ws handbook

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War Studies Commissioning Course Handbook

Written by members of the

Department of War Studies

The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

Edited by Dr Gregory Fremont-Barnes

Copyright 2013

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Contents

Why Study Military History? 5

Theories and Concepts of War 7

Introduction to Clausewitzian Thought 8

On War 9

Reception and criticism of Clausewitz: Is Clausewitz still relevant? 17

Questions to provoke your thinking 19

Annex 19

Suggested Reading 23

Total War 24

War Aims 28

Methods of Warfare 28

Mobilisation of society 29



Limited War and Escalation: The Cold War and Beyond 31



The Problem of Hybridity in War 37



The Manoeuvrist Approach 42

The Evolution of Manoeuvre Warfare Theories 43

Manoeuvre Warfare Concepts 50


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Annexes 56

Glossary of Manoeuvre Warfare terms 71

Coalition and Expeditionary Operations 76

Why embark on a coalition operation? 77

Coalition Operations: Doctrine and Problems of Cohesion and Command 80

Expeditionary Operations 88

Maritime Power Projection 89

Sea Power and Sea Control 90 Amphibious Operations 92

Air Power 93

A British Tradition of Expeditionary Operations? 94

The British Revival of Expeditionary Operations 97

British Coalition and Expeditionary Operations in the 21st Century 99


Expeditionary Operations Case Studies 101

• Operation Detachment: The Invasion of Iwo Jima, 19 February-19 March 1945 101

• Operation Musketeer: The Anglo-French Expedition to Egypt, 1956 105

• Operation Corporate Repossession of the Falklands, April-June 1982 111

• Operation Palliser: British intervention in Sierra Leone, 2000 123

• Operation TELIC I: The British invasion of Iraq, March-May 2003 127

Insurgency 131 Introduction 131

Theories 132

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Limitations 136 The Urban Option 139 Conclusion 141 Early 20th century insurgencies 141 The Anglo-Irish War, 1919-21 150 Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Experience 154 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency to 1945-75 162 Introduction 162 French Counterinsurgency 165 Indochina, 1946-54 165 Algeria, 1954-62 167 The United States and the Vietnam War 174 The Cuban Revolution and the Emergence of Urban Terrorism 178 British Counterinsurgency 185 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency since Vietnam 194 Central America 194 The Soviets in Afghanistan, 1979-89 196 Suggested Reading on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 205

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Why Study Military History?

The study of history cannot provide answers to all the questions that a military

commander has to ask. Particularly in the sphere of low-level tactics, new technologies and

weapon systems constantly change and thus impact on the conduct of war. However,

historical examples do provide a framework for these ever-changing realities. For instance,

the impact of battle on the human psyche can be studied as well as its effect on the soldier,

while his combat readiness and general well-being can be explored. Battle-shock occurred in

all wars – even though the effects that caused them have altered over time. How did soldiers

and societies deal with these realities? Deeper questions can also be asked: Why has the

proportion of soldiers suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder increased massively over

time? Were societies just ignorant in earlier times or has, for instance, the fact that in western

societies a general perception of threat and an awareness of danger diminished, resulting in

the weakening of the soldiers’ psyche?

History also shows us that, in order to be successful in war, an army and, in essence, a

state must be victorious within the entire spectrum of war. Being the master of the battlefield

does not necessarily result in overall victory. In the third century B.C. the Carthaginian

general Hannibal was able to win numerous battles against the Romans, but he was not able

to turn these successes into strategic victory. In the end, he was overcome by superior Roman

strategic thought. The same applies to the German army in both world wars. Arguably, the

Germans had the best-trained and most successful fighting organisations in both conflicts.

However, they were not able to turn their superiority on the battlefield and their tactical and

operational abilities into tangible strategic victories. As a consequence, they eventually lost

both world wars.

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Michael Howard, former Professor of the History of War at Oxford University, said

that if a commander studied military history in width, depth and in context it could provide

him with important and valuable insights into war and its conduct. Even more important,

Howard contended that the study of history does not prepare an officer to conduct the next

battle better, but to make him wise forever.1

Accordingly, the value of the study of history can be great, but only if this task is

carried out studiously. Otherwise, history loses all its impact, simply providing us with

enough battles, engagements and wars that can basically produce any answer we want them

to provide. The view was supported by the German philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz,

who stated that history teaches us powerful lessons for the conduct of war. However, he

argued that if the analysis remains shallow the danger is that ‘the writer pretends he is trying

to prove something, but that he himself has never mastered the events he cites, and that such

superficial, irresponsible handling of history leads to hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus

theorizing’.2

If the pitfalls alluded to above are avoided and the principles of the study of history

applied, this study does not only make us wiser, as Michael Howard has claimed, but it offers

the military leader tangible and valuable hand-rails on which to hold on to as he marches

down the corridors of his own (military) history.

1Michael Howard, ‘The Use and Abuse of Military History,’ in, The Causes of Wars and

other essays, London: Temple Smith, 1983, pp. 183-97. 2Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976, p. 173.

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Suggested Reading

Howard, Michael. ‘The Use and Abuse of Military History,’ in The Causes of War

and other essays. London: Temple Smith, 1983.

Murray, Williamson and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. The Past as Prologue: The

Importance of History to the Military Profession. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2006.

Theories and Concepts of War

This chapter provides an overview of fundamental thinking about the nature and

conduct of war. Any officer, by dint of being a significant part of the military instrument of

the state, needs to understand the link between national policy and military strategy, the very

nature of war, and, in broad outline, how war is waged. The concepts presented in this

chapter deal with conventional, interstate war rather than internal conflicts such as

insurgencies, but they are applicable beyond the realm of interstate war.

Of the many books written about war and the art of war, most have dealt with very

restricted aspects such as tactics and technology, or, alternatively, general observations

which, however, only had relevance for their time and age. Among those books that still

provide a fundamental understanding of war and the art of war must rank the works of Sun

Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Antoine-Henri de Jomini. Sun Tzu, a famous Chinese general

who lived around 500 BC, offered some general advice about the use of the military

instrument in pursuit of political objectives, but the main contribution of his Art of War

consists of intriguing ideas on the conduct of war, particularly on how numerically inferior

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forces can defeat larger forces without incurring heavy casualties. Significant traces of his

school of thought can still be found in current British and US doctrine. Jomini (1779-1869), a

staff officer and general under Napoleon, wrote an analysis of Napoleon’s operational art and

principles of war which is still of interest to the modern military professional.

The bulk of the chapter, however, is devoted to Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), a

Prussian general, and his unfinished work, On War. Clausewitz’s central position in military

thought is based on his timeless observations on the nature of war, the nexus between war

and politics, and operational concepts such as the ‘centre of gravity’ and the ‘culminating

point’. Clausewitz is widely quoted all over the Western world, and British military doctrine

explicitly draws on his ideas.3 The strategist Bernard Brodie went so far as to call it “…not

simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war.”4 The chapter then turns to two

fundamentally different forms of interstate war, namely limited and total war, and, associated

with these phenomena, the concepts of escalation and limitation.

Introduction to Clausewitzian Thought

Clausewitz was born at a time of fundamental historical change. When he was nine

years old, the French Revolution took its course; and when he was 12 years old, he joined a

Prussian infantry regiment as a Junker5 soon to see action in the war against revolutionary

France. Clausewitz continued to serve for the rest of his life, mostly in staff positions and

senior instructor appointments in the Prussian Army and, for a spell, in the Russian Army.

3See Annex 3. 4Bernard Brodie, “The Continuing Relevance of On War”, in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 53. 5Comparable to ‘ensign’.

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During this time, he directly witnessed or took part in five campaigns and major battles as

well as numerous minor engagements.

His major work, On War reflects his experience of the French Revolutionary and

Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) but was also based on a much broader historical analysis. On

War presented a theory of war that was sufficiently general to encompass both the limited

‘cabinet wars’6 of the 18th century and the more total wars of the ‘nation in arms’ of 1792-

1815.7 Though some chapters of On War have lost relevance due to technological and social

change, the continued value of the book rests in its fundamental observations on the nature of

war, in particular the link between war and politics.

On War

On War starts with a fundamental question: what is war? Clausewitz understands war

as an extended duel, a clash of opposing wills. Because our will and that of our enemy

clashes – our interests are diametrically opposed – it is necessary to use force to compel the

enemy to yield to our will. Clausewitz articulates the idea of ‘Absolute War’ in the earliest

section of his book, arguing that at least in theory (if not in reality) all wars – regardless of

the issue(s) for which they are fought – should be taken to extremes, and involve the

annihilation of one side by the other. In this sense, war was an apolitical activity, abstracted

from the real world and motivated by the mere existence of a potential opponent, whose

intentions could not be known, but who had to be assumed to be hostile. Only by the total

removal of this threat could one’s own security be guaranteed.

6 Cabinet wars: wars waged between princes and kings, by royal armies, usually in pursuit of dynastic interests.

7See sections on Limited War and Total War.

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In the real rather than the abstract world, however, Clausewitz stresses that war

cannot be separated from politics. He emphasises that in reality, the government’s will is

expressed in the form of a war aim, a political objective.8 Put another way, war is part of

political intercourse and therefore has to be understood in its political context. Not only does

war serve a political purpose, continuous political control has to ensure that the war is waged

in a manner that is in keeping with the attainment of its political objective. Further political

considerations, such as the cost of the war in terms of lives and treasure, also influence the

conduct of war. Thus, political considerations permeate the whole planning and conduct of

war.9 A general may, for instance, be asked to achieve a military victory at a given date, not

because this makes sense militarily, but because this military success can be exploited

politically. Clausewitz summarises the relationship between war and politics in his famous

phrase, “War is the continuation of politics with the addition of other means.”10

Clausewitz distinguishes between the political aim in war and the subordinated

military aim in war. If the political aim is to wipe the enemy country off the map, then the

military aim is to render the enemy defenceless. If the political aim is to seize some territory

from the enemy, then the military aim is to exert sufficient military pressure on the enemy to

make him yield.11

Because political aims can differ considerably in their scope and scale, Clausewitz

distinguishes between two kinds of war. On the one hand, there is war for extreme aims,

which seeks to destroy the enemy as a political entity. Because the war aim is extreme, there

is no scope for negotiations or compromise. Hence, the enemy will have to suffer total defeat, 8Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter I, pp. 75-89.

9Ibid., Book VIII, Chapter 6B, p. 605.

10Ibid., Book VIII, Chapter 6B, p. 605.

11Ibid., Book I, Chapter 1, pp. 75-89.

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rendering him utterly defenceless. Total victory requires that the enemy’s army is incapable

of continuing the war, that the enemy’s territory is occupied, and that the will of the enemy’s

government and population is broken. Only if his will has been broken can victory be

considered total, because even a country that is occupied and whose army is destroyed can

still resist by way of popular resistance and guerrilla warfare.12

On the other hand, there is war for moderate aims such as limited territorial

expansion. Because this war does not threaten the vital interests of the enemy, his willingness

to expend lives and treasure in order to resist us will be limited. We therefore do not need to

achieve total victory. It will be sufficient to get the enemy into such an inferior military

position that giving in to our demands would seem a lesser evil than the continuation of the

war. In other words, we need to exert sufficient pressure on the enemy to bring him to the

negotiating table, where our superior bargaining position will then permit us to achieve our

war aim. This type of war is likely to be characterised by a parallel strategy of fighting and

negotiating.13

Clausewitz stresses that these two kinds of war are not pure, but part of a continuum.

Thus, war can range in intensity from mere armed observations at the lower end of the

spectrum to wars of annihilation at the higher end of the spectrum. Furthermore, a war may

move within the spectrum during its duration due to escalation and limitation.14

Because war is a clash of wills and the enemy will resist us, we may need to escalate

our efforts in order to overcome this resistance. Since the enemy is likely to respond in kind,

a process of escalation can take place, which sees the war being waged with increasing effort, 12Ibid., Book I, Chapter 2, pp. 90-99.

13Ibid., Note of 10 July 1827, p. 69 and Book I, Chapter 1, pp. 87-88; also Book VIII, Chapter 2, pp. 579-581.

14Ibid., Book I, Chapter 1, p. 81.

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thus raising costs and risks on both sides. It is also possible that emotions such as hatred and

revenge are aroused during the war – emotions which are likely to add to escalation. At the

same time, however, the belligerents may not wish to escalate beyond a point where the costs

of the war would outweigh the expected benefits. Depending on the relative strength of the

escalating and limiting factors in a given war, therefore, some wars will see extreme

escalation, whilst others will be dominated by the desire to limit cost, risk, and effort.15

Clausewitz cautions that the decision to use war as an instrument of politics in pursuit

of political objectives must not be taken lightly. The national leaders must be clear what the

intended purpose of the war is, and what they need to achieve in military terms in order to

make the attainment of this purpose possible. Planning a war is greatly complicated by the

fact that interaction, chance, and friction make war inherently unpredictable. That is, enemy

actions and intentions are designed to counter our own efforts; the fog of war does not permit

us to see clearly what is on ‘the other side of the hill’; chance events such as inclement

weather can frustrate our intentions; and human weakness and fallibility, exacerbated by

danger and hardship, can contribute to military failure. Indeed, there are so many things that

can go wrong in military operations that Clausewitz speaks of war as the ‘realm of chance’.16

Clausewitz summarises his understanding of the fundamental nature of war in his

Remarkable Trinity. He observes that three aspects are always present in war: first, violence,

hatred and enmity, which he compares to blind natural forces; second, probabilities,

uncertainty, and chance, reflecting his dictum that war is the realm of chance; third, the

instrumental nature of war, which is to say its use as an instrument of politics. The three

aspects could be summarised as the rational, the irrational, and the unpredictable tendencies

15Ibid., Book I, Chapter 1, pp. 75-89.


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of war. The character of each individual war is determined by the relative strength of these

three aspects. If, for instance, the peoples or nations in a given war are very passionate, easily

aroused, and full of hatred for the enemy, governments risk being swept along with this

passion and hence the character of the war will be dominated by irrational forces. If, in

contrast, the people are not very interested in the war, the government can do what it

considers sensible, and hence the character of the war will be dominated by rational

considerations and probably a limited war effort. Clausewitz is careful, though, not directly to

link the people to irrationality, the army to chance, and the government to rationality, though

he says that these links exist as a tendency.17

T

he

Rem

arka

ble

Trini

ty is

usef

ul

beca

use

it

dem


TheRemarkableTrinity

“Warismorethanatruechameleonthatslightlyadaptsitscharacteristicstothegiven

case.Asatotalphenomenonitsdominanttendenciesalwaysmakewararemarkabletrinity–

composedofprimordialviolence,hatred,andenmity,whicharetoberegardedasablindnatural

force;oftheplayofchanceandprobabilitywithinwhichthecreativespiritisfreetoroam;andof

itselementsofsubordination,asininstrumentofpolicy,whichmakesitsubjecttoreasonalone.

Thefirstofthesethreeaspectsmainlyconcernsthepeople;thesecondthecommander

andhisarmy;thethirdthegovernment.Thepassionsthataretobekindledinwarmustalready

beinherentinthepeople;thescopewhichtheplayofcourageandtalentwillenjoyintherealm

ofprobabilityandchancedependsontheparticularcharacterofthecommanderandthearmy;

butthepoliticalaimsarethebusinessofgovernmentalone.

Thesethreetendenciesarelikethreedifferentcodesoflaw,deep‐rootedintheirsubject

andyetvariableintheirrelationshiptooneanother.Atheorythatignoresanyoneofthemor

seekstofixanarbitraryrelationshipbetweenthemwouldconflictwithrealitytosuchanextent

thatforthisreasonaloneitwouldbetotallyuseless.

Ourtaskthereforeistodevelopatheorythatmaintainsabalancebetweenthesethree

tendencies,likeanobjectsuspendedbetweenthreemagnets.”

CarlvonClausewitz,OnWar,BookI,Chapter1,p.89,editedandtranslatedby

MichaelHowardandPeterParet,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976.

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onstrates that war is not a purely rational, cerebral, and predictable activity such as chess, nor

does it consist of random slashing and killing, but that elements of all three aspects are

present in every war, though in different mixes. Thus, a careful Trinitarian analysis helps a

belligerent to understand what the character of the forthcoming war will be like.

The fact that uncontrollable and unpredictable factors can have a decisive impact on

the course of the war suggests that war is a far from flawless instrument. The war aim, the

reason why we have entered the war, is likely to change in the course of the war as the aim

may become more ambitious when the war is going well for us, or conversely may become

more modest when the war is going badly. Even if we win, we may well be achieving a war

aim that is different from the one that brought us into the war in the first place.18

Clausewitz also offers sage advice about the conduct of war. Two concepts are of

particular value here: the ‘centre of gravity’, and the ‘culminating point’. If our war aim

requires us to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy, we should try to strike with concentrated

force at an enemy ‘centre of gravity’ (Schwerpunkt) which, in military terms, Clausewitz

describes as the “hub of all power and movement”.19

What constitutes a centre of gravity depends on the nature of the enemy. If the enemy

has inexhaustible manpower reserves and resources, then the enemy territory and the

population and resources therein constitute a centre of gravity. If the enemy’s state is a

heterogeneous entity held together by force, then the enemy’s capital is a centre of gravity,

because its capture could lead to the disintegration of the whole country. If the enemy is

dependent on the support of another power, then this key ally becomes a centre of gravity. If

the nature of the state is such that the enemy will continue fighting as long as an army


19Ibid., Book VIII, Chapter 4, p. 595.

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remains in the field, then the enemy’s field army is the centre of gravity. If we want to strike

at a centre of gravity, we will be forced to defeat the enemy’s army which is protecting it.

Thus, battle plays a central role in warfare.

Clausewitz also thought about centres of gravity in terms of intangibles: in a coalition, unity

is the centre of gravity; in an insurgency, the charismatic leader and public opinion are

centres of gravity.

The ‘culminating point’ refers to situations in which a commander has to decide

whether he should shift from the defence to the attack or vice versa. As the attacker’s army

advances into the depth of enemy territory, it is likely to get weaker in physical and moral

forces as troops become exhausted, the supply lines become overstretched, garrisons have to

be left behind to guard the lines of communication, and combat and disease take their toll.

The attacking army reaches its culminating point when it has become so weak that it can still

hold on to its gains, but can no longer advance with any hope of achieving the campaign

objective. If the commander pushes his army beyond the culminating point, he will not only

fall short of the campaign objective, but also risks that his exhausted troops are struck in their

vulnerable and overextended positions by a powerful strategic counterattack. If a cautious

commander stops the advance too early, however, he may forsake victory. A wise attacker

will therefore stop and consolidate when he is no longer strong enough to achieve the

campaign objective, but still strong enough to hold onto his gains. The fog of war makes it

very difficult precisely to identify the culminating point.20

The next section will deal with the reception of ‘On War’.

20Ibid., Book VII, Chapter 5, p. 528.

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Reception and criticism of Clausewitz: Is Clausewitz still relevant?

When Clausewitz’s On War was published after his death in 1832, it did not

immediately have a major impact. In fact, it was only after the Prussian victories in the

Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) that interest in Clausewitz, both

in Germany and outside, began to increase significantly. The British studied Clausewitz

between the end of the Boer War and the Great War (1902-14), the Communists, Lenin and

Mao Tse-Tung in particular, greatly admired his theory, and US military thinkers turned to

Clausewitz for analysing strategy from the 1950s onwards. Since the late 19th century, then,

Clausewitz has increasingly established himself as the leading authority on the theory of war

and strategy.21

His position as the central authority of military thought has never been universally

accepted, though. With the end of the Cold War and the confusing internal conflicts of the

1990s, On War has come under renewed attack.

Single prong of attacks have been directed against Clausewitz’s premise that modern

wars are waged by states and between states, rather than by non-state actors. According to

this view, Clausewitz’s theory can be discarded, because he describes wars which have

become almost extinct.22

21Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, London: Pimlico, 2002, pp. 12-23.

22Mary Kaldor, ‘Elaborating the ‘New Wars’ Thesis”, in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., Rethinking the Nature of War, London: Frank Cass, 2005; Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, London: Free Press, 1991.

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Whilst it is true that internal armed conflicts such as insurgencies, civil war, and

ethnic strife are nowadays more prevalent than conventional wars between states, and whilst

it is also true that Clausewitz primarily writes about states, governments, and conventional

armies – though he also mentions insurgency and irregular forces – key concepts can still be

applied. Even in a civil war or insurgency, the three aspects of the Trinity are still present:

“Whether state, warlord, Communist revolutionary, or international terrorist organization, all

entities are subject to the interplay of the forces of violence, chance, and rational purpose.”23

Instead of government, people, and army, internal wars may substitute in their stead political

leadership, ethnically or tribally defined population base, and irregular forces. In fact, in such

conflicts, it is often the aim of the successful belligerent to acquire the trappings and authority

of a properly constituted and internationally recognised government.

Another prong of attacks has been directed against Clausewitz’s premise that war is

the continuation of politics, rather than war being motivated by individual gain or by

irrational urges. According to this view, individuals and collectives do not go to war in

pursuit of rational political objectives, but are driven by religious fanaticism, ethnic hatred,

the dark side of human nature, or the individual combatant’s desire for loot and gain.24

Clausewitz does not deny the presence of irrational influences in war. On the

contrary, he explicitly makes them the first element of the Trinity. Yet, every belligerent is

bound to have a leadership which pursues a concrete political aim, be this aim religious or

23Bart Schuurman, “Clausewitz and the ‘New Wars’ Scholars, Parameters, XL, No. 1, Spring 2010, p. 95.

24Herfried Muenkler, Die Neuen Kriege, Rowohlt, 2002; also, John Keegan, A History of Warfare, London: Vintage Books, 1993.

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secular, materialist or idealist, reasonable or unreasonable in its nature; this makes war an

instrument of politics.25

Irrespective of the criticism of the Trinity and the instrumental nature of war, On War

is full of enlightening concepts, such as ‘friction’, the ‘culminating point’, and the ‘centre of

gravity’, which, arguably, have lost nothing of their relevance or utility. Beatrice Heuser

concludes: “War as an instrument of politics, war as a contest of wills, limited war and

unlimited war, friction, the danger of escalation, all these are Clausewitzian concepts which

today are virtually taken for granted in the military manuals and the key literature of the

world’s leading military powers.”26

Questions to provoke your thinking:

• Which of Clausewitz’s ideas are most relevant for the platoon/troop or company/squadron commander on operations?

• Why is it justified that the government will often try to influence even seemingly minor tactical decisions?

• Why does a platoon/troop commander need to understand both the political context and aim of the war?

• Which political considerations might induce you, as a subaltern, to forego an opportunity to inflict heavy losses on enemy forces?

• Why is it important for a platoon/troop commander to understand the process of escalation, as well as the attendant risks and challenges?

Annex: Clausewitz and current British doctrine

25For a detailed criticism of On War and rebuttals, see Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, pp. 179-194.

26Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, p. 179. See also Annex 3.

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Clausewitzian concepts are still prominently reflected in British and US military

doctrine publications. For instance, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 defines ‘total

war’ and ‘escalation’ in broadly Clausewitzian terms:

“total war: General war waged towards unlimited objectives.”27

“escalation/de-escalation: A qualitative transformation in the character of a conflict

where the scope and intensity increases or decreases, transcending limits implicitly accepted

by both sides.”28

British Defence Doctrine views military force as an instrument of the state in pursuit

of political objectives:

“War is an instrument of policy, normally stimulated by fear, self-interest or ideology,

and is characterised by organised violence, used as a means to assert the will of a state,

individual or group.”29

“National strategy directs the coordinated application of the instruments of national

power […] in the pursuit of national policy aspirations.”30

“Military power is the ultimate instrument and expression of national power, in

circumstances ranging from deterrence and coercion through to the deliberate application of

force to neutralize a specific threat, including pre-emptive intervention.”31

27 JDP 0-01.1. United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions, 7th Edition, p. T-9. ‘General War’ is defined as: “A conflict between major powers in which their large and vital national interests, perhaps even survival, are at stake.” JDP 0-01.1, United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions, 7th Edition, p. G-1.

28Ibid., p. E-6.

29JDP 0-01, British Defence Doctrine, 3rd Edition, August 2008, p. 2-1, paragraph 201.

30Ibid., p. 1-3, paragraph 111.

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“However, the military instrument is most effective when employed in conjunction

with the other instruments to achieve national objectives […].”32

British Counterinsurgency doctrine reaffirms the primacy of politics across the

spectrum of operations:

“What is important is the principle that in counterinsurgency, political purpose has

primacy. As Clausewitz noted, even in ‘less intense’ conflicts, the political aim is more

complex and more prominent. This makes counterinsurgency no different from any other

type of military operation because for the UK and its allies, the military operates in support of

legitimate political objectives. This is the case whether the task at hand is general war or

counterinsurgency.”33

ADP Operations quotes Clausewitz on the importance of correctly identifying the

character of the forthcoming war.34

ADP Operations and the US Field Manual 3-0 confirm Clausewitz’s view of the

nature of war, including ‘friction’, ‘uncertainty’, and ‘fog of war’:

“a. Friction. Friction is the force that frustrates action, makes the

simple difficult, and the difficult seemingly impossible. Friction may be

mental, perhaps caused by indecision, or physical, for example caused

by the effects of violence. It may be externally imposed, by an

31Ibid., pp. 1-5, paragraph 122.

32Ibid., pp. 1-5, paragraph 123.

33Army Field Manual (AFM) 1/10, Countering Insurgency, January 2010, p. 3.3.

34 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Operations, November 2010, pp. 3-6.

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adversary or the environment, or be self-induced, for example by a poor

plan.

b. Uncertainty and Chaos. No matter how much information there

is in conflict, a ‘fog of war’ will descend that can lead to uncertainty and

chaos. Chaos amounts to disorder and confusion that is so

unpredictable as to appear random. It is inherent in conflict. Conflict is

a human activity – an ‘option of difficulties’ – that is uncertain and

subject to inaccurate or contradictory information. Chaos might be

deliberately exacerbated by adversaries, and presents opportunities for

the bold to seize. It is something to be exploited rather than endured.”35

“Chaos, chance, and friction dominate land operations as much today as when Clausewitz

wrote about them after the Napoleonic wars.”36

British Counterinsurgency doctrine, British Defence Doctrine, and Army Doctrine

Publication (ADP) Operations use Clausewitz’s concepts of ‘centre of gravity’ and the

‘culminating point’:

“Centre of Gravity. A centre of gravity is the identified aspect of a force, organisation,

group or state’s capability from which it draws its strength, freedom of action, cohesion or

35Ibid., p. 3-2.

36US FM 3-0, Operations, Feb. 2008, Preface.

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will to fight. Again, this concept’s relevance at the tactical level is based on understanding it

rather than using it.”37

“Centres of Gravity. The concept of centre of gravity (that from which power or

freedom to act derives) is applicable to counterinsurgency but it is not sufficient to merely

identify friendly and insurgent centres of gravity as a commander might do during combat

operations. A commander will also need to identify the centre of gravity of each of the

elements of society (communities/groups e.g. the insurgents, the host nation government,

allies etc) with whom he is dealing. Selecting the correct centres of gravity is critical to

success and making the wrong choice may skew an operation entirely leading to resources

being wasted or inappropriate action being taken. Similarly, in designing an operation its

impact on multiple centres of gravity should be assessed less success in one direction sets

back others and thus hinders the achievement of a lasting comprehensive solution. Centre

of gravity analysis needs to be regularly examined and changes made

when and where necessary.”38

“Culminating Point. A culminating point is reached when the current situation can be

maintained, but not developed to any greater advantage. To attempt to do so, without a pause

or reinforcement, would risk over-extension and the vulnerability this may cause.”39

“Culminating Point: An operation reaches its culminating point when the current

operation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage.”40

37ADP Operations, November 2010, p. 7-7.

38AFM 1/10, Countering Insurgency, January 2010, p. 7-7.

39ADP Operations, November 2010, p. 7-7.

40JDP 0-01.1, p. C-29.

23

Suggested Reading

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, edited by Michael Howard, Peter

Paret and Beatrice Heuser. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Freedman, Lawrence. War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Handel, Michael. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. Third revised and

expanded edition. London: Frank Cass, 2001.

Howard, Michael. Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2002.

Howard, Michael. War and the Liberal Conscience. London: Hurst & Co., 2008.

Howard, Michael. War in European History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Jomini, Antoine Henri de. The Art of War. London: Greenhill Books, 1992.

Jordan, David, ed. et al. Understanding Modern Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge


Heuser, Beatrice. Reading Clausewitz. London: Pimlico, 2002.

Paret, Peter, Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds. Makers of Modern Strategy: From

Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Strachan, Hew and Andreas Aerberg-Rothe. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London:

Penguin, 2006.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1963.

Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation

of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz. London: The Free Press, 1991.

Total War

24

In contrast to the Clausewitzian ‘natural ideal’ of ‘absolute war’ the term ‘total war’ is

mainly – but not exclusively – used to describe the character of war in World War I (1914-

18) and World War II (1939-45). Other wars, such as the French Revolutionary and

Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) or the American Civil War (1861-65), also entailed certain

aspects of totality, but did not reach the same degree as the aforementioned. In the case of the

latter conflict, total war is most directly associated with General William Tecumseh Sherman,

a Union commander who inflicted a deliberate swathe of devastation across the South during

his campaign of 1864.

T

he

term

was

first

used

by

Max

imili

en

Rob

espie

rre

in a

“UntilwecanrepopulateGeorgia,itisuselesstooccupyit;buttheutter

destructionoftheroads,housesandpeoplewillcrippletheirmilitaryresources.Ican

makethemarch,andmakeGeorgiahowl.”

“Wearenotonlyfightinghostilearmies,butahostilepeople,andmustmake

oldandyoung,richandpoor,feelthehardhandofwar.Thetruthisthewholearmyis

burningwithaninsatiabledesiretowreakvengeanceuponSouthCarolina.Ialmost

trembleforherfate.”

“Ifthepeopleraiseahowlagainstmybarbarityandcruelty,Iwillanswerthat

wariswar.Iftheywantpeace,theyaretheirrelativesmuststopthewar.”

GenWilliamT.Sherman[separateoccasions],1864

“Itiswarnowthatitmaynotbewaralways.Godsenduspeace–butthereisno

peaceexceptincompletesubmissiontotheGovernment,andthisseemsimpossible

exceptthroughtheterrorsofwar.Shermanisperfectlyright–theonlypossiblewayto

endthisunhappyanddreadfulconflictistomakeitterriblebeyondendurance.”

HenryHitchcock,ADCtoSherman

25

speech to the legislative assembly during the French Revolution and was picked up again in

World War I by the right-wing French writer Léon Daudet in his book La Guerre Totale41.

However, the term was popularised only in the 1930s with Erich Ludendorff’s book Der

Totale Krieg.42 The former quartermaster of the German Army in World War I attempted to

explain the reasons for the German defeat and elaborated the consequences to draw on for

future wars. For Ludendorff, Germany had lost the war because the government failed to

fully mobilise society towards the war effort. Arguing all future wars would be unlimited,

Ludendorff categorically rejected Clausewitz’s notion of restriction in warfare. For him war

was the natural state of mankind and peace only an interval for the preparation for the next

passage of arms. Ludendorff’s apocalyptic vision became reality only a few years later in

World War II and was used expressis verbis when the German propaganda minister Joseph

Goebbels declared “total war” in his famous “Sports Palace Speech” in February 1943 shortly

after the German defeat at Stalingrad.

T

he

evol

ution

of

41Daudet, Léon, La Guerre Totale, Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1918. 42Ludendorff, Erich, Der Totale Krieg, Munich: Ludendorff Verlag, 1935. English

translation: General Ludendorff, The Nation at War, London: Hutchinson, 1936.

“Thenatureofwarhaschanged,thecharacterofpoliticshaschanged,andnow

therelationsexistingbetweenpoliticsandtheconductofwarmustalsochange.Allthe

theoriesofClausewitzshouldbethrownoverboard.Bothwarfareandpoliticsaremeant

toservethepreservationofthepeople,butwarfareisthehighestexpressionofthe

national‘willtolive’,andpoliticsmust,therefore,besubservienttotheconductofwar.”

GeneralLudendorff,TheNationatWar,London:Hutchinson1936,pp.23‐24.

“TheEnglishclaimtheGermanpeopleresistthemeasuresfortotalwar

introducedbyourgovernment.TheEnglishsaytheGermansdonotwanttotalwar,but

capitulation.Iaskyou:Doyouwanttotalwar?Ifnecessary,doyouwantawarmoretotal

andradicalthananythingwecanevenimaginetoday?”

TheGerman“MinisterforPropagandaandPeople’sEnlightenment”JosephGoebbelsinhisfamous“SportsPalaceSpeech”on18February1943.Thecrowd’sunanimousanswertothequestionswas“yes!”Overthelecternalargebannerstated:“TotalWar–Shortest

26

total wars in the 19th century and finally culminating in the first half of the 20th century is

closely linked to the Industrial Revolution and the rise of new ideologies, namely

nationalism, liberalism, communism and national-socialism/fascism. Yet, until today

academia has not been able to agree on a common definition for the term “total war” and has

had to content itself with identifying three key components: far-reaching war aims, radical

warfare methods and the mobilisation of society.43

War Aims

Starting with the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) the

belligerents’ war aims became more ambitious. It was no longer a question of conquering a

piece of land; governments were toppled instead and the map of Europe redrawn under

Napoleon. Yet, in all following wars in Europe the belligerents restrained their war aims

again. This was also largely true in the opening stages of World War I, but changed with the

entry of the USA into the war, as the Allies declared the deposition and the trial of the

German Kaiser as one of their war aims. Political compromise thus became more difficult as

a means of ending wars. This tendency intensified even further with the emergence of new

radical ideologies, namely communism and national-socialism. Cohabitation of these

ideologies did not seem to be possible anymore. The US and the UK demanded

‘unconditional surrender’ from Nazi Germany in World War II, and after 1945 German

society had to undergo a comprehensive “re-education programme”. Though very often 43Fundamental are five volumes of a series of conferences about the subject of “Total War”: On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification 1861-1871, ed. Förster Stig and Nagler, Jörg, Cambridge: Cambridge, 1997; Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914, ed. Boemke, Manfred F., Chickering, Roger and Förster, Stig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, ed. Chickering, Roger and Förster, Stig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003: A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction 1937-1945, ed. Chickering, Roger, Förster, Stig and Greiner, Bernd, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Other more dated books include: Wright, Gordon, The Ordeal of Total War 1939-1945, New York: Harper, 1968; Sallager, Frederick M., The Road to Total War, New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1969.

27

acting pragmatically, communist ideology sought nothing less than world revolution and

dominance. National Socialism did not differ in this sense and took it to the extreme with the

conscious extermination of entire races. The Holocaust was thus an unspoken German war

aim in World War II.

Methods of Warfare

The ever more ambitious war aims had a huge impact on the way wars were fought.

In total wars stakes were perceived to be so high that the belligerents often recurred to

methods of warfare normally seen as unacceptable in a cultural and legal sense. Targeting

civilians thus became legitimate, often accompanied by demonising (“Filthy Hun”) or even

dehumanising (“Slav subhuman”) the enemy. Consequently, this facilitated ruthless methods

of warfare like naval blockades which led to chronic food shortages, unrestricted submarine

warfare, the bombing of cities, scorched earth policies, or the burning down of entire villages

in anti-partisan operations.

Mobilisation of society

The radicalisation of methods of warfare was closely linked to the idea that the

enemy’s society was seen as one block. Indeed, modern industrialised wars were no longer an

exclusive business of the army, but the entire nation was affected in one way or another.

Universal conscription was often introduced and the country’s economy geared towards the

requirements of the war. The ‘home front’ became an integral part of a total war. Due to the

shortage of men in factories during both World Wars, women often had to fill the gaps left

behind and later even benefitted from the war: female suffrage was introduced in the UK in

1918, in Germany in 1919 and in France in 1944. The historian Arthur Marwick has thus

28

argued that total wars are generally a testing field of a society and have a lasting impact on

the nation’s psyche even long after the war.44

When talking about total war one must be aware of the different perceptions for each

single belligerent. For example, American society was much less affected in both World

Wars than German or Soviet society in World War II. In the end this can also mean that one

side fights a total war whilst the other one wages a limited war, as many post-1945 examples

show (e.g. the Vietnam War). It must also be emphasised that ‘total wars’ or elements thereof

are not confined to the period between the French Revolution (1789) and the end of World

War II (1945). For example, the Third Punic War (149BC-146BC) saw the complete

destruction of the Carthaginian Empire including its capital. Similarly, after the Thirty Years’

War (1618-48) large parts of Germany were devastated with a loss of two-thirds of the pre-

war population. After 1945, for example, genocide marked the Rwandan Civil War (1990-93)

fought between the rival Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities.

Like ‘absolute war’ the term ‘total war’ has to be understood as a “heuristic device”45

of a “theoretical ideal” that can never be reached. Even in the most ‘total’ wars characterised

by genocidal tendencies, both belligerents still exercise certain restraints, be it for moral,

pragmatic or utilitarian reasons. An example would be the treatment of prisoners of war in the

German-Soviet War (1941-45). Despite a widespread no-quarter policy on both sides, the

vast majority of prisoners were not shot on the spot, but brought into captivity. Due to various

factors the mortality rate was very high in the camps on both sides. Around 50% of the over 5

million Red Army prisoners taken during the war died in German captivity. Yet, the other

half survived because from 1942 onwards they were seen as a useful labour force for the

44Marwick, Arthur, Total War and Historical Change: Europe 1914-1955, London:

Palgrave, 1988. 45Chickering, Roger and Förster, Stig, in Chickering and Förster, Shadows, p. 7.

29

German war economy and thus their treatment improved considerably. This ensured the

survival of a far larger percentage than in the first months of the war.


• Are total wars a historical phenomenon and have they really ceased to occur around the globe since 1945?

• Does the involvement of civilians in war automatically mean total war?

• Are Western armies today fighting against enemies which are prepared to embark on a total war?

Suggested Reading

Chickering, Roger and Stig Först, eds. Great War, Total War: Combat and

Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918. Cambridge: Cambridge


Chickering, Roger, Stig Förster, and Bernd Greiner, eds. A World at Total War:

Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Marwick, Arthur. Total War and Historical Change: Europe, 1914-1955.

Open University Press, 2001.

Marwick, Arthur,ed. Total War and Social Change. London: Palgrave Macmillan,

1988.

Shaw, Martin. War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society. Polity Press,

2003.

Limited War and Escalation: The Cold War and Beyond

30

In broad historical terms one could argue with considerable authority that the concept

of limited war was certainly nothing new. Clausewitz, for example, wrote that ‘two kinds of

limited war are possible: offensive war with a limited aim and defensive war’.46 Clausewitz

considered the idea of limited war in the context of 18th and 19th century Europe, but in fact

conflict in Europe enjoyed an extensive period of limitation that ran from the Peace of

Westphalia in 1648 to the commencement of the Revolutionary Wars in 1792.47 International

conditions peculiar to historical periods contributed to the prevalence of limited war and such

would be the case after 1945.

The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States

Army Air Force in August 1945 quickly brought about the capitulation of Japan and opened

the nuclear age in warfare. The destructiveness of these weapons represented something of a

climax to the idea of total war but also indicated that the risks to adversaries fighting a total

war were now very much greater. As Bernard Brodie observed, ‘with the advent of nuclear

weapons the entire value of past military experience as a guide to the future was called

basically into question’.48

The impact of nuclear weapons on the future of warfare was profound. Moreover, the

global geopolitical context added a sense of urgency to coming to grips with the impact of

nuclear weapons on warfare. The birth of the nuclear age paralleled the onset of the Cold

War. The global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union saw both

superpowers acquire first atomic and then thermonuclear weapons and the means of strategic

delivery to their respective homelands. With each side possessing arsenals of such

46Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

Princeton University Press, 1976, Book VIII, Chapter 5, p. 602,47Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, London: Routledge, 1983, p. 3. 48Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University

Press, 1959, p. 149.

31

destructiveness grew ‘the conviction that total nuclear war is to be avoided at almost any

cost’.49 The outcome of strategic stalemate was the doctrine of deterrence where each side

maintained nuclear arsenals and delivery systems that deterred either side from initiating a

strategic nuclear exchange. Any gains would be more than offset by the ‘mutually assured

destruction MAD’ that attended either side starting a nuclear war. The doctrine of deterrence

rested on credible military capability to deliver nuclear weapons and political will to use them

if necessary. Deterrence as a policy evolved over time and in the wake of the Second World

War the nuclear powers were only just beginning a journey of understanding how nuclear

weapons would shape warfare.50

In the first decade following the Second World War the enthusiasm of the nuclear

powers to explore the possible utility of nuclear weapons moved from the strategic realm to

that of the tactical. The 1953 study of two US Army Colonels, Reinhardt and Kintner, entitled

Atomic Weapons in Land Combat examined the battlefield use of atomic weaponry. The book

advocated such tactical ideas as ‘atomic envelopment’ entailing manoeuvre through areas

‘swept by atomic blasts’.51 A more sober study by F. O. Miksche suggested that ‘A-weapons

will “atomise” tactics to such an extent that the forms of ground combat will take on a

completely guerrilla-like character’.52 Such studies seem somewhat fantastic today given the

lack of illusions over the practical problems of the contemporary use of nuclear weapons but

they reflected the desire to understand the place of these new weapons on the battlefield.

