Docwment of

The World Bank

FOR OmCIL USE ONLY

Report No. 8420

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

CAMEROON

NORTHERN PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CREDIT 1075-CM/LOAN 1919-CM)

FEBRUARY 28, 1990

Agriculture Operations DivisionOccidental and Central Africa DepartmentAfrica Regional Office

This doement has a resticted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance ofther oMcia duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Worid Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY DEFINITIONS

Currency Unit: CFA Franc (CFAF)Fixed Parity: 50 CFAF - 1 French Franc

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

CCCE Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Econoiique (France)CFDT Compagnie Fransaise pour le Ddveloppement des Fibres TextilesCNCE Centre National du Coanerce Ezt6rieurCRF Centre de Recherche Foresti&reCTFT Centre technique Forestier TropicalFNFP Ponds National Forestier et PiscicoleFONADER Fonds National de Developpement RuralFSAR Fonds Special d*Actions RuralesIRA-Nord Institut de Recherches Agronomiques, MarouaIRZ Institut de Recherchps ZootechniquesMESRES Ministere de l'Enseignement SupAricur, de l'Informatique et

de la Recherche ScientifiqueMIDEVIV Mission de Ddveloppement des Semences et des Cultures

VivribresMINAGRI Ministire de l'AgricultureMINDIC Ministere du Developpement Industriel et CommercialMINEL Ministare de l'ElevageMINEQ Ministere de l'EquipementMINEP Ministere du PlanMINEPIA Ministere de l'Elevage, de la POche et des Industries

AnimalesMINFIN Ministare des FinancesNSMP National Seed Multiplication ProjectMINPAT Ministere du Plan et de l'Am6nagement du TerritoireoC Office CdrealierONAREF Office National de Regeneration des ForetsONCPB Office National de Commercialisation des Produits de BaseONDAPB Office National de D6veloppment Agricole et du Petit BetailOPV Office Pharmaceutique VetdrinairePCC Project Coordinating CommitteePMEU Project Monitoring and Evaluation UnitSEMRY Soci6td d'Expansion et de Modernisation de la Riziculture a

YagouaSODECOTON Societe de DAveloppement du Coton du CamerounUSAID United States Agency for International Development

FOR OMCUL usE ONLYrHE WORLD SANKtWashgton. D.C. 20433

U.S-A.

OU1. al Ovt4r-G.wMaOpmtatom Ivahiasa

February 28, 1990

HEMORANDUM TO THE EXECVTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report - Cameroon Northern ProvinceRural Development Proiect (Credit 1075-CM/Loan 1919-CM)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled"Project Completion Report - Cameroon Northern Province Rural DevelopmentProject (Credit 1075-CM/Loan 1919-CM)", prepared by the Africa RegionalOffice. No audit of this project has been made by the OperationsEvaluation Department at this time.

Attachment

This document has a restficted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authofization.

FOR OMCIL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

CAMEROONNORTHERN PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 1075-CM/LOAN 1919-CM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE .. *#so ... . . ................. iBASIC DATA SHEET . ...............................................iEVALUATION SUMMARY ............................. ....................V

I. INTRODUCTION . ........................................ .. . 1

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND PREPARATION ..................... 2

III. IMPLEMENTATION .................................. 6

IV. OPERATIONAL PE.FORMANCE AND PROJECT IPACT .................. 11

V. FINANCIAI. AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE . .................... *.. 19

VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE.. ........ ........ 22

VII. BANK PERFORMANCE ............................................ 23

VIII. CONCLUSION . ........................ ................. 25

ANNEXES

1. Disbursements by Project Component and Disbursement Category2. Cameroon Northern Province Rural Development Projects

Selected Annual Production Indicators3. Seed Cotton Production, Acreage and Yields, Cameroon:

1970-1986 - Table 1 and Figure 14. Cameroon Northern Rural Development Project - Economic Rate

of Return Worksheet - Base Case Analysis and SensitivityAnalysis

HAP: IBRD No 21508 Cameroon Regions and Main Crops

I This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

CAMEROONNORTHERN PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 1075-CM/LOAN 1919-CM)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Northe nProvince Rural Development Project in Cameroon, for which Credit 1075-CM inthe amount of US$12.5 million and Loan 1919-CM for US$25.0 million wereapproved on November 18, 1980. The credit and loan were closed on June 30,1987, six months behind schedule. The credit was fully disbursed, and theamount of Us$4.72 million of the loan was cancelled. The last disbursementwas on February 24, 1988.

