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World Transport Policy & Practice

Contents Volume 3, Number 1, 1997

2 Abstracts & Keywords

3 Editorial

4 Livable Streets for Pedestrians in Nairobi: The Challenge of Road Traffic AccidentsMeleckidzedeck Khayesi

8 Developing strategies to meet the transport needs of the urban poor in GhanaE.A. Kwakye, P.R. Fouracre, D. Ofosu-Dorte

15 Appropriate Transport and Rural Development: Economic Effects of an Integrated RuralTransport Project in TanzaniaNiklas Sieber

25 Solving Bangkok’s Transport Woes: The Need to Ask the Right QuestionsPeter du Pont and Kristina Egan

38 Heading for a New Transport Policy in SwedenHans Silborn

43 The Future of Air Travel and International TourismMayer Hillman

©1997 Eco-Logica Ltd ISSN 1352-7614

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Edi tor

John Whitelegg, Professor of Environmental Studies, Liverpool John Moores University,Clarence Street, Liverpool, L3 5UG, U.K.

Editorial Board

Eric Britton, Managing Director, EcoPlan International, The Centre for Technology & SystemsStudies, 10 rue Joseph Bara, 75006 Paris, France.

Paul Tranter, Senior Lecturer, Schoolof Geography and Oceanography, University College,Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra ACT 2600, Australia.

John Howe, Professor of Transportation Engineering and Head of Infrastructural Engineeringand Physical Planning, International Institute for Infrastructural, Hydraulic and Environ-mental Engineering, Delft, The Netherlands

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Abs t r acts

Livable St reets for Pedestrians in Nair obi: TheChallenge o f Road Traf f ic Accidents

Meleckidzedeck Khayesi

KEYWORDS: pedestrians, road safety, street planning

This paper examines the trend in pedestrian road trafficaccident fatalities and injuries in Nairobi from 1977 to1994. Pedestrians constituted the largest victim group offatalities and injuries. This state of affairs is largely due tothe neglect of pedestrian needs in transport planning andpractice in Nairobi. The key to improving pedestrian safetyin Nairobi lies in a re-orientation of transport policy frommotor-vehicle fixation to pedestrian promotion. There is anurgent need for serious thought to be given to a meaningfulpedestrianisation process in Nairobi.

Developing st rategies to meet the transportneeds o f the urban poor in Ghana

E.A. Kwakye, P.R. Fouracre, D. Ofosu-Dorte

KEYWORDS: urban transport, urban poor, accessibility,quality of life

An efficient and ef fective urban transport sector is a meansto both promoting urban development and providingadequate access and mobility to the urban dweller. In thiscontext, in 1993, the Government of Ghana initiated itsfirst Urban Transport Project (UTP) with the express aimsof increasing and sustaining the quality and efficiency ofurban transport services and making their delivery moreequitable across all income categories. This improvedtransport, resulting in increased mobility and access toemployment, markets and other centres, as well as jobopportunities is of prime importance because theaccessibility of the poor to these facilities is a measure oftheir quality of life. This paper presents the transportdevelopment strategy which has been adopted under thecountry’s first Urban Transport Project, and assesses whatthe likely impacts towards poverty alleviation will be.

Appropriate Transport and Rural Development :Economic Ef fects of an Integrated RuralTransport Pro ject in Tanzania

Niklas Sieber

KEYWORDS agricultural production, non-motorisedtransport, infrastructure improvements

Poor transport conditions are a substantial constraint forthe increase of agricultural production in Sub-SaharanAfrica. Conventional rural transport projects, which focusexclusively on motorised transport can only partly removethese restrictions. Therefore, an integrated transportapproach is proposed, which takes into account non-motorised transport. A field study in Tanzania

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demonstrates that these interventions have at least thesame magnitude of effects as rural road improvements. Asystem dynamics model shows that a succession of roadimprovements and non-motorised interventions constitutesan optimum scenario, which can be entirely financed byroad pricing. This new approach towards rural transportnecessitates an extension of conventional appraisalmethodologies.

So lving Bangkok’s Trans port Woes:The Need to Ask the Right Quest ions

Peter du Pont and Kristina Egan

KEYWORDS: mass transit, role of government, privateinvestment

Bangkok has a transport crisis with serious negativeimplications for health and welfare. Congestion is causingeconomic distress and technical solutions involvinginfrastructure development are being recommended bywestern consultants. The approach of government appearsmeddlesome due to institutional barriers, and the lack ofregional land use planning and the absence of a transportstrategy.

Heading for a New Trans port Po licy in Sweden

Hans Silborn

KEYWORDS: infrastructure investment, CO2 targets,transport policy re-evaluation

Swedish policy makers see a need for a thorough re-evaluation of transport policy and its related governmentalstructures. The focus of investment will be shifted awayfrom major infrastructure development to more modestmeasures such as improvements of existing routes. Animportant element will be improving road safety.Reduction of noxious emissions, especially greenhousegases is seen as vitally important.

The Future of Air Travel and Internat ional Tourism

Mayer Hillman

KEYWORDS aviation, tourism, global warming,sustainability.

Governments' attitudes towards aviation is a usefulindicator of the value which they place on planetaryhealth. With air travel increasing and a resultant growingdemand for infrastructure the environment is losing out. Itis important that air operators pay the full external costs oftheir industry and that this sector of the economycontributes to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions. Thiswill require multilateral action to reconcile the dichotomyof promoting air travel and improving planetary health.

Editoria l

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THIS is the first issue of World TransportPolicy and Practice with its new publisher,Eco-Logica Ltd. We are grateful to MCBUniversity Press who launched the journaland saw it though its first two years ofpublication. Its transfer of ownership hasprovided an opportunity to build on thesuccesses of the first two years and to takesome new initiatives. WTPP will still providea high quality medium for original andcreative ideas in world transport. WTPP has aphilosophy based on the equal importance ofacademic rigour and a strong commitment toideas, policies and practical initiatives thatwill bring about a reduction in globaldependency on the car, the lorry and theaircraft. WTPP has a commitment tosustainable transport which embraces theurgent need to cut global emissions of carbondioxide, to reduce the amount of newinfrastructure of all kinds and to highlight theimportance of future generations, the poor,those who live in degraded environments andthose deprived of human rights by a planningsystem that puts a higher importance oneconomic objectives than on the environmentand social justice.

WTPP embraces a different approach toscience and through science to publishing.This view is based on an honest evaluation ofthe track record of transport planning,engineering and economics. Theseinterrelated disciplines have failed thepopulations of the developed world and arenow failing the populations of the developingworld. They have embraced a quantitative,elitist and mechanistic view of society, spaceand infrastructure and have eliminatedpeople from the analysis. They have pursuednarrowly defined technocratic objectives forthe last 50 years and pursued many of theseobjectives (e.g. road building) long after theaccumulation of overwhelming evidence thatsuch an obsession was counterproductive.They are now pursuing the same narrowlybased mechanistic objectives in aviation andhave learned nothing from the experience ofroad building.

Professional transport planning in all itsguises has been intellectually deficient simplybecause it has chosen to eliminate peoplefrom the analysis and to stifle debate. WTPPwill put people at the centre and welcomescreative debate. This creative debate involvesno sacrifice of rigour. Articles in WTPP willmeet the highest standards of traditionalacademic rigour. They will be well foundedon fact and experience and they willrepresent the widest possible consideration ofthe full range of issues any particular topic

raises. In this way we can work towards amore modest science and a science that isself-critical and reflective.

WTPP will encourage the flow of materialfrom those countries under-represented in theprofessional world of transport publishingand from young researchers. It will work withthese authors to help them to improve theirmaterial and it will identify key areas ofdebate for special issues. The editorial boardwelcomes suggestions for these key areas andoffers of guest editorship.

Volume 3, No 1 carries a number of articlesthat begin to put these ideas into practice.Khayesi addresses the problem of pedestrianfatalities in Nairobi, Kenya and the urgentneed to produce solutions to the sameproblem in all the rapidly developing cities ofAsia and Africa. Kwakye and his colleaguesask how urban transport planning can assistthe poor in Ghanaian cities, particularlyAccra. Sieber assesses the importance of ruraltransport in Tanzania and makes connectionsbetween transport planning objectives and theimpact on quality of life for rural dwellers.Peter du Pont takes us back to Bangkok andthe intensity of the transport problems in thiscity. Bangkok has become something of ametaphor for transport failures (at greatexpense) in large cities and a solution toBangkok’s problems is central to the wayforward in Bombay, Calcutta or Shanghai.

Two papers from Europe explore topics ofglobal importance. Firstly, Silborn explainsthe Swedish response to sustainabledevelopment. Sweden has put more effortthan most countries into defining andoperationalising sustainable transportobjectives but this is the same country thathas advanced the plan for a road and rail linkacross Öresund to connect Malmö (Sweden)with Copenhagen in Denmark. It will beinteresting to see how Sweden’s sustainabledevelopment objectives make headwayagainst the strongly entrenched economic andinfrastructural plans represented by theÖresund link.

Finally Hillman takes us to the heart ofwhat is now the most serious threat of all toglobal sustainable development. Aviation hastaken over from the road builders as the lastbastion of “predict and provide” and sees noproblem whatsoever in doubling and treblingcapacity every 20 years or so into theindefinite future. Our ability globally to dealwith sustainable development will stand orfall on our ability to tame aviation. Oncurrent form we are not doing very well.

John Whitelegg, Editor

K e yw ord sPedestrians, road safety, street planning

Abs t r a ct

This paper examines the trend in pedestrianroad traffic accident fatalities and injuries inNairobi from 1977 to 1994. Pedestriansconstituted the largest victim group offatalities and injuries. This state of affairs islargely due to the neglect of pedestrian needsin transport planning and practice in Nairobi.The key to improving pedestrian safety inNairobi lies in a re-orientation of transportpolicy from motor-vehicle fixation topedestrian promotion. There is an urgentneed for serious thought to be given to ameaningful pedestrianisation process inNairobi.

Int r oduct i on

Pedestrians constitute a very vulnerablegroup to road traffic accidents. Theirvulnerability largely results from the neglectof their mobility needs in transport planning.This neglect contrasts sharply with theunrivalled and undue advantages given tothe motor vehicle (Whitelegg, 1993;Conservation Law Foundation, 1995;Monheim, 1996).

In Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya,pedestrians constitute the largest singlevictim group of road traffic accident fatalitiesand injuries. The lives of pedestrians inNairobi are therefore at great risk from roadtraffic accidents. In other words, the streetsof Nairobi do not offer a livable environmentto pedestrians. The streets of Nairobi shouldnot just be seen as part of the urban jungle.Nor should they be viewed as satisfyingmainly the needs of motorised traffic. Rather,they should be seen as livable streets. Thismeans that they should contribute torealizing the economic and social goals of allroad users, including pedestrians.

This paper examines the trend in pedestrianfatalities and injuries in road traffic accidentsin Nairobi from 1977 to 1994. The paper thenbriefly outlines the transport policy contextof pedestrian road traffic accidents. Astrategy to improve the safety of pedestriansis suggested at the end of this paper.

The reality o f pedestrian deaths andinjuries in road t raf fic accidents inNai robi

The picture that emerges from the datapresented in this paper is one of increasingloss of life and injuries that accrue topedestrians in Nairobi. Between 1977 and1994, Nairobi experienced a rising trend inthe number of road traffic accidents (Figure1). A total of 54,350 road traffic accidentsoccurred in Nairobi during this period. Theseaccidents resulted into 6005 deaths.Pedestrians constituted the largest number ofroad traffic fatalities (3,929 or 64.5%). Thesecond largest victim were passengers (1,189or 19.8%). They were followed in relativeimportance by drivers (615 or 10.2%), pedalcyclists (183 or 3.0%) and motor cyclists (89or 1.5%). This aggregate pattern is more orless repeated for the individual years.

A look at the trend in serious injuries revealsthat pedestrians constitute the highest singlevictim group also (Figure 2). Out of a total of14,826 persons that were seriously injured,6,465 (43.6%) were pedestrians, 4,025(27.1%) were passengers, 2669 (18.0%) weredrivers, 913 (6.2%) were pedal cyclists and754 (5.1%) were motor cyclists. Thepedestrians are also the highest victim groupwith respect to slight injuries (Figure 3).There were 47,100 slight injuries, out ofwhich 19,469 (41.3%) were pedestrians,15,049 (32.0%) were passengers, 7,739(16.4%) were drivers, 2,946 (6.2%) werepedal cyclists and 1,906 (4.0%) were motorcyclists.

The picture that emerges from the data in thetables and diagrams underscores the fact thatpedestrians are a high road traffic accidentrisk group in Nairobi. The official statisticson which this paper is based reveal only asmall proportion of the threat to pedestriansin Nairobi. The situation may even be worsethan portrayed here if all the data onpedestrian accidents were included. There isthe universal problem of under-reporting inroad traffic accident statistics (Adams, 1986).The question that arises is: What is transportpolicy doing to improve pedestrian safety inNairobi?

Livable Streets for Pedestrians in Nairobi:The Challenge of Road Traffic Accidents

Melecki dzedec k KhayesiKenyatta University Deparment of Geography, Nairobi, Kenya

Meleckidzedeck Khayesi:‘Livable Streets for Pedestrians inNairobi: The Challenge of RoadTraffic Accidents’World Transport Policy & Practice3/1 [1997] 4-7

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Meleckidzedeck KhayesiKenyatta UniversityDept of GeographyP.O. Box 43844Nairobi, KenyaFax: +254-2-810759

importance of walking in these householdswas further emphasized by the fact that alarge proportion of the first trip of the dayand the most important every-day trip wasmade on foot. In fact, walking had over 40%share of these kinds of trips (Omwenga,Obiero and Malombe, 1994).

Pedestrian trips in Nairobi cover varyinglengths, within a complex web of origins anddestinations. For instance, in the survey byOmwenga et al (1994), the average travellength among the households was estimatedat 5-8 kilometres. Residents in some newsettlement areas were found to cover over 10kilometres. Pedestrian, as well as motorised,mobility arises due to the separation ofactivities in time and space in Nairobi. Thispattern of movement is closely related toresidential patterns, location of work places,location of shopping zones and location ofentertainment places. This is why there is aweb of movement patterns in Nairobi interms of origins, destinations, purpose, modeuse, direction and volume. It is during thesemovements and interactions that pedestrianscome into contact with motor vehicles.

This contact should not always lead to apedestrian road traffic accident. Howeverdue to deficiencies in transport planning,pedestrians often become victims of roadtraffic accidents. Analysis of the distributionof accident spots in Nairobi reveals that themost dangerous spots are those with heavypedestrian traffic in the CBD and along themain primary distributors leading to the CBDfrom low-income high density residentialareas (Ogonda, 1976; Maina, 1978; Omwengaet al, 1993). These roads also happen to bethose with heavy fast moving motor vehicletraffic e.g. Jogoo Road and 1st Avenue-Eastleigh.

Road transport planning in Nairobi is by andlarge motor-vehicle oriented (Omwenga et al,1993). The general policy statement on urbantransport in Kenya has tended to ignore non-motorized transport: walking and cycling.Priority in transport planning has been givento the development of motorized transport(Omwenga et al, 1993). The existing roadnetworks in Kenyan urban areas, includingNairobi, do not meaningfully cater for non-motorised modes. The existing pedestrianinfrastructure is inadequate. In brief, there isa general lack of infrastructure for ped-estrians and cyclists in the urban transportsystem in Kenya (Omwenga et al, 1993).

Though pedestrian mobility needs are now

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Meleckidzedeck Khayesi:‘Livable Streets for Pedestrians inNairobi: The Challenge of RoadTraffic Accidents’

World Transport Policy & Practice3/1 [1997] 4-7

The Pedestrian in Na irobi TransportPolicy and Practice

Transport policy and practice in Nairobi donot appear to reflect the reality of the tripmaking characteristics of the residents.Walking is a dominant mode of transport inNairobi. A survey carried out in 1973revealed that about 44.6% of household tripswere made on foot. These trips were foressential purposes such as work, school,personal and business (Nairobi MetropolitanGrowth Strategy, 1973). A 1994 survey ofmode use in 302 households in a low-medium income area in Nairobi revealed thatwalking is the predominant mode of travelamong these households. A modal split forcombined first four trips in the day revealedthat walking had a 47% share. It wasfollowed by public transport (41%), privatecar (7%), bicycle (1%) and others (4%). The

Figure 2: Nairobi: Pedestrians seriously injured in road traffic accidents inrelation to other road users, 1977-1994

Figure 1: Nairobi: Number of road traffic accidents and persons killed, 1977-1994

receiving some attention in some of thecountries of Europe, the USA, Japan andAustralia, no meaningful and clear policyshift are evident in Nairobi. Pedestrianisationof the transport system is yet to get the policyand action programmes it deserves inNairobi. Nairobi has very few and inadequate(in some cases non-existing) pedestrianfacilities in terms of footbridges,underground passages, exclusive walkingpaths, zebra crossings and pedestrianprecincts. It is not unusual to find motorvehicles in narrow streets which shouldideally be left for pedestrians. The situationof pedestrians is worsened by the use oflimited walking space on pavements forparking and hawking. Pedestrians havetherefore to use this limited space oralternatively walk on the road, thus exposingthemselves more to the likelihood of beinghit by motor vehicles.

The pedestrian is often blamed forcarelessness as a road user. The roads inNairobi are used by both motorised and non-motorised traffic. Such a traffic mix creates ahigh probability of conflict that could easilylead to a road traffic accident. Thisprobability gets even higher in a situationwhere the road users do not adhere to thetraffic rules, a state of affairs that is prevalentin Nairobi. The pedestrian turns out to be aweak and disadvantaged negotiator whenconfronted with the strong motor traffic.

Many motorists in Nairobi do not givepedestrians their right of way. Pedestriansare even in danger from motorists at zebracrossings. To facilitate pedestrian mobility at

zebra crossings, the traffic police personnelhave often to stop motorists. Recently, a non-governmental organisation called RoadSafety Network (RSN) was formed. Thisorganisation deploys personnel at peak hoursat critical points to control traffic. They eventry to stop motorists so as to make it possiblefor pedestrians to cross the road. Pedestrianstend to be blamed for crossing the road whenconditions are not favourable. They areaccused of failure to heed the presence ofvehicular traffic. Children are often blamedfor playing in the road. A contextual analysisreveals that these actions cannot be whollyblamed on pedestrians. In the absence ofadequate pedestrian facilities and in asituation where there is little regard for thepedestrian right of way, pedestrians areobliged to take risky actions to cross theroads. This can easily result in a road trafficaccident, for instance, when an oncomingvehicle gets to the pedestrian when half-wayacross the road.

Reclaiming the St reets o f Nairobi forPedestrians : A St rategy

An issue that is increasingly drawing a lot ofattention in transport planning is how toreclaim streets for pedestrians (ConservationLaw Foundation, 1995; WALKBoston, 1996).Literature on the livability of streets indicatesthat streets have an important function toplay in the social and economic life of theresident population (Appleyard et al., 1981;Hass-Klau et al., 1994). The livability ofstreets has been lost with the passing of time,largely due to increasing motorisation whichled to the neglect of pedestrians in transportplanning. The threat posed by road trafficaccidents to pedestrians is thus a globalproblem.

For Nairobi, it is necessary to tackle theproblem of road traffic accidents, especiallywith a view to making the streets livable topedestrians. The key to tackling this problemlies in effectively and meaningfullyaddressing the critical issues which havebeen raised concerning transport planningand the road user system. The strategy toimproving pedestrian safety in Nairobirequires intervention at two principal levels:policy framework and practice in transport.

Po licy f ramework

At the policy level, there is need for arethink. In specific terms, there is need for acomprehensive policy and institutionalframework that incorporates the needs of



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Figure 3: Nairobi: Road Traffic Accident fatalities and injuries by road usergroup, 1977-1994

pedestrians and other non-motorised traffic.The policy fixation on the needs of mainlymotorised transport needs a drastic reversal.What is needed in transport policy is a re-orientation from motor vehicle fixation tointer-modal compatibility. In particular, theneglect of pedestrians has to be addressed.The present transport policy in Kenya lacks aclear statement on urban transport in generaland non-motorised traffic in particular(Omwenga et al. 1993). Though it soundsaltruistic, it appears that transport policy inthe world generally does not fully recognisethat “walking is transport“ (Monheim, 1996;Nebe, 1996). At the institut ional level,Omwenga et al. (1993) observe that there isno strong lead agency empowered to co-ordinate and implement comprehensiveurban transport policy measures in Kenya.An effective institutional framework toconsistently plan and manage the urbantransport system is lacking. What exists areseveral agencies and institutions concernedwith various transport matters at mixedlevels. The need for a clear policy statement,co-ordinated institutional framework andpolitical commitment to pedestrian needs inNairobi will constitute the initial significantstep to tackling pedestrian accidents.

Pract ice in t ransport

Beyond goal and target-setting in transportpolicy, there is a need to undertake specificaction programmes that are aimed atimproving pedestrian safety. There are anumber of measures that are necessary.



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Among these are: pedestrianisation of someroads in the CBD, residential traffic calmingand provision of adequate pedestrianfacilities (walking lanes, zebra-crossings,footbridges, underground passages, enoughtime for pedestrians at traffic lights). Alongwith these action programmes is the need foreffective legal enforcement whichincorporates a strong element of road safetyeducation. A city-wide programme of roadsafety education is needed in Nairobi. Thiswill conscietize Nairobi residents to thedangers of road traffic accidents, more so tothe need to improve personal behaviour onthe road. In other words, road safety inNairobi needs to be community-oriented,whereby the residents and road users seethemselves as part of the problem andsolution to road safety.