Nevertheless the destructiveness and lingering lethal effects of nuclear weapons could not be

ignored at whatever level of war.

49Brodie, Strategy, p. 269. 50The subject of deterrence is comprehensively treated in two books by Lawrence Freedman:

Deterrence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004 and The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 3rd Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003.

51Col. R. C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1953, pp. 36-37.

52Lt. Col. F. O. Miksche, Atomic Weapons and Armies, London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1955, p. 218.

32

The Korean War (1950-53) represented something of an early watershed in the

potential risks associated with nuclear weapons and acted as a catalyst to renewed interest in

the concept of limited war. The conflict in Korea began as an attack mounted by North

Korean communist forces crossing the 38th Parallel in the peninsula in a bid forcibly to unite

Korea and create a communist state. The North Koreans enjoyed the support of China and the

Soviet Union. The North Korean attack on the south led to the creation of a US-led UN

coalition to defend South Korea from communist aggression. The conflict saw initially North

Korean forces nearly overrun the peninsula and in turn UN forces advance north to reach the

Yalu River boundary with China before the conflict settled into a stalemate roughly at the

point where the conflict began. In the course of the war China intervened, sending the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to the aid of its North Korean ally. Gen Douglas

MacArthur, who led the UN command until his removal in 1951, favoured an aggressive

response to China’s intervention and advocated widening the conflict into Manchuria and

employing atomic weapons in an attempt to bring the conflict to a favourable end for the UN

coalition. President Harry Truman, however, did not agree and chose not to risk escalation

that could trigger global war.53 Korea pointed to an emerging pattern of conventional regional

conflicts involving the superpowers either directly or by proxy that were to be a reoccurring

feature of Cold War competition. Nevertheless, limiting such conflicts grew in importance

because of the danger of escalation leading to a nuclear war between the superpowers.

The renewed interest in limited war by the second half of the 1950s had produced

works that would shape thinking on warfare throughout the Cold War. Foremost among the

studies produced in this period was Robert Osgood’s book Limited War: The Challenge to

American Strategy. Osgood’s study examined the problem of how to limit war in the context

of the Cold War superpower competition and the advent of nuclear weapons. While not the

53Hastings, Max, The Korean War, London: Pan Books, 1987, p. 226.

33

only figure in the 1950s to consider the issue of limited war, his book stands out for its

historical analysis and for crafting a coherent theory of limited war in the nuclear age.54 He

developed his ideas of limited war taking into account the experience of the Korean War and

the engagement in the conflict of two nuclear-armed superpowers. The result was a fresh

perspective on limited war where Osgood defined it in the following manner:

A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement. Generally speaking, a limited war actively involves two (or very few) major belligerents in the fighting. The battle is confined to a local geographical area and directed against selected targets – primarily those of direct military importance. It demands of the belligerents only a fractional commitment of their human and physical resources. It permits their economic, social, and political patterns of existence to continue without serious disruption.55

According to Osgood, among these factors listed above there was one more important

than the others. Osgood argued that ‘the decisive limitation upon war is the limitation of the

objectives of war’.56 Also writing in the 1950s, Bernard Brodie believed that ‘limited war

involves an important kind and degree of restraint – deliberate restraint’.57 The risks

associated with the use of nuclear weapons provided the driving force behind the need for

‘deliberate restraint’.

Brodie’s expression of ‘deliberate restraint’ pointed to another issue related to limited

war – the problem of escalation. A recent study on escalation defined it as ‘an increase in the

intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or more

54Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 3rd Edition, pp. 93-96. 55Osgood, Robert Endicott, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 1-2. 56Osgood, Limited War, p. 4. 57Brodie, Strategy, p. 309.

34

of the participants’.58 Clausewitz argued in his On War that there is no theoretical limit to the

intensification of violence in war as each belligerent in war seeks to gain advantage. For

those considering the problem of limited war during the Cold War period, understanding how

to control escalation became a major issue. Herman Kahn’s book On Escalation was among

the best known studies of the problem in the Cold War. It was Kahn who introduced the idea

of the ‘escalation ladder’ in his attempt to understand the dynamic of escalation. To illustrate

the idea of the escalation ladder, Kahn devised a hypothetical example of one containing

forty-four rungs that started with ‘ostensible crisis’ to ‘spasm or insensate war’.59 Although

an important piece of work in the literature devoted to escalation, Kahn’s work today appears

dated and closely associated with Cold War conditions. A more recent study by the American

think tank RAND has moved away from the metaphor of the ladder to that of the climber of a

‘treacherous ravine face or mountainside’.60 The RAND study argued that escalation cannot

be seen as a linear process but a more fluid one in its consequences – hence the rock climber

having to move up, down, sideways or diagonally.


• With the advent of nuclear weapons, are all wars in the future likely to be limited?

• How might the limited nature of a conflict impose restraints on the actions of a platoon commander?

• If Clausewitz is right that there is no theoretical limit to the intensification of violence in war, then what steps can be taken to limit escalation or de-escalation in war?

• Across the conflict spectrum are the problems of escalation the same for the platoon commander?

58Morgan, Forest E., et al., Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century,

Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 8. 59Kahn, Herman, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, London: Pall Mall Press, 1965,

37-39. 60Morgan, Dangerous Thresholds, pp. 17-18.

35

Suggested Reading

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, edited by Michael Howard, Peter Paret and Beatrice Heuser. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959

Freedman, Lawrence. Deterrence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 3rd Edition. Basingstoke:

Palgrave, 2003.

Morgan, Forest E., et al. Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st

Century. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2008. Miksche, F. O. Atomic Weapons and Armies. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1955. Osgood, Robert Endicott. Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. The Problem of Hybridity in War

Clausewitz in his theory of war endeavoured to identify principles that underpinned

armed conflict as a human activity in his period of history. His effort to understand the

features common in war led him to his ‘remarkable trinity’, discussed earlier in this chapter.

The Prussian military philosopher, however, also recognised that war is a ‘true chameleon’.61

The metaphor of the chameleon, a creature able to change its colour to blend into its

environment, is an appropriate one for indicating that war is in fact a constantly changing

phenomena. Clausewitz recognised this when he wrote that ‘every age had its own kind of

war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions’.62 The challenge for

each generation therefore is to visit anew the complexities of war, seeking to identify that

which is unchanging in the nature of war and to come to grips with the changing character of

war.

61Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and

Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976, Book I, Chapter 1, p. 89. 62Ibid., p. 593.

36

In trying to understand the ‘true chameleon’, post-Cold War analysis has focussed on

the increasingly complex and multi-faceted character of war where the new and the

unexpected are married to the more conventional means of war fighting. Moreover, this view

maintains that all of the means of war can occur simultaneously and in a battlespace that has

no spatial boundaries. This line of thinking has evolved in recent years into the idea of

‘hybrid war’. In the United States in 2005, two US Marine Corps officers, Lt Gen James N.

Mattis and Lt Col Frank Hoffman produced an influential article in the journal, Proceedings

arguing that the future will be characterised by ‘hybrid war’.63 Hoffman has since written

extensively on the idea of hybrid war, including a paper for the Potomac Institute for Policy

Studies entitled Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. In this study, Hoffman

defined hybrid war in the following way:

Hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. Hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.64

Hoffman’s definition suggests revolutionary change in the conduct of war. Have

Hoffman and the other exponents of hybrid war identified something new – a revolution in

how wars are fought? The term ‘hybrid’ has been used before to describe the complex and

multi-faceted character of war. Thomas R. Mockaitas in his 1995 book British

Counterinsurgency in the Post Imperial Era described the 1960s confrontation with

Indonesia as a ‘hybrid war, combining low-intensity conventional engagements with

63Lt Gen James N. Mattis and Lt Col Frank Hoffman, ‘Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid

Wars’, Proceedings, November 2005, p. 19. 64Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Arlington,

Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007, p. 14. Accessed at web address: http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf.

37

insurgency’.65 What is more, Mockaitas went on to offer the following observation regarding

the problem of hybridity in war:

Hybrid war demonstrates the extreme fluidity of categories such as “low”, “mid” and “high” intensity when applied to modern war. The conflict spectrum operates within individual wars as well as separating them from each other.66

When tested against the historical pattern of armed conflict, the idea of hybridity is

nothing new either in terms of how wars have been fought or in thinking over the decades on

the character of conflict. On the former point, it is well to remember that in the 1930s Mao

Tse-Tung described his revolutionary war in a way that was recognisably hybrid. The

‘people’s guerrillas’ and the main (conventional) forces of the People’s Liberation Army

were likened to a ‘man’s right arm and left arm’, the two forms of warfare being

indispensible to the success of the other.67 During the Second World War, the Allies fought

in a hybrid fashion, arraying conventional forces against the Axis powers while employing

organisations such as the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to organise resistance and to

conduct sabotage and attacks on enemy personnel in occupied Europe.68

In a similar vein, analysis of the problem of hybridity in war punctuated Cold War

debates on the character of war. In 1958, Raymond Aron described the hybrid nature of war

as ‘polymorphous violence’.69 Andrew Mack coined the phrase ‘asymmetric’ warfare in the

65Thomas R. Mockaitas, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era, Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 1995, p. 16. 66Ibid., p. 38. 67Quoted from ‘Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War’, December 1936, in:

Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, Peking: 1966, p. 90.

68M.R.D. Foot, SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-46, London: BBC, 1984, and SOE Syllabus: Lessons in Ungentlemanly Warfare in World War II, Kew, Surrey: The National Archives, 2001.

69Raymond Aron, On War: Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy, London: Secker and Warburg, 1958, p. 57.

38

1970s and at the end of the 1980s Frank Kitson described hybridity as the ‘ladder of

warfare’.70 Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a string of ideas expressing in

different ways the problem of hybridity in war: ‘compound wars’, ‘three block war’, ‘beyond

limits warfare’, ‘fourth generation warfare’ ‘war amongst the people’.71 All these post-Cold

War concepts seek, to a greater or lesser degree, to capture the complex and multi-faceted –

‘hybrid’ – character of war. Of all the post-Cold War studies, the monograph entitled

Unrestricted Warfare produced by two colonels of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

offered the most thorough and rigorous analysis of the hybrid character of war in the

contemporary setting.72

This discussion suggests that there is really nothing particularly new about the hybrid

nature of war and, in fact, that the problem of hybridity has long been the subject of study and

analysis. It is therefore better not to think in terms of ‘hybrid war’ as a new and distinct form

of war, but rather to recognise that all wars are hybrid and that the characteristics of hybridity

change over time. The Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) of the UK

Ministry of Defence (MoD) has highlighted the importance of being alert to the problem of

hybridity in contemporary and future war in its recent study, Future Character of Conflict

(FCOC) that looks ahead to 2029:

Future Conflict will be increasingly hybrid in character. This is not a code for insurgency or stabilisation, it is about a change in the mindset of our adversaries, who are aiming to exploit our weaknesses using a wide variety of high-end and low-end

70Andrew Mack, ‘Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars’, World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 175-200; Frank Kitson, Warfare as a Whole, London: Faber and Faber, 1987, p. 2. 71Thomas Huber, Compound Wars: The Fatal Knot, Fort Leavenworth, 1996; Gen. Charles C. Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marines Magazine, January 1999; Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: 1999; William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John Schmitt, and Gary I. Wilson, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into Fourth Generation Warfare’, Marine Corps Gazette, November 2001; and, Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of war in the Modern World, London: Allen Lane, 2005.

72Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare.

39

asymmetric techniques. These forms of conflict are transcending our conventional understanding of what equates to irregular and regular activity; the “conflict paradigm” has shifted and we must adapt our approaches if we are to succeed.73

The FCOC went on to emphasize that: 'In future conflict smart adversaries will

present us with hybrid threats (combining conventional, irregular and high-end asymmetric

threats) in the same time and space'.74 Understanding how war is changing both in the present

and looking ahead into the future has enormous implications for armed forces in terms of

determining doctrine, training and capabilities. Without seeking to understand how war is

changing, how can an army prepare to fight? By the same token, unless past conflicts are

well understood, how can the changing characteristics of war be identified? The study of the

theory of war thus provides a vital intellectual bridge between past, present and future armed

conflict.


• Is the hybrid character of war anything new?

• If hybrid war is something new, then what has changed in warfare?

• How does the hybrid character of war challenge the platoon commander with regard to doctrine, training and leadership?

• In confronting a hybrid adversary intellectual agility is the most important component of leadership. Do you agree?

Suggested Reading

Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big

One. London: Hurst & Co., 2011. 73Future Character of Conflict, Strategic Trends Programme, DCDC, 2010, p. 1. 74Ibid., p. 13.

40

Latawski, Paul, ‘Marching to the Drumbeat of Intellectual Fashion’, British Army

Review, Autumn 2011, pp. 7-15.

Murray, Williamson and Peter Mansoor, eds. Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex

Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge


Simpson, Emile. War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics.

London: Hurst & Co., 2012.

The Manoeuvrist Approach

The “Manoeuvrist Approach” is the “first precept of the British Army’s capstone land

environmental doctrine.”75 The term manoeuvre warfare is generally taken to mean

conducting operations according to the tenets of the Manoeuvrist Approach. The British

Army currently defines the latter as “an attitude of mind” that encompasses “an approach to

operations” based upon “understanding and manipulating human nature; applying strength

against vulnerabilities and points of influence; and exploiting indirect methods, in order to

affect an adversary’s fighting power.”76 This approach involves “manoeuvring the mind,

more than it is about physical manoeuvre.” 77 Indeed, although fast-paced strategic

penetrations by mechanised forces, backed by air support, became the typical way of waging

Manoeuvre Warfare during the 20th century, such physical mobility is not, however, a

prerequisite for an application of the Manoeuvrist Approach. In the 21st century, a soldier (or

75ADP: Operations in the Land Environment, (May 2010), Paragraph 0401. 76Ibid., Paragraph 0402. 77Ibid., Paragraph 0402.

41

terrorist) downloading a virus into an opponent’s IT terminal or holding a Shura to influence

local perceptions would be as much an implementer of the Manoeuvrist Approach as a tank

commander; it is the nature of the enemy’s vulnerabilities that determines the nature of the

Manoeuverist’s attack.

Through exploiting the unexpected, the initiative, and a ruthless determination to

succeed, the Manoeuvrist Approach seeks to defeat, disrupt or neutralise the opponent. This

is achieved by employing combinations of “power and influence” or of “violent and non-

violent means” to “achieve effects which shape the adversaries’ … understanding, undermine

their will, or shatter their cohesion.”78 Activity to influence the perceptions of the enemy, as

well as of other local, regional and international actors, forms a crucial part of the

Manoeuvrist’s attack on enemy cohesion, will and understanding. The requirement of

understanding the situation forms an essential pre-requisite for the Manoeuvrist Approach.79

Although Western doctrine first developed these ideas for the conduct of Cold War-era

conventional warfare, many countries’ military doctrines have subsequently exported these

ideas into what doctrinally used to be termed Operations Other Than War or Other

Operations, which encompasses Countering Insurgency and Stabilisation Operations. With

recent doctrinal perspectives viewing all styles of, or approaches to, war as part of the

complex reality of Hybrid Warfare, the Manoeuvrist Approach now suffuses the full breadth

of contemporary British doctrine for all types of operations in the land environment.80

The Evolution of Manoeuvre Warfare Theories

78Ibid., Paragraphs 0403, 0415. 79Ibid., Paragraph 0207; ADP: Operations (November 2010), Paragraph 0207. 80Current British doctrine defines “hybrid threats” as “any adversaries that simultaneously and adaptively employ a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the same battle-space to obtain their political objectives”; British Army Field Manual Part 1 Vol. 10 Countering Insurgency (2010), 1-1.

42

In 1982, the United States Army embraced the world’s first explicitly designated

Manoeuvre Warfare warfighting doctrine, AirLand Battle, a doctrinal shift subsequently

followed by other Western forces. In early 1991, Anglo-American forces conducted the first

major conventional AirLand Battle campaign during their liberation of Iraqi-occupied

Kuwait.81 These manoeuvre warfare theories had emerged during the 1980s and 1990s in the

context of three processes.82 First, they developed as a backlash to the perceived ills of the

traditional Western attritional style of warfare, personified by the two World Wars; while

attrition delivered ultimate victory, it did so only after prolonged operations and massive

costs to the victor. Second, Manoeuvrist doctrine emerged in reaction to limited wars such as

Korea and Vietnam, where the U.S. Government only allowed its forces to “fight to tie”

rather than to win. AirLand Battle doctrine thus sought to restore decisiveness to warfare,

even in limited wars where – within overarching political constraints – the conduct of

operations would largely be unrestrained. Finally, the doctrine emerged out of NATO’s

recognition that attritional operations could not stop the Warsaw Pact’s onslaught on Central

Europe; this led to a search for ways of “fighting smart” that would enable NATO to punch

above its weight.

This last reaction reveals that, at its simplest level, the Manoeuvrist Approach is

merely little more than an admonition to “fight smart”. In this sense, there is little new about

the doctrine; when the first cave-man tribe ambushed a rival group instead of attacking it

head-on, the era of the Manoeuvrist Approach was born, millennia before the term itself

entered military doctrine. One famous early Manoeuvrist was Hannibal, who in 218 BC took

81US Army, Field Manual FM100-5 Operations, 1982, 1986, and 1993; John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post Cold-War World, Fort Monroe, Virginia: TRADOC, 1996. 82Influential early works on Manoeuvrist concepts included: Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. London: Brassey’s, 1985; Richard Hooker, Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, Novato., CA: Presidio, 1993; William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Novato., CA: Presidio, 1993; Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle. Novato., CA: Presidio, 1994.

43

his Carthaginian army, including elephant-cavalry, across the seemingly impassable terrain of

the Alps to strike the Roman forces by surprise from the rear. Equally, during 1939-42 the

Germans, in waging their fast-paced strategic armoured operations (subsequently labelled

“Blitzkrieg”), demonstrated an effective implementation of the Manoeuvrist Approach

decades before the term was coined.

Indeed, in developing these manoeuvre warfare doctrines during the 1970s and 1980s,

American analysts explicitly looked back for inspiration to the earlier doctrinal precedents of

the inter-war years. Between 1918 and 1939 two British officers – Major-General J.F.C.

Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart – played an important role in the international debate

over what today would be described as Manoeuvre Warfare, even though Liddell Hart’s

international impact was more meagre than has traditionally been portrayed. In addition,

towards the end of the First World War, Fuller had developed his “Plan 1919”, which aimed

at the quick defeat of the German army by deploying echeloned mechanised formations in

order to achieve surprise, shock and even the collapse of the enemy “brain”, or decision-

making cycle as it is now termed. Even though the plan was not implemented due to the

war’s end, it was an important conceptual stepping stone in the development of the

Manoeuvrist Approach. A key practical British stepping stone was the exercises conducted

during 1927-28 by the Experimental Mechanised Force, the world’s first all-arms mechanised

brigade. During the 1930s, however, Britain lost this leading role. Constant under-funding,

the increasing importance of the RAF, and an emphasis on imperial policing rather than on

the seemingly more distant threat of a major European war, all blighted British Manoeuvre

Warfare thinking.83

83Brian Bond, ‘The Army Between the two World Wars 1918-1939’, in David G. Chandler and Ian Beckett, eds., The Oxford History of the British Army. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 256-271.

44

As a result, Britain lost its edge to other states, in particular Germany. The German

army had always aimed at a quick military victory over its opponents, because Germany’s

geo-strategic location in the centre of Europe did not allow for prolonged wars. In contrast to

the Manoeuvrist Approach adopted by the modern British Army of today, and the emphasis

on the defeat of enemy forces, the Germans put more stress on the destruction of the enemy.84

In World War I, railway systems and the pace of the foot soldier had dictated the speed of

operations. The Germans realised that mechanisation and the build-up of a tank force would

facilitate the application of the Manoeuvrist Approach.

Their version of this approach – often incorrectly called ‘Blitzkrieg’ – enabled them

to achieve impressive tactical and operational victories in the first half of the Second World

War. This approach utilised the concentration of mechanised formations at key points to

enact bold high-tempo penetrations, ably supported by Luftwaffe airpower providing Close

Air Support (CAS), Air Interdiction (AI), Air Recce, Airborne Operations (formerly Air

Assault) and Intra-Theatre Air Lift missions. However, a flawed strategy resulted in an over-

stretch of German resources. Heavy defeats on the Eastern Front, in such battles as Moscow

(1941-42), Stalingrad (1942-43) and Kursk (1943) resulted in a heavy death-toll, the loss of

the ability to conduct large-scale mobile operations, and a restriction of initiative and mission

command at higher formation level – both vital prerequisites for the successful application of

the Manoeuvrist Approach.

In contrast with the tactical brilliance of the Germans, the Soviet practice of

manoeuvre warfare during the Second World War was built upon sophisticated strategic- and

operational-level doctrine. The key concepts of Soviet manoeuvre warfare – the operational

level, operational art, deep battle and deep operations – were developed in the period 1905-

84Matthias Strohn, The German Army and the Defence of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle 1918-1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

45

36. In 1907, Major (later General) Aleksandr Svechin argued that the sheer scale, duration,

numbers and casualties involved in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 meant that massive

military encounters such as Sha-Ho and Mukden were engagements fought at the operational

level, not just as separate tactical battles. The operational level, he argued, occupied an

intermediate position between strategy and tactics, acting as the bridge between the two. In

terms of numbers, depth of front, duration, firepower and casualties the scale of the First

World War confirmed, at least in Soviet eyes, the emergence of the operational level of war.

In the wake of the First World War, the Red Army concluded that modern states

possessed such enormous social, economic and military resources that they could not be

defeated in a single battle, operation or campaign. The Red Army concluded that victory in

war could only be achieved through the cumulative impact of successive operations. This was

a strategic theory but it had significant operational and tactical implications. The Red Army

believed that field armies were dependent upon, and drew their strength from, their

operational rear. It was this system of command, control, communications, reserves, supplies

and infrastructure such as railways, roads and bridges that maintained an army and gave it

direction and flexibility in the conduct of operations. In short, an army relied on its

operational rear to be an effective military force.

Therefore, the key to operational victory lay in the ability to advance through the

enemy’s operational rear. Soviet thinkers argued that the interaction of tactical losses at the

front combined with deep operational manoeuvre could achieve operational victory. It was

the task of operational commanders to conceive, organise and link tactical battles into an

operational whole; this was operational art. The Red Army’s search for the tactical and

operational methods required to achieve success led them to deep battle and deep operations,

respectively.

46

The aim of deep battle was the ‘almost simultaneous neutralization of the defensive

zone in all its depth.’ Deep battle was a tactical concept designed to achieve a breakthrough

to create the conditions for mobile forces to strike deep into the enemy’s operational rear.

These deep operations to be conducted by specialist operational manoeuvre forces were

designed to turn tactical success into operational victory. In summary, Soviet manoeuvre

warfare engaged in tactical attrition; that is, deep battle, in order conduct operational

manoeuvre through deep operations.

In addition to these inter-war and Second World War precedents, the developers of

Manoeuvrist thinking also looked explicitly to the examples set by the Arab-Israeli Wars,

particularly the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Founded in 1948, Israel

remained geo-strategically vulnerable to the Arab enemies that surrounded it. Israel’s lack of

territorial depth, its small population (which forced it to adopt a genuine nation-in-arms

mobilisation in times of crisis), and vulnerability to naval blockade led the Israeli Defence

Force (IDF) to adopt a broadly Manoeuvrist approach to war-fighting that aimed to deliver

decisive success quickly. In 1967, fearing that Israel was about to be attacked, the IDF

initiated the Six Day War with a devastatingly-successful pre-emptive air strike against the

Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian air forces that achieved air supremacy. This subsequently

enabled Israel to employ air power to support the unfolding ground offensive, through Air

Reconnaissance, Close Air Support, Air Interdiction, and Airborne Operations. In the

aftermath of a well-conducted all-arms battle to overwhelm the Egyptian defensive shields in

the Sinai, tank-heavy elite Israeli armoured units, lacking much support from other arms, but

ably supported by air assets, audaciously exploited this success with an advance deep into the

Sinai against weak opposition from a demoralised opponent. This success reinforced the

existing (yet erroneous) Israeli doctrinal belief in the effectiveness of shock delivered by

tank-heavy armoured units, rather than well-balanced all-arms ones.

47

The 1967 Israeli occupation of the Egyptian Sinai, the West Bank of Jordan, and the

Syrian Golan Heights seemed to offer it greater geo-strategic depth, but this victory also

made Israel’s enemies more determined to win back these lost territories. Continual failure in

the face of Israeli military might, however, led the Arabs to reassess their approach to battle.

Determined to regain the Sinai, the Egyptians conceived a limited war strategy that aimed to

bring the Israelis to the negotiating table. Their plan was to launch a surprise attack across the

Suez Canal under an air umbrella of newly purchased Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) missile

batteries in conjunction with a Syrian assault against the Golan Heights. The initial attack –

launched on 6 October 1973, Yom Kippur – went like clockwork and successfully established

a bridgehead. As the Egyptians had predicted, during 6-8 October, the Israeli armoured

reserves, despite lacking many supporting elements that were still being mobilised,

repeatedly counter-attacked the Egyptian bridgehead and were bloodily repulsed by dug-in

Egyptian infantry using new Soviet anti-tank missiles, as well as traditional anti-tank guns.

The turning back of the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights, however, forced the

Egyptians to resume their advance, hoping to draw Israeli forces away from the Golan front.

On 14 October, the Egyptian strategic armoured reserves pushed out from under their air

defence umbrella and were decisively beaten by IDF armoured formations that had in the

previous few days relearned an all-arms approache that enabled them to neutralise the

Egyptian anti-tank threat. The subsequent Israeli counter-attack crossed the Suez Canal and

established a bridgehead on the eastern side that encircled the Egyptian Third Army in the

Sinai. The campaign had again demonstrated the key doctrinal lessons learned (but

occasionally forgotten thereafter) back in 1940; namely, that the key ingredients to a

successful Manoeuvrist approach included: the use of a joint air and ground campaign; the

employment of well integrated all-arms armoured formations; the audacious employment of

such armoured spearheads through a de-centralised command style; the seizing and

48

exploitation of fleeting battlefield opportunities; and the generation of momentum to create a

growing crisis with which the enemy could not cope.

Since the development of such Manoeuvrist theories in the 1980s, this body of

thought has incorporated new nuances based upon the experiences of subsequent

Manoeuvrist campaigns. The Coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait in January-February

1991, part of the 1990-91 Gulf War, has exerted the greatest impression on the body of

Manoeuvrist thought. The other major conventional war of the Post- Cold War period, the

US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, has also allowed Manoeuvrist doctrines to hone their tactics

and techniques as new cutting-edge technologies enter service, thus increasing the range of

capabilities and effects that can be achieved. Finally, the complex US-led counterinsurgency

campaigns in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-11) have also exerted some impact

on Manoeuvrist theory, leading to a growing discussion on how the Manoeuvrist approach

might be implemented effectively in a partly conventional war setting.

Manoeuvre Warfare Concepts

Having articulated how the body of Manoeuvrist thought emerged in and after 1982,

this chapter will now proceed to articulate the key concepts upon which such ideas are based.

To articulate its current understanding of the Manoeuvrist Approach, contemporary British

doctrine discusses the following eleven key concepts: cohesion; will; understanding;

surprise; shock effect; initiative; tempo; momentum; influence; mission command; and

disruption/pre-emption/dislocation. The ensuing analysis of these British doctrinal concepts

will be placed in a wider Western doctrinal perspective where it is appropriate to do so. The

Manoeuvrist Approach clarified its central concept – cohesion – by borrowing systems theory

from the sciences. A system comprises many variables that interact to produce the system’s

output. Manoeuvre theory saw the enemy as a system, with combat power as its output,

49

whose variables included its fielded forces and the various “links” (physical and intangible)

that connected these forces together. Cohesion refers to these links’ ability to facilitate the

interaction between the enemy system variables that is essential for the enemy’s generation of

combat power. These links include the enemy’s decision-making capability, its logistical

capabilities, and the flow of will and fighting spirit through the system.

Manoeuvre warfare aims to concentrate strength against these “weak” enemy links.

By neutralising (rather than destroying) these links through effects-based precision strikes,

the Manoeuvrist can neutralise the opponent’s cohesion even though most of the latter’s

fielded forces remain intact. If the Manoeuvrist prevents enemy supplies reaching the front,

paralyses the enemy forces’ ability to react, and weakens their fighting spirit, then the

Manoeuvrist can render the enemy incapable of offering effective resistance, even when the

latter still possesses most of its personnel and weapon systems. For example, by 28 February

1991, the end of the ground campaign in the First Gulf War, some 75% of the Iraqi fielded

forces remained in the battle-space, but they lacked orders, munitions, and fighting spirit

sufficient effectively to resist Coalition ground operations: in short, their cohesion had been

smashed.

To engage effectively the components of the enemy’s cohesion, the Manoeuvrist

needs to understand the enemy; this involves understanding the situation, the ground, the

human terrain, and the desired effects/outcomes.85 To swiftly collapse the enemy’s cohesion,

the Manoeuvrist strives to seize the initiative, which is why strategic surprise is often a

crucial precursor to a successful Manoeuvrist ground campaign. With the enemy caught

unprepared or unawares, the Manoeuvrist then strives ruthlessly to develop operations with

such tempo and momentum that significant shock is inflicted upon the enemy, who cannot

respond to the opponent’s actions. If this is achieved the Manoeuvrist is said to have got 85ADP Operations, Paragraph 0505.

50

within the latter’s decision-cycle, or OODA-loop (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act); the

enemy is merely reacting to previous events that have been rendered irrelevant by the

Manoeuvrist’s subsequent actions. Once within the enemy’s decision-cycle, the Manoeuvrist

can steadily neutralize enemy will and cohesion. Such an effort is facilitated if the

Manoeuvrist embraces risk and the chaos of war, accepting the lack of situational clarity. A

crucial element of the Manoeuvrist’s attack on enemy cohesion is activity that influences not

only the adversary’s perceptions, but also those of locals and wider public opinion.

To seize and hold the initiative, as well as to generate and maintain high tempo and

momentum during operations, the Manoeuvrist invariably attempts to pre-empt, disrupt or

dislocate enemy reactions. This might be achieved, for example, through air assets carrying

out air interdiction against enemy reserves attempting to move up toward the front line,

although airborne operations might also be used for this task, which may be described as a

depth battle that shapes the unfolding contact battle.

To generate high tempo and momentum during operations, the Manoeuvrist

invariably has to employ some form of Mission Command. This is a “command philosophy

of centralised intent and decentralised execution that promotes freedom of action and

initiative.” Current British doctrine views Mission Command as “the second core precept of

the British Army’s approach to operations in the land environment” that “complements” the

Manoeuvrist Approach.86 Such a devolved command philosophy permits subordinates to

decide how best to achieve their superior’s Intent with the resources allocated to them.

Mission Command also facilitates a swift decision-making cycle, which is essential if tempo

and momentum is to be sustained, and also enables fleeting tactical opportunities on which,

perhaps obtained through recce-pull, to be capitalised. Mission Command is based on five

86ADP: Operations in the Land Environment, (May 2010), Paragraph 0502c.

51

“enduring principles”: Unity of Effort, Main Effort, Trust and Mutual Understanding,

Freedom of Action, and Timely and Effective Decision-Making.87

By exploiting their professional skills and advanced technology, manoeuvre warfare

appears to offer modestly-sized Western armed forces a beguiling prospect: the vision of a

quick and decisive victory with modest own-side costs and, through precision neutralization,

with little damage inflicted on the enemy. The success that the 1991 AirLand Battle

campaign achieved in liberating Iraqi-occupied Kuwait subsequently encouraged a confident

America to intervene militarily around the world. U.S. military interventions in Somalia

(1993), Iraq (1996) and Kosovo (1999) produced a profound impact on international security.

The rapid collapses of the Afghan and Iraqi regimes in the face of U.S.-led invasions during

2001 and 2003, respectively, no doubt further reinforced America’s confidence in its

Manoeuvrist doctrine. As subsequent events have showed, however, the achievement of

overwhelming military success no longer necessarily guarantees, as it perhaps once did, the

restoration of regional peace and stability.

The fact that Manoeuvrist warfighting apparently brings decisive success but only

with limited damage inflicted on the defeated side may ensure that the doctrine continues to

exert a profound influence on international security into the foreseeable future. Some of the

future conflicts in which Western forces may become involved will be wars fought for

humanitarian reasons rather than for the direct defence of national territory, harking back to

the 1999 Kosovo Intervention. In such wars, the Manoeuvrist may find that the limited

damage he inflicts could be the crucial determinant of success. In such conflicts, the

Manoeuvrist’s preservation of favourable domestic/international public opinion may be more

important in achieving success than overcoming enemy resistance; by not being seen to

inflict too much devastation, the Manoeuvrist may sustain international support for a 87ADP: Operations in the Land Environment, (May 2010), Paragraphs 0438-0456.

52

sufficiently long period to enable him to achieve military victory. As manoeuvre warfare

seemingly makes it easier to win such wars swiftly and cheaply, presumably Western powers

will continue to intervene around the world for humanitarian motives. Whether the probable

decisive Western military victories that arise do or do not restore local stability will go a long

way to determine whether this warfighting approach will exert an overall positive or negative

impact on international security over the foreseeable future.

Suggested Reading

i. Doctrinal literature

ADP: Operations in the Land Environment (May 2010)

ADP: Operations (2010)

ATP 3.2.1 Land Tactics

ATP 3.2.2 C2 of Land Forces

AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations

AFM Pt.1 Vol.10 Countering Insurgency (2010)

ii. Works on Manoeuvre Warfare and related doctrine

Bellamy, Chris, The Evolution of Land Warfare: Theory and Practice, Routledge, London and New York, 1990.

Bond, Brian. ‘The Army Between the two World Wars 1918-1939’, in David G. Chandler and Ian Beckett, eds., The Oxford History of the British Army. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Hooker, Richard. Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology. Novato., CA: Presidio Press, 1993.

Leonhard, Robert. The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle.Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994.

Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Novato., CA: Presidio Press, 1993.

53

Romjue, John L. American Army Doctrine for the Post Cold-War World. Fort Monroe, Virginia: TRADOC, 1996.

Simpkin, Richard. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. London: Brassey’s, 1985.

Strohn, Matthias. The German Army and the Defence of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle 1918-1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

iii. Campaign-specific texts

Anon. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress. Washington D.C.:US Government Printing Office, 1992.

Aspin, Les, and William Dickinson. Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Washington, Brassey's, 1992.

Bergman, Ahron. Israel’s Wars, 1947-93. London: Routledge, 2000. Carver, Michael. The Apostles of Mobility. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979. Cordesman, Anthony. The Iraq War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Cornish, Paul, ed. The Conflict in Iraq, 2003. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Doughty, Robert A. The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. North Haven:

Archon, 1990.

Dayan, Moshe. Story of My Life. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976. Eshel, David. Chariots of the Desert. London: Brassey’s, 1989. Fontenot, Gregory. On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Annapolis, MD, 2005.

Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh. The Gulf Conflict 1990-91: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005.

Gordon, Michael R., and Bernhard E Trainor. The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. London: Little, Brown & Co, 1995.

Hallion, Richard P. Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War. Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1992.

54

Head, William, and Earl H. Tilford. The Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back at U.S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War. Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1996.

Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars. New York: Vintage House, 1982. Hiro, Dilip. Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War. New York, NY:

Routledge, 1994.

Inbar, Efraim. The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered (BESA Studies in International Security). New York, NY: Routledge, 2002.

Keegan, John. The Iraq War. London: Hutchinson, 2004. Murray, Williamson and Scales, Robert H. The Iraq War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard


Nye, Joseph S. Jr., and Roger K. Smith, eds. After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War. Lanham, MD.: Madison Books, 1992.

O’Loughlin, John, Tom Mayer, and Edward S. Greenberg (eds). War and its Consequences: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1994.

Pimlott, John, and Stephen Badsey, eds. The Gulf War Assessed. London: Arms and Armour, 1992.

Staff of Director of Development and Doctrine, Operations in Iraq: Analysis from a Land Perspective, 2003.

Van Crevald, Martin. The Sword and the Olive. New York: BBS, 1998.

Annexes

• Annex A: The 1940 German Blitzkrieg in the West: The Successful Application of the Manoeuvrist Approach

• Annex B: Soviet Manoeuvre Warfare Concepts, 1942-45 • Annex C: The 1990-91 and 2003 Gulf Wars

Annex A

The 1940 German Blitzkrieg in the West: The Successful Application of the Manoeuvrist Approach

55

“Success springs from speed. The important thing is to forget about your right

and left flank and to push quickly into the enemy’s depth and to take the defenders

again and again by surprise.”88

On 3 September 1939, two days after the German invasion of Poland, France and

Britain declared war on Germany. Despite this act, hardly any fighting occurred on the

western front. Germany was occupied with the campaign in the East, and, after its successful

completion, with the re-grouping of her forces. Both France and Britain were reluctant to

commence offensive actions because of the expectations of high casualties. This period of

comparative quiet, known as the ‘phoney war’, gave the Germans time to evaluate the

campaign against Poland and to draw the appropriate lessons from it. It also enabled them to

adapt their plan for an offensive in the West. The initial plan of attack had resembled the so-

called Schlieffen Plan of the First World War; Germany would invade Belgium, thus

bypassing the Maginot Line, the fortifications that stretched along the Franco-German border

from Switzerland to the Ardennes. However, critics of the initial plan, such as General Erich

von Manstein, regarded it as uninspired and unlikely to produce the ‘big victory’89.

Moreover, when the German plans fell into Allied hands, Manstein’s alternative plan was

eventually adopted. This plan shifted the operation’s main effort from the right (northern)

flank (the Netherlands and Belgium) towards the centre. It was clear that the main German

strike had to fall north of the Maginot Line, because fighting through these fortifications

would result in a loss of surprise, tempo, and momentum, and would also engender high

casualties. Further to the north, the Allies had deployed their main force, so that a German

main effort in the Netherlands and northern Belgium would result in a titanic clash of force-

88Panzer Group Kleist attack order, Ia/Op Nr. 214/40 (21.3.1940) Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, RH 21-1/19. 89Mungo Melvin, Manstein. Hitler´s Greatest General, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010, p. 137

56

on-force that would probably produce a stalemate like the one experienced in the First World

War. The Germans realised that there was another area that could be used for the main thrust:

the northern end of the Maginot Line where it ended in the Ardennes region, a hilly and

wooden area that was regarded as unsuitable for the deployment of large mechanised

formations. Accordingly, it was defended only lightly by the Allies and it was exactly here,

against the Allied centre, that the Germans decided to strike with their main effort.

The German plan was based on boldness and doing the unexpected. Panzer Group

Kleist, which was to spearhead the offensive in the Ardennes, consisted of over 41,000

vehicles. It was granted only four march routes through the Ardennes; heavy congestion –

stretching back as far as the Rhine – was the consequence, making the Panzer Group

vulnerable to enemy air attacks. These, however, did not materialise. Further Allied

operational mistakes facilitated the German offensive, in particular the adoption of the so-

called Breda-Dyle Plan: in the case of a German invasion the Allied troops were to advance

into the Netherlands and Belgium, establishing defensive positions in the area of the Dutch

city of Breda and along the river Dyle. For this, the French had to deploy their Seventh Army,

the bulk of their operational reserves, which was then badly needed elsewhere when the

Germans invaded.

On 10 May 1940, the Germans finally attacked. Infantry divisions supported by only a

few tank divisions invaded the Netherlands and Belgium, while in the south the iron fist of

the army advanced through the Ardennes. The most crucial event was the crossing of the

river Meuse by Heinz Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps on 13 May, which enabled the Germans

audaciously to drive an armoured wedge into the enemy’s rear and advance rapidly to the

Channel coast. This, in combination with the realisation of the Breda-Dyle Plan by the Allies,

led to the rapid encirclement of Allied troops in Northern France, Belgium and the

Netherlands. Despite the fact that 300,000 British and French troops were successfully

57

evacuated from the Dunkirk pocket, Case Yellow, the first phase of the invasion, proved an

outstanding operational success. Some 1.7 million Allied soldiers found themselves caught to

the north of the German advance to the Channel coast; of these 1.2 million surrendered or

were taken prisoner.90 This success enabled the Germans to re-group their forces and to push

deeper into France. The second phase of the operation, called Case Red, lasted until 22 June.

