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Hanoi, July10, 2013 TAKING STOCK AN UPDATE ON VIETNAM’S RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

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Page 1: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 141

Hanoi July10 2013

TAKING STOCK AN UPDATE ON VIETNAMrsquoS

RECENT ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENTS

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AN UPDATE ON VIETNAMrsquoSRECENT ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENTS

TAKING STOCK

This report has been prepared by Deepak Mishra and Viet Tuan Dinh with contributions from

James Anderson Reena Badiani Quang Hong Doan Sameer Goyal Duc Minh Pham Habib Rab

Gregory Smith and Viet Quoc Trieu under the general guidance of Victoria Kwakwa and Sudhir Shetty

Administrate assistance was provided by Linh Anh Thi Vu

The World Bank

Hanoi July 983089983088 983090983088983089983091

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CDS Credit Default Swap

CIT Corporate Income Tax

CPI Consumer Price Index

EAP East Asia and Paci1047297c

ECB European Central Bank

EU European Union

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GI Government Inspector

GSO General Statistics Office

IIP Index of Industrial Production

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPO Initial Public Off ering

MampA Mergers and Acquisition

MDG Millennium Development Goals

MampE Monitoring and Evaluation

MOF Ministry of Finance

MPI Ministry of Planning

NCERD National Steering Committee for Enterprise

Retructuring and Development

NPL Non-performing Loans

ODA Official Development Assistance

PMI Purchasing Manager Index

QE Quantitative Easing

ROW Rest of the World

SBV State Bank of Vietnam

SEDP Socio-Economic Development Plan

SME Small Medium Enterprise

SOCB State-owned Commercial Bank

SOEs State-owned Enterprises

USA United State of America

VAT Value Added Tax

VAMC Vietnam Asset Management Company

VHLSS Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey

WTO World Trade Organization

ACRONYMS AND

ABBREVIATIONS

CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE US$ = VND 21036

Government Fiscal Year January 1 to December 31

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PART I GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 5

A Global Growth is Consolidating 5

B Financial Market Conditions have Seen Signi1047297cant Improvements 6

C In1047298ationary Pressures Remain Benign Promoting Monetary Policy Easing 7

D Trade Remains Volatile Though Commodity Prices are Easing 9

E Medium-Term Growth Outlook 10

F Risks to Outlook 11

PART II VIETNAM RECENT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 15

A Macroeconomic Conditions Continue to Improve but Growth Remains Sluggish 15

B The Real Sector Is Slow Growth Here to Stay 17C Performance of The External Sector Continues to be Impressive 21

D In1047298ation Has Stabilized But In1047298ationary Expectation are Not 27

E Monetary Policy Eff ectiveness Has been Hindered by Banking Sector Problems 28

F Fiscal Development and Policies 29

G Near-term Outlook 33

PART III AN UPDATE ON THE RESTRUCTURING AGENDA 35

A Banking Sector Update 35

B State-Owned Enterprise Reforms 39

TABLE OF CONTENTS

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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6

B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS

4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of

quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial

conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow

of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken

by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank

of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of

a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013

underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets

5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013

gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)

to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel

1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically

high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion

in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial

public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe

and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows

6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks

Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been

rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of

the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness

of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back

into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better

stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part

of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines

Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices

Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1

Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )

Developing Countries

World

High-income countries

100

1679

1196

1120

1053

1020

93590

110

130

150

170

Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)

China

South Asia

East Asia (ex

China)

Global

Europe and

Central Asia

High-income

countries

Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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7

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13

New equity issuance Bond issuance

Bank Loans

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13

Implied developing country yield

US 10 year treasury yield

Spread

C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING

7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-

income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK

In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao

PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation

remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal

burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and

armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth

8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan

Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam

Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised

interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign

given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity

already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity

without commensurate payoff in additional output

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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8

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures

to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures

on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand

the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ

announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)

program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US

While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international

capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly

22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely

to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in

local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the

Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of

2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)

The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for

Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly

important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries

in 2012

FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298

ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt

3279 647 2632 4214

Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945

Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269

PR China 735 103 98 05 84

Brazil 30 281 56 224 58

Thailand 31 23 15 09 33

Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20

India 136 5 34 16 19

Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14

Mexico 26 116 05 111 14

Philippines 9 27 03 25 12

Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)

935

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

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10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241

11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541

14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741

16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041

19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141

20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941

28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3241

31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 2: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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AN UPDATE ON VIETNAMrsquoSRECENT ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENTS

TAKING STOCK

This report has been prepared by Deepak Mishra and Viet Tuan Dinh with contributions from

James Anderson Reena Badiani Quang Hong Doan Sameer Goyal Duc Minh Pham Habib Rab

Gregory Smith and Viet Quoc Trieu under the general guidance of Victoria Kwakwa and Sudhir Shetty

Administrate assistance was provided by Linh Anh Thi Vu

The World Bank

Hanoi July 983089983088 983090983088983089983091

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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CDS Credit Default Swap

CIT Corporate Income Tax

CPI Consumer Price Index

EAP East Asia and Paci1047297c

ECB European Central Bank

EU European Union

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GI Government Inspector

GSO General Statistics Office

IIP Index of Industrial Production

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPO Initial Public Off ering

MampA Mergers and Acquisition

MDG Millennium Development Goals

MampE Monitoring and Evaluation

MOF Ministry of Finance

MPI Ministry of Planning

NCERD National Steering Committee for Enterprise

Retructuring and Development

NPL Non-performing Loans

ODA Official Development Assistance

PMI Purchasing Manager Index

QE Quantitative Easing

ROW Rest of the World

SBV State Bank of Vietnam

SEDP Socio-Economic Development Plan

SME Small Medium Enterprise

SOCB State-owned Commercial Bank

SOEs State-owned Enterprises

USA United State of America

VAT Value Added Tax

VAMC Vietnam Asset Management Company

VHLSS Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey

WTO World Trade Organization

ACRONYMS AND

ABBREVIATIONS

CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE US$ = VND 21036

Government Fiscal Year January 1 to December 31

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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PART I GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 5

A Global Growth is Consolidating 5

B Financial Market Conditions have Seen Signi1047297cant Improvements 6

C In1047298ationary Pressures Remain Benign Promoting Monetary Policy Easing 7

D Trade Remains Volatile Though Commodity Prices are Easing 9

E Medium-Term Growth Outlook 10

F Risks to Outlook 11

PART II VIETNAM RECENT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 15

A Macroeconomic Conditions Continue to Improve but Growth Remains Sluggish 15

B The Real Sector Is Slow Growth Here to Stay 17C Performance of The External Sector Continues to be Impressive 21

D In1047298ation Has Stabilized But In1047298ationary Expectation are Not 27

E Monetary Policy Eff ectiveness Has been Hindered by Banking Sector Problems 28

F Fiscal Development and Policies 29

G Near-term Outlook 33

PART III AN UPDATE ON THE RESTRUCTURING AGENDA 35

A Banking Sector Update 35

B State-Owned Enterprise Reforms 39

TABLE OF CONTENTS

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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6

B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS

4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of

quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial

conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow

of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken

by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank

of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of

a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013

underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets

5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013

gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)

to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel

1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically

high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion

in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial

public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe

and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows

6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks

Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been

rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of

the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness

of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back

into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better

stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part

of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines

Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices

Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1

Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )

Developing Countries

World

High-income countries

100

1679

1196

1120

1053

1020

93590

110

130

150

170

Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)

China

South Asia

East Asia (ex

China)

Global

Europe and

Central Asia

High-income

countries

Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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7

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13

New equity issuance Bond issuance

Bank Loans

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13

Implied developing country yield

US 10 year treasury yield

Spread

C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING

7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-

income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK

In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao

PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation

remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal

burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and

armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth

8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan

Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam

Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised

interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign

given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity

already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity

without commensurate payoff in additional output

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 941

8

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures

to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures

on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand

the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ

announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)

program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US

While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international

capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly

22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely

to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in

local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the

Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of

2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)

The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for

Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly

important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries

in 2012

FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298

ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt

3279 647 2632 4214

Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945

Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269

PR China 735 103 98 05 84

Brazil 30 281 56 224 58

Thailand 31 23 15 09 33

Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20

India 136 5 34 16 19

Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14

Mexico 26 116 05 111 14

Philippines 9 27 03 25 12

Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)

935

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1041

9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1141

10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241

11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1341

12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441

13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541

14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741

16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841

17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041

19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341

32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3541

34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741

36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 3: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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CDS Credit Default Swap

CIT Corporate Income Tax

CPI Consumer Price Index

EAP East Asia and Paci1047297c

ECB European Central Bank

EU European Union

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GI Government Inspector

GSO General Statistics Office

IIP Index of Industrial Production

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPO Initial Public Off ering

MampA Mergers and Acquisition

MDG Millennium Development Goals

MampE Monitoring and Evaluation

MOF Ministry of Finance

MPI Ministry of Planning

NCERD National Steering Committee for Enterprise

Retructuring and Development

NPL Non-performing Loans

ODA Official Development Assistance

PMI Purchasing Manager Index

QE Quantitative Easing

ROW Rest of the World

SBV State Bank of Vietnam

SEDP Socio-Economic Development Plan

SME Small Medium Enterprise

SOCB State-owned Commercial Bank

SOEs State-owned Enterprises

USA United State of America

VAT Value Added Tax

VAMC Vietnam Asset Management Company

VHLSS Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey

WTO World Trade Organization

ACRONYMS AND

ABBREVIATIONS

CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE US$ = VND 21036

Government Fiscal Year January 1 to December 31

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PART I GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 5

A Global Growth is Consolidating 5

B Financial Market Conditions have Seen Signi1047297cant Improvements 6

C In1047298ationary Pressures Remain Benign Promoting Monetary Policy Easing 7

D Trade Remains Volatile Though Commodity Prices are Easing 9

E Medium-Term Growth Outlook 10

F Risks to Outlook 11

PART II VIETNAM RECENT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 15

A Macroeconomic Conditions Continue to Improve but Growth Remains Sluggish 15

B The Real Sector Is Slow Growth Here to Stay 17C Performance of The External Sector Continues to be Impressive 21

D In1047298ation Has Stabilized But In1047298ationary Expectation are Not 27

E Monetary Policy Eff ectiveness Has been Hindered by Banking Sector Problems 28

F Fiscal Development and Policies 29

G Near-term Outlook 33

PART III AN UPDATE ON THE RESTRUCTURING AGENDA 35

A Banking Sector Update 35

B State-Owned Enterprise Reforms 39

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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6