Concl u s i on

An analysis of road traffic accident statisticsfor Nairobi for the period 1977-1994 revealsthat pedestrians are the largest single victimgroup of fatalities and injuries. The in-creasing vulnerability of pedestrians to roadtraffic accidents is largely due to the neglectof their needs in transport planning inNairobi. There is a strong orientation towardsthe needs of the motorised traffic at theexpense of non-motorised traffic in Nairobi.The key to solving pedestrian safety inNairobi lies in policy re-orienation whichshould address the neglect of pedestrians.There is an urgent need for meaningful trafficcalming measures to be undertaken in Nairobi.

R e fe r e n ce s

ADAMS , J. (1986), Risk Homeostasis and thePurpose of Safety Regulation. Paper presented tothe CEC Workshop on Risky Decision Making inTransport Operations, TNO Institute for Percep-tion, Soesterberg, The Netherlands, 9 November1986 .

APPLEYARD, D, GERSON, M. S. AND LINTELL, M. (1981),Livable Streets, Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress

CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION (1995), Take BackYour Streets: How to Protect Communities fromAsphalt and Traffic, Boston: Conservation LawFoundation.

HASS-KLAU, C., DOWLAND, C AND NOLD, I. (1994),Streets as Living Space: A Town Centre Study ofEuropean Pedestrian Behaviour, Part 1 Brighton:Environmental and Transport Planning.

MAINA, B. R. (1978), “Road Safety in Nairobi: AnAnalysis of Road Accidents on Nairobi RoadNetwork“, M.A. Thesis, University of Nairobi.

MONHEIM, H. (1996), The Triangle of Transport-Economics-Environment in Europe. PaperPresented at the Kouvola Conference, 1996.

NAIROBI METROPOLITAN GROWTH STRATEGY, VolumeTwo (1973).

NEBE, J.M. (1996), Feet First: The Debate andProgress towards More Livable Cities in Ger-many, Lecture given to WALKBoston Initiative,October 10th, 1996.

OGONDA , R.T. (1976), “Transportation in theNairobi Area: A Geographical Analysis“, M.A:Thesis, University of Nairobi.

OMWENGA, M. E., OBIERO, S. AND MALOMBE, J. (1993),Non-Motorised Urban Transport Studies, Eastern& Southern Africa: Nairobi, Kenya: PreliminaryAssessment Report of Issues and Interests, Reportno. 4A.

OMWENGA, M. E., OBIERO, S. AND MALOMBE, J. (1994),Non-Motorised Urban Transport Studies, Eastern& Southern Africa: Nairobi Household andCorridor Survey Analysis: Urban Mobility of theLow and Middle Income Population, Report no.11 .

WALK B OSTON (1996), Walkable Communities: 5Steps to Making Your Community Safe andConvenient for People on Foot.

WHITELEGG, J. (1993), Transport for a SustainableFuture: The Case for Europe, London: BelhavenPress.

K e yw ord s

Urban transport, urban poor, accessibility,quality of life.

Abs t r a ct

An efficient and effective urban transportsector is a means to both promoting urbandevelopment and providing adequate accessand mobility to the urban dweller. In thiscontext, in 1993, the Government of Ghanainitiated its first Urban Transport Project(UTP) with the express aims of increasingand sustaining the quality and efficiency ofurban transport services and making theirdelivery more equitable across all incomecategories. This improved transport, resultingin increased mobility and access toemployment, markets and other centres, aswell as job opportunities is of primeimportance because the accessibility of thepoor to these facilities is a measure of theirquality of life. This paper presents thetransport development strategy which hasbeen adopted under the country’s first UrbanTransport Project, and assesses what thelikely impacts towards poverty alleviationwill be.

1 Intr oduct i on

By the end of the 1980s, Ghana’s per capitaincome placed it among the world’s poorestcountries. Ghana continues to have highdependence on a small range of exportables(principally cocoa, gold and other minerals),low domestic savings, low aggregateinvestment and a low level of privateinvestment. It is generally estimated thateven with the improved economicperformance since the launching of itsEconomic Recovery Programme (ERP) in1983, real growth has only been about 5%per annum, with per capita income rising atabout 2% per annum. At this rate, it wasestimated that the average poor person in

Ghana would not cross the poverty line foranother half century.

In 1993, as a logical sequence to the ERP,Ghana in association with the World Bank,launched its Accelerated Growth Rate andPoverty Reduction Programme. This aims toconsolidate and build on the earliereconomic achievements in order to furtheradvance the goal of poverty reduction in thecountry. Ghana needs to strike for fastergrowth through policies that will createopportunities and tangible change for thepoor. The anticipated accelerated growth isexpected to go hand-in-hand with povertyeradication (World Bank,1993). Ghana’snational planning document, Ghana-Vision2020 (Government of Ghana, 1995), foreseesGhana attaining the status of a middleincome country over the next 25 years.Initiatives like the Gateway Programme,creation of Free Enterprise Zones and theencouragement of private sector capitalinvestment are being promoted in support ofthis objective.

As the World Bank has noted, c ities of thedeveloping world are major engines foreconomic growth (World Bank, 1996), and asa result, more attention is being focused onurban development as an important part ofthe national growth process. Furthermore,the alleviation of urban poverty has beenidentified by the World Bank as one of thethree priorities for urban development in the1990’s (World Bank, 1991).

An efficient and effective urban transportsector is a means to both promoting urbandevelopment and providing adequate accessand mobility to the urban dweller. In thiscontext, in 1993, the Government of Ghanainitiated its first Urban Transport Project(UTP) with the express aims of increasingand sustaining the quality and efficiency ofurban transport services and making theirdelivery more equitable across all incomecategories. It is expected that as a result of

E.A. KwakyeDirector of Planning, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ghana

P.R. FouracreUrban Transport Adviser, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ghana.

D. Ofosu-DorteDirector, TDP Consult, Accra, Ghana

Developing strategies to meet the transportneeds of the urban poor in Ghana

Kwakye, Fouracre & Ofosu Dorte:‘Developing strategies to meet thetransport needs of the urban poorin Ghana’World Transport Policy & Practice3/1 [1997] 8-14

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the UTP many of the urban poor will benefitfrom improved transport, resulting in theirincreased mobility and access toemployment, markets and other centres, aswell as job opportunities. This is of primeimportance because the accessibility of thepoor to these facilities is a measure of theirquality of life. Improvements will alsoenhance their productivity and contributionto the national economy.

This paper presents the transportdevelopment strategy which has beenadopted under the country’s first UrbanTransport Project, and assesses what thelikely impacts towards poverty alleviationwill be. Reference is made mostly to Accra,the main city of Ghana, but the conditionsdescribed apply equally in the other largecities, Kumasi, Takoradi, Tema and Tamale.

2 The Urban Poor

In Ghanaian cities the existing urban poorcommunities are not confined to inner orouter areas of the city. For example, in theAccra Metropolitan Area some of thecommunities, particularly those of theoriginal or indigenous Ga settlers, are verycentrally located within the city while othersare some 20 km from the Central BusinessDistrict (CBD). However, it is evident thatnew urban poor settlements are springing upon the periphery of the c ity, and that theseare likely to accommodate an increasingproportion of the c ity’s poor over time. Thiswill have a longer term impact on travelpatterns, thereby placing an increasingburden on the existing inadequate publictransport services.

Most of the poorer communities havedeveloped as squatter settlements on lessfavourable residential land with poordrainage which is often subjected to floodingafter heavy rains. Almost all are built-upareas with little room for expansion.Conditions are generally deplorable withinadequate supporting social and engineeringinfrastructure. Buildings are of poor materialand structural quality with low maintenance

levels. Most houses cannot be accessed bymotorised transport. However, there are somelanes between buildings which are used forpedestrian access, but also serve as drainagechannels.

Overcrowding in the houses is common withthe indigenous areas of Accra having anaverage of 3.6 persons per room and 29.5persons per house whilst the non-indigenousareas have 3.1 persons per room and 30.4persons per house (APDP, 1990). In somepoor communities household occupancyrates have been recorded as high as 8 personsper room. Fluctuations in household size,which result from more open boundaries offamily membership, are also apparent (Griecoet al., 1996).

In the very poorest communities of Accra,almost 70% of personal incomes were belowthe 1992 Accra average monthly earnings of¢24,691 (about US$40 in 1992 prices). Thereis evidence, however, that some middle andhigher income families continue to live inthese depressed areas. This may be partlyout of choice to remain within onestraditionally or indigenous ‘acceptedcommunity’ and partly because of the highrents charged in other areas within the city.

3 Transport availability

3.1 Vehicle ownership

Motor vehicle ownership for the whole ofAccra was 35.7 per 1000 population in 1993,with an average annual growth rate of 4.1%between 1987 - 1993. The distribution ofvehicle ownership by income category is notknown, but it can be expected to be highlyskewed towards the high income households.

Statistical data on bicycle ownership are notknown with any certainty. However, from asurvey of travel in the poorer communities ofAccra, it has been estimated that per capitaownership levels of bicycle range between 30and 120 bicycles per 1000 persons (TDP,1992b). Even if these figures are realistic, it isclear from traffic counts and generalobservation that cycles are not widely usedin daily travel.The higher bicycle ownershiplevels recorded in some areas reflect the factthat these communities have a marked‘cycling culture’ which is associated withtheir ethnic origins such as those from theNorthern half of the country (Grieco et al.,1995). The survey also indicated that forevery bicycle owner there were another 1.5persons who had access to the use of thesame bicycle.

Kwakye, Fouracre & Ofosu Dorte:‘Developing strategies to meet thetransport needs of the urban poorin Ghana’


Table 1. ESTIMATED TAXI AND TROTRO OPERATIONAL FLEET IN ACCRA

Shared Taxi Trotro Total

Vehicle fleet in use 6,500 3,200 9,700

Seat capacity 26,000 48,000 74,000

Vehicle per 100,000 pop 42 21 63

Seats per 100,000 pop 169 312 481

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3.2 Public Transport

In the main, public transport services areprovided by shared taxis and ‘trotros’ orminibuses (Fouracre et al, 1994). Taxis havea legal seating capacity of four passengers,while the trotros range in size from 12 to 30seats. There are limited numbers of biggerbuses; those in use are mainly operated byindustrial companies for use by employees.A range of services are offered by thesevehicles, including chartering, point-to-point(‘dropping’) and fixed route sharing or‘joining’ (Grieco et al., 1996). The estimatedoperational fleet strengths of shared taxis andtrotros are shown in Table 1.

Access to public transport from thedepressed areas seems reasonable though theterminal facilities are poor. Fare levels ontaxis tend to be about twice those on trotrosfor any given trip length. There is no obviousdifferentiation in fares between services tohigher and lower income communities.However, there are differences in servicequality between richer and poorercommunities. For example, trotros servingthe squatter settlement of Tsui-Bleoo in theTeshie area of Accra are very old and in poorstate of repair. Their drivers avoid using themain roads of Accra for fear of police arrest.

Fares also vary with the type of serviceprovided (Grieco et al., 1996).

Average waiting times at terminals are veryvariable with some high recorded maximumvalues; passengers often have to struggle forthe few available seats. Taxi waiting timesbetween terminals are one third to half ofthose of trotros. This should be expectedbecause taxis are far more numerous and arethus likely to be operated at higherfrequency with resulting lower waiting times.Taxis are also more highly utilised than otherpublic transport vehicles. They cover 240 kmper day as against 160 km for trotros and 90km for big buses (Ofosu-Dorte, 1994).

3.3 Roads

The road conditions within the depressedareas are for the most part poor. Almost halfof the road lengths have no engineeredsurface. Even then some of these poor roadsare being used by vehicles since there are noalternative roads leading into these poorareas. Although, over a quarter of the roadshave surface dressing, these have anextensive degree of deterioration with onlyone third being in good condition. There islack of pedestrian walkways, coupled withthe hazards of open drains. Where walkwaysdo exist they are often used for street trading.

By contrast, the road network in the highincome areas of the city are generally of ahigher standard. They are more likely to havea properly engineered surface, and aremaintained to the highest level possible.

4 . Travel characterist ics

The distribution of trip lengths from thedepressed areas has been established bysample survey. Figure 1 shows thecumulative distribution of trips for eachmode by trip length. Forty per cent of tripsby all modes are less than 5 km, while 75 percent are less than 10 km.

Modal choice is strongly associated with tripdistance, as is shown in Figure 2. There is amarked increase in the proportion of tripsundertaken by the trotros with increasing tripdistance. For non private-car trips in excessof 25 km, which constitute about 5% of alltrips, over 90% are undertaken by trotros.The majority of short distance trips whichare less than 5 km are undertaken bywalking. The proportion of trips undertakenby taxis are relatively independent of tripdistance. Taxis carry about 20 - 25% of alltrips on distances up to 25 km. Beyond thisdistance the taxi share drops to below 10%.



[ 1 0 ]

Figure 2: Mode choice by trip distance

Figure 1: Trip length distibution for each mode

Use of shared taxis and trotros is stronglyassociated with income, status and gender.The higher a travellers’ income and, in alllikelihood, status the more likely the use oftaxi, and the less likely the use of trotro. Thisis shown in Figure 3. Taxis are not onlyconvenient to use but also more comfortableto ride in because of the fewer number ofpassengers they carry and the low floorclearance compared to the size of the trotros.Comparatively, the trotros are big,uncomfortable, and in some cases difficult toaccess by women when they are carryingloads or babies. Women, especially those inthe middle and higher income groups, areprobably more likely to use taxis inpreference to trotros, though there is nosubstantive data in this report to supportthis. This is due not only to the convenienceof the taxis, but also to the nature of the

choice of modes. They ‘both adapt theirtransport behaviour to the poor quality andlow reliability of existing informal transportsystems and creatively adapt the localinformal public transport system to theirbusiness needs’ (Grieco et al., 1996).

Expenditure on transport as a proportion oftotal daily expenditure is broadly correlatedwith income levels. In general, higherincome earners spend less on transport as aproportion of total daily expenditure. Table 2shows the transport expenditure patterns fora sample of workers in different earningcategories. The very low income earnersspend less, as a proportion of income, thanthe next category. This probably reflects thefact that wage earners with very low incomescannot afford to use even the cheapest publictransport on a regular basis. Transport forthis poorest category is largely by walking.

Travel speeds in Accra are poor and areconstantly, over the years, getting worse. Inthe central areas, average peak hour speedsdeclined by about 12.5% in the three yearperiod between 1987 and 1990. Since thenthere has been continued decline and currentevidence suggests that speeds in the CBD arebelow 10 kmph.

5 . Improving the mobility andaccessib ility o f the urban poor: designof the urban t ransport project.

In order to improve upon the mobility andaccessibility needs of the urban poor in thecountry, the Government of Ghanaapproached the World Bank for assistance.This culminated in the negotiation of aWorld Bank sponsored Urban TransportProject (UTP) in 1993 for the five major citiesof the country namely, Accra, Tema,Sekondi/Takoradi, Kumasi and Tamale at atotal cost of US$87.6 million. While theWorld Bank is providing US$76.2 million,the Government of Ghana is financing theremainder from its own resource ascounterpart funds.

5.1 Outline of the Urban TransportProject (UTP)

There are five main components in the UTP.These are:

1. Road rehabilitation in Accra and Sekondi/Takoradi;

2. Traffic management improvement andaccident reduction measures;

3. Lorry parks and bus terminalrehabilitation;



[ 1 1 ]

Table 2. EXPENDITURE ON TRANSPORT BY WAGE EARNERSEarnings ¢ per month Transport cost as a proportion of total daily expenditure

0 - 10,000 13.7

11,000 - 25,000 24.2

26,000 - 40,000 12.0

41,000 - 60,000 11.6

> - 60,000 4.3

Figure 3: Mode choice by income category

Ghanaian society, whereby women are moreconscious of their dress when they aretravelling than their men counterparts andalso due to their status in the society.

Mode choice is also a particularconsideration for female traders, as has beenpowerfully demonstrated in the work ofGrieco et al., (1996). This group, which playsan important role in the Ghanaian economythrough ensuring local availability of goods,has the need for diversity and flexibility in

4. Construction of non-motorised transportfacilities and access roads to low-incomeareas;

5. Technical assistance to central and localgovernment agencies for policydevelopment; project preparation andimplementation, and institutionaldevelopment.

While it is expected that all the componentsof the project should have a positive impacton the accessibility and mobility of the urbanpoor in the country, some of these measuresare particularly targeted at the urban poorareas, especially in Accra as their specificcircumstances dictate.

5.2 Bus terminal rehabilitation

The UTP includes improvements to thesurfacing, drainage, access control, lighting,and the provision of shelter, sanitary andrefreshment facilities to selected terminals inall the five main cities of Ghana. Bicyclestorage facilities are also to be provided tocomplement the non-motorised transportcomponents and to encourage people to cycleto and from terminals in the manner of a‘park and ride system’.

5.3 Non-motorised transport facilities

In support of the Government ’s policy toprovide balanced development of transportmodes in the urban areas, the project makesprovision for the construction of around50km of dedicated cycle paths connectinglow and middle income residential areas tocommercial and business districts in Accra.Cycle lanes and tracks have also beenincorporated as part of the road rehabilitationdesigns for Accra. In the proximity ofmarkets, these tracks and lanes will be wideenough to accommodate the manuallypushed trolleys which are widely used totransport goods between the markets and theterminals/ lorry parks for the traders.

These ‘pilot’ paths will form the initial phaseof an integrated bike path network for Accraand eventually for other cities andmetropolitan areas of Ghana. A study will beundertaken to produce a master plan for thedevelopment of a comprehensive bike pathnetwork for the whole of Accra.

Seven low-income areas in Accra, identifiedas having the worst access problems, namely,Teshie old Town, Chorkor, Russia, Sukura,Sabon Zongo, old Nungua and Abeka will beconnected to the main arterial routes withbasic surfaced roads, thereby reducing the

operating costs of public transport which inturn will help reduce the transport burden ofthe urban poor living in these areas. Accessto selected markets is also to be improvedthrough the construction, or designation, ofdedicated tracks or lanes between lorry parksand markets for non-motorised transport,such as hand-carts.

5.4 Policy support

Specific Urban Transport Policies are to bedeveloped which will focus on the followingissues:

1. Regulatory options for improving thequality and quantity of public transport;

2. Management of bus terminals;

3. Management of parking in the main cities;

4. Options for private sector participation inthe Government owned bus companies,

5. Restructuring of the Vehicle Examinationand Licensing Division and the NationalRoad Safety Committee in order to mini-mise road accidents and their effects onthe society especially in the poor commu-nities.

The general aim of this set of policy-relatedstudies is to develop an operatingenvironment in which an effective andefficient public transport service willflourish. This should be for the benefit of theurban poor who depend so heavily on publictransport for accessibility and mobility.Policy development will be within a generalframework of trying to achieve a selfsufficient sector in which the ‘user paysprinciple’ is followed.

5.5 The expected benefits and impact ofthe Urban Transport Project

The project is designed to improve theefficiency and increase the capacity andsafety of urban public transport and roadnetwork operations in Ghana. It is expectedto reduce traffic delays and congestion in thefive urban areas by better organising andcontrolling the flow of buses, other motorvehicles and non-motorised transport. It willimprove access and circulation, reducingpassenger and freight transport costs, andhence improve the performance of the urbaneconomy.

While a broad cross-section of Ghana’spopulation will benefit from improvementsin the urban transport system, many of theurban poor will particularly benefit fromimproved transport from their homes to



[ 1 2 ]

markets and the main roads. This is expectedto result in increased mobility andaccessibility to job opportunities broughtabout by improved taxi, trotro and busservices, safer pedestrian pathways andincreased bicycle usage.

6 Status o f implementat ion o f the UTP

The UTP has been in progress for almostthree years. The access roads to thedepressed areas of Accra have been designed,and work has started on implementation. TheDepartment of Urban Roads (DUR), theexecuting agency for this work, has laid greatstress on the public presentation anddiscussion of the designs with the localcommunities involved. Apart from generatinglocal goodwill, this participation is to ensurethat designs meet community needs.

The DUR is also using public participationexercises, or so-called user platforms’ tohelp in the development of the designs forthe non-motorised paths, which are currentlybeing formulated. The originally conceivedpathways have been modified as a result ofthese consultations, and the result is that thepaths which will be constructed are moreclosely aligned to the existing main areas ofcycle use. An innovation in the design workhas been the use of a sociologist and anexperienced non-motorised transport expert,to help identify how best the communitiescan be served by the paths, what designfeatures will improve their acceptance, andhow best to promote the use of the paths,given the existing behavioural patterns ofcyclists, and the attitudes towards cyclists byother road users and the community at large(Turner et al., 1996).

The designs for the public transport terminalimprovements have also been completed, andwill similarly be presented by DUR for publicacceptance. An important aspect of therehabilitation work is the need to put inplace an efficient and sustainablemanagement system which can maintaincontinuing high standards of operation at theterminals. The Ministry of Transport andCommunications (MOTC) is putting in placethe institutional arrangements for supportingthe Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies(MMAs) who have the responsibility forrunning the terminals. Management of theterminals will be contracted out to theprivate sector on the basis of an open tendercompetition.

The MOTC and DUR are also collaborating in



giving more general support to the MMAs todevelop their technical capacities to plan fortraffic and transport. The MMAs have a weaktechnical capacity in this field, which is nowreceiving attention as part of a wider policyof decentralising the powers of centralgovernment. The DUR, which is a centralgovernment agency, has already developedRoads Units within the five main MMAs.These Units initially have the role of roadmaintenance within the MMAs, but theirresponsibilities will gradually be developedto include more major road works, trafficmanagement and public transport monitoringand control. This process of expanding therole of the Roads Units has started under theUTP, through the creation of Traffic andTransport Units (TTUs)’. The TTUs are beingformed to oversee the management of thepublic transport terminals, and to implementthe policy initiatives towards urban parking,which have been developed by MOTC.