The fortifications of the Maginot Line were attacked from the rear and the Germans pushed

into central France; Paris fell on 14 June and the French government finally surrendered on

the 22nd.

In a campaign that only lasted from 10 May to 22 June 1940, Germany defeated the

numerically stronger Allies in the West. In total, the Germans utilised 135 divisions in the

attack of 10 May (93 of these deployed in the first wave). As pointed out by one historian, the

Wehrmacht resembled ‘a lance whose point consisted of hardened steel; but the wooden shaft

looked all the longer and therefore ever more brittle’.91 In 1940, the German army comprised

157 divisions. Only 10 were tank (panzer) divisions and 6 were motorised infantry divisions;

all the other formations were infantry divisions which marched into France like their fathers

had done in 1914 and their grandfathers in 1870. The German forces were opposed by a total

of 151 Allied divisions, but because the German military had the initiative and established

their main effort, it was possible to convert the Allies’ absolute superiority into relative

German superiority in the decisive central sector of the front.92 Here, 45 German divisions

faced just 18 Allied divisions, most of them of a comparatively low quality. The outcome is

even more astonishing when compared to the First World War, which, in the west, lasted for

over four years without strategic German success and resulted in millions of casualties on

90Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005, p. 318. 91Frieser, p. 32. 92Frieser, p. 90

58

either side. Compared to this, the losses of the 1940 campaign appear light: 49,000 killed in

action and missing on the German side, 120,000 French and 5,000 British KIA and MIA.93

The reason for the swift success lay in the German conduct of battle. The army

wanted to avoid the tactical slaughter that was typical of the First World War and instead

tried to outmanoeuvre the enemy in an operational manner. However, it would be wrong to

speak of a revolution in military thinking and the sudden emergence of a ‘Blitzkrieg’

doctrine. The German army had always aimed at the quick destruction of enemy forces in

battle. It was clear that Germany’s geo-political situation would not countenance prolonged

wars against powerful allies which could mobilise their respective empires. Thus, the German

war plan of 1914 aimed at destroying the French army within a matter of weeks. The problem

was that the speed of operations was dictated by railways and, ultimately, by the speed of

soldiers on foot. Both sides’ operations were restricted by this fact, so that it was difficult to

achieve momentum and surprise on an operational level and to get inside the enemy’s OODA-

loop. By 1940, the armies were motorised to a higher degree, so that the speed of operations

increased. This gave the Germans the upper hand since the French in particular were trying to

re-fight the more static and prolonged First World War, thus forewent full use of the potential

that motorisation offered to their armies. As a consequence, while the potential absolute

speed of both armies increased, in reality the comparative speed of German operations was

higher than that of the French, making it possible for the Germans to achieve surprise, shock,

and momentum on both the tactical and operational levels. Moreover, the Germans were

superior in the conduct of joint and all-arms battle. Their ground units were well-trained in

all-arms warfare, while their air force provided effective CAS, AI, Air Recce, Airborne

Operations and Intra-Theatre Air Lift. The French marshal, Maxime Weygand, summed up

93Frieser, p. 318.

59

the different doctrines by observing that, ‘We have gone to war with a 1918 army against a

German Army of 1939. It is sheer madness.’94

Annex B

Soviet Manoeuvre Warfare Concepts, 1942-45

During the inter-war years the Red Army’s thinking focused on the operational level

of war, operational art, deep battle and deep operations. By 1943-45 seven key themes

dominated Soviet operations: the broad front; maskirovka; tactical concentration of force;

holding and strike forces; operational simultaneity; and tactical annihilation followed by deep

operational manoeuvre. These principles were incorporated into three forms of operational

art: the frontal blow, operational encirclement and the turning move.

Broad Front. The broad front spread the enemy’s forces, thus reducing their depth

and density.95 In conjunction with deception this undermined the enemy’s ability to discern

the main effort, forcing him to defend his entire frontage. In addition, by reducing the depth

and density of the enemy’s tactical defences the Red Army increased the chances of a rapid

breakthrough in deep battle.

Maskirovka. This comprised a compound of deception, disinformation, security and

camouflage.96 It aimed to confuse the enemy by playing to false expectations or misleading

him. It was a mandatory part of the Red Army’s commitment to out-think, out-manoeuvre

94Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, p. 539. 95Richard W. Harrison, The Development of Russian-Soviet Operational Art, 1904-37, p. 186; Raymond L. Garthoff, How Russian Makes War: Soviet Military Doctrine. London: George Allen and Unwin p. 129. R. Simpkin, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii. London: Brassey’s, p. 34. Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-1917. London: Penguin, 1998, pp. 237-239. 96Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya (The Soviet Military Encyclopaedia), vol.5., Moscow, 1977, pp. 175-177 has a detailed definition of the theory and practice of maskirovka.

60

and out-fight the enemy. 97 It was practised at the strategic, operational and tactical level and

was closely connected to the concepts of acquiring the initiative and surprise.98

Localised Tactical Concentration of Force. The combined purpose of a broad front

and maskirovka was to create disguised concentrations of force to facilitate a rapid

breakthrough.99 In July 1944, in the Lublin-Brest Operation, Rokossovsky’s 1st Belarussian

Front deployed on a 200 km front, but with 70th Army alone covering 120km of this front.

Maskirovka ensured 8th Guards Army, the main effort, was secretly deployed on a 9km

breakthrough sector. The 8th Guards Army’s three rifle corps each deployed on their own

3km sector. These individual corps deployed three divisions, one behind the other. Therefore,

localised concentration in breadth was supported by strength in depth.100

Holding and Strike Forces. Soviet theory divided formations into holding and strike

forces. A strike force, like 8th Guards Army, struck deep while a holding force, such as 70th

Army, fixed and stretched the enemy.101 The aim was to make the breadth and depth of attack

compatible.102 If all Soviet formations had been equal, operational command would simply

have involved launching a huge grinding mass. However, skilful operational commanders

integrated holding and strike forces into an overall plan.

97David M.Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. London: Frank Cass, 1989, p.33. 98Glantz, pp. 22-23. 99Harrison, p. 63. 100Glantz, p. 405; B.Petrov, ‘O Sozdanii Udarnoi Gruppirovki Voisk v Lyublinskoi-Breskoi Nastupatel’noi Operatsii’ [About the Creation of Shock Groups in the Lublin-Brest Operation], Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal [Military History Journal], no.3, (March 1978), p. 83. 101Garthoff, p. 134 citing the Red Army Field Regulations of 1936. 102Colonel V. I. Ul’yanov, The Development of the Theory of Deep Offensive Battle in the Prewar Years, in Orenstein, vol. II, op.cit. p. 292.

61

Operational Simultaneity: Simultaneous General Assault. A Soviet operation was

launched simultaneously in the air, on the ground, in breadth and in depth.103 A simultaneous

assault disguised the main effort, fixed the enemy and undermined his ability to re-deploy

forces to key sectors. Operational simultaneity’s clearest expression was the airborne

descent.104 Airborne forces were to confuse, disrupt and dislocate the enemy, but theory

proved ruinous in practice. After a disastrous operation over the Dnepr, west of Kiev in

November 1943, the role of airborne forces was executed instead by airpower.105

Localised Tactical Annihilation. Localised tactical annihilation of the enemy in deep

battle was vital to a Soviet operation. A quick breakthrough created ideal conditions for deep

operations. Failure condemned an operation to grinding attrition or positional stalemate. In

practice some Soviet commanders accepted tactical attrition as an end in itself but this did not

constitute Soviet doctrine, which argued that ‘if a tactical effort does not develop into an

operational achievement it becomes, in essence, pointless.’106

The Nature of Soviet Deep Operations. A Soviet operation consisted of tactical

deep battle and deep operational manoeuvre. The aim of a deep operation was “to prevent or

delay the arrival of” the enemy’s “operational reserves by defeating these units in detail; to

surround and destroy those units still at the front; and to continue the offensive into the

defender’s operational depth.”107 In short, the deep operation sought to turn tactical success

into operational victory. Soviet mobile groups conducted deep operations to:

103Marshal M. V. Zakhravo, On the Theory of Deep Operations, in Orenstein, vol. II, p. 115 gives the clearest definition. See also Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory, London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 215-16. 104Garthoff, How Russian Makes War, op.cit., p. 351. 105See David M. Glantz, History of Soviet Airborne Forces, London: Frank Cass, 1993. 106G. Isserson, The Evolution of Operational Art, In Harold S. Orenstein, The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, vol. 1, op. cit, p.74. 107N.Varfolomeyev, Operativnoye Iskusstva na Sovremennom Etape [Operational Art at the Contemporary Stage], Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 3rd June 1932, p. 2, cited in Richard Harrsion, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940, University Press of Kansas, 2001, p.195.

62

• Pre-empt enemy defences

• Disrupt and defeat enemy reserves

• Secure bridgeheads and river crossings

• Seize key ground and systemic points

• Threaten enemy withdrawal routes and approach routes

• Exercise psychological leverage upon the enemy

• By-pass enemy strong points and forces

• Inflict continuing losses on the enemy108

Frontal Blow. A frontal blow aimed to penetrate the enemy’s tactical defences and

launch a deep operation designed to splinter the enemy into isolated tactical pieces before

shattering his physical and psychological cohesion.109 On 17 January 1945, Marshal

Rokossovsky unleashed 5th Guards Tank Army into East Prussia. It crashed into the German

operational rear, reached the Baltic coast and cut off German troops in East Prussia. This

deep strike achieved the strategic division of East Prussia from Germany and shattered the

operational cohesion of German forces in western and eastern Prussia. Simultaneously, deep

operations by individual Soviet armoured corps fragmented German tactical forces. In short,

in strategic, operational and tactical terms the East Prussian operation of January 1945

constituted a classic frontal blow operation.110

108P. A. Kurochkin, ‘Operations of Tank Armies in Operational Depth,’ in Selected Readings from Military Thought, 1963-1973, Washington D.C., 1982, p. 65. 109A. M. Vol’pe, Frontalnyi Udar [Frontal Blow], in A. B. Kadishev, Voprosy Strategii I Operativnogo Iskusstva [Questions of Strategy and Operational Art], pp. 362-373; S. Naveh, In Pursuit of Operational Military Excellence, op. cit. pp. 213-215, discusses different forms of the frontal blow. 110Tsentral’yni Arkhiv Ministerstva Oborny [Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence], f. 46. op. 2430. d.1369. ‘ Boyevoye Doneseniye Shtaba 2-go Belorusskogo Fronta O Razvitti Nastupatelniya I Vykhode Podvizhnykh Chasey Fronta K Yuzhnomu Poberezh’yu Danzigskoy Bukhty v Rayone Severnee El’binga’ [Battle Report of the Staff of 2nd Belorussian Front About the Development of the

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Operational Encirclement and Annihilation. Other Red Army commanders such as

Zhukov, however, emphasised massive operational encirclements.111 Physical annihilation

was the key, so if the enemy lacked depth, deep operations were shallow. If the enemy

possessed greater depth, operational manoeuvre was deeper. Therefore, in this area of

operational art deep operations were a means to an end. The dominant theme was operational

annihilation, not depth. It is ironic that Zhukov, the epitome of a Soviet commander,

possessed an operational style that was Germanic.112

The Turning Move (obkhod) targeted the psychological will to fight through a deep

strike into the enemy operational rear. It was designed to threaten key ground as well as the

potential destruction of the enemy. By threatening catastrophic annihilation Soviet

commanders sought to manoeuvre the enemy out of a position. However, the Red Army

understood that the psychological threat of the obkhod required the raw, physical fighting

power necessary to make the threat of annihilation a credible one. Therefore, the

psychological concept of the obkhod relied heavily on physical fighting power. After

Stalingrad, German soldiers were susceptible to fears of disaster and none could be under any

illusions about the ruthless determination of the Red Army.113

Soviet operational art, deep battle and deep operations were distinctly Russian

concepts that anticipated similar western ideas by half a century. The Red Army may not

Offensive and Movement of Front Mobile Formations to the Southern Coast of the Bay of Danzig in the Area North of Elbing], 26th January 1945. 111In the period August 1939-March 1945, Zhukov was involved in the planning or execution of at least nine major operational scale encirclement and annihilation operations in contrast to his fellow commander, Marshal Rokossovskiy whose preferred operational method was the deep operational strike. See, Stephen Walsh, Leadership and Command on the Eastern Front (1941-1945): The Military Style of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovskiy, Ph.D Thesis, Cranfield University, 2009, pp. 344-347. 112Walsh, op.cit., p.347. 113See Chris Bellamy, ‘Heirs of Genghis Khan: The Influence of the Tartar-Mongols on the Imperial Russian and Soviet Armies, The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, CXXVIII, No.1, March 1983, pp. 54-55; C. Bellamy, The Evolution of Land Warfare: Theory and Practice, London and New York: Routledge, 1990, p.34; R. Simpkin, Deep Battle¸ London: Brassey’s, 1997, p. 33.

64

have matched the tactical prowess of the Germans, but at the operational and strategic level in

the period November 1942-May 1945 it frequently out-thought and out-manoeuvred the

Wehrmacht. It might be argued that with the possible exception of the Normandy landings,

this was not an achievement matched by the western allies.

Annex C

Modern Manoeuvrist Wars: The 1990-91 and 2003 Gulf Wars

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces occupied the oil-rich neighbouring state of Kuwait. In

response, the United Nations authorised the defensive deployment to the region of a 500,000-

strong U.S.-led multinational coalition, and subsequently the use of military force to reverse

Iraq’s aggression, giving the Iraqis until 15 January 1991 to withdraw. On 16 January, with

no withdrawal apparent, the Coalition initiated the First Gulf War. The campaign allowed

U.S. forces to test their new AirLand Battle Manoeuvre Warfare doctrine, which used

advanced technology to fight a decisive Joint-service campaign in pursuit of limited political

aims. The Coalition air war lasted 43 days, but only involved simultaneous ground operations

during its last 100 hours. Combining attritional strikes against Iraq’s ground forces with

strategic efforts, spearheaded by revolutionary Stealth aircraft to smash Iraq’s C3I

capabilities, the air campaign was stunningly successful. Saddam responded by firing Scud

missiles against Israel, unsuccessfully aiming to bring it into the war and thus collapsing the

Coalition’s cohesion. With the achievement of not just Air Superiority but Air Supremacy,

Coalition airpower effectively supported the ensuing ground war through Air

Reconnaissance, Close Air Support, Air Interdiction, and Airborne Operations.

On 24 February, the Coalition ground war against Iraq’s ground forces, 250,000-

strong, commenced. Some 24 infantry divisions manned the Iraqi defences along Kuwait’s

coast and the Iraqi-Saudi/Kuwaiti-Saudi borders. Behind them Saddam deployed as mobile

65

reserves eight army and seven Republican Guard divisions, the latter forming his regime’s

politico-military backbone. Saddam hoped that the Coalition would operate solely on

Kuwaiti, not Iraqi, territory, and thus pose little threat to his regime – his overriding concern.

Iraqi strategy aimed to force a compromise on the Coalition by inflicting heavy casualties, or

at least be expelled from Kuwait in what Saddam could “spin” as admirable Arab resistance

to Western neo-imperialism. This strategy failed due to the Coalition’s professional skills and

cutting-edge technology, as well as the Iraqi forces’ inherent weaknesses. Saddam never

placed the need for military victory above his staying in power; with the exception of the

Guard, he restricted his conscript forces’ competence to prevent them posing an internal

threat. Moreover, Iraq’s centralised command ethos ensured its commanders obeyed

Saddam’s orders. Coalition air strikes smashed Iraqi C3I capabilities and with commanders

unable to act on their own initiative, Iraqi ground units reacted very sluggishly to the high-

tempo Coalition operations, which got inside the enemy’s decision-making cycle. Air attacks

further degraded the Iraqis’ already fragile morale, which led to thousands of soldiers eagerly

surrendering.

The Coalition ground campaign plan comprised two key elements. In the east,

Coalition forces would assault north toward Kuwait City to fix Iraqi forces, thus facilitating

the main effort across remote desert terrain out to the west. Here, U.S. armour would advance

200 miles north-east in a “left hook” to smash the Guard and seal off Kuwait to the south; the

Coalition would thus achieve decisive success within a limited geographical area. The ground

war developed broadly as planned. During 24-27 February, as the eastern attack unfolded,

further west U.S. mobile forces charged north-east. Operating over flat desert terrain, these

forces not only generated tempo and momentum, but inflicted shock upon the enemy,

allowing them to overrun numerous Iraqi positions. During these battles Iraqi fire failed to

destroy a single American tank, testifying to the Coalition’s technological superiority. By 27

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February only a sliver of north-eastern Kuwait remained to be liberated, and so at 0800 hours

on the 28th the Coalition accepted an Iraqi-proposed ceasefire.

The Coalition had achieved a stunning military victory in pursuit of limited political

aims, liberating Kuwait at a cost of 996 combat casualties against 65,000 enemy casualties

inflicted, thus validating AirLand Battle doctrine. This victory, however, was more

ambiguous than it seemed. Despite overwhelming tactical success, the Coalition did not fully

achieve its secondary aims of destroying Saddam’s WMD and his Guard, which meant that

he could continue to destabilise regional security. One reason for this wider failure was the

impact of media coverage. During 27 February the Western public’s attitude to the war

swiftly changed after viewing scenes of the apparent mass-slaughter of Iraqis along the Basra

road; this change shocked the American government into prematurely ending the war. This

failure to limit Saddam’s de-stabilising regional influence led to confrontations that

culminated in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

The U.S. forces that undertook Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) were considerably

smaller than those that had been so successful in Operation Desert Storm: the post-Cold War

draw down had seen to that. Doctrine had changed, too, to reflect a new world order. Many in

the U.S. military advocated a heavy, cautious invasion in keeping with the Powell Doctrine of

‘Overwhelming Force’; however, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld was adamant

that the force would be considerably smaller – ‘light, lean and mean’, as he put it.114 Indeed,

the Coalition would deploy less than half the troops and one-third of the tanks used in 1991.

Unable to deploy from Turkey in the North, the main U.S. assault came from the

south via Kuwait in the shape of 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division and 1st Marine

114Department of Defense daily brief, 20 March 2003, cited by Philip Wilkinson and Tim Garden, ‘Military Concepts and Planning’ in Paul Cornish, ed., The Conflict in Iraq, 2003, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 111.

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Expeditionary Force (1st MEF), supported by the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions. Heading

straight for Baghdad, reckoned to be the Iraqi centre of gravity – avoiding both significant

Iraqi forces and major conurbations – the 3rd Division advanced along a western axis roughly

following the Euphrates River, while 1st MEF thrust north up the eastern route along the

course of the Tigris. Unlike 1991 there was no long preliminary air bombardment. Twelve

years of UN-imposed sanctions and intermittent air strikes meant that the Iraqi air defences

were already degraded. Thus, the opening air effort of 20-21 March concentrated on

supporting the ground invasion; it was only on the following night that the full weight of

Coalition air power was concentrated on Baghdad as part of the so-called ‘shock and awe’

campaign, which failed both to bring down the regime or instigate the immediate collapse of

the army. Indeed, the main contribution of the highly integrated air campaign was the

immediate establishment of air supremacy and the support it provided for ground

operations.115

The ground campaign was remarkably successful. Iraqi forces failed to mount much

coordinated resistance, and an attempt to counter-attack on 26-27 March during a sandstorm

was devastated by Coalition air power. The twin-pronged advance on the capital made

excellent progress and the deployment of 173rd Airborne Brigade to the north in conjunction

with special forces and Kurdish guerrillas fixed the Iraqi forces north of Baghdad in place

and took pressure off the advance in the south. U.S. forces defeated the Republican Guard

divisions defending the capital without any difficulty and then 3rd Infantry Division began a

series of armoured ‘reconnaissance by force’ probes or ‘Thunder Runs’ into the city. This

was followed by a major drive into the centre of the city that took advantage of the collapsing

defence and by 9 April the city had fallen. Fighting elsewhere continued sporadically until

about 14 April. 115Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, The Iraq War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 2003, pp. 110-1.

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The broadly conventional phase of the 2003 invasion was a remarkable example of

manoeuvre warfare. Although Iraqi performance was singularly unimpressive, the U.S. drive

for Baghdad, correctly seen as the regime’s centre of gravity, demonstrated flexibility,

maintenance of momentum and application of shock action that by any measure ‘shattered

the enemy’s cohesion and will to fight.’

The British contribution to the invasion of 2003, Operation Telic, was similar in scale

and complexion to that of Operation Granby in 1991: roughly 20,000 troops of 1st Armoured

Division. This time, however, it was a considerably higher proportion of the Coalition ground

effort, comprising about one third of the land power committed.116 First Armoured Division,

consisting of 7th Armoured, 3 Commando and 16 Air Assault Brigades had the tasks of

securing the Ramaila oil fields, seizing the vital port of Umm Qasr and besieging and then

capturing Basra, Iraq’s second city.

On 20 March 2003, supported by naval gunfire, land based artillery and U.S.

airpower, Royal Marines and U.S. and British special forces seized the oil facilities on the Al-

Faw peninsula, taking the Iraqi defenders by surprise. U.S. Marines captured the port at Umm

Qasr before handing it over to 3 Commando who then went on to clear the city. The troops of

16 Air Assault, meanwhile, and 7th Armoured Division pushed north onto the outskirts of

Basra. The Iraqi defence was predicated on drawing the British into an urban battlefield. The

1st Armoured Division commander, Major-General Robin Brims was unwilling to comply

and a state of siege developed over the subsequent two weeks. The British pushed special

forces and sniper teams into the city, launched raids against Ba’ath Party targets and directed

air strikes against Iraqi command and control centres. An Iraqi attempt to launch an armoured

break-out was decisively defeated by Challenger tanks of the Scots Dragoon Guards.

116Murray and Scales, p. 132.

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On 6 April the British mounted a three-pronged drive into the city centre. The

intention had been to pull back at night, but Brims judged that the situation had reached its

‘tipping point’ and the Ba’ath Party was on the point of collapse.117 Thus, the British battle

groups pushed on and the final Iraqi stand took place in the Manawi Albashi district which

had to be cleared with, in the words of a British officer, ‘good old-fashioned bayonet and rifle

work.’118 Basra had been captured at minimal cost in both British and civilian lives. While

certainly not a classic mobile battle, the British had used Manoeuvrist principles in refusing

to play to Iraqi strengths and fight as their opponents had hoped. The British had targeted the

Iraqi centre of gravity – the Ba’ath Party command and control structure – and achieved

tactical and moral dominance. They had accurately judged the point of Iraqi collapse and thus

maintained the momentum of their final assault, bringing about the end of Ba’athist control in

Basra. While militarily overrunning the entire country had proven relatively straightforward,

winning the peace proved more problematic. We now know that Saddam had recognised that

he could not prevent a U.S.-led invasion overrunning the country, so instead prepared to

wage a subsequent well-orchestrated insurgency. In so doing, Saddam focussed less on

resisting the American military conquest of Iraq and more on ensuring that this U.S. victory

did not lead to peace on the latter’s terms. In that sense Saddam could be aptly described as

using his strength to engage Coalition weakness; one is thus left wondering whether Saddam

was in fact the most Manoeuvrist actor during the war in Iraqi during 2003-04.

Glossary of Manoeuvre Warfare terms

Airborne Operations (formerly,

Deliver land forces directly onto the objective in order to seize ground or installations that are vital to the opponent.

Allied Joint publication [AJP]-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land

117Wilkinson and Garden, p. 129. 118Murray and Scales, p. 152.

70

Air Assault) This may be achieved by airdrop or air-landing delivery.

Operations, Paragraph 0414.SH

Air Interdiction (AI)

Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade or destroy an enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively and at such distance that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and manoeuvre of friendly forces is not required.

Allied Joint publication [AJP]-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Paragraph 0412a.SH

AirLand Battle

The US land and air forces’ Manoeuvrist Joint Doctrine introduced in the 1982 version of FM-100-5 (Operations).

John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post Cold-War World, Fort Monroe, Virginia: TRADOC, 1996, page 16-17.SH

Air Superiority

That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

JDP-0.01.1 United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions. SH

Air Supremacy

That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.

JDP-0 01.1 United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions. SH

Close Air Support (CAS)

Action by fixed and rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets, which requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces for fratricide avoidance and targeting guidance.

Allied Joint publication [AJP]-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Paragraph 0412b. SH

Cohesion The action or fact of forming a united whole. It is central to the effectiveness of teams of all sizes …. [and] has three related aspects: moral, conceptual, and physical.

ADP: Operations in the Land Environment, Paragraph 0408. SH

Combat The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military

JDP-0.01.1 United Kingdom Glossary of

71

Power unit/formation can apply against an opponent at a given time.

Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions. SH

C3I Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

Common Usage

Decision-cycle

See OODA Loop n/a

Defeat To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy, to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or at least cannot fulfil his intention.

JOTAC Aide-Memoire, Page 46. SH

Destroy To kill or so damage an enemy force that it is rendered useless.


Disrupt [To] Break apart the enemy formation and its tempo; to rupture the integrity of the enemy’s capability.


Effects The consequences of activities. They are changes or consequences as a result of actions, circumstances, or other causes.


Fix To deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and thus deprive him of his freedom of action to gain one’s own forces freedom of action.


Hybrid Threats

Any adversaries that simultaneously and adaptively employ a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the same battle-space to obtain their political objectives.

Army Field Manual Part 10 Countering Insurgency (2010), Page 1-1. SH

Initiative The ability to dictate the course of tactical events.


Intra-theatre airlift

Provides air movement within the J[oint] O[perating] A[rea] and is normally fulfilled by tactical air transport/support helicopters capable of operation under a wide range of tactical conditions,

Allied Joint publication [AJP]-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Paragraph

72

including small, austere, unimproved field operations.

0413b. SH

Intent Is defined as Purpose. It represents what the commander has determined to achieve and binds the force together; it is the principal result of decision-making. It is normally expressed using effects and objectives.


Manoeuvrist Approach

An attitude of mind. It is an approach to operations based on understanding and manipulating human nature; applying strength against vulnerabilities and points of influence; and exploiting indirect methods, in order to affect an adversary’s fighting power. The essence of the approach is that the effect achieved is more important than how it is done. …. The Manoeuvrist Approach is about manoeuvring the mind, more than it is about physical manoeuvre.


Manoeuvrist Approach (1996 definition)

An approach to operations in which the shattering of the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.

Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine (1996), Page 4-21. SH

Manoeuvre Warfare

A war-fighting philosophy that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion – his ability to fight as an effective, co-ordinated whole – rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition.


Manoeuvre Warfare (1996 definition)

[Operations] that seek to inflict losses indirectly by envelopment, encirclement and disruption. [These aim at] the destruction of the enemy’s will and cohesion … by inflicting on him a series of rapid, violent and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.

Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine (1996) Page 4-22. SH

73

Main Effort A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision.


Mission Command

A command philosophy of centralised intent and decentralised execution, that promotes freedom of action and initiative.

ADP: Operations in the Land Environment, Paragraphs 0404, 0445. SH

Momentum The effect that a formation or unit that is moving can have. It is the product of that force’s size and speed (mass multiplied by velocity).

Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine (1996) Pages 4-23 – 4-24. SH

Neutralise To render the enemy temporarily ineffective.


OODA-loop The phases of the decision-making process – or Observe, Orient[ate], Decide, and Act – as conceived by USAF Colonel John Boyd in the 1970s.

Common Usage

Other Operations

Other Operations are those that are conducted in situations other than war; it replaces ‘Operations Other Than War’ to reflect the need for similar combat capabilities in situations short of warfighting.


Operations Other Than War

Operations in which key factors other than war would be the key elements in achieving mission success; [they] involve often complex and sensitive political situations ‘when victory comes more subtly than in war’.

John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post Cold-War World, Fort Monroe, Virginia: TRADOC, 1996, page 126. SH

Operational Art

Operational Art is the orchestration of a campaign, in concert with other agencies, to convert strategic objectives into tactical activity and employment of forces in order to achieve a desired outcome. The key aspects of this art need to be recognised and understood by those


74

operating at the tactical level, not least because it is the source from which they derive intent.

Operational Level

The operational level of warfare provides the bridge between the strategic and tactical levels. It is the level at which a J[oint] F[orce] C[ommander] or theatre commander plans, conducts and sustains military operations as part of an overall inter-agency approach.


Pre-emption. To seize an opportunity, which may be fleeting, in order to deny him [the enemy] an advantage before he acts. It wrests the initiative from the adversary and frustrates his plan.


Shape (Shaping)

Shaping tasks create or preserve the conditions for the success of the decisive act. Those conditions relate to the enemy, the environment, and a force itself. Influence is a key outcome of shaping tasks. Achieving economy of effort is an important aspect of shaping tasks, as it supports the concentration of force, in time and space, required for the decisive act. Shaping may occur before, during or after the decisive act. Shaping will often be aimed at the perceptions of the parties involved and the population.


Shock Action The sudden, concentrated application of violence.


Tempo The rate of activity … [it] is a measure of the extent to which the potential speed of a formation or unit is exploited relative to the enemy.

Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine (1996), Page 4-24. SH

Unity of Effort

Stems from a number of inter-related means. These include: the commander’s ability to formulate a clear intent and mission statements; the use of common doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures; a common language of

Allied Joint publication [AJP]-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Paragraph 0614. SH

75

command; a high standard of collective training and teamwork; and the designation of a main effort. Taken together, these generate common understanding throughout a force.

Will Will is the determination to persist in the face of adversity. It has two aspects: intent and resolve.


Coalition and Expeditionary Operations

The contraction of British global power and the disappearance of the British Empire

have decisively shaped how the United Kingdom conducts its British military operations in

the aftermath of the Second World War. Moreover, the pace of change has only accelerated

since the Cold War has come to an end. The application of British military force is now most

likely to take place in the context of a coalition and to involve an expeditionary dimension.

As General Sir Jack Deverell has commented ‘there are two distinct military phenomena that

are almost always intrinsically linked: expedition and coalition’.119 For reasons of evolving

foreign policy priorities, changed strategic circumstances and diminished economic

resources, British military power is most likely to be deployed alongside others and at a

distance from the United Kingdom. It has been only rarely used in a unilateral fashion - - the

Falklands conflict in 1982 being one of the few notable cases. With a greatly diminished

capacity for the unilateral military action, the British armed forces have engaged with allies

and partners in coalition operations. Although in a few instances, the coalition military action

has been undertaken as an equal partner (Suez 1956), more often than not and particularly

since the end of the Cold War, collaborative military endeavours have been as a junior

119General Sir Jack Deverell, ‘Coalition Warfare and Expeditionary Operations’, RUSI Journal, (February 2002), p. 18.

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partner to the United States (Gulf Wars and Afghanistan). With a greatly reduced global

network of bases, operations in the wake of the Cold War have become expeditionary in

character. Post-Cold War political developments saw British defence policy shift from a

NATO European-centric military posture to one focused increasingly upon expeditionary

operations outside the UK-NATO area. This renewed emphasis on expeditionary operations

has provided an important reminder of the doctrinal and capability challenges in mounting

and sustaining operations at a distance from the UK home base. This chapter will examine in

turn the nature of coalition and expeditionary operations by defining key concepts,

highlighting the relevant elements of doctrine, and considering the challenges associated with

these types of operations. The case studies to the chapter will provide supplementary material

concerning Iwo Jima 1945, Suez 1956, Falklands 1982, Sierra Leone 2000 and the invasion

of Iraq 2003 from the perspective of coalition and expeditionary operations.

Why embark on a coalition operation?

The answer to this question is to aggregate the military power of individual states into

a stronger whole so that the sum of each individual part is greater than any single

contribution. Harnessing the aggregated military strength on a coalition operation, however,

has always been more challenging than arriving at a simple sum of all of its participants’

contributions. Indeed, critics of coalitions argue that the very opposite can be true: ‘coalitions

mean friction, inefficiency, and the whole amounting to less than the sum of the parts’.120

Because of the challenges inherent in a military coalition, the fulcrum of opinion is distinctly

tilted in the direction of the detractors of coalition operations. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower,

who led during the Second World War what was one of the most successful coalition military 120Wayne A. Silkett, ‘Alliance and Coalition Warfare’, Parameters, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, (Summer 1993), p. 83.

77

efforts in modern times and who is considered something of a paragon of coalition leadership

was nevertheless a scathing critic of coalition operations: ‘History testifies to the ineptitude

of coalitions in waging war. Allied failures have been so numerous and their inexcusable

blunders so common that professional soldiers had long discounted the possibility of effective

allied action . . .’121 British military disdain for coalition operations has historically matched

that of other countries. Maj Gen Sir Reginald Clare Hart, in his Reflections on the Art of War

published in 1901, maintained that ‘allied armies seldom fight well together; there are always

discords, dissensions, and jealousies. The counsels and interests of allies are so divergent that

concerted action and loyal co-operation are almost impossible’.122

Despite this military pessimism, coalition military operations have for the British

Army been historically ubiquitous and since the end of the Second World War less

discretionary and more an operational way-of-life. The British success in meeting the

challenges of coalition operations has been underpinned by flexibility and pragmatism as

exemplified by Field Marshal Sir William Slim’s observations on the coalition aspects of

high command during the Second World War:

Now, it is an extraordinary thing that you should meet with so much opposition from allies. Allies, altogether, are really very extraordinary people. It is astonishing how obstinate they are, how parochially minded, how ridiculously sensitive to prestige and how wrapped up in obsolete political ideas. It is equally astonishing how they fail to see how broad-minded you are, how clear your picture is, how up-to-date you are and how cooperative and big-hearted you are. It is extraordinary. But let me tell you, when you feel like that about allies – and you have even worse allies than the British, believe me – when you feel like that, just remind yourself of two things. First you are an ally too, and all allies look just the same. If you walk to the other side of the table, you will look just like that

121Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, London: William Heineman Limited, 1948, p. 6. 122Maj Gen Sir Reginald Clare Hart, Reflections on the Art of War, London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1901, p. 141.

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to the fellow sitting opposite. Then the next thing to remember is that there is only one thing worse than having allies – that is not having allies.123

Field Marshall Slim’s last point, that on balance it is preferable to have coalition

partners on an operation than not, is key and requires more elaboration. British military

doctrine provides three reasons why it is desirable to embark on coalition operations and the

advantages they bring to the United Kingdom. The capstone joint doctrine publication JDP 01

Campaigning, states that ‘. . . the commitment by multiple nations to contribute military

forces in order to accomplish agreed goals brings 3 advantages’:

• increased political muscle and enhanced legitimacy across the international community;

• shared risk and cost; and • increased military power and effectiveness.124

The operational experience of General Sir Rupert Smith, who held coalition command

in Southeast Europe in the 1990s, echoed many of the themes found in British military

doctrine:

We enter into these arrangements for a number of reasons: we need more forces, or more space; we want the legitimacy of numbers; we want to spread the risk – of failure, to resource, of responsibility; and we all want a seat at the table.125

Coalition Operations: Doctrine and Problems of Cohesion and Command

With the increasing standardisation of military terminology due to long-standing

relationships between allied states, such as those in NATO, it is possible to find widely-

accepted definitions of key concepts found in doctrine. Nevertheless, some distinctive

123Field Marshal Sir William Slim, ‘Higher Command in War’, Military Review, Vol. LXX, No. 5, (May 1990), p. 12. 124Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (JDP01) Campaigning, 2nd Edition, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, 21 December 2012, p. 4A-1. 125Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, London: Allen Lane, 2005, p. 301.

79

national terminology can persist. In United Kingdom military doctrine, a coalition is defined

as ‘an ad-hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action’.126 In contrast,

the United States Department of Defense describes a coalition as ‘an arrangement between

two or more nations for common action’.127 A more elaborate version of the above two

definitions is provided by Andrew J. Pierre, Coalitions: Building and Maintenance. Pierre

defines a coalition as ‘a grouping of like-minded states that agree on the need for joint action

on a specific problem at a particular time with no commitment to a durable relationship’.128

From the above definitions, it is clear that coalitions are formed for specific purposes and can

have limited durability and life-span.

Apart from differing nuances in meaning, ‘coalition’ is not always used with enormous precision and is often used interchangeably with the term ‘alliance’. To a greater or lesser degree, politicians, soldiers and academics can all be guilty of this imprecision.129 At least for the United States the term ‘alliance’ has a distinctive meaning. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, an alliance is ‘the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members’.130

The key difference between a coalition and an alliance rests on its permanency. An

alliance is a formal standing arrangement which, at its core, has an obligation of collective

defence if one of its members is attacked. Thus, an alliance has a great deal more durability

with its treaty foundation, its developed institutions and its capacity for deterrence. The North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an example of such an alliance. The multiplicity of

terms to describe military collaboration between different countries also embraces the

126Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1, United Kingdom Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database, 8th Edition, September 2011, p. C-3. 127Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 August 2012), p. 47. 128Andrew J. Pierre, Coalitions: Building and Maintenance. Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, War on Terrorism, Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2002, p. 2. 129For an academic example the interchangeable use of coalition and alliance see: Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete (eds.), Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1983. 130Joint Publication 1-02, US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 14.

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expression ‘multinational operations’. According to the U.S. Defense Department a

multinational operation is defined as ‘a collective term to describe military actions conducted

by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or

alliance’.131 Unlike the definitions for coalition and alliance, the descriptor ‘multinational

operations’ tells us nothing about its purpose but simply indicates that two or more countries

are conducting military activity together.

The above definitions highlight some significant conceptual and doctrinal differences.

Since the end of the Cold War such distinctions between alliance and coalition have been

breaking down with the two categories becoming applicable at the same time. For example,

in the NATO operation in Afghanistan, the NATO alliance is functioning in a strikingly ad

hoc way despite more than a half a century of NATO institutions and efforts to cultivate

allied integration and solidarity and to promote common aims. What this tells us is that when

an alliance engages in collective military activity that is discretionary and not driven by

collective self-defence, then alliances in those circumstances behave and indeed become

effectively a coalition, albeit one with a permanent address. Despite these contradictions, all

of these concepts have the shared common feature of indicating the differing ways in which

military collaboration between states can be understood.

As doctrine is meant to be a starting point to indicate how armed services fight and

provide a guide to training, what doctrine exists on military coalitions? In the United

Kingdom, there is no specific and discrete doctrine for coalition operations. At the national

level, British military doctrine weaves into the fabric of capstone joint doctrine publications

such as JDP 01 Campaigning or the Army’s ADP Operations discussion of the factors

131Ibid., p. 210.

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shaping coalition operations.132 The British armed services can also draw on international

efforts to produce ‘doctrine-like’ aide memoirs for coalition operations. Collaborative efforts

such as the ABCA group (America, Britain, Canada and Australia) have resulted in the

creation of an international body that has produced guidance for coalition operations.133 One

of the most important ideas to come out of this doctrinal development has been the idea of

‘unity of purpose’ and ‘unity of effort’. The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions

defines ‘unity of effort’ in the following way: ‘in military operations, coordination and

cooperation among all actors in order to achieve a common goal’.134 This idea may be critical

to making coalition operations work but it rows against one of the central tenets of military

life – the idea of unity of command. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded one

of the most diverse coalition operations during the first Gulf War in 1991, a conflict in which

the United States made the overwhelmingly dominant military contribution to coalition

operations, accepted that unity of command was not possible in this instance in order to

achieve military success:

I agreed that for the alliance to have a prayer of working, we needed a hybrid system like the one we’d used in Vietnam, where Americans had fought under American commanders, South Vietnamese under South Vietnamese commanders, and the actions of the armies were coordinated at the very top. Though this approach violated an age-old principle of warfare called unity of command, I’d seen it in action, and I knew I could make it work even better in the Gulf than it had in Vietnam.135

For an army taking part in a coalition military operation it has to overcome a number

of challenges. At the strategic and operational levels of war, the problem faced is one of

132Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (JDP01) Campaigning, 2nd Edition, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, 21 December 2012 and Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Operations, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, 1 November 2010. 133ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook, 4th Edition, ABCA Publication 332, 14 April 2008. 134AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), Edition 2012 Version 2, NATO Standardization Agency, 2012, p. 2-U-1. 135General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, London: Bantam Press, 1992, p. 313.

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exercising control or influence over objectives and the course of military operations. The

efforts to achieve ‘unity of purpose’, ‘unity of effort’ or ‘unity of command’ are shaped by

the distribution of military power in a coalition operation. Traditionally, participants in

coalition operations have had to contend with either horizontal or vertical power

relationships. The distribution of military power is an important, indeed, paramount factor in

any coalition. In a horizontal coalition operation, a few roughly equal major military

contributors dominate decision-making and coordinate operations in a partnership

characterized by consensual decision-making. The British-French (Russian and US) coalition

during the First World War is a good example of the horizontal military coalition structure.

A vertical coalition structure sees one very large military contributor having the dominant

voice over all the other coalition members due to the size of their military contribution.