B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS

4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of

quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial

conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow

of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken

by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank

of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of

a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013

underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets

5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013

gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)

to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel

1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically

high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion

in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial

public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe

and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows

6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks

Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been

rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of

the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness

of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back

into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better

stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part

of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines

Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices

Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1

Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )

Developing Countries

World

High-income countries

100

1679

1196

1120

1053

1020

93590

110

130

150

170

Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)

China

South Asia

East Asia (ex

China)

Global

Europe and

Central Asia

High-income

countries

Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

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7

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13

New equity issuance Bond issuance

Bank Loans

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13

Implied developing country yield

US 10 year treasury yield

Spread

C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING

7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-

income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK

In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao

PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation

remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal

burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and

armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth

8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan

Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam

Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised

interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign

given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity

already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity

without commensurate payoff in additional output

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8

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures

to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures

on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand

the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ

announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)

program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US

While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international

capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly

22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely

to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in

local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the

Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of

2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)

The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for

Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly

important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries

in 2012

FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298

ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt

3279 647 2632 4214

Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945

Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269

PR China 735 103 98 05 84

Brazil 30 281 56 224 58

Thailand 31 23 15 09 33

Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20

India 136 5 34 16 19

Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14

Mexico 26 116 05 111 14

Philippines 9 27 03 25 12

Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)

935

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

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9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

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10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

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11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441

13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541

14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841

17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 4: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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PART I GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 5

A Global Growth is Consolidating 5

B Financial Market Conditions have Seen Signi1047297cant Improvements 6

C In1047298ationary Pressures Remain Benign Promoting Monetary Policy Easing 7

D Trade Remains Volatile Though Commodity Prices are Easing 9

E Medium-Term Growth Outlook 10

F Risks to Outlook 11

PART II VIETNAM RECENT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 15

A Macroeconomic Conditions Continue to Improve but Growth Remains Sluggish 15

B The Real Sector Is Slow Growth Here to Stay 17C Performance of The External Sector Continues to be Impressive 21

D In1047298ation Has Stabilized But In1047298ationary Expectation are Not 27

E Monetary Policy Eff ectiveness Has been Hindered by Banking Sector Problems 28

F Fiscal Development and Policies 29

G Near-term Outlook 33

PART III AN UPDATE ON THE RESTRUCTURING AGENDA 35

A Banking Sector Update 35

B State-Owned Enterprise Reforms 39

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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6

B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS

4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of

quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial

conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow

of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken

by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank

of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of

a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013

underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets

5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013

gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)

to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel

1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically

high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion

in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial

public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe

and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows

6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks

Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been

rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of

the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness

of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back

into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better

stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part

of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines

Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices

Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1

Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )

Developing Countries

World

High-income countries

100

1679

1196

1120

1053

1020

93590

110

130

150

170

Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)

China

South Asia

East Asia (ex

China)

Global

Europe and

Central Asia

High-income

countries

Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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7

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13

New equity issuance Bond issuance

Bank Loans

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13

Implied developing country yield

US 10 year treasury yield

Spread

C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING

7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-

income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK

In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao

PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation

remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal

burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and

armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth

8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan

Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam

Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised

interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign

given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity

already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity

without commensurate payoff in additional output

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8

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures

to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures

on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand

the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ

announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)

program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US

While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international

capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly

22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely

to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in

local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the

Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of

2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)

The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for

Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly

important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries

in 2012

FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298

ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt

3279 647 2632 4214

Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945

Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269

PR China 735 103 98 05 84

Brazil 30 281 56 224 58

Thailand 31 23 15 09 33

Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20

India 136 5 34 16 19

Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14

Mexico 26 116 05 111 14

Philippines 9 27 03 25 12

Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)

935

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

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9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

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10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

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11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

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13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

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14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

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17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

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18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041

19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141

20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941

28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3041

29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3241

31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 5: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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6

B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS

4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of

quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial

conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow

of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken

by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank

of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of

a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013

underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets

5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013

gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)

to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel

1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically

high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion

in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial

public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe

and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows

6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks

Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been

rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of

the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness

of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back

into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better

stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part

of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines

Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices

Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1

Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )

Developing Countries

World

High-income countries

100

1679

1196

1120

1053

1020

93590

110

130

150

170

Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)

China

South Asia

East Asia (ex

China)

Global

Europe and

Central Asia

High-income

countries

Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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7

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13

New equity issuance Bond issuance

Bank Loans

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13

Implied developing country yield

US 10 year treasury yield

Spread

C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING

7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-

income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK

In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao

PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation

remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal

burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and

armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth

8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan

Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam

Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised

interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign

given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity

already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity

without commensurate payoff in additional output

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8

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures

to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures

on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand

the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ

announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)

program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US

While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international

capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly

22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely

to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in

local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the

Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of

2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)

The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for

Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly

important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries

in 2012

FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298

ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt

3279 647 2632 4214

Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945

Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269

PR China 735 103 98 05 84

Brazil 30 281 56 224 58

Thailand 31 23 15 09 33

Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20

India 136 5 34 16 19

Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14

Mexico 26 116 05 111 14

Philippines 9 27 03 25 12

Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)

935

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1041

9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1141

10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241

11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1341

12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441

13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541

14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741

16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841

17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041

19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 6: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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6

B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS

4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of

quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial

conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow

of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken

by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank

of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of

a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013

underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets

5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013

gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)

to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel

1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically

high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion

in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial

public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe

and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows

6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks

Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been

rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of

the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness

of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back

into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better

stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part

of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines

Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices

Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1

Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )

Developing Countries

World

High-income countries

100

1679

1196

1120

1053

1020

93590

110

130

150

170

Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)

China

South Asia

East Asia (ex

China)

Global

Europe and

Central Asia

High-income

countries

Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

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7

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13

New equity issuance Bond issuance

Bank Loans

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13

Implied developing country yield

US 10 year treasury yield

Spread

C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING

7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-

income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK

In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao

PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation

remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal

burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and

armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth

8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan

Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam

Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised

interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign

given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity

already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity

without commensurate payoff in additional output

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8

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures

to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures

on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand

the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ

announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)

program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US

While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international

capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly

22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely

to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in

local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the

Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of

2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)

The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for

Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly

important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries

in 2012

FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298

ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt

3279 647 2632 4214

Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945

Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269

PR China 735 103 98 05 84

Brazil 30 281 56 224 58

Thailand 31 23 15 09 33

Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20

India 136 5 34 16 19

Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14

Mexico 26 116 05 111 14

Philippines 9 27 03 25 12

Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)

935

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

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9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

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10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

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11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

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13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541

14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741

16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841

17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141

20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941

28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 7: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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6

B FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTS

4 While the global 1047297nancial market conditions continue to improve eventual phasing out of

quantitative easing in advanced economies is beginning to worry investors The improvement in1047297nancial

conditions can be seen in lower yields on long-term debt higher stock market returns and near-record 1047298ow

of gross capital to developing countries This re1047298ects the extraordinary monetary policy easing undertaken

by the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States the Bank of England the ECB and most recently the Bank

of Japan as they have 1047298ooded global capital markets with liquidity At the same time the slightest hint of

a scaling back of the US stimulus program did send panic through many emerging markets in June 2013

underscoring the volatile nature of global capital markets

5 Gross capital1047298ows to developing countries have been robust During the1047297rst1047297ve months of 2013

gross capital 1047298ows (international bond issuance cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements)

to developing countries rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a historic high at $306 billion (left panel

1047297gure 2) International bond1047298ows to developing countries have been particularly robust reaching a historically

high level at $158 billion for the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of the year with the record monthly issuance of $45 billion

in April Syndicated bank lending to developing countries totaled $91 billion during the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 69 percent higher compared to a year ago There has also been a steady increase in equity 1047298owsmdashinitial

public off erings (IPOs) and follow-on issuancemdashdue to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia Europe

and Central Asia and Latin America and the recovery of IPO activity from last yearrsquos lows

6 Despite increased 1047298ows capital costs are rising re1047298ecting reduced high-income country risks

Developing countriesrsquo sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields (right panel 1047297gure 2) have been

rising despite their improved ratings and stronger investor appetite for developing-country bonds Part of

the decline in developing-country risk premiums over the past 1047297ve years was due to the increased riskiness

of high-income country debt Now that those risks are receding investors are shifting their portfolios back

into high-income country assets resulting in an increase in developing-country yields and spreads and better

stock-market performance in high-income countries These developments may also re1047298ect concern on the part

of investors about in1047298ation of asset prices in some developing countries (such as Brazil Indonesia Philippines

Thailand and Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices

Figure 1 While global growth is stabilizing recovery in industrial production has been uneven

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1

Quarterly GDP growth annualized (in )

Developing Countries

World

High-income countries

100

1679

1196

1120

1053

1020

93590

110

130

150

170

Pre-crisis peak 2013 (latest)

China

South Asia

East Asia (ex

China)

Global

Europe and

Central Asia

High-income

countries

Industrial production since global crisis (Index=100)

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 841

7

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13

New equity issuance Bond issuance

Bank Loans

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13

Implied developing country yield

US 10 year treasury yield

Spread

C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING

7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-

income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK

In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao

PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation

remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal

burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and

armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth

8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan

Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam

Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised

interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign

given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity

already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity

without commensurate payoff in additional output

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 941

8

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures

to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures

on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand

the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ

announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)

program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US

While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international

capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly

22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely

to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in

local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the

Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of

2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)

The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for

Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly

important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries

in 2012

FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298

ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt

3279 647 2632 4214

Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945

Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269

PR China 735 103 98 05 84

Brazil 30 281 56 224 58

Thailand 31 23 15 09 33

Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20

India 136 5 34 16 19

Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14

Mexico 26 116 05 111 14

Philippines 9 27 03 25 12

Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)

935

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1041

9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1141

10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241

11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441

13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541

14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741

16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841

17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041

19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141

20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941

28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3141

30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3241

31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341

32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 8: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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7

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

M-09 S-09 M-10 S-10 M-11 S-11 M-12 S-12 M-13

New equity issuance Bond issuance

Bank Loans

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

J-11 D-11 J-12 D-12 J-13

Implied developing country yield

US 10 year treasury yield

Spread

C INFLATIONARY PRESSURES REMAIN BENIGN PROMPTINGMONETARY POLICY EASING

7 Global in1047298ationary pressures remain relatively subdued in most countries In1047298ation in high-

income countries has remained low and within the comfort zone of their central banks except perhaps in UK

In1047298ationary pressures in China appear to have eased somewhat but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao

PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively accommodative macroeconomic policy and core in1047298ation

remains high in Vietnam In the Middle East amp North Africa high prices re1047298ect both eff orts to reduce the 1047297scal

burden of price subsidization by raising some regulated prices as well as supply disruptions caused by civil and

armed strife In South Asia as well as in Vietnam increases in administrative prices have also played a role ashave tight market conditions despite the relatively slow pace of growth

8 Monetary policy in developing countries continues to ease including in Albania Azerbaijan

Belarus Colombia Georgia India Kenya Mongolia Mexico Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Uganda and Vietnam

Only 1047297ve developing countries (Brazil the Arab Republic of Egypt Gambia Ghana and Tunisia) have raised

interest rates in 2013 Serbia raised and then cut rates Although global in1047298ationary pressures remain benign

given the lags in monetary policy transmission this additional easing may add to a strengthening activity

already under way resulting in additional in1047298ationary pressures in countries operating close to full capacity

without commensurate payoff in additional output

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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8

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures

to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures

on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand

the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ

announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)

program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US

While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international

capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly

22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely

to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in

local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the

Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of

2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)

The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for

Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly

important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries

in 2012

FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298

ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt

3279 647 2632 4214

Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945

Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269

PR China 735 103 98 05 84

Brazil 30 281 56 224 58

Thailand 31 23 15 09 33

Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20

India 136 5 34 16 19

Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14

Mexico 26 116 05 111 14

Philippines 9 27 03 25 12

Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)

935

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

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9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

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11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441

13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541

14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841

17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 9: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 941

8

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

In November 2012 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures

to 1047297ght against de1047298ation The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures

on April 4th this year These measures include the monthly purchase of yen75 trillion ($75 billion) ofthe Japanese government bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years It will also expand

the average maturity of bonds that it purchases from three to seven years More importantly the BoJ

announced that it would continue these ldquoas long as necessaryrdquo The BoJrsquos quantitative easing (QE)

program is broadly similar to the QE3 program in the US

While the immediate bene1047297ciary of the program is domestic assets its spillover into international

capital markets is inevitable especially because the Japanese bond market is relatively smallmdashonly

22 percent and 8 percent of US bond and equity market respectively The bulk of these 1047298ows are likely

to go to other high-income countries though Japanese investors have been actively investing in

local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (see table) According to the

Investment Trusts Association of Japan Japanese portfolio investment in local debt securities increasedin Mexico (by 34 percent) Turkey (28 percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 1047297rst two months of

2013 and at a less pronounced rate in Philippines (59 percent) and South Africa (44 percent)

The Japanese QE program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for

Japanese multinationals Rising outward FDI1047298ows from Japan in recent years have been particularly

important for Thailand and Vietnam accounting for 40 percent and 55 percent of those countries

in 2012

FDI Portfolio Investment Total capital1047298

ows from Japan Total Total PI Equity PI Debt

3279 647 2632 4214

Developed Countries 742 3203 619 2585 3945

Developing Countries 193 76 28 47 269

PR China 735 103 98 05 84

Brazil 30 281 56 224 58

Thailand 31 23 15 09 33

Indonesia 139 58 33 26 20

India 136 5 34 16 19

Malaysia 99 43 16 27 14

Mexico 26 116 05 111 14

Philippines 9 27 03 25 12

Vietnam 56 01 01 0 6

Box 1 Japanrsquos monetary easing and implications for developing countries

Japanese outward investment position by destination 2011 ($ billion)

935

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

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9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1141

10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1241

11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

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13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

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14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

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17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041

19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341

32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3541

34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741

36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941

38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 10: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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9

D TRADE REMAINS VOLATILE THOUGH COMMODITY PRICES ARE EASING

9 After a cyclical rebound in global trade the pace of trade expansion has started to decelerate

again Following the slump in Q2 2012 global trade began a cyclical rebound in Q3 led by acceleration

in developing country imports which sparked increase in exports from both high-income and developing

countries (left panel 1047297gure 3) South-South trade continued its rapid growth during this period (see box 2)

However re1047298ecting ongoing fragility in the global economic recovery the pace of trade expansion has slowed

in recent months Indeed in the three months of 2013 global trade expansion had decelerated to a below

trend pace of 08 percent compared with 109 percent in March

10 Commodity prices have weakened in response to new capacity and changing consumption

patterns Despite the strengthening of the global economy the prices of most industrial and agricultural

commodities have been declining (right panel 1047297gure 3) While it is still too early to be certain the declines

appear to result from both increased supply and increased substitution on the demand side induced by the

high prices of the past several years Expectations are that prices will continue to ease over the medium term

The World Bank forecast which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to $102 in 2013 and to $101 in 2015

re1047298ects a technical assumption that oil prices will slowly decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent

with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Canadian tar sands using existing technology Metals

prices are expected to decline in real terms by 37 and 14 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively re1047298ecting

increased supply and a gradual reduction in the metals intensity of developing-country (especially Chinese)

growth Food prices are also projected to decline (77 60 and 55 percent over 2013ndash15) re1047298ecting a gradual

improvement in supply conditions and reduced production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer prices

Figure 3 Trade has seen cyclical recovery and deceleration

while commodity prices are steadily declining

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Export and import volumes percent growth 3m3m sa

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

240

Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13

Agricultural goods

Energy

Metals amp Minerals

USD price indexes January 2005=10

Developing-country Imports

Euro Area Exports

Other High-income

Exports

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10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

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11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

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13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

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14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

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17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041

19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141

20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941

28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3041

29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 11: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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10

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

More than half of developing

country trade is now with other

developing countries up from 37

percent in 2001 China has playeda big role in this transformation

with 26 percent of total exports

from all developing countries

now going to China up from

14 percent in 2001 But even

excluding Chinarsquos trade with other

developing countries growth

of trade between developing

countries has also outpaced their

trade with high-income countries

by a wide margin in the last decade

(see adjacent 1047297gure) The US

dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 193 percent

over the past decade (175 percent if trade with China is excluded) whereas growth is about 11 percent

for developing-country exports to high income countries Interestingly the rapid expansion of intra-

developing-country trade re1047298ects more than just commodity trade with the value of developing-country

exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013

East Asalaamp

Paci1047297c

0

5

10

15

20

25

Europeamp

Central Asla

Average annual growth 2000-2011 percent

Average all developing countries

All developing Developing (exd China)

Average (exd China) Average exports to

High Income countries

High-Income Imports

Latin

Americanamp

Caribbean

Middle-east

ampnorth

Africa

Sub-saharan

AfricaSouth Asla

E MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK11 The global economy is slowly getting back on its feet though the recovery remains hesitant and

uneven Global GDP is projected to grow at 22 percent during 2013 marginally slower than in 2012 The

recovery is expected to strengthen with the global economy growing at 30 percent in 2014 and 33 percent

in 2015 (left panel 1047297gure 4) However the prospects for individual countries and regions will vary widely (right

panel 1047297gure 4) Here is a brief discussion of the economic outlook for a select set of advanced and developing

countries

Source Global Economic Prospects June 2013 Developing Trends June 2013

40

28

22 22

30 33

76

62

48 51

56 57

29

1713 12

20 23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

22

30 33

51

56 57

12

2013 2 4 2 15

World

Developing Countries

High-income countries

012345678

E a s t A s i a amp

P a c i 1047297 c

E u r o p e amp

C e n t r a l A s i a

L a t i n A m e r i c a amp

C a r i b b e a n

M i d d l e E a s t amp N

A f r i c a

S o u t h A s i a

S

u b - S a h a r a n

A f r i c a

2012 2013 2014 2015

Box 2 South-South Trade Grows Faster than South-North Trade By A Wide Margin

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11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1441

13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1541

14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841

17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 12: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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11

12 In the United States the private sector recovery appears to be relatively robust as re1047298ected in

an improving labor market (unemployment has fallen to 76 percent) and recovery in the housing market

Policymakers have extended both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations well into the future thereby

reducing the likelihood of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of default On the downside both the

tax increases agreed at the beginning of the year and the spending sequester will be a drag on growth in

coming quarters off setting some of the strength from the private sector recovery Overall GDP growth for the

year is projected to slow somewhat compared with 2012 to about 20 percent in 2013 before strengthening

to 28 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2015

13 The economy of the Euro Area remains weak despite improved 1047297nancial conditions and some

signs of strengthening The funding costs in core Euro Area countries have declined and lending has started

to grow again Imports exports and industrial production have all returned to positive (albeit modest) growth

However borrowing costs in high-spread economies remain very high unemployment is crushingly high in

periphery economies and weak growth is compromising progress on the 1047297scal front GDP for the Euro Area is

projected to contract by 06 percent in 2013 with annual growth slowly strengthening to 09 percent in 2014

and to about 15 percent by 2015

14 The strength in the Japanese economy re1047298ects the eff ects of a large quantitative easing 1047297scal

stimulus and structural reforms The structural measures announced include deregulation of the agriculture

and electricity sectors a relaxation of rules in health care investment tax incentives (including FDI) some

corporate governance reforms and a partial relaxation of restrictions on the investment behavior of pension

funds Growth is projected to come in at 14 percent this year and in 2014 and at 13 percent in 2015

15 Prospects for developing countries vary widely re1047298ecting local economic and policy conditions

Overall growth in developing-country is expected to 1047297rm somewhat in the years ahead with GDP growing by

51 percent in 2013 and gradually rising to 56 percent in 2014 and 57 percent in 2015 This aggregate story

however masks considerable regional and country-level variation At least four classes of developing countries

can be identi1047297ed

Oslash Several countries in East Asia Sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Latin America are growing rapidly

and are already close to or above potential and therefore at risk of overheating

Oslash Several large middle-income countries such as Brazil India Russia South Africa Turkey and

Vietnam have struggled to regain pre-crisis growth rates despite signi1047297cant stimulus

Oslash Some countries are dealing with high unemployment and economic slack due to the severity of

the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe) or due to social and political turmoil (Middle East

amp North Africa)

Oslash The majority of developing countries are performing well with output gaps closed or closing

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

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13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

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14

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

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17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

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21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

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22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 13: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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12

F RISKS TO OUTLOOK

16 Although the risk of a major crisis in Europe has subsided a new set of risks is gaining

prominence

Oslash Withdrawal of quantitative easing in the United States The eventual tapering of quantitative

easing in the United States and other high income economies is likely to cause interest rates

to rise for developing countries Higher rates may generate difficult adjustments and possibly

domestic crises especially in countries where public and private sector indebtedness has been

on the upswing

Oslash A faster than expected decline in commodity prices Over the past year energy and metals prices

have been easing in response to supply and demand-side substitution induced by high prices