MOTC is centrally involved in theinstitutional and policy development aspectof UTP, and has set up an Urban TransportUnit (UTU) as a dedicated cell to handle itsprogrammes (Kwakye and Fouracre, 1996).The UTU has been developing theinstitutional framework through the creationof an Inter-Ministerial Committee, whichfunctions at various levels by bringingtogether all interested parties on a regularbasis. It is through the UTU that MOTC hasbeen working directly with the MMAs tocreate the necessary organisational andmanagement structures required to manageeffectively traffic and transport in the cities.The UTU is also trying to promote, throughtraining programmes, the development of anurban transport planning expertise in theAgencies concerned.

7 Concl u s i on

Transport plays an important role in city life,not least for the urban poor who largely relyon the provision of public transport serviceson which they spend a large proportion oftheir income. The importance of transportissues in the life of the urban poor can beseen in the findings from a survey ofcommunity improvement projects. The up-grading of roads and drainage ranked secondin depressed community priorities, ahead ofsuch other worthwhile schemes such as theprovision of health centres, schools andmarkets.

While transport improvements cannot by

[ 1 3 ]



[ 1 4 ]

themselves solve the problem of poverty,they can contribute to a more efficient urbanorganisation, and a higher quality of life. Akey feature of Ghana’s Urban TransportProject is therefore to promote projects whichwill have a specific and positive impact onthe lives of the urban poor. Furthermore, inorder that these projects can be sustained, theUTP has stressed the need for publicparticipation and consultation, as well as thedevelopment of institutional structures

which can carry the process of developmentforward at the end of the current project.

Ghana’s UTP is still in progress and some ofthe important components have still to berealised. However, it is clear that the originalproject conception was well founded, andthat a significant and positive impact is beingmade on transport development in the maincities. Urban transport is at last being giventhe support it deserves, and the urban poorwill be major benef iciaries.

R e fe r e n ce s

APDP (1990) Housing needs assessment study(Accra Planning and Developing Programme)’.Report to the Ministry of Works and Housing,Accra.

Fouracre, P.R., Kwakye, E.A., Silcock, D., andOkyere, J.N. (1994) Public transport in Ghanaiancities - a case of union power.’ TransportReviews, Vol. 14, No.1. pp 45-61.

Government of Ghana (1995) Ghana-Vision 2020. ’Presidential Report to Parliament on Co-ordinated Programme of Economic and SocialDevelopment Policies. Government of Ghana,Accra.

Grieco, M., Turner, J., and Kwakye, E.A. (1995) Atale of two cultures: ethnicity and cyclingbehaviour in urban Ghana.’ Transport ResearchRecord 1441, Washington, DC.

Grieco, M., Apt, N., Dankwa, Y., and Turner, J.(1996) At Christmas and on rainy days: transport,travel and the female traders of Accra.’ Avebury,Aldershot.

Kwakye, E.A. and Fouracre, P.R. (1996) Thecontribution of institutional development in theimplementation of Ghana’s Urban TransportProject.’ Paper presented at CODATU VIIConference on the Development and Planning ofUrban Transport in Developing Counties, NewDelhi. CODATU Association, Paris.

Ofosu-Dorte D. (1994) Transportation SectorEnergy Audit, Phase III.’ Report for the Ministryof Energy and Mines, Accra.

TDP Consult (1992a) Assessing the transport andmobility needs of the urban poor.’ Report to theMinistry of Transport and Communications,Accra.

TDP Consult (1992b) Urban transport project -addendum to urban poor mobility needs study.’Report tothe Ministry of Transport and Commu-nications, Accra.

Turner, J., Grieco, M., and Kwakye, E.A. (1996)Subverting sustainability? Infrastructural andcultural barriers to cycle use in Accra.’ WorldTransport Policy and Practice, Vol.2, No.3, pp18-23 .

World Bank (1991) Urban Policy and EconomicDevelopment: An Agenda for the 1990’s.’Washington, DC.

World Bank (1993) Ghana 2000 and beyond.Setting the stage for Accelerated Growth andPoverty Reduction.’ Washington, DC.

World Bank (1996) Sustainable transport: prioritiesfor policy reform. ’ Series: Development inpractice. Washington, DC.

Niklas Sieber: ‘AppropriateTransport and Rural Development:Economics of an Integrated RuralTransport Project in Tanzania.’


Figure 1 Transport activities in Makete District 1986/87

Appropriate Transport and Rural Development:Economi c Effects of an Integrated Rural Transport Pro ject in Tanzania1

Niklas SieberInstitute of Economic Policy Research, Karlsruhe

[ 1 5 ]

Abs t r a ct

Poor Transport Conditions are a substantialconstraint for the increase of agriculturalproduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. Conven-tional rural transport projects, which focusexclusively on motorised transport can onlypartly remove these restrictions. Therefore anIntegrated Transport Approach is proposed,which takes into account as well the non-motorised transport. A field study in Tan-zania demonstrates that these interventionshave at least the same magnitude of effects asrural road improvements. A system dynamicsmodel shows that a succession of roadimprovements and non-motorised interven-tions constitutes an optimum scenario, whichcan be entirely financed by road pricing. Thisnew approach towards rural transportnecessitates an extension of the conventionalappraisal methodologies.

Int r oduct i on

Poor transport conditions are regarded as oneof the main constraints for rural developmentin Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, since1946 the World Bank spent more than US$62 billion world-wide in over 1,000 transportprojects. Transport investments, comprising13-16% of the Bank’s total expenditure, wereexclusively used for the improvement ofmotorised transportation.

The focus of donors on ‘roads and cars’ basbeen criticised since the 1980s, because thetransport needs of rural households, com-

prising two thirds of the population wereneglected. In his famous World Bank Paper“Rural Poverty Unperceived” Robert CHAM -BERS (1980) linked rural indigence firmly tolack of mobility. Four years later anotherWorld Bank Paper by EDMONDS and RELF

conclude that ‘plans, projects and existingpolicies in the transport sector do nothing orlittle for the rural poor’. This group of‘transport disenfranchised’ can be conserva-tively estimated at world-wide to be in theorder of 700 million people. One of the mainreasons is the low rate of motorisation, whichis 8 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants in Sub-Saharan Africa2. A number of recent studies3

show that the rural population of manyDeveloping Countries moves mainly bywalking on paths and trails away from therural road network and undertakes very fewmotorised trips. The majority of time andeffort is spent for transport purposes whichsecure the household’s subsistence needs.Here the Makete District in Tanzania mayserve as an example4. A household with fivepersons undertakes more than 1,600 tripsannually, which require more than 2,500hours (Fig 1). The procurement of energyand water, which is available inindustrialsed countries instantly requiresannually more than one thousand hours.During one year an average householdtransports 85 tkm. Two thirds of transporttime is spent in and around the village . Thebiggest share of the transport burden iscarried by women.

The effort, drudgery and the high timerequirements for transport purposes sig-nificantly hamper the growth of per annumagricultural production: In labour intensiveeconomies this allocation of time is a drainon a households labour resources. Timeconstraints may have severe negative impactson the productivity, especially during peakworking periods, e.g. in the harvestingseason. In Makete more time is spent ontransport activities than on labour in thefields. JENNIN GS (1992, p. 29) reports thatmany women in the Makete District “indi-cated that they had additional shambas(fields) which they could cultivate if theyhad additional time”. According to theInternational Food Policy Research Institute(MELLOR, 1985) the lack of labour is the main



reason for the low agricultural production:“Africa’s poor record on food production islargely due to labour constraints .. . Theseserve to reduce labour input into agriculture,slowing the expansion of area cultivated aswell as the yields per acre.”

Therefore, one of the main goals of ruraltransport projects should be to reduce thehousehold’s time requirements for transportpurposes. The question arises whether thetime savings will be used for productionincreasing activities. The farm householdscan use 16 hours of their daily time budget5

for labour on the fields, for leisure and fordomestic tasks like water and firewoodcollection. The amount of time used forhousehold tasks determines how much timeis left for leisure and labour. In the initialsituation household tasks restrict the maxi-mum available for leisure and labour to timeLmaxR. The production frontier PR indicateshow much output can be produced withdifferent inputs of labour time within thegiven time restriction LmaxR. The decisionhow much time is used for crop productionand how much leisure time remains can bevisualised by a set of indifference curves I 1, I 2

... In, each of them symbolising a differentlevel of utility of a given utility function. Thefarmers will choose the indifference curve IR

in order to find the optimal production OR,which necessitates a labour input of LmaxR - LR

and leaves leisure of LR.

A different situation occurs after transportinterventions have reduced the time re-quirements for household tasks: the maxi-mum labour time moves from LmaxR to LmaxA,the production frontier shifts from PR to PT, a

the needs and economic means of the ruralpopulation:

• Promotion of affordable IntermediateMeans of Transport (IMT).

• Implementation of a network of paths,trails and tracks, which can be used by theIMT and complement the existing roadnetwork.

• Labour based and low cost constructionand maintenance of the infrastructure.

• Transport avoiding measures to reducetrip length to public services and tosources of energy and water.

Economic Effects o f the MaketeIntegrated Rural Transport Pro ject

The understanding that “Roads Are NotEnough”6 was the reason why the Interna-tional Labour Office conducted an IntegratedRural Transport Project in Makete District,Tanzania. The district is located in the southwest of Tanzania and stretches over a moun-tainous plateau containing mountains, hills,ridges, valleys and steep escarpments. Thepopulation lives mainly in scattered settle-ments and the average density amounts to 18persons/km2. The economy basically relieson subsistence agriculture. Theagroecological conditions are favourable forthe rainfed cultivation of crops from tropicaland moderate climates. The latter are tradedwith the hot lowlands. The salient feature ofthe regional development in the MaketeDistrict is the shift from subsistence economytowards market orientation. In 1994 still lessthan half of the products harvested aremarketed which generated annual revenuesof US$80 per household.

[ 1 6 ]

new indifferencecurve IT is chosenresulting in anoutput of O T. Thegraph shows thatthe saved time willbe partly used forleisure, but theremaining time isused to increaseagricultural output.Thus a reduction ofthe household’stransport time willentail a productionincrease.

Therefore thetransport planningmust be adapted to

Figure 2: Effects of reduced time requirements for transport

Figure 3 Time savings per household

The project had the aim to reduce the trans-port burden of rural households. Low-costroads and tracks were constructed andimproved with unpaid Self-Help-Labour,Intermediate Means of Transport (IMT) weredeveloped and promoted and a number of



systems followed by the promotion ofbicycles and donkeys. While mainly womenbenefit from the first intervention, the bicyclereduces the time consumption pre-dominantly for men. Women profit morefrom grinding mills and donkeys. But alsothe feeder road causes a significant reductionof the female time used for crop marketing.

Figure 4 lists the total monetary benefits7,which are made up of the monetarised timevalues, the increase in marketing, the salariesearned by the project implementation andother sources of income like hiring of vehi-cles, lending of donkeys etc. The biggestmonetary benefits are caused by DONKEYSwhich are followed by BICYCLES. Thesurvey found that both have very strongimpacts on market production: They enablefarmers to cultivate bigger fields and usemore fertiliser. Donkey-households markettwice as much, and bicycle-households twofifths more than comparable non-IMT-households. The purchase of IMT changesthe productivity of the household from

tion of WATER SUPPLY systems have asignificant impact on the time budget of ruralhouseholds. The relatively high costs forpiped water entails a benefit/cost ratio lowerthan one (Figure 5). If low cost wells insteadof expensive pipes are chosen the ratioincreases up to 3. The non-monetary benefitsfrom the improved water supply due toenhanced health cannot be assessed.

The benefits of the FEEDER ROAD consist oftime savings (46%), marketing increases(27%), income by hired vehicles (21%) andincome by project employment (6%)8. Thebenefits from road improvements are distrib-uted unequally among the survey villages.Two survey villages with the best road accesscould not take advantage of the improvedmarketing possibilities: In the first villagewhich was a traditional source for migrantlabour, the rural exodus increased and theagricultural production stagnated. Thesecond village could not compensate for thebreakdown of the regional pyrethrum market,while a neighbouring village performed

[ 1 7 ]

transport avoiding measures introduced.Before the project started and at its termina-tion a survey of the transport and productionactivities of rural households was conducted.The data base allows a detailed analysis ofthe impacts of the various transport inter-ventions on the household level.

One of the salient effects are time savings,which are an indicator for the reduction ofthe transport burden. Figure 3 shows thechanges of the time budget of an averagehousehold benefiting from the transportimprovement. The biggest effects can beachieved by the installation of water supply

decreasing to increasing returns of scale.Donkeys are mainly used for the transport ofproducts from the field, while bicyclestransport fertiliser and grain to the grindingmills and generate more trips outside thevillage than in non-bicycle-households. Thelatter reduces the isolation of the household.The main restriction for the purchase of IMTare the relatively high procurement costs. 80-90% of the households desiring an IMTstated that they could not afford the price,which amounts to the annual marketingrevenues.

Traffic avoiding measures like the installa-

Figure 4 Average monetary benefits per household



surprisingly well, even though its road accessstrongly deteriorated. The latter villageprofited from its traditional trading links andtransported the whole market production byheadload down a steep escarpment. Thestrongest impacts of the road investmentwere registered in a village, which is too faraway from the market to undertake dailyreturn trips and where heavy, low valueproducts are cultivated. Here transport byheadload would be too time consuming andtiring.

Agroecological frame conditions, traditionaltrading links and walking access to themarkets seem to be as important for marketintegration as road access. Many inhabitantsof villages within walking distance to themarket prefer to carry a big portion of theirgoods by headload to the market in order toprofit from price arbitrage. This is even thecase when good road access exists. Thefeeder road shows the second best benefit/cost ratio (Figure 5). The main reasons arethe low costs of the road rehabilitation withhigh labour, and low machinery input. I f thecosts of commercial capital based roadconstruction projects in Tanzania would beapplied the benefit/cost ratio of the feederroad would decrease to two!

importance leading down a steep escarpmentto a regional market. Especially during therainy season when paths become slipperylike soft soap, travelling is a dangerousundertaking and more often than not thesepaths are avoided. Obstacles like rivers,marshes and invading vegetation force thetravellers to walk big detours. The projecttrained gang leaders and foremen to conductsimple improvements on the path such asbuilding wooden bridges and staircases,digging small ditches for drainage, con-structing timber guard barriers and windingthe path on steep slopes. The local popula-tion gave very positive feedback regardingthe impacts of the improvements: Travel ismuch faster and safer, bigger loads can becarried and one third of the households isable to reach new places. The latter statementmust not be underestimated because pathimprovement is an appropriate measure toreduce rural isolation. Agricultural produc-tion in the catchment area increased morestrongly than in comparable villages. Thenumber of pedestrians using the path toreach a regional market is higher than that ofpassengers using the feeder road mentionedabove. A considerable amount of traffic wasgenerated by footpath improvement. Theabsolute benefits from the improvement arenevertheless quite small, because the catch-ment area has a “traditional” low marketorientation. But the low construction costsattribute the high benefit-cost-ratio to foot-path improvement.

A local trail connecting a village with theward centre was widened to a MOTORABLETRACK. While the village representativesemphasised the large benefits due to in-creased health care and the appearance oftraders in the village, the monetary benefitsand the benefit/cost ratio are relatively low.The construction of tracks could possibly beeconomically warranted if they would beused by bicycle-trailers or animal drawn-carts.

C oncl u s i ons

The improvement of footpaths can be a veryefficient and cheap measure to stimulate themarketing of primarily subsistence orientedvillages within walking distance to regionalmarkets. If the distance to the market islonger than a half day walk then motorisedaccess is a necessary precondition for re-gional market integration, but it does notautomatically stimulate the development

[ 1 8 ]

The feeder road performs better than theGRINDING MILLS, which benefit mostlyfrom time savings. The high costs entail abenefit/cost ratio below one. The fact thathouseholds use their scarce monetaryresources to pay the fees for grinding showsthat benefits other than transport timesavings must be taken into account. Thealternative of grinding by hand seems to beso arduous, that the service is valued morehighly than the benefits from the savedtransport time.

The cheapest transport intervention was theimprovement of a FOOTPATH with regional

Figure 5 Benefit / cost ratio



process. The increasing marketing entails thegrowth of production and market relatedtransport tasks: in this phase the purchase ofIntermediate Means of Transport can induceanother sharp increase of agricultural pro-duction. The strong effects and the highbenefit/cost ratio warrant the promotion ofIMT. Traffic avoiding measures can only beeconomically justified if they are low costinterventions. Other non-transport effects,like health improvements, are probablybigger than transport related benefits. Com-paring the absolute effects and the costefficiency it can be safely stated that non-motorised transport interventions have thesame magnitude of impacts as interventionsin the motorised sector.

Transport Intervent ions and theDynamics o f Rural Development

A rural development process entails incre-asing time requirements for production andmarketing related transport activities. Thelimited time budget sets restrictions for thefurther increase of productive activities. Onthe other hand rising cash incomes give anopportunity to use more non-labour inputslike seeds and fertiliser, which entail afurther growth in production. I t is difficult tojudge the effects of the various interrelations,feedbacks and restrictions. Therefore aneconometric model was designed in order toanalyse these interrelations by using a systemdynamics approach. The software used wasdeveloped by the Michigan Institute ofTechnology and it’s most popular applica-tions were the world development scenariospublished by the Club of Rome.

The model describes the nexus of productionand transport as it was observed in Makete.

The main system features are given in Figure6. Agricultural production, which is thesalient variable of the system, is determinedby the following inputs: labour, cultivatedarea and amount of fertiliser used. Thebiggest share of production is consumed bythe farming household and only a smallshare is traded on markets. Marketingrevenues reduced by input costs determinethe agricultural income of the region. Themain negative feedback loop is caused bytransport activities, which are determined bythe transports necessary for subsistence, cropproduction and crop marketing. A risingtransport burden reduces the disposable timeelement of the time budget. If more time isused for transport activities, less time can bespent for labour in the fields. This feedbackloop establishes an equilibrium between thetime needs for labour and transport. Thenumber of working hours rises as long asenough time is disposable. Increasing labourmakes the cultivation of more plots possibleand leads to a bigger acreage. A positivefeedback loop exists between the amount offertiliser applied and income. Transportinterventions influence the transport patternsof the household and modify the timebudget, which leads to a changing produc-tion. Some of the interventions have directimpacts on the household income situation.

The following assumptions are constituentfor the model:

• External demand for agricultural produceis unlimited and local production does notchange producer prices, which givesufficient incentives to stimulate produc-tion.

• A free transport market exists assuring theevacuation of all crops offered by thefarmers.

• The sectoral division of labour does notchange during the observed period.

• The time saved by transport interventionswill be entirely used for direct productiveor production-related transport activities.

The model simulates the process of a grow-ing market integration of a predominantlysubsistence oriented region over a period of20 years. The initial situation assumes thecomplete isolation of the idealised region(Figure 7), where 20,000 people dwell. Fivescenarios are set up to assess the differentimpacts of transport interventions.

Initially the model region is completely

[ 1 9 ]

Figure 6 Main features of the model



isolated and agricultural production is usedto satisfy subsistence needs. The regionaleconomy stagnates because low internaldemand is not able to generate significantgrowth. This process is induced by theconstruction of a FOOTPATH from Village Bto Market C in Figure 7. Because the marketis within walking distance some villagesbegin to increase their production and sellcrops outside the region. Disposable incomeincreases annually by an average of 3.8%.Low construction and maintenance costsmake it possible to obtain an internal rate ofreturn of 114%. The rate seems to be quiteelevated, but the initial situation with anassumed complete isolation of the region hasto be taken into account9. It can neverthelessbe stated that production is very soonrestricted by the limited time requirementsfor long walking trips to the external marketand the lack of fertiliser, which is not avail-able without motorised access.

Thus the construction of a footpath seems tobe an efficient transport intervention, if theregion has no motorised access, markets arewithin walking distance, funds available forroad construction are not sufficient, or a riskaverse investment strategy is preferred.

The construction of a FEEDER ROAD be-tween the regional centre A and market C(Figure 7) reduces time requirements for theevacuation of crops and makes fertiliseravailable, both of which cause a strongerincrease in production and in income than inthe previous scenario. The increasingnumber of trips to the fields and to collectionpoints reduces the disposable time budget

and sets limits on production. Disposableincome increases by 5.2% annually. If a lowcost road is built the internal rate of returnamounts to 56%. Good initial conditions andthe low construction costs favour a high rateof return. The construction of a feeder road isthe basis for all the following scenarios andthe effects always have to be regarded inrelation to this scenario.

The third scenario tries to reduce the timeconstraints by supplying every village withmotorised access. Construction of a networkof MOTORABLE TRACKS combined withthe above described feeder road causes areduction in the transport time to marketsand gives rise to another increase in produc-tion. Disposable income increases slightlyfaster than in the previous scenario, but dueto the high investment and maintenancecosts the rate of return reaches only 37%. Ofcourse the roads would have other non-transport impacts, which cannot bemonetarised here: reduced drudgery formarket trips, access for ambulances andmobile health services.