Differences in power and influence among coalition partners means that ‘smaller partners…

[can] feel bullied or neglected’ and larger, dominating partners complain of ‘inequitably

shared risks and burdens’.136

Since the end of the Cold War, the British armed forces have regularly participated in

coalition military operations as a junior partner to the United States. For a junior partner on a

coalition military operation, achieving a level of influence over objectives and decision-

making in order to realise its national interests becomes the critical challenge. On the face of

things, the potential for sustaining national interest and operational influence can be low

given disparities in military contribution. The junior partner, however, is not completely

disarmed in seeking influence within a military coalition. In coalition operations the sources

of influence include things such as the reliability and loyalty of the junior partner to the

dominant military contributor, the effectiveness of the junior partners’ military contribution

and the interoperability of its forces. Not all of the levers of influence are positive ones;

136 Silkett, ‘Alliance and Coalition Warfare’, p. 80.

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historically the military contingents of junior partners are given a veto over decisions or

limitations of participation by their national governments. Thus, caveats to military

participation exist where national contingents indicate what they are unwilling to undertake.

The caveats of some NATO members in Afghanistan are a good contemporary illustration.137

In extremis, a national component commander will deploy the ‘red card’ in the heat of an

operation. Typically, national contingent commanders possess in their national directives the

ability to refer orders given by the dominant coalition partner to national command

authorities if such an order may jeopardise the safety of their command or contravene

national policy. Moreover, the size of a national contingent does not affect the reality of

caveats and red cards. For example, New Zealand deployed during the Malayan Emergency

an SAS squadron with a directive replete with ‘caveats’ on the squadron’s employment in

internal security operations.138

For coalition operations to be cohesive and effective and to overcome the in-built

centrifugal influence of national priorities and interests there is no prescribed doctrinal

formula to guide their design and employment. At the strategic and operational levels,

however, one can nevertheless identify areas where coalition partners must reach agreement

in order to minimise differences and be operationally effective. As Jeffrey Grey has argued,

‘there are five basic operational features of coalition warfare, and agreement must be reached

in these areas’:

Strategic Policy – resource allocation and priorities at the operational level. Command of Forces in the field. Combat Effectiveness. Logistic Questions.

137Nathan Hodge, “US General Sees ‘Undeclared Caveats’ in Afghanistan’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 May 2007, p. 7. 138Christopher Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and Borneo 1949-1966, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 372-73.

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Financing of the military effort.139

Strategic policy is centrally about the need to establish common goals and the integration

of the political, military and diplomatic lines of the operation. As Maj Gen Roger Lane has

noted regarding the challenge of strategic policy for coalition operations: ‘it is not unusual for

objectives to be broadly defined, but extremely challenging’.140 Command of forces sits

astride a critical crossroads between the quest for unity of command and the preservation of

national prerogative on a coalition operation. Compatible doctrine and planning processes,

training, cultural awareness, liaison officers, and national representation on central staffs can

mitigate strains related to questions of command of forces on operation. A good example of

how problems of command can be mitigated against in a coalition context can be seen by the

British approach in the First Gulf War. General Sir Peter de la Billiere described the

command challenges he faced in the following way:

The problem facing the British was how to integrate our forces and exercise command and control . . . I was given the authority to place them, when required, under the tactical control of the US for specific operations. . . I had to be sure, however, that I was in a position to influence their use.141

General de la Billiere found a solution in embedding British officers in all levels of

operational planning and command. These officers received permission to wear American

uniforms and in one instance a British brigadier became a Lt Colonel to facilitate his

integration into a US staff. In the end, ‘there were about 100 British officers from all three

services in various key positions in the US Command system’.142 Differing levels of combat

effectiveness are amongst the most vexing areas to be managed on a coalition operation.

139Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, p.6. 140Roger Lane, ‘The Command, Leadership and Management Challenges of Contemporary Multinational Command’, RUSI Journal, (December 2006), p. 30. 141General Sir Peter de la Billiere, ‘The Gulf Conflict: Planning and Execution’, RUSI Journal, (Winter 1991), p. 9. 142Ibid. For a more detailed account of the arrangements see, General Sir Peter de la Billiere, Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War, London: Harper Collins, 1992.

85

Stronger contributors may feel that they are carrying too much of a burden and weaker

performances of partners can undermine the effort. Moreover, it does not automatically

follow that the largest contributors are the most militarily effective. Conferring operational

latitude and recognizing how to recognise weaknesses and apply strengths of national

contingents is key to getting the best results out of diversity in combat effectiveness. The last

two points on logistics and finance are highly technical questions but are vitally important for

agreement to be reached for the day-to-day functioning of any coalition operation.

If the strategic and operational levels of coalition operations are about control and

influence over objectives and operational decision-making in order to establish cohesion in

operations, then the tactical level is about integration and effectiveness at the sharp end of

battle. Tactical integration at the battalion level and below is amongst the most challenging

aspects of a coalition military operation. At the tactical level, questions of interoperability of

communications, spare parts and ammunition, tactics, techniques and procedures all have a

huge impact. The differences in military culture, quality of training, doctrine and language

barriers all shape whether or not different armies can operate together at the lowest tactical

levels on the battlefield. Because of the very lethal consequences of failure at the tactical

level, historically most armies have spurned integration at this level, preferring to operate

autonomously from other coalition partners. Focusing tactically at the national level and

operating in a discreet geographical area has been the traditional means of avoiding the

complexities and risks of tactical integration in a coalition military operation. While the

cultivation of interoperability through organisations like NATO and the widespread influence

of American military doctrine and practice militate against the risks inherent in tactical level

integration, armies are inherently suspicious and wary of working closely with even the most

compatible of partners. Indeed, where it does occur it is only with the most trusted partners.

An example of this can be seen in the close tactical integration between Estonian and Danish

86

units on operations in southern Afghanistan, particularly with the latter at Musa Qala.143 As

the British experience on operations in Helmand in Afghanistan indicates, tactical level

integration may be more common in the future, requiring greater emphasis on compatibility

and interoperability.

The attributes of command and leadership exercised on a coalition operation are the

things that ultimately will bring success or failure to a given operation. Given the nature of

coalition operations, the qualities of command and leadership required of the coalition

commander can challenge leadership models cultivated within national armies.144 Silkett

argues that for a holder of coalition command to be effective, it is necessary for leadership to

be exercised in a more accommodating way:

Although unity of command is important to coalition military success, this does not necessarily mean, and historically it has usually not meant, full compelling authority over allied commanders and formations. Authority, therefore, tends to be collegial, and a successful coalition leader will be persuasive rather than coercive.145

Expeditionary Operations

Expeditionary operations are defined as, 'Military operations which can be initiated at

short notice, consisting of forward deployed, or rapidly deployable, self-sustaining forces

143Anthony King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 257-259. 144Col Larry M. Forster, ‘Coalition Leadership Imperatives’, Military Review, November-December 2000, p. 58 145Silkett, ‘Alliance and Coalition Warfare’, p. 79. The need for persuasion is strongly emphasized among many officers who have exercised command in coalition operations. See for example, John Kiszely, ‘Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations’, Whitehall Report 1-08, The Royal United Services Institute, 2008, p. 17. Similarly, these qualities of leadership are stressed in UK doctrine. See, Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (JDP01) Campaigning, 2nd Edition, p. 4A-2.

87

tailored to achieve a clearly-stated objective in a foreign country'.146 In conducting these

operations the British stress that

An expeditionary mindset (go anywhere, at any time, for any task) should underpin individual and collective ethos. This purposeful attitude should be reinforced by a preparedness to fight, personal resilience, a philosophy of clear, centralised intent and properly-resourced decentralised execution: professional mobility supported by suitable terms and conditions of service; and the ability to project force strategically and quickly, and then sustain it. Expeditionary is not necessarily the same as rapid response. An expeditionary approach should have an element of continuous engagement in order to anticipate, understand or prevent conflict, as well as respond to it.147

In setting out the intellectual demands of these operations and stressing the concept of

an 'expeditionary ethos' ADP – Operations highlights that for the British Army expeditionary

operations are a 'mind set' and not a formal doctrine.148 This is paralleled in the

complementary capstone doctrines of the Royal Navy BR 1806 British Maritime Doctrine

(3rd Edition) and Royal Air Force AP 3000 British Air and Space Power Doctrine (4th

Edition).149 Under this overarching concept the practicalities of conducting these operations

are detailed in British Joint Doctrine Publications. The keystone document is JDP-01

Campaigning. This sets out the principles of joint campaigning, providing ‘guidance to a

joint force commander to help him understand the operational level of campaigns in which he

plans, conducts and sustains military operations as part of a comprehensive approach'.150 This

is underpinned by the Functional Doctrine publications, JDP 3-00 Campaign Execution, JDP

4-00 Joint Logistics and JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning, that deal with the operational level of

war. 146This is the most recently published official definition of expeditionary operations. See, Joint Doctrine Publication 01.1 (JDP 0-01.1), United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions, 7th Edition, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, June 2006, p. E-9. 147ADP – Operations, pp. 2-8. 148This stands in contrast to the United States Marine Corps which as early as 1998 had issued MCDP, Expeditionary Operations. 149In British defence doctrine 'capstone' documents are the single service doctrines that guide and inform lower level doctrine. 150ADP – Operations, pp. 2-7

88

Maritime Power Projection151

As an island nation Britain has historically been forced to use the sea to deploy her

armed forces in support of national policy outside the United Kingdom. The base concept for

these operations is that of maritime power projection. This is defined as 'the threat or use of

maritime combat capabilities at global range to achieve effects in support of national policy

objectives; usually to influence events on land. It exploits sea control to achieve access to

littoral waters from where force can be threatened or projected ashore using amphibious

forces, organic aircraft, land attack weapons and special forces'.152 Sea Control represents 'the

condition in which one has freedom of action to use the sea for one's own purposes in

specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use

to the enemy'.153 Maritime power projection represents the Royal Navy's contribution to the

United Kingdom's expeditionary capabilities.

Deployment of ground and air units ashore in landing or amphibious operations

depends on logistic support from naval and merchant vessels in the area of operations, rather

than from home bases. Transportation at sea also remains the most efficient method of

deploying and sustaining substantial expeditionary forces. In conjunction with the fact that an

estimated 80% of the world's population lives within 300 miles of coastal waters (technically

referred to as the littoral region), sea power is central to the conduct of expeditionary warfare.

Seaborne expeditions can be projected ashore by two basic methods. If deploying to a 151For a more detailed consideration of themes considered in this section see, Chapter 3 'Principles Governing the Use of Maritime Power' in BR1806 The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (3rd Edition), Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, 2004. It should be noted that unlike the 1st Edition (1995) there is no longer a section devoted to Maritime Expeditionary Operations as a distinct activity and as BR1806 has migrated to the realm of joint doctrine its successor continues this pattern. See, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 (JDP 0-10), British Maritime Doctrine, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, August 2011. 152BR1806, (3rd Edition), p. 45. 153Ibid., p. 41.

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friendly state then forces can simply be landed at secure ports and beaches. Landing on a

hostile shore, potentially in the face of enemy opposition, requires an amphibious landing.

During the Pacific War (1941-45) U.S. Marine forces conducted operations thousands of

miles from their principal bases in the United States. Consequently, to achieve their specific

missions they were dependent upon ship borne supplies that accompanied them to their

objective. The scale of these operations was immense. When V Amphibious Corps invaded

the island of Iwo Jima in February 1945 the Fifth Marine Division (13,000 strong) was

provided with sufficient logistic support to feed the town of Columbus, Ohio (population

302,000) for a month and enough cigarettes to supply every marine with twenty a day for

eight months.154

Sea Power and Sea Control

In mounting such operations, as noted, sea control is an essential prerequisite. The

principal method for ensuring this is by exercising sea power through the threat or actual

deployment and use of naval forces. What is termed ‘command of the sea’ is not concerned

with attaining an 'absolute' control but upon establishing a 'working' control in the intended

area of operations. Sea Control is therefore 'the condition that exists when there is freedom of

action to use an area of the sea for one's own purpose for a period of time and, if necessary,

deny its use to an opponent'.155 To achieve this in a hostile area it is the task of naval forces to

suppress enemy air and naval forces to protect the vulnerable landing forces. It is often the

case that enemy air and naval forces that have previously avoided action may offer battle in

an attempt to oppose an amphibious landing. The level of naval forces deployed and the

154G. W. Garand and T. R, Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations, vol. 4, History of United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Washington, 1971, p. 480. 155JDP 0-10 British Maritime Doctrine, pp. 2-10.

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actions they undertake in support of expeditionary operations will vary according to the

nature of the operation. In Peace Support operations naval forces can be required to land

amphibious and other ground forces and provide logistic support. It is unlikely that they will

have to undertake combat operations to secure control of the surrounding sea area – though

naval gunfire and air support may be provided to forces ashore. During operations in Sierra

Leone in 1999 (Operation Palliser) a Royal Navy Task Group provided potential support to

British land forces with aircraft from the light carrier HMS Illustrious. Royal Marines of 42

Commando operating from the assault ship HMS Ocean carried out practice landings as a

demonstration of British capabilities to rebel forces. Other situations may require naval forces

to establish control of the sea by defeating enemy naval forces in combat. Therefore,

expeditionary operations often run in parallel with operations to secure a 'working' control of

the sea. In the Falklands conflict (1982) Royal Navy forces secured control of the waters

around the islands by forcing the Argentine Navy into port after the loss of the light cruiser

General Belgrano and foiling the Argentine Air Force's intention of defeating the amphibious

landings at San Carlos Water.

Amphibious Operations156

156A more comprehensive doctrinal consideration of this form of operation can be found in ATP-8(B), Amphibious Operations, vol. 1 NATO, July 2004 and vol. 2, NATO, September 2007. See also, BRd 9400 Amphibious Forces Handbook, vol. 1 (Tactical Doctrine) and vol. 2 (Amphibious Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, Force Structures and Platform Characteristics), April 2011. Further reading on historical case studies can be found in the comprehensive range of studies in T. Lovering (ed), Amphibious Assault – Manoeuvre from the Sea: Amphibious Operations from the Last Century, (Royal Navy, 2005).

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An amphibious operation is 'a military operation launched from the sea by a naval and

landing force (LF) embarked in ships, with the principal purpose of projecting the LF ashore

tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile'.157 Amphibious operations

are generally joint, and occasionally combined, in nature. They represent the most ambitious

form of operation that armed forces can undertake. Weather, tides and the nature of the

landing beaches can all complicate the problems of transporting forces to, and landing upon,

an enemy coastline. In the 1930s the United States Marine Corps identified six fundamental

principles that required consideration for a successful operation. These were set out in the

doctrinal publication FTP-167 'Fleet Landing Manual' (1938) which has formed the basis of

all subsequent manuals for amphibious operations.158 The six principles identified were:

command arrangements; naval gunfire; air support; ship-to-shore movement; securing the

beachhead; loading and logistical matter. These factors apply to varying degrees to the many

types of amphibious operations which can be undertaken: demonstration; raids; assault;

withdrawal.159 Since the 1950s the use of air manoeuvre operations has come to hold a

dominant place in amphibious operations as seen during the Royal Marines’ assault on the Al

Faw peninsula in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.160

Air Power

157ATP-8(B) Amphibious Operations, vol. 1, p. 1-1. 158United States Navy, FTP-167 Landing Operations Manual, Washington, 1938. This rare volume can be viewed and downloaded on-line at www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar. See also, A. R . Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, New York, 1991, chapter 12, for the development of this manual. 159For definitions see ATP-8(B) Amphibious Operations, vol.1, pp. 1-3. 160 For an account of operations in Iraq, 2003, see J. M. F. Robinson, 'Iraq; Operation TELIC, March 2003; Al Faw Landings - Post Modern Amphibious Operations?', in Lovering, pp. 451-64.

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Air power is defined by the Royal Air Force (RAF) as 'The ability to project power

from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events'.161 The

core characteristics of air power are defined as: speed; reach; height. These make air power

highly agile, enabling deployment and concentration of forces rapidly at the strategic,

operational and tactical levels.162 The RAF details four key roles for air and space power, all

of which are critical for its contribution to expeditionary operations. These are: control of the

air and space; air mobility; intelligence and situational awareness; attack.163 As with sea

power, control of the air is the fundamental basis for implementing other air roles. Critically,

it is arguably fundamental in all aspects of expeditionary operations because it 'enables

freedom of manoeuvre in all of the Service environments: air, land and maritime'.164

Consequently air power can often be the quickest method for deploying expeditionary forces

in a crisis through the use of Air Mobility that 'enables forces to be moved and sustained

worldwide across the entire spectrum of operations. It provides rapid and flexible options to

military planners and national and international governments, allowing rapid responses to

crisis situations globally'.165

The concept consists of six sub-sets: Air Lift; Air to Air Refueling; Airborne

Operations; Special Air Operations; Aerial Delivery; Aeromedical evacuation.166 Deploying

forces in this manner has several disadvantages. Forces can often require host nation support

to provide airfields, or access to similar facilities in neighbouring states in order to acquire

entry to an Area of Operations. A move over great distance can require the use of staging

bases en route – again reliant upon friendly states. Such support, or permission to over fly

161British Air and Space Power Doctrine, AP 3000, 4th Edition, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, 2009, p .7. 162Ibid., p. 16-17 for definitions of these factors. 163Ibid., Chapter 3 'The Four Fundamentals of Air and Space Power', pp. 37-60. 164Ibid., p.38. 165Ibid., p. 44. 166Ibid., p. 44-45

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states’ territory, cannot always be relied upon. During Operation Palliser (Sierra Leone,

2000) British forces relied upon access to French airbases at Dakar in North Africa as a

staging post. Even with access to airbases Air Lift can only deliver light forces and limited

logistic needs. The delivery of heavy equipment and large-scale logistic support remains

dependent upon sea lift. If access to a theatre is denied then an airborne operation might be

mounted to secure entry. Forces that conduct airborne operations differ from those that are

air-transported in that they possess the ability to immediately fight, seize and hold objectives

on their own. The employment of an airborne force is restricted by their light armament,

meaning that ‘they are high-risk, high gain undertakings’ and therefore often require rapid

reinforcement, or relief, by regular forces deployed by Sea or Air Lift.167

A British Tradition of Expeditionary Operations?

The United Kingdom has a long historical experience of mounting expeditionary

operations. This stems from the obvious fact that as an island nation Britain's ability to

project power requires such a capability. Historical experience has not meant that the British

have developed a strong innate military tradition and culture or organisation for expeditionary

operations. British experience has proved erratic and largely transitory, with lessons

consistently having to be re-learnt.

During the wars of the late seventeenth to mid-eighteenth centuries, in which Britain

emerged as one of the great European powers, the conduct of expeditionary and associated

amphibious operations produced mixed results. Lack of formal doctrine alongside forces

specifically organised, equipped and trained for such operations meant that success depended

upon inter-service and personal relations, as well as an enemy who was largely unprepared.

167Ibid., p. 45

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This situation changed from the 1740s when organisational and doctrinal issues were

systematically addressed.168 The result was a series of outstanding expeditionary operations.

This institutional knowledge was allowed to wane after the end of the Napoleonic

Wars in 1815. Most notable was the scrapping of the Royal Navy's transport fleet created in

the 1790s as a permanent and dedicated expeditionary capability, rather than the hiring of

unsuitable merchant vessels.169 As a result, British effectiveness in the conduct of

expeditionary operations again became erratic. The culmination of this institutional malaise

came at the landings on Gallipoli in 1915. Although forces were successfully landed, the

operation revealed severe shortcomings in all aspects of mounting this type of operation.

Gallipoli cast a long and distorting influence over amphibious operations during the period

1919-39, with many arguing that opposed landings were unfeasible. The extent of these

views has been exaggerated. The United States Marine Corps developed a highly

sophisticated landing doctrine that provided the basis of all Allied operations during the

Second World War, and remains a core doctrine to the present. British developments were

more modest, but these were the result of budgetary limitations as opposed to lack of interest

or belief in the utility of amphibious operations.170

After 1945 the capabilities developed during war were allowed to atrophy with the

result that during the 1956 Suez Crisis, although an amphibious expeditionary force did

successfully land in Egypt, it took months to organise and revealed serious operational and

tactical inadequacies. The British reaction to this came in the 1956 Sandy's Defence Review

that initiated a brief return to the Napoleonic era's idea of a dedicated expeditionary force.

168See R. Harding, Amphibious Operations in the Eighteenth Century, chapter 4 'Amphibious Warfare', Royal Historical Society, Boydell Press, 1991, for the best overview of this period. 169N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815, London, 2004, p. 423. 170R. Harding, 'Amphibious Warfare, 1930-39', and I. Speller, 'Amphibious Operations, 1945-1998', in R. Harding, ed., The Royal Navy, 1930-2000; Innovation and Defence, Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 42-48 and pp. 213-45.

95

This proved short-lived and from the late 1960s onwards British capabilities were gradually

reduced in light of withdrawal from empire and a foreign policy focus on Europe, NATO in

particular. By 1982 the proposed cuts to the Royal Navy in Defence Secretary John Nott's

review 'The Way Forward', appeared to herald the end of Britain's ability to mount anything

but punitive expeditionary operations. Certainly the Chief of Staff to Commandant General

Royal Marines took this view in a formal paper, choosing to comment in whimsical verse:

If trouble brews in distant lands

We heave a sigh and wring out hands

Forgotten are the lessons learnt

(Afraid of getting fingers burnt)171

The British Revival of Expeditionary Operations

Although the Falklands conflict stayed execution of Nott's cuts, it was developments

in the Far East and more critically the ending of the Cold War between NATO and the

Warsaw Pact that were seen as the catalyst for international instability. From the NATO

perspective the 1990-1 Gulf conflict and the collapse of the former Yugoslavia seemed to

give substance to this claim. In addition, the end of the Cold War released western powers

from the strategic straightjacket of NATO commitments in Europe. This new potential was

complemented by, and served to reinforce, an apparently re-invigorated United Nations in the

171Michael Clapp and Ewan Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands; The Battle for San Carlos, Barnley: Leo Cooper, 1996, p. 362.

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wake of the successful 1990-91 Gulf conflict with Iraq. In Britain this new situation was

reinforced by the coming to power of the Labour Party in 1997. Imbued with a strong

internationalist ideology that Britain should be a 'force for good', New Labour's determination

that Britain play an active and assertive role in preserving international security meant that

the use of military force was seen as a viable, and increasingly in some circles desirable,

method for resolving disputes. These trends were reinforced in Britain and broadened to

include NATO in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States that saw

the start of the so-called 'Global War Against Terror' and the subsequent campaigns in Iraq

and Afghanistan.

These political developments saw British defence policy shift from a NATO emphasis

to one focused increasingly upon expeditionary operations outside the UK-NATO area.

Tentative steps were taken under 'Options for Change' and the 1996 Defence Review. These

saw the creation of the Joint Service Command and Staff College and Permanent Joint

Headquarters. In general terms the changes were modest tinkering; this was acknowledged in

the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the follow-up paper 'SDR: A New Chapter'.172 These

policies were intended to restructure the armed forces so that 'Our future military capability

will therefore be built around a pool of powerful and versatile units from all three services

which would be available for operations at short notice'.173 Central to this was the creation of

the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) designed as a pool of resources that Permanent Joint

Headquarters (PJHQ) could draw upon to create a force specifically tailored to a particular

mission. Notable was the commitment to the building of a dedicated Amphibious Task Group

of assault and support shipping and two 65,000-ton aircraft carriers as the core of British

expeditionary capabilities.

172Strategic Defence Review, (London, HMSO, 1998). 173Op cit., p. 23.

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The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review reaffirmed the notion of British

commitment to expeditionary operations in support of Britain's allies, the international

community and in wider British global strategic interests.174 Yet this commitment must be set

against the impact of budgetary retrenchment that has resulted in the short and medium term

degrading of British expeditionary capabilities in terms of maritime power projection. The

three exiting light carriers are in various stages of scrapping, de-commissioning and laying

up. The first of the two new carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth is not due to enter service until

2016, and will then be laid up when HMS Prince of Wales commissions in 2018, making

only one carrier immediately available. The scrapping of the Joint Harrier Force and delays

and confusion over the replacement Joint Strike Fighter alongside the critical loss of

personnel experienced at carrier-air operations means that 2025 could be the earliest date that

a balanced independent British maritime expeditionary capability can be restored. As often in

its history, Britain is again attempting to balance overseas political commitments against

budgetary retrenchment that has serious implications for the expeditionary capabilities of its

armed forces.175

British Coalition and Expeditionary Operations in the 21st Century

Whatever the shortfalls that may beset British expeditionary capabilities or the

operational challenges in working with other armed forces, events in the 21st century only

suggest that the British armed forces are going to continue to be engaged in both coalition

and expeditionary operations. In UK policy terms this is exemplified by coalition and

174Securing Defence in and Age of Uncertainty; The Strategic Defence and Security Review, London: HMSO, 2010. 175See D. Brown chapter 3 'British Defence Policy' in Britain's Security Architecture, Commissioning Course Handbook, vol. 4, Department of Defence and International Affairs, RMAS, 2011, pp. 51-86. See also, NAM Rodgers, The Command of the Ocean, passim, for this debate and its ideological as much as practical matters between 1649 and 1815.

98

expeditionary operations explicitly coming together within the framework of the Anglo-

French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) created in November 2010. The purpose

of the CJEF ‘will be…to conduct offensive and defensive operations on land, in the air, and

at sea, wherever UK and French national security interests are aligned’.176 While the CJEF

does not alter the fact that the British armed forces will continue to work alongside the

military forces of the United States and other allies, CJEF is an important development

because it underscores the view that such structures and co-operative mechanisms will be

necessary to facilitate operations that are coalition, expeditionary and of growing complexity.

On the basis of recent trends, coalition operations have had an ever-increasing number of

members and have moved into such demanding military activity as counterinsurgency.177

Linked to this is a further trend for coalition integration to take place at the tactical level but

with coalition members bringing to it a wide range of ‘rules of engagement’ on the use of

force and other issues.178 If the past is any guide, then these operations can occur at short

notice and can be of many differing scales and durations. As in the cases of the Suez

operation in 1956 or the Falklands in 1982, the adaptability and agility of the British armed

forces will be critical. However much more capability is desired or required, the armed

services will inevitably go to war with the capabilities they have at hand, with an array of

coalition partners, and will have to manage the risk that confronts them.

Suggested Reading

176 Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) User Guide, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, November 2012, pp. 1-2. 177Lt Col Ian Hope, ‘Coalition Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Afghanistan’, in, Bernd Horn and Emily Spencer (eds.), No Easy Task: Fighting in Afghanistan, Toronto: Dundurn, 2012, p. 83, and Kiszely, ‘Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations’, p. 4. 178 Jan Angstrom and Jan Willem Honig, ‘Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No, 5, (October 2012), pp. 663-87.

99

Beaufre, Andre. The Suez Expedition 1956. London: Faber and Faber, 1969. Clapp, Michael and Southby-Tailyour, Ewan. Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle for San Carlos, Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1996. Fergusson, Bernard. The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations, London: Collins,

1961.

Garand, G.W. and Strobridge, T. R. Western Pacific Operations, vol. 4: History of United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1971.

Grey, Jeffrey. The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.

Harding, R. Amphibious Operations in the Eighteenth Century. London: Royal Historical Society, Boydell Press, 1991.

Jackson, Robert. Suez 1956: Operation Musketeer. London: Ian Allen, 1980. Kiszely, John, ‘Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations’, Whitehall Report 1-08,

London: The Royal United Services Institute, 2008. Ladd, James. The Royal Marines, 1919-1980: An Authorised History. London: Jane’s Information Group, 1980. Lane, Roger. ‘The Command, Leadership and Management Challenges of Contemporary

Multinational Command’, RUSI Journal, (December 2006).

Lovering, T., ed., Amphibious Assault – Manoeuvre from the Sea: Amphibious Operations from the Last Century, Seafarer Books, 2007.

Maurer, Martha. Coalition Command and Control. Washington D. C.: National Defence University, 1996.

Millett, A. R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: Free Press, 1991.

Neilson, Keith, and Prete, Roy A., eds., Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1983.

Pierre, Andrew J. Coalitions: Building and Maintenance: Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, War on Terrorism. Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2002.

Showalter, Dennis E., ed., Future Wars: Coalition Operations in Global Strategy. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2002.

Silkett, Wayne A. ‘Alliance and Coalition Warfare’, Parameters, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, (Summer 1993), pp. 74-85.

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Speller, I. 'Amphibious Operations, 1945-1998', in R. Harding, ed., The Royal Navy, 1930- 2000: Innovation and Defence. London: Frank Cass, 2005.

Expeditionary Operations Case Studies

Operation Detachment: The Invasion of Iwo Jima, 19 February-19 March 1945

On 3 October 1944 Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet

and Commander Pacific Ocean Areas was instructed by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

to draw up plans for the seizure of one or more positions in the Bonin or Volcano Islands.

The objective chosen was Iwo Jima in the latter group. This eight square mile island of barren

sulphurous smelling rock and ash was to be secured for its airfields to support U.S. bomber

operations against mainland Japan, 350 miles to the north.179 Operation Detachment

illustrates the complexity of joint amphibious operations and the ability of the United States

to project expeditionary forces over vast distances in the Second World War.

The plan for Operation Detachment consisted of three broad phases. First, air and

naval forces would bombard the island over a period of several months. In phase two naval

forces would conduct a three day preliminary bombardment. In phase three the island would

be assaulted across the eastern shore and secured in ten days by Major-General Harold

Schmidt’s 5th Amphibious Corps. The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions would land abreast on the

eastern beaches between Surabachi and the East Boat Basin, secure these objectives and then

wheel north and drive to the north coast. The 3rd Marine Division was originally held in

179Later claims that Iwo Jima was seized as an emergency landing area for stricken B-2’s and to counter Japanese attacks on their bases in the Marianas are revealed as special pleading in hindsight. See, War With Japan: The Advance to Japan, vol. 6, (London, HMSO, 1995), pp. 5 and 151, and, R. S. Burrell, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment’, Journal of Military History, vol. 68 (October 2004).

101

reserve ashore on Guam, but Commander Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lieutenant-General

Holland M. Smith, concerned about the scale of Japanese defences, ordered it to be re-

deployed afloat off Iwo Jima.

By the time of the American landing on Iwo Jima in February 1945 Japanese

defences, commanded by Lieutenant-General Kuribayashi, comprised over 21,000 personnel,

361× 75mm guns, 65 × 150mm mortars and over 200 × 20-25mm anti-aircraft guns.180

Anticipating the American intention to use massive firepower, Kuribayashi downgraded

beach defence and concentrated the bulk of his forces inland on two defence lines running

east-west to the south and north of Motayama No. 2 airfield. In the south a semi-independent

group occupied Mount Surabachi, a 550-foot eminence which dominated the landing zones.

Japanese forces constructed hundreds of strong-points reinforced with concrete and steel

doors and connected by tunnels to offset American firepower.

Preparatory bombardment of Iwo Jima began on 8 December 1944. Over the next 72

days United States Army Seventh Air Force and naval units hit Iwo Jima daily, delivering a

total 6,800 tons of bombs and nearly 22,000 five to sixteen inch naval shells.181 Final pre-

invasion operations commenced on 16 February 1945 as Task Force 54 ‘Gunfire and

Covering Force’ began fire missions to destroy Japanese positions and protect the

minesweepers. Between 16-18 February 14,250 tons of shells were fired, but the effects of

this bombardment proved as limited as the preceding attacks in light of the strength and

concealment of Japanese positions. Holland Smith and Schmidt had argued for a ten day

bombardment to ensure reduction of an estimated 450 Japanese positions but the Navy

refused on grounds of limited ammunition supply and an unwillingness to expose its

amphibious forces to attack whilst the covering force of fast carriers was attacking enemy air 180G. W. Garand T. R. Strobridge, History of United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Western Pacific Operations, vol. 4, Washington, D.C. 1968, pp. 453-4. 181War With Japan, vol. 6, pp. 153-4.

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power on Japan.182 Both services held sound positions in terms of their own operational

requirements, but these did not, or could not be made, to complement each other to the

Marines’ satisfaction.183

In the early hours of 19 February Task Force 53 carrying the Marines of 5th

Amphibious Corps anchored off Iwo Jima. Joint Expeditionary Force commander Vice

Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner now assumed overall supervision. In all, 450 ships lay off

the island. As nearly 50,000 Marines ate a hearty breakfast at 0640, seven battleships, four

heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and ten destroyers opened fire, bringing to a crescendo the

bombardment begun eighty days previously. In the heaviest pre-H-Hour bombardment in

history they fired 38,500 shells of five to sixteen inch calibre.184 At 0830hrs Turner signalled

‘Land the Landing Force’. The final closely-choreographed stages of support for the troops

commenced as naval guns lifted their fire and aircraft attacked. Continuity of naval gunfire

closely coordinated with air strikes delivering rockets, bombs and napalm was achieved for

the first time in the war. The first wave of assault troops landed at H-Hour (0900hrs). One

minute previously the navy began a pre-timed rolling barrage inland predicated on the troops’

expected rate of advance. At 0902 the second wave landed, followed by eight others at five-

minute intervals. This carefully organised assault plan put 9,000 troops ashore across a 3,000

yard front in 45 minutes. Cohesion was soon lost as Japanese defenders, having held their fire

until the Marines had advanced 200 yards inland through their concealed positions, opened

fire. Very quickly the advance was reduced to a crawl, ultimately falling short of the day’s

objectives.

182E. Morison, Victory in the Pacific 1945, vol. 14, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012, p. 13. 183W. S. Bartley, Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic, (Washington, 1968), pp.40-1.184Morison, Victory in the Pacific 1945, pp. 34-5.

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Over the next six weeks, in the face of fanatical Japanese resistance, the advance

proved slow and chaotic. Iwo Jima was officially declared secure on 19 March. The fighting

can be viewed in three broad phases. In the first (20-23 February) a dual advance was

mounted. Advancing methodically, 4th and 5th Divisions cleared Airfield Number 1 and

Suribachi to reach their D-Day objective. The second phase (24 February-10 March) involved

breaking Kuribayashi’s main defences along the Motoyama plateau either side of Airfield

Number 2. The intensity of fighting forced Schmidt to commit the reserve 3rd Division,

justifying Holland Smith’s decision to designate it as a floating reserve. In the third phase

(ending 19 March) a series of isolated pockets along the northern fringes of the island were

painstakingly eliminated.

Conquest of the island cost the Marines 5,931 dead and missing and 18,770 wounded.

Around 1,000 Japanese, too wounded to commit suicide, were taken prisoner. Holland

Smith’s summary of the battle serves to emphasise the irrelevance of manoeuvre concepts to

Iwo Jima: ‘It was an operation of one phase and one tactic. From the time the engagement

was joined until the mission was completed it was a matter of frontal assault maintained with

relentless pressure’.185 The success of the operation rested upon careful fulfilment of the six

principles of amphibious assault, as well as a superb logistics capability which supported an

expeditionary force over 500 miles from its nearest base and approximately 5,000 from the

United States. Perhaps the best illustration of the immense capability of the U.S. at this stage

of the war was the fact that the 5th Marines could be afforded the luxury of a packet of twenty

cigarettes for every man for eight months.186

185J. H. Alexander, Storm Landings; Epic Amphibious Landings in the Central Pacific, Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997, p. 126. 186Garand and Strobridge, p.

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Operation Musketeer The Anglo-French Expedition to Egypt, 1956

The Suez Canal has been a strategically vital waterway for Britain since its

completion in 1869. With the establishment of independent Arab states in the Middle East in

the wake of the Second World War, the British position in the region went through a period

of fundamental change. The British presence in Egypt and the canal zone would be no

exception. A military coup in Egypt in July 1952 paved the way for the emergence of Abdel

Gamal Nasser, an Egyptian Army colonel who became leader and in due course president of

the country. Nasser was an Arab nationalist and his politics not only changed the situation in

Egypt but throughout the region. His regime would become a supporter of anti-colonial

insurgencies in the Arab world. By 1954, Britain agreed to withdraw its military forces from

Egypt in exchange for a treaty that preserved the business interests of the Anglo-French

company in running the canal and internationalized access to the waterway. Nasser, however,

courted both United States and Soviet support, and his political overtures to the Soviet Union

only served to alienate Britain and the United States. In order to support his political

ambitions, Nasser had to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance, receiving pledges of aid for

the Aswan Dam project and arms shipments. His next step would precipitate a major crisis.

On 26 July 1956, he nationalized the Suez Canal. For Britain, the Egyptian nationalisation of

the canal broke treaty commitments, impinged on important strategic interests and occurred

soon after the last British troops departed the Canal Zone. For France, the Egyptian seizure of

the canal hit French commercial interests in the waterway while Nasser was seen as a

regional problem, not least for his support to the insurgency against French rule in Algeria.

105

This mounting international crisis set the scene for the first major British coalition and

expeditionary operation since the end of the Second World War.187

By early August 1956, Britain and France took the political decision to confront

Nasser and repossess the Suez Canal by military means. Britain and France were the two

principal allies, but Israel through French contacts became a secret third partner in the

military operations. With its military action against Egypt in the Sinai, Israel broadly

coordinated its action and provided a pretext for Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. From

the start, military planners would be beset by the lack of clear political objectives. Although

both Britain and France wanted to see Nasser ousted from power, practical military

limitations and international politics eventually produced the more limited aim of regaining

control of the Suez Canal.188

The Suez expedition was to be a combined joint operation from the onset. General Sir

Charles Keightley was appointed Commander-in-Chief of allied forces with Vice-Admiral

D’Escadre Barjot as his deputy. In the higher tiers of command of the operation, French

senior officers were placed as deputies to British commanders throughout what was

essentially a British command structure. Formations and units from both armed forces

remained under national control and reported to the higher level combined headquarters. As

General André Beaufre, the deputy Land Task Force Commander stated: ‘in deciding at the

outset of planning to subordinate the French command to the British within an integrated

command system, we were accepting the most thoroughgoing solution’.189 According to

Keightley, the allied command structure ‘worked extraordinarily well’ in military terms, with

187For Background to the crisis see, Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez: The Double War, London, 1979, pp. 1-15; Robert Jackson, Suez 1956: Operation Musketeer, Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2006, pp. 7-13; and, W. M. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 188Fullick and Powell, Suez: The Double War, pp. 54-66. 189André Beaufre, The Suez Expedition 1956, London: Faber and Faber, 1969, p. 132.

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the biggest problem being that the ‘British and French Governments were giving divergent

directions to their Commanders’.190 From a military perspective, the fact that it was not a

joint headquarters created disconnects between each of the British services which impacted

on co-ordination of the operation. Keightley’s post-operations report recommended the

establishment of a standing joint headquarters to undertake such operations in the future.191

Keightley also highlighted that the successful working of the coalition command structure

‘depended on personalities’.192

Given the lack of clarity over political aims, in the run-up to the operation in August

and September plans went through a number of revisions. Initial planning envisaged seizing a

foothold in Egypt at Alexandria, a build-up of land forces followed by an advance on Cairo

which then proceeded to the Suez Canal. This ambitious scheme eventually gave way to a

more focused airborne and amphibious assault at the northern end of the Suez Canal and a

drive south to secure the length of it. Musketeer Revise as it became known, because of the

short time available to the allied planners, was a modification of an earlier plan and, after

further political prevarication, was eventually given the go-ahead to be initiated in late

October.

The Musketeer Revise plan had assigned to it very sizable forces, with Britain

providing 45,000 men, 12,000 vehicles, 300 aircraft and 100 warships. The French side

contributed to the operation 34,000 men, 9,000 vehicles, 200 aircraft and 30 warships. For the

seizure of Port Said and Port Fuad, airborne forces committed included elements of the

British 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group and the French 10th Airborne Division.

The amphibious part of the operation included 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and

elements from the French airborne division. Follow-on forces assigned to the operation

190TNA [The National archives, UK], DEFE 7/1081, Egypt Keightley Report, 1956. 191Ibid. 192Ibid.

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included the British 3 Infantry Division deploying from the UK and the French 7 Division

Mecanique Rapide moving into theatre from Algeria.193

Mounting the operation entailed considerable challenges. The initial assault forces

launched the operation out of bases in Malta and Cyprus. The transit times necessitated by the

distances into theatre left little scope for surprise in terms of the initial landings. The

amphibious assault forces had to sail nearly 1,000 miles from Malta to Port Said, taking six

days. The poor port facilities at Cyprus meant that it could not be used to stage the

amphibious assault despite being only 250 miles from the objective. The assault amphibious

shipping was old and slow, having seen service in the Second World War. The capacity of the

amphibious shipping also meant that little more than a brigade of forces could be delivered in

the seaborne assault.194 The airborne part of the operation faced other challenges – certainly

on the British side. The airborne forces committed to jump were engaged in

counterinsurgency operations on Cyprus until a few weeks before Musketeer Revise began.

Training time and opportunities were limited, with 3 Para having had only one battalion drop

on exercise the previous summer. The individual equipment of 3 Para was virtually

unchanged since 1944. The French position in terms of capabilities was better as the French

Army required fundamental re-equipment following the Second World War. In particular,

their transport aircraft were more modern and suited to the airborne delivery role.195

Musketeer Revise envisaged dropping 3 Para to the west of Port Said to seize the

Gamil airfield. French airborne forces had the mission of seizing key bridges and installations

inland and south of Port Said and Port Fuad. The amphibious assault would be directed into

193Jackson, Suez 1956: Operation Musketeer, p. 19. 194Ian Speller, ‘The Suez Crisis: Operation MUSKETEER, November 1956’, in: T. Lovering , ed., Amphibious Assault – Manoeuvre from the Sea: Amphibious Operations from the Last Century, Seafarer Books, 2007, p. 400. 195Ibid., pp. 66-68.

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the heart of the port and urban area at the head of the Suez Canal. Indeed, both the airborne

and amphibious forces were mounting an assault into a highly built-up area. An innovation in

the operation included helicopter insertion of Royal Marine Commandos from HMS Ocean

and HMS Theseus. These two Royal Navy carriers had been modified into helicopter landing

platforms in what was to be the first major use of helicopters in a British amphibious

operation.196

Egyptian conventional capabilities were not seen as formidable despite the influx of

modern Soviet weaponry. In any case, much of the Egyptian Army was committed to dealing

with the Israeli attack into the Sinai. Not so apparent were Egyptian preparations for

insurgent action once Anglo-French forces were in occupation of Egyptian territory. For

political reasons and in order to reduce the risk of casualties among Egyptian non-combatants

there were significant constraints on the employment of force. For example, naval gunfire

support for the initial assault was very limited in duration and scale to avoid civilian

casualties in a densely-populated urban area.197

Air operations conducted by the RAF and the French air force relied on Cypriot

airfields. The facilities were too few and cramped for the large numbers of fighters, and strike

and transport aircraft that had to be accommodated. Nevertheless, air operations successfully

neutralized Egyptian air capabilities and insured air supremacy over the invasion area.

Because the distance from Cyprus to Egypt allowed little loiter time for aircraft of the day,

the naval aviation assets embarked on the five British and French aircraft carriers provided

persistent close air support for the assault forces.198

196Despatch by Sir Charles F. Keightley, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Operations in Egypt – November to December 1956, Supplement to the London Gazette, 10 September 1957, pp. 5327-5337. 197Ibid, p. 5333. 198For an overview of air operations see, Brian Cull, Wings Over Suez, London: Grub Street, 1996.

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Operation Musketeer began on 31 October 1956 with the launching of air strikes

against the Egyptian air force which possessed a mixture of reasonably modern combat

aircraft of British and Soviet origin. By 2 November the Egyptian air force was neutralised

with targets shifting from airfields to other military facilities. Successful air operations set the

scene for the airborne assault on 5 November which took its assigned objectives followed by

the amphibious assault a day later. By late 7 November Port Said was virtually cleared of

enemy forces after time-consuming house clearance by allied units on the ground. Moreover,

Allied units began to drive south in an effort to secure the length of the Suez Canal. The

military operations, however, were to grind to a halt due to international pressure. The United

States, whose support for the operation had not been secured by the British government, used

its financial leverage on the British economy to force an end to the Suez expedition. With a

ceasefire arranged by 8 November, one of the earliest UN peacekeeping missions was

established to separate Egyptian and allied forces. British and French soldiers, however,

faced a smouldering urban insurgency in Port Said until their withdrawal in December 1956.

In assessing the military performance of the Suez expedition, the coalition aspects of

the operation were less problematic and generally worked well. As was the case in so many

coalition operations it was down to the commanders who made it work. The expeditionary

elements of Suez, however, indicated important operational and capability deficiencies,

particularly in British forces. One of the most serious operational shortcomings was the time

that it took to organise and launch the operation. In part this was due to political factors, but

the lack of suitable amphibious shipping and inadequate basing facilities from which to stage

the operation led to the rather stately tempo. The British armed forces lacked modern

equipment (much dating from the Second World War) in such capabilities as amphibious

shipping and transport aircraft. These shortcomings affected the capacity of assault forces to

generate a higher tempo operation. Some important innovations did take place in the use of

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the helicopter in ship-to-shore delivery of assault forces, a capability which heralded the birth

of the Commando carrier (Landing Platform Helicopter – LPH in modern naval terminology)

in British service.

Operation Corporate

Repossession of the Falklands, April-June 1982

When Argentine forces descended on the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, Britain

faced a daunting challenge: repossessing a territory geographically extremely remote from

the United Kingdom at a time when most of her resources were not immediately deployable

owing first to the country’s NATO commitment to the defence of Western Europe and the

North Atlantic, and second to her on-going struggle against the nationalist insurgency in

Northern Ireland. Margaret Thatcher’s government laboured under the further disadvantage

that the Argentine invasion caught it completely by surprise and lacking any contingency

plan for repossessing the islands, which lay 8,000 miles away in the South Atlantic. Nor

could the armed forces call upon any recent operational experience, for one had to look back

to the failed Suez Crisis of 1956 for the most recent example of a major expeditionary

operation launched from British shores. In the event, the forces assembled to liberate the

Falklands represented the UK’s largest military and naval endeavour since the Second World

War.

This response the Argentines certainly did not anticipate, and indeed confidently

launched their invasion on the basis of various signals from London of waning interest in the

South Atlantic – above all, in light of the withdrawal of the Royal Navy’s last patrol vessel,

HMS Endurance – and on the mistaken assumption that Britain would not resort to force

once occupation became a fait accompli. Britain had moreover yet to carry out its extensive,

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planned defence cuts stipulated by the Nott Review of the previous year. Yet if Britain found

herself caught unprepared, poor planning characterised the Argentine position from the very

start, for by invading in early April the Argentines inadvertently furnished their opponents

with a very narrow – yet in the event a sufficiently large – window of opportunity in which to

retake the islands before the southern hemisphere winter reached its height. Such

miscalculations – above all the failure of Argentina’s military junta accurately to gauge

Thatcher’s, not to mention the British public’s, exasperation and resolve – obliged Buenos

Aires to mount a poorly-devised defence of a bleak and inhospitable possession 400 miles off

its southern coast, leaving many of its best troops behind to protect its long border with Chile,

with whom, like Britain, Argentina also maintained a long-running territorial dispute.

The speed with which Britain launched the first elements of the Task Force mark out

its efforts at mounting an expeditionary operation on this scale as both remarkable and

impressive, particularly in light of the absence of any plans for operations in such a remote

part of the globe. In very short order the Royal Navy deployed two aircraft carriers, Hermes

and Invincible, which sailed from Portsmouth on 5 April, only three days after the Argentine

landings, while further departures swiftly followed with the requisitioned P & O liner,

Canberra conveying 40 and 45 Commando Royal Marines and 3 Para, accounting for much

of 3 Commando Brigade. By the middle of April many of the warships and supply vessels of

the Task Force had reached Ascension Island, 4,000 miles to the south – though still only half

way to the Falklands. Wideawake Airfield would prove itself an absolutely essential element

in the success of the campaign, providing a secure base of operations which would assist

decisively in maintaining an exceptionally long logistics and command chain.

In fact, while the logistics chain remained vulnerable yet intact throughout the war, its

command counterpart proved one of the weaker elements of the operation as a whole, for the

campaign involved no overall theatre commander in situ. Owing to the essential maritime

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nature of the operation the Royal Navy took precedence, with the Task Force Commander

drawn from that arm in the person of the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, based at Norwood,

Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, who reported to Admiral Lewis, Chief of the Defence Staff.

Beneath them served the land forces commander, Major General Jeremy Moore, plus several

operational commanders, including Rear Admiral ‘Sandy’ Woodward, responsible for all

vessels apart from the submarines, which reported directly to Northwood; Commodore

Michael Clapp, who led the amphibious ships; and Brigadier Julian Thompson, commanding

the Landing Task Group which consisted principally of 3 Commando Brigade, the first of the

two major ground formations dispatched to the South Atlantic.

British strategists well understood that success in so distant an area of operations

hinged upon an efficiently-managed logistics chain. Indeed, nothing less than a gargantuan

effort undertaken by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force could transport troops and

supplies such a prodigious distance, thus sustaining the fighting capabilities of British forces

so remote from home shores. To facilitate supply, large numbers of Hercules C-130s, VC

10s, strategic freighters and Boeing 707s would be required to convey tens of thousands of

tons of freight and thousands of personnel, supported by heavy-lift helicopters to cross-deck

supplies and move troops once in theatre. At sea, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and dozens of

ships taken up from trade (STUFT) transported vital supplies of oil and vast amounts of other

supplies in cargo vessels, while the Ministry of Defence requisitioned many other types of

vessels, including the previously-mentioned Canberra, the North Sea ferry Norland, which

transported the whole of 2 Para, and the luxury liner Queen Elizabeth II, which carried most

of 5 Infantry Brigade.

This array of vessels, numbering over 80, supported the largest force of warships

deployed by Britain on active operations since 1945, including two aircraft carriers (carrying

between them 20 Sea Harriers), five destroyers, 11 frigates and three nuclear submarines. The

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critical importance of this naval force – not least its logistic element – cannot be over-

estimated. The Argentines need only have disrupted it by sinking a few key vessels – either

high-profile warships such as a carrier or a heavily-laden troopship, or several cargo vessels

holding essential equipment like helicopters, spare parts for aircraft, or oil – before putting

the entire operation in jeopardy. Even without doing so, if the Argentines could simply

maintain a lengthy occupation of the capital, Port Stanley, deteriorating weather conditions

would bring their opponents’ logistic system to a halt and oblige the Task Force to withdraw

at least as far as Ascension – thus rendering the renewal of operations after winter a very

remote possibility – for with the initiative lost and the mood of public opinion almost

certainly dampened by the failure of British forces to achieve a quick, decisive victory at

minimal cost in lives, there could remain no appetite for renewed hostilities by the time the

skies finally cleared and the seas calmed. In short, an expeditionary operation conducted at

such great distance from home waters faced the very pressing constraint of time, for with

winter approaching operations intended to secure repossession of the Falklands could not

extend much beyond mid-June before snow, high winds, poor visibility and heavy seas

rendered impossible operational sorties conducted by fighter aircraft as well as heliborne

resupply and troop transport.

The objective of the task force was to establish an air and sea blockade of the islands

in order to prepare the way for an amphibious landing, first by 3 Commando Brigade and

later by 5 Infantry Brigade, with the expedition’s ultimate goal the capture of Port Stanley,

the site of the great majority of the islands’ 1,800 inhabitants and the site of the principal

airfield and port. The Argentines garrisoned the islands with 13,000 troops, artillery and anti-

aircraft guns, against which Britain could deploy 7,000 ground troops and supporting naval

and air elements. Yet if the British could not match the Argentines numerically, they

benefitted enormously from the fact that the airstrips on the Falklands were not substantial

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enough to enable the Argentines to employ their best aircraft, thus obliging them to launch

their Skyhawks, Super Etendards, Mirages and Daggers from bases on the South American

mainland about 400 miles west of Stanley. This marked the practical limit of their range,

which left pilots only a few minutes of flight time over the Falklands – a serious disadvantage

for aircraft which, like the Skyhawk and Mirage, closely matched the capabilities of the

British Harrier. In addition to fighters, the Argentines operated a number of Pucara ground

attack aircraft which could operate throughout the islands, supplemented by helicopters of

which, like their opponents, they possessed in insufficient numbers.

From the British point of view recapturing the islands would require a strategy based

on stages: first, imposing a sea blockade around the Falklands; retaking South Georgia

(which lies 800 miles to the southeast) to make use of it as a secure base and transit area;

second, establishing air and naval supremacy around the Falklands; and finally, defeating the

Argentine garrison on the Falklands and reoccupying the islands. Strategists intensively

studied the characteristics of the islands to determine the best site for a landing, a task made

considerably easier by the expert, first-hand knowledge of the coastline provided by Major

Ewan Southby-Tailyour RM, who had sailed around and mapped the islands’ periphery a few

years earlier. Although the Falklands cover about 4,000 square miles, once the landings

occurred ground forces would focus their attention on the Argentines in and around Stanley,

at the eastern end of East Falkland.

British strategists appreciated that they could largely ignore West Falkland, for

although the Argentines deployed about 1,700 on that island, the garrison there possessed no

amphibious capability to facilitate a crossing of Falkland Sound, the narrow body of water

which separated it from its far more strategically-important counterpart to the east. Moreover,

no jet aircraft could operate from this very sparsely inhabited area owing to the absence of a

suitable airfield and ground facilities. In short, Argentine forces on West Falkland stood

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isolated and static, unable to affect operations to the east. On East Falkland, conversely, about

1,200 Argentines occupied the twin settlements of Darwin and Goose Green, towards the

western end of the island, while the bulk of their remaining forces garrisoned Stanley, and the

mountains immediately west of the town, where infantry and marines had established

prepared positions amongst the rocky crags of Mt Harriet, Two Sisters, Mt Tumbledown, Mt

Longdon and Wireless Ridge, the last of these less than two miles from the capital and the

last line of the Argentine defensive ring. The island boasted very few roads, a few isolated

settlements involved in sheep-farming, and large stretches of open, wind-swept, treeless,

water-logged ground made all the more difficult to traverse by the ubiquitous presence of

substantial tufts of grass known as ‘babies’ heads’ – the bane of the soldier’s knees and

ankles.

The first phase of operations took place on 25 April when a small force of Royal

Marines landed on South Georgia and forced the surrender of the token Argentine garrison

there. Shortly thereafter, in order to tighten the ring around the Falklands themselves, the

British government declared a total exclusion zone of 200 nautical miles around the islands, a

course intended to alert the Argentine navy that all vessels operating within this area now fell

subject to attack – though it should be stressed that Britain retained her right to fire on vessels

operating outside these designated limits.

The first strike against the Argentines on the Falklands themselves came on 1 May

when an RAF Vulcan bomber, flown in history’s longest sortie (from Britain to Ascension

and thence to East Falkland – all made possible by regular inflight re-fuelling), targeted

Stanley airfield with 1,000 pound bombs. Due to incorrect mapping, however, the Vulcan

inflicted relatively little damage. Further attacks by carrier-borne aircraft caused more

substantial harm, particularly on Argentine aircraft both at Stanley and at Goose Green. The

following day, the Task Force struck a mortal blow on the naval front when the nuclear-

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powered submarine HMS Conqueror sank the cruiser General Belgrano, taking 368 lives,

and constituting a loss of sufficient magnitude to persuade the Argentines to recall their entire

fleet, including their single aircraft carrier, to home waters. Yet if their naval assets were no

longer to play a role in the conflict, this certainly did not apply to the impressive air power

the Argentines could bring to bear from the mainland. Three days after the sinking of the

Belgrano an Exocet missile fired from a Super Etendard launched from Tierra del Fuego

struck HMS Sheffield, setting the ship ablaze, killing 20 sailors, injuring 24, and leaving the

stricken vessel a useless hulk.

Nevertheless, the Argentines failed to achieve air supremacy over the islands, as a

consequence of which amphibious commanders adhered to their schedule for landings on 21

May in San Carlos Water, an inlet on the west coast of East Falkland. Chosen from amongst

many potential landing sites, the beaches there proved suitable for landing craft, the

surrounding hills offered good cover from air attack and the narrow passages provided a

sheltered anchorage for supply vessels. The Argentines maintained only a small observing

force in the area which Special Forces could easily drive off. The only disadvantage lay in its

distance from Stanley: almost 60 miles of entirely exposed, boggy ground over which

helicopters could theoretically convey large amounts of supplies and equipment and a

substantial body of troops – but only if three conditions were satisfied. First, a successful

offensive required the availability of sufficient numbers of helicopters and fuel; second, the

inability of the Argentines to mount an effective counterattack against San Carlos or any

main forward supply base which the British might establish closer to Stanley; and third, the

availability of sufficient air assets to keep the Argentines’ Pucaras or fighter aircraft at bay

while helicopters flew the many dozens of sorties required to convey ground forces and

artillery forward – not to mention keeping them supplied with rations, water and ammunition

thereafter.

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The landings proceeded unopposed in the early hours of 21 May, but even as the

Marines and Paras established a firm presence on the ground, over the course of the next four

days a series of determined air attacks struck British warships in Falkland Sound, now

dubbed ‘Bomb Alley’. Over 10 warships fell victim to Argentine bombs and Exocets,

including the frigate Ardent and the destroyer Coventry, which sank, and the frigate Antelope,

which blew up. Fortunately for the British, many Argentine bombs failed to explode and 10

Argentine aircraft were shot down, mostly by Sea Harriers. Although the Argentines had

inflicted serious damage on their opponents’ shipping, they failed to concentrate on the Task

Force’s most vulnerable elements: the supply ships, the heavy loss of which, as noted earlier,

might have put paid to the entire British effort in a matter of days. Indeed, one loss struck the

Task Force particularly hard: that of the container ship Atlantic Conveyor, the loss of which

during an Exocet attack on 25 May included 10 helicopters and vital supplies, thus posing a

very serious blow to the Task Force in terms of its ability to move and resupply its ground

forces. Still, just enough helicopters remained at the disposal of Brigadier Thompson to

enable him to formulate plans for conveying a portion of his troops eastwards; the remaining

Marines and Paras he ordered to ‘yomp’ and ‘tab’, respectively.

At the same time, on 28 May, 2 Para attacked the Argentine garrison at Darwin-Goose

Green where the Lt Col ‘H’ Jones’s battalion, despite lacking proper fire support, overran a

composite force enjoying a clear numerical superiority and a trench-lined front stretching

across a narrow, easily-defensible isthmus. The British captured the entire garrison – over a

thousand troops – for a loss of 18 dead, including the CO, and 66 wounded. Meanwhile, as 40

Cdo remained behind to protect the supply base and medical facility at San Carlos,

helicopters conveyed 2 Para and 42 Cdo to a forward position at Mt Kent, 10 miles east of

Stanley, while 3 Para and 45 Cdo proceeded on foot bearing kit in excess of a hundred

pounds – a remarkable feat which only troops enjoying the highest degree of fitness and

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endurance could possibly hope to achieve. A few days later, on 1 June, 5 Infantry Brigade

landed at San Carlos, now making the entire ground force available to Maj Gen Jeremy

Moore RM, on whom devolved command of all ground forces, enabling Brig Thompson to

resume his normal role as commander of 3 Cdo Bde. All now seemed to bode well for the

British; but if poor intelligence and an inability to fly reliably in darkness denied the

Argentines the opportunity to slow the British advance, on 8 June they offered a graphic

reminder that the skies did not go uncontested everywhere, when over Fitzroy bombs dropped

by Skyhawks struck the landing ship Sir Galahad, carrying Welsh Guardsmen awaiting

orders to disembark, killing 48 men and injuring or burning another 115.

If the sinking of Sir Galahad (Sir Tristram had also been struck, but less severely) put

the Welsh Guards out of action, Moore nevertheless enjoyed a commanding position: 3 Cdo

Bde now stood poised within 10 miles of Stanley at the outer ring of Argentine defences,

with elements from 5 Inf Bde, including 2 Scots Guards and a battalion of Gurkhas deployed

to play an equal part in the assaults which now followed in short order, consisting of a series

of well-conducted, comprehensively-successful night attacks executed on 11-12 June against

Mt Harriet, Two Sisters and Mt Longdon conducted by 42 Cdo, 45 Cdo and 3 Para,

respectively, and, on the following evening, against Wireless Ridge and Mt Tumbledown, led

by 2 Para and 2 Scots Guards, respectively. In each case the survivors fled east into Stanley

where, on the morning of 14 June, the Argentine commander, Brigadier Mario Menendez,

surrendered all his forces on the Falklands. The entire ground phase of the campaign thus

concluded after a mere three weeks – 21 May to 14 June – a remarkable achievement

considering the fact that not only did the Argentines enjoy a clear numerical superiority over

the British, but possessed ample time with which to prepare their defences and establish

stockpiles of supplies during the nearly seven week period between their own invasion of 2

April and the British landings on 21 May.

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Total losses for both sides in the conflict amounted to 252 British dead and 777

wounded across all services. The Task Force lost four warships and a landing craft, one fleet

auxiliary vessel and one merchantman. Helicopter losses amounted to 23 from the Royal

Navy, seven from the RAF, three from the Royal Marines and one from the Army. Argentine

fatalities amounted to about 750, plus 1,100 personnel wounded or ill. The entire garrison of

over 13,000 men fell into British hands, plus numerous armoured vehicles, aircraft and

artillery, rendering this one of the most successful expeditionary operations in British military

history.

In analysing the factors behind British success several stand out particularly

prominently: the assembly of the Task Force with extraordinary rapidity, including the

acquisition and fitting-out of requisitioned vessels to supplement the existing resources of

the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary within days of the Argentine invasion; the

formulation of a clearly laid-out and effective strategy for re-taking the islands; the dispatch

of naval and air assets – all trained and equipped to a high standard – in sufficient numbers to

drive off the Argentine navy as well as to confine air attacks down to an acceptable, albeit

expensive, level; the deployment of first-rate ground forces boasting superb levels of fitness,

training, motivation and junior officer and NCO leadership; the skilful use of Special Forces

(both SAS and SBS) for reconnaissance and raiding; and the acquisition, via diplomatic

channels, of clandestine, non-operational American logistic support in the form of vast

quantities of aviation fuel based at Ascension Island, as well as critical satellite intelligence.

No proper explanation of British victory must rest alone on the successes attributed to

the Task Force and planners in Northwood and Whitehall. Rather, a balanced approach must

consider some of the principal errors committed by the Argentines. Amongst many of their

shortcomings, they failed to concentrate their air attacks against the British logistic chain – a

far more important element of the Task Force in terms of maintaining the operational

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longevity of ground forces than high-profile naval assets; they neglected to concentrate their

efforts against the two opposing aircraft carriers, the loss of either of which might alone have

caused a set-back of sufficient magnitude as to jeopardise the entire British effort; they made

the short-sighted and fatal decision to deploy to the Falklands and South Georgia

predominately inexperienced recruits as opposed to marginally better-prepared reservists or,

above all, marines and Special Forces, both composed of full-time professional personnel;

they failed to recognise that light armour could operate across most of the islands despite the

boggy nature of the ground, giving them an incalculable advantage over the British, who

brought only small numbers of such vehicles; although incapable – quite understandably – of

protecting the entire coastline of East Falkland in anticipation of the British landing, they

failed once it materialised to mount a counterattack against the beachhead at San Carlos, thus

enabling 3 Cdo Bde to advance simultaneously south against Goose Green and east towards

enemy defences immediately west of Stanley; they maintained an inflexible, static defence

throughout the campaign, thus abandoning the initiative to the British from the moment they

effected their landing on 21 May; they operated an appallingly poor logistic system within

Stanley, such that while the garrison there received adequate provisions and rest, their

comrades only a few miles away in the mountains suffered from food shortages owing to

faulty administration, pilfering by their own commissariat, and an almost total absence of

supply vehicles capable of negotiating trackless ground; they failed to hold out in the defence

of Stanley even after the collapse of their defensive ring just west of the town, neglecting the

supreme advantage still remaining to them: deteriorating weather conditions, for with the

steady decline in visibility and temperature no British forces – whether on land, at sea and in

the air – could not sustain themselves, much less fight, for long after mid-June.

Suggested Reading

121

Anderson, Duncan. The Falklands War 1982. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002.

Brown, David. The Royal Navy and the Falklands War. Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1987.

Burden, Rodney, et al. Falklands: The Air War. Poole: Arms and Armour Press, 1986.

Clapp, Michael and Southby-Tailyour, Ewen. Amphibious Assault Falklands. Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1996.

Freedman, Sir Lawrence. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign. Abingdon: Routledge, 2005.

Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Falklands 1982: Ground Operations in the South Atlantic. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2012.

Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon. Battle for the Falklands. London: Pan, 2010.

Middlebrook, Martin. The Falklands War 1982. London: Penguin Classics, 2007.

Thompson, Julian. No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic 1982. Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1985.

Van der Bijl, Nick. Nine Battles to Stanley. Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999.

_______________. Victory in the Falklands. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2007.

Woodward, Sandy. One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander. London: HarperPress, 2000

Operation Palliser

British intervention in Sierra Leone, 2000199

In April-May 2000 the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone reached

the edge of collapse when factions of the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) broke the

Lomé Peace Agreement. The British Labour Government's initial attempts to avoid direct

military intervention were overturned when further deterioration of the situation raised fears

for the safety of 1,000 British nationals in Sierra Leone. Additional pressure from the

199Unless otherwise stated all information in this chapter is from A. Dorman, Blair's Successful War: British Intervention in Sierra Leone, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, chapter 4. Dorman's information is drawn from private interviews with officers involved in Palliser.

122

international community for Britain to act in what was a former Crown Colony, long-standing

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development

(DfiD) involvement in achieving a settlement in Sierra Leone, and the Labour Government's

strong internationalist ideology, exerted strong moral influences on the decision to militarily

intervene.

The initiation of an expeditionary operation requires the conduct of an operational

estimate in which 'the construct of a military force, its desired order and means of arrival in

theatre should be driven by careful analysis of the specific situation’.200 Moreover, doctrine

emphasized that the expeditionary operation should be ‘set within a context of clear political

direction [and that] this analysis should be informed through estimates at both the military,

strategic and operational levels'.201 In conducting Operation Palliser British commanders at

points experienced difficulties in meeting doctrinal requirements for a clear political aim,

sufficient preparation time, and adequate information as a basis for planning at the strategic

and operational levels.

Strategically, clarity of mission was hindered for a time by inter-departmental

differences. The Ministry of Defence's view of the deployment as one of rapid evacuation

followed by immediate withdrawal was at odds with the FCO's view that envisaged British

forces remaining to support stabilisation efforts and conflict resolution. The FCO position

was later accepted as British policy, but during the initial stages of Operation Palliser these

political arguments delayed issue of the formal mission directive until the second day of the

deployment on 9 May. In the interim between deployment and receipt of his directive Joint

Task Force Commander (JTFC), Brigadier David Richards, based his action upon verbal

orders given unilaterally by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), General Sir Charles 200Joint Doctrine Publication 3-00 (JDP 3-00) Campaign Execution, 3rd Edition, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, October 2009, p. 1-1, p. 2-22. 201Ibid.

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Guthrie. As JDP 3-00 Campaign Execution observes, 'military planning and preparations may

have to be made with ambiguous strategic direction.'202

Operationally, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) was hampered in drawing up

military options by lack of up-to-date intelligence. To improve this situation the Operational

Reconnaissance and Liaison Team (ORLT) commanded by Brigadier David Richards

deployed, whilst PJHQ drew up three contingency deployment options. Option one envisaged

deployment of RAF transport aircraft protected by Special Forces to Lungi Airport (near the

capital, Freetown) to commence evacuation at 24 hours’ notice. Option two, requiring several

days to execute, involved 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment (1 PARA) in the role of the

Airborne Task Force (ABTF). Option three involved the most powerful force based upon the

Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of 42 Royal Marines Commando and supporting arms, but

required 10 days to arrive. To assist in these decisions the Paras and Marines each sent a

liaison officer to PJHQ to act with orders to get their units involved or not return.

Arrival of the ORLT on 6 May revealed the seriousness of the situation on the ground

and confusion in the UN Command. Richards requested the Joint Rapid Reaction Force

(JRRF), comprised of elements of 1 PARA and Special Forces, be moved to the French

airbase at Dakar in Senegal in order to speed any deployment. As the likelihood of

intervention emerged the MOD began a scramble to find the requisite medical supplies for a

tropical deployment, although shortages and lack of time meant that some personnel did not

receive them until in theatre.

On 7 May the ORLT was re-tasked as the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ),

receiving reinforcements from officers on exercise in Ghana and the UK. To speed action

London devolved full political and military decision-making powers to the British High

202Ibid.

124

Commissioner and Brigadier Richards. C Company 1 PARA with Special Forces flew in to

secure Lungi Airport from Dakar. Landing in a single RAF C-130 Hercules to their relief

they were met by a Liaison Officer from JTFHQ and elements of a Nigerian battalion from

UN forces rather than the feared possible 'warm' reception from the RUF. That day the ARG

sailed from Marseilles picking up extra personnel flown into Gibraltar. A Royal Navy Task

Group containing the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, carrying the RAF/RN Joint Harrier

Force, and the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) vital for conducting offensive

air operations, was ordered to re-deploy from exercise in the North Atlantic. Similarly, D

Company, 2 PARA, was attached to 1 PARA whose A Company was in Jamaica. To assist in

the deployment and evacuation, the RAF deployed eight C-130 Hercules and four Tristar

passenger aircraft, with an additional five chartered civilian airliners. Lack of transport

aircraft capable of carrying the large Chinook transport helicopters required them to deploy

into theatre under their own power. Spanish refusal to allow use of its airspace over the

Canary Islands forced them to divert over the Portuguese Azores, necessitating a flight of

3,000 miles.

With Lungi airport secured the evacuation proceeded swiftly with the majority of

British nationals departing in a few days. During the operation tensions briefly erupted

between 1 PARA and DfiD when the latter failed to understand that the expansion of the

perimeter at Lungi was essential to keep RUF heavy weapons out of range of the runway and

evacuation points, and was not a military escalation. Inter-service problems also emerged.

The RAF refused to hold a squadron of Jaguar strike aircraft at the Azores, insisting they

continue to exercise in the United States, thereby removing any air support until HMS

Illustrious arrived on 14 May. Such criticism of the RAF ignores logistic demands that meant

the aircraft could not have been based at Lungi any earlier than the arrival of Illustrious.

Valid criticism can be made concerning initial RAF refusal to operate its Harrier contingent

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aboard the carrier until procedures for pilot rescue were in place. In contrast RN Fleet Air

Arm Harriers commenced operations without insistence on such provisions.

What started out as a unilateral Non-Combatant Operation (NEO) to evacuate British

and other entitled citizens quickly expanded so that Palliser began to take on a distinctly

coalition hue. Even in the deployment phase, Palliser had already benefitted enormously

from French co-operation which had led to British forces being granted access to French

bases in Senegal, but the arrival of British forces led to the establishment of additional aims

by the British government. The new aims meant that British forces now took on the tasks of

assisting the government of Sierra Leone in the development of its armed forces and to

prevent the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) from collapsing.203

Although British forces retained their operational independence, they quickly evolved into

the hub of a loose coalition to stabilise the failing state of Sierra Leone.

Operation TELIC I

The British invasion of Iraq, March-May 2003204

In March 2003 Coalition forces under the overall command of United States Central

Command (CENTCOM) invaded Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The aim was the removal

of the Ba'ath Party regime under President Saddam Hussein and the destruction of alleged

stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons whose possession was seen as a threat to the

peace and stability of the Middle East. The invasion began on 19 March and was declared a

complete success by US President George Bush Jr in May. In reality what had ended in May

203Brig D. J. Richards, ‘Operation Palliser’, Journal of the Royal Artillery, (October 2000), p. 13. 204This section draws heavily upon unpublished restricted internal MOD reports and interviews by the author whose full details cannot be disclosed. Quotes and observations drawn from these sources are not cited.

126

was the war against Saddam that had begun with his invasion of Kuwait in 1990. What

followed was a new war over the future governance of Iraq that would see Coalition forces

operate in support of a fledgling Iraqi government against numerous ethnic, religious, tribal

and criminal insurgent groups and gangs. It would be the end of 2011 when the last American

combat forces, representing the final major Coalition war-fighting commitment, would be

able to withdraw from Iraq.

The British contribution to Iraqi Freedom was a tri-service deployment codenamed

Operation Telic I. The principal ground force was 1 (UK) Armoured Division comprising 7th

Armoured, 16 Air Assault, and 3 Commando Brigades. The British operated under the 1st US

Marine Expeditionary Force and were tasked with securing the right flank of the American

drive north towards Baghdad by securing Basra. Operations commenced on 19 March as 7th

and 16th Brigades moved towards Umm Qasr on the coast with 1st US Marine Division,

whilst 3 Commando Brigade conducted a series of air manoeuvre operations in to the Al Faw

peninsula to the south east of Basra. By 23 March the Royal Marines had taken over Umm

Qasr and secured Al Faw and 16 Air Assault held the Rumaila oilfields, thus securing the left

flank of 7th Armoured Brigade which was poised to secure Basra from bridgeheads over the

Shatt-Al-Basra waterway. From 1 April onwards 7th Armoured Brigade closed on Basra and

undertook a series of intelligence-led precision air strikes, ground raids and information

operations that crumbled enemy resistance and saw the city secured on 7 April, ending the

conventional war-fighting stage of Telic I.

In these operations the Royal Navy and RAF provided important support. The RN

provided escorts to the 78 transport ships bringing heavy equipment and supplies, undertook

mine counter-measures, provided amphibious lift, and at sea logistics support to its own and

other Coalition vessels. The RAF suppressed enemy SAM defences, interdicted enemy

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forces, provided precision strikes with its latest air-launched cruise missiles and other

precision munitions in support of ground forces.

Operation Telic I had confronted the British armed forces with a number of challenges

in deploying and sustaining a balanced tri-service expeditionary force. In many ways the

operation was impressive in its achievements. The British committed 46,000 personnel,

15,000 vehicles, 360 RAF and civilian transport aircraft, 115 fixed wing aircraft, 100

helicopters, 78 cargo ships and over 30 RN vessels. This made Telic I larger than the

deployments to Korea in 1950, Suez in 1956 and comparable to Operation Granby in the

1990-1 Gulf War. Notably, whilst it had taken 22 weeks to deploy in 1990, in 2003 the same

was achieved in just 10 weeks.205

Such figures obscure a number of fundamental problems the British encountered and

that demonstrate the problems of expeditionary operations undertaken at short notice, in haste

and at odds with formally established planning guidelines. The principal problem was the

limited time available for deployment. Although by summer 2002 the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO) had become convinced that war was inevitable this was not

formally communicated to the Ministry of Defence. In addition, the fear that undertaking

preparations for deployment might undermine a diplomatic solution already largely

discredited in political circles meant that British forces were not ordered to begin deployment

until mid-December. Consequently, it was 16 January - 61 days before the war began - when

forces commenced deployment.206 The exception was 3 Commando Brigade which was

already poised at sea in the Arabian Gulf and began planning on 22 November 2002. This

situation was further compounded when irreconcilable diplomatic problems with Turkey

forced the British to abandon plans to operate 1 (UK) Armoured Division from there and re-205MOD (UK), Operation TELIC: United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq, Report by Comptroller and Auditor General (HC 60 Session, 2003-2004; 11 December 2003), p.1-3. 206Ibid, p. 7.

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deploy to Kuwait. The lack of time and extra logistic requirements meant that the original

intention to have a division of two heavy brigades was unfeasible, resulting in the lighter 16

Air Assault being brought in as a replacement of second choice. Set alongside the need to

start operations in March before the hot season in May, and clear American intent to go

without the British if they were not ready, meant that there was inadequate time to deploy,

resulting in equipment shortages in some areas and lack of time to work up forces and, in

particular, certain specialist troops.

The problems of international and alliance politics served to reveal the fallacy of

certain national defence planning assumptions made in the United Kingdom over preceding

years. Although the 1998 Strategic Defence and Security Review had committed to

developing British expeditionary capabilities to undertake operations such as Telic I, pressure

from the Nation Audit Office and Committee of Public Accounts to reduce costs led the

Ministry of Defence to reduce its stockpiles of stores. Critically, this was predicated on a

guarantee that there would always be a 90-day warning order for any deployment in order to

build up stores from Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) placed on industry. In reality,

industry struggled to meet the many UORs in light of having only a 70-day warning period

which was further reduced by Christmas to about 49 days. The result was critical shortages in

some areas; for example, chemical and biological equipment and vehicle spares. Shortages in

spares were made up by cannibalising vehicles not employed; in the case of the Challenger 2

Main Battle Tank 22% of the total fleet was rendered unserviceable to meet 7th Armoured

Brigades needs.207 Lack of equipment and training of personnel in storing medical supplies at

the correct temperature saw the RAMC throw away drugs and vaccines because they had no

confidence in their quality.

207Ibid, p. 12.

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Problems of overall availability of certain supplies were compounded by

organisational problems in their handling and shipping. This was the responsibility of the

Defence Transport Military Administration (part of the Defence Logistics Office) and in-

theatre service logistics authorities. Procedural problems in scheduling and tracking the

shipment of container supplies from Britain to Kuwait led a post-war official report to

comment: 'Means of tracking supplies in-theatre was largely ineffective, manpower intensive

and swamped by the sheer volume of supplies. The whereabouts of some key equipment and

supplies was unknown'.208 In one instance the mis-prioritisation of supplies meant that

equipment vital for lorry movement of ammunition arrived on 17 March limiting the ability

to move supplies to the front-line, exacerbating a belief among troops that a shortage existed

in what was in reality an abundant supply of ammunition.209 This lack of confidence in the

supply chain led to further disruption as forward units sent parties in search of their

containers with the result that there was considerable unauthorised taking of supplies destined

for other units, with obvious implications. In the most bizarre case, unable to locate stores in

containers already in theatre a team from 1 (UK) Armoured Division was dispatched to the

Defence Stores and Distribution Agency in Bicester, Oxfordshire210! The cumulative effect of

these problems was summarised by one senior officer who noted that if 1 (UK) Armoured

Division had been required to advance farther and fight at a more sustained and higher

intensity its logistic situation would have become a matter of serious concern.

Operation Telic I was a considerable achievement as a British expeditionary

operation. Considerable success was achieved both in the deployment and operation of

forces. That serious weaknesses in overall defence planning and in the organisation of

logistics was revealed was a sobering lesson – one noted in an official report that summarised

208Ibid, p. 4. 209Ibid, p. 21 210Ibid, p.19.

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a fundamental problem of expeditionary operations that are often conducted at short notice.

In future, it observed, Britain 'Might not have the preparation time available to it that it had

previously presumed'.211

Insurgency

Introduction

Definitions of what insurgency constitutes are legion, with most of the world’s major

armies and law-enforcement agencies having at least one, sometimes several. Though they

tend to differ in wording and stress certain features to a greater or lesser degree, their gist is

very similar. In the British case, the Army defines insurgency as “an organised, violent

subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to establish

authority”.212 It is usually taken as read that such a group, irrespective of it representing a

body of popular opinion which is in the majority or the minority does not have ready access

to the sources of power of a state such as its armed forces or police agencies. As a result of

this, the armed struggle rather than taking the form of a coup d’ etat will manifest itself as an

insurgent campaign featuring terrorist attacks, guerrilla warfare, or both. Historically, this is

nothing new, with the weak having recurred to this form of war as a way of getting back at

the strong, such as an occupying power, for a long time. Before the French Revolution such

movements, however, tended to be tribal in nature and accordingly limited in their scope.

Only in exceptionally rare cases did such a grassroots movement develop the momentum

needed to threaten the overthrow of a modern state or the defeat of a sizeable army.

Theories

211 Ibid, p.7. 212Army Field Manual. Countering Insurgency. Volume 1 – Part 10: January 2010 (Section 2)

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The great Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz devoted but a small chapter in his

1831 book On War to the subject of insurgent warfare. Without intending to belittle its

potential, he expressed the opinion that insurgents would only be able to persevere when

operating in conjunction with conventional forces. This is what had happened in Spain from

1808 to 1813. Spanish insurgents (guerrilleros), quite a few of whom drew their strength

from social circumstances which had favoured banditry prior to invasion, preyed on the

French and their supporters and forced the occupying power to spread itself thin by dotting

the country with small garrisons and patrolling the major roads. On the downside, they

usually only paid lip service to directives coming from the central Spanish government,

proved reluctant to cooperate with other bands and, more often than not, preyed on the local

civilian population to the same degree as on the French. Having said this, the fact that the

insurgents supplied the Allied armies with ready intelligence turned them into a major asset

from an operational point of view. Nothing suggests, however, that they would ever have

been in a position to drive the French from Iberia unassisted.213

Nearly a hundred years after Clausewitz penned On War these thoughts were echoed by

T. E. Lawrence, a British officer detached to the western Arabian peninsula in 1916 to assist

an ongoing Arab rebellion against the Ottoman Empire (Germany’s Middle Eastern ally).

Lawrence managed to convince the various tribes of rebellious Bedouin to cooperate with

each other and to desist from attacking towns, since this would do little more than provide the

Turks with an opportunity to engage them with superior firepower. Instead he advised

constant attacks on the railway which linked this backwater of the Turkish Empire with its

centres of power further north. In a similar vein to Clausewitz, Lawrence saw the insurgents

as playing a role subordinate to that of conventional forces. The last months of the war in the 213For a recent analysis of this aspect of the Napoleonic wars, see Charles J. Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain 1808-1814. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004.