(metal and energy prices are down 30 percent and 14 percent since their early 2011 peak) If

commodity prices were to decline faster towards their long-term equilibrium than envisaged

in the baseline commodity exporting developing countries could experience serious 1047297scal

setbacks and weaker GDP growth although commodity importers would stand to gain

Oslash Implications of a radical relaxation of 1047297scal and monetary policy in Japan The 21 percent real

eff ective depreciation of the yen between September and April could dampen developing

country exports to Japan as well as in third markets where they compete with Japanese

exports However some developing countries (especially in East Asia) could gain from yenrsquos

(real) depreciation and higher demand for Japanese exports and larger FDI 1047298ows to the extent

that they supply parts and components to Japanrsquos production networks Finally by adding to

the looseness of global monetary conditions this policy could lead to strong capital 1047298ows and

potentially add to overheating pressures especially in East Asia

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13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

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14

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

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17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

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18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

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21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

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22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341

32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 14: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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13

2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f

Global Conditions

World Trade Volume (GNFS) 62 27 40 50 54

Consumer Prices

G-7 Countries 53 -06 -01 09 10

United States 24 21 24 25 25

Commodity Prices (USD terms)

Non-oil commodities 207 -95 -47 -11 -15

Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 1040 1050 1024 1010 1010

Interest Rates

$ 6-month (percent) 08 05 07 11 14

Real GDP growth

World 28 23 22 30 33

High income 17 13 12 20 23

Euro Area 15 -05 -06 09 15

Japan -05 20 14 14 13

United States 18 22 20 28 30

Developing countries 60 50 51 56 57

East Asia and Paci1047297c 83 75 73 76 75

ANNEX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Table 1 Global Economic Outlook

Table 2 East Asia and Paci1047297c GDP Growth Projections

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

SourceGlobal Economic Prospects June 2013 The World Bank

2010 2011 2012 2013f 2014f 2015f

Developing East Asia 96 83 75 73 76 75

China 104 93 78 77 80 79

Indonesia 62 65 62 62 65 62

Malaysia 72 51 56 51 51 53

Philippines 76 39 66 62 64 64

Thailand 78 01 65 50 50 55

Vietnam 64 62 52 53 54 54

Developing EAP excluding China 69 46 62 57 59 60

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14

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

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17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

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18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

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21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

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22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 15: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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14

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

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17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

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22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 16: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

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17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

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22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 17: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1741

16

Figure 5 Macroeconomic Conditions Remain Stable but Growth Is Weakening

Source SBV GSO IMF and the World Bank

0

5

10

15

20

25

J-11 A-11 J-11 O-11 J-12 A-12 J-12 O-12 J-13 A-13 J-13

In1047298ation rate (yy in )

Resolution 11

16000

18000

20000

22000

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Exchange rate (VND for 1 US$

Resolution 11

16

19 18

16

22 23

23

27 28

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

International reserves (in months of import

Resolution 11

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J - 1 1

M - 1 1

M - 1 1

J - 1 1

S - 1 1

N - 1 1

J - 1 2

M - 1 2

M - 1 2

J - 1 2

S - 1 2

N - 1 2

J - 1 3

M - 1 3

M - 1 3

Cost of borrowing in the international capital marke

Resolution 11

Sovereign spreads

CDS 5 years

51

95

48

78

54

64

49

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP Growth ()

annual

3-year moving average

East Asian Crisis

Global Economic CrisisBreak-up of Soviet Union

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841

17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141

20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 18: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1841

17

B THE REAL SECTOR IS SLOW GROWTH HERE TO STAY

20 Vietnamrsquos economy is experiencing its longest spell of slow growth since the onset of economic

reforms in the late-1980s Real GDP grew by 5 percent in 2012 the lowest level since 1998 1 The economy

extended its slow growth into the 1047297rst half of 2013 registering a growth rate of 49 percent in the 1047297rst quarter

and 5 percent in the second quarter (left panel 1047297gure 6) This is the 1047297rst time that Vietnam has experienced

two consecutive years of sub-5 percent growth in the 1047297rst half of the year since it started publishing quarterly

GDP In fact what had distinguished Vietnam from other countries is its ability to recover rapidly after an

economic shockmdashbe it during the East Asian crisis in 1999 or the global 1047297nancial crisis in 2009 However

Vietnam has found it harder to take timely and decisive actions to jumpstart its economy from the current

growth slowdown

21 Vietnam is the only large developing country in the East Asia and Paci1047297c region other than

China whose post-crisis growth rate has been lower than its pre-crisis level The economies of Indonesia

Malaysia Philippines and Thailand have all grown faster in the post-crisis period (2010-13) than prior to the

crisis (2005-08) as can be seen in the right panel of1047297gure 6 And Chinarsquos pre-crisis growth rate was exceptionally

high On the other hand Vietnamrsquos post-crisis growth rate (58 percent) has been one percentage point lower

than its pre-crisis level (68 percent) Indonesia and Philippinesmdashtwo countries that had historically grown at

a much slower pace than Vietnammdashhave been growing more rapidly than Vietnam since 2010

22 Growth has been uniformly decelerating in all the sectors though agriculture and industry

seem to be particularly hard hit The services sector expanded by 59 percent in 2012 and contributed 22

percentage points to overall growth Growth in the agriculture forestry and 1047297shery sector decelerated to 27

percent in 2012 from 4 percent in 2011 due to unfavorable weather conditions diseases in livestock and falling

prices of most agricultural products Manufacturing growth also slowed down re1047298ecting weakening domestic

demand and rising inventories Agriculture and industry which together account for 70 percent of labor force

contributed just around 3 percentage points to growth compared to a 38 percentage point contribution

during the 2005-11 period (left panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 6 Vietnamrsquos Declining Economic Growth From the Perspective of

Its Own History and In Comparison With Its Regional Peers

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

0

2

4

6

8

10

q 1 - 0 5

q 1 - 0 6

q 1 - 0 7

q 1 - 0 8

q 1 - 0 9

q 1 - 1 0

q 1 - 1 1

q 1 - 1 2

q 1 - 1 3

Growth rate (quarterly )

Growth rate (annual )119

88

59 6352

6168

5854 57

4348

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis

China Indonesia

Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Thailand

Real GDP growth rate (in )

1 Vietnam recently revised its GDP series and used 2010 as the base year According to the new series the economy grew by 525 percent in 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141

20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 19: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 1941

18

23 All demand side components of GDP except net exports have also been growing slowly Private

consumption and investment which account for over 90 percent of Vietnamrsquos GDP showed a sharp decline

Private consumption grew 35 percent while investment rose merely 19 percent in 2012 compared to 53

percent and 98 percent respectively during the 2009 -2010 period Net exports turned positive in 2012 due

to strong export performance and slowing import growth Merchandise exports grew by 182 percent in

2012 driven by stronger growth in the foreign-invested (FDI) sector Reduced consumption growth and a

slowdown in investment meant that merchandise imports grew at a subdued rate of 66 percent in 2012 (right

panel 1047297gure 7)

Figure 7 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

15 12 13 1006

2925 24

2020

32

28 26

22 23

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2010 2011 2012 Q1 -13

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by productionsupply (in )

Services

Industry amp

Construcon

Primary01

-04 -05 -02 01

21 19 23 20 16

0403

0404

03

49

35

4341

34

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2005 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Net exports

Investment

Govt

consumption

Private

consumption

GDP growth

Contribution to growth by sources of demand (in )

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

In January 2013 the Government issued Resolution No 2 announcing a number of measures to assist

enterprises and individuals to deal with the current economic difficulties These measures included (i)

delayed payment of corporate income tax (CIT) 6 months for payments due in Q1 2013 and 3 months

for Q2 and Q32013 (ii) deferring payment of value added tax (VAT) 6 months for payments due in

Q1 2013 The tax incentives were intended for (i) Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ii) Labor-

intensive enterprises in certain sectors (iii) Enterprises engaging in sale leasing 1047297nancial leasing of

houses and (iv) Enterprises that produce iron steel cement construction tiles The governmentrsquos

estimates show that total deferred tax payment will amount to about 91 trillion dong in the 1047297rst four

months of 2013 In addition the Prime Minister has also authorized the Ministry of Finance to proposeto the National Assembly a lowering of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 20 percent for SMEs and to

10 percent for enterprises engaging in investment sale and lease of social housing (for low-income

households) starting from July 1 2013 These measures have subsequently been approved by the

National Assembly

Despite these measures the corporate sector remains in difficulty In the 1047297rst four months of 2013

nearly 16600 1047297rms closed or suspended their operations up 169 percent from last year At the same

time nearly 23 800 new enterprises were established down 12 percent compared to the same period

last year High borrowing costs an unfavorable business environment and accumulated inventory are

often cited as the reasons for shutdown or bankruptcy of many enterprises

SourceMPI MOF Various sources from media

Box 3 Governmentrsquos Response to the Growth Slowdown

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2041

19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2141

20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

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22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941

28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 20: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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19

24 One of the worrying signs is the steady and across the board decline in investment rates Total

investment in the 1047297rst quarter of 2013 is estimated at 296 percent of GDP nearly 13 percentage points below

the peak achieved in 2007 (left panel 1047297gure 8) While a 40 percent or higher investment rate was neither

sustainable nor desirablemdashit was based on excessive lending by banks to inefficient SOEsmdasha reduction of

nearly 10 percentage points over a period of three years seems hasty and unplanned Some decline in state

sector investment was expected given the stimulus spending during 2009-10 spending that was intended to

be temporary to begin with The declining investment ratio from the Non-State (domestic) sector is however

worrisome as this sector has been hit hard by falling domestic demand rising interest rates and a slowdown in

credit growth during the last two years

25 While foreign direct investment remains high it is declining progressively as a share of the

economy In the past 1047297ve years implemented (or disbursed) FDI has hovered between $105 to $115 billion

(right panel 1047297gure 8) This has been viewed as a sign of foreign investorsrsquo continued commitment to Vietnam

that they are undeterred by problems of macroeconomic instability or slowdown in structural reforms

Implemented FDI as a share of GDP however has been steadily falling over the past six years from a peak of 12

percent of GDP in 2008 to 7 percent in 2012 Despite a falling FDIGDP ratio and continued macroeconomic

problems Vietnam is still considered to be one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investors in the

East Asia region (see box 4) largely on account of its low wages favorable demography ideal location and

political stability

Figure 8 Contribution to Growth Production Versus Demand Side Components

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 rices World Develo ment Indicators

159129

159 147123 115 109

164

134133 139

128 119 109

104

118 100 9982

71 78

427

382 392 385

333

305 296

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 q1-13

Total

Foreign

Non- state

(domestic)

State

Investment by ownership ( of GDP)

80

115

100

110 110105

10

12

1010

8

7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FDI Implemented

FDIGDP (left scale) FDI in USD Billion

(right scale)

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2241

21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2941

28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3041

29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3141

30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3241

31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341

32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 21: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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20