In the fourth scenario the effects of TRANS-PORT AVOIDING MEASURES in combina-tion with a feeder road are simulated: Allvillages receive wells, water pumps and lowconsumption stoves 10, which reduce the timebudget for subsistence transport. Productionreaches the same level as in the previouslocal-track-scenario, but the lower Vehicleoperating costs cause a slightly higherdisposable income. High investment costsreduce the rate of return to 32%, which isbelow the previous scenario.

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Figure 7 Main features of the scenarios



The biggest effects after the construction of afeeder road can be achieved by the pro-motion of DONKEYS AND BICYCLES. Themain reason why farmers are nowadays notpurchasing the IMT is their high price:Without any access to credit only 15% of thehouseholds would be able to purchase anIMT. The scenario simulates the effects of arevolving fund for small scale credit. A credit

financial situation in many Sub-SaharanAfrican countries there is little hope that newrural roads can be financed by recurrentbudgets. A step towards a sustainable systemcould be taken if village governments, wardsor districts would be permitted to levy usercharges under the following conditions:

• charges should be simple and inexpensiveto collect,

• users pay only according to their utilisa-tion,

• revenues should be earmarked for trans-port purposes, and

• a locally elected committee or institutionshould control the proper use of therevenues.

Revenues from road user charges are paid ina road fund, which has the task to financemaintenance costs and repay the debt forroad construction (real interest rate 8%)within 20 years. The necessary user chargesare listed in column 4 of Table 1. It has to beassumed that traders pass on the user chargesto the farmers by reducing the producerprices of agricultural products and thusdecreasing disposable income (column 5).Complete cost coverage of a feeder roadwould imply road user charges of $ 4 per tonand a reduction of disposable income by 4%.In the case of the construction of motorisedtrack access to all villages, user charges ofUS$9/ton would have to be levied. Thiswould reduce the disposable income ofhouseholds by 10%. Income would reach thesame level as achieved in the feeder roadscenario. The question arises whether thepeople are willing to pay this price forreduced market transport and the non-monetary effects of the tracks. If only main-tenance should be financed by the fund, thenjust 35% of the given charges would benecessary.

An integrated transport approach favours acombination of the above mentioned trans-port interventions as proposed in Figure 8.The measures are financed with a RegionalTransport Fund which is a combination ofthe Credit Fund for IMT and the Road Fund.The fund is financed by an internationalcredit with 8% interest rate. In the initialphases, when the region is not accessible bymotor vehicles a local footpath to an externalmarket is improved and credit is distributedfor the purchase of IMT. If the farmersrespond after a period of three years by

coverage of 75% would give altogether 62%of the households access to IMT at the end ofthe simulation period. The IMT have twogeneral effects: They reduce the transporttime and they increase the productivity fromdecreasing to increasing returns to scale.These effects induce a strong growth inproduction. Disposable income increasesannually by 6.7% and exceeds the growthrates of all previous scenarios. The rate ofreturn can be estimated at 58%. The modelshows, that the purchase of an IMT, evenwith a high real interest rate of 12%, couldbe very profitable for the farmers.

The main problems of these types of fundsare high overhead costs and low repaymentmorale. I f it is assumed that only 80% of thecredit is paid back and no credit distributedto replace old IMT, the fund would reachpositive values after 12 years. The GrameenBank in Bangladesh demonstrates how thedistribution of credit can be more efficientlyorganised. It seems to be sensible to designthe credit system primarily for women inorder to reduce the female transport burden.The West African savings clubs “Tontine”could be an appropriate institution.

How can Road Investments andMaintenance Be Financed?

In consideration of the desperate public

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Table 1 Salient results of the scenarios



increasing their market production, a feederroad to the regional centre is constructed.After six years of simulation the total debtreaches its maximum at 9.3 $ per inhabitant.A road user charge comprising 8% of theproducer price is levied on the exportedproducts. The growing market productionenables the road users to repay the debt untilyear nine. Now the market productionexceeds three tons and transport constraintshamper its further growth. After another twoyears enough user charges are collected tofinance the construction of motorable tracksto every village. This investment entailsanother production expansion and the fundfills up faster in order to finance transportavoiding measures in year 16. After 20 yearsthe annual market production exceeds 4.2tonnes and disposable income reaches $ 290,which implies an annual increase of 7.1%.The income seems to be still very low, but ithas to be compared to the reality in Makete,where in 1994 the revenues amounted to lessthan $ 80.

o logies o f Transport Pro jects

The new bias towards rural transport ne-cessitates a widening of the approaches forthe ex-ante-assessment of transport inter-ventions. HOWE (1994, p.35) judges “thecurrent state-of-the-art for surveying andforecasting local level rural traffic demands”as “extremely crude”. The concern of manystudies rarely goes beyond the routineprediction of motorised traffic and growthgeneration. While the b iggest benefits inconventional assessments are usually gener-ated by the reduction of vehicle operatingcosts, the Makete Survey demonstrated thatthese benefits are relatively small comparedto the other effects.

Therefore an appraisal of the different typesof rural transport interventions should bebased on a road and a household survey(Figure 9). The planning methodologychanges from a top down view, where theregion is regarded as one entity, to a bottom-up approach, where the household is thebasis for the conception of transport in-terventions.

The road survey observes the existingmotorised transport on main roads. Thebenefits can be derived if reduced vehicleoperating costs are multiplied byexpectedtraffic. Countries experiencing a severeshortage of foreign exchange may not be ableto expand the size and usage of their vehiclefleet and therefore no extra traffic willappear. Therefore expected vehicle supplyhas to be taken into account if future trans-port volumes are estimated.

The household survey contains an assess-ment of household size and composition andan estimation of future population growth,migration and change in employment. Thehousehold survey gives indication of actualmarket production per household. Theproject may have direct impacts on marketproduction (e.g. by dissemination of IMT) orreduced vehicle operating costs which giverise to future production increases (ProducerSurplus Theory, CARNEMARK 1976). Thehousehold survey reveals also the actualtransport patterns of rural households. Thetime savings per household can be achievedby reducing the number of trips and decreas-ing trip length. The changes in the house-hold’s transport patterns can be derived fromthe experience of other projects. Because IMThouseholds have different transport patterns,the number of households possessing IMTshould be estimated. Direct income effects

The model shows as well, that with increas-ing production the investments have smallerproductive effects due to decreasing returnsto scale with the given technology. At theend of the simulation period new agrariantechnologies, like the use of ploughs withanimal traction, high yielding varieties orirrigation schemes might entail a change ofthe production function. A further produc-tion increase necessitates a change of thetransport technology again: the evacuation ofcrops can be only managed with animaldrawn carts or small motor vehicles.

A New Approach to Appraisal Method-

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Figure 8 Succesion of various transport interventions



[ 2 3 ]

can be assessed by wages paid during theconstruction phase.

European cost/benefit calculations for roadinvestments include a monetary value fortime savings and reduced accidents. Timesavings can be valued with the opportunitycosts of time. In the case of Makete themarginal productivity of labour was chosenas the basis for the valuation.

The empirical evidence from many studiesabout the impacts of road improvements12

shows that the estimation of production andmarketing changes is related to stronguncertainties. The low reliability of thepredictions favours risk averse investmentstrategies:

• Choice of the cheapest investment op-portunity related to the local needs: In aninitial development phase the improve-ment of footpaths or construction ofmotorable tracks might be more appro-priate than a wide feeder road.

• Spatial distribution of investments: Buildas cheaply and extensively as possible orundertake spot improvements on existingroads and wait for a response from pro-ducers. If bottlenecks occur, then furtherinvestments can be warranted in theresponding regions.

• Choice of labour intensive constructionmethodologies in order to distribute thedirect income effects more equally amongthe local population.

• Leave the risk assessment to the produc-

ers: A small scale credit system delegatesthe decision about the productive effectsto the farmers. Probably the individualappraisal of the farmers is more reliablethan the global assessment of a highlyeducated planner.

An eurocentric transport planning approach,which focuses exclusively on motorisedtransport, does not reflect the productionconstraints of African rural households. Theimprovement of the local transport system inand around the village can set forces freewhich stimulate economic development.Reduced effort and drudgery in transport,decreasing time constraints and better accessto public facilities and markets will mostprobably entail an expansion of agriculturalproduction. Intermediate Means of Transportcan increase agricultural productivity, reducerural isolation and thus raise the acceptanceof agricultural innovations. Transportimprovement for rural households is animportant precondition for a dynamic ruraldevelopment process.

Figure 9 Assessment procedure for rural transport interventions



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R e fe r e n ce s

ADLER , HANS A: (1987 ): Economic Appraisal ofTransport Projects, A Manual with Case Studies ,The World Bank, Baltimore and London.

AIREY, Tony (1992): “Transport as a Factor andConstraint in Agricultural Production”, LocalLevel Transport in Sub Saharan Africa, RuralTravel and Transport Project, The World Bank,ILO, Ardington, Oxon.

BARTH Ursula and Claus HEIDEMANN (1987): RuralTransport in Deve loping Countries , - A synopsisof f indings and a framework for studies ,Karlsruhe.

BARWELL , I., EDMONDS, G.A., HOWE , J.D.G.F. and J.DE VEEN (1985): Rural Transport in DevelopingCountries, ILO, London.

BARWELL , Ian (1993): “Final Synthesis of Findingsand Conclusions from Village Travel andTransport Surveys and Related Case Studies”,Local Level Rural Transport in Sub-SaharanAfrica , The World Bank, ILO, Ardington, Geneva.

BARWELL , Ian and Christina MALMBERG CALVO(1989): The T ransport Demand of Rural House-holds : Findings from a Village Travel Survey ,ILO Geneva.

BARWELL , Ian und Jonathan DAWSON (1993):Roads are not Enough, Intermediate TechnologyPublications, London.

CARNEMARK, Curt, BIDERMANN, Jaime and DavidBOVET (1976): “The Economic Analysis of RuralRoad Projects”, World Bank Staff Working PaperNo.241 , Washington.

CHAMBERS, Robert (1980): “Rural PovertyUnperceived: Problems and Remedies”, WorldBank Staff Paper No. 400 , Washington D.C.

EDMONDS, G.A. und J.J. van de Veen (1993):Technology Choice for th e Construction andMaintenance of Roads in Deve loping Countries,ILO, Geneva.

HARRAL, Cell G. (1988): Road Deterioration inDeveloping Countries, Causes and Remed ies, AWorld Bank Policy Study, Washington D.C.

HEGGIE, Ian (1994): “Management and Financing ofRoads; An Agenda for Reform”, Technical PaperNo. 275, Africa Technical Department Series ,The World Bank, Washington D.C.

HERTEL , Sven (1991): Labour-Intensive PublicWorks in Sub-Saharan Africa, ILO, Geneva.

HINE, John L. (1993): “Transport and MarketingPriorities to Improve Food Security in Ghana andthe Rest of Africa”, in: THIMM, Heinz-Ulrich undHerwig HAHN (Ed): Regional Food Security andRural Infrastructure , International Symposium inGießen/Rauischolzhausen May 3-6, p. 251-266.

HOWE, John und Peter RICHARDS (1984): “TheImpact of Rural Roads on Poverty Alleviation: AReview of the Literature”, in: Rural Roads andPoverty Alleviation, ILO, Intermediate Technol-ogy Publications, p. 48-81, London.

JENNINGS, Mary (1992): Study of the constraints onWomen’s Use of Transport in the Makete Dis trict,Tanzania, ILO Geneva.

KAIRA, Charles K. (1993): “Der Transportbedarf derländlichen Bevölkerung” in Entwicklungs-ländern, Ansätze zu einer Verbesserung d erVerkehrsplanung, Schriftenreihe des Instituts fürRegionalwissenschaft Heft Nr. 21, Karlsruhe.

MELLOR, John (1985): The Changing World FoodSituation, Washington.

RIVERSON, John and S. CARAPETIS (1991): “Poten-tial of Intermediate Means of Transport inImproving Rural Travel and Transport in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Transport Research Record ,May 1991

RIVERSON, John, GAVIRA, Juan und SydneyTHRISCUTT (1991): Rural Roads in Sub-SaharanAfrica, Lessons from World Bank Experience.

STRANDBERG , Tom (1993): “Makete IntegratedRural Transport Project”, in: AppropriateTechnology, No.1 June, p.6 -8

WILSON, George W. (1973): “Towards a Theory ofTransportation and Development”, in: HOYLE,B.S. , Transport and Development, London.

Foot n ote s1 This article relies on the PhD-Thesis: S IEBER,Niklas (1996 ): The Contribution of TransportInvestments to Regional Development in the RuralAreas of Sub-Saharan Africa, Karlsruhe.2 UNCTADA II, The Republic of South Africa isexcluded.3 AIREY (1992), BARTH/HEIDEMANN (1987), BARWELL(1993), BARWELL/EDMONDS/HOWE/DE VEEN (1985),BARWELL/DAWSON (1993), HOWE/RICHARDS (1984),KAIRA (1993), RIVERSON/CARAPETIS (1991).4 BARWELL / MALMBERG (1989)5 The remaining eight hours are spent sleeping.6 Title of the book by BARWELL and DAWSON (1993)7 The benefits from reduced Vehicle OperatingCosts are not listed here, because it is assumedthey are included in the benefits by increasedmarket production. Compare: ADLER (1987, p.34)8 The direct income effects are high, because alabour based construction technology was chosen.Compared to capital based technology the labour

based approach increases the share of wages ontotal expenditure, reduces the financial costs andthe need for foreign exchange. (RIVERSON et al 1991,HERTEL 1991, ILO)9 Probably the model overestimated the produc-tion increase for the footpath scenario, because nofunctional relation between distance to the marketand market production could be implemented. Thelong walking distance would probably set strongerrestrictions than in the other scenarios.10 It is assumed that wells have the same effects asthe water pipes observed in Makete. Low con-sumption stoves reduce the consumption offirewood by 40 %.11 Regular Maintenance expenditure is excluded.The necessary money to fill up the credit fund forIMT is added to the total investments.12 A comprehensive overview of various transportstudies is given in HOWE/RICHARDS (1984) and inWILSON (1973)

1 Intr oduct i on

Bangkok is a city in transportation crisis, andthe impacts of its traffic problem aregradually impinging upon all aspects of life— environmental quality, human health andpsychology, economic productivity, energyuse, and human mobility and quality of life.Solutions exist to Bangkok’s transportationproblem, and they have been mapped out ina growing body of consulting studies andacademic papers over the past 20 years. Atpresent, the Thai government is embarkingon a crash course of expressway and mass-transit projects which — although they haveencountered numerous delays — will beginto yield results during the second half of the1990s. Although these “megaprojects” mayprovide some relief for the traffic crisis, it isdoubtful that they will significantly improvehuman transport, environment, and healthconditions in the city.

The notable aspect of the transportationplans and studies that have been conductedto date in Bangkok is that they have all beenconceived and written from an economic/engineering perspective. These studies,which have been conducted by Western andJapanese consulting firms, have focused onthe technical issues of how to manage traffic.Although a passing nod has been given to theneed for institutional reform in order toimplement policies, this aspect of theproblem has been almost completelyoverlooked. The basic barrier, as many havepointed out, is the ability to develop apolitical consensus that will permit theimplementation of a coordinated set ofpolicies to deal with the problems. Yet howmight Thai policymakers move toward thedevelopment of such a consensus? And isthere a role for outside analysts andresearchers in providing Thai policymakerswith information that could assist in thepolicymaking process?

Social science research could provide newinsights into Bangkok’s traffic crisis byasking a different set of questions than thosetypically posed by both Thai and foreigntransportation experts. For example, insteadof asking “Which are the four best policies torelieve congestion?” or “What combinations

of roads and transit will satisfy futuretransport demand?”, we might ask “Whatinstitutional factors have slowed or limitedimplementation of the recommendedtransport schemes?” or “What set of actionsdo Thai bureaucrats and politicians thinkwill most effectively deal with the currentproblem?”

This paper summarizes the current status ofthe transportation situation in Bangkok andproposes a research agenda that could furtherunderstanding of the barriers toimplementation of an integrated transportplan. The proposed research would assistpolicymakers as they grapple with theessentially political problems of retrofittingtransportation solutions into a severelycongested megacity. The first section of ourpaper deals with the current status ofBangkok’s transportation system, drawing ona number of recent studies that havedocumented the problems and offeredmyriad sets of policies to deal with theproblems. We then summarize severalstudies that have been undertaken tocompare transportation policies in Bangkokwith policies being implemented in otherAsian cities, in order to place itstransportation problems in a regionalcontext. A subsequent sect ion describes thestatus of the three megaprojects beingundertaken to alleviate the city’s trafficcongestion. We conclude by discussing therole that social science research could playby identifying critical attitudinal andinstitutional issues that must be addressed inorder for Thai political leaders to dealeffectively with the transportation crisis.

2 Bangkok’s Trans portat ion Cris is

2.1 Population

Bangkok is typical of other “megacities” inAsia (e.g., Jakarta, Manila, Delhi) that areunable to expand their infrastructures tokeep up with the pressures of rapidpopulation growth. More than half of theworld’s urban population increase isoccurring in Asia (Pendakur 1993). Thepopulation of the Bangkok Metropolitanregion is currently increasing at a rate of 2%annually and has more than doubled — to

Peter du Pont and Kristina Egan1

Solving Bangkok’s Transport Woes:The Need to Ask the Right Questions

Peter du Pont & Kristina Egan: ‘Solv-ing Bangkok's Transport Woes: TheNeed to Ask the Right Questions’World Transport Policy & Practice3/1 [1997] 25 - 37

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nearly 6 million — in the last 25 years. Thereis no other similar urban magnet in Thailand— the next largest metropolitan centre,Nakhon Ratchasima (Khorat), has apopulation of less than 300,000.2

2.2 Vehicle Ownership

Bangkok’s transportation problems alsoreflect the systemic problem inherent in thetraditional pattern of development. Asincomes rise, people purchase their ownprivate vehicles, and the existing roadinfrastructure is unable to handle theresulting traffic load. In Asia, car ownershipis increasing at a rate of 6-20% each year,while motorcycle sales are increasing by 10-30% annually (Pendakur, 1993).

Bangkok has 15% of Thailand’s populationand more than three quarters of the privatelyregistered automobiles (see table 1). Givencurrent motorization trends, the problem isdestined to get worse before it improves —new vehicles are being added to the

A major factor contributing to the increasedusage of private cars is that Bangkok’s mass-transit system is inadequate. Although 65%of Bangkok travellers use buses, private carsrule the roads, and buses use just 10% of theroad space on average. Although Bangkokhas more than 100 km of bus lanes, there hasbeen no successful effort to establish barrier-separated bus lanes (also called “busways”)— a strategy that has successfully reducedcongestion in many other c ities (Guruswamy1994). The three megaprojects underconstruction will add rail-based mass-transitsystems into the city — two elevated railsystems and a subway — but these will notbe completed for several years.

There is some discrepancy over projectionsfor growth in the amount of vehicle activityin Bangkok. Three major studies have madeprojections for the period 1989 to 2006.Estimates of the number of motorized tripsper day in 1989 range from 12.7 million to25.5 million (JICA, 1990; Halcrow, Fox et al.,1991; and TDRI, 1990). Projections for 2006range from a low of 21.5 million to a high of43 million daily trips. The reports by JICA,and Halcrow & Fox et al. agree that thepercentage of trips taken on buses willremain constant at about 39%.

2.3 Transportation Infrastructure

Most analysts contend that a major limitationin Bangkok’s ability to handle a large andincreasing number of private motor vehiclesis the low proportion of road area. Roadscover just 8% of Bangkok’s land area,compared to 20-25% in cities like London,Paris, and New York. However, Poboon(1994) disputes the importance of increasedroad provision.4 Bangkok’s existing roads arenot adequately configured to handle existingtraffic flows, and there are a lack ofsecondary roads connecting the majorarteries. This causes an estimated increase ofup to 30% in the number of vehiclekilometres traveled and exacerbatescongestion on the major arteries. (Sayeg etal. , 1992).

2.4 Current Traffic Situation

Traffic has become intolerably slow in thecentral business district of Bangkok. It isdifficult to schedule more than 2 meetingsper day, and it often takes 1-2 hours to getjust part way across town. It has beenestimated that the average Bangkok residentspends the equivalent of 44 working days intraffic each year, and that the lostproductivity — US$9.6 billion — is


roadways at a rate of more than 800 per day,or 300,000 each year3 (Sayeg et al, 1992).

Table 1 shows the breakdown of motorvehicles by type for Bangkok and for theentire kingdom for 1990. The table shows,among other things, that the overwhelmingmajority of vehicles in Bangkok are privatelyowned. The rapid increase in Bangkok’sautomobile fleet over the past 40 years isshown in table 2. The increase wasparticularly high — nearly four-fold —during the 1980s, and this trend hasaccelerated since the import duty onautomobiles was dramatically reduced in1991.

Table 1 Vehicle Registrations in Thailand, by type.

Type of Vehicle Bangkok Whole CountryMotorcycles 729,000 (36%) 4,778,000 (63%)

Private Cars 598,000 (29%) 777,000 (10%)Private Buses 301,000 (15%) 445,000 (6%)

Pick-up Trucks 269,000 (13%) 926,000 (12%)Trucks 68,000 (3%) 331,000 (4%)

Buses 21,000 (1%) 72,000 (<1%)Other (taxis, tuk-tuks, etc.) 60,000 (3%) 263,000 (3%)

Total 2,046,000 (100%) 7,592,000 (100%)

Source: Thailand Department of Land Transport in Sayeg et al. 1992

Table 2. Increase in Bangkok’s Vehicle FleetYear 1947 1960 1970 1980 1990

No. vehicles 6,000 70,000 275,000 570,000 2,000,000(Source: Poboon et al. 1994)

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equivalent to about 10% of Thailand’s GNP(Sayeg et al., 1992).

Average vehicle speeds during peak hours inthe central business district are 6-10 km perhour. In the areas outlying the centralbusiness district, vehicles move faster,around 18 km/h. At the city’s worstintersection5, it can take up to 45 minutesjust to travel 600 metres (Pendakur 1993).

In addition to the large and increasingnumber of vehicles and the limited roadspace, two factors contribute to Bangkok’straffic problem: lack of governmentcoordination and poor traffic signalmanagement. The Traffic EngineeringDepartment manages traffic signals while theDepartment of Public Works manages thedevelopment of public infrastructure (i.e.roads). Although there are plans to install acomputerized system to manage the trafficsignals, the signals are currently manuallycontrolled by the police.6 The policecontribute to the traffic congestion problemby operating the lights on cycles of up to 10minutes, compared to the normal cycle ofabout 2 minutes in other countries (Sayeg etal. , 1992).

2.5 Impacts of Transportation System

The impacts of Bangkok’s traffic congestioninclude lost economic productivity, humanhealth impacts (some of which arequantifiable) and environmental healthimpacts (most of which are not quantifiable).As mentioned above, a rough estimate of losthuman productivity due to wasted time intraffic is $9.6 billion. However, this figureonly accounts for the value of lost work time,and does not account for increased stress andmental illness as well as a deterioratingquality of life. Table 3 lists some of themajor economic and health impacts.

2.5.1 Environmental and Human Health

Impacts

Pollution levels on Bangkok streets havebeen widely studied and reported in theliterature (Pendakur, 1993; Sayeg et al., 1992;TDRI, 1990). Levels of carbon monoxide andsuspended particulate matter far exceedsafety guidelines set by the World HealthOrganization. One source estimated that 8-hour exposure at street level is equivalent tosmoking 9 cigarettes per day (TDRI 1990).

Until the government offered tax incentivesfor the sale of unleaded gasoline in early1991, airborne lead was a serious problem.Since that policy was implemented, sales ofunleaded gasoline have increaseddramatically and average airborne lead levelsare now below the Thai standard (TEI 1994).Nonetheless, blood lead levels of childrenliving in one densely congested area ofBangkok near the expressway ranged from150-180 Mg/l (microgrammes per litre),significantly higher than the WHO guidelineof 10 Mg/dl (Pendakur 1993). In short, theproblem of lead poisoning exists, but it isexpected to decrease in the future as theamount of leaded gasoline used in Thaiautomobiles declines.

The biggest transport-related health impact isdue to suspended particulate matter (SPM).The World Health Organization guideline for24-hour ambient mean levels is 230 Mg/m3.Readings in Bangkok often exceed 500-600Mg/ m3, and more than 60% of the SPM issmaller than 10 microns in diametre, whichmeans it can easily penetrate into the lowerportions of the lungs and cause greaterdamage. A study of 1,758 traffic policeconcluded that more than 40% suffer fromrespiratory diseases, including asthma,conjunctivitis and lung cancer (Pendakur,1993) .

2.5.2 Energy Impacts

The cost of the energy wasted while vehiclesidle in Bangkok’s horrendous traffic jams hasbeen estimated at about $1.6 billion per year(Sayeg et al., 1992; Poboon, 1994). Clearly,solving the traffic congestion problem wouldhave substantial energy benefits,7 and thiswould translate into significant monetarysavings for the public and a reduction in thecountry’s fuel bill for the import ofpetroleum. Bangkok consumes 40% of all ofThailand’s fuel for road transport, and mostof this is in the form of imported fuels (Sayeget al., 1992).

Substantial energy and cost savings could beachieved even without tackling the


Table 3. Economic and Health Impacts of Bangkok’s Traffic Crisis

Economic Impacts•$9.6 billion/year in lost work productivity

•$1.6 billion worth of energy/year wasted idling in traffic•Millions of dollar/year in health bills

Health Impacts•CO and particulates exceed WHO standards

•42% of traffic police suffer from respiratory diseases (asthma, conjunctivitis, lung cancer)•1 million respiratory infections/year linked to air pollution

•Bangkok has lung cancer rates 3 times higher than other areas of Thailand•elevated child blood lead levels (3 times WHO guidelines)

•many nervous disorders associated with traffic stressSource: Sayeg et al. 1992

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congestion problem. Currently, there are nofuel economy standards for vehicles sold inThailand. The Thailand DevelopmentResearch Institute (TDRI) has reported thattypical Thai automobiles in the mid-1980sused 11 litres/100 km. TDRI estimated thatincreasing fuel economy to a level of 8 litres/100 km would reduce automobile energy useby 20-30%.8 TDRI proposed that this couldbe achieved by a combination of governmentmandated fuel economy standards and anincrease in fuel prices (TDRI, 1990).

3 What Can be Learned fromComparat ive Studies?

Comparative international studies canprovide Thai policymakers with valuableinformation on policies and schemes thathave worked elsewhere. In many cases,strategies that have succeeded in othercountries could be adapted and implementedin Bangkok. However, the problem for Thaipolicymakers is not one of finding solutions,but rather of developing a political consensusand organizational framework that can leadto the selection and implementation of acoherent set of policies. Nonetheless, a briefreview of some comparative studies can helpto place Bangkok’s traffic problems in abroader context.

3.1 Singapore

Several recent studies of transportation inAsian cities have focused on the successes oftransportation policies in Singapore ascompared to its fast-growing neighbors:Jakarta, Bangkok, and Manila. At least twostudies have used the comparison betweenBangkok and Singapore to highlight thedifference that an authoritarian governmentalstructure can make in the development andsuccessful implementation of transportationpolicies (Guruswam, 1994; Tanaboriboon,1993) .

3.1.1 Limiting Automobile Usage

While neither Guruswamy nor Tanaboriboonexamined the organizational andinstitutional factors that make for asuccessful transportation planning effort,they itemized the specific initiatives thatSingapore — in contrast to Bangkok — hasbeen able to implement to discourage privateautomobile usage.

• Buying a car is expensive. In Singapore,75-80% of the cost of purchasing a carconsists of the import duty, registration

fee, title fee, and other taxes and fees. Incontrast, Thailand in 1991 lifted the banon importing fully assembled, small-engine cars and dramatically reduced theimport duties on small cars from as highas 300% down to 20-30% (Poboon et al.,1994) .

• Operating a car is expensive. Gas inSingapore costs $2.80 per gallon — twiceas much as in Bangkok — and the monthlycost of operating a car is estimated at$400.

• Area licensing scheme. A Singaporegovernment committee recommended anarea licensing scheme in 1973, and it wasimplemented by the government in 1975.Traffic data show that, while the numberof cars doubled between 1975 and 1991,the amount of daily traffic in the restrictedzone has declined dramatically, thusreducing congestion (Guruswamy, 1994).

• Electronic road pricing. Singaporerecently began testing an electronic road-pricing system that relies on a technologythat automatically charges motorists forthe use of roads in the central city zone.Singapore has thus become the worldleader in this technological approach.

• Weekend car category. Singapore hasintroduced a registration category for“weekend cars”, which receive asubstantial discount on their vehicleregistration fee. Weekend cars can only beused between 7 pm and 7 am onweekdays, after 3 pm on Saturdays, andall day on Sundays.

• Other policies. The Singaporegovernment has enacted additionalpolicies to discourage car ownership anduse. These include a 45 mile-per-hourspeed limit, a difficult and lengthyprocedural requirement to obtain adriver’s license, and the high price ofusing parking garages (many of which aregovernment owned).

In contrast to this array of policies thatSingapore has adopted to discourage car use,the Thai government has not initiated asingle policy to establish such disincentives.The institutional reasons that may explainsuch lack of action are discussed later in thispaper.

3.1.2 Providing Adequate Mass Transit

As noted earlier, the mass-transit system inBangkok is not well developed: there have


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been several unsuccessful efforts to establishseparated bus lanes in Bangkok, and elevatedrail and subway systems are currently underconstruction. Singapore, by contrast has amass-transit system that carries nearly 70%of all passengers to and from work in atimely fashion. The mass-transit railway isfinanced largely by automobile taxes, whichgenerated $400 million in revenues in 1990.The automobile taxes in Bangkok aresignificantly lower and generatecorrespondingly less revenue (Guruswamy,1994) .

3.2 Other International Comparisons

Newman and Kenworthy (1989) have carriedout the most comprehensive internationalcomparison on urban transportation systems.Over a two-year period, the authors visited31 cities and collected a standardized set ofdata that allows comparison across a range ofindicators. In a follow-up to this study, theyteamed with a Thai researcher to collect asimilar data set for Bangkok and, given anhistorical understanding of the developmentof the Thai transportation infrastructure,explain the current Thai traffic crisis. A fewof their findings are illustrative:

• Transportation in Thailand makes up amuch higher percentage of total energydemand than other Asian countries (56%in Thailand, compared to 36% inMalaysia, 30% in Indonesia, and 15% inKorea.)

• Bangkok’s rate of car ownership is similarto that in East Asian countries with a per-capita income many times higher thanBangkok. Bangkok residents own 200 carsper 1,000 inhabitants, compared to 225per 1,000 in Tokyo, 101 per 1,000 inSingapore, and 43 per 1,000 in HongKong.

• Although Bangkok has one of the lowestpercentages of road area (8% versus 20-25% for London, Paris, and New York),and is thus structured against car use, itprovides a level of parking spaces that issimilar (on a proportional basis) toautomobile-centred U.S. cities such asHouston or Detroit.

• Policies that rely on building more roadsto limit congestion are doomed to failure.Bangkok’s road network is 3,780kilometres in length. With 800 new carsbeing registered each day, this adds up toa 1,400-km-long line of new cars beingadded to the vehicle fleet each year.9

• Bangkok’s infrastructure discourages non-motorized modes of transport; forexample, there is a lack of sidewalks andno bicycle lanes. Only 10% of work tripsare made on foot or by bicycle, comparedto 25% for wealthier Asian countries andan average of 22% for European countries.

• Given Bangkok’s limited amount of roadarea, its public transport system is notadequate. Thirty percent of totalpassenger miles travel in Bangkok are onpublic transport, compared to an averageof 64% for wealthier Asian cities. Poboonet al. (1994) conclude that: “Traffic jamsin Bangkok are therefore inevitablebecause they are attempting to carry toolittle passenger travel on public transportrelative to their provision of roads.”

Other comparative international research hashighlighted successful traffic managementstrategies that — given the political will —could be applied in Bangkok. For example:

• In Mexico City, automobile use isrestricted to five days a week, using asystem of different-colored license plates(Pendakur, 1993).

• Jakarta in early 1992 required all cars onmain roads to carry at least three people.The policy was repealed later the sameyear when the courts ruled it illegal(Pendakur, 1993).

Another study compared the transportationinfrastructures in four Asian cities atdifferent stages of development: Bangkok;Surabaya, Indonesia; Varanasi, India; andIslamabad, Pakistan (Birk and Zegras, 1993).Because of the differences among the cities’transport systems, it is difficult to translatesuccessful strategies from the other cities toBangkok. However, unlike most otherstudies, Birk and Zegras studied the mostcritical element in developing a successfultransportation strategy: the existence of agovernment institution with the ability toimplement all decisions that will affect thecity’s transportation system.10 Of the fourcities studied, only Islamabad has animplementing body with the authority tocontrol and coordinate transportationplanning. The study concluded thatIslamabad’s implementation adheres to thecity’s Master Plan, and that the city’stransportation problems relate more to thecontent of the policies themselves rather thanto their implementation (Birk and Zegras,1993) .


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4 History o f Bangkok’sTransportat ion Plans

Table 4 presents an overview of thetransportation plans that have been drawn upfor Bangkok since 1960; none of these planshave actually been implemented. A keytheme of this paper is to explore the reasonsfor a continuing lack of effective politicalaction, especially in the face of growingtraffic congestion and occasional “gridlock”events, when the entire city becomesparalyzed for several hours at a time. One ofthe more comprehensive recent assessmentsof the transportation situation in Bangkokproposed a set of policies with this caveat:

“The problem, therefore, is not coming upwith proposals on how to alleviate Bangkok’stransportation crises, rather the dilemma ischoosing the most appropriate of theproposa ls and ensuring their implementat ionand follow-through ... Whether [this] or anyother plan is actually implemented dependson institutiona l commitment and will, thelack of which has plagued all attempts tochange Bangkok so far.” (Sayeg et al., 1992)

This statement is clearly accurate, and itreveals the weakness of the engineering/

economic approach that has been used toanalyze Bangkok’s traffic woes. Numerousconsultants have proposed technical fixes forBangkok’s traffic congestion problem; butnone has attempted an in-depth study of theinstitutional barriers that have preventedeffective action while the traffic situation hasdeteriorated to its present state.

5 Status o f Current Po lic ies

5.1 Roles of the Public and PrivateSectors

5.1.1 Government Reliance on the PrivateSector

Since the late 1980s, the basic approach ofthe Thai government in transportationplanning has been to rely on private-sectorinvestment. This strategy relieves thegovernment of a large financial burden andtransfers this risk to private-sector firms,which usually bid for the projects in the formof consortia. The private sector is motivatedby profits that it can accrue throughoperation of a transport concession, realestate development along transport corridors,and by tax incentives and “tax holidays”11

provided by the government.

The trend has been away from government


Table 4. Overview of Bangkok Transportation Plans — 1960 to Present

Year Plan/Initiative Description

1960 Litchfield Plan Designated land use in concentric rings of development. Never formally adopted or actually implemented.Partially as a result of the Litchfield Plan, the Department of Town and Country Planning (DTCP) wasestablished in 1961-2 under the Ministry of Interior.

1969 Updated Litchfield Plan Prepared by City Planning Division of the Bangkok Municipality. Prior to this, the City Planning Division didnot have jurisdiction for such a plan. Outlined different land-use patterns and road configurations than theearlier Litchfield Plan and the 1971 DTCP update of the Litchfield Plan (see below). Never taken beyondpaper stage.

1971 Updated Litchfield Plan Prepared by DTCP. Differed little from the original Litchfield Plan. Expanded overall development area andadjusted the 1990 target population from 4.5 million to 6.5 million. Stressed development of the road networkto accommodate growing traffic congestion. Never taken beyond paper stage.

1975 Town Planning Act Passage of this act required another revision of the Litchfield Plan. The revised plan was called the GreaterBangkok Plan 2000 and was prepared as part of the 4th National Economic and Social Development Plan(NESDP) for 1977-1981. The plan proposed a polycentric development model and adjusted the 1990 targetpopulation to 7.5 million. It was revoked in 1978 due to opposition to its proposal to decentralize the cityadministration.

1982 BMA Structure Plan Prepared as part of the 5th National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) for 1982-1986. Planaimed to slow down Bangkok’s physical growth through land use planning, zoning regulations and targetedinvestments. Plan did not provide any government agency with the legal authority to implement the plan. Thetransportation component of the 6th NESDP (1987-1991) had the same shortcoming.

1992 7th National Plan The 7th NESDP placed most of its emphasis for solving Bangkok’s transportation problems on the financingand construction of two large mass-transit projects by private sector firms — the Hopewell project, whichwould combine an expressway with light rail service; and the Skytrain project (later called the TanayongElevated Rail project), which would provide an elevated light rail system. The Plan emphasized coordinationof existing and planned expressway projects; called for road pricing as a tool to manage transport demandand a “Regional Structure Plan” to guide development. As with pervious plans, the 7th National Plan lackeddetailed planning regulations and proper enforcement authorities.

Note: Table adapted from Sayeg et al. (1992) None of these plans have ever been wholly, or even mostly, implemented.

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purchase of — or contracting of — private-sector services and toward a much greaterrole for the private sector in the conceptionand design of projects. The benefit of suchan approach is that it can relieve thegovernment of much of the financial burdenof raising capital for expensive road andmass-transit infrastructure projects. Forexample, the Hopewell Company isfinancing, building, and operating a $3.2billion elevated road and rail project for theThai government. When this project wasconsidered by the Thai Cabinet in 1990,private financing and the expected quickconstruction time were seen as two of itsbiggest benefits.

At the same time, such reliance on theprivate sector has several drawbacks.Projects can be driven by the needs of theprivate sector rather than the public good.This drawback is reflected in the lack ofequity in the allocation of funds for thetransportation infrastructure: two-thirds ofspending is on roads and one-third on mass-transit projects (Poboon et al., 1994). In thecase of Hopewell, the government concededrailroad rights-of-way for construction of theproject in Bangkok; granted land along therights-of-way for the development of realestate projects along the rail corridor; andgave the company a multi-year tax holidayon the profits from these real estatedevelopments. Another drawback is the lackof integration between the transitmegaprojects. Several legal wrangles haveheld up implementation of the megaprojects,and most of them stem from the fact that theprojects were separately formulated in theabsence of an overarching, operationalmaster plan.12

5.1.2 Status of the Megaprojects

Table 5 summarizes the three major mass-transit initiatives in Bangkok. In addition to

the three megaprojects listed in the table, thegovernment is pursuing four majorexpressway projects and a crash program tobuild overpasses at 18 of the c ity’s mostcongested intersections (most of which havebeen completed). As noted above, thecurrent mix of projects has resulted from thegovernment’s ad hoc policy of entertainingbids from the private sector rather thandeveloping a comprehensive set of integratedtransport plans and then putting theseprojects out to bid.

Recently, some factions within thegovernment have begun to question some ofthe contract provisions signed by previousgovernments and have taken steps to gaincontrol of the transportation planningprocess. Such steps include threatening totake over projects if the private sector firmsdelay implementation;13 increasing pressureon developers to build their megaprojectsunderground in the city centre, and theapproval in September 1994 of a BangkokTransit Master Plan which includes two newmass-transit routes totalling 77 km in length(Bangkok Post, 21 October 1994).

By relying on the private sector to plan andfinance the three mass-transit megaprojects,the Thai government hoped to avoidburdening itself with debt. Unfortunately,questions about contractor ability to financethe projects, delays, and conflicts betweenthe contractors have instead burdened thegovernment with headaches.

Only the construction of Tanayong’s elevatedrail is proceeding according to schedule. TheHopewell elevated rail and road system,slated for completion by the 1998 Asiangames, is less than 10% complete(Wancharoen, 1996). Many believe thatHopewell’s inability to complete its northernroute by December 1995, as promised, isindicative of the firm’s lack of commitment


Table 5. Status of Bangkok’s Transportation Megaprojects

Project Financing Mode(s) Length/Cost Status

Hopewell – Thai-Hong Kong joint venture – elevated road – $3.2 billion – 9.3% completea

– 30-58-yr concession – commuter train – 60 km tracks – target to complete by '98 Asian games– light rail – 40 km roads

– 80,000 pass./hr in each direction

Tanayong – Thai-foreign joint venture – elevated train – $1.12bn – target to complete by late 1998Elevated Rail b – 30-yr concession – 23.7 km tracks

– 700,000 pass./day

Mass Rapid Transit – Thai-foreign joint venture – subway – $2.4bn – in planning stageAuthority (MRTA) – 30-yr concession – 20 km subway – plan to begin construction in 1997

– 35-yr management – 80,000 pass./hra As reported by Wancharoen (1996) b Also called the Bangkok Transit System Corporation project

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to the project. Indeed, a recent investigationrevealed far less construction equipment andfewer laborers present at construction sitesthan is required for such a project(Wancharoen, 1996). In addition, Hopewellhas had serious difficulty securing financialbacking for the project.

The subway project of the Mass RapidTransit Authority (MRTA) has alsoexperienced delays, although in this casethey have been due to government changes tothe project design and the f inancing plan.Originally, the MRTA mass-transit projectwas designed as an above-ground system,and was to be undertaken by Bangkok LandCo. However, in 1994, the MRTA orderedhalf the route underground. Later, in 1995,the order extended to the whole system, andthe government — via MRTA — took over theproject. In addition, MRTA decided toprivately finance only the operation of theelectric trains, rather than the design of thesystem. With so many changes, the lack ofapplications from qualified subcontractors isnot surprising. The project promises tocontinue to be a political football since theparty of the former Deputy Prime Ministerwho backed the project recently left thegovernment coalition. His departure onceagain put the basic design of the system intoquestion. Another point of contention is thecoordination of junctures between theHopewell system, the Tanayong elevated railand the MRTA subway.


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5.2 Inst itutional Issues

5.2.1 The Existing Regulatory Confusion

There are more than 30 government agencieswith responsibility for transport and urbandevelopment of Bangkok. In practice,however, the implementation of transportand land-use plans are carried out by 11agencies which fall under two ministries —Interior and Transport & Communications(see Table 6).

“There are a number of key problems withexisting institut iona l arrangements includingthe large number of overlapping agencies, thelack o f effective coordination and monitoringof other agencies’ activities, the lack of stafftrained in transportation and urban planningdevelopment , and an outdatedadministrative and legal framework withinwhich to implement the proposals. The long-term nature of many transport projects, suchas construction of a mass-transit system,tends to lower agency staff and morale.”(Sayeg et al., 1992)

The case of the Second-Stage Expresswayillustrates the potential dangers of thecurrent bureaucratic confusion in the area oftransport planning. A Thai-Japaneseconsortium, the Bangkok ExpresswayCompany, Ltd. (BECL), contracted with theThai government to construct and operate theSecond-Stage Expressway. Just prior to theopening of the first stage (12 km) of theexpressway in early 1993, the Thai Cabinetreneged on its contract with BECL by onlypermitting the firm to collect a toll fee of$0.80, rather than the $1.20 fee stipulated in

Table 6. Agencies Implementing Transport and Land-Use Plans in Bangkok Metropolitan AreaAgency or Committee Reports to:

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) Ministry of Interior

Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA) Ministry of Transportation and Communications

Department of Highways Ministry of Transportation and Communications

Department of Land Transport Ministry of Transportation and Communications

Public Works Department Ministry of Interior

Department of Town & Country Planning Ministry of Interior

Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority (ERTA) Ministry of Interior

Harbor Department Ministry of Transportation and Communications

Office of the Committee for the Management of Road Traffic (OCMRT) Ministry of Interior

State Railway of Thailand (SRT) Ministry of Transportation and Communications

Traffic Police Division, under Metropolitan Police Ministry of InteriorSource: Sayeg et al. (1992) Note: acronyms are provided only where they are commonly used to refer to the agency.

the contract. For more than three monthsduring mid-1993, BECL refused to open theexpressway. Finally, with city trafficbecoming increasing congested, a Thai courtforced the company to open the expressway,a move which brought temporary relief tomany traffic-weary Bangkok residents.However, the whole episode seriouslydamaged the credibility of the Thaigovernment in the eyes of the foreigninvestment community, which is expected toprovide much of the future investment inBangkok’s transportation infrastructure.

One bright light during 1994 was the shortlife of Traffic Crisis 94 a non-governmentalbody established in early 1994 to provide thegovernment with an action plan to deal withthe ever-worsening traffic situation. Thegroup was convened by Anand Panyarachun,a highly regarded former prime minister, andcomprised members of the private sector,government officials and members ofcitizen’s and community organizations. Thegroup’s highly publicized report contained aprioritized list of 62 action items to alleviatethe traffic crisis.14 The action plan was notimplemented by the government, however,and by mid-1994, Traffic Crisis 94 haddisbanded. While the group’srecommendations provided a specific andlimited set of objectives, it did not addressthe fundamental institutional issues whichhave hindered the Thai government’s abilityto adopt and implement a comprehensiveplan to reduce traffic congestion.Nonetheless, the birth and death of TrafficCrisis 94 set a promising precedent of citizenparticipation in transportation planning.

5.2.2 The Attitudes of Thai Policymakers

There is a consensus among Thai decision-makers that Bangkok is in the midst of aserious and worsening transport crisis. Onecharacteristic of the current situation is what

we call the “silver bullet” theory. Thereseems to exist a belief among governmentofficials responsible for transport policy thatcompletion of the 3 current mega-projects(Hopewell, Tanayong elevated railway, andthe MRTA subway) will solve Bangkok’scurrent traffic woes. Unfortunately, thisprevalent optimism has the ef fect offorestalling other complementary demandmanagement measures which could currentlybe undertaken to help relieve Bangkok’straffic congestion and to reduce theassociated energy, environmental health, andeconomic impacts.

In fact, the road map to solving Bangkok’straffic congestion exists — on paper. Thescores of consulting reports that have beencompleted agree on the basic menu ofpolicies that need to be implemented inorder to improve Bangkok’s transportationservices. Some of these are listed in Table 7.Unfortunately, the lack of government abilityto coordinate and build a consensus for acomprehensive set of specific policymeasures has received little serious studyand analysis. The following statement istypical of the hand-wave approach taken toinstitutional issues by most of theconsultants who have studied Bangkok’stransportation system:

“Since the problem does not seem to be lackof plans or proposals for navigating Bangkokout of its difficulties, it seems thatinstitut iona l barriers to contro lling Bangkok’sdevelopment are [the problem].” (Sayeg et al.1992)

5.3 A Proposed Research Agenda forBangkok

The many engineering and economic studiesthat have been conducted for the Thaigovernment have assumed that politicians,given a set of c lear policy options, will actupon a common set of assumptions andmaximize societal gain. Clearly, in the caseof Bangkok, this assumption is false. At boththe individual and organizational levels,political actors are making decisions thatmaximize their own interests. There is thusa constant conflict over purposes and anongoing process of bargaining between theactors.15 In the case of Bangkok, the mainactors are the different ministerial agenciesand the political parties that control them.

In order to have an impact on policydevelopment in Bangkok, further researchshould focus on three primary areas:examining the gap between stated


Table 7. Basic Set of Policies Identified to Solve Bangkok’s Traffic Crisis• Improve vehicle technology

• Inspect and monitor vehicles• Promote alternative and cleaner fuels

• Implement Area Traffic Control system• Implement comprehensive land-use plan

• Road-area pricing• Mass-transit rail systems

• Separated bus lanes• Additional roads and expressways

• Education and awarenessAdapted from Sayeg et al. (1992)

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government policy and actualimplementation; understanding the culture ofthe Thai governmental bureaucracy; andassessing the role of outside organizations,and their influence on government decision-makers. An additional area of research thatmight be fruitful is the study of transitplanning authorities in other countries.

5.3.1 Gap Between Planning andImplementation

A first step toward critically examininggovernment transportation policy, is tomeasure the alignment of public policy goalswith actual implementation. The SeventhNational Economic and Social DevelopmentPlan (1992-1996) outlines a variety ofobjectives for government transportationpolicy. These included construction of twomass-transit schemes; co-ordination of futureand planned expressways with roads and carparking; road pricing and other measures tomanage transport demand; strengthening ofthe Bangkok Metropolitan Administration’splanning authority; and the development ofan “authoritative” Regional Structure Plan toguide development. This phase of theresearch would systematically compare theobjectives of the Seventh Plan with theresults achieved to date. It will also serve asthe basis for later interviews with the mainactors in Bangkok’s transportation sector: theThai bureaucracy, politicians, and outsideorganizations.

5.3.2 The Culture of the Thai GovernmentalBureaucracy

The Thai governmental bureaucracy wasdeveloped by King Rama V during the late1800s, and it quickly mushroomed in sizeand power to become a significant force inThai society. In order to understand the roleof the various government agenciesresponsible for t ransport, it is necessary toexplore the assumptions and attitudes of thebureaucrats. How do the governmentofficials get their information? Whatmotivates their decision-making? What typesof behavior are rewarded by promotion?What types of behavior and decisions areconsidered risky?

This investigation should be carried out intwo steps. The first part would involve acomprehensive study and analysis of theliterature. The next step would be a series ofsemi-structured interviews with top ministryofficials designed to gain an understanding ofhow the “elite” develop their framework ofsocial policy problems and solutions. To

complement these interviews, a series ofinterviews should also be conducted with ahandful of actors who are outside thebureaucracy but who, along with thebureaucrats, play a key role in policydevelopment and implementation — e.g.,politicians, academics, and transportationconsultants.16 The combined results of theseinterviews could provide crucial insights notonly into the motivations and decision-making behavior of policymakers but alsointo the common areas of interest wheredevelopment of a political consensus mightbe possible.

5.3.3 Influence of Outside Organizations

A final piece of the research puzzle is toexamine the influence of externalorganizations on the policymaking process.The significant role of the private sector hasbeen demonstrated earlier: the mostambitious and costly of the mass-transitprojects (Hopewell) arose, not fromgovernment policymakers, but from a privatedevelopment firm that is raising capitalprimarily from overseas investors and plansto recoup its investment on real estatedevelopment around the stations of thecombined rail-expressway project.17 Giventhis type of policy development, it is clearthat policies may represent a diversity ofinterests — other than the societal good —may seldom be “rational”, and are not likelyto originate from a commonly held set ofassumptions.

This section of the research would parallelthe interviews with Thai governmentbureaucrats and transport elite. An open-ended or semi-structured interviewmethodology would be employed to examinethe role of international institutions, such asthe World Bank and the Asian DevelopmentBank, which play a major role in financingpublic sector transportation projects; private-sector firms that act as project developersand concessionaires for transport projects;private financial institutions which providecredit to either the government or to privatecontractors; and non-governmentalorganizations that have recently begun to putpressure on the government to modify themass-transit projects.18

5.3.4 Transit Authorities in Other Countries

While we feel that solutions to Bangkok’stransportation problems must be generatedfrom within the country, we also believe thata study of foreign transit organizations, ifperformed in a descriptive rather than a

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normative fashion, could prove useful toThai policymakers.

In the case of the U.S., there has been nearlytwo decades of experience with transitauthorities empowered to maketransportation planning decisions for urbanmetropolitan areas. These authoritiesresulted from the transfer of responsibilityfor urban transportation from private firms tolocal governments that occurred during thelate 1950s and throughout the 1960s.(Hughes 1994) The development of politicalarrangements to manage transport decisionshas been widely analyzed in the U.S.(Hamilton 1981, Orski 1988, Adler and Edner1990, Hughes 1994) and Europe (Simpson1988), and the results of these institutionalstudies should be made available to Thaipolicymakers.

6 C oncl u s i ons

Transportation planning efforts indeveloping countries have focused primarilyon meeting demand for private vehicles andon dealing with the resulting problems ofurban congestion. Dimitriou (1992) showedin a methodical fashion how this focus hasresulted from the transplanting of Westernconsultants to carry out transportationplanning in the developing world. In thispaper, we have argued that the technicalsolutions to Bangkok’s traffic problems havebeen well documented in the plethora oftransportation plans and reports that havebeen prepared by foreign consultants.

Unfortunately, while international consultingfirms have generated stacks of reportsdetailing the technical solutions to the trafficproblem, few have taken the time to carefullystudy the institutional barriers toimplementing those solutions and to workclosely with Thai bureaucrats and politiciansto understand and overcome those barriers.

This paper proposes a research project thatwould include interviews with keypolicymakers in the agencies responsible fordeveloping and implementing Thaitransportation policy. Additional elementsof the proposed research project wouldinvolve analysis of the gap between statedgovernment policy and actualimplementation, as well as study of the roleplayed by external organizations in thedevelopment of government transportationpolicy.

By asking a different, non-technical set ofquestions about Bangkok’s traffic planningand management, the proposed researchcould identify the roots of the institutionalbarriers to developing a more effectivetransportation policy for Bangkok. We hopethat the fruits of this research will proveuseful to policymakers and that their widedissemination may provoke seriousdiscussion and institutional reform. Anotherdesired outcome would be the developmentof a truly collaborative effort — involvinggovernment agencies, the private sector, andnon-governmental organizations — to add-ress Bangkok’s pressing transportation issues.

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N ote s

1 Peter du Pont is an energy policy analyst withthe International Institute for Energy Conserva-tion (IIEC) in Washington, D.C. and a Ph.D.Candidate in Energy and Environmental Policyat the University of Delaware. Kristina Egan isa project manager in IIEC’s Asia Regional Officein Bangkok.

2 According to 1993 population data from theInstitute of Population Studies atChulalongkorn University, the Bangkokmetropolis had a population of 5.6 million.Based on 1990 population data from the UnitedNations, Nakhon Ratchasima had a populationof 278,000. More recent population data forsecondary Thai cities were not available.

3 More recent newspaper articles state that theincrease in cars is even higher — in the range of1,000 to 1,200 new automobiles per day.(Phatarawadee 1994)

4 Poboon dismisses the importance of increasedroad provision as a myth: “Bangkok’s level ofroad provision is believed to be the main causeof its traffic disaster. As a result, a major andcommon focus in solving the traffic problem is

to build more roads. But data from citiesaround the world demonstrate that the propor-tion of land devoted to road space is notunusually low (e.g., Paris, Hong Kong, andMunich are almost identical to Bangkok in thisfactor). Many Asian cities have a low length ofroad per person similar to Bangkok, while somecities such as Surabaya, Hong Kong, Manila,and Jakarta have a lower road length per capitathan Bangkok.”

5 The Din Daeng Intersection, near the MassCommunication Organization of Thailand.

6 After several years of delay, the BangkokMetropolitan Administration in late 1996announced plans to begin operating an auto-matic traffic light control system at 143intersections. The cost of installing this initialpart of a larger computerized traffic controlsystem was US$9 million. However, thereapparently remains significant skepticismamong police and city officials as to theeffectiveness of the system, and the contract toexpand the system to cover an additional 226intersections has been suspended.


(Assavanonda 1996)

7 Recent newspaper articles have noted that pricesare increasing noticeably due to the trafficcongestion: “Traffic-related problems inBangkok have taken a toll on people’s livingexpenses country-wide as business proprietorshave increased their product prices to cover therising cost of transport in and out of the capitaldue to traffic congestion. (Bangkok Post 4 Nov.1994:3)

8 The U.S. fuel economy standard for automobilesis 8.55 liters per 100 km.

9 This assumes an average vehicle length of 5meters.

10 Curitiba, Brazil is a well-known example of acity that has developed an integrated andeffective public transportation system. Al-though Curitibans have a level of car ownershipsimilar to other like-sized Brazilian cities, therate of car use is much lower (due to the qualityof public transportation). A major factor in thissuccess has been the leadership provided byCuritiba’s long-time mayor, Jaime Lerner.Another factor has been the central planningrole of the Research and Urban PlanningInstitute of Curitiba, which coordinatedtransportation planning decisions in that citysince the early 1970s. (Birk and Zegras 1993)

11 The term “tax holiday” means that the com-pany is given a waiver from paying corporateincome taxes for a specified number of years.

12 There are several examples of overlap andimplementation difficulties due to the fact thatthe megaprojects have been planned largely bythe private sector rather than by the a central-ized government authority. The MegaprojectManagement Office in the Office of LandTraffic Management commissioned a study ofthe areas of overlap between the megaprojects.In February 1994, it was announced that thenumber of points of overlap or “route clash”had been reduced from 31 to 4. (Bangkok Post21 February 1994) Another case of overlap is alegal wrangle between the Hopewell Co. andthe developers of the Don Muang Tollway, aproject that predates the Hopewell project. TheThai government ruled that Hopewell will haveto change part of its planned route, which runsparallel and adjacent to the tollway for 11 km,so that the developers of the tollway do nothave substantial lost revenues. (Bangkok Post 1October 1994) In September 1994, in an effortto reduce the environmental impact of havingthree elevated transit systems running throughthe heart of the city, the Thai Cabinet decreed— based on the recommendations of a newlydeveloped Bangkok Mass Transit Master Plan— that the 3 rail systems would have to gounderground in a 25 km2 area of the citycenter. After protests from the private-sector

transit developers, who argued that thecontracts to construct the systems were alreadysigned and could not be changed, the decreewas relaxed in July and only applies to futureprojects (for which a contract is not yet signed).

13 For example, the Expressway and Rapid TransitAuthority, a government agency, plans to takeover the Din Daeng-Don Muang elevatedtollway, which has been operated until now bya private company. The government hasrefused to honor its contract with the firm todemolish two flyovers, and the firm is underfinancial duress. Since fewer vehicles thanexpected are using the road, the firm is onlyrecovering two-thirds of its daily costs.(Bangkok Post, 2 March 1996. “ETA Steps UpEffort to Control Elevated Tollway.”)

14 The group’s key recommendations were: a banon private cars on certain streets during rushhours; an increase in license fees and relatedvehicle taxes, which would be used to fundmass-transit projects; and a much greater focuson mass-transit over road projects. It wasironic that almost all members of the groupchose not to ride specially available microbuses(small passenger buses with more comfortableseating than regular buses) to the group’smeetings and drove their own private vehiclesinstead.

15 Elmore (1978) describes this interaction usingthe conflict and bargaining model . Essentiallythis model calls for an understanding of thevarious incentives (primarily economic) actingon decision-makers. The conflict and bargain-ing model is similar to what Dye (1992) calls“public choice theory” and Ellerman (1990)calls “ social choice theory”.

16 Ellerman (1990) used such a set of “elite”interviews with transit managers at municipaltransit agencies in the U.S. to validate hisdecision-making incentive model for U.S.transportation planning.

17 The financial returns on the Hopewell mass-transit project have been the subject of muchspeculation. A consultant’s report prepared inApril 1994 cla imed that the internal rate ofreturn on the project would be just 3%, withouttaking into account the fact that likely construc-tion costs for the project were twice as high asprojected by Hopewell. (Bangkok Post, 29 April1994 )

18 The Traffic Crisis 94 group, which provided acomprehensive set of recommendations to thegovernment, was mentioned earlier. Anothercoalition of non-governmental organizationswaged a public relations and media campaignwhich led the Thai Cabinet to mandate thatsections of all future mass-transit projects beconstructed underground in a 25-square-kilometer area in the city center.

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[ 3 7 ]

R e fe r e n ce s

Adler, Sy , and Sheldon Edner. 1990. “Governingand Managing Multimodal and Regional TransitAgencies in a Multicentric Era.” In PublicPolicy and Transit System Management, editedby George M. Guess. New York, NY: Green-wood Press.

Assavanonda, Anjira. 1996. “Area Traffic-Controlto Run 24 Hours Next Month.” Bangkok Post.25 September.

Bangkok Post. 1994. Selected articles fromEnglish-language daily newspaper.

Birk, Mia Lane, and P. Christopher Zegras. 1993.“Moving Toward Integrated Resource Planning:Energy, Environment, and Mobility in FourAsian Cities.” International Institute for EnergyConservation, Washington, D.C.

Dimitriou, Harry T. 1992. Urban TransportPlanning: a Deve lopment Approach. New York:Routledge.

Dye, Thomas R. 1992. “Models of Politics: SomeHelp in Thinking About Public Policy.” InUnderstanding Public Policy. Englewood Clifs,NJ: Prentice Hall.

Ellerman, Donald. 1990. Modeling Policy Out-comes: Decision Making at Local TransitAgencies . Utrecht, Netherlands: VSP.

Elmore, Richard F. 1978. “Organizational Modelsof Social Program Implementation.” PublicPolicy 26 (2): 185-223.

Guruswamy, Dharm. 1994. “Urban Transportationin Bangkok and Singapore: A Comparison.”University of Maryland.

Halcrow et al. 1991. “Final Report, Bangkok:SPURT.” Halcrow, Fox and Associates; Pak Poyand Kneebone Pty Ltd. Bangkok, Thailand.

Hamilton, Neil W. Hamilton, Peter R. Governanceof Public Enterprise: A Case Study of UrbanMass Transit. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath andCo.

Hanson, Mark, and Robert Lopez. 1991.“Methdology for Evaluating Urban Transporta-tion Energy/Environment Stragies: A CaseStudy of Bangkok.” Paper read at 70th AnnualMeeting of the Transportation Research Board,at Washington, D.C.

Hughes, Mark Alan. 1994. “Mass Transit Agencies:Deregulating Where the Rubber Meets theRoad?” In Deregulating the Public Service : CanGovernment Be Improved?, edited by John J.DiIulio. Washington, DC: The BrookingsInstitution.

Ishiguro, Masayasu, and Takamasa Akiyama. 1994.“Structure of and Prospects for Energy Demandin Five Major Asian Developing Countries:.”International Trade Division, InternationalEconomics Division, The World Bank, Wash-ington, D.C.

JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency).1990. “The Study on Medium- to Long-TermImprovement/Management of Rail and RoadTransport in Bangkok: Final Report.” JICA(Japan International Cooperation Agency).Bangkok, Thailand.

NESDB (National Economic and Social Develop-ment Board). 1992. “Seventh National Eco-nomic and Social Development Plan, 1992-1996.” NESDB (National Economic and SocialDevelopment Board). Bangkok, Thailand.

Newman, P., and J. Kenworthy. 1989. Cities andAutomobile Dependence : An InternationalSourcebook. Aldershot, Aust.: Gower.

Orski, C. Kenneth. 1988. “New Solutions to OldProblems in Public Transportation.” In PrivateInnovations in Public Transit, edited by J. C.Weicher. Washington, DC: American EnterpriseInstitute for Public Policy Research.

Pendakur, V. Setty. 1993. “Congestion Manage-ment and Air Quality: Lessons from Bangkokand Mexico City.” Asian Journal of Environ-mental Management 1 (2): 53-65.

Phatarawadee, Phataranawik. 1994. “The Long andBumpy Road.” In the Bangkok Post. 12 Novem-ber.

Poboon, Chamlong. 1994. “IIEC Workshop: SomeConclusions and Suggestions.” Institute forScience and Technology Policy, MurdochUniversity, Perth Australia. November.

Poboon, Chamlong, Jeff Kenworthy, PeterNewman, and Paul Barter. 1994. “Bangkok:Anatomy of a Traffic Disaster.” Paper read atEnvironment, State, and Society in Asia: theLegacy of the Twentieth Century, at Perth,Western Australia.

Premo, Jerome C. 1988. “Privatization in Practice:The Case of New Jersey Transit.” In PrivateInnovations in Public Transit, edited by J. C.Weicher. Washington, DC: American EnterpriseInstitute for Public Policy Research.

Sayeg, P., P. Taneerananon, M. Birk, and C.Zegras. 1992. “Assessment of TransportationGrowth in Asia and Its Effects on Energy Use,the Environment, and Traffic Congestion: CaseStudy of Bangkok, Thailand.” InternationalInstitute for Energy Conservation. Washington,D.C. 1992.

Simpson, Barry J. 1988. City Centre Planning andPublic Transport. Berkshire, U.K. : VanNostrand Reinhold.

Tanaboriboon, Yordphol. 1993. “Demand Manage-ment Implementation in Southeast Asia.” ITEJournal September: 21-28.

TDRI (Thailand Development Research Insitute).1990. “Energy and Environment: Choosing theRight Mix. Paper read at 1990 TDRI Year-EndConference.” Industrializing Thailand and ItsImpact on the Environment, at Jomtien,Thailand.

TEI (Thailand Environment Institute). 1994.“Critical Traffic and Pollution Problems.” TEI,Thai Department of Pollution Control,Chulalongkorn University, and Radial Corpora-tion.

Wancharoen, Supoj. 1996. “Hopewell Project:Little Progress Seen.” Bangkok Post. 28 August.

K e yw ord s

Infrastructure investment, CO2 targets,transport policy re-evaluation

Abs t r a ct

Swedish policy makers see a need for athorough re-evaluation of transport policyand its related governmental structures. Thefocus of investment will be shifted awayfrom major infrastructure construction tomore modest measures such asimprovements of existing routes. Animportant element will be improving roadsafety. Reduction of noxious emissions,especially greenhouse gases is seen as vitallyimportant.

Int r oduct i on

REDUCED investments in highways by 50 %,but increased inputs of 30 % for maintenanceand operation of the national road network.Increased funds for safety and environmentalmeasures. Heavy investments to increase thecarrying capacity of railway lines in order tomake the railway system more competitive.These are some of the proposals in an interimreport by a parliamentary commission inSweden – Heading for a New TransportPolicy, Government Commission onTransport and Communications, 1996 (SOU1996:26) .

To meet the carbon dioxide target thecommission suggests heavier carbon dioxidetaxation, regulation of the specific fuelconsumption of vehicles and a rapidintroduction of bio-based fuels. Thecommission also proposes experiments infour counties for testing a planning processwhich strengthens political control ofinfrastructure planning.

Infrast ructure planning is inseperablefrom t raf fic po licy

The commission has been given the task ofdrawing up a national plan forcommunications in Sweden which will formthe basis of a new resolution on transportpolicy to be passed by the Government andParliament in the spring of 1998. That planwill be presented by the commission in thefinal report in March 1997.

Sweden makes ten-year-plans forinvestments in transport infrastructure, planswhich are revised every fourth year. We havean integrated planning of highways, railwaysand county traffic facilities. The first step isto make a strategic plan for infrastructure.This strategic plan should point out:

• financial resources for road and railinfrastructure;

• financial resources for construction,maintenance, operation and specialmeasures for traffic safety and goodenvironment ;

• goals for measures in infrastructures.

When the Government and Parliament havecome to a decision about the strategic plan,the Swedish Road Administration, SwedishRail Administration and the CountyAdministration Boards are given the task todraw up concrete plans for investments andmaintenance during the planning period.

The commission should supervise theplanning process for the plan 1998–2007. Inorder to fullfill this task we have studiedalternative approaches for the developmentof infrastructure during the period 1998–2007. The commission also recommend oneapproach in the interim report.

Maybe it looks strange to first decide astrategy for development of infrastructureand after that form a new overarchingtransport policy. Infrastructure investmentscannot be viewed in isolation from societyand transport policy. Both the necessity andthe focus of investments are heavilydependent on the objectives defined bysociety for transport policy. Equally crucialare the decisions made concerning economicinstruments, the structure of cost liability,regulations on vehicles and fuels or Stateprocurement of traffic in various forms.

The sequence is however given by our termsof reference. The Government has a strongdesire to finish the work with newinfrastructure plans and a new transportpolicy before the next election in Sweden.But next time the infrastructure plans will berevised we will have a new overarchingtransport policy as a base for the work.

Heading for a New Transport Policy in Sweden

Hans SilbornSecretary, Governmental Commission on Transport and Communications

Hans Silborn: ‘Heading for a NewTransport Policy in Sweden’World Transport Policy & Practice3/1 [1997] 38-42

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In drawing up our proposals on the focus ofinfrastructure planning we have made ageneral analysis of various other measuresneeded in order for the objectives to be met.A more concerted and cogent analysis of thetransport policy and infrastructural measuresneeded in order to achieve the objectives willbe presented in our final report. Several ofthe measures to be considered are of such akind that they may come to affect the sumtotal of traffic inputs and the balancebetween different types of transport.

Thus our standpoints on general issues oftransport policy may have an impact on theplanning of infrastructure investments.

Analyses o f alternat ive focuses

We have analysed five alternative focuses forthe development and maintenance ofinfrastructure:

• A basic alternative including allmeasures which are judged to be socio-economically profitable.

• An alternative attaching specialimportance to the objective of a goodenvironment.

• An alternative attaching specialimportance to the objective of improvedtraffic safety.

• An alternative focusing particularly on theattainment of regional balance .

• An alternative attaching specialimportance to business enterprise issues .

These alternatives are compared with acomparative alternative (zero alternative)which only includes measures which areexpected to be completed or begun by theNew Year 1998.

In the light of the analyses of the alternativefocuses, we have drawn up a draft focus forinfrastructure planning for the period 1998–2007 .

Heading for a new direction o finfrast ructure development

Our proposals imply a redirection ofinfrastructure planning.

• Following a period of heavy expansion ofthe national trunk road network,operational and maintenance-relatedinputs will have to be increased. Wepropose an increase of rather more than 30per cent for operation and maintenance of

the entire national road network,compared with the present-day level(1995).

• For the rail network we propose that theallocation for operation and maintenancebe raised by 22 per cent compared withthe present-day level.

• Heavy investments are recommended toincrease the carrying capacity of railwaylines and of the regional road network.

• Of rail and road investments totallingMSEK 58,000 it is proposed that 60 percent go on railways and 40 per cent onroads.

• Investments in the enlargement of nationalhighways are reduced by more than halfcompared with the existing plan. This ispartly because the standard of the roadnetwork has been elevated throughenlargements in recent years and becausewe have now given priority to operationand maintenance within a limitedbudgeting frame. It is also connected witha new view of development strategy. Weendorse the systematic approach and thedevelopment of a functionally integratedroad network which have characterisedplanning, but we no longer attach anyintrinsic importance to a uniformgeometrical and traffic-technical standard.Every part of the national routes should beenlarged at the rate and given thestandards which are justified by its owntraffic conditions. The parts we havestudied are relatively large and naturallydemarcated. There is no question ofreplacing investments in new trunk roadswith spot measures, but the big nationaltrunk roads can be divided up intosections with differing traffic conditions.

• Traffic safety work, for socio-economicreasons, will concentrate on implementingmeasures under the national traffic safetyprogramme. Measures relating to the roadsystem will be concentrated on spotmeasures for black-spot intersections andsections instead of larger roadinvestments.

• Our proposals imply a heavy reallocationfrom large road investments to theoperation and maintenance of the roadnetwork. Since the poorest road standardis to be found on the minor road networkin the forest counties, the increasedoperating and maintenance allocations

Hans Silborn: ‘Heading for a NewTransport Policy in Sweden’


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and load capacity investments werecommend imply an equalisation ofregional imbalances in road standards. Wealso recommend special measures for thefurther encouragement to regionaldevelopment and business competitivecapacity.

We propose a planning frame of MSEK190,000 for investments and road and railoperation and maintenance during theplanning period 1998–2007. This fits in wellwith the investment cut in this field resolvedon by the Parliament for the coming budgetperiod.

Other measures are necessary tomeet the environmental targets

Infrastructure planning must agree withpolicy objectives for transport and theenvironment. The actions proposed must, forexample, as far as possible beenvironmentally appropriate and conduciveto traffic safety.

Infrastructure measures, however, are oflimited significance in the solution ofenvironmental problems. The purpose ofinfrastructure is to provide goodopportunities for the transportation of peopleand goods. The achievement ofenvironmental objectives demands furthermeasures over and above those affectinginfrastructure.

Our analyses have shown that, of theenvironmental targets we have defined, thecarbon dioxide target is the most difficult toachieve. As an intermediate target, we haveassumed that carbon dioxide emissions inthe road sector will decline by 20 per centbetween 1990 and 2020.

Measures of several different kinds areneeded in order to achieve the carbondioxide targets. We have assumed heaviercarbon dioxide taxation, regulation of thespecific fuel consumption of vehicles and therapid introduction of bio-based fuels.

Increased carbon dioxide tax

In our calculations we have assumed thatcarbon dioxide tax will be raised in such away that the price of petrol, in real terms,will rise by 10 öre (SEK 0.1) per litre eachyear between 1990 and 2020. The real pricerise for the period ending 2020 will then beSEK 2.30 per litre of petrol. A correspondingincrease is assumed in the price of dieselfuel.

A large part of the scope created by thistaxation revenue ought, in our opinion, to beapplied to State support for environmentalmeasures in the transport sector. Some formof compensation will probably also beneeded for persons travelling long distancesto work. If the rise in fuel prices shouldprove to have unacceptable distributiveeffects to the detriment of rural areas, thoseeffects should be offset by means of regionalpolicy measures in the broad sense.

We will be analysing the question of carbondioxide tax and related supportive measuresin closer detail in our final report.

Regulat ion o f vehic le fuelcons u mp t i on

In order for carbon dioxide emissions fromcar traffic to be substantially reduced, carswill have to be made more fuel-efficient.There are several conceivable ways ofinducing improvements in the fueleconomics of new cars, e.g. regulations ordifferentiated taxes. It is difficult, however,for Sweden to introduce such instruments onits own. International agreements are needed.

In a specimen calculation we have shownhow fuel efficiency will have to be improvedin order for our carbon dioxide target to beattainable. We assume that the specific fuelconsumption of new cars will graduallydecline until 2005. As from that year, newcars are on average to have a fuelconsumption of not more than 6.3l/100km(the average fuel consumption of new carstoday is 9.2). Technically this is quitefeasible, but it will make heavy demands oninternational co-operation.

Support for the introduction o f b io -based fuels

In our calculations we have assumed thatfrom 2010 onwards, bio-based fuels will onaverage provide 15 per cent of the energycontent of fuel. This can be achieved througha combination of measures, including boththe development of vehicles running on bio-based fuels only, e.g. ethanol or methanol,and low admixture of bio-based fuel to thefossil fuel.

In order for this to be possible, both technicaldevelopment and some form of publicsupport for the introduction of bio-basedfuels will probably be needed. We intend toreturn with proposals on this subject in ourfinal report.



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It is also necessary for Sweden to make activeefforts to secure amendments to the EUdirective on excise duties on mineral oils, soas to facilitate the introduction of bio-basedfuels.

Small ef fect on road t raf f ic f lows, butlarger on emiss ions

Infrastructure measures in the national roadnetwork outside urban communities haveonly a marginal bearing on traffic generationand choice of transport. Our proposals,therefore, will have hardly any effect at all onthe development of road traffic. Thepresumed increase in carbon dioxide tax andregulation of fuel consumption will betweenthem make motoring cheaper in real termsper kilometre. Traffic growth between 1993and 2010 is estimated at roughly 30 per cent.

As a result of heavy investments in railways,passenger rail traffic is expected to increaseby about 80 per cent during the same period.But the car is still very dominant.

Therefore the focus of infrastructureplanning makes little difference to emissionsof air pollution and carbon dioxide.

The possibility of achieving the carbondioxide target with a 20 per cent reductionbetween 1990 and 2020 will depend ent irelyon the possibility of reducing specific fuelconsumption in motor vehicles andincreasing the proportion of bio-based fuelsto the extent which we have assumed.

Stricter exhaust rules are needed in order toachieve the aim of an 82 per cent reductionin nitrogen oxide emissions between 1980and 2020. Failing this, the reduction isexpected to be about 65 per cent. The aim ofreducing emissions of volatile hydrocarbonswill be achieved in the short term, but in thelonger term the growth of traffic willnecessitate stricter exhaust regulations.

Targeted measures in the form of noiseprotection will remedy the noise problems ofthe 25,000 persons living alongside nationalhighways and exposed to noise levelsexceeding 65 dBA. The long-term target of 55dBA will not be achieved, however, andserious noise problems will persist on themunicipal road network.

Improved t raf f ic safety

By the end of the planning period (2007), thenumber of persons killed in road traffic isexpected to have fallen to about 370, as

against 589 in 1994. The number seriouslyinjured is expected to decline from 4,221 in1994 to about 3,600 in 2007.

Our analyses show that only a small part ofthe improved traffic safety can be accountedfor by heavy road investments. The mostefficient measures are spot measures forblack-spot intersections and sections togetherwith all ”soft” measures in the nationaltraffic safety program. This program includesreduced speed limits, control of the drivers,safer cars, increased use of safety equipmentetc. In the long run the commission want togo for a zero-solution. No deaths or seriouslywounded will be accepted in road traffic.

Equalisa t ion of regional imbalances

The investments in operations andmaintenance have a strong regional profile.Nearly half the increase will be in northernSweden. Roughly 20 per cent of all frost-damaged roads can be remedied (4,000 kmout of 19,000).

The investments in operation andmaintenance and in load capacityimprovements will mean a great deal tobusiness enterprise, since they will improvethe scope for heavy goods transport both byroad and by rail. Special investmentstotalling MSEK 5,350 are recommended forrail freight traffic.

Experiment in st ronger po lit icalcontr o l

We recommend experiments in Skånewhereby responsibility for drawing up andfinalising plans for county traffic facilities(LTA) for the period 1998–2007 is transferredfrom the County Administration Board to theSkåne Administration.

We also recommend that the StockholmCounty Council be made responsible for LTAplanning in the County of Stockholm(instead of the County Adminstration Board).

Both in Skåne and in the County ofStockholm, the planning process will beconstructed in such a way as to strengthenpolitical control and improve co-ordinationbetween different types of transport systems,between transport and infrastructure andbetween infrastructure and other physicalplanning.

In the Stockholm County experiment, specialimportance will be attached to developingand testing a planning process in which



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urban planning and infrastructure planningare integrated with the planning of masstransit, goods transport and motor traffic.There should be good opportunities for thistype of integration in the County ofStockholm, where the County Council isresponsible both for regional planning andfor public transport.

The experimental activities in Skåne and theCounty of Stockholm must be co-ordinatedwith the Government’s response to theproposals of the Regional GovernmentCommission and with the experimentationwhich those proposals may lead to. AGovernment Bill is expected in September1996.

In the Counties of Västernorrland andJämtland we propose experiments aimed atstrengthening regional influence on themaintenance of county roads. Certainmeasures at present classed as maintenanceand funded out of the operations andmaintenance allocation of the National RoadAdministration or the special load capacityplan, e.g. frost-proofing and road capacityreinforcement, are instead to be regarded asinvestments and transferred to the LTAallocations. The corresponding money is alsoto be transferred to the LTA allocations. Inthis way the counties will have more to sayconcerning which measures are to be takenand in what order.

Evaluat ion o f transport po licy

Our terms of reference require us to analysewhether the transport policy aims in theresolutions passed by the Parliament in 1988and later have been achieved. The followingare some of the important conclusionsresulting from the transport policy evaluationconducted on our behalf.

• Input data need to be improved - In ourview, the input data for investment planningmust be improved and clearer guidelines areneeded concerning the input data requiredfor different planning situations.

• Decisions must be followed up - In ourview, clear rules and distinct responsibilityare needed for follow-up at both national andregional levels. The results of infrastructureinvestments should be followed up inrelation to the targets defined for transportpolicy and for individual projects. It isimportant to make clear whether costs andeffects agree with those indicated in theinput data.

• Financial responsibility must be reviewed- The principles of financial responsibilityneed to be reviewed and ways of improvingcalculations of the marginal socio-economiccosts analysed, because at present thesecalculations are surrounded by a great deal ofuncertainty.

• The balance between public planning andfree competition in different types oftransport systems should be analysed - Theevaluations show that the deregulations of airtraffic and taxi services have had bothpositive and negative effects, although it istoo early yet to pronounce on the long-termoutcome. The deregulations appear to havefavoured densely populated areas but to havehad a number of negative effects on regionswith lower traffic densities.

It is essential to analyse whether measuresare needed to compensate rural areas for theeffects of deregulation, and to study whatmay be an appropriate balance betweenpublic planning and free competition.

Our cont inuing work

As our work continues, we will beaddressing all the problem fields observed inthe course of the evaluation. We will bestudying the principles and general issues oftransport policy concerning the way inwhich the transport system is to beorganised, controlled and financed.

In our overarching transport policy analysesof the structure of financial responsibility,the state of competition between differenttypes of transport systems, State procurementof regionally necessary transport etc., airtransport and shipping will figure muchmore prominently than they have done in ourinterim report, the main concern of whichhas been investment planning.

We will present our final report in March1997. In October 1996 we will present asecond interim report with proposals for roadtraffic taxation.

The Swedish Governmental Commisson onTransport and Communications is a parl iamentarycommission. All pol i tical parties in the Parl iamentare represented in the commission. RolfAnnerberg, Director General of the Swed ishEnvironmental Protection Board is the Chairman.



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Int r oduct i on

FEW areas of public policy and practicebetter illustrate the difficulty of reconcilingthe growth of the economy with protection ofplanetary health than the one relating to theair travel and tourism industries. We arehaving to learn fast that the capacity of theenvironment to allow abuse of its self-regulating mechanisms - which have evolvedover probably hundreds of thousands if notmillions of years - is not limitless. There isan urgency to review current policy andpractice on this subject for it has perhaps thegreatest and longest-term significance for ourfuture well-being than any other on whichpoliticians should be adjudicating. Given thebroad scientific consensus that climatechange is underway and that humanactivities are almost certainly contributing,decisions affecting the future of the twoindustries must not be taken without dueconsideration to the destabilising effects onthe planetary environment of addingpollution to the upper atmosphere andthereby adding to global warming and ozonedepletion.

T r e nd s

Worldwide energy demand is growing,apparently inexorably. The BP 1996Statistical Review of World Energy showsthat, in the last 20 years, consumption offossil fuels - coal, gas and oil - has risen bywell over a third. Crucial interacting whichhave brought this about are rising materialstandards and the growth of the world’spopulation. As for the future, the UNPopulation Fund forecasts an increase fromthe current 5.7 billion persons to 8.3 billionby 2025, 90 per cent of it in poorer countries.

At the same time, economies in thedeveloped world and in many parts of thedeveloping world, whose populations clearlyhave a greater claim on increasing theirconsumption of fossil fuels - the WorldEnergy Council has pointed out that twobillion people in them have neitherelectricity nor other communal sources ofenergy - continue to grow apace. Both growthof the economy and of population are set tohave an even greater impact in the future on

this consumption unless progressivelydifficult policy changes are made: per capitacarbon dioxide emissions from the use offossil fuels in the US are roughly doublethose in the UK, they are ten times those inChina and nearly 30 times those in India.Contemplation of the consequences of thepopulations of the developing worldenjoying western lifestyles in the nextcentury should help to focus the mindwondrously!

International professional, business andsports events are becoming more frequent,drawing on participants and spectators fromfurther and further afield. Talk to seniorbusinessmen and they are likely to makereference to the number of times they ‘have’to fly, or to boast of distant destinations theyhave visited frequently. Holidays areadvertised in newspapers offering atphenomenally low prices the chance toexperience for a week or two the culture andclimate of ever more exotic locations,invariably by flying, and many billedeuphemistically as ‘eco-tourism’ - a night inLapland to see the midnight sun; a journey ofdiscovery to north-west China along the SilkRoad; Livingstone’s Africa - with themagnificent view of the Victoria Falls or alocal flight over a gathering of 500 zebras;Madagascar - a must for anyone in love withnature; passage to the wonders of theantiquities in the Middle East; the highlightof the Argentinian tour, Die Walkurie inBuenos Aires; Bermuda for weekend breaks -eight remarkable golf courses; a five-day tourof Australia - feed the dolphins in the wild;island hopping ‘down under’; a 15-day cruiseup the Irrawaddy to Mandalay; ‘spiritualawakening’ by flying to Tuxtla in Mexico; asix-night sand safari in Dubai; Hong Kongwhere it is worth a taxi ride to market for‘name’ clothes manufactured locally forworld markets, and take public transport tothe Temple where registered fortune tellerswill read your palm; go bungee jumping inNew Zealand.

International air travel is increasing at amuch faster rate than most other fossil fuel-consuming sectors of the economy. Look atrecent statistics on the number of peopleflying, distances travelled, and the quantity

The Future of Air Travel and International Tourism

Mayer HillmanPolicy Studies Institute, London, UK

Dr. Hillman is SeniorFellow Emeritus atPolicy Studies Institute.The contents of thisarticle draws from hiswritten and oral evi-dence to the House ofCommons TransportCommittee Inquiry onUK Airport Capacity.

Mayer Hillman: ‘The Future of AirTravel and International Tourism’World Transport Policy & Practice3/1 [1997] 43-50

[ 4 3 ]

of aviation fuel used worldwide. In the lastten years alone, international UK and foreignaircraft movements using airports in thiscountry have increased by 65 per cent andpassengers by 89 per cent; air cargo tonnagehas risen by 94 per cent and cargo and mailtonne kilometres flown by 88 per cent.Flights to and from Member States of the EUhave increased by 87 per cent and to the restof the world by 95 per cent. The expectationis that this proportion will rise sharply in thefuture. Air travel now accounts for aboutone-sixth of fuel used for transport purposes,with a major contribution from the half amillion UK residents now travelling to NorthAmerica each year. This might be thought ofas a remarkable figure - but it represents lessthan one per cent of the population. In thesame ten years, the number of internationaland domestic passenger kilometres flown onscheduled airlines has almost doubled.World airlines now carry over 1.25 billionpassengers, with a predicted increase ofabout five per cent per annum up to the year2010 and probably beyond.

Links with global po llut ion

Whilst attention is now paid to theenvironmental impacts of airport locationand aircraft movements, the focus tends to beon those exclusively local to airports.However, interest is now being shown in theeffects of exhaust emissions on the stabilityof the troposphere and stratosphere.Pollution from aircraft is now regarded asmore significant owing to a betterunderstanding of what happens when theemissions are released at cruising altitudes.Subsonic aircraft flying at levels within theupper troposphere and lower stratosphere,which is extremely sensitive to chemicalchange, has been the subject of major studies,notably those that have been undertaken byNASA in the US in the last few years.

The two primary concerns are the thinning ofthe ozone layer which protects the earth fromharmful ultra-violet radiation; and carbondioxide emissions contributing to globalwarming, with water vapour promoting theformation of clouds, and carbon monoxideand hydrocarbons adding to the problem. Asoxides of nitrogen decrease ozone in thestratosphere, there must be considerabledoubt about the prospects for a newgeneration of supersonic aircraft underconsideration by Japanese and Americanmanufacturers as these aircraft have to fly at

this higher level. Paradoxically, lower down,in the troposphere where most commercialjets fly, the release of these emissionsincreases ozone. The damage is compoundedby the fact that more fuel is needed at loweraltitudes and pollutants remain there muchlonger.

At present, air traffic is responsible for 15 to20 per cent of the global warming effect offossil fuel used for transport purposes. Asnoted in the Royal Commission onEnvironmental Pollution Report, an annualrate of increase of two to three per cent inthis is predicted by the year 2010. However,owing to the disproportionate effect of theemissions at high altitude, it has beencalculated that 50 per cent of thiscontribution will stem from aircraft, a figurejustifying even greater concern as carbondioxide emissions have a longevity of 50 to200 years.

Climate effects

Evidence is accumulating of the effects of thegrowing use of fossil fuels increasingconcentrations of greenhouse gas emissions.The rate of temperature change is nowgreater than at any time during the last10,000 years: nine of the ten warmest years ofthe last 140 years of world-wide temperaturereadings have occurred since 1980. It hasbeen calculated that, of the extra 320 billiontonnes of carbon emitted into the atmosphereduring the last century and a half, about 60per cent has been absorbed by warming theoceans and by forest ‘fixing’, leaving 40 percent in the atmosphere to increase airtemperatures. Rises of 3.0 degrees Centigradeabove the average for the last 30 years havebeen recorded in parts of Siberia wheremethane and other organic gases are nowknown to lie at much shallower depths thanwas previously thought, and the release ofwhich could accelerate global warming aspermafrost thaws over the coming decades.Scientists at the Meteorological Office’sHadley Centre for Climate Prediction andResearch have forecast an increase of 2.0degrees Centigrade in world temperatures by2050 unless urgent action is taken.

Temperature changes are also thought toaccount for the higher incidence of extremeclimatological events - floods, droughts,shrinking glaciers, storms and hurricanes.The sea level rises of 25 cms. in the last 100years are explained by the expansion of thewarmer oceans, and further average rises of

Mayer Hillman: ‘The Future of AirTravel and International Tourism’


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15 to 95 cms are predicted. Compared withthe previous decade, sea ice melting in theArctic has doubled in the past decade. Theice shelf in the Antarctic is retreating at anunprecedented rate, with a temperature riserecorded of 2.5 degrees Centigrade in the last50 years. The ozone layer is thinning overboth poles, including a 60 per cent decreasein its concentration over the Antarctic.

It was in recognition of the possibility ofirreversible damage from the risingconcentrations of greenhouse gases, at leastpartly attributable to human activity, that theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) was set up nearly ten years ago. In1990, it produced a report stating thatatmospheric concentrations of carbondioxide at levels posing no danger to thestability of the world’s climate requires a 60to 80 per cent reduction. In the light offurther research by the hundreds of scientistscontributing to the Panel’s work, it has notseen the need to revise its consensualjudgement. Its latest report indicates that,even if emissions were held at their currentlevel, concentrations would still rise byabout 40 per cent over the next hundredyears. One of its working groups recentlycalculated that the capacity of the oceans toact as carbon sinks is lower than had beenpreviously thought.

G rounds for allaying fears and specialpl ea d i ng

In light of all the evidence and commentaryset out above, it could have been expectedthat there would be intense debate about theprospects for air travel in the future,particularly from the viewpoint of the relatedindustries’ contribution to economic growthand employment. Clearly, public policy inthis domain should not be determined inisolation from considering its ecologicalimplications. What have been the responsesof those vested with responsibility forreaching rational decisions in areas such asthis where public interest objectives canconflict so starkly? Five key arguments infavour of limiting interference with thegrowth of the aviation and tourist industriescan be identified.

Scientific uncertainty

It is claimed that there are both positive andnegative feedbacks affecting global warmingand ozone depletion from aircraft flying athigh altitudes, and that the effects ofreductions in urban smog and acid rain-

reducing aerosols, which increase exposureto global warming, are not yet properlyunderstood. It has been suggested too thatmany years must elapse to allow for precisefigures to be made for research and analysisin order to measure the chemical andphysical characteristics of the atmosphere,particularly bearing in mind the fact that, forinstance, the occasional volcanic eruption isresponsible for more damage to the ozonelayer than can be identified as attributable tohuman activity. Thus, it may be too early tosay that the earth is necessarily in the grip ofglobal warming triggered by human activity:in other words, most climate scientists mayhave made incorrect calculations. Thewisdom of a ‘no regrets’ policy has thereforebeen proposed in which reliance at this stageis placed on technology to deliver what isseen to be cost-effective at present. Such apolicy was supported by signatories to theUN Framework Convention on ClimateChange at Rio in 1992 who agreed that ‘lackof full scientific certainty should not be usedas a reason for postponing cost-effectivemeasures to deal with climate change’. Inaddition, the transfer of shorter ‘long’journeys to more fuel-efficient rail travel hasbeen encouraged where this can be anavailable alternative.

However, in its 1994 report, the RoyalCommission on Environmental Pollutionnoted that ‘even if g lobal emissions werestabilised at 1990 levels, atmosphericconcentrations of carbon dioxide wouldcontinue to increase for several centuries’.Not surprisingly, the governments ofcountries with substantial populations livingin river delta regions, such as China,Bangladesh and Egypt, and therepresentatives of the alliance of the 35 smalllow-lying countries, have argued that theycannot afford the luxury of waiting forconclusive proof.

The roles of operational economies andtechnology

The second line of defence has been to citethe contribution that technology is making toreducing fuel consumption and pollutants byimproving efficiency in various operationalaspects - increased seat occupancy ratesthrough fares concesssions, new combustiontechniques, cleaner engines and betteraerodynamic performance, and newer wide-bodied aircraft carrying more passengers. It isnow claimed that fuel consumption can belowered by 10 to 20 per cent and nitrogen



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oxides by 50 per cent in the next 20 years.

However, it is clear that these measuresachieve a reduct ion in the unit cost of travelso that when combined with morecompetition, the rate of growth in air travelexpands well beyond the savings that havebeen and still can be brought about by thesemeans. The prospect has been raised that asolution may lie through the development ofcleaner emissions from aircraft has beenraised by research on hydrogen as a fuelsince this would not only minimise the useof finite energy resources but also theconsequent release of carbon dioxide. But,use of this fuel produces nitrogen oxides andwater vapour both of which contribute toglobal warming.

External costs

Somewhat more radically, it has been arguedthat the solution can be found in policybased on fairer and eco-oriented taxation. Forinstance, it has been proposed that air travelis managed on a ‘level playing field’ byremoving aviation fuel from tax exemption.However, modelling the effect of the higherfares that would come in the wake of thissmall additional tax suggests that demandwould only be marginally affected.

A complementary approach put forward hasbeen to oblige aircraft operators to pay thefull ‘external’ costs of air travel as this wouldlead to higher fares and thereby also toreduced demand. In this instance, on theother hand, a daunting task would bepresented to transport economists whowould have to determine notional values forthe costs of damage from greenhouse gasemissions and from the thinning of the ozonelayer (although this has been attempted).Account too would have to be taken of theeffects of these types of environmentaldamage on future generations, especially ifthe values were to reflect the fact that theemissions accumulate over time and somehave long lives in the atmosphere.

Action at the international level

The next positional gambit has been to pointout how unrealistic it would be for any onecountry to act unilaterally on this issue. In1992, at a London conference on the worldenvironment, John Major cited the fact thatthe UK only contributes three per cent of allemissions from human activity and thattherefore any decisions taken by hisgovernment would make little difference tosolving the global problem. On these

grounds, the focus must be on achievingpolitical collaboration on environmentalissues at the international level: the successof action on limiting the damage to the ozonelayer from the use of CFCs is oftenhighlighted as indicative of this assured,effective, and apparently successful strategy.However, even the effectiveness of theMontreal Protocol on removing ozonedepleting gases used in industry must becalled into question given recent evidencethat more of the depletion of the ozone layeris attributable to other sources than it is toCFCs, and that there is reason to believe thata major one of these is the nitrous oxideemissions from jet aircraft flying in thestratosphere.

Moreover, the wide-ranging issuessurrounding the burning of fossil fuels pointto the application of this path of diplomacy,in which politicians and scientists workcollaboratively, being fraught with infinitelygreater difficulties than those relating to thelimited number of gases thought to beresponsible for the thinning of the ozonelayer, and with only a limited number ofapplications in industry. The inadequacy ofthe current approach to resolving theproblem of greenhouse gas emissions isapparent f rom the difficulties in even settingwhat was clearly a wholly inadequate targetof stabilising carbon dioxide emissions attheir 1990 levels by the year 2000 - a 0 percent change - as a response to the IPCC callreferred to earlier for a 60 to 80 per centreduction in emissions. The fact that manyEU countries are almost certain to fail tomeet this modest target suggests that policyin this domain will require more intenseactivity, particularly if the further target of afive to ten per cent reduction by thedeveloped world by the year 2010 is to beachieved.

Fuel dependency and the partisan claim ofthe aviation and tourism industries

As a consequence of the phenomenal take-upof air travel, the economies of the destinationcountries become increasingly dependent forforeign earnings on its growth. With tourismas the third largest industry in the world,with an annual turnover greater thanUS$3000 billion, governmentsunderstandably become anxious if there isany downturn in demand for any reason or ifthere is any debate about its downside, suchas the damage to landscapes, thedestabilising of local cultures, the pollution



[ 4 6 ]

of air and water, let alone questioning oreven considering whether the benefits justifythe wider ecological impacts. As naturalallies in this venture, the industries ofaviation and tourism dependent on air travelpresent a confident stance in spite of thesteadily accumulating evidence of climatechange, to which they are contributing: theirsuccess in promoting and catering forsubstantial growth in public demand for theirservices encourages wider participation inthe apparently inexorable trajectory ofexpansion.

The point is made therefore that, in contrastto many other fossil fuel-dependent humanactivities, no alternative to kerosene exists asa fuel for aircraft, nor is there any prospect ofone being found soon enough to allow forconversion to its use. I t is claimed thereforethat it is more cost-effective to devoteattention to achieving reductions in the othersectors of the fossil fuel-using economy thanto burden the aviation industry with arequirement to deliver its fair share. It isargued that tourism, which is a growthindustry in nearly every country in the worldand a substantial and largely irreplaceablesource of foreign earnings for many of them,is heavily dependent on air travel as it catersfor over 70 per cent of tourist arrivals in atleast 20 of the major tourist-receivingcountries. In the UK, there has been fiercecriticism of the government for not reachingearly decisions on how its airport capacitycan be increased to accommodate the growth.The concern is that travellers will choose tofly to Paris, Frankfurt or Amsterdam unlessthe passenger carrying capacity of airportscan be increased, and that Heathrow, forexample, will loose its status as the leadinghub for international airlines in Europeunless it can handle an additional 30 millionpassengers on top of the current 50 million ayear.

Even in the face of the possibility ofcatastrophic environmental damage owing tothe fact that the population of the planetcannot conceivably support the developedworld’s level of energy-intensive lifestyles,these arguments imply that there is anunarguable right for the aviation and touristindustries to continue to follow their growthpaths into the future. Consideration of thisissue needs to be seen in the context of thevery reasonable intention of the governmentsof developing countries to advance thematerial prosperity of their people which, for

instance in the case of China, is almostwholly dependent on reserves of highlypolluting coal. Yet it is apparent that, unlessthe developed world makes major policychanges in this area to demonstrateconclusively its intention of modifying itspatterns of activity, it does not have thepolitical base from which to argue foragreement at the international level on thesubstantial cuts called for by the IPCC.Moreover, it does not have the ethical baseeither. No doubt, for this reason, the WorldCouncil of Churches is, with its moralauthority, at long last speaking out on it.

Discussi on o f issues rai sed

The UK government policy White Paperentitled This Common Inheritance referred tothe ethical imperative of stewardship andmankind’s duty to act prudently andconscientiously so that the planet is handedover to future generations in good order. Italso referred to the full integration ofenvironmental considerations into economicpolicy decisions to achieve sustainabledevelopment which it warned was not opento compromise. In practice, this imperativeand its political implications may require adramatic shift from the dedication to greaterefficiency and productivity. The objective ofrising material prosperity may have to beabandoned in favour of solutions derivedfrom analysis of a sustainable policy base. Asyet, however, governments around the worldhave given no warning that the public mayhave to be called upon to make necessarychanges which are likely to entail substantialrather than modest alterations to thelifestyles that they have only been able toadopt because these implications have beenlargely ignored.

If climate change, with its potentiallycatastrophic consequences, is to be avoided,the IPCC target for reduction must beconsidered in the context of internationaland intergenerational equity. There areneither moral grounds nor political prospectof obtaining international agreement on anyother basis for the populations of thedeveloping world cannot be expected toreduce the impact of their lifestyles bymaking the same 60 to 80 per centcontribution called for by the IPCC that wedo in the affluent West. For this reason, theexpansion of air travel and tourism to meetfuture demand must be considered in thecontext of its ecological consequences. Given



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the ceiling below which human activitieswhich lead to greenhouse gas emissions canbe maintained whilst at the same timepreventing the destabilisation of the climate,with its attendant major hazards, there wouldappear to be strong grounds forcontemplating the possibility of the need tomanage the marked contraction rather thanexpansion of the two industries.

The gravity of the situation is reflected in thefollowing Tables. On a per capita basis, theUK must cut its emissions by about 90 percent, that is over a five per cent annualreduction from now to 2040 - a very tallorder. But the rate rises to six per cent if wedo not start until 2000. Currently, totalannual UK emissions of carbon dioxide fromman-made activities are over 560 milliontonnes, shared out between the varioussectors shown in Table 1.



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Table 1. UK carbon dioxide emissions in million tonnes, by sector

Transport 139 25%Domestic 157 28%Industry 164 29%Other 107 18%All 567 100%

Source: Dept of Environment (1994)

Table 2. UK average annual per capita carbon dioxide emissions in tonnes,

and reductions needed to stabilise the world climate

IPCC recommendationcentral high equity-based

Current 60% reduction 80% reduction 90% reductionTransport 2.42 0.97 0.48 0.24Domestic 2.71 1.08 0.54 0.27Industry 2.83 1.13 0.57 0.28Other 1.84 0.73 0.37 0.18All 9.78 3.91 1.96 0.98

Table 2 shows these figures set out inrelation to current per capita emissions,together with the lowering of these emissionspro rata within the range of therecommended IPCC global reductions, andthe equity one based on its central figure. Itcan be seen that the average person in the UKaccounts for annual emissions of 9.78 tonnes.

To illustrate the significance of these figuresfor the future of air travel, especially fortourism, reference can be made to thequantity of carbon dioxide emitted on around trip by air from London to Florida,based on the aviation fuel used and typical

aircraft seat occupancy on such flights.Carbon dioxide emissions for one person’sround trip accounts for 1.8 tonnes, that is,just under half of the total average annualtonnage that can be allowed for each personfor all purposes, with the central IPCCrecommendation, and nearly double theannual tonnage that could be allowed on anequity base, if the world climate is to bestabilised.

It is clear that every sector of the economymust contribute its share towards reducingits greenhouse gas emissions, and especiallythose sectors causing most damage. I t hardlyneeds to be said that, if the reduction is notdelivered by some sectors - especially by thehigh energy-consuming populations of theworld - then other sectors and populationswould have to make even larger reductions toavert catastrophe. The environmentalproblems posed by air travel will not goaway. It is clear that the growth in air travel,particularly if airport capacity is increasedand the international tourist marketcontinues to expand, will intensify theenvironmental problems of climate changeand ozone depletion. From this perspective,the current path of aviation and internationaltourism runs counter to the goal ofenvironmental protection.

Given the obviously higher claims on fossilfuel consumption for the winter heating ofbuildings, the generation of electricity, thepower needed for industry, and the fuel forland-based motorised transport, air travelcannot be excused from measures required toachieve the necessary reductions shown inTable 2. Indeed, in the hierarchy of basicfuel-dependent human activities for theworld’s population now and in the future,little air travel can realistically be classifiedas ‘essential’.

The Royal Commission on EnvironmentalPollution indicated that ways must be found,and compromises reached, to reconcile theconflicting objectives of economic growthand environmental protection. What needs tobe faced is the very real dilemma that, inview of the planet’s limited capacity toabsorb greenhouse gas emissions from humanactivity without destabilising the climate,there is, at the least, a distinct possibility,and more likely a probability, that theseobjectives cannot be reconciled. The longerthat action is put off in the face of this simplebut crucial deduction, the more we intensifysocial and environmental problems for the

future, and the more we create difficulties forthe next generation in finding workablesolutions.

It is comforting to note that not all voiceswithin the aviation industry are complacent.Four years ago, the Director of theInternational Civil Aviation Organisationstated that

‘For many years, we have been accustomed togrowth in the aviation industry. Now we arefaced with the prospect that environmentalproblems could restra in growth. I t isconceivable that they might even lead to areduct ion of a ir t ransport act ivity… Theavia tion industry has an obligat ion to theworld’s population, and to future generations,to act responsibly on environmental issues,particularly the global ones. How to do thiswhile protect ing avia tion’s own legit imateinterests is one of the most serious challengesfacing civil aviation today’.

This strong statement mirrors the argumentsset out in this article on the dangers ofarriving at decisions affecting the future ofthe aviation and tourist industries which payinsufficient regard to the interface betweenthe objectives of transport and environmentalpolicy.

This critical issue could have been the focusof the House of Commons Select Committeeinquiry on UK Airport Capacity in its 1995-96 Session. However, when first raised withthe Committee Chairman, it was ruled to beoutside the Inquiry’s terms of reference.However, these terms were widened duringits course to allow evidence to be taken on it.The Memorandum written by the author ofthis article following this decision includedthe following three recommendations: first,that a methodology should be established toenable emissions from air transport to beincluded in national inventories so that thesecan be assigned to individual countries;second, that Government should be workingtowards setting more realistic targets ongreenhouse emissions, including targets forthe aviation industry; and third, that thisindustry should be involved in preparingpolicies and programmes to deliver its shareof the reduction of these emissions in orderto achieve the global objective of limitingclimate change.

The Report of the Committee, published inthe early summer of last year, does in factrefer to studies currently in progress onclimate change and on the impact of aircraftemissions at high altitude. In its conclusions,

it states that Government should determineits policy from a national interest perspectiveand calls on it to publish its response tothese studies and its implications for asustainable level of air transport. In light ofthis, it proposes that a new policy statementon aviation and airport capacity is produced‘without undue delay (later spelled out aswithin two years) so as to inform publicdebate… It may then need to revise its policythat demand should be met where it arises’(my italics), that is a possible trebling ofpassengers in the next 20 years.

Nevertheless, the wording in the Report givesevery impression that it does not considerthat the outcome of this process willseriously affect demand: its contents aremainly devoted to looking at alternativemeans of and locations for accommodatingthe forecast demand and speeding up‘cumbersome’ planning procedures,apparently accepting the concerns expressedthat, if this is not done, the UK economywould be seriously damaged. Indeed, thequestioning of this witness by the Chairmanof the Committee implied strongly that ifclimate change were to prove on balance tobe in the UK’s national interest, it should bewelcomed! And another member of theCommittee in apparent justification of itsmembers’ demonstration of occasional tunnelvision stated that their role was to representtheir constituents, in turn implying that MPscannot hold independent views.

A further indication of the failure ofGovernment and relevant institutions tobegin to address this subject in a mannerreflecting its importance - the likelihood thatindustrial and commercial practices andcurrent lifestyles will have to be substantiallymodified - is apparent in the stance taken byanother House of Commons SelectCommittee. In May last year, the NationalHeritage Committee announced its intentionof conducting an Inquiry, the main aim ofwhich was to establish what can be done toencourage tourists to come to the UK. In spiteof the obvious error of determining publicpolicy decisions in this domain withoutreference to the consequential release ofgreenhouse gas emissions into the upperatmosphere - almost certainly a key issue toconsider - its Chairman ruled that evidenceon this topic cannot be taken as it wouldextend the scope of the Inquiry beyond thetime available.



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Concl u s i on

It would appear that politicians and publicalike are, trance-like, travelling down theroad to ecological Armageddon, intoning themantra about the economy’s dependence oncatering for growth and the need for newjobs, whilst uttering pious statements aboutmankind’s duty to act prudently so that theplanet can be handed over to futuregenerations in good order.

When Darwin’s Origin of Species was firstpublished, the ecclesiastical authorities kepttheir collective heads well down, hoping nodoubt that his ‘theory’ would be disprovedand that their image of God as the designer ofeach species on which their texts were andremain based would triumphantly prevail.



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Now, we have a new heresy, this timechallenging two long-standing and widely-shared beliefs, first, that economic growthhas no limits and that the demand itgenerates from the six billion on the planet issustainable in a resource sense, and second,that ecological problems that come in itswake can be resolved satisfactorily.

Clearly, in the policy domains which are thesubject of this article, governments aroundthe world, especially those representing itsmore affluent member states, cannot go onindefinitely side-stepping the need fordetailed studies of the crucial interfacebetween policy on promoting air travel, andthat sector of tourism dependent on it, andinternational policy on limiting greenhousegas emissions.

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