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Middle East, which saw a rapid advance of Allied armies through what are today Israel and

Syria, with the newly formed insurgent armies operating on their right flank, appeared to

offer proof of the basic soundness of this thinking. Today Lawrence’s thoughts on those

events are above all remarkable for the emphasis he placed on the need to adapt an insurgent

strategy to the cultural and historical framework of the society affected by it.214

1917 saw the birth of the world’s first Communist regime – Soviet Russia. Even though

the exceptional circumstances prevailing in Russia that year allowed the Communist Party of

the Soviet Union under Vladimir Lenin to stage a coup rather than having to gain power from

the ground up, for the next 70-80 years Communist ideology would prove to be the main

ideological propellant for insurgencies all over the world.215 Politically, it seemed to give

millions of oppressed people a viable solution to their woes as well as a plausible reason to

believe that the forces of history were on their side; i.e., that time was ripe for action. In

keeping with the legacy of the European urban uprisings of 1848 (revolutions in Paris, Berlin,

Vienna and elsewhere) and 1871 (the Paris Commune), orthodox communism showed a

certain tendency to see revolts by the urban proletariat as the preferred tool of revolution,

even though other courses of action were not ruled out.

In the 1930s, the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse Tung put forward a blueprint for an

insurgent strategy which went well beyond anything Clausewitz and Lawrence and even

Lenin had envisaged. He was greatly assisted in this by the turmoil experienced at the time by

large parts of China. In the years which followed the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and

the proclamation of the republic, much of China fell prey to secessionist movements and

assorted warlords, with gangs of bandits making life unbearable in rural areas. When the

Kuomintang Party under Chiang Kai-shek had finally managed to establish effective

214See for instance, wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_ 27_ Articles_ of_ T.E._ Lawrence 215For a thorough account of the ideological permutations of Communism, see David Priestland, The Red Flag: How Communism Changed the World. London: Grove Press 2010.

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government control over a large part of the country in the late 1920s and turned to the task of

wiping out the Communists, the latter were unwittingly assisted by a Japanese invasion. In

the ensuing years, the main body of the Communists managed to establish a safe base area in

remote Yenan and nurse their wounds. The regular army, on the other hand, while attempting

to protect the remainder of the country’s demographic and industrial centres from the

invaders found itself on the receiving end of a whole series of offensive drives, which ended

up by inflicting crippling damage on it. It was this experience which gave Mao the

framework for his idea of “protracted war”. An initial defensive phase would see the

insurgents establish a safe base area and proselytise among the rural population, with the

politicisation of the latter being seen as the key to this new approach. Military action during

this period would be very limited. The stalemate phase would see increased guerrilla warfare

and the establishment of further safe base areas. At a tactical level, regular forces would only

be engaged if the tactical circumstances favoured the insurgents. By the time the offensive

phase was initiated, Mao asserted that a large part of the guerrilla force needed to have made

the transition to high-intensity warfare capability. These units would then seek out and defeat

the main government forces. While Clausewitz and Lawrence had just seen insurgent warfare

as a means to an end, with Mao, the military insurgency and the political revolution acting

practically as one aimed at the overthrow of the social structures of the affected society. At a

purely operational level, this meant that any territory occupied by insurgents for any length of

time would be infested with political cadres to facilitate the insurgents’ return in case of a

temporary retreat. Mao had shown remarkable flexibility in adapting the dictates of orthodox

Communism to the circumstances of 1930s China. Very much like Clausewitz, he had also

plundered the events of the recent past to find historical precedents which would buttress his

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theories. Last, but not least, he had been prepared to admit that the struggle would likely as

not be long and bloody.216

The last theory to be examined here constitutes an attempt to dodge this uncomfortable

truth. In 1956-58 the Caribbean island of Cuba was rocked by an insurgency which started

from very small beginnings but then snowballed into a movement that drew support from

Cubans from all walks of life while at the same time spreading despondency among the army

facing it. Effective use was made of gullible representatives of the western media who were

allowed to visit the insurgent HQ in the Sierra Maestra and produced sympathetic coverage.

In the insurgency’s final phase, opposition melted away so rapidly that one historian has

likened those events less to an insurgency than to Mussolini’s 1922 March on Rome.217 One

of the insurgent leaders, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, convinced himself that, far from being a

fluke, these events constituted the shape of things to come in the underdeveloped societies of

Latin America. A small group of dedicated revolutionaries, he argued, would by their very

actions be able to create an insurgent “foco” (Spanish for ‘focus’) from which the rebellion

would spread across the entire country. Rather than wait for the right set of circumstances to

favour the revolution (something Communist ideology had always stressed), the insurgents

would be able to create them for themselves. Needless to say this disregarded the fact that

Latin American societies, though sharing an early history and even a common language, had

hardly evolved in parallel. Cuba in the 1950s had actually been more prosperous than the next

country Guevara tried to subvert – Bolivia. Even so, the greater proficiency of the Bolivian

army, by now aided by the US, together with poor preparation of the human terrain, was

216For a pithy introduction into Mao’s military thought, see Samuel B. Griffith II, ed., Mao-Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare. Baltimore: Maryland 1992. 217Daniel Moran, Wars of National Liberation. London: Cassell & Co. 2001, p. 145.

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more than enough to put paid to a rather hare-brained attempt on the part of Guevara and a

small band to start an insurgency there in 1967.218

Limitations

The key limitation of any insurgent strategy lies in the unpredictability with which the

audience it is addressing might react to it. Different people have rebelled against those

wielding power for different reasons at different times. Any insurgency needs to allow for

this by closely studying the historical pressure points of a society. While one nation might

easily be rallied to drive out, for instance, a foreign occupier, another might have a long

history of simply resisting occupation by peaceful means. Most insurgencies are also civil

wars and the politics affecting such conflicts can play a major role in galvanising or limiting a

rebellion. If the insurgents hail mostly from a particular ethnic minority, this can have

unforeseen effects insofar as the other ethnic groups – even when critical of those in power –

are likely to rally behind the government almost by default. Only in a few cases is the case

for rebellion so powerful and all-pervading that ethnic groups lacking a history of making

common cause end up forming an anti-government front. The most clear-cut instance of such

an evolution is to be found in occupied Yugoslavia, most of which was divided between the

Germans and Italians during the Second World War. While the Axis occupiers made a few

concessions to a newly-founded Serb puppet state, they gave the Slovenes no such

perspective and installed ultra-fascist collaborators with a genocidal agenda (the Ustasha) in

the only genuinely independent state to emerge out of the carve-up of the old Yugoslavia: the

Independent State of Croatia, which combined Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result,

while Bosnian Serbs were disproportionately represented in the ranks of the Communist

218For a critical appraisal of Guevara’s thinking on insurgent warfare see Paul J. Dosal, Comandante Che: Guerrilla soldier, commander and strategist, 1958-1967. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

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insurgents (the partisans), Croats, Muslims and Slovenes had joined them in large numbers

by 1943-44.219 The case of Malaya in the 1950s is much more typical: there, none of the other

ethnic groups took to the idea of allowing the local Chinese to become their future lord and

masters, thus leaving the insurgents isolated.

Conversely, the government/occupying power can reinforce its war against the

insurgency or terminate it for the most unforeseen reasons. While a domestic government will

usually have few compunctions about escalating the struggle, a foreign occupier may –

depending on other priorities – escalate or terminate his commitment to the ongoing struggle

quite abruptly. After their spectacular defeat in Indochina (1946-54)220, the French might

have been expected to throw in the towel as far as the maintenance of their colonial empire

was concerned, especially since this was the course of action being adopted by virtually all

other European powers.221 Instead in Algeria (1954-62) they made a maximum effort which

by 1959-60 put them on the threshold to victory222, only for a new government under

President Charles de Gaulle to then sign an agreement with the insurgents which gave the

fruits of that victory away virtually overnight. Lest the reader put this down to the fickle

nature of the Latin temperament, it is worth remembering that Britain put an end to the Irish

insurgency (1919-21) under very similar circumstances.

Militarily, any insurgent movement has to find a way to work around the fact that the

enemy is likely to enjoy a considerable to crushing margin of superiority in terms of access to

greater firepower and technology, with air power constituting the most obvious manifestation

of this. If successful, the progress of the insurgency may render it necessary to move on to the

219Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. 220Martin Windrow, The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson 2004; Mark Atwood Lawrence & Fredrik Logevall, eds., The First Vietnam War: Colonial conflict and Cold War crisis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. 221The one major exception to this rule was Portugal. 222For the French COIN campaign in Algeria see the relevant chapter below .

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equivalent of the Maoist Third Phase: forming units capable of conventional high-intensity

warfare. Even if the equipment to do so is readily available, the decision is still a very risky

one, since it basically requires the insurgents to break cover on a large scale and expose

themselves to superior firepower. In the case of the Indochina War, the French colonial

power, even though severely weakened, in 1951 managed to inflict a series of major defeats

on the Vietminh insurgents when the latter attempted to rush the French position in the Red

River Delta around Hanoi and Haiphong. Almost as sobering as the prospect of defeat is the

likelihood of a Maoist second phase which stretches into eternity – an unending stalemate.

The best case study is to be found in the Latin American republic of Colombia. There, the

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) have waged guerrilla warfare

against virtually every government since 1962. Government in Colombia has a long history

of being weak and ineffective, especially in rural areas, and the FARC in its heyday have

ruled over a large swathe of the country; this state of affairs notwithstanding they have never

been able to seize a provincial city, much less the capital. In recent years, targeted strikes by

the Colombian armed forces have forced the FARC deeper and deeper into the jungle and

turned an already unlikely victory into a mirage. These days, FARC manages to fund its

existence by running extortion rackets and taking protection money from drug lords.

The urban option

Taking an insurgency into an urban area at first glance appears to be self-defeating: in the

first instance, guerrillas have always made a point of choosing areas rendered inaccessible by

forests, jungles or mountains in order to gain a degree of protection from the government’s

superior firepower. In a city, the available transport network makes this a moot point.

Moreover, politically, taking over a major city constitutes a challenge which no occupying

power or government will be in a position to overlook or ignore. However, opportunity or

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circumstances may force the insurgent leadership to opt for an all-out urban uprising of the

kind imagined by the Marxist theorists of the late 19th century. In the case of the Warsaw

uprising (1 August - 2 October 1944) the proximity of the German frontline practically left

the insurgents with no other choice than to make an attempt to take the city – there were no

other worthwhile objectives left and a Soviet move had to be pre-empted. Even though

partially successful, the ultimate outcome proved that against an adversary willing to make

the maximum use of superior firepower in a congested environment, while disregarding the

safety of local civilians, the idea of an urban insurgency was simply not viable. Hungarian

rebels facing the Red Army in Budapest (1956) and the Vietcong challenging the US Army

and the South Vietnamese in Saigon (1968) failed to find a solution to the same dilemma; in

the latter case the problem was compounded by the fact that most of the urban “insurgents”

were actually infiltrators from the countryside who on the day of the uprising struggled to

make their rendezvous points in time because of their lack of local knowledge. Both in the

case of Warsaw 1944 and Saigon 1968 the insurgents had had some reason to expect outside

help after a few days which then failed to materialise; in the case of Fallujah in 2004, not

even that far-fetched hope was likely, thus turning this battle into a case study for all the

problems likely to limit the impact of an urban uprising: though well-armed, the Sunni

insurgents were not very numerous (c. 3,000-4,000). They were given time enough to

establish themselves in the city, but then found themselves trapped from all sides. By the time

the US Marines and their allies moved in, the insurgents had decided to hold a number of

fortified buildings rather than most of the city, hoping to force a costly FIBUA battle on their

enemy. While Coalition forces had considerably more qualms about harming civilians than

the Germans had had in 1944, superior tactics and weaponry allowed the Coalition forces to

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wrest control of Fallujah from the insurgents at a cost (95 fatalities) and within a time frame

(six weeks), which while well out of the ordinary, was still deemed acceptable.223

The only form of urban insurgency which is likely to be with us for a long time yet is

that waged by a small band of men seeking “spectaculars” – essentially, terrorism. Algiers

1957, Montevideo 1963-73 as well as Londonderry and Belfast 1969-98 have witnessed

urban “insurgencies” which rarely featured more than a couple of hundred activists at the

most. Tactics tend to be similar to those of the first Maoist phase insofar as the security forces

are engaged deliberately only on occasions. The big advantage of this approach is that it

facilitates the “propaganda of the deed”, since there are usually plenty of media

representatives on hand and even an authoritarian government will struggle to completely

suppress the news of this challenge to its authority spreading all over the world. On the

downside, a small band of activists is hardly in a position to gain adherents in appreciable

numbers for security reasons, thus limiting the impact they might conceivably have right

from the start. Almost uniquely, an exception to this rule can be made for EOKA, which

fought a mostly urban insurgency against the British colonial administration in the 1950s

while enjoying the passive support of the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots. The

1959 settlement saw both sides making important concessions, but it still constitutes the

nearest thing to a clear-cut success story for urban insurgency.224 Even though the increased

urbanisation of the world we live in may well create more opportunities for campaigns fought

along these lines, at the moment it appears to be a strategic dead end. Urban areas are

however likely to play a role – especially when poorly policed – as safe base areas into which

rural insurgents can retreat for replenishment, R & R and medical aid.

223For these and other case studies, see Anthony James Joes, Urban Guerrilla Warfare. University of Kentucky Press, 2007. 224Nick van der Bijl, The Cyprus Emergency: The Divided Island 1955-1974. Barnsley: Pen & Sword , 2010. Despite its rather misleading title, most of the contents of this book are dedicated to the events of the 1950s insurgency.

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Conclusion

Very few insurgencies have triumphed without an appreciable degree of outside help

and those that did succeed (like Cuba) were nevertheless assisted in their progress by some

massive failure on the part of the government they were fighting or by their adversary being a

colonial empire with only a lukewarm commitment to staying the course. Some insurgent

leaders (Mao and Guevara come to mind) placed great stress on the supposedly

“revolutionary” nature of their strategies, but it is important to remember that the

circumstances as dictated by the culture and history of the countries they were trying to

subvert played at least as big a role in shaping their course of action as any ideological pre-

disposition on their part. This was a point which Lawrence understood very well, though

Guevara ultimately did not.

Early 20th century insurgencies

Insurgency in the first half of the 20th century continued to be linked with the threat of

organised revolution in the developed industrialised world, and armed opposition or revolt

against various colonial empires. There were, however, important differences from the 19th

century.

Most colonial empires had reached their peak, both in the strategic and economic value

of their colonies, and in the ideology of empire as a positive force. The British Empire

reached its largest extent in the 1920s, and in the same period there ceased to be anywhere on

earth – land or sea – that was not claimed as its sovereign territory by at least one country.

The gains made by Britain and France after the First World War were League of Nations

‘mandates’ or ‘trusteeships’ rather than formal colonies. Military conquest also became

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harder to achieve, in every sense. The attempts by Japan to establish an empire in Asia in the

1930s were viewed as a violation of the established order rather than as a legitimate activity.

As global communications improved, and industrialisation spread outside Europe, the

likelihood of insurgents receiving political, financial or military support from outside also

increased.

In both the First and Second World Wars, all sides encouraged revolution and revolt

against their enemies as a weapon of war. The Soviet Union, particularly in its first decade,

saw the promotion of worldwide revolution as an important part of its own ideology. Up to

the end of the Second World War, counterinsurgency was largely a continuation of the older

imperial policing role, while insurgency developed new doctrines and techniques, and

became a much more systematic and organised activity. Indeed, one of the problems that

European empires had with early 20th century insurgencies is that they appeared to be only

colonial revolts or even banditry, which they knew already how to defeat. Already after the

First World War Europe no longer dominated the rest of the world, and two extra-European

powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, did so after 1945. The two central global

issues for the remainder of the 20th century were the Cold War and decolonisation, and it was

in this context that almost all insurgencies took place. The United Nations in particular took

from its creation a strongly anti-colonial line.

The British made their first significant move towards decolonisation with the granting

of independence to British India in 1947,225 followed more reluctantly by France and other

European powers. Counterinsurgency in this period was seen by the British and French in

particular as an aspect of the ‘Retreat from Empire,’ with the object of leaving behind stable

225India had never existed as a unified state before the 20th century. British-controlled India was divided broadly along religious lines into India and Pakistan; the latter physically split into two areas: East Pakistan and West Pakistan. In 1971 the Second India-Pakistan War resulted in East Pakistan becoming the independent country of Bangladesh. Difficulties arising from the frontier settlement of 1947 continue to persist.

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independent countries that maintained close links with the original colonial power.

Revolutionary insurgents on the other hand viewed decolonisation as a sham in which

imperial powers gave up direct rule – including responsibility for their colonies – while

maintaining economic and financial domination. Economic issues became much more

important in revolutionary ideology, with ‘land for the landless’ being a frequently used

slogan. The most influential theoretical exponent of these revolutionary ideas was the

Martinique-born Franz Fanon (1925-61), particularly in The Wretched of the Earth (1961,

which argued that violence was itself a form of liberation, and that colonial peoples had a

moral right to the wealth of the West.

The United States saw counterinsurgency as part of its broader strategy of

‘containment’ of the Soviet Union, as well as a continuation of its more traditional policies of

domination of Central and South America. While maintaining its own hold over Eastern

Europe, the Soviet Union particularly under Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971, in power 1958-

64) proclaimed its support of revolutionary insurgents world-wide. As relations between the

United States and the Soviet Union improved in the later 1960s, ideological leadership of the

global revolution passed to Mao Tse-tung’s China.

Meanwhile, in North America and Western Europe complex social and economic

changes promoted a culture of rebellion and even radical chic that challenged and partly

transformed the existing order. This reached its high point in 1968 with the American

recognition that the Vietnam War could not be won, and a near revolution (‘les eventements’)

in Paris. Virtually all of this protest was entirely legitimate. Many revolutionary insurgents

of this period were, or recently had been, university students, regarded by theorist Abraham

Guíllen (1913-94) of the Urugyan Tupermaros (themselves a distinctly intellectual terrorist

group with a populist slogan – ‘Everybody dances or nobody dances’) as forming the

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vanguard of the revolution.226 In this context, almost any revolt or violent protest was

interpreted – or at least portrayed – as a Communist insurgency by its opponents. Repressive

regimes particularly in South and Central America and the Far East sought American support

under the broad provisions of the Truman Doctrine by depicting their adversaries as

consisting only of Soviet- or Chinese-backed Communist revolutionaries, sometimes quite

accurately. Both superpowers also engaged in ‘covert action’ around the world, and many

countries used proxy war against their neighbours by supporting insurgents. Whereas 19th

century revolutionaries had seen popular attitudes within their own target countries as the

sole factor in success, 20th century insurgencies were recognised as having an international

dimension. When insurgencies took place in a colonial or post-colonial context, this included

the domestic political attitudes of the colonial power.

For Britain, most of the features associated with 20th century insurgency were already

present at its very start in the Boer War (1899-1902). This was virtually the last of the British

wars of colonial expansion, fought against the two ‘Boer’ republics (boer means ‘farmer’ in

Afrikaans) of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The war was forced upon a reluctant

government in London by imperial idealists and by Cape Colony businessmen intent on

control of the region’s gold fields, but once committed the British regarded victory as

essential for their international prestige. The Boer republics were European-model colonial

states with access to international contacts and trade, armed and militarily equipped at least as

well as the British, but with an irregular army and little acceptance of European laws or

conventions of war. In a pattern typical of colonial warfare, the British suffered some defeats

due to unpreparedness, followed by a successful campaign leading to the occupation and

annexation of both countries within a year, as part of the new Republic of South Africa. The

Boers enjoyed considerable international political support, including volunteer contingents of

226Quoted in Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (1977)

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which the largest were two Fenian Irish ‘brigades,’ each of about 100 men. The Fenians of

the IRB also made the offer, shocking at the time and not accepted, of sinking a British troop

transport ship by placing a bomb on board. After the annexations in 1900, a hard core of

Boers, regarded by the British as rebels in law, resorted to guerrilla warfare which lasted a

further 18 months. These ‘bitter enders’ depended on support from their farms and

homesteads. To remove this support the British resorted to a system of fortified posts and

blockhouses, barbed wire fences, mounted patrols, farm burning, and to internment camps,

known at the time as ‘concentration camps,’ in which over 20,000 women and children died

of disease.227

Although Britain was not yet a democracy, the era of mass politics had already begun. A

vocal minority of opponents of the war in Britain, known to their enemies as the ‘pro-Boers,’

argued that it was being fought for narrow commercial interests, and that the methods

employed were contrary to the laws of war. Revelations in the press of British Army

methods in the guerrilla phase produced a scandal, particularly as the government claimed

that the war had ended. In a speech in 1901 the Liberal Leader of the Opposition, Sir Henry

Campbell-Bannerman (1836-1908), proclaimed:

A phrase often used is ‘war is war’. But when one comes to ask about it, one is told that no war is going on – that it is not war. When is a war not a war? When it is carried on by methods of barbarism in South Africa.

− Quoted in Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (1979)

Altogether 448,435 troops fought in the war of which 256,000 were British Army regulars.

Total Boer forces were never greater than about 60,000, and the ‘bitter enders’ no more than

20,000 men. The final peace settlement in 1902 confirmed the British annexation, and was

227One lasting claim is that ‘the British invented the concentration camp’. The term, meaning a camp where troops or others are concentrated, gained notoriety in the Spanish counterinsurgency campaigns in Cuba in the 1880s and ‘90s. In the 1930s Germany deliberately chose the name for its detention and punishment camps for political and social prisoners, and death camps for ethnic ‘undesirables’ in order to disguise their true nature.

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sufficiently moderate for most South Africans to support the British Empire in the First

World War. The war’s unresolved issues plagued South Africa for the rest of the century.

British methods in South Africa were very much those of colonial warfare as outlined

in Callwell’s Small Wars. But the frustrating experience of a few thousand ‘bitter enders’

tying down many times their own number of troops in an expensive and protracted war was

typical. The United States, which had annexed the Philippines from Spain in 1898, faced

similar problems in a guerrilla revolt of 1899-1902, the first of a number of insurgencies

conducted by Filipino separatists or nationalists. These experiences led to arguments that

imperial expansion had reached its limits, and also that new military methods were required

to deal with revolt.

The first ideas of 20th century counterinsurgency emphasising political as well as

military factors, winning the support of the target population and drawing on local

knowledge, came from French Army theorist Louis Hubert Gonsalve Lyautey (1842-1934).

The practical application of these ideas came in Indochina (modern Vietnam, Cambodia and

Laos), a French colony since 1862. In the northern part, ‘Tonkin China’ (close to the Chinese

border), the French faced a serious threat from ‘pirates’ who included nationalists enjoying

considerable local support. In 1892 Joseph Simon Galliéni (1849-1916) arrived to take

command, joined by Lyautey in 1894. Galliéni believed that the French Army needed an

administrative and social function in colonial warfare. Mobile columns would attack the

pirates themselves, while the French largely respected local culture in an effort to improve

the life of the people, rather than attempting to destroy traditional structures. One distinctive

feature of the ‘Galliéni method’ was that, although it emphasised the link between the

military campaign and civil administration, both were in the hands of the military

commander.

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Lyautey coined the term tache d’huile (oil stain) for this method: pacification extending

outwards from individual villages like drops of oil on blotting paper, until the areas became

joined together. In Tonkin China it worked so well that by 1896 the region was effectively

pacified. Lyautey’s analysis of the campaign used ideas and phrases that would be endlessly

repeated in 20th century counterinsurgency:

The pirate is a plant which will grow only in certain soils, and the surest method is to make the soil uncongenial to him…Armed occupation, with or without fighting, is as the ploughshare; the establishment of a military cordon fences it and isolates it definitely, if an internal frontier is in question; and finally the organisation and reconstitution of the population, its arming, the setting up of markets and various cultivations, the driving of roads, are all like the sowing of the good grain, and render the conquered region impervious to brigandage.

− Quoted in Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows (1994)

Lyautey repeated the method successfully in other French colonies, including

Madagascar in 1896-1900 under Galliéni as colonial governor, followed by campaigns in

Algeria 1903-10, and Morocco 1912-25, where Lyautey functioned effectively as political-

military dictator.228 Lyautey viewed these campaigns as part of a wider philosophy of the

civilising role of the French Army, establishing its position in French political and cultural

life; increasingly, he regarded the civil state and its political apparatus as something to be

circumvented. This caused problems later, not always in French campaigns, from officers

who lacked Lyautey’s skills and patriotic commitment. The extremely successful tache

d’huile was copied by many countries as a standard counterinsurgency method.

In the First World War, all sides encouraged insurrections and revolutionary

movements in enemy-controlled countries. The Germans backed an abortive Boer uprising

against the British in South Africa in 1914, as well as revolts in British India. When the first

Russian Revolution took place in March 1917, Vladimir Lenin was in exile in Zurich. He 228Both men also saw distinguished service on the Western Front in the First World War, Galliéni particularly for the defence of Paris during the Battle of the Marne in September 1914.

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was allowed passage through Germany in a sealed train since the Germans believed he would

ferment further trouble for Russia. Lenin succeeded beyond expectation, playing together

with Leon Trotsky (born Lev Davidovich Bronstein 1879-1940) a leading role in the

subsequent ‘October Revolution’ with coups in Moscow and Petrograd (modern St.

Petersburg, then Russia’s capital city) followed by a series of wars that lasted until 1923 and

established the Soviet Union.229

In the traditions of people’s war, Lenin and Trotsky regarded revolutionaries in other

countries and guerrilla or irregular forces as an integral part of their political and military

strategy. But like other followers of Marx, they had absorbed Clausewitz’s ideas on war, and

saw guerrilla warfare by itself as ineffective. The importance of the success of the Russian

Revolution for the history of the 20th century cannot be overstated. But almost as important

for the development of insurgency was the British (and also French) support for the Arab

revolt against the Ottoman Turkish Empire 1916-18 led by Emir Imal Faisal (1883-1933,

King of Iraq from 1921). The main British campaign was a conventional advance from

Egypt through Turkish Palestine 1917-18, for which they saw the insurrectionists as useful

support. They supplied arms and liaison officers, the most famous of who was the

archaeologist and Arabist turned soldier, T. E. Lawrence (‘Lawrence of Arabia’ 1888-1935).

Rather than trying to convert desert Arabs into conventional forces, the Arab Revolt

used their traditional military strength of desert mobility on camel and horseback, together

with British weapons, to launch attacks on Turkish garrisons and railway communications.

Politically the Turks could not afford to withdraw without losing control of the region; but

they did not have the forces to defend the railway properly. The Arab Revolt tied down

229Due to the continued use of the Julian Calendar, the ‘October’ revolution took place in November 1917, followed by the Russian Civil War 1917-19 in which a number of countries sent intervention forces including Britain, and the effectively contiguous Russo-Polish War of 1919-23, in which Soviet troops came within measurable distance of extending the revolution into Germany.

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Turkish forces many times larger than itself, as well as provided important support for the

main British campaign. Lawrence became a legendary figure both during and after the war,

particularly through his book, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1927) and wrote most of the entry on

‘Guerrilla’ for the 1929 Encyclopaedia Britannica. He stressed the political, social and

psychological aspects of guerrilla warfare, including the common argument that guerrillas

and their methods possessed a mystical superiority over conventional forces:

[The experience of the Arab Revolt] strengthened the belief that irregular war or rebellion could be proved an exact science, and an inevitable success, granted certain factors and pursued along certain lines…In fifty words: granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraeical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfection of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

− Encyclopaedia Britannica 14th Edition, under ‘Guerrilla’ (1929)

Lawrence influenced British views of both conventional and irregular warfare,

particularly through his association with the inter-war theorist Basil Liddell Hart. They both

emphasised psychology and mobility as an aim in itself, and shared the belief that small

forces could have an effect out of all proportion to their size. The contrast with the Western

Front also made Lawrence a symbol of the belief that conventional military thinking was in

itself inadequate. His ideas bear comparison with Liddell Hart’s concept of the ‘indirect

approach’ and modern manoeuvrist thinking about guerrilla warfare:

There is a ‘felt’ element in troops, not expressible in figures, and the greatest commander is he whose intuitions most nearly happen. Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought [and] practising the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex.

− Encyclopaedia Britannica 14th Edition, under ‘Guerrilla’ (1929)

In Britain, rather than establishing the superiority of guerrillas over conventional forces,

the desert campaign helped foster the idea of what would now be called Special Forces. But

it also acted as an important inspiration for future Arab insurgents.

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The Anglo-Irish War, 1919-21

Even more important in the history and theory of insurgency, especially for Britain, was

the only case in 20th century Western Europe of a successful insurgency leading to the

creation of an independent country under the rule of the insurgents: the Anglo-Irish War

1919-21. Irish success was a complicated mix of political and military factors. British

governments had first tried to give Ireland its political independence in 1886. In 1902 the

Fenian political party Sinn Fein (‘ourselves alone’) was founded. In 1912 the Irish Home

Rule Act was passed, which would have given Ireland independence at the end of 1914. This

was opposed by the dominant minority in Northern Ireland, the chiefly Protestant ‘Ulster

Unionists’, who enjoyed support from the Conservative Party and among senior Army

officers of Irish descent, and who at once formed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), an

illegal armed militia. By 1914 Ireland was on the verge of open civil war, in which the

British Army’s loyalties were by no means clear.230 On the outbreak of the First World War

the Home Rule Act was suspended. The Ulster Unionists, in a calculated political move,

transformed the UVF into the 36th Ulster Division, a volunteer formation of the British Army,

on the basis that if they fought for Britain this established their right to remain part of the

United Kingdom.231 The strain of the First World War increased problems in Ireland,

particularly in January 1916 when conscription was introduced for the rest of the United

Kingdom. Led by James Connolly (1870-1916), the IRB staged in April 1916 the ‘Easter

Rising’, an almost-farcical attempt to seize the centre of Dublin, but which in the event was

suppressed by British troops. The British decision to execute 15 ringleaders, viewed as

traitors in the middle of the war, turned them into martyrs.

230In the April 1914 ‘Curragh Incident,’ Army officers of the garrison in Ireland, believing that they were about to be given orders to suppress the UVF by force, resigned en masse. The situation was defused and later claimed as a misunderstanding. 231The 36th Ulster Division was one of the most successful fighting divisions on the Western Front, taking heavy casualties on 1 July 1916, the first day of the Battle of the Somme, which became an important symbol. At the Battle of Messines in June 1917 they attacked side-by-side with the 16th South Irish Division, an event commemorated by a memorial on Messines ridge in 1999.

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By 1918 circumstances had changed considerably. Britain was war-weary and needed

political and economic support from the United States, which had considerable sympathy

both for Ireland and for independence movements. Prime Minister David Lloyd George

(1863-1945, in power 1916-22) was also sympathetic, but headed a coalition government

dominated by Conservatives and Ulster Unionists,232 blocking attempts to implement the

1912 settlement. In the 1918 British general election, Sinn Fein under the American-born

Eamon De Valera (1882-1975), won a majority of Irish seats and, refusing to come to

London, formed itself instead into an Irish parliament.233 Simultaneously, in January 1919,

what was now the Irish Republican Army (IRA) under Michael Collins (1890-1922) began

guerrilla attacks throughout Ireland. The IRA campaign under De Valera and Collins became

known as a ‘strategy of denial’ (a term also used by Lawrence), in which maintaining the

guerrilla force actively in existence was more important than any military objective. As

described by an IRA veteran of the 1918-1921 fighting:

Guerrilla tactics can never achieve against a regularly organised army a military decision. What they can do is to create what is really a political situation whereby government by the big battalions becomes impossible: a situation that may be dragged out to an indefinite length and that may ultimately achieve for the side adopting these methods the same result as might be achieved by a decisive military victory.

− Quoted in M. L. R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish

Republican Movement (1995)

In Dublin, Collins mounted a terrorist campaign against the Royal Irish Constabulary

(RIC), with an emphasis on denying the enemy information. In the countryside, IRA ‘flying

columns’ carried out attacks against police stations and other isolated targets, forcing the RIC

to abandon them. In response, the RIC was supplemented both by the Army and by

paramilitary forces, the ‘Volunteers’ and the ‘Auxiliaries,’ former soldiers colloquially

232For many years the party’s official title was The Conservative and Unionist Party. 233Constance, Countess Markowitz, standing as a Sinn Fein candidate, became the first woman to be elected a British MP, but did not take her seat.

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known as the ‘Black and Tans’.234 The resulting campaign of terror and counter-terror tied

down 80,000 British troops and 15,000 police and paramilitaries against an IRA force no

larger than 3,000 men. With the reductions in the British Army after the First World War and

the need to police the Empire, this was not a commitment that Britain could afford.

In 1920 the British passed the Government of Ireland Act, establishing two separate

Irish parliaments, including one for Ulster. In military terms the IRA was almost defeated,

and both sides were anxious for a compromise peace. A ceasefire in 1921 was followed by

the Treaty of London, partitioning Ireland to create in 1922 an ‘Irish Free State’. Part of

Ulster remained part of what was now ‘The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland’. De Valera and others refused to accept anything but complete independence for the

whole of Ireland, and the result was the Irish Civil War 1922-23 in which Collins was killed.

In 1937 the new Irish constitution changed the country’s name to Eire, claiming sovereignty

over all Ireland but accepting the existing frontier, and in 1948 Eire was declared a republic.

The IRA’s methods inspired British thinking on sabotage and subversion in the Second

World War, particularly for the Special Operations Executive (SOE). British theorists of the

inter-war years continued to advocate methods of imperial policing based on coercion. The

RAF in particular saw this as a major role for itself, by punitive bombing of rebel villages.

But as early as 1927 at least one theorist, B. C. Dearing, published work which was also

influenced by the Irish experience. He outlined what was to become the dominant form of

insurgency in the developed world: a political-military campaign based on propaganda,

coercion, attacks on financial targets, and on influencing domestic public opinion.

The Anglo-Irish War illustrates important themes in insurgency warfare. It has been

common for armed forces to claim that they ‘almost’ won but were betrayed by a political

234The name comes from their wearing black RIC caps with their khaki Army uniforms.

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settlement; but the issue was not whether the IRA could defeat the British Army and RIC but

whether Ireland could – and should – be governed by massive military force without popular

support. Both sides recognised that they could not achieve a military victory, and were

prepared to accept a compromise peace. As in the Boer War, and in contrast to many

conventional wars, mutual allegations of brutality made even basic facts about the war hard

to establish, and left a legacy of bitterness. Intelligence, the need for popular support, and the

wider political context – including the international context – were all fundamental to the

settlement. The political strategy of solving an intractable situation by partition and

withdrawal became popular in Britain during the retreat from Empire, including the partitions

effected in India in 1947and Palestine in 1947-48, and proposed for Cyprus in 1955-60. Even

when it succeeded, this practice left long-term issues unresolved, and often led to renewed

conflict; it was seen very much as the least-bad option.

Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Experience

Western military thinking on counterinsurgency in the Cold War was dominated by the

model of insurgency that emerged from China at the end of the Second World War. The

United States had promoted Nationalist China as one of the five permanent members of the

United Nations Security Council, the ‘five policemen’ of the world. The defeat of the

Nationalists by the Communists under Mao and the establishment of the People’s Republic of

China in 1949 was shocking and incomprehensible. It led to claims of a new and unstoppable

method of insurgency warfare that – as in the past – was described by both its advocates and

enemies in mystical terms.

The context for the Maoist model of insurgency was a protracted series of civil wars

and interventions in China of almost unbelievable complexity, reaching back into the 19th

century. Although themselves of great historical significance, the actual events are less

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important for 20th century insurgency than the doctrines derived from them. Similarly, and

as with Clausewitz, Maoist insurgency doctrine itself and the uses made of it are more

important than whether Mao himself deserves the entire credit for its development.

Specifically for British counterinsurgency, the Maoist model is important chiefly for the

Malayan Emergency 1948-60, and indirectly for the Vietnam War of 1961-75 (during which

period US combat forces were active from 1965 to 1973).

The Manchu Empire collapsed in the revolution of 1911, ushering in a period of

virtually continuous factional and civil wars until 1949. China broke up into warlordships,

many the size of European countries. While many Chinese cities, almost all of them either

ports or close to the eastern seaboard, were industrially advanced and modern, the vast

majority of the Chinese of the interior remained poor peasants whose lifestyle had hardly

changed for centuries. In this confused situation the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang

or KMT, now transliterated as Guomindang) attempted to secure power by political and

military methods. The ‘Autumn Harvest’ uprising of 1927, a violent confrontation in the

cities between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party (founded 1921), led to the

communists taking refuge in the Kiangsi region of southern China, establishing military

bases. By 1935 Mao Tse-tung had emerged as the dominant communist leader.

Conventional military wisdom in China was that rule of the country depended on

control of the cities; and this accorded with Lenin’s view that the cities were the key to the

revolution. But gradually Mao came to the argument that a great rural peasant uprising

would provide the power-base that the communists needed. In 1931 the KMT military

launched the first of a series of ‘bandit annihilation’ (or ‘encirclement’) campaigns against

the communist strongholds. The success of the Fifth Annihilation Campaign led the

communists in October 1934 to the desperate measure of the ‘Long March’, an almost

mythical event in Chinese history. Their entire Communist forces and civilian population

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moved out across the country, reaching safety in Shansi province in northern China in

December 1935, an area where the Nationalist regime was too weak to pose a direct threat.

In 1936 the Communists and Nationalists agreed a united front against the Japanese,

who had annexed Manchuria by force in 1931.235 In 1937 the Japanese invaded China itself,

overrunning the major cities and perpetrating the notorious ‘rape of Nanking’. The

Communists were not a major threat to the Japanese except briefly in the ‘Hundred

Regiments’ campaign of 1940 (a Chinese regiment was usually three or four battalions),

which in turn prompted a Japanese counterinsurgency policy known as the ‘Three All

Strategy: burn all, kill all, destroy all’.

Relations between the United States and Japan over China had become openly

hostile,236 and in December 1941 the Japanese attacked the British, French and Dutch

colonial possessions in South East Asia, as well as of course the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl

Harbor. This made the war in China part of the Second World War, in which the Nationalist

effort was increasingly part of American grand strategy. By the Japanese defeat in 1945, the

Communists had become organised as a conventional army superior to that of the

Nationalists, who they then defeated. The Nationalists retreated to Taiwan (or Formosa) and

kept the fifth permanent seat on the UN Security Council until the United States recognised

Communist China in 1972.

The actual conduct of the wars of 1927-49 reveals little consistent pattern in the

Communist methods other than pragmatism. Both guerrilla and warlord armies (including

that of the KMT) had a low tolerance for casualties and a reluctance to seek battle, since their

armed forces were also their political base. The Japanese, suffering from severe overstretch,

235The Japanese renamed the country Manchukuo in 1932, placing the ‘last emperor’ P’u-yi (also known as K’ang-te) on the throne. 236This included the United States supplying arms and mercenaries to the Chinese Nationalists, including the famous ‘Flying Tigers’ fighter unit.

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also could not commit large forces to China. But a compromise peace between the

Communists and the Nationalists, or with the Japanese, was impossible since all sides aspired

to control the country absolutely. The scale of the fighting and high level of civilian

involvement also gave the war in China many of the characteristics of Total War.

Mao derived from this experience an underlying doctrine of insurgency known in China

as ‘people’s war’, bearing some resemblance to 19th century people’s war. Mao himself

described the early period of fighting in 1927-34 against the Nationalists and the later period

of 1941-45 against the Japanese as most characteristic of people’s war. His fundamental idea

was that a strong political and institutional base among the Chinese peasant village

population would provide an unassailable position from which to operate. The use of

guerrillas in conjunction with conventional forces had many historical precedents, and was

also part of Soviet Deep Operations doctrine in the Great Patriotic War 1941-45, using

partisans in the ‘war against the railways’ to disrupt German logistics.

What was new in Mao’s approach was the systematic manner in which these ideas were

combined to form an overall doctrine, particularly in the fusing of military and political

strategies. Mao linked guerrilla war with a coherent political strategy and conventional

warfare to make it a powerful force. Mao was also good at reducing the complex ideas of

insurgency to simple slogans, repeated until they had the status of proverbs or folk-wisdom.

Mao’s starting point was that of a pragmatic politician, analysing how in China of the 1920s

the Communists could gain political power. His answer, in a famous slogan, was that ‘In

China, political power grows from the barrel of a gun’, meaning that negotiated political

routes to power, economic and social disruption, and coups d’etat had all failed, and that the

military route was the one to follow. Mao drew on old Chinese cultural traditions to argue

that the real measure of military power was ‘will’ or determination to outlast the enemy. This

led him to favour ‘Protracted War’ – to wear down the enemy over a long period of time.