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

Two recent surveys re1047298ect continued interest of foreign investors in Vietnam

According to the 201213 ASEAN

Business Outlook Survey by AmChamSingapore and US Chamber of

Commerce Vietnam remains the most

popular location for expansion within

the ASEAN region by a wide margin

Thailand is ranked second followed

by Singapore and the Philippines (see

adjacent 1047297gure)

Similarly the 201213 National

Business Survey of the Singapore

Business Federation (SBF) showedthat Vietnam is the second most keen

overseas investment destination for its

members after Myanmar (see adjacent

1047297gure) The traditionally popular

investment destinations such as China

and India seem to be less favored than

in the past Indonesia and Thailand

remain close competitors to Vietnam

as the other overseas ventures of

interest to SBF members

Source ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 201213 SBF National Business Survey 201213

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand

Thailand

Americas

India

0 5

9

12

12

815

1214

18

2012

2011

17

21

24

21

11

11

11

18

10 15 20 25 30

China (including Hong Kong)

Singapore Philippines

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Myanmar

Myanmar

Cambodia

Cambodia

Malaysia

Malaysia

Laos

Location of Expansion in ASEAN

Top 10 keen Overseas Venture

1226678

11

57

26 The problems facing the industrial sector seem to be coming largely from domestic enterprises

catering mostly to the domestic market Production slowdown is re1047298ected quite clearly in modest growth

in the Jan-May index of industrial production (IIP) which grew at only 52 percent compared to 62 percent a

year ago Similarly the purchasing manager index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector shows a rather sobering

picture with PMI remaining below 50 marks (implying contraction) for most of 2012 and 2013 In June 2013 PMI

slumped to 464 its lowest level since July 2012 (left panel 1047297gure 9) The lackluster PMI score is consistent with

a weakening of household consumption with total retail sales of goods and services in the 1047297rst 1047297ve months of

2013 up a mere 48 percent in real terms compared to 66 percent during the same period of 2012 (right panel

1047297gure 9) On the other hand exports are still growing at a healthy pace indicating that production problems

seem to be largely con1047297ned to enterprises producing for the domestic market

Box 4 Vietnam Remains An Attractive Destination for Foreign Investors

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21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

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22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

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25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 22: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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21

C PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR CONTINUES TO BEIMPRESSIVE

Oslash Exports

27 Vietnamrsquos export performance continues to be strong and resilient to domestic problems

Exports grew at 16 percent during the 1047297rst four months of 2013 after achieving a growth rate of 182 percent

in 2012 and 342 percent in 2011 While earnings from commodity exports are declining due to falling prices

Vietnam traditional labor-intensive manufacturing exports such as garments footwear and furniture continue

to sustain rapid growth A noteworthy addition to the export basket has been the exports of hi-tech and high-value products (eg cell phones and parts computers electronics and accessories automobile parts) that

have emerged as the largest and fastest growing export items in 2012 As table 3 shows Vietnam exported

$127 billion worth of cell-phones and accessories in 2012 compared to $37 billion of rice $61 billion of

seafood and $73 billion of footwear In 2013 exports of cell phones and accessories are expected to exceed

$18 billion overtaking garments as the largest export item from Vietnam2

2 According to South Korean Embassy with Samsungrsquos rapid expansion in Vietnam exports of cellphones are expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2015

Following Samsungrsquos success LG Electronics is establishing a cell phone factory in Vietnam as well With their entry a number of ancillary units have

started to relocate to Vietnam giving rise to the prospect that Vietnam could emerge as one of the largest exporters of cell phones in the world

Figure 9 Both PMI and Retail Sales Growth Point to a Slowdown in Domestic Demand

Source GSO (GDP based on 2010 price) World Development Indicators

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

M-11 S-11 J-12 M-12 S-12 J-13 M-13

Expansion

Contr action

Purchasing Manager Index (PMI)

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

M-08 M-09 M-10 M-11 M-12 M-13

Retail Sales and Services (in )

Real growth ()

Nominal growth ()

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2341

22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2441

23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3241

31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3341

32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 23: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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22

Export Turnover 2012 Value Change in

US$ Bln Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total export value (fob price) 1146 1000 342 182 160

Crude oil 82 72 442 136 21

Non-oil 1063 928 334 186 170

Agriculture

Rice 37 32 126 04 -52

Other Agricultural Commodities 99 86 399 92 -113

Seafood 61 53 219 -03 -35

Low cost manufacturing

Garment 151 132 253 75 180

Footwear 73 63 279 109 142

Wood products 47 41 137 179 131

Hi-tech Electronics and computers 78 68 301 681 445

Cell phones and accessories 127 111 984 988 970

Transport vehicles and parts 46 40 492 322 185

Others 346 302 340 87 31

Domestic sector 423 369 265 12 38

Foreign sector (including oil) 723 631 408 311 237

Table 3 Merchandise Exports

Figure 10 Vietnamrsquos Exports Basket has Changed Considerably in the Past Ten Years

Crude oil20

Rice4

Agriculture20

Garments16

Footwear11

Electronicsamp

computers3

Other26

2002

Crude oil7

Rice3

Agriculture9

Garments13

Footwear7

Electronicsamp

computers7

Phonesand parts

11

Tranportvehicles

and parts4

Machineryand parts

4

Plasticproducts

3

Other32

2012

Source General Department of Customs

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

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23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 24: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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23

Figure 11 Vietnamrsquos Export Destinations Have Changed Little in the last Ten Years

28 Vietnamrsquos export basket has quietly undergone a signi1047297cant transformation in the last ten

years Crude oil and agriculture including rice which accounted for 44 percent of Vietnamrsquos total export value

in 2002 have seen their share plummet to 19 percent in 2012 In the same period the share of low-value

manufacturing exports (garments and footwear) also fell from 27 percent to 20 percent Hi-value export items

which had a negligible share in 2002 now account for more than a 1047297fth of Vietnamrsquos exports (see 1047297gure 10)

29 While the export basket has transformed export destinations have barely changed in the past

decade Vietnamrsquos top three export markets in 2002 were Europe the US and Japan accounting for 49 percent

of its exports The corresponding number in 2012 was 46 percent (see 1047297gure 11) The modest decline in the

share of exports going to advanced countries has been captured by its neighbors namely China and ASEAN

Given that South-South trade is increasing at 15 times the rate of growth of North-South trade (see box 2) it is

important for Vietnam to continue to diversify its export destinations and explore new markets in Africa South

Asia and Latin America

China9

Japan15

USA14

EU20

ASEAN14

East Asia

(exclJapan)

10

18

2002China11

Japan11

USA17

EU

18

ASEAN

15

East Asia(excl

Japan)10

18

2012Rest of the WorldRest of the World

Oslash Imports

30 Import growth slowed considerably in 2012 but is picking up again in 2013 Lower demand for

capital investment and intermediate goods as well as weaker private consumption caused import values to

increase at a moderate rate of 66 percent in 2012 Imports from the domestic sector contracted by 7 percent

during 2012 re1047298

ecting a substantive cut in public investment and weak domestic retail sales whereas importsfrom the FDI enterprises grew at 227 percent during 2012mdashconstituting 527 percent of the total import bill

Imports have revived in recent months growing at 17 percent (yy) during April 2013 The restoration of import

growth especially positive growth for the domestic sector indicates an improvement of both investment and

consumption demand in the near term Imports of machinery equipment raw materials and intermediate

goods has been rising faster in 2013 compared to 2012 implying that a new cycle of investment and production

may be underwaymdashoff setting to some extent the pessimism about investment demand discussed earlier

Imports of automobiles contracted by 28 percent in April 2013 compared to a much bigger contraction of

322 percent during 2012

Source General Department of Customs General Statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2541

24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2641

25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941

38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 25: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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24

Table 4 Merchandise Imports

Figure 12 Vietnamrsquos main imports

Import Turnover 2012 Growth in

US$ bn Share () 2011 2012 4M-13

Total import value (cif price) 1138 1000 258 66 170

Capital Goods 90 79 616 -93 -229

Machinery and Equipment 160 141 130 32 100Intermediate Goods

Garment and Leather Materials 32 28 125 71 134

Computer and Electronics 131 115 531 670 610

Phones and Parts 50 44 820 853 926

Materials

Steel 60 52 45 -72 126

Plastics 48 42 261 09 145

Fabrics 70 62 255 46 161

Chemicals 28 24 272 23 -50

Fibers and Weaving Yarns 14 12 304 -84 39

Cotton 09 08 561 -167 370

Fertilizer 17 15 461 -48 132

Pesticides 07 06 166 81 221

Products

Petrol and Gasoline 90 79 616 -93 -229

Chemical Products 24 22 166 21 91

Pharmacy 18 16 193 207 87

Paper 12 10 154 90 127

Automobiles 21 18 68 -322 -28

Domestic Sector 538 473 210 -70 66

Foreign Sector 599 527 321 227 270

Source General Department of Customs

Motorvehicles8

Machineryamp

equipment26

Petroproducts14Agricultural

Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics4

Textilematerial22

Hi-techintermediat

e5

2002

Motorvehicles3

Machineryamp

equipment20

Petroproducts11

Agriculturalmaterials

4Metal11

Chemicals6

Plastics6

Textilematerial16

Hi-techintermediat

e23

2012Motorvehicles6

Machineryamp

equipments19

Petro

products10

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8Chemicals

5

Plastics3

Textilematerials16

Hi-tech

intermediates3

Other27

2002Motorvehicles2 Machinery

ampequipments

14

Petroproducts

8

Agriculturalmaterials

3Metals8

Chemicals5

Plastics4

Textilematerials11

Hi-techintermediates

16

Other29

2012

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

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25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2741

26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 26: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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25

Figure 13 Vietnamrsquos Imports by Sources

31 The composition of Vietnamrsquos imports has changed largely re1047298ecting the changes in its exports

basket and move to a more high-tech industrial landscape The share of machinery and equipment

petroleum products textile materials plastics and motor vehicles in total import value has gradually fallen

while the share of high-tech intermediate products has increased nearly 1047297ve timesmdashfrom 3 percent of the

total import bill in 2002 to 16 percent in 2012 (1047297gure 12) The share of many other items such as agricultural

materials metals and chemicals in total imports has remained unchanged in the last one decade

32 Vietnamrsquos imports from China have signi1047297cantly increased while shares of other countries in

the import bill have commensurately declined Vietnam imported one-quarter of its import needs from

