Lesley McNair an artilleryman had ordered motorized 3-inch M10 units disbanded and replaced by towed 3-inch guns because for some out of touch with reality reason he thought a 2 ton gun was much better than a motorized gun. While some of the men handling the towed 3-inch guns fought heroically in the Battle of The Bulge, many were slaughtered due to the lack of mobility of the gun.

(2) A second issue was ammunition supply. US troops were not very happy with the 57-mm because the US Army neutered it. It was a fine weapon for close range shots against even some of the heavily armored German vehicles in the side or rear. But when the Germans were attacking, shots were often against the front faces. The standard armor piercing shot was hard pressed to cope with tanks such as the Tiger or Panther from the front US crews simply watched the rounds bounce off. They could break a track on the vehicle, which did not stop the crew from shooting them up.Picking a good defensive position could help some weapons get in aide shots, but then again the Germans were not stupid and scattering weapons out led to them being gobbled up piece meal.Range was another bugaboo. It helped little to know that a 57-mm could pierce a Tiger or Panthers armor from the side or rear at 500 yards or less if the Germans stood out at 1,000 to 3,000 yards and called in artillery and pelted them with HE rounds. The Germans werent stupid and they did that when they could. As did US ground forces faced by German anti-tank guns.It wasnt that a better round was not available. The British had it an Armor Piercing Discarding Shot (APDS) which could handle a Panther or Tigers frontal armor at close range. It was adept at defeating Tigers at longer range. The US Army did not develop nor field such ammunition. US ground forces had to acquire this ammo from the British.Nor did the US Army issue high explosive ammunition in a timely fashion. Although referred to as an anti-tank gun, any anti-tank gun was also a field gun. It was expected and used to support the infantry forces by firing at bunkers, houses, enemy soldiers whatever target was found. High explosive rounds were very useful for this. The Germans typically did not have enough tanks to swarm the US lines; they often scattered them out and used them judiciously. Thus anti-tank forces often had nothing to do but fire in support. A lack of an HE shell hindered this. An AP round worked to some degree, but was decidedly inferior for the job.During the Normandy campaign, US forces had to acquire this ammo from the British. Later the US Army began manufacturing it and supplying it.

Thus: some of the US ground units dissatisfaction with the 57-mm originated from a mishandling of the ground forces by the upper level USA commanders, who neither issued proper weapons in a timely fashion nor supplied them with proper ammunition. Which was a slap in the face for men fighting and dieing on the front lines.