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In practical terms, this took the form of basing the guerrilla movement in the peasant

villages, a mutually beneficial arrangement whereby the peasantry provided logistic support,

information, and a ‘secure base area’, while the revolutionaries provided education,

assistance and land reform. While guerrillas had traditionally operated on the fringes of

society, Mao insisted that ‘the guerrilla must be in the population like fishes in the ocean’.

The great strength of this system was that whereas one major defeat was enough to disperse

most guerrilla uprisings, Mao’s guerrillas could return to village life as peasants until the

threat diminished, preserving their basic infrastructure intact.

Mao’s village structure was vulnerable in two respects, first of which that his guerrillas

could lose the support of the peasant population. He may have been the first person to use

the phase ‘hearts and minds’ in this context, and he certainly emphasised education and

indoctrination in his methods.237 The other vulnerability was if the enemy simply destroyed

the village structure, as the British had done to Boer farmsteads in 1900-02. This method was

used by the KMT in the Fifth Annihilation Campaign on the advice of Colonel-General Hans

von Seeckt (commander of the German Armed Forces 1919-26). It was also the basis of the

Japanese ‘Three All’ strategy, again deriving from German methods and attitudes towards

guerrillas.

For his guerrilla methods, Mao drew on ancient Chinese texts, notably fictional classics

such as The Water Margin238 and The Romance of the Three Kingdoms (which Mao believed

to be factual); and the writings of Sun Tsu, who probably flourished in the ‘Age of the

Warring States’ in China (450-300 BC), a period in which China’s political structure was

similar to that of the warlord era of 1911-49. There is a close similarity between Sun Tsu’s

writings and Mao’s formula for guerrilla operations, a slogan that in the original is only 16

237Other candidates for this early use of ‘hearts and minds’ as a phrase as well as an idea include the British Indian Army of the 1920s. 238The subject of a Japanese television series shown on British television in the 1970s.

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characters long: ‘The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy

tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue’. However, Mao never saw guerrilla warfare

as anything but a means to an end, writing that ‘guerrilla units formed from the people may

gradually develop into regular units and when operating as such, employ the tactics of

orthodox mobile warfare’. 239

In the 1961 edition of his translation of Mao’s 1937 work On Guerrilla Warfare, which

was very influential on American political and military thinking in the Vietnam War,

Brigadier General Samuel Griffith USMC characterised Mao’s doctrine as ‘Protracted

Revolutionary War’ of which guerrilla war was only an aspect:

Mao conceived of this type of war as passing through a series of merging phases, the first of which is devoted to organisation, consolidation and preservation of the regional base areas…In the second phase, acts of sabotage and terrorism multiply; collaborationists and ‘reactionary elements’ are liquidated. Attacks are made on vulnerable military and police outposts; weak columns are ambushed…Following Phase I (organisation, consolidation and preservation) and Phase II (progressive expansion) comes Phase III: decision, or destruction of the enemy. During this period a significant percentage of the active guerrilla force completes its gradual transformation into an orthodox establishment capable of engaging the enemy in decisive battles.

In his On Protracted War of 1938 Mao used the three-phase structure in a slightly

different way to describe his proposed strategy against the Japanese: an initial period of

strategic weakness in which the Communists would rely on mobile and guerrilla warfare to

drag out the expected Japanese offensive; a period of strategic stalemate in which over-

extended Japanese forces would be harassed and weakened by guerrillas; and finally a

conventional offensive backed by guerrilla operations to recover the lost territory. Mao’s

view of conventional operations mixed Soviet deep operations with the German stress on

annihilation by encirclement, methods popular in both Chinese and Japanese military staff

colleges. He emphasised the importance of assembling overwhelming force, and of never

239Quoted in Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (1961)

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engaging in battle unless certain of destroying the enemy. His view of logistics was that

supplies that could not be produced by the peasant village culture should be obtained where

possible by attacking or tapping into the enemy supply lines. ‘We have a claim on the output

of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang [modern Hupei], and what is more, it is to be

delivered to us by the enemy’s own transport corps.’

Mao’s protracted war envisaged a long drawn-out campaign using both guerrilla and

conventional forces together. Most insurgencies since Mao have been won or lost before the

guerrillas develop conventional forces, so Maoist insurgency doctrine has often been

regarded as synonymous with guerrilla war. In the 1980s the British Army doctrinal term to

describe it was Revolutionary Guerrilla War (RGW). But in all his writings, Mao

emphasised cultural and political conditions, and seeing every operation of war in the

perspective of the whole effort to achieve power, rather than guerrilla operations as such.

Mao’s success came not only from his political and military exploitation of the situation in

China itself. Also critical to victory were his ability to establish secure base areas for his

forces, and the impact of intervention from outside, notably assistance from the Soviet Union

in 1945, Japanese intervention as enemies 1937-45, and the United States’ influence on

Nationalist strategy in the period 1941-49.

Mao and Communist Chinese military theorists after 1949 believed that they had

created a new form of warfare, that people’s war was like land warfare, air warfare and naval

warfare, a fundamental military activity, and that it could be applied elsewhere as long as the

necessary cultural and political adjustments were made. A recent American study has

commented that:

The main elements of People’s War continued to be a politically motivated and organised peasantry, willing to suffer in order to deny both intelligence and supply to invading enemy columns, attrition by communist guerrilla units, and defeat in detail by communist regular forces.… For Mao and his supporters, it remained important to stress the political,

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peasant-mobilisation aspects of military strategy: doing so served the twin purposes of denying that non-Maoist regimes could ever imitate or defeat the strategy of People’s War, and of claiming for Mao and China a position of originality and leadership within the world communist movement.

− Edward L. Dreyer, China at War 1901-1949 (1995)

The end of the Second World War produced a potential power vacuum in South East

Asia. The weakened European colonial powers mainly prepared to withdraw, while the

initial Japanese victories had shown that Asian troops could defeat Europeans, and that their

empires lacked the resources to hold the region by military force. Maoist-inspired

insurgencies occurred in countries where part of the population had close links with mainland

China, and where the insurgents had experience fighting the Japanese occupation, which had

also disrupted organised government.

The Malayan Emergency 1948-60, fought against the British, marked a critical defeat

for the Maoist approach. The Huk (Hukbalahap) revolt in the Philippines, which became

independent in 1946 but depended on American support, lasted from 1946 to 1954 and ended

inconclusively. The insurgency against the returning French in Vietnam, known as the First

Indochina War (1946-54), as did the Second Indochina War or Vietnam War (1961-75), from

which the United States withdrew in 1973.

That the world’s strongest country had been defeated by Maoist methods (as well as

North Vietnamese regular forces) made a tremendous impression. From the 1950s onwards

many Western specialists painted a gloomy picture of the entire developing world, from the

Far East through to Africa and the Middle East, and then South and Central America, falling

victim to this mysterious new form of warfare, which would surround and isolate the

democracies of Western Europe and North America. As late as 1986, one influential

American specialist on Vietnam described Maoist insurgency strategy as having ‘no known

counterstrategy’. Two years later, a retired US Army general expressed the same view: ‘Sad

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to say, we cannot counter revolutionary war even now – our defeat in Vietnam has taught us

nothing’.240 In contrast to earlier experiences, in the 20th century it came to be expected that

this war of the military weak against the military strong would most likely succeed. This

apparent paradox became one of the most important issues in Western, including British,

military thinking.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 1945-75

Introduction

After the Second World War, insurgency became by far the most common form of

warfare around the world, accounting for about 90 per cent of all cases: at least 300 wars in

50 years, several lasting for decades.241 Civilian casualties vastly outnumbered military in all

these wars. Many insurgencies were anti-colonial or nationalist revolts showing common

characteristics with the Maoist style, interpreted in the West as part of a Soviet strategy for

global domination.

British examples of non-communist insurgencies characterised at the time as being

Soviet-inspired include the successful Zionist revolt against British control of Palestine

(1945-47), which led to the creation of Israel; the Mau-Mau insurgency in Kenya (1952-59)

240Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam (1986); Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1976 (1988). 241As OOTW these were strictly not ‘wars’ in current doctrine, and were often described at the time by other terms such as Emergency, Revolt, Confrontation, The Troubles etc, just as the Korean War was called a ‘police action’.

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as a result of which Kenya became independent in 1961 and Mau-Mau leader Jomo Kenyatta

(1889-1978) became its first president), and the Greek nationalist EOKA insurgency on

Cyprus (1955-60), which led to the island’s independence in a compromise peace.242 As the

case of Cyprus shows, together with that of Cuba (1956-59) and Sri Lanka (1983-2009),

insurgencies have taken place on islands with varying degrees of success. But one of the

strongest forms of a Maoist safe base area is that which is across a political frontier, and

cannot be attacked.

Many insurgencies in this period were also proxy wars, requiring their opponents to

deal simultaneously with both international (inter-state) and internal (intra-state) issues. A

clear illustration is the Mozambique Civil War (1974-92) following independence from

Portugal. In 1977 the government of Rhodesia decided to sponsor the Mozambique National

Resistance (MNR or Renamo), since Mozambique was harbouring anti-Rhodesian guerrillas.

In 1979 Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, and South Africa became Renamo’s new principal

supporter, as part of its own strategy of weakening the ‘front line’ states to its north. The

resulting civil war in Mozambique lasted until South Africa withdrew its support as part of its

own transition to majority rule in 1994.

A British regional specialist commented:

Most countries have ethnic, regional or language minorities who often have legitimate grievances and who protest about their cultures being marginalised and their regions being economically disadvantaged. These include Friesians in the Netherlands, Bretons in France, Welsh in Britain…Consider, then, what would happen if a powerful and wealthy neighbouring state inflamed that dissent, trained and organised guerrillas, provided arms and sabotage teams, set up a radio station, and launched an international propaganda campaign to boost the credibility of the new movement…Mozambique is poor and weak and hasn’t much chance against the South-African backed MNR.

− Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid’s Second Front (1986)

242These were particularly promoted as Communist by the Foreign Office’s clandestine Information Research Department (IRD), closed down in 1977, whose job was to provide propaganda in support of British counterinsurgency campaigns for the British and foreign media.

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Recent accusations of states using (or alleged by their enemies to be using) insurgency as

proxy war include support by Pakistan for the separatist movement in Assam against India

1998-2001.

Increasingly, counterinsurgency has been seen as a fight for control of the country’s

civilian population. One strategy is to treat them as an enemy and destroy the social fabric

(which involves attacks on civilians of an often brutal nature) to win them over by political,

economic and psychological means while providing military protection. In both cases the

central issue is how to break the link between the civilian population and the insurgents, who

can then be fought directly. Common methods that date back to the Boer War include the use

of physical barriers such as defended fence lines, and the relocation of the population, often

forcibly. In the more benign versions of counterinsurgency, this has involved a move to new

villages which offer a higher standard of living.

In the Cold War a closely related counterinsurgency issue was whether to treat

insurgents as primarily nationalists, emphasising local factors, or as principally Soviet-backed

Communists, emphasising wider global interests and expecting methods that worked in one

country to work in another. These decisions were seldom straightforward, particularly when

facing a combination of conventional and guerrilla forces. A substantial guerrilla campaign

began in South Korea in 1948 and continued throughout the Korean War 1950-53, leading

the United States to believe during the early part of the Vietnam War (up to about 1965) that

the Viet Cong campaign in South Vietnam was also preparation for a mass conventional

invasion.

Increasingly as domestic political attitudes changed and international media coverage

of wars improved, democratic Western countries found that destroying farms and villages,

employing terror tactics, or causing mass civilian casualties, were not politically acceptable

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options. Senior officers who had previously thought of themselves as soldiers not involved in

politics accepted the political-military nature of insurgency warfare. Many countries created

special military units for counterinsurgency. The British Special Air Service (SAS) was

formed in 1948 to operate in Malaya.243 The United States created the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) in 1947 partly to conduct covert operations around the world, and the US

Army Special Forces (‘The Green Berets’) in 1952.

French Counterinsurgency

Indochina, 1946-54

A controversial French style of counterinsurgency also developed in the Cold War,

called Guerre révolutionnaire (revolutionary war). The French Empire in Indochina

consisted of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (divided by the French into Tonkin China, Annam

and Cochin China). By the end of the Second World War a well-organised Vietnamese

insurgency movement existed, the ‘Viet Minh’ under Ho Chi Minh,244 with a Maoist-style

village guerrilla structure and mobile forces. They had fought against the Japanese, receiving

support from the United States as part of its own campaign in the Far East, and in September

1945 they entered Hanoi, expecting Allied political recognition as the government of

Vietnam.

243The SAS had a previous existence in the Second World War, in a rather different form. Disbanded in 1945, it was recreated in 1948 as The Malay Scouts (Special Air Service) out of the Artists Rifles, the only case of a Territorial Army unit being parent to a Regular Army one. 244Ho worked in London and Paris from 1912 to 1918, and was in Moscow in 1922. His chosen name, ‘Ho Chi Minh’ means approximately ‘he who brings ‘liberation’.‘Viet Minh’ is a shortening of ‘Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi’ (Vietnamese Liberation Movement).

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For France, seeking to recover from its defeats in the Second World War, retention of

its empire was essential to its standing in the world. The French Army also saw itself even

more than previously as the embodiment of French civilisation and values, the dominant

partner in colonial rule. The United States, seeing France as essential to post-war security in

Europe, and the creation of NATO, supported this policy. Particularly after the loss of China

in 1949 and the start of the Korean War in 1950, French colonial policy in Indochina and

American Containment policy coincided.

At first, the French tache d’huile methods coupled with mobile forces proved

successful. In December 1946 the French inflicted crushing defeats on the Viet Minh that

appeared to end the insurgency. Deeply embedded in Vietnamese society, however, the Viet

Minh resorted to a Maoist three-phase strategy of protracted war, as Ho Chi Minh explained

at its height in 1951:

The enemy schemed a lightning war. As they wanted to attack swiftly and win swiftly, our Party and Government put forth the slogan ‘Long-term Resistance War’. The enemy wanted to sow dissension among us, so our slogan was ‘Unity of the Entire People’…Our Party and Government foresaw that our Resistance War has three stages. In the first stage [1945-1947], all we did was to preserve and increase our main forces. In the second stage [1947-1951], we have actively contended with the enemy and prepared for the general counteroffensive. The third stage is the general counteroffensive…We must understand that each stage is linked with another, the second succeeds the first, and produces seeds for the third. Many changes occur in the course of one stage to another. Each stage also has changes of its own…It is not possible to cut off completely one stage from the other like cutting bread. The length of each stage depends on the situation at home and in the world, and the changes between the enemy forces and ours. − ‘Political report read at the Second National Congress of the Viet-Nam Workers’ Party,

held in February 1951’ quoted in Bernard B. Fall (ed.) Ho Chi Minh on Revolution

(1967)

The first Viet Minh attempt at a major offensive in 1951 was defeated, but large-scale

guerrilla war persisted. Severely overstretched and short of troops, in November 1953 the

French attempted to provoke a major conventional battle by establishing a base at the village

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of Dien Bien Phu, deep in the jungle of the north-west. After an epic siege, the French

garrison was overrun in May 1954.245 The peace settlement in Geneva gave independence to

Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel to aid a separation of

forces. Rival governments came to power in Vietnam, the Communists under Ho Chi Minh

in the North, and an American-backed regime in the South. From the Viet Minh perspective,

they had fought one protracted war and won half their country.

Algeria, 1954-62

As discussed, after 1945 France was confronted with national independence movements

in many parts of its colonies; major insurgencies raged in Madagascar (1947-48), Indochina

(1946-54) and Algeria (1954-62). Of all these conflicts the Algerian War was the bloodiest

and most costly and left deep scars both in France and in Algeria. It was also one of the most

prominent campaigns fought in the “golden era of counterinsurgency”. The French Army

developed a number of innovative counter-insurgency techniques, but despite a series of

military victories was unable to convert them into a favourable political outcome. Algeria

also revealed the importance of public opinion in a counterinsurgency.

Strictly speaking Algeria was not a colony, but part of homeland France. Since 1830

the French had occupied the country and invited settlers from the entire Western European

Mediterranean region to populate Algeria. These settlers, the pieds noirs (black feet), built up

a flourishing infrastructure, mainly in the cities of Algiers, Oran and Constantine, and formed

the new upper class. Algeria became a strictly divided two class society with a rich urban

245As was common in colonial warfare, the ‘French’ forces included Vietnamese, Algerians, Moroccans, and units of the Foreign Legion.

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European minority (about 1.2 million people or 13% of the Algerian population) and an

impoverished Muslim majority of Arab and Berber ethnicity.

In the Second World War many Muslims fought in the ranks of French colonial units

and helped to liberate the French motherland. After 1945 they demanded political autonomy,

but French security forces harshly suppressed civil unrest. The problems, however, persisted;

tensions between the pieds noirs and the Muslim population continued. The Toussaint Rouge

(Red All Saints’ Day) on 1 November 1954 is generally seen as the real starting point of the

insurgency. In the early hours of this day the insurgency movement, the Front de la

Libération Nationale (FLN or National Liberation Front) launched a series of bombings and

acts of sabotage against police and military targets during which 7 people were killed. The

French government responded by increasing the number of soldiers from about 56,000 to

83,000.

A socialist and Islamist independence movement, the FLN was relatively small in

numbers (at no point more than 30,000 men) with a poorly armed military wing, the Armée

de la Libération Nationale (ALN or National Liberation Army). The FLN tried to

compensate these shortcomings and also the initial lack of popular support through ruthless

terrorist acts and the most radical means. The political aim was nothing less than full national

independence; more moderate independence movements were eliminated.

In August 1955 the FLN revealed its true nature during the Philippeville massacres

when it murdered 71 pieds noirs and 52 Muslims in the most horrible way. The French

reaction was not long in the waiting: paras and security forces killed over 1,200 Muslims in

reprisals, many of the slain innocent civilians. The FLN achieved its aim: French security

forces had over-reacted and seemingly exposed their brutality. The Philippeville massacres

divided Algerian society for good, with already at this very early stage of the war

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reconciliation becoming impossible and a political compromise no longer feasible. The two

options for the population were either to support the FLN or to be branded as a collaborator

with the French.

Not only the FLN, but also the pieds noirs quickly radicalised. The unstable and short-

lived governments of the French Fourth Republic did little to find a political solution to the

problem. Instead, Paris gave the Army or, more specifically the Colonial Army, a relatively

free hand in how to deal with the insurgency. Lacking governmental control and strategic

guidelines, the Army interpreted its mission to mean that the country was to remain Algérie

Française – and accordingly rallied to the pieds noirs. Further reinforcements were sent to

Algeria, but this time not merely colonial troops, but also parts of the metropolitan (i.e.

mainland French) army with conscripts in its ranks. The number of troops garrisoned in

Algeria peaked at 500,000. In theory this constituted a very respectable number with which to

pacify the country.

The officers of the Colonial Army set their own strategy and applied the principles of

their Guerre Révolutionnaire counterinsurgency theory with its two pillars of “destruction”

and “construction” and its overarching ideas of psychological warfare and influence, both in

within its own ranks and within the body of the civil population. The Army became obsessed

with population control, both physically and psychologically, as the Battle of Algiers in

1956-57 showed. The heavy-handed approach of the French paras put an end to FLN activity

in the Algerian capital, where their leadership was killed or arrested or from which it fled to

neighbouring countries. In short, after the Battle of Algiers the FLN virtually ceased to exist

in the city. However, this constituted only a short term success. The French partly owed their

victory to the widespread use of torture during the interrogations of suspects. It is wrong to

believe the entire French Army applied these questionable techniques, for this “dirty job” was

left to specialist interrogation units. Torture led to a huge controversy, not only in Algeria,

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but also in France, where the Communists had denounced the war from the beginning. Even

on a global stage the French Army was seen as an evil force – an image which FLN

propaganda had always portrayed and which the media happily conveyed to the public.

Until today the debate on torture has overshadowed more positive sides of the French

COIN campaign in Algeria, such as the “construction” phase. New schools were built, young

Algerians were enabled to start apprenticeships and modern settlements were erected. Many

Muslims seemed to see their future rather in an Algérie Française than in an independent

country governed by a radical FLN. The French recruited between 200,000 and 250,000

harkis, Muslim volunteers fighting on the French side. This was four times more than the

FLN could ever muster in their ranks. However, French financial resources always remained

limited. Many of the infrastructure projects did not materialise. Furthermore, the

“construction” phase, too, was driven by an obsession to control the population, as Colonel

Antoine Argoud, one of the key theorists of Guerre Révolutionnaire, briefly summed it up:

“Protect them, involve them, control them.” Between 1 and 2 million Arabs and Berbers were

resettled, either voluntarily or by force. Whilst in military terms this allowed a better physical

control of the population, it also meant the destruction of traditional social life in many parts

of rural Algeria.

The Algerian War put an ever heavier strain on French economics and domestic

politics. The Communist Party, which represented about a quarter of the French voters,

openly supported the insurgents’ cause. The war had largely slipped out of the hands of the

politicians in Paris, whilst in Algeria the alliance between hardcore pieds noirs and the

Colonial Army categorically ruled out any form of autonomy. They feared the French

political class would abandon them, just like they had abandoned Indochina five years earlier.

As a consequence, in May 1958 the Army seized governmental powers in Algiers and

threatened to remove the government in France. Airborne forces were ready to be parachuted

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into Paris. The Army demanded the assumption to power of Charles de Gaulle, as they hoped

the Second World War hero would have a firmer hold on politics in Algeria. The Fourth

French Republic collapsed and de Gaulle formed a new government.

In his first visit to Algiers he greeted the pieds noirs community with his famous

words: “Je vous ai compris!” (I have understood you!), but in reality de Gaulle knew that the

war was lost – not in Algeria, but on the international stage. For some time international

opinion had turned against France, whose Army seemed to systematically violate human

rights. Amongst various Arab states, notably Egypt, the FLN had found important allies who

voiced demands for independence in the UN General Assembly. The Algerian War was no

longer a French problem – but rather an international issue.

Ironically, at the same time, in 1958-59, the French Army had nearly won the war. A

sophisticated system of military bases (quadrillage) enabled the French to hold the ground

that had been cleared from insurgents, with small and mobile commandos de chasse (hunting

detachments) driving the ALN out of areas which were difficult to access. All the insurgents’

logistical support from neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia was effectively cut off by the

Morice Line, a barbed wire fence system supported by watchtowers and minefields. But

military victories alone never guarantee victory; Algeria demonstrated once more that war is

a political act.

President Charles de Gaulle wanted to bring this unwinnable and unpopular war to an

end. He held a referendum on Algerian self-determination which was approved by the vast

majority both in France and in Algeria. This angered the radical pieds noirs and the Colonial

Army. In April 1961 they staged a coup – for a second time within three years. Since the

metropolitan Army as well as the majority of the Army in Algeria itself (amongst them

General Jacques Massu) stood loyal to de Gaulle, the coup quickly collapsed. The most

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radical soldiers of the Colonial Army founded the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS or

Organisation of the Secret Army), a terrorist organisation which tried to mirror FLN tactics.

The project ultimately failed despite a nearly successful attempt on de Gaulle’s life.

On 19 March 1962 de Gaulle and the FLN leadership signed an agreement in Evian.

Algeria was granted full national independence, which was later legitimised by a referendum

in Algeria with 99.7% “yes” votes. This result did not come as a surprise: almost all of the

1.2 million pieds-noirs had fled the country in the weeks before, together with 100.000 harkis

and their families. Tens of thousands of harkis who could not flee Algeria in time were killed,

and large parts of the remaining population intimidated. Since its independence Algeria has

never come to terms with the legacy of this war and has remained an unstable country. The

war cost the lives of almost 30,000 French soldiers. The numbers of Algerian dead remain

obscure, ranging between 30,000 and 100,000 harkis and between 300,000 to 1.5 million

other Algerians, mostly civilians.

The Algerian War illustrates and highlights many of the problems with which a

counter-insurgent force is often faced. France won the war militarily, but lost it politically.

Many boots on the ground can indeed facilitate a military victory, but this remains futile if it

is not translated into a political outcome. Early in the war all governments in Paris shied

away from defining a coherent strategy with achievable political aims and a clear direction to

the Army in terms of how the war should be fought. When de Gaulle came to power in 1958

it was already too late to positively influence the outcome of the war. The French did not

follow the key Clauswitzian rule; military action was not used as an extension of politics.

Instead, French politics lost control over the campaign to such an extent that the Army not

only set their own strategy, but even interfered twice in French domestic politics by staging

two coups d’état. The Algerian War also shed light on the importance of the media and public

perception in a counterinsurgency campaign. Both the French Army and the FLN committed

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many unlawful acts, but the world condemned unanimously only the French. In metropolitan

France the war became increasingly unpopular as many Frenchmen asked themselves

whether their Army was fighting for a good cause. The FLN moreover fully understood the

importance of propaganda and public opinion. Facing military defeat in Algeria they

consequently internationalised their cause, with this international support proving more

decisive than military action. Yet the FLN identified armed resistance as only one means to

achieve their political aim, for they won the war of ideas and the contest for legitimacy, even

if they proved inept in running the country after independence. Algeria was more than just an

extremely bloody and ruthless war between the French and Algerian Muslims; rather, it

exhibited many features of a globalised conflict and as such may be seen as a precursor of

many current conflicts.

Guerre révolutionnaire, although not used since by France, remains a known

counterinsurgency technique that has its supporters. In the 1990s, during the ‘Shining Path’

insurgency in Peru (begun 1980), a so-called ‘French school’ of the Peruvian Army strongly

advocated the use of a Guerre révolutionnaire counterinsurgency strategy. There are also

some parallels with the methods used by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) against the Intifada

insurgencies (1987-93 and 2000-2005). As with the Anglo-Irish War, Guerre révolutionnaire

and the Algerian War illustrate recurring themes in counterinsurgency. In industrialised

conventional war, destruction of the enemy armed forces produced political victory, but in

counterinsurgency there was little relationship between killing the enemy and winning the

war. The methods the armed forces claimed were necessary to fight the war were a violation

of the values for which their countries stood, just as in 18th century Europe wars had been

deliberately fought with limitations in order to preserve the broader existing structure.

The frequent response of senior officers of the Cold War era was to blame their own

civil societies and governments, and to seek political support, in a manner reminiscent of the

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German ‘stab in the back’ myth after the First World War. The resulting internal political

conflicts produced severe political dislocation at home: not just changes of government but of

constitutions. The protracted insurgency in the colonies of Angola and Mozambique was a

principal cause of the Portuguese Army’s coup d’etat in 1974. The Vietnam War caused

trauma in the United States, and caused the resignation of President Lyndon Johnson (1908-

73, President 1963-69). The war in Afghanistan (1979-89) played an important part in the

decision by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (born 1931, in power 1984-1992) to institute

reforms that led to the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.

The United States and the Vietnam War

The Vietnam War (1961-1975) was among the longest and most complex wars of the

20th century. Its impact on all aspects of military thought and practice, including

counterinsurgency, was immense. The United States had fought guerrillas before the Second

World War, including campaigns in the Philippines, Cuba, in Nicaragua (1927-33) against

the ‘Sandinistas’ under Augusto Sandino (1893-1934), and in the Korean War; but

counterinsurgency was never seen as a priority. In 1961, when the first American combat

troops were sent to South Vietnam, orders were issued ‘to expand rapidly and

substantially…the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of non-nuclear war,

paramilitary operations and sublimited or unconventional wars’.246 Counterinsurgency

became one of the roles of Special Forces.

After a few years of relative peace, by 1961 South Vietnam faced a substantial double

threat from the indigenous village-based guerrillas of the ‘Viet Cong’ (Vietnamese

246Quoted in Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960s (1962).

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Communists or VC), and the incursions of the conventional if jungle-wise North Vietnamese

Army (NVA).247 At first the American military response was chiefly advisory, including

Special Forces and a ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency strategy. In 1962 a ‘strategic

hamlet’ programme was introduced to create new villages.

The corruption and unpopularity of successive South Vietnam governments made a

political-military counterinsurgency strategy virtually impossible. In 1965 the Americans,

fearing both a major conventional invasion of South Vietnam and also (only two years after

the Cuban missile crisis) a direct confrontation with China or the Soviet Union, moved to a

limited war strategy in Vietnam. Even at this early date, President Lyndon Johnson believed

that the war could probably not be won, but that it must be continued as part of the wider

Cold War deterrence and containment policy. The counterinsurgency approach was never

officially abandoned in Vietnam, and Special Forces achieved success with it, notably with

the Montagnard people of the Vietnam central highlands. Elsewhere, American conscripts

untrained in counterinsurgency and on one-year tours of duty made any ‘hearts and minds’

campaign unworkable. One US Army lieutenant who headed a Mobile Assistance Team

(MAT) helping South Vietnamese village forces in 1969 wrote:

Far too many [American soldiers] were harsh with their judgements, obvious in their contempt, and expressive of their dissatisfaction. Their attitudes were corrosive and terribly chilling to the ever-spluttering sense of co-operation between the natives and the American soldiers. As a result, I was often grateful that there were no American units in my district, or in the entire province for that matter…[They] would have wrecked my own efforts at bringing some sort of peace and calm to my villages.

− David Donovan, Once a Warrior King (1985)

The United States was so powerful compared to North Vietnam that it seemed

inconceivable that it could lose the war. This led to a confused American strategy, with

overlapping chains of command and authority, as different methods and strategies were

247These were the names given them by their enemies, and adopted by the United States. They called themselves the National Liberation Front (NFL) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA,) respectively.

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adopted. The fundamental doctrinal problem was that limited war, which depended on the

United States stalemating the war and waiting for the real enemy (meaning the Soviet Union)

to recognise that it could not be won, was opposing the Communists’ ‘protracted war’, the

entire basis of which was outlasting the enemy, together with a fiercely determined

Vietnamese nationalism. The great strength of the Communist system in Vietnam, which had

in 1965 existed for almost 30 years, was the synergy between the NVA and the VC. In the

villages the VC promoted a political strategy of revolutionary land reform together with

guerrilla operations, providing support for NVA units that undertook major battles. But the

NVA and VC knew that they could never defeat the United States, and were shocked by

American firepower and resources, adopting tactical expedients such as extensive

underground tunnel systems (notably in the ‘Iron Triangle’ north-west of Saigon).248

By late 1967 the VC had taken heavy losses, and the American government believed it

had won the war. Then came the NVA and VC ‘Tet Offensive’ in January 1968, the first of a

series of attacks on South Vietnamese towns and cities that lasted until October. Although

the VC were virtually wiped out in these battles, the American government was not prepared

to provide the increased numbers of troops demanded to continue the war. Domestic public

protests against the war and its conduct were increasing, and although a majority of

Americans still supported the war this was not expected to last. President Richard Nixon

(1913-94, in office 1969-74), who was elected in 1968 on a platform of ending the war,

sought to achieve this by three methods. He sought détente with the Soviet Union and in

1972 recognised Mao’s China, hoping to deprive North Vietnam of their support. In South

Vietnam he adopted ‘Vietnamisation’, providing arms and equipment to South Vietnamese

forces while reducing the American commitment, believing correctly that Americans

objected less to the war than to their own involvement in it. He also sought to end the war by 248NVA troops were also instructed to ‘fight the Americans by clinging to their belt-buckles’, closing the range in infantry firefights so that American fire support could not be used effectively.

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escalating it. In 1969 American B-52 heavy bombers attacked the ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail’, the

main NVA supply route down the central highlands in neutral Cambodia, followed in 1970

by a brief cross-border invasion of Cambodia itself. A cease-fire with North Vietnam and the

VC was signed in Paris in 1973 and the United States withdrew from the war. Bombing

Cambodia was an act of war that Nixon had sought illegally to conceal, believing that he

could not obtain the necessary political support. The de-stabilisation caused by American

escalation also led in 1975 to the collapse of Cambodia and Laos into anarchy, with their own

Maoist insurgents – the ‘Khmer Rouge’ and the ‘Pathet Lao’ respectively – coming to power.

In Hanoi in 1975, in a famous exchange, US Army Colonel Harry G. Summers told his

North Vietnamese opposite number, ‘You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield,’

and received the reply, ‘That may be true, but it is also irrelevant’. Whether an American

counterinsurgency strategy alone could have won the Vietnam War is debatable. The

Australian and New Zealand brigade group that fought in South Vietnam achieved

considerable success using British-style counterinsurgency, and Special Forces were equally

successful with the Montagnards – but these were isolated cases.

By the early 1980s an American military consensus emerged in keeping with the

changes made to their Limited War doctrine. This argued that, in addition to the flaws in

Limited War itself, the mistake had been attempting a political-military strategy at all: the

United States had won the ‘people’s war’ in South Vietnam by destroying the VC guerrillas,

and should have treated the entire war as conventional. Summers was a prominent exponent

of this view:

Our error was not that we were fearful of the dangers of nuclear war and of Chinese or Russian intervention in Vietnam. These were the proper concern of the military strategist. The error was that we took counsel of these fears and in doing so paralysed our strategic thinking…The guerrillas in Vietnam did not achieve decisive results on their own. Even at the very end there was no popular mass uprising to overthrow the Saigon government…[Rather] they harassed and distracted both the United States and South

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Vietnam so that North Vietnamese regular forces could reach a decision in conventional battles.

− Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (1982)

This interpretation of Vietnam has been much criticised. One specialist on guerrilla warfare

dismissed Summers’s argument as ‘All would have gone well in Vietnam if there had been

no guerrillas and Carl von Clausewitz had been in command’.249 But increasingly the view

that United States armed forces should not engage in counterinsurgency or other forms of

political-military operations – restricting themselves to conventional approaches to any

military problem – grew to become their orthodoxy.

The Cuban Revolution and the Emergence of Urban Terrorism

An important variant on the Maoist style of insurgency emerged from the Cuban

Revolution (1956-59) and became very influential around the world. Cuba had been annexed

by the United States from Spain in 1898 and made independent, although dominated by

American interests and subject to revolts. In 1953 an attempt to overthrow the island’s

dictator Fulgencio Batista failed, and its leader Fidel Castro (born 1927) went into exile,

returning in 1956 to start an insurgency. Although Cuba is the largest island in the

Caribbean, events were on a tiny scale in comparison with Mao’s China. The Cuban Army

was 30,000 men, and the insurgents before 1959 no more than 2,000 and sometimes fewer

than 20 effectives. But Batista’s regime was extremely corrupt and unpopular; riots and

insurrections in the cities, notably the capital Havana, tied down almost half the Cuban Army,

and Castro slowly gained popular support, assisted by the charismatic Argentinean, Ernesto

249Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows (1994).

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‘Che’ Guevara (1928-67). In January 1959 the Batista government collapsed and Castro

captured Havana, proclaiming a Communist republic in Cuba.

Ordinarily, the United States would have intervened militarily. Its initial response was

a covert CIA operation in April 1961, landing an invasion force of anti-Communist Cubans to

topple Castro, an attempt that failed disastrously at the Bay of Pigs on the south of the island.

Castro turned for help to the Soviet Union, which in October 1962 tried to install medium-

range nuclear missiles on Cuba, causing the Cuban missile crisis. As part of the settlement to

end the crisis, the United States undertook neither to invade Cuba nor to topple Castro

(although it tried repeatedly to assassinate him over the next decade). In Central and South

American terms, the Cuban Revolution was an isolated special case, consisting of a very

unstable and incompetent target government and an American refusal to intervene for reasons

of Cold War politics. Castro’s insurgency owed much to Mao, but the growth in popular

support in its last year was clearly not protracted war. Guevara, together with his associate

the French Marxist philosopher Régis Debray (born 1941), claimed that Cuba was a model

for a new insurgency method, developed independently from Mao, that was applicable

anywhere on the South American continent. Guevara advanced three main propositions:

• Popular forces can win against the Army.

• It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection

can create them.

• In underdeveloped [Latin] America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.

− Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (1961)

The main practical contribution of the Cuban Revolution to insurgency theory was the

‘foco’ (‘focus’ in Spanish), a small guerrilla group moving around the countryside, keeping

itself in being and carrying out raids. Guevara believed that such groups had generated mass

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popular support almost spontaneously by their arrival and demonstration of revolutionary

zeal and effectiveness, hence the name. Mao’s long preparations, constructing secure bases

among the peasant village population, were neither relevant nor necessary. In several South

American countries in the early 1960s small revolutionary foco groups (often fewer than 50

people) tried to repeat the Cuban experience, all without success. Guevara was killed with an

unsuccessful foco in Bolivia in 1967, by the Bolivian army which had received training,

equipment and Special Forces assistance from the United States. The foco concept in practice

produced a return to traditional guerrilla warfare, with insurgents roaming the countryside,

difficult to destroy but not a threat to the state. It was employed particularly in sub-Saharan

Africa by revolutionary groups assisted by Cuban advisors sent by the Soviet Union. Most

sub-Saharan African insurgencies took their basic ideas from Mao and Guevara. In 1968 the

deposed President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah (1909-72; in power 1960-66), who advocated

a pan-African insurgency, wrote:

Between a zone [of Africa] under enemy control where the masses are awakening and a hotly contested zone, there is only one missing link: a handful of genuine revolutionaries prepared to organise and act.… In base areas, it is essential to use the armed forces in conjunction with the masses in order to defeat the enemy…Our liberation struggle must be based on the immense revolutionary potential of the peasantry.

− Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (1968)250

The Rhodesian War 1965-79 also showed many characteristics of the Maoist insurgency

style. Although Rhodesian forces inflicted heavy casualties on insurgents both in Rhodesia

itself and in cross-border raids into Mozambique, their long-term political defeat was never

seriously in doubt. In a settlement brokered by Britain in 1979-80, Rhodesia became

Zimbabwe with Robert Mugabe (born 1924) leader of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front as

president.

250Nkrumah became the first leader of an independent Ghana in 1957, established a one-party state in 1964, and was deposed by coup d’etat in 1966, fleeing to Hanoi. His book was written in exile in Guinea, and he died in Romania in 1972.

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Although both Mao and Guevara emphasised rural safe bases, cities had played a

significant part in both the Chinese Civil War and the Cuban Revolution. The 19th century

idea of the cities as the focus of revolution never entirely disappeared. As counterinsurgency

forces and skills developed, it also became much harder for insurgents to establish their rural

base areas. Meanwhile, urbanisation in many developing countries led to the creation of

large inner-city slums. In the 1960s there was a revival of city-based insurgency,

characterised as ‘urban terrorism’ or the urban guerrilla campaign, directed particularly at

repressive regimes in South America that practised state terrorism. These revolutionary urban

terror campaigns had strong overtones of 19th century anarchism in their emphasis on the

‘propaganda of the deed’, and the small numbers involved. Their political objective was to

provoke the target government into over-reaction, becoming even more repressive; their

related military objective was to tie down police and armed forces (increasingly referred to

collectively as ‘security forces’ or SF) in a protracted campaign. The underlying ideas of

wearing down the enemy were still largely Maoist, but the context had changed from the

countryside to the city. As expressed by a Venezuelan Communist leader:

In the present conditions, to regard guerrilla warfare in the rural areas as the main form of revolutionary struggle would be mechanically to transfer an experience which, while successful in other countries, does not correspond to the peculiarities of national reality. We proceed from the fact that nearly three-fourths of our population are urbanised, that the radicalised masses and our main motive forces of the revolution are concentrated in the towns…Revolutionary armed actions [are] therefore mostly in the form of urban insurrections. − Juan Rodríguez, ‘The New in the Political Line of the Communist Party of Venezuela’,

World Marxist Review, 1967, quoted in William J. Pomeroy (ed.) Guerrilla Warfare

and Marxism (1969)

Urban terror campaigns were mounted throughout South America, notably in

Venezuela, by the Tupermaros in Uruguay, and in Brazil under the most famous of the urban

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terrorism theorists Carlos Marighela (1911-69), whose posthumous Mini-Manual of the

Urban Guerrilla enjoyed wide international circulation. In this short book, Marighela

advocated ‘firing groups’ of five or fewer as the basic urban guerrilla unit. De-centralised

organisation and mobility within the city were critical to avoiding detection, identification

and capture by the security forces:

From the moment a large proportion of the people begin to take his activities seriously, his success is assured. The government can only intensify its repression, thus making the life of its citizens harder than ever: homes will be broken into, police searches organised, innocent people arrested, and communications broken; police terror will become the order of the day, and there will be more and more political murders – in short, a massive political persecution. − Carlos Marighela, The Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla (1969), quoted in Walter

Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (1977).

This urban tactical battle would prepare the way for a campaign in the countryside as

the area of ‘strategic decision’. Other theorists and urban guerrilla groups maintained the

anarchist belief that a terror campaign could itself bring about a revolution. As Abraham

Guillen in Uruguay expressed it:

The urban guerrilla will have to remain, like a fish in water, within a favourable urban milieu. And in order to endure he will have to change his domicile constantly, never settling in a given place. In a large city where there are a hundred guerrilla cells of five persons living separately and fighting together, the police will be unable to control matters; they will have to cede terrain, especially at night, in unfavourable population zones where no police dare appear separately or in small groups. If at night the city belongs to the guerrilla and, in part, to the police by day, then in the end the war will be won by whoever endures longest.

− Quoted in Conor Gearty, Terror (1991)

Guillen’s adaptation of Mao’s ideas and phrases to urban terrorism is evident. He considered

that the Tupermaros failed in Uruguay through being over-centralised, becoming static and

vulnerable to identification.

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These South American urban terror campaigns largely succeeded in provoking state

over-reaction and counter-terror. Typically, Brazilian government death squads killed at least

1,000 people between 1964 and 1970. But none of the insurgent groups won political power.

Instead, largely with support from the United States, most South American governments

moved back towards democracy in the 1980s. The commitment to terrorism meant that the

guerrillas could never win the popular support they needed. They could not win militarily,

nor – unlike rural guerrillas who could make some claim to recognition as legitimate soldiers

– could they make a credible transition to political respectability. The 1960s also marked the

start of globalisation. Business and finance became increasingly multinational, and so did

organised crime, profiting particularly from an expanding international drug trade that was

also used to finance many insurgencies. International and intercontinental travel became

more common, particularly by commercial jet aircraft. Changes in media technology and the

rise of television also made news more international. One consequence was the emergence of

something close to the old anarchist dream of a true global revolutionary movement, aided

once more by a new generation of explosives and small automatic weapons that provided

increased firepower.

This form of terrorism had links with revolutionary and insurgent groups, but chiefly

consisted of very small cliques of anarchists (although few used the old title) carrying out

murders, kidnapping and planting bombs. They included the romantically named

Weathermen, Black Panthers and Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States, and the

Red Brigades in Italy and Japan. The most famous, the Baader-Meinhof Gang (the Red

Army Faction or RAF) that terrorised West Germany in the 1970s, believed that its attacks

would provoke a reaction in the form of a neo-Nazi government, and that the ensuing protests

would bring about a Communist revolution. This form of terrorism contributed to a general

climate of concern, but never posed a serious threat to any democratic government’s survival.

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Other terrorist groups had neo-Fascist or radical right-wing ideologies, particularly in Italy

and South and Central America. In the context of the Cold War these were seen as less of a

threat.

A further form of terrorism to emerge in the same period was ‘international terrorism’ –

traditional guerrilla warfare adapted to the new global environment. The most marked case

of this form of terrorism came from the Middle East. In 1957 the Movement for the

Liberation of Palestine or al-Fatah was formed, with among its leaders Yasser Arafat

(Mohammed Abed Ar’ouf Arafat al-Husseini, 1929-2004), leading in 1964 to the creation of

the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Israel’s crushing victory in the Six Day War of

1967 left guerrilla warfare as the PLO’s only viable strategy. Resembling a semi-

conventional army made up of competing factions rather than a traditional guerrilla group,

the PLO and its associates mounted almost 4,000 raids into Israel from Jordan in 1969.

Another part of the Palestinian guerrilla strategy was an international campaign of terror,

including hijacking commercial aircraft for publicity purposes. In the tradition of the

‘propaganda of the deed’, George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP), declared:

When we hijack a plane, it has more effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis in battle. For decades world opinion has been neither for nor against the Palestinians. It simply ignored us. At least the world is talking about us now.

− Quoted in Conor Gearty, Terror (1991)

In the ‘Munich Massacre’, Palestinian terrorists took hostage some Israeli athletes at the

1972 Olympic Games, and died with them in a failed West German rescue attempt. This type

of hijack or hostage-taking was widely adopted in the 1970s. Separatists from South

Molucca (part of Indonesia) sought publicity by capturing targets such as a school and a train

in the Netherlands. Special techniques including military action also evolved in response. In

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1976, after a commercial aircraft containing Israelis was hijacked to Entebbe airport in

Uganda, Israeli commandos carried out a spectacular rescue. In 1980 the Iranian Embassy in

London was seized by Iranian separatists, leading to its being stormed by the SAS.

Although this form of international terrorism was sometimes a military concern, it was

not insurgency in the sense that there was no real threat to the stability of the target country.

Rather, terrorism was a way of placing a grievance on the political agenda, of fighting the

enemy by the only means available, and of seeking to exert long-term influence. The PLO

was not going to cause the downfall of Israel by these methods. Forcibly expelled from

Jordan in 1970, it moved increasingly towards political methods and was recognised by the

United Nations in 1974. Resettling in the increasingly failed state of Lebanon, it resumed

guerrilla raids until forcibly expelled again by an Israeli invasion in 1982. When a grassroots

Palestinian insurgency, the intifada, emerged in 1987, the PLO was sought out by the Israelis

as a useful leader for bringing the Palestinians under control, becoming the Palestinian

Authority in 1993.

In British Armed Forces doctrine, responses to international terrorism fall within

Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). Although terrorist organisations often form links

with each other, the doctrinal division between urban terrorism as a tactic within insurgency

and terrorism as anarchism or guerrilla warfare has been valuable in helping military planners

conceptualise their operations and responses. Some theorists, notably the British specialist

Conor Gearty in the 1990s, have argued that terror is a tactic that may be employed for

almost any motive, rather than grouping all ‘terrorists’ and their activities together. In this

context, the ‘War Against Terror’ declared by the Americans after 9/11 is meant to make the

tactic of terrorism too costly to employ, rather than to oppose the aims of groups which use

the tactic.

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British Counterinsurgency

During the retreat from empire, British troops were involved in continual military

operations, most of them counterinsurgency campaigns. The British developed a distinctive

counterinsurgency style based on minimum military commitment, civilian primacy, and a

‘hearts and minds’ approach that was much admired and copied. Demands on the British

economy after the Second World War meant that minimum force was the only realistic

option. Much of British counterinsurgency evolved from the older imperial policing role,

particularly civilian primacy and the role of local intelligence and paramilitary forces

(including colonial police forces). The British also had an immense political advantage in

colonial counterinsurgency: their policy of withdrawing peacefully from Empire, made

credible by granting independence to India in 1947, making it hard for insurgents to gain

popular support as nationalists fighting to expel British colonial rulers. It also gave

successive British governments great latitude in deciding where to fight and which wars

could be won. No government committed British forces to an unwinnable war for the sake of

prestige, and there were no major political traumas in Britain.251

The unsuccessful British counterinsurgency in Palestine 1944-47 was the last use of the

older British coercive imperial policing style, against Zionist insurgents who used various

methods including urban terrorism.252 The next British counterinsurgency, the Malayan

Emergency 1948-60, was important as the first defeat for the Maoist insurgency style.

Malaya became part of the British Empire in the early 19th century, consisting of several

states each with its own native ruler, plus the important port and naval base of Singapore.

Other than the Malay population there was a large minority of ‘Straits Chinese’, originally

251 The single British exception was the 1956 Suez expedition, which caused the resignation of Prime Minister Anthony Eden and left a political trauma that took years to disappear; but this was not a counterinsurgency. 252One of the ironies of Israel’s war against Arab terrorists has been that some senior Israeli politicians had themselves practised terrorism against the British.

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immigrant workers, and other smaller minorities. In 1942 the Japanese over-ran the

peninsula, capturing Singapore, and the Allies organised a guerrilla resistance movement for

the duration of the Second World War. In 1945 its leader, Chin Peng (probably born 1921)

was awarded the OBE. In 1948 the British created the Malayan Federation as a prelude to

independence, and the Malayan Communists under Chin Peng responded with an insurgency,

encouraged by Mao’s own victory. Mainly Straits Chinese, the ‘Communist Terrorists’

(CTs) as the British called them,253 had their power base among the ‘squatter villages,’

technically illegal dwellings that housed Chinese tin and rubber workers close to the jungle

edge.

For the first two years, the British were on the defensive as CTs carried out attacks on

plantations and mines, and planted bombs in cities. But many factors worked to the British

advantage: they had a credible political platform; there was a marked ethnic and religious

split between the mainly Chinese CTs and the majority of Malays; there was a post-war

economic boom, particularly in demand for rubber and tin, which helped fund the

counterinsurgency effort. The British also controlled the sea and the air; Malaya was a

relatively small peninsula; and Thailand to the north was hostile to the CTs, who had no

political safe base area. The CTs also alienated many people by indiscriminate violence not

supported by political indoctrination.

Particularly after the Korean War began in 1950, Britain could not afford a large

military commitment to Malaya. Its counterinsurgency strategy was formulated first by

Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs (1895-1951) in consultation with civil servant, Robert

Thompson (later Sir Robert 1916-92), and implemented by General Sir Gerald Templer (later

Field Marshal 1898-1979) as High Commissioner, 1952-54. The ‘Briggs Plan’ was a co-

253Their own name changed from The Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army in the Second World War to The Malayan Peoples’ Anti-British Army, and then to The Malayan Peoples’ Liberation Army.

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ordinated political-military response aimed at defeating subversion within the cities first,

particularly by reform of the police. Land grants and other measures made it possible to

move the squatter population to new ‘model villages,’ isolating the insurgents, who were

tracked down in the jungle by deep penetration forces. Templer, who popularised the phrase

‘this is a war for the hearts and minds of the Malayan people,’ wrote in November 1952 that

‘The shooting side of the business is only 25 per cent of the trouble and the other 75 per cent

is getting the people of the country behind us’.254 By 1955 the CTs were on the defensive,

two years later Malaya was given independence, and in 1960 the insurgency was declared

over. As so often, there were unresolved issues. In 1963 Malaya became part of the

Malaysian Federation, but Singapore left to become independent in 1965. Disputes between

Malaysia and Indonesia produced the Borneo Confrontation between 1963 and 1966. The

last few Malayan CTs only surrendered in 1989.

Success in Malaya greatly enhanced the British reputation for counterinsurgency. In

1961-65 Robert Thompson headed a British advisory mission to United States forces in South

Vietnam. In a book, Defeating Communist Insurgency, written in 1965 comparing Vietnam

with Malaya, he outlined some basic principles of counterinsurgency. Each of these took

several pages, but reduced to headings they were:

• The government under threat must have a clear political aim.

• It must function within the law.

• It must have a co-ordinated plan between civil and military authorities.

• It must give priority to defeating political subversion.

• It must secure its own base area before mounting campaigns into the interior.

254Quoted in John Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya (1985)

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The ‘Thompson Principles’ became famous, and the basis for British counterinsurgency

doctrine for the decolonisation era. Malaya also popularised the ‘model villages’ approach,

copied by the ‘strategic hamlets’ in South Vietnam. The British themselves were often

sceptical of the practice, recognising that separating the population from the insurgents was

critical, but arguing that in many cases resettlement was not the best option. Thompson’s

principles also did not mention information and intelligence, which were at the core of British

counterinsurgency, probably because they were so fundamental that he took them for granted.

A significantly different kind of insurgency began in Northern Ireland in 1969, almost

the only case of broad-based protracted insurgency in Western Europe (although the Basque

ETA separatist movement began in 1966 but which declared a ceasefire in 2010).

Violence first broke out in 1965 with terrorist attacks on Catholics by the re-formed Ulster

Volunteer Force. In 1969 the Army was deployed to keep order and at first to protect the

Catholics.255 The IRA, which had mounted spasmodic campaigns since 1923, including a

number of cross-border raids into Ulster from 195 to 1962, saw these disturbances as an

opportunity. Members of the government of Eire (although not the government itself)

supplied funds and arms to the IRA, providing a safe base area across the border, and

seriously considered armed intervention by the Irish Army. In 1970 the IRA split between

the Official IRA (OIRA) which declared a cease-fire in 1972, and the more militant

Provisional IRA (PIRA), which began armed attacks on the security forces, killing its first

British soldier in 1971.

The first years of the Troubles closely resembled an insurgency as envisaged by

Marighela, with a PIRA campaign of shootings and bombing, including the innovation of the

255Strictly speaking, the British Army was not ‘sent’ to Northern Ireland, in which there had been a British garrison for centuries; but it was substantially reinforced.

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car bomb. Reportedly, PIRA strategy was described in briefing documents given to its new

recruits as:

• A war of attrition aimed at maximising casualties among British troops so as to create

a demand from the British public for their withdrawal.

• A bombing campaign aimed at damaging British financial interests and long-term

investment in Northern Ireland.

• Making Northern Ireland ungovernable ‘except by military colonial rule’.

• Sustaining the war by national and international propaganda and publicity campaigns.

• ‘Defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals, collaborators and informers.’

− The PIRA ‘Green Book’ cited in Thomas Hennessy, A History of Northern Ireland

1920-96 (1997)

By 1970 both Belfast and Londonderry had barricaded Catholic ‘no go areas’ in which

government authority did not run. As the insurgency developed, guerrilla attacks also took

place in the ‘bandit country’ of south Armagh, close to the Eire border. The government of

Northern Ireland was successfully provoked into over-reaction. In August 1971 it introduced

internment without trial. This was an often-used tactic in counterinsurgency, ‘bending’ the

law, but in this case all the internees were Catholics. In January 1972, in an episode that

remains controversial, British soldiers in Londonderry shot dead 13 people at a demonstration

on ‘Bloody Sunday’. In July the British government held secret talks with the PIRA

leadership to negotiate a settlement. After these first negotiations failed, the British gradually

regained the initiative. Later in 1972 they launched ‘Operation Motorman’ to reclaim the no-

go areas, closed down the Northern Ireland parliament, and began reforms of the Royal Ulster

Constabulary (RUC). By 1974 the PIRA was forced to abandon its existing broad-based

structure, replacing it with small ‘active service units’ similar to the Marighelan ‘firing

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groups’. By then, although the PIRA retained considerable popular support, they were on the

defensive. Deaths from the insurgency dropped off dramatically from 467 in 1972 to 215 in

1974, and continued to decline. The Army’s role increasingly resembled MACP rather than

counterinsurgency. Indeed, given the PIRA strategy, the ability to restore ‘police primacy’

with a reformed RUC was a critical step towards restoring peace.

In 1981 the PIRA announced a shift to a more political approach, ‘with the Armalite in

one hand and the ballot box in the other’.256 The phrase draws on Yasser Arafat’s speech to

the UN in which he said, “I come bearing an olive branch and a machine gun. Do not let the

olive branch fall from my hand.” In 1985 the Anglo-Irish Agreement considerably reduced

the availability of Eire as a safe base area. In 1994 the PIRA declared a ceasefire which

virtually ended the insurgency, followed by a second and apparently lasting ceasefire in 1997.

In the course of the Troubles the British Army had killed 318 people and lost 511 dead itself.

Total deaths in the Troubles (1969-97) reached just under 3,600 of which just over half

occurred in the period 1971 to 1973.

One difference between Northern Ireland and British colonial counterinsurgency was

that the British could not make a credible offer of withdrawal and independence, and in 1972

the PIRA – mindful of the consequences of the 1922 partition – would settle for nothing less.

The world economic recession of the 1970s, and political and financial support for the PIRA

from sympathisers within the United States, were further factors operating against the British.

Frank Kitson, who commanded a brigade in Belfast in 1970, identified another critical

difference:

In previous campaigns, neutralising insurgents could usually be achieved if the security forces could find them…. [Intelligence gathering] was based on the assumption that if

256This was PIRA policy from the late 1970s, but the phrase was first used at a Sinn Fein press conference in 1981. Armalite is the commercial name for the Colt M-16 rifle, the standard personal weapon of the US Armed Forces, also widely used throughout the world.

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found, insurgents could be engaged in battle legally, or captured and convicted in court, or detained under emergency legislation. The situation that faced the army in Northern Ireland was that the law only permitted soldiers to open fire in very restricted circumstances and court convictions were, and still are, hard to get.

− Sir Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (revised 2010 edition)

The basis of Kitson’s own theories of counterinsurgency, and of much British practice,

was information gathered by the troops and by intelligence organisations. Once again,

methods that had worked in a colonial context were inappropriate for the later 20th century

British Isles. Michael Dewar, a British Army veteran of the conflict, wrote:

In the early days, until about 1972, the Army over-reacted to the success of the crude IRA propaganda of the 1970-71 period…The Army took a while to learn that Ulster was a very different proposition from the colonial campaigns of the post-war period, which were sufficiently far removed from home for the Press to be relatively disinterested or easily misled. In Ulster, scores of highly competent journalists were able to see everything at first hand.

− Michael Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland (revised 1997 edition)

The most successful insurgency movement in modern European history against the world’s

most skilful and experienced counterinsurgency forces was always likely to be a hard and

protracted conflict. It is nevertheless remarkable that the insurgency lasted until 1997,

making it Britain’s longest war of modern times.

A further important development in British counterinsurgency was the establishment of

doctrine for post-colonial operations. This was based in particular on the Dhofar War 1970-

75, fought in south-western Oman. After a brief counterinsurgency campaign against Arab

nationalists (1962-67), the British abandoned the strategically important port of Aden at the

southern end of the Red Sea, which in 1970 became the capital of the People’s Democratic

Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), a Communist state supported by the Soviet Union. A

minor separatist rebellion also began in the neighbouring province of Dhofar in Oman in

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1962. After 1970 the insurgents obtained support from South Yemen to become much better

organised, and appeared close to success.257 In Cold War politics this was regarded as part of

a Soviet strategy to expand its influence in the Middle East. Neighbouring countries were

also concerned at the Communist threat to their own stability. In 1970 Sultan Qaboos bin

Said (born 1940) came to power in Oman in a virtually bloodless coup, and requested British

intervention. The British sent small specialist military units to Dhofar, including a ‘British

Army Training Team’ (BATT) of SAS. They also used diplomacy to encourage expansion

and reform of the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF), and troop contributions from Jordan and the

Shah’s Iran.258 Social development in Dhofar was aided by SAS ‘Civil Action Teams’

(CAT), while an accompanying military campaign, including the building of a succession of

defensive barriers, pushed the insurgents back into the PDRY. In late 1975 the insurgency

was declared over. In 1990 the PDRY ceased to be Communist, joining the Yemen Arab

Republic to form the modern state of Yemen.

In the decade after 1975, Dr John Pimlott (1948-97, Head of the Department of War

Studies, 1993-97) devised a set of counterinsurgency principles based in particular on the

Dhofar campaign that encapsulate the British style and experience since Malaya:

• Recognition of the political nature of the problem

• Establishment of a civil-military command and control structure with civilian

supremacy

• The importance of information and intelligence

257Oman was never part of the British Empire, but had close links with the British going back almost two centuries. In 1970 the country’s name was officially changed from the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman to the Sultanate of Oman. 258Until the 1979 revolution Iran was ruled by Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919-80, in power 1941-79), whose rule was seen as a cornerstone of Western defence policy in the region.

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• Splitting the insurgents from the people through the use of propaganda and ‘winning

hearts and minds’

• Destroying the isolated insurgents; and

• Political reforms to prevent re-occurrence

− Based on Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott (eds), Armed Forces and Modern

Counter-Insurgency (1988)

The ‘Pimlott Principles’ of counterinsurgency were officially adopted as British Army

doctrine in 1996, having been absorbed and practised by the Army for much longer. Unlike

Thompson’s principles they were intended to be prescriptive and sequential – a checklist of

activities to follow from the start to the finish of the counterinsurgency. They continued to

exercise considerable influence on all aspects of British COIN doctrine but have since been

subsumed by the ten principles now contained in Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency

(2012).

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency since Vietnam

Central America

The pure Maoist style of insurgency based on protracted war and rural settings has

become rare since 1975, mainly because fewer countries fulfil its criteria. Despite American

concerns about there being no effective counterstrategy, it has been defeated by governments

and security forces which, lacking the resources of the United States, have emphasised local

political and social factors. Even so, these have been very long wars. They include the

Maoist insurgencies in Thailand 1965-1983; in the Philippines 1968-1993; and the ‘Tamil

Tigers’ (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) insurgency in Sri Lanka, which started in 1983,

became much closer to conventional war by 1991, and ended in 2009. In all cases, political

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reforms satisfying a previously dissident mass of the people played a much greater part than

military defeat of the insurgents. Insurgency in this form may be a way of changing

intolerant governments; and like the coup d’etat its results may be politically beneficial.

However, such cases are the exception.

Among the Maoist insurgencies that still continue is the ‘Shining Path’ (Sendero

Luminoso) movement in Peru,259 which began a protracted war in 1980 under Abimael

Guzman (‘Chairman Gonzalo’ born 1934). Like Guevara before him, Guzman claimed to

have found a new method of insurgency superior to Mao’s, based particularly on the cultural

conditions of Peru. But his basic concept of developing a strong political base among the

peasantry, controlling the countryside, and outlasting the enemy remains the same. From

about 1986 Guzman began to modify this Maoist approach and to join other groups in a terror

campaign in the cities, complicated by a large illegal drug trade. Guzman was captured in

1992, and the insurgency has since declined significantly. Another overtly Maoist insurgency

was waged from 1996 to 2006 in Nepal, which suffers considerable problems, especially high

levels of poverty.

By the 1980s insurgency was more likely to take the form of linked campaigns in the

cities and the countryside, mixing terrorism, guerrilla war and subversion. This was well

illustrated by the two largest insurgencies in Central America, the Nicaraguan Civil War

1979-88 and the war in El Salvador 1980-94. In Nicaragua, revolts against the right-wing

Somoza family dictatorship began in 1961, led by the ‘Sandanista Liberation Front’ (FSLN or

‘Sandanistas’). Under Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1925-80, president 1974-79) repressive

policies including the use of death squads vastly increased support for the Sandanistas, who

seized power in 1979 after a guerrilla campaign, establishing what became a Cuba-like

259The full title of the movement is: The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the Thoughts of Chairman Gonzalo.

194

Communist government with Soviet support. The United States under President Ronald

Reagan (1911-2004; in office 1981-88) responded by providing financial and military support

for an army of pro-Somoza guerrillas and mercenaries, the ‘Contras’, against the Sandanistas.

The resulting war more closely resembled a mixture of terrorism and guerrilla war practised

by conventional armies than true insurgency. American political and popular opinion was

also deeply divided over its involvement in Nicaragua.260 In 1990 the war ended as part of the

wider Cold War settlement; in supervised elections the Sandanistas were voted from office,

and the Contras disarmed.

In Nicaragua the United States supported the insurgents against the government; at the

same time in neighbouring El Salvador from 1980 to 1994 it supported the government

against the insurgents. Communist-led revolts in El Salvador date back to 1932. In 1979 a

coup imposed yet another in a succession of quasi-military governments, backed by right-

wing death squads. An organised insurgency movement, the Farabundo Martí National

Liberation Front (FMLF) began an urban campaign in retaliation, obtaining support from

Cuba and the Soviet Union, and increasingly establishing rural bases. In response, the United

States provided support to a succession of El Salvadorean governments. The result was a

long and bitter guerrilla war with neither side able to achieve victory, and which again

provoked political controversy in the United States. This insurgency was also defused by

external political pressure at the end of the Cold War, with the imposition of a United Nations

monitoring and peacekeeping force to oversee elections in 1993-94. The experience of

Nicaragua and El Salvador reinforced American preferences for conventional war over

counterinsurgency.

260To fund its support of the Contras, in 1986 the Reagan government sold arms to revolutionary Iran for the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), in violation of American law. The ‘Iran-Contra’ scandal broke after Reagan retired from office in 1988.

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The Soviets in Afghanistan, 1979-89

Its significance often overlooked, the Soviet–Afghan War stands as one of the seminal

events of the last quarter of the 20th century. In less than a decade it exposed fatal defects in

the Soviet political structure as well as in communist ideology itself, helped trigger and

sustain the policy of internal reform led by Mikhail Gorbachev from 1985, contributed

strongly to the collapse of the communist party and the consequent end to the Cold War and,

finally, played a decisive contributing role in the disintegration of the USSR. The conflict

rapidly involved other nations with strong political interests at stake in Central Asia, not least

the United States, which clandestinely siphoned billions of dollars in aid to the mujahideen

through Pakistan. Pakistan itself not only strongly supported the resistance in general, but

particularly those factions of religious extremists who in the wake of Soviet withdrawal took

a prominent part in the internecine struggle between rival mujahideen factions that ultimately

led to the Taliban’s triumph in the autumn of 1996. In short, the network that became al-

Qaeda took root as a direct consequence of the Soviet–Afghan War, in which Osama bin

Laden and others like him provided substantial funds to large numbers of jihadi.

The international implications soon became apparent. Quite apart from the horrific

wave of repression which their regime unleashed, the Taliban offered Afghanistan as a

training and recruiting ground for other extremist groups whose political and ideological

agenda stretched far beyond the borders of their war-ravaged country. By hosting al-Qaeda

on Afghan soil, the Taliban sowed the seeds for the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,

which in turn triggered a devastating reaction from the United States and the United

Kingdom, soon followed by other NATO powers. All of this ‘Pandora’s box’ may be traced

to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ghastly war it inaugurated.

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The foundations of a full understanding of the West’s involvement in Afghanistan

today must rest upon a firm grasp of the causes, course and outcome of the Soviet–Afghan

War, the lessons from which confirmed the folly that underpinned Soviet strategy: the pursuit

of unrealistic political aims with armed forces unable to cope with the unconventional

methods of an adversary which, though vastly disadvantaged in weapons and technology,

managed to overcome the odds through sheer tenacity and an unswerving devotion to

freedom and faith.

In 1979, political leaders in Moscow directed a sceptical military to intervene in the

Afghan civil war in order to maintain in power in Kabul a nominally communist regime,

which was struggling against a resistance movement of disparate groups known collectively

as the mujahideen or ‘fighters for the faith’. Deeply unpopular with large swathes of rural,

deeply conservative, tribal peoples stretched across a country divided on religious, ethnic and

tribal lines, Nur Mohammed Taraki’s government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

(DRA) controlled the urban areas but very little of the countryside, where tribal elders and

clan chiefs held sway. Even within the communist party apparatus, rival factions grappled for

sole control of the affairs of state, denying them the time and ability to implement the

socialist reforms they espoused, including the emancipation of women, land redistribution

and the dismantling of traditional societal structures in favour of a more egalitarian

alternative. None of these reforms resonated with a traditional, Islamic nation, whose

opposition manifested its outrage in open civil war. Taraki was overthrown by his own prime

minister, Hafizullah Amin, a member of the opposing communist faction; yet Amin proved

even less effective at imposing rule than his predecessor. Lack of political direction and anger

at unwanted reforms precipitated mutinies and mass desertions within the army and outbreaks

of bloody revolt in villages, towns and cities across the country, which the Soviets

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immediately appreciated as a threat to their influence over a neighbouring state sharing a

border with three of the USSR’s Muslim republics.

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

concerned at the disintegrating situation in Afghanistan and determined to maintain a sphere

of influence over the region, ordered an invasion. As neither the climate nor the terrain suited

Soviet equipment or tactics, the sheer size of the endeavour became daunting. When Soviet

troops rolled over the border in December 1979, ostensibly in aid of a surrogate government

in Kabul, they expected to conduct a brief, largely bloodless campaign with highly

sophisticated mechanized and air assault forces, easily capable of crushing Afghan resistance

in a matter of months before enabling a newly installed government to tackle the resistance

thereafter. Events exploded at least two myths prevalent in the West: the Soviets never

intended to remain long in Afghanistan, as supposed in Washington, and their relatively small

troop numbers attested to this fact. Nor did the invasion represent the belated realisation of

the historic Russian drive to establish a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean. Theirs was to

constitute a temporary – albeit an internationally condemned – presence.

Yet the Soviets comprehensively failed to appreciate the quagmire in which they found

themselves. Their forces possessed very limited combat experience – none at all in

counterinsurgency – and they foolishly assumed their successful interventions in East

Germany in 1954, in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 offered models for any

military operation executed against a popular struggle. Western analysts, too, predicted

Soviet victory, but the political and military circumstances behind the Iron Curtain offered no

parallels with Afghanistan. Unlike the Soviets’ client states in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan

stood embroiled in the midst of a civil war – not a simple, effectively unarmed, insurrection –

and thus applying simple, albeit overwhelming, military might could only guarantee

protection for the central government in Kabul and perhaps control of larger cities and towns,

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but not the countryside. Soviet intervention in December 1979 achieved its initial objective

with predictable ease: elite troops overthrew the government, seized the presidential palace

and key communications centres, killed Amin and replaced him with a Soviet-sponsored

successor, Babrak Karmal.

The plan thereafter seemed straightforward: stabilize the political situation, strengthen,

re-train and enlarge DRA forces to enable them to quell the insurgency on their own, while

concurrently performing the more passive roles of garrison duty and protecting the country’s

key infrastructure such as major roads, dams and its sources of electricity and gas. Thus,

within three years, the Soviets, confident in the notion that the Afghan government could

stand on its own feet when armed with the continued presence of Soviet advisors including

army officers, KGB personnel, civilian specialists in engineering, medicine, education and

other spheres, and furnished with a continuous supply of arms and technology, believed their

forces could withdraw across the border, leaving a friendly, stable, compliant and

ideologically like-minded regime firmly in power behind them.

None of these objectives stood up to the reality of the situation, however. The civil war

continued to spiral beyond the government’s ability to suppress it and the DRA forces’

morale plummeted further, decreasing their operational effectiveness and worrying Moscow

that withdrawing its troops would amount to both humiliation and the collapse of all Soviet

influence over its client state. Thus, what began as a fairly simple military operation –

overthrowing a government and occupying key positions throughout the country, a task

which the Soviet military, trained in large-scale, high-tempo operations could manage with

ease – soon developed into a protracted, costly and ultimately unwinnable fiasco. The conflict

pitted small, ill-armed but highly motivated guerrillas – employing fighting methods bearing

no relation to those practised by opponents trained and armed to fight in central Europe –

against forces of utterly different organisation and doctrine. Experience soon demonstrated

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the limited efficacy of heavy infantry, tanks, artillery, and jet fighters in a struggle that

decisively depended upon more helicopter gunships, more heliborne troops, and more special

forces to meet the demands of the fluid, asymmetric war conducted by the mujahideen.

As the years passed and Soviet casualties steadily mounted – totalling about 15,000

dead and over 10,000 invalids, not to mention the vast numbers of other categories of

wounded personnel – the war graphically exposed the weaknesses of Moscow’s strategy and

the poorly suited structure of their armed forces, which never succeeded in overcoming an

ever-growing resistance movement operating over a vast, varied and exceedingly challenging

landscape. Indeed, both Soviet tactics and strategy contained fatal flaws. Their doctrine

directed the use of armoured and motor rifle units to advance along narrow axes, maintaining

secure lines of communication while wreaking destruction upon any resistance they

encountered through combined arms (the coordination of firepower offered by infantry,

armour and air assault units). With little experience or training in a counterinsurgency role,

Soviet forces chose a simplistic approach to the problem: simply clearing territory in their

path, which translated into the widespread killing of civilians as well as resistance fighters,

who avoided where possible the superior weight of fire which their opponents could bring to

bear. Everywhere circumstances appeared to confirm Alexander the Great’s dictum that ‘one

can occupy Afghanistan, but one cannot vanquish her’.

Civilians who survived the onslaught naturally fled, embittered, abandoning their

destroyed villages and property to seek refuge in cities or over the border. Such ruthless

exploitation of air and artillery power was deliberately meant to clear areas, particularly along

the border with Pakistan, so as to deprive the resistance of recruits and local support as well

as to aid in the interdiction of supplies crossing over into Afghanistan. This strategy resulted

in horrendous human suffering. Statistics vary on the unnatural, war-related Afghan deaths

that occurred during the war, but range between 900,000 and 1.3 million people. What

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proportion of this number may be identified as mujahideen is impossible to discern, but their

losses must have numbered in the many tens of thousands. Yet this already staggering scale

of combined military and civilian fatalities must not obscure the record of suffering caused to

ordinary villagers through injury and disability. An estimated 1.5 million Afghan civilians

became physically disabled as a result of the war.

At the outset of the war the Soviets’ strategy involved persuading the population to

support the communist-led Kabul government, thus denying the resistance of aid within the

anonymity of the provinces. This soon proved unrealistic, not least owing to the regime’s

heavy-handed measures. They then turned to denying the insurgents supplies, which led to

driving civilians off their land or destroying their livelihoods as a warning to withhold their

support from the insurgency. This also involved interdicting supply routes that connected the

insurgents to the vital matériel moving through Pakistan, the principal source of aid to the

mujahideen. The Soviet 40th Army mounted numerous substantial operations against areas

known to be actively supporting the resistance and severed supply lines whenever possible,

but the ‘drip, drip’ effect caused by the guerrillas’ constant ambushes, sniping, raids and

mine-laying ultimately inflicted unsustainable losses on the invader.

The Soviet–Afghan War differed from other conflicts of the Cold War era. Although it

was a limited conflict, it was longer than most – slightly over nine years in length – and thus

did not share the decisive nature of the Arab–Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, or

the Falklands War of 1982. The Soviet imbroglio lacked the scale of either the Korean War

(1950-53) or Vietnam (1965-73) and did not conclude with a clear political outcome, in

contrast to those proxy conflicts. Nor can it be seen as some sort of Soviet ‘Vietnam’,

especially in terms of scale. The Soviets never deployed anything approaching the numbers

the Americans sent to South East Asia, with over half a million personnel by 1968, compared

with the average of approximately 118,000 Soviets serving at any given time in Afghanistan.

201

Whereas the Americans conducted numerous operations involving several divisions, the

Soviets’ entire 40th Army in Afghanistan consisted of a mere five divisions, four independent

brigades and four independent regiments, plus various small support units. Numbers as

insufficient as these denied the Soviets – by their own faulty strategic calculations – any

realistic chance of securing over 20 provincial centres plus various key industrial sites, to say

nothing of the manpower required to control whole swathes of remote and practically

inaccessible territory inhabited by a seething population supporting elusive, seldom visible,

opponents who moved by stealth, struck at will, and melted back into civilian life with little

or no trace. The protection required for hundreds of miles of roads, communication lines, and

points of strategic importance – some of which the Soviets had to occupy outright or, at the

very least, deny to the mujahideen – placed a colossal burden on the invaders, who failed to

appreciate both the sheer scale of the enterprise and the immense commitment in manpower it

required. In short, the Soviets failed to deploy sufficient numbers of forces to fulfil their

mission and could not possibly hope to defeat the insurgency when spread across such a vast

area. The defence of bases, airfields, cities and lines of communication alone committed the

bulk of Soviet forces to static duties when circumstances demanded unremitting strike

operations against the insurgents, thereby maintaining the initiative and obliging the

resistance to look to their own survival in favour of attacks of their own.

An analysis of the operational record of the conflict reveals that the Soviets completely

failed to accept that their doctrine and training ill-suited them for the type of war into which

they plunged themselves. Fully capable of undertaking operations on a grand scale and in a

conventional context, apart from their special forces Soviet troops were not armed, equipped

or trained for a platoon leaders’ war that entailed locating and destroying small, elusive, local

forces that only stood their ground and fought when terrain and circumstances favoured them,

and otherwise struck quickly before rapidly melting away. There were no fixed positions, no

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established front lines and rarely any substantial bases of operation for the insurgents.

Whereas the Soviets could perform extremely well at the operational level, complete with

large-scale all-arms troop movements, these could not be easily adapted to circumstances on

the ground where the fighting occurred on a small scale and amidst circumstances in which

Soviet tactics did not conform to the requirements of guerrilla warfare. Soviet equipment,

weapons and doctrine suited their forces well for a confrontation on a massive scale on the

northern European plain, a context in which they were confident in employing massed

artillery to obliterate NATO’s defensive positions before driving through the gaps created to

crush further resistance and to pursue the remnants of shattered units.

Soviet tactics in Afghanistan by contrast simply did not accord with their opponent’s

fighting methods. No benefit accrued by massing artillery to carry out a bombardment of an

enemy who seldom concentrated in large numbers and who dispersed at will, reforming

elsewhere for the next ambush or raid. Soviet conscripts and reservists could dismount from a

personnel carrier and deploy rapidly for the purpose of laying down suppressive fire on an

enemy unit or sub-unit of like composition, but the tactics and standard battle drills of the

typical motorized rifle regiment failed to match the attacks of a highly mobile, fluid enemy

who refused to fight on terms consistent with Soviet doctrine. Air assault and Spetsnaz forces

learned to adapt their tactics to meet the demands of a guerrilla war, and in this regard they

achieved some success. But the level of innovation required to defeat such a wide-scale

insurgency proved beyond the means of Soviet forces as a whole, and thus must be seen as

one amongst many factors which doomed them to ultimate failure.

[Officer Cadets are advised that sections on Iraq and Afghanistan are in preparation, but that in the meantime they may consult sources on these subjects from the suggested list which follows. Current COIN doctrine is comprehensively covered in AFM Countering Insurgency, which constitutes core reading:

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United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. Countering insurgency: Army Field Manual, Vol. 1 Pt. 10 (AC71876), London: Ministry of Defence, 2010.

Selected Reading on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

General Historical Beckett, Ian F. W. Modern insurgencies and counter-insurgencies: guerrillas and

their opponents since 1750. London: Routledge, 2001.

Beckett, Ian F.W., ed. The roots of counter-insurgency: armies and guerrilla warfare, 1900-1945. London: Blandford, 1988.

Joes, Anthony James. Resisting rebellion: the history and politics of counterinsurgency. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

Marks, Thomas A. Maoist insurgency since Vietnam. London: Frank Cass, 1996. Marston, Daniel and Malkasian, Carter, eds. Counterinsurgency in modern

warfare. Oxford: Osprey, 2008.

Nagl, John A. Learning to eat soup with a knife: counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

Theory, Concepts and Doctrine

Angstrom, Jan and Isabelle Duyvesetyn, Isabelle, eds. Modern war and the utility of force: challenges, methods, strategy, London: Routledge, 2010.

Benbow, Tim, & Thornton, Rod, eds. Dimensions of counter-insurgency: applying

experience to practice. London: Routledge, 2008.

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Connable, Ben and Libicki, Martin C. How insurgencies end. Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2010.

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006 [originally published 1964].

Joes, Anthony James. Urban guerrilla warfare. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007.

Kilcullen, David. The accidental guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of big ones. London: Hurst, 2010.

Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. London: Hurst, 2010.

Rid, Thomas and Keaney, Thomas, eds. Understanding counterinsurgency warfare: doctrine, operations, challenges. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010.

United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. Countering insurgency: Army Field Manual, Vol. 1 Pt. 10 (AC71876), London: Ministry of Defence, 2010.

United States. Department of the Army. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24: The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual. Chicago, IL: Chicago University

Press, 2007.

United States. Marine Corps. Small-unit leaders’ guide to counterinsurgency. USMC Combat Development Command, 2006.

Insurgency and COIN theorists and practitioners (historical) Guevara, Che [Ernesto]. Guerrilla warfare. University of Nebraska Press, 1985. Kitson, Frank. Low intensity operations: subversion, insurgency & peacekeeping.

London: Faber and Faber, 1971.

Mao Tse Tung. On guerrilla warfare. University of Illinois Press [2nd rev. ed.]. Marighella, Carlos. For the liberation of Brazil. London: Penguin, 1974.

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Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist insurgency: the lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. London: Chatto and Windus, 1966.

COIN and Insurgency contemporary and historical case studies

Braithwaite, Rodric. Afgantsty: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89. New York: Profile

Books, 2012. Caraccilo, Dominic and Thompson, Andrea. Achieving victory in Iraq: countering an

insurgency. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2008.

Clarke, Michael, ed. War without consequences: Iraq’s insurgency and the spectre of strategic defeat. London: RUSI, 2008.

Cordesman, Anthony. The Afghanistan campaign: can we win? Washington DC:

CSIS, 2009.

Cordesman, Anthony and Davies, Emma R. Iraq’s insurgency and the road to civil conflict. 2 vols. Washington DC: CSIS, 2008.

Edwards, Aaron. The Northern Ireland Troubles. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011.

Evans, Martin. Algeria: France’s Undeclared War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Flynn, Matthew J. Contesting history: the Bush counterinsurgency legacy in Iraq. Praeger, 2010.

Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-89. Oxford: Osprey Publishing,

2012.

Hashim, Ahmed. Iraq’s Sunni insurgency. London: Routledge/IISS, 2009.

Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace, 1954-62. New York: New York Review of Books,

2006.

Jones, Seth. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2008.

Jones, Seth. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war with Afghanistan. New York: Norton, 2009.

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Ledwidge, Frank. Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012.

McKittrick, David and McVea, David. Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict. London: Penguin, 2012.

Mockaitis, Thomas R. Iraq and the challenge of counterinsurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008.

Ricks, Thomas. The gamble: General Petraeus and the untold story of the American surge in Iraq, 2006-2008. London: Allen Lane, 2009.

Newsinger, John. British counter-insurgency from Palestine to Northern Ireland. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.

Strachan, Hew, ed. Big wars and small wars: the British Army and the lessons of war in the 20th century. London: Routledge, 2006.

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