China in 2012 compared to only 11 percent in 2002 (1047297gure 13) This trend is similar to what we observe in many

other developing countries where China has gradually displaced advanced economies to emerge as their

primary trading partner This process has been facilitated by growing intra-enterprise trade by multi-national

companies a dramatic decline in logistics costs and the move to increasingly form efficient global supply

chains The rise of Chinese share in Vietnamrsquos imports has meant a smaller share for most other countries but

mostly by Japan EU and ASEAN countries

China11

Japan13

USA2

EU10

ASEAN24

East Asia(excl

Japan)28

12

2002

China25

Japan10

USA4

EU8

ASEAN18

East Asia(excl

Japan)22

Rest of the WorldRest of the World13

2012

Oslash Trade Balance

33 Vietnam is expected to continue to enjoy a surplus in its trade balance in the near-term thoughthe size of the trade surplus may shrink Vietnam used to have a problem of persistent trade de1047297cits The

level of trade de1047297cit peaked in 2008 at $18 billion equivalent to 20 percent of GDP The trade balance has since

improved and Vietnam posted a trade surplus in 2012mdashthe 1047297rst time since 1992mdashthanks to strong growth

in exports and subdued imports It is also important to note that while the economy as a whole is running

a de1047297cit in its trade account the foreign direct investment sector has been recording a trade surplus With

imports starting to pick up in the 1047297rst half of 2013 Vietnamrsquos trade surplus is expected to get smaller in the

coming years

Source General Department of Customs General statistics Office the World Bank

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 2841

27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 27: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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26

-27-40

-24 -27 -14

-36 -30-42

-64

-89 -94

-116

-202

-247

-172

-148-161

-115

-43

-01

02 00 06 12

25 1812 13

34 49

65 61 66

43

22

63

123

36

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 4m -13

Domestic sector

FDI sector

Total

Figure 14 Vietnamrsquos Trade Balance (in US$ billion) Domestic Versus Foreign Sectors

Figure 15 External Accounts ( of GDP) Figure 16 Foreign Reserves (months of imports)

Source General Department of Customs (exports in fob and imports in cif price)

Source SBV IMF and World Bank Staff Estimates

Oslash Current Account Balance and International Reserves

34 Vietnam posted its largest ever current account surplus in 2012 though future surpluses are

likely to be considerably smaller Booming exports a sustained 1047298ow of external capital (private and official)

and remittances and lackluster import performance all contributed to Vietnamrsquos record current account surplus

of 59 percent of GDP in 2012 With a capital account surplus of 58 percent of GDP its balance of payments was

in surplus by 93 percent of GDP with the remaining amount accounted for by errors and omissions (1047297gure 15)

The surplus in the balance of payments helped in building up its international reserves which went from 22

months of import cover at the beginning of 2012 to 28 months by the end of 1047297rst quarter 2013 The reservebuild up was one of the factors contributing to the stable macroeconomic environment (1047297gure 16)

16

19 18

16

22 23 23

2728

0

1

2

3

Q1-11 Q3-11 Q1-12 Q3-12 Q1-13

- 1

1 0 -60

-38 02

59

126 111

61 53

58

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e

Capital account

Current account

Overall balance

Surplus

De1047297cit

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27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 28: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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27

Source GSO

Source GSO

D INFLATION HAS STABILIZED BUT INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONSHAVE NOT

35 In1047298ation is in single digit and relatively stable Headline in1047298ation (yy) was at 67 percent in June

2013 a steep deceleration from 181 percent in December 2011 The decline of in1047298ation has been largely

contributed by the easing of food prices and the eff

ect of stabilization measures Food prices grew by just1 percent (yy) in December 2012 and 15 percent in June 2013 generally due to an adequate supply of

agricultural products and reduced growth in household consumption throughout the year However core

in1047298ation averaged around 10 percent re1047298ecting a series of increases in the prices of goods and services that

are administratively managed

36 A large part of in1047298ation has been due to administrative price hikes which are likely to continuein the foreseeable future In the past six months increases in prices of healthcare transport and education

services alone account for about 40 percent of the in1047298ation rate On the other hand sectors where prices have

been largely determined by market forces have seen marginal or negative price increases (1047297gure 18) Since user

charges for many of the government provided services remain below cost one would expect further increase

in the in1047298ation rate during the remaining months of 2013 as these prices are adjusted to market levels

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

-10

00

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov -11 May -12 Nov -12 May -13

Monthly

year-on-year

0

10

20

30

40

May -11 Nov-11 May -12 Nov-12 May -13

Headline

Food

Core

Figure 17 In1047298ation has been Low and Relatively Stable in Recent Months

Figure 18 CPI across diff erent goods and services

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Beverage amp tobacco

Garment hats footwear

Household appliancies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

May-10 Feb-11 Nov-11 Aug-12 May-13

Healthcare

Transport

Education

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 29: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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28

E MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN HINDERED BYBANKING SECTOR PROBLEMS

37 Eff orts by the authorities to support growth through monetary policy relaxation have had

limited impact The easing of in1047298ation in the past twelve months has provided the State Bank of Vietnam

the space to gradually ease monetary policy to support growth The State Bank of Vietnam has slashed itskey policy rates by 800 basis points and lowered the deposit rate cap on local currency accounts by 650 basis

points since March 2012 (1047297gure 19) Policy rates are now below the level where the tightening cycle began and

deposit rates have fallen sharply as well The growth of money supply has also been fast with broad money

(M2) rising at 257 percent (yy) in May 2013 In spite of substantial loosening of monetary policy total credit

to the economy from the banking system is estimated to have grown by only 29 percent in May 2013 (yy)

compared to the annual target of 12 percent (1047297gure 20)

38 Low credit growth can be attributed to several factors First with their balance-sheet impaired

by rising NPLs the commercial banks have been cautious in extending further credit to a stagnant real sector

They have also been more aggressive in collecting debt Therefore as reported by the SBV credit institutions

loaned VND570 trillion in January and more than VND400 trillion in February but loan collection was still large

enough to off set these increases resulting in negative credit growth in the 1047297rst two months of 2013 Second

1047298ushed with extra liquidity the credit institutions have turned to bonds as an alternative to lending to the

real sector The 1047297rst four months of 2013 saw an approximately VND82 trillion government and government-

guaranteed bonds being sold (out of a target of VND208 trillion of revenue from bond sales in 2013) much of

which were subscribed by the credit institutions

39 The eff ectiveness of monetary easing will continue to be constrained by the poor health of the

banking system The interest rate cuts have yet to boost lending and the 1047298ow of capital to private sector

mainly SMEs which continue to complain about their limited access to bank credit Credit activity remains

subdued as banks have become more reluctant to lend due to increased risk perception while credit demand

has waned in light of weaker business prospects Under such circumstances further monetary easing is likely

to have only limited impact on growth but could add to concerns surrounding credit quality and negative

consequences on macroeconomic instability Therefore in order to restore the functions of the credit market

and make monetary policy more eff ective restructuring of the banking sector (and the associated restructuring

of SOEs) continues to be an imperative

4

12

14

16

Jun -10 Mar-11 Dec -11 Sep -12 Jun -13

Discount rate Re1047297nancing Rate

0

10

20

30

40

Apr-10 Jan-11 Oct-11 Jul-12 Apr-1

Total Credit Total Liquidity (M2) Total Depo

6

8

10

Figure 19 Key Policy Rates Figure 20 Growth in Monetary Aggregates (in )

Source SBV

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

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The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 30: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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29

F FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES

Oslash Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

40 Vietnamrsquos public1047297nances have come under stress during the past few years on account of slower

growth lower revenue buoyancy and increased stimulus spending During 2012 1047297scal de1047297cit increased

to 48 percent of GDP (under GFS de1047297nition) as revenue collection to GDP ratio fell to a record low of 228

percent (left panel 1047297gure 21) and despite governmentrsquos eff ort to reign in capital spending3 Primary de1047297cit

which excludes interest payments was closer to 36 percent of GDP in 2012 As a result of higher de1047297cits

governmentrsquos debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 2011 to 52 percent in 2012 with domestic debt to GDP

ratio rising to a record level of 23 percent With government set to borrow nearly VND 208 trillion during 2013

domestic debt is expected to hit a new high this year

Figure 21 Vietnamrsquos Fiscal De1047297cits and Public Debt have been Rising in Recent Years

Source

1 9 2

1 2 6 3

0 2 9

2 7

2 7

2 6 2

9 3 0

2 8

2 9

External

Debt

Domesc

Debt

3 Vietnamese accounting standards suggest that at 43 percent of GDP this is still just within the governmentrsquos medium-term target of

maintaining the overall 1047297scal de1047297cit at below 45 percent of GDP per year from 2011 to 2015

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 31: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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30

Oslash Steadily Declining Revenue Performance

41 Revenue collection has been steadily declining in the past 1047297ve years Vietnam used to have one

of the highest revenue to GDP ratios in the East Asia region but the situation has changed in more recent years

Total revenue has been on a declining trend since mid-2000s when it peaked at around 30 percent of GDP and

has been gradually dropping since then to an all-time low of 228 percent of GDP in 2012 (left panel1047297

gure 22) The spike in 2010 (296 percent of GDP) was due to rapid economic recovery from the post crisis stimulus and

high oil prices Total revenue collection in 2012 grew by 10 percent in nominal terms compared to an average

growth rate of 20 percent in 2010 and 2011 Revenue outturn in 2012 is estimated at close to 100 percent The

general tendency in the past has been to overshoot the revenue target due to underestimation in the annual

State Budget

42 Slowdown in revenue collection has been due to a combination of a slowing economy and the

governmentrsquos response in terms of tax breaks for small and medium enterprises One of reasons for weak

revenue performance appears to be the declining share of fees charges non-tax revenue and capital revenue

which are related directly or indirectly to revenue from land and oil Their combining share has fallen from 54

percent of GDP in 2007 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012 Tax collection as a share of GDP has also declined over

time from its peak level of 244 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent in 2012 largely on back of a slowing

economy CIT collections have fallen from 69 percent of GDP to an estimated 67 percent of GDP between

2010 and 2012 and VAT collections from 72 percent to 66 percent over the same period Revenue from oil isestimated to have declined from 38 percent of GDP in 2011 to 32 percent of GDP in 2012 though collections

were higher than projected ndash average price per barrel of crude was $105 in 2012 compared to an $85 estimate

in the budget

43 Around one quarter of total revenue are estimated to be collected from State Owned Enterprises

and another quarter from foreign invested enterprises The latter have to some extent helped to sustain

CIT and VAT collections Many private domestic 1047297rms on the other hand have closed down in 2012 as noted

earlier In addition to these revenues from selling and leasing of land for industrial development fell as did

revenues from trade taxes due to scheduled tariff reductions and lower imports in 2012

Figure 22 Revenue Performance and Composition of Tax Revenue

Source

Othertaxes

Nat Res tax

Trade taxes

Value Added Tax

Corporate Income Tax

Breakdown of Tax Revenue ()Revenue to GDP Ratio (in )