The PCR was prepared by the Agriculture Operations Division of theOccidental and Central Africa Department, Africa Regional Office, and isbased, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Loan and CreditAgreements; supervision re'3orts; correspondence between the Bank and theBorrower; and internal Bank -.zeinoranda.

The PCR was read by the Operations Evaluatic Department (OED).The draft report was sent to the Borrower on December 7, 1989 for comments,but none were received.

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CAEOONNOlTMEN RUIL DEVELORMENT SOJECT

KEY PROJECT DATA -Appisgal A eual or AcWal as S ofEsti"mt Estimatd Acual Aceraisal Esltmate

Pro.ect Costs (USm) 74.7 n.a.Credit and Loan Amount (US$m) 87.6 82.6 67Date %ord - N.A. 11/UDate efetivenes N.A. 66/61Closing &ate . 12/6S 06167Economic Rate of R"urn (X) J2.4 t1Numbr of diect benetiiearlos 163, 11119. 67

CWUILATIE DIh11MEN

FY62 FP6 FVP64 FY6 FYN FY6T FP6Appraisal Estimate (USImillten) 5.0 18.2 19.8 26.6 8.6 87.6 -Actual (UIStellIIOn) 2.4 0.4 16.9 19.2 24.7 W.0 32.sAcUal as* Of Estimate 40 64 72 72 76 *2 67DatO Ot final dlsUrsq.pmt 21241S Principal repaid (USS$m) 4.6

MISSLON DATA

No. Of Mandays Special liat in Per?. Typ OfMission Pat& ( P - In Field m reet I/ Retina V/ Leg e / ProblI es

Identification / - - - - - -Prepration 11/77 - - - - - -Appraisal 12/79 7SUP.vieIO. I 1U/01 1 1 f 1 2 bSupervision 2 12/62 1 9 * 2 2 T,PSupervision J 1/"8 2 1S 2 2 TSupervision 4 8/84 2 6 ,b 2 2 TSupervisio S 12/64 1 19 a 1 1 TSupervisionO 5 0/5 8 1S s*,e, 1 2 TSupervision 7 12/65 2 N.A. N.A. 2 2 F,PSupervioI1n 6 S/O6 2 N.A. N.A. 2 8 F,PSupervision 9 1/67 1 N.A. N.A. 8 * F,P

OTHER PROJECT DATA

Borro r ove rn nt of CameroonExecuting Agency Societe de 10el Oppsm s O doa Cn du Cameroun (SODECOTONFlil year Jkly 1 - June SONam of currecy (abbreviation) CFWACurrency Excange Rat:

Appraisl Year Averag UWIM * 219 CfAfnte rv ning Yeare Averag U0S1.11 a *75 CcArCompletion Year Avera US1.6 * 26 CPA?

Follow-up Project: Non

)/aagricvlterist; bagriculteral economist; tlinaU ial analys; I gsonemlot; eururaIenginer; #agronomist.

/lmproblem-rze or omnor problems; 2mederat problems and Sneajor problems.

3/lnimproving; 2luttionary; an udsterloratlia.

i/Winancalol Unesnagerial; Tutechnical; P1woliticl and Obotier.

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BASIC DATA SHEET(Cont' d)

STAFF INPUT

11 n4 15 lb U nI n9 o t 02 I U os b 61 UWIh

wm~ _ OEIII_IIE RIIIIiilt v . . . . 10.0 9.2 5s 1.0 . . . . . . . .m.?FM,l21. . . . . . . .2 9.5 .3 . . . . . 9.0IIIUIIS . . . . . . . . It.? . . . . . . . 89.1O I, . . . . . . . . 5.1 IS1 20.7 It.3 I.2 .L IL9 2.9 I.1O1n . . . . . .2 . .2 .1 . . . . . . . .5

'1TO NUMC XA 9 .0 .6 .0 .0 Q 99,4 5.1 202. U5. 15.1 0..2 26.6 l..9 2.9 332.9

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

CAMEROON'iORTHERN PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 1075-CM/LOAN 1919-CM)

EVALUATION SOMMARY

Obiectives

1. The project sought to provide the means for development ofprofitable cash crops other than cotton in areas of Northern Cameroon,notably groundnuts and maize, and to improve the productivity of staplefood crops production (mainly sorghum), while maintaining the momentum oncotton intensification.

2. The specific objectives of the project were to (i) improve ruralinfrastructure, including roads, stores and marketing facilities; (ii)provide effective services, including input delivery, supervised credit,extension, marketing, adaptive research, and project monitoring and (iii)support forestry development in the North; (iv) provide financial andtechnical assistance to SODECOTON; and (vi) help existing administrativestructures at the provincial level.

Implementation Experience

3. The project was approved in Noveuber i8C and became effective inJune 1981. After a five-year implementation period, the project wasextended for a six-month period and closed on June 30, 1987, about six anda half years after Board Approval.

4. Several events occurred during project implementation that had abearing on project implementation and impact:

- the dollar appreciated sharply relative to the CFA franc from 1981to 1985 and depreciated just as sharply in 1986-1987, withsubstantial repercussions for project finances.

- the North Province was subdivided in 1984 into three provinces(Far North, North and Adamaoua).

- the five growing seasons in project period were characterized bywell below normal precipitation levels,

- the cotton price peaked in 1980 at a little over two dollars akilo and fell to just over a dollar in 1986. After 1985, furtherdecline in world cotton prices combined with a large decrease ofthe value of the dollar in 1986-1987 led to a major financialcrisis for SODECOTON.

Results

5. The project included over twenty separate activities and most wereimplemented satisfactorily and on schedule. In particular, activitiesfocusing on extension agent training, seasonal credit and internalSODECOTON management proceeded smoothly. Despite this, not all of theproject objectives were achieved, or are today sustainable.

6. What was designed to be a rural development project with cotton asthe most important crop turned into a cotton project with few substantialnon-cottcn activities. The SAR overestimated the viability of expandingfood crop production, as well as the incentives to farmers to do so. Maizecultivation turned out not to be practical under prevailing precipitationlevels, while sorghum and groundnuts production growth was constrained bylimited marketing possibilities. During implementation of the projectlittle was done to promote agricultural extension in the non-cotton growingareas. The poorest area in the region, the Mandara Mountains. was excludedbecause cotton is not produced there.

7. The financial performance of SODECOTON, the main projectimplementing agency, was overshadowed by the fluctuations in the price ofcotton. Financial returns to farmers throughout the project period weresatisfactory. Economic performance of the project has been more favorable (10)than is suggested by the lack of financial profitability of SODECOTON.

Sustainability

8. The Bank paid insufficient attention to the sustainability ofproject results. By 1986, it was clear that many of the project activitieswould end with the end of Bank funding, as continued counterpart fundingwas increasingly unlikely, and would undermine project results withsizeable recurrent expenditure implications. It was foreseeable that theproject's end implied the slow decay of the feeder roads built orrehabilitated by the project for example.

Findings and Lessons Learned

9. The success of this project was undermined by a series ofexogenous events which could not have been predicted or controlled.Drought, the wide swings in the value of cotton and of the CFAF, and thegrowing government financial crisis undermined project implementation andthe sustainability of its achievements.

10. The project aesign followed Bank and government policy in Cameroonat that time of implementing the project through the existing relativelyefficient and experienced SODECOTON, rather than using the project for thelonger run objective of increasing implementation capacity in the centraladministration. SODECOTON expanded into a number of non-cotton activities,such as extension, training, industrial training, village levelinfrastructure, food crop marketing and road maintenance, often at thebehest of international donors like the Bank, because of the deficienciesof the central administration. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that much ofthe experience gained by SODECOTON in rural development with cotton growingfarmers can be readily utilized by the other Government implementingagencies to benefit the majority of non-cotton growing farmers of the Northand Extreme-North Provinces. Financial consider. tions dictate thatSODECOTON will have to concentrate its efforts or, cotton and cotton farmersfor the foreseeable future, and separate plans will have to be made forMINAGRI and associated Government institutions to assist the other two-thirds of the region's farmers.

I. INTRODUCTION

1.01 Despite the importance of oil in recent years, Cameroon'seconomy is still fundamentally based on agriculture. Over the period 1971-75 prior to the advent of oil in late 1970's, agriculture contributed about302 to GDP and agricultural exports accounted for 821 of the total. In1984-85, agriculture only accounted for 202 of GDP while agriculturalexports fell to 282 of total exports. However, the sector still providesemployment to about three-quarters of the population, and contributes about15 to 202 of state revenues. Agricultural exports have regained theirimportance in recent years however, and accounted for about half of totalexports in 1987188. More importantly, it produces almost all of Cameroon'sfood and serves as the main source of raw materials for the agro-industrialsubsector, the potential of which has not yet been sufficiently developed.

1.02 Although the shares of various components of the agriculturalsector have varied over time, the food crop subsector has continued toprovide the main agricultural contribution to GDP, which accounted forabout 542 df value added in agriculture over the last 18 years, exportcrops about 212, livestock and fisheries about 162, and forestry about 92.

1.03 The Northern Province Rural Development Project (NPRD) fellwithin Govarnment's overall rural development strategy in the North, whichcomprised four main types of actions (a) relieving pressure on land in theCenter North by providing infrastructure and services for settlement in theBenoue Valley; (b) use of irrigation of the main water courses in theregion; (c) raising the productivity of rain-fed agriculture inconjunction with efforts to improve rural infrastructure (particularlywater supplies) in the most densely populated areas and (d) exploiting theunpopulated Guinea savannah grasslands of the Ademous Plateau for livestockproduction. The NPRD was intended by Government to contribute an importantpart in both the implementation and the direction of the above developmentstrategy.

1.04 The NPRD was the fourth Bank supported Rural DevelopmentProject in the country. The other three projects, Rural Development Fund(FY77), Plaine des M'Bo (FY78), and Western Highland (FY79) were stillbeing implemented at the time of appraisal. To-date, the Bank has financeda total of 24 projects in agriculture amounting to USS 496.06 million overthe past 20 years (1967-1987).

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II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND PREPARATION

A. Identification. Preiaration and Appraisal

2.01 The NPRD originated from needs identified in the Bank'sagricultural sector survey in 1974. Following a formal Government requestfor assistance in November 1978, a Bank identification mission isitedCameroon in May-June 1977. The project was then prepared by FAO/CP whichvisited Cameroon twice, in October/November 1977, and in March 1978, whenconsultants from Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement des FibresTextiles (CFDT), financed under Technical Assistance Credit 673-CM,assisted in preparation of the Project. The Project was appraised by aseven-man mission in November-December 1979. The Project was approved bythe Board in November 18, 1980.

B. Proiect Area

2.02 The project area covered 19,700 square kilometers of theCenter-North, a Sudano-Sahelian ecological zone of the then NorthernProvince, and comprised of the departments of Margui-Vandala, Diamare andMayo-Danay (except the SEMRY area along the Logone River) 1/. Inaddition, the project would include the arrondissement of Guider in theBenoue Department. This area had an average population density of 61persons per square kilometer, with a total population of 1.34 millionpeople estimated by the 1980 Census. Excluded from the project were themountainous areas of Mandara in Margui-Wandala department, in part becausethe USAID was then con:emplating a rural development project in that areaand in part because SODECOTON was not active in the Mandara Hills wherethere is little or no cotton potential. Since that area was the mostdensely populated in the project zone, the project area had an estimatedpopulation density of 58 persons per square km.

2.03 The Bank identification mission originally suggested theproject cover the entire Northern Province, but the Appraisal missionagreed with the Government's view that the project should be limited to theCentral North region, in the middle of the Province. The focus on theCenter-North was justified by the fact that it contained two thirds of therural population of the then Northern Province, and that soil fertility wasdeclining with farmers having a hard time maintaining yields. Thus, theAppraisal mission recognized the limited long term potential of the projectarea and its environmental problems even if it did not address the issue ofdeclining precipitation levels.

1/ The Northern Province was subdivided into Far North, North and AdamaouaProvinces by presidential decree in 1984, in the middle of projectexecution. At the same time, the old Department of Margui-Wandala was sub-divided into Mayo-Sanaga and Mayo-Louti Departments, and also the oldDiamare Department was divided into Diamare and Kaele Departments. Unlessotherwise noted, this report will designate Northern Province as the new,smaller geographical area (see Map IBRD 21508).

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C. Proiect Approach and Justification

2.04 The Appraisal saw the need for a twin approach to ruralactivities in the project area. Cotton intensification under thedirection of SODECOTON in Northern Province since 1975 had resulted inrapid increases in cotton production and yields. Now the Government soughtto diversify cautiously away from cotton. As the SAR explained,

"the next phase in this strategy is, whilemaintaining the momentum on cottonintensification, to (a) provide the means fordeveloping other profitable cash crops in areaswhere cotton is not suited, notably groundnutsand maize; and (b) to improve the productivityof staple food crops productions (notably ofsorghum), in line with expected increases indemand' (SAR, p. 6).

This strategy provided the justification for the rural developmentactivities of the project. The decision to situate these activities inSODECOTON, and not in MINAGRI, was based on the view that SODECOTON was themost efficient development institution in the project area, on the onehand, and the then prