world bank vietnam economic progress 2013.pdf
TRANSCRIPT
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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Hanoi July10 2013
TAKING STOCK AN UPDATE ON VIETNAMrsquoS
RECENT ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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AN UPDATE ON VIETNAMrsquoSRECENT ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS
TAKING STOCK
This report has been prepared by Deepak Mishra and Viet Tuan Dinh with contributions from
James Anderson Reena Badiani Quang Hong Doan Sameer Goyal Duc Minh Pham Habib Rab
Gregory Smith and Viet Quoc Trieu under the general guidance of Victoria Kwakwa and Sudhir Shetty
Administrate assistance was provided by Linh Anh Thi Vu
The World Bank
Hanoi July 983089983088 983090983088983089983091
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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CDS Credit Default Swap
CIT Corporate Income Tax
CPI Consumer Price Index
EAP East Asia and Paci1047297c
ECB European Central Bank
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GI Government Inspector
GSO General Statistics Office
IIP Index of Industrial Production
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPO Initial Public Off ering
MampA Mergers and Acquisition
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MampE Monitoring and Evaluation
MOF Ministry of Finance
MPI Ministry of Planning
NCERD National Steering Committee for Enterprise
Retructuring and Development
NPL Non-performing Loans
ODA Official Development Assistance
PMI Purchasing Manager Index
QE Quantitative Easing
ROW Rest of the World
SBV State Bank of Vietnam
SEDP Socio-Economic Development Plan
SME Small Medium Enterprise
SOCB State-owned Commercial Bank
SOEs State-owned Enterprises
USA United State of America
VAT Value Added Tax
VAMC Vietnam Asset Management Company
VHLSS Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey
WTO World Trade Organization
ACRONYMS AND
ABBREVIATIONS
CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE US$ = VND 21036
Government Fiscal Year January 1 to December 31
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PART I GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 5
A Global Growth is Consolidating 5
B Financial Market Conditions have Seen Signi1047297cant Improvements 6
C In1047298ationary Pressures Remain Benign Promoting Monetary Policy Easing 7
D Trade Remains Volatile Though Commodity Prices are Easing 9
E Medium-Term Growth Outlook 10
F Risks to Outlook 11
PART II VIETNAM RECENT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 15
A Macroeconomic Conditions Continue to Improve but Growth Remains Sluggish 15
B The Real Sector Is Slow Growth Here to Stay 17C Performance of The External Sector Continues to be Impressive 21
D In1047298ation Has Stabilized But In1047298ationary Expectation are Not 27
E Monetary Policy Eff ectiveness Has been Hindered by Banking Sector Problems 28
F Fiscal Development and Policies 29
G Near-term Outlook 33
PART III AN UPDATE ON THE RESTRUCTURING AGENDA 35
A Banking Sector Update 35
B State-Owned Enterprise Reforms 39
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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6
B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS
4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of
quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial
conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow
of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken
by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank
of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of
a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013
underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets
5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013
gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)
to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel
1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically
high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion
in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial
public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe
and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows
6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks
Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been
rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of
the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness
of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back
into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better
stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part
of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines
Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices
Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1
Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )
Developing Countries
World
High-income countries
100
1679
1196
1120
1053
1020
93590
110
130
150
170
Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)
China
South Asia
East Asia (ex
China)
Global
Europe and
Central Asia
High-income
countries
Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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7
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13
New equity issuance Bond issuance
Bank Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13
Implied developing country yield
US 10 year treasury yield
Spread
C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING
7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-
income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK
In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao
PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation
remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal
burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and
armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth
8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan
Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam
Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised
interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign
given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity
already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity
without commensurate payoff in additional output
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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8
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures
to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures
on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand
the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ
announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)
program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US
While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international
capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly
22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely
to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in
local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the
Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of
2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)
The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for
Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly
important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries
in 2012
FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298
ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt
3279 647 2632 4214
Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945
Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269
PR China 735 103 98 05 84
Brazil 30 281 56 224 58
Thailand 31 23 15 09 33
Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20
India 136 5 34 16 19
Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14
Mexico 26 116 05 111 14
Philippines 9 27 03 25 12
Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)
935
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
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9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
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10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
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11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
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12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
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14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
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17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041
19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941
28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3041
29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341
32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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AN UPDATE ON VIETNAMrsquoSRECENT ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS
TAKING STOCK
This report has been prepared by Deepak Mishra and Viet Tuan Dinh with contributions from
James Anderson Reena Badiani Quang Hong Doan Sameer Goyal Duc Minh Pham Habib Rab
Gregory Smith and Viet Quoc Trieu under the general guidance of Victoria Kwakwa and Sudhir Shetty
Administrate assistance was provided by Linh Anh Thi Vu
The World Bank
Hanoi July 983089983088 983090983088983089983091
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CDS Credit Default Swap
CIT Corporate Income Tax
CPI Consumer Price Index
EAP East Asia and Paci1047297c
ECB European Central Bank
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GI Government Inspector
GSO General Statistics Office
IIP Index of Industrial Production
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPO Initial Public Off ering
MampA Mergers and Acquisition
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MampE Monitoring and Evaluation
MOF Ministry of Finance
MPI Ministry of Planning
NCERD National Steering Committee for Enterprise
Retructuring and Development
NPL Non-performing Loans
ODA Official Development Assistance
PMI Purchasing Manager Index
QE Quantitative Easing
ROW Rest of the World
SBV State Bank of Vietnam
SEDP Socio-Economic Development Plan
SME Small Medium Enterprise
SOCB State-owned Commercial Bank
SOEs State-owned Enterprises
USA United State of America
VAT Value Added Tax
VAMC Vietnam Asset Management Company
VHLSS Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey
WTO World Trade Organization
ACRONYMS AND
ABBREVIATIONS
CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE US$ = VND 21036
Government Fiscal Year January 1 to December 31
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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PART I GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 5
A Global Growth is Consolidating 5
B Financial Market Conditions have Seen Signi1047297cant Improvements 6
C In1047298ationary Pressures Remain Benign Promoting Monetary Policy Easing 7
D Trade Remains Volatile Though Commodity Prices are Easing 9
E Medium-Term Growth Outlook 10
F Risks to Outlook 11
PART II VIETNAM RECENT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 15
A Macroeconomic Conditions Continue to Improve but Growth Remains Sluggish 15
B The Real Sector Is Slow Growth Here to Stay 17C Performance of The External Sector Continues to be Impressive 21
D In1047298ation Has Stabilized But In1047298ationary Expectation are Not 27
E Monetary Policy Eff ectiveness Has been Hindered by Banking Sector Problems 28
F Fiscal Development and Policies 29
G Near-term Outlook 33
PART III AN UPDATE ON THE RESTRUCTURING AGENDA 35
A Banking Sector Update 35
B State-Owned Enterprise Reforms 39
TABLE OF CONTENTS
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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6
B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS
4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of
quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial
conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow
of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken
by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank
of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of
a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013
underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets
5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013
gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)
to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel
1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically
high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion
in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial
public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe
and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows
6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks
Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been
rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of
the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness
of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back
into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better
stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part
of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines
Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices
Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1
Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )
Developing Countries
World
High-income countries
100
1679
1196
1120
1053
1020
93590
110
130
150
170
Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)
China
South Asia
East Asia (ex
China)
Global
Europe and
Central Asia
High-income
countries
Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 841
7
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13
New equity issuance Bond issuance
Bank Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13
Implied developing country yield
US 10 year treasury yield
Spread
C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING
7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-
income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK
In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao
PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation
remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal
burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and
armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth
8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan
Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam
Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised
interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign
given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity
already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity
without commensurate payoff in additional output
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 941
8
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures
to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures
on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand
the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ
announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)
program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US
While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international
capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly
22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely
to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in
local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the
Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of
2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)
The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for
Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly
important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries
in 2012
FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298
ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt
3279 647 2632 4214
Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945
Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269
PR China 735 103 98 05 84
Brazil 30 281 56 224 58
Thailand 31 23 15 09 33
Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20
India 136 5 34 16 19
Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14
Mexico 26 116 05 111 14
Philippines 9 27 03 25 12
Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)
935
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1041
9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1141
10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241
11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1341
12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441
13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541
14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741
16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041
19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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CDS Credit Default Swap
CIT Corporate Income Tax
CPI Consumer Price Index
EAP East Asia and Paci1047297c
ECB European Central Bank
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GI Government Inspector
GSO General Statistics Office
IIP Index of Industrial Production
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPO Initial Public Off ering
MampA Mergers and Acquisition
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MampE Monitoring and Evaluation
MOF Ministry of Finance
MPI Ministry of Planning
NCERD National Steering Committee for Enterprise
Retructuring and Development
NPL Non-performing Loans
ODA Official Development Assistance
PMI Purchasing Manager Index
QE Quantitative Easing
ROW Rest of the World
SBV State Bank of Vietnam
SEDP Socio-Economic Development Plan
SME Small Medium Enterprise
SOCB State-owned Commercial Bank
SOEs State-owned Enterprises
USA United State of America
VAT Value Added Tax
VAMC Vietnam Asset Management Company
VHLSS Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey
WTO World Trade Organization
ACRONYMS AND
ABBREVIATIONS
CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE US$ = VND 21036
Government Fiscal Year January 1 to December 31
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PART I GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 5
A Global Growth is Consolidating 5
B Financial Market Conditions have Seen Signi1047297cant Improvements 6
C In1047298ationary Pressures Remain Benign Promoting Monetary Policy Easing 7
D Trade Remains Volatile Though Commodity Prices are Easing 9
E Medium-Term Growth Outlook 10
F Risks to Outlook 11
PART II VIETNAM RECENT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 15
A Macroeconomic Conditions Continue to Improve but Growth Remains Sluggish 15
B The Real Sector Is Slow Growth Here to Stay 17C Performance of The External Sector Continues to be Impressive 21
D In1047298ation Has Stabilized But In1047298ationary Expectation are Not 27
E Monetary Policy Eff ectiveness Has been Hindered by Banking Sector Problems 28
F Fiscal Development and Policies 29
G Near-term Outlook 33
PART III AN UPDATE ON THE RESTRUCTURING AGENDA 35
A Banking Sector Update 35
B State-Owned Enterprise Reforms 39
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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6
B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS
4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of
quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial
conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow
of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken
by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank
of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of
a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013
underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets
5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013
gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)
to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel
1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically
high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion
in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial
public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe
and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows
6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks
Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been
rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of
the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness
of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back
into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better
stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part
of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines
Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices
Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1
Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )
Developing Countries
World
High-income countries
100
1679
1196
1120
1053
1020
93590
110
130
150
170
Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)
China
South Asia
East Asia (ex
China)
Global
Europe and
Central Asia
High-income
countries
Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
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7
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13
New equity issuance Bond issuance
Bank Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13
Implied developing country yield
US 10 year treasury yield
Spread
C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING
7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-
income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK
In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao
PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation
remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal
burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and
armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth
8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan
Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam
Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised
interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign
given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity
already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity
without commensurate payoff in additional output
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8
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures
to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures
on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand
the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ
announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)
program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US
While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international
capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly
22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely
to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in
local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the
Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of
2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)
The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for
Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly
important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries
in 2012
FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298
ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt
3279 647 2632 4214
Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945
Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269
PR China 735 103 98 05 84
Brazil 30 281 56 224 58
Thailand 31 23 15 09 33
Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20
India 136 5 34 16 19
Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14
Mexico 26 116 05 111 14
Philippines 9 27 03 25 12
Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)
935
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
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9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
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10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
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11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441
13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541
14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741
16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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PART I GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 5
A Global Growth is Consolidating 5
B Financial Market Conditions have Seen Signi1047297cant Improvements 6
C In1047298ationary Pressures Remain Benign Promoting Monetary Policy Easing 7
D Trade Remains Volatile Though Commodity Prices are Easing 9
E Medium-Term Growth Outlook 10
F Risks to Outlook 11
PART II VIETNAM RECENT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 15
A Macroeconomic Conditions Continue to Improve but Growth Remains Sluggish 15
B The Real Sector Is Slow Growth Here to Stay 17C Performance of The External Sector Continues to be Impressive 21
D In1047298ation Has Stabilized But In1047298ationary Expectation are Not 27
E Monetary Policy Eff ectiveness Has been Hindered by Banking Sector Problems 28
F Fiscal Development and Policies 29
G Near-term Outlook 33
PART III AN UPDATE ON THE RESTRUCTURING AGENDA 35
A Banking Sector Update 35
B State-Owned Enterprise Reforms 39
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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6
B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS
4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of
quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial
conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow
of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken
by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank
of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of
a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013
underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets
5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013
gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)
to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel
1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically
high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion
in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial
public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe
and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows
6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks
Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been
rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of
the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness
of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back
into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better
stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part
of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines
Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices
Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1
Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )
Developing Countries
World
High-income countries
100
1679
1196
1120
1053
1020
93590
110
130
150
170
Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)
China
South Asia
East Asia (ex
China)
Global
Europe and
Central Asia
High-income
countries
Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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7
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13
New equity issuance Bond issuance
Bank Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13
Implied developing country yield
US 10 year treasury yield
Spread
C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING
7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-
income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK
In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao
PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation
remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal
burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and
armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth
8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan
Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam
Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised
interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign
given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity
already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity
without commensurate payoff in additional output
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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8
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures
to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures
on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand
the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ
announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)
program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US
While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international
capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly
22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely
to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in
local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the
Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of
2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)
The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for
Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly
important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries
in 2012
FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298
ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt
3279 647 2632 4214
Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945
Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269
PR China 735 103 98 05 84
Brazil 30 281 56 224 58
Thailand 31 23 15 09 33
Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20
India 136 5 34 16 19
Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14
Mexico 26 116 05 111 14
Philippines 9 27 03 25 12
Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)
935
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
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9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
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10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
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11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
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12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
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13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
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14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
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17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041
19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941
28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3041
29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3241
31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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6
B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS
4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of
quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial
conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow
of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken
by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank
of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of
a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013
underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets
5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013
gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)
to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel
1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically
high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion
in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial
public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe
and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows
6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks
Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been
rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of
the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness
of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back
into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better
stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part
of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines
Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices
Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1
Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )
Developing Countries
World
High-income countries
100
1679
1196
1120
1053
1020
93590
110
130
150
170
Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)
China
South Asia
East Asia (ex
China)
Global
Europe and
Central Asia
High-income
countries
Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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7
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13
New equity issuance Bond issuance
Bank Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13
Implied developing country yield
US 10 year treasury yield
Spread
C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING
7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-
income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK
In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao
PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation
remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal
burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and
armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth
8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan
Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam
Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised
interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign
given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity
already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity
without commensurate payoff in additional output
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8
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures
to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures
on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand
the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ
announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)
program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US
While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international
capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly
22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely
to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in
local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the
Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of
2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)
The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for
Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly
important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries
in 2012
FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298
ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt
3279 647 2632 4214
Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945
Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269
PR China 735 103 98 05 84
Brazil 30 281 56 224 58
Thailand 31 23 15 09 33
Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20
India 136 5 34 16 19
Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14
Mexico 26 116 05 111 14
Philippines 9 27 03 25 12
Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)
935
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1041
9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1141
10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241
11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1341
12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441
13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541
14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741
16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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6
B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS
4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of
quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial
conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow
of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken
by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank
of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of
a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013
underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets
5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013
gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)
to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel
1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically
high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion
in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial
public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe
and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows
6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks
Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been
rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of
the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness
of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back
into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better
stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part
of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines
Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices
Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1
Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )
Developing Countries
World
High-income countries
100
1679
1196
1120
1053
1020
93590
110
130
150
170
Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)
China
South Asia
East Asia (ex
China)
Global
Europe and
Central Asia
High-income
countries
Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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7
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13
New equity issuance Bond issuance
Bank Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13
Implied developing country yield
US 10 year treasury yield
Spread
C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING
7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-
income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK
In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao
PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation
remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal
burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and
armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth
8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan
Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam
Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised
interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign
given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity
already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity
without commensurate payoff in additional output
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8
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures
to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures
on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand
the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ
announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)
program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US
While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international
capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly
22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely
to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in
local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the
Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of
2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)
The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for
Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly
important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries
in 2012
FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298
ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt
3279 647 2632 4214
Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945
Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269
PR China 735 103 98 05 84
Brazil 30 281 56 224 58
Thailand 31 23 15 09 33
Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20
India 136 5 34 16 19
Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14
Mexico 26 116 05 111 14
Philippines 9 27 03 25 12
Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)
935
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
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9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
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10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
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11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
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12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
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13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
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14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041
19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941
28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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6
B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS
4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of
quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial
conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow
of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken
by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank
of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of
a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013
underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets
5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013
gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)
to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel
1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically
high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion
in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial
public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe
and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows
6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks
Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been
rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of
the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness
of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back
into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better
stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part
of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines
Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices
Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1
Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )
Developing Countries
World
High-income countries
100
1679
1196
1120
1053
1020
93590
110
130
150
170
Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)
China
South Asia
East Asia (ex
China)
Global
Europe and
Central Asia
High-income
countries
Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 841
7
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13
New equity issuance Bond issuance
Bank Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13
Implied developing country yield
US 10 year treasury yield
Spread
C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING
7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-
income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK
In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao
PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation
remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal
burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and
armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth
8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan
Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam
Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised
interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign
given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity
already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity
without commensurate payoff in additional output
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 941
8
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures
to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures
on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand
the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ
announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)
program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US
While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international
capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly
22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely
to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in
local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the
Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of
2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)
The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for
Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly
important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries
in 2012
FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298
ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt
3279 647 2632 4214
Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945
Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269
PR China 735 103 98 05 84
Brazil 30 281 56 224 58
Thailand 31 23 15 09 33
Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20
India 136 5 34 16 19
Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14
Mexico 26 116 05 111 14
Philippines 9 27 03 25 12
Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)
935
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1041
9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1141
10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241
11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1341
12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441
13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541
14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741
16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041
19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941
28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3541
34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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7
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13
New equity issuance Bond issuance
Bank Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13
Implied developing country yield
US 10 year treasury yield
Spread
C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING
7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-
income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK
In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao
PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation
remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal
burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and
armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth
8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan
Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam
Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised
interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign
given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity
already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity
without commensurate payoff in additional output
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8
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures
to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures
on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand
the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ
announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)
program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US
While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international
capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly
22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely
to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in
local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the
Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of
2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)
The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for
Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly
important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries
in 2012
FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298
ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt
3279 647 2632 4214
Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945
Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269
PR China 735 103 98 05 84
Brazil 30 281 56 224 58
Thailand 31 23 15 09 33
Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20
India 136 5 34 16 19
Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14
Mexico 26 116 05 111 14
Philippines 9 27 03 25 12
Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)
935
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
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9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
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10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
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12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541
14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 941
8
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures
to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures
on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand
the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ
announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)
program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US
While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international
capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly
22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely
to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in
local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the
Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of
2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)
The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for
Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly
important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries
in 2012
FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298
ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt
3279 647 2632 4214
Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945
Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269
PR China 735 103 98 05 84
Brazil 30 281 56 224 58