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 32: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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31

Oslash Composition of Spending is Increasingly Skewed Against Investment

44 In response to these developments and in line with its policy to enhance public investment

efficiency the government has continued to consolidate capital spending Total capital spending

(including off -budget) is estimated to have fallen from around 126 percent of GDP in 2010 to 94 percent in

2011 and 78 percent in 2012 This could potentially fall further as the government has already frontloadedits spending on capital projects through off -budget funds On the latter the government had targeted to

spend a maximum of VND 225 trillion through off -budget funds between 2011 and 2015 with VND180 trillion

budgeted for 2011-2013

45 The growth in recurrent spending has fallen over the course of 2012 but recurrent spending on

the social sectors has remained a priority in the State Budget The ratio of capital to recurrent spending

has consistently declined in the past three years from 62 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2011 and 38 percent

in 2012 (1047297gures 23) This partly re1047298ects the relative priority accorded by the government to the social sectors

Recurrent spending on both education and health as a share of the total recurrent budget and as a share of

GDP has steadily risen since 2010 The government maintains a policy of ensuring that at least 20 percent of

the State Budget is spent on education and that the health budget grows by at least as much as the overall rate

of growth of the budget

46 Notwithstanding social sector needs and given ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending the government will need to 1047297nd savings from recurrent spending Vietnamrsquos current surplus

has declined in the last two years to an estimated 23 percent of GDP in 2012 Similarly the primary de1047297cit

has also increased from an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 34 percent of GDP in 2012

This suggests as noted below that maintaining 1047297scal sustainability may require further eff orts at promoting

spending efficiency

1 6 9

1 7 9

1 8 5

2 0 3

1 9 7

1 8 1

1 8 7

1 9 3

2 0 3

1 9 5

9 2

9

4

9

1 9 1

1 1 8

1 4 9

1 1 6

8 5 7

8

7 1

Expenditure to GDP ratio ()

Capital

Recurrent

4436

48 43 46 46 45

16

12

1916 17 17 16

31

30

3330

29 2927

06

06

07

06 06 06

05

Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Estimate Budget

2010 2012 2013

Social Sector Recurrent Spending ( of GDP)

Education Health Social Security Other Social Expenditure

2011

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 23 Composition of Expenditure Capital and Recurrent

Source World Bank staff estimates based on MOF published data

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3441

33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

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34

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

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39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 33: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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32

Oslash 2013 State Budget

47 The 2013 State Budget approved by the National Assembly in December 2012 projects more

moderate revenue and spending growth compared to recent years Revenue is expected to grow at 10

percent in nominal terms (1 percent real growth compared to projected real GDP growth of 55 percent in 2013)

Spending is expected to grow at 8 percent in nominal terms (1 percent contraction in real terms) compared to

an average nominal growth of 152 percent in 2010-2012 Implementation of the 2013 State Budget in the 1047297rst

quarter has been broadly in line with target Revenue collection is at around 21 percent of budget at the end

of the 1047297rst quarter but will likely pick up over the course of the year Similarly capital spending is at around 20

percent of budget though this may be due to project start up time

Oslash Debt Sustainability Analysis

48 The latest joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

assesses Vietnam at low risk of debt distress but there are important downside risks Public external

debt (domestic and external) has increased slightly to 515 percent of GDP in 2012 from 479 percent of GDP

in 2011 Public sector debt dynamics over the medium to long-term have deteriorated somewhat compared

to last yearrsquos DSA largely on account of slower growth projections lower revenue buoyancy and higher 1047297scalde1047297cits Public and external debt sustainability indicators are projected to remain below their applicable debt

thresholds

49 Despite this the government will need to maintain its ongoing control over spending growth

to ensure medium-term 1047297scal sustainability The above DSA results hinge on a baseline macroeconomic

scenario in which government reduces the pace of spending considerably below historical levels Even a small

increase in the pace of spending growth or maintaining primary de1047297cits at the current levels will lead to a rapid

deterioration in debt dynamics Most importantly the baseline scenario assumes no realization of contingent

liabilities and little progress on structural reforms Therefore any systemic shock may also contribute to a rapid

rise in public debt

Debt indicator Government target 2012

Public DebtGDP lt 65 percent by 2020 515 percent

Public External DebtExport Revenue lt 25 percent

Total Public Debt ServiceRevenue lt 25 percent

Table 5 Debt burden indicators4

4 Government targets are taken from Prime Ministerrsquos Decision 929 on Public Debt Management approved on July 17 2012

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941

38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 34: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

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33

50 With a slowing economy the government needs to manage tighter 1047297scal conditions with

potentially large needs for economic restructuring Economic restructuring is necessary for sustained

economic growth over the medium to long-term It will however have short-term challenges both in terms of

potentially lower growth and in terms of 1047297scal costs The latter are currently not accounted for in the 2013 State

Budget Some of these 1047297scal could be met through the governmentrsquos ongoing eff orts to consolidate capital

spending though attention also needs to be paid in generating efficiencies on the recurrent side Similarly

any reduction in tax rate should be done in a revenue-neutral way to ensure that the government can continueto mobilize adequate resources to meet is growing infrastructure and social sector needs

G NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK

51 Vietnamrsquos economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of around 53 percent during 2013

and 54 percent in 2014 The slower than potential growth projection is based on the fact that it will take

several years to address the structural problems facing the country However in our baseline scenario (see

table 6) we assume continuation of the good spell of macroeconomic stability a reasonable export growth and

no imminent threat of a 1047297nancial or economic crisis In1047298ation is expected to increase during the second half

of the year on account of planned rise in administrative prices hike in civil servants salary and the year-endseasonal factors with in1047298ation ending the year at around 82 percent

2010 2011 2012e 2013p 2014p

Real GDP ( change y-y ) 1 64 62 52 53 54

Consumer Price Index ( change year-end) 117 181 68 82 79

Government Fiscal Balance ( GDP) 2 -28 -29 -48 -40 -40

Public sector debt ( GDP) 3 517 479 515 504 505

Current Account Balance ( of GDP) -38 02 59 56 33

1 GDP based on 2010 price

2 Includes off -budget items

3 Public and public-guaranteed debt

52 There are however several downside risks to our projections First slower growth may intensify

demand for further loosening of monetary and 1047297scal policies with the risk of stoking in1047298ationary pressures

and reversing the recent gains in macroeconomics stability Second if the implementation of structural

reforms is delayed further investorsrsquo con1047297dence would be undermined further worsening growth prospects

On the external side Vietnamrsquos economy remains susceptible to a further slowdown in the global economy

since its declining revenue performance and rising public debt which leaves little room for signi1047297

cantcounter-cyclical policies

Table 6 Vietnamrsquos Key Economic Indicators

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3541

34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

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36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941

38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 35: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3541

34

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741

36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941

38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 36: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3641

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741

36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941

38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 37: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3741

36

55 Restoration of macroeconomic stability and tight credit policy of SBV have prevented the

vulnerabilities from growing bigger The rapid expansion of deposits and credit in the banking system

during the 1047297rst decade of 2000smdashfrom 44 percent of GDP to 114 percent in the case of deposits and from

39 percent to 115 percent of GDP in the case of credit (left panel 1047297gure 24)mdashfacilitated rapid growth of the

economy but also contributed to its mounting vulnerabilities One of the key sources of vulnerability was

the exposure to inefficient and under-performing SOEs especially for the SOCBs Though the share of credit

going to SOEs has been declining in 2009 SOEs still accounted for 29 percent of credit with two-thirds coming

from SOCBs (right panel 1047297gure 24) The growth of credit and the share going to SOEs both fell during 2011

and 2012 arresting any further deterioration in banksrsquo soundness7 Similarly loans to real estate and property

developers are also reported to have fallen from a peak of more than 40 percent in 2009 to fell to less than 20

percent at the end of 2011 however part of the this decline is also associated with change in the de1047297nition of

real estate loans SBV also forced the mergers of three weak banks and capped their new lending amount to

the volume of debt collected (ie zero net lending growth) With continued growth in deposits limited growth

in credit and SBVrsquos active support the systemrsquos liquidity has been restored However the stock of NPLs are yet

to be resolved and the root causes of 1047297nancial fragility have not been addressed actively

Figure 24 Banking Sector Itrsquos Better to Grow Slow Than to Grow More Vulnerable

42

34

29

17

91 94

6560

0

20

40

60

80

100

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

Credit to SOEs

SOEs borrowing from SOCBs

( of total credit to SOEs)

Banking Sector exposure to the SOEs

44

59

90114

100

39

59

86

115

95

30

60

90

120

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2 e

Deposit and Credit in the Banking Sector ( GDP)

DepositCredit

Note In 2010 SBV changed the way loans are classi1047297ed by borrowers (SOEs and the rest) therefore data from 2010

are not directly comparable to the previous years

Source State Bank of Vietnam

Oslash Restructuring E ff orts on part of the Government

56 Establishment of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) has so far been the most

visible step on the part of the Government to resolve the NPL problems After more than a year of discourse

and debate Decree 53 on the establishment and operation of a national asset management company was

issued by the Prime Minister on May 18 2013 The Decree empowers SBV to establish the Vietnam Asset

7 Some of this decline is purely because of changes to the way loans to SOEs are being classi1047297ed

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941

38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 38: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3841

37

Management Company (VAMC) as a not for pro1047297t one-member limited liability company that is fully owned

by the State with a charter capital of VND 500 billion (equivalent to $24 million) VAMC is expected to buy

bad debts from banks at book value through special zero interest 1047297ve year maturity bonds or at market price

without the bonds The banks can use the bonds for re1047297nancing loans from SBV and are obliged to make

annual provision in their operational expense at a rate of not less than 20 percent of the value of the bond At

the time of maturity of the special bonds banks will repurchase bad debts from the AMC at book value and

return the special bonds to AMC

57 VAMC while being part of SBV is expected to enjoy some authority and responsibility

According to the Decree it will be able to purchase and sell bad debts and collateral restructure debt adjust

debt payment conditions convert debts to capital of the loan customers invest repair upgrade and use and

lease the collateral organize asset auctions and even provide guarantees to other organizations businesses

and individuals to borrow money from credit institutions If a credit institution with more than 3 percent NPL

ratio refuses to sell bad debts to VAMC SBV can carry out an inspection or hire an independent auditor or

valuation company to assess the quality and value of assets of those banks and use the audit results to decide

the amount of NPLs purchase of bad debts to make provisions and to comply with adequacy ratios prescribed

by SBV At the same time VAMC will disclose its annual 1047297nancial statements which are audited by independent

auditors and the procedures and methods for valuing and selling of debts and assets

58 Another important part of the restructuring process has been an increase in mergers and

acquisition (MampA) activities among banks and increasing the share of foreign investors in the banking

sector These include the merger of three weak banks (Tin Nghia Ficom Bank and SCB) acquisition of Habu

Bank by SH Bank sale of an 85 percent stake of Trust Bank to a group of investors (led by Thien Thanh Group)

and merger of Western Bank and PVFC Foreign investors increased their presence in the banking sector with

the purchase of 20 percent stake of Tien Phong Bank by a group of investors led by DOJI group 15 percent

state bought by Mizuho Bank in Vietcombank and 20 percent stake purchased by Mitsubishi UFJ in Vietin Bank

Because of these MampAs the number of domestic commercial banks has been reduced from 43 in November

2011 to 39 by the end of 2012 In 2013 there are other potential MampAs among banks as well as the purchases

of bank stakes to non-bank institutions There is a new bank being created as well (ie the Central Credit Fund

was recently transformed into a Cooperative Bank) But the merger of several weak banks has not necessarily

created a new healthy bank and therefore their underlying problems remain unaddressed Second there is

a risk that control of banks by non-bank corporates could lead to con1047298ict of interest encourage connected

lending and more systemic risks down the road

59 The ongoing eff orts to improve loan classi1047297cation and provisioning have been delayed In

January 2013 SBV issued Circular 02 on loan classi1047297cation and provisioning requiring banks to comply with

stricter standards closer to international practices in calculating NPLs for all types of bank assets including

those that Decision 493 had missed8 However the implementation of the circular initially planned on June

01 2013 was delayed by one year because of lack of readiness on part of the banks 9 In this connection the

continuation of Decision 780 on the classi1047297cation of rescheduled loans will continue to give room to the banks

(and related borrowers) to 1047298exibly interpret the loan classi1047297cation system and to underreport NPLs

8 As among other things Circular 2 will cover the following additional aspects (i) require banks to downgrade loans if it rated a borrower higher than other

banks as reported by the Credit Information Center (ii) tighten rules for deducting collateral from loan values to compute exposures for provisioning

purposes and (iii) introduce provisioning for b anksrsquo holding of corporate bonds9 Another reason for the delay it is alleged is the concern that reported NPLs would sharply increase after Circular 2 is implemented This increase will

cause new problems for the banks trying to get rid of excess NPLs and for the national asset management company (VAMC) that has a tiny equity capitalbase relative to the size of NPLs

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941

38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 39: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 3941

38

60 SBV has also been forceful in requiring banks to lower the lending rates for both new and

existing loans putting additional stress on banking sector pro1047297tability It is believed that more than 60

percent of the loan portfolio is subject to lending rates of below 15 percent and new loans in priority sectors are

provided at 10 percent or lower rates Despite all these eff orts credit growth has been anemic and with strong

growth in deposits commercial banks have turned to government bonds as a safe investment channel

Oslash Success Will Require a Multi-pronged Approach

61 The Governmentrsquos approach to restructuring its banking sector is considerably diff erent from

what is generally considered as good practice First accurately measuring the size of the NPLs through

special audits of banks and using them to estimate the recapitalization needs are important for a successful

restructuring process In Vietnam there have been some ad-hoc external audits of weak banks but no systemic

eff orts to undertake 1047297nancial and portfolio audits of the larger and systemically important 1047297nancial institutions

The size of NPLs and the recapitalization costs therefore remain uncertain Second most banking sector

restructuring involves costs which are absorbed into the government budget often stretching over a number

of years The Government of Vietnam has however decided not to put any tax-payersrsquo money towards the

restructuring exercise and instead has asked VAMC to issue special bonds with zero interest rates In addition

the charter capital of VAMC is minuscule given the size of NPLs outstanding in the economy Third the AMC is

expected to buy bad debts from banks according to the book value of the outstanding debt minus the unused

provisions for such debts10 Good practice however suggests that bad assets should be bought at market prices

or at fair value based on special audit assessment Finally there remains a heavy reliance on administrative

measures to solve problemsmdashdeposit rate caps lending rate caps monopolization of certain trade (eg gold)

and mergers of selected weak banksmdashthat often create distortions and prove costly for the economy in the

medium to long-term

62 Resolution of NPLs will require a proactive multi-pronged approach The resolution of NPLs

through the VAMC will depend on its attractiveness to banks as well as its pro-activeness in addressing NPLs

(as opposed to it serving as a temporary warehouse for NPL) The VAMC design requires banks to provision

20 percent per year against the VAMC bonds without giving them an earning asset (VAMC bonds that will be

exchanged for the NPLs have a zero coupon rate) The access to liquidity using VAMC bonds may also be of

interest to only a handful of banks Furthermore if the assets are transferred and warehoused with no active

managed or disposition they may actually lose value while the VAMC waits to grow out of the problem (do

nothing approach which could lead to higher cost of resolution in the future) In any event only part of the

NPL stock will be addressed through the VAMC Banks will thus need to actively restructure and resolve NPLs

in-house Inadequate supporting regulation (insolvency bankruptcy out of court options etc) and a judicial

system not trained or experienced in addressing such cases further constrains corporate restructuring and

NPL resolution Given the exposure to SOEs in particular reforming the SOEs need to be undertaken soon For

successful and sustainable NPL resolution it needs to be seen as part of the broader 1047297nancial and economic

restructuring program as it stands little chance of being eff ective in isolation

10 There is also provision to buy at market prices but not with the special bonds

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 40: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4041

39

B STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS

63 More than two years after the government set out to reform the SOE sector progress has

been limited The general framework for SOE restructuring was laid out by the Government in the Socio-

Economic Development Plan 2011-15 which was approved by the National Assembly in November 2011 The

Governmental Resolution 01NQ-CP (dated January 2012) then set out a reform agenda for State Economic

groups and Corporations This was further articulated in Decision 704 in June 2012 and Decision 929 in July

2013 both by the Prime Minister Decision 704 covers the reform measures to strengthen SOE corporate

governance and Decision 929 outlines the restructuring framework for the state economic groups and state

general corporations for period 2011-15 The reform eff orts however have been limited to preparation of new

regulations by various line ministries and developing restructuring plan by the SOEs Most of these regulations

have yet to be approved and will take few years to be implemented Against the target of equitizing 93 SOEs

it 2012 it seems only 12 SOEs were equitized

64 Work is ongoing to build on the existing legislation to create a comprehensive framework for

the management of SOEs Key ongoing eff orts include

Classi 1047297cation of SOEs Consolidation of all the SEG and GC restructuring plans to update Decision

14 (2011) on the role of the State in diff erent sectors and to classify them by the level of government

ownership This regulation is expected to promote equitization in SOEs by suggesting that state

ownership should concentrate on strategic areas including military monopoly industries provision

of primary goods and services and high technology sectors

Law on the management of state capital invested in enterprises This draft law aims to better de1047297ne

the roles and responsibilities of various ministries agencies and the Prime Minister with regard to

the management of state capital The current draft does not call for appointment of an autonomous

and professional agency to centrally manage state capital because of the prevailing view that no one

agency can eff ectively manage and represent the State in all the 1300 SOEs However according to

the people drafting the legislation Vietnam does intend to move toward such a regime in the long-run as the number of SOEs is reduced

Enterprise law SOE chapter revisions The plan is to lsquosupplement not redraftrsquo the law with a focus on

streamlining the regulatory process for SOEs Failures like Vinalines and Vinashin have illustrated to

government officials that the corporate governance framework needs revision and SOE governance

in general must be improved The need for both internal and external reporting and MampE has been

called for including evaluation that that is linked to the remuneration of SOE management

Disclosure of information by SOEs Several regulations are under preparation that requires SOEs to

disclose 1047297nancial information (see box 5) and to entrust the Ministry of Finance with the responsibility

to monitor and report on SOE performance

65 Successful restructuring of SOEs will be difficult to achieve without strong inter-agency

coordination Currently diff erent ministries and agencies are drafting their SOE-related regulations

independently without sufficient inputs from and consultation with other relevant ministries and agencies

This is resulting in overlapping mandates and further fragmentation of the legal framework in which SOEs

operate Similarly several agencies are collecting information and data on SOEs sometimes duplicating each

otherrsquos eff ort and at other times working with fragmented and incomplete information Therefore improving

the inter-ministerial coordination of the SOE restructuring process by strengthen existing arrangements like

national Steering Committee for Enterprise Restructuring and Development (NSCERD) or establishing new

arrangements is critical

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure

Page 41: World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013.pdf

8142019 World Bank Vietnam Economic Progress 2013pdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullworld-bank-vietnam-economic-progress-2013pdf 4141

The 1047297ndings from recent World Bank research support the prevailing view that current information disclosure in

Vietnam needs attention The analytical work suggests that while SOEs report various forms of 1047297nancial and non-

1047297nancial information to the Government the quality of information is unsatisfactory and key information required

for proper oversight monitoring and evaluation are missing

The standard of public disclosure is below levels in comparable jurisdictions and regional competitors With no

Economic Groups and only eight percent General Corporations reporting lsquosummarized 1047297nancial informationrsquo on

their website public information disclosure by SOEs in Vietnam is at worst non-existent and at best outdated

ambiguous and is often contradictory (see Table below) It is also apparent that being in the spot-light can increase

the demand for information as many of the troubled SOEs have been subject to additional requirements

Sample of Vietnamese SOEsrsquo current website content

The following steps could improve SOE information disclosure and thus contribute to SOE efficiency Overlaying

this is a fundamental requirement to ensure that there is a political consensus around the need for reform and

an understanding of the bene1047297ts that reform can bring Without a strong drive for reforms groups that bene1047297t

from existing SOE policy will be able to block progress and ensure reforms that might disempower them take a

back seat The ideas include

Enhance public disclosure and do not focus merely on internal disclosure

Disclose information on the SOEs at one central place (website) with a national agency being in charge

of coordinating the process The task of collection compilation and reporting of the information to the

central agency should be the responsibility of the SOEs

Simplify information requirements and build a more straight forward legislative framework and a

standardized information disclosure system

Incentivize compliance by SOEs to the legislative and regulatory framework by rewarding compliant

enterprises and penalizing non-complaint ones

Phase in the enhanced disclosure process by piloting it with a select set of SOEs One such phasing

could start with the Economic Groups then expand to General Corporations and 1047297nally to the remaining

SOEs with 100 percent state equity

Source Unlocking SOE Efficiency in Vietnam How Information Disclosure Can Help Policy Note The World Bank (2013)

Type of Information ()Number

with

Website

Basic

Information on

SOE

News and

Strategy

Overview

Annual report or

FSs or Auditor

report

Summarized

Financial

Information

SOE sample 89 100 87 16 8

Of which EGs 11 100 100 45 0

Of which GCs 12 100 50 8 8

Box 5 SOE Information Disclosure