Thailand 31 23 15 09 33
Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20
India 136 5 34 16 19
Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14
Mexico 26 116 05 111 14
Philippines 9 27 03 25 12
Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6
Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries
Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)
935
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1041
9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1141
10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241
11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1341
12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441
13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541
14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041
19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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9
D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING
9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate
again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration
in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing
countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)
However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed
in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below
trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March
10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption
patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural
commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines
appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the
high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term
The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015
re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals
prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting
increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)
growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual
improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices
Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration
while commodity prices are steadily declining
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13
Agricultural goods
Energy
Metals amp Minerals
USD price indexes January 2005=10
Developing-country Imports
Euro Area Exports
Other High-income
Exports
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10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
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11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
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12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
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13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
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14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941
28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3041
29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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10
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
More than half of developing
country trade is now with other
developing countries up from 37
percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation
with 26 percent of total exports
from all developing countries
now going to China up from
14 percent in 2001 But even
excluding Chinarsquos trade with other
developing countries growth
of trade between developing
countries has also outpaced their
trade with high-income countries
by a wide margin in the last decade
(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US
dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent
over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent
for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-
developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country
exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013
East Asalaamp
Paci1047297c
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europeamp
Central Asla
Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent
Average all developing countries
All developing Developing (exd China)
Average (exd China) Average exports to
High Income countries
High-Income Imports
Latin
Americanamp
Caribbean
Middle-east
ampnorth
Africa
Sub-saharan
AfricaSouth Asla
E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and
uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The
recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent
in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right
panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing
countries
Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013
40
28
22 22
30 33
76
62
48 51
56 57
29
1713 12
20 23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
22
30 33
51
56 57
12
2013 2 4 2 15
World
Developing Countries
High-income countries
012345678
E a s t A s i a amp
P a c i 1047297 c
E u r o p e amp
C e n t r a l A s i a
L a t i n A m e r i c a amp
C a r i b b e a n
M i d d l e E a s t amp N
A f r i c a
S o u t h A s i a
S
u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
2012 2013 2014 2015
Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
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12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441
13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541
14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741
16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241
11
12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in
an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market
Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby
reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the
tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in
coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the
year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening
to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015
13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some
signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started
to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth
However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in
periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is
projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014
and to about 15 percent by 2015
14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal
stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture
and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some
corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension
funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015
15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions
Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by
51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story
however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries
can be identi1047297ed
Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly
and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating
Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and
Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus
Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East
amp North Africa)
Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1341
12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441
13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541
14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741
16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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12
F RISKS TO OUTLOOK
16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining
prominence
Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative
easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates
to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly
domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been
on the upswing
Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices
have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices
(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If
commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged
in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal
setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain
Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real
eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing
country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese
exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos
(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent
that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to
the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and
potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441
13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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13
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10
United States 24 21 24 25 25
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010
Interest Rates
$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14
Real GDP growth
World 28 23 22 30 33
High income 17 13 12 20 23
Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15
Japan -05 20 14 14 13
United States 18 22 20 28 30
Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57
East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75
ANNEX
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Table 1 Global Economic Outlook
Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank
2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f
Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75
China 104 93 78 77 80 79
Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62
Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53
Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64
Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55
Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54
Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60
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14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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14
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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16
Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening
Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank
0
5
10
15
20
25
J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13
In1047298ation rate (yy in )
Resolution 11
16000
18000
20000
22000
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$
Resolution 11
16
19 18
16
22 23
23
27 28
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
International reserves (in months of import
Resolution 11
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
J - 1 1
M - 1 1
M - 1 1
J - 1 1
S - 1 1
N - 1 1
J - 1 2
M - 1 2
M - 1 2
J - 1 2
S - 1 2
N - 1 2
J - 1 3
M - 1 3
M - 1 3
Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke
Resolution 11
Sovereign spreads
CDS 5 years
51
95
48
78
54
64
49
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Real GDP Growth ()
annual
3-year moving average
East Asian Crisis
Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841
17
B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY
20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic
reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy
extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter
and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced
two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly
GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an
economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However
Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current
growth slowdown
21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than
China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia
Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the
crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally
high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower
than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at
a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010
22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry
seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22
percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27
percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling
prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic
demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force
contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution
during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of
Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
0
2
4
6
8
10
q 1 - 0 5
q 1 - 0 6
q 1 - 0 7
q 1 - 0 8
q 1 - 0 9
q 1 - 1 0
q 1 - 1 1
q 1 - 1 2
q 1 - 1 3
Growth rate (quarterly )
Growth rate (annual )119
88
59 6352
6168
5854 57
4348
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
China Indonesia
Philippines Vietnam
Malaysia Thailand
Real GDP growth rate (in )
1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041
19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941
18
23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private
consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline
Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53
percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due
to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in
2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a
slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right
panel 1047297gure 7)
Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
15 12 13 1006
2925 24
2020
32
28 26
22 23
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )
Services
Industry amp
Construcon
Primary01
-04 -05 -02 01
21 19 23 20 16
0403
0404
03
49
35
4341
34
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Net exports
Investment
Govt
consumption
Private
consumption
GDP growth
Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist
enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)
delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months
for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in
Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-
intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of
houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos
estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four
months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to
10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income
households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the
National Assembly
Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013
nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same
time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period
last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are
often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises
SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media
Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041
19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141
20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941
28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3041
29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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19
24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total
investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below
the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither
sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of
nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state
sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to
be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however
worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in
credit growth during the last two years
25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the
economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion
(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam
that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms
Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12
percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic
problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the
East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and
political stability
Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators
159129
159 147123 115 109
164
134133 139
128 119 109
104
118 100 9982
71 78
427
382 392 385
333
305 296
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13
Total
Foreign
Non- state
(domestic)
State
Investment by ownership ( of GDP)
80
115
100
110 110105
10
12
1010
8
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI Implemented
FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion
(right scale)
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941
28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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20
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam
According to the 201213 ASEAN
Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of
Commerce Vietnam remains the most
popular location for expansion within
the ASEAN region by a wide margin
Thailand is ranked second followed
by Singapore and the Philippines (see
adjacent 1047297gure)
Similarly the 201213 National
Business Survey of the Singapore
Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen
overseas investment destination for its
members after Myanmar (see adjacent
1047297gure) The traditionally popular
investment destinations such as China
and India seem to be less favored than
in the past Indonesia and Thailand
remain close competitors to Vietnam
as the other overseas ventures of
interest to SBF members
Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213
Vietnam
Vietnam
Thailand
Thailand
Americas
India
0 5
9
12
12
815
1214
18
2012
2011
17
21
24
21
11
11
11
18
10 15 20 25 30
China (including Hong Kong)
Singapore Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Cambodia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Laos
Location of Expansion in ASEAN
Top 10 keen Overseas Venture
1226678
11
57
26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises
catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth
in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a
year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering
picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI
slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with
a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of
2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel
1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems
seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market
Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors
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21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
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22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
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23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
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25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241
21
C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE
Oslash Exports
27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems
Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent
in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices
Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue
to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that
have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported
$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of
seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed
$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2
2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015
Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have
started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world
Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand
Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13
Expansion
Contr action
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13
Retail Sales and Services (in )
Real growth ()
Nominal growth ()
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341
22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441
23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941
28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3241
31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341
32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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22
Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in
US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160
Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21
Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170
Agriculture
Rice 37 32 126 04 -52
Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113
Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35
Low cost manufacturing
Garment 151 132 253 75 180
Footwear 73 63 279 109 142
Wood products 47 41 137 179 131
Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445
Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970
Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185
Others 346 302 340 87 31
Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38
Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237
Table 3 Merchandise Exports
Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years
Crude oil20
Rice4
Agriculture20
Garments16
Footwear11
Electronicsamp
computers3
Other26
2002
Crude oil7
Rice3
Agriculture9
Garments13
Footwear7
Electronicsamp
computers7
Phonesand parts
11
Tranportvehicles
and parts4
Machineryand parts
4
Plasticproducts
3
Other32
2012
Source General Department of Customs
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
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25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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23
Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years
28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten
years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value
in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value
manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items
which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)
29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past
decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent
of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the
share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN
Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is
important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South
Asia and Latin America
China9
Japan15
USA14
EU20
ASEAN14
East Asia
(exclJapan)
10
18
2002China11
Japan11
USA17
EU
18
ASEAN
15
East Asia(excl
Japan)10
18
2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World
Oslash Imports
30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for
capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to
increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent
during 2012 re1047298
ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill
Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import
growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and
consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate
goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production
may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier
Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of
322 percent during 2012
Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541
24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641
25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741
26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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24
Table 4 Merchandise Imports
Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports
Import Turnover 2012 Growth in
US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13
Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170
Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229
Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods
Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134
Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610
Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926
Materials
Steel 60 52 45 -72 126
Plastics 48 42 261 09 145
Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161
Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50
Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39
Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370
Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132
Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221
Products
Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229
Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91
Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87
Paper 12 10 154 90 127
Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28
Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66
Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270
Source General Department of Customs
Motorvehicles8
Machineryamp
equipment26
Petroproducts14Agricultural
Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics4
Textilematerial22
Hi-techintermediat
e5
2002
Motorvehicles3
Machineryamp
equipment20
Petroproducts11
Agriculturalmaterials
4Metal11
Chemicals6
Plastics6
Textilematerial16
Hi-techintermediat
e23
2012Motorvehicles6
Machineryamp
equipments19
Petro
products10
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8Chemicals
5
Plastics3
Textilematerials16
Hi-tech
intermediates3
Other27
2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery
ampequipments
14
Petroproducts
8
Agriculturalmaterials
3Metals8
Chemicals5
Plastics4
Textilematerials11
Hi-techintermediates
16
Other29
2012
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
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25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
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26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341
32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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25
Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources
31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports
basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment
petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen
while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the
total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural
materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade
32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in
the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from
China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many
other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their
primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national
companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply
chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but
mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries
China11
Japan13
USA2
EU10
ASEAN24
East Asia(excl
Japan)28
12
2002
China25
Japan10
USA4
EU8
ASEAN18
East Asia(excl
Japan)22
Rest of the WorldRest of the World13
2012
Oslash Trade Balance
33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The
level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since
improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth
in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running
a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With
imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the
coming years
Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank
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26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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26
-27-40
-24 -27 -14
-36 -30-42
-64
-89 -94
-116
-202
-247
-172
-148-161
-115
-43
-01
02 00 06 12
25 1812 13
34 49
65 61 66
43
22
63
123
36
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13
Domestic sector
FDI sector
Total
Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors
Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)
Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)
Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates
Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves
34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are
likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)
and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus
of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was
in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)
The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22
months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)
16
19 18
16
22 23 23
2728
0
1
2
3
Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13
- 1
1 0 -60
-38 02
59
126 111
61 53
58
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e
Capital account
Current account
Overall balance
Surplus
De1047297cit
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841
27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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27
Source GSO
Source GSO
D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT
35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June
2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely
contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff
ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of
agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core
in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that
are administratively managed
36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education
services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have
been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user
charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase
in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10
00
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13
Monthly
year-on-year
0
10
20
30
40
May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13
Headline
Food
Core
Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months
Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Beverage amp tobacco
Garment hats footwear
Household appliancies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13
Healthcare
Transport
Education
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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28
E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS
37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had
limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam
the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis
points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and
deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money
(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit
to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)
compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)
38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired
by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector
They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions
loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large
enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second
1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the
real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-
guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of
which were subscribed by the credit institutions
39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the
banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector
mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains
subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand
has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely
to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative
consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market
and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring
of SOEs) continues to be an imperative
4
12
14
16
Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13
Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate
0
10
20
30
40
Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1
Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo
6
8
10
Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )
Source SBV
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
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29
F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower
growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased
to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228
percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit
which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits
governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP
ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013
domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year
Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years
Source
1 9 2
1 2 6 3
0 2 9
2 7
2 7
2 6 2
9 3 0
2 8
2 9
External
Debt
Domesc
Debt
3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of
maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
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32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
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33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
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38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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30
Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance
41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one
of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years
Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and
has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297
gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and
high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average
growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The
general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual
State Budget
42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the
governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak
revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue
which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54
percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over
time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing
economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between
2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections
were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate
in the budget
43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises
and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain
CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted
earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did
revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012
Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue
Source
Othertaxes
Nat Res tax
Trade taxes
Value Added Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341
32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
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34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
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39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3241
31
Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment
44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment
efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending
(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in
2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to
spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion
budgeted for 2011-2013
45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on
the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending
has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent
in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors
Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of
GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of
the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate
of growth of the budget
46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus
has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit
has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012
This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting
spending efficiency
1 6 9
1 7 9
1 8 5
2 0 3
1 9 7
1 8 1
1 8 7
1 9 3
2 0 3
1 9 5
9 2
9
4
9
1 9 1
1 1 8
1 4 9
1 1 6
8 5 7
8
7 1
Expenditure to GDP ratio ()
Capital
Recurrent
4436
48 43 46 46 45
16
12
1916 17 17 16
31
30
3330
29 2927
06
06
07
06 06 06
05
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget
2010 2012 2013
Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)
Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure
2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent
Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341
32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3541
34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741
36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341
32
Oslash 2013 State Budget
47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more
moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10
percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)
Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to
an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst
quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end
of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20
percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time
Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis
48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external
debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP
in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared
to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt
thresholds
49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth
to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic
scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small
increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid
deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent
liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid
rise in public debt
Debt indicator Government target 2012
Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent
Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent
Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent
Table 5 Debt burden indicators4
4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3541
34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741
36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441
33
50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with
potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained
economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of
potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State
Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital
spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly
any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs
G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013
and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take
several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see
table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and
no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half
of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent
2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p
Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54
Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79
Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40
Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505
Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33
1 GDP based on 2010 price
2 Includes off -budget items
3 Public and public-guaranteed debt
52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify
demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures
and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural
reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects
On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy
since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297
cantcounter-cyclical policies
Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3541
34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741
36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3541
34
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741
36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741
36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741
36
55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the
vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system
during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from
39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the
economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was
the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit
going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming
from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011
and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property
developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20
percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of
real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to
the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth
in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet
to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively
Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable
42
34
29
17
91 94
6560
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Credit to SOEs
SOEs borrowing from SOCBs
( of total credit to SOEs)
Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs
44
59
90114
100
39
59
86
115
95
30
60
90
120
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 e
Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)
DepositCredit
Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010
are not directly comparable to the previous years
Source State Bank of Vietnam
Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government
56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most
visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse
and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was
issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset
7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841
37
Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned
by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy
bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price
without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make
annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At
the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and
return the special bonds to AMC
57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility
According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust
debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and
lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses
and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL
ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or
valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide
the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed
by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent
auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets
58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and
acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking
sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu
Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)
and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with
the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent
state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank
Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November
2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases
of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund
was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily
created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is
a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected
lending and more systemic risks down the road
59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In
January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with
stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including
those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June
01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the
continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks
(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs
8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other
banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning
purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will
cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941
38
60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and
existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60
percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are
provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong
growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel
Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach
61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from
what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through
special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful
restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic
eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions
The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector
restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number
of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the
restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition
the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is
expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused
provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices
or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative
measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)
and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the
medium to long-term
62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs
through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs
(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision
20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be
exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of
interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active
managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do
nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the
NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs
in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial
system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and
NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For
successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic
restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation
10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041
39
B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS
63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has
been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-
Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The
Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic
groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July
2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate
governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state
general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new
regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations
have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs
it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized
64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for
the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include
Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision
14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government
ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state
ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision
of primary goods and services and high technology sectors
Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne
the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to
the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous
and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one
agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to
the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced
Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on
streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to
government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance
in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been
called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management
Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to
disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility
to monitor and report on SOE performance
65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency
coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations
independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies
This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs
operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each
otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving
the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like
national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new
arrangements is critical
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure
8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141
The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in
Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-
1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required
for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing
The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no
Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on
their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated
ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase
the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements
Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content
The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying
this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and
an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t
from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a
back seat The ideas include
Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure
Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge
of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the
central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs
Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a
standardized information disclosure system
Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant
enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones
Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing
could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining
SOEs with 100 percent state equity
Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)
Type of Information ()Number
with
Website
Basic
Information on
SOE
News and
Strategy
Overview
Annual report or
FSs or Auditor
report
Summarized
Financial
Information
SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8
Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0
Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8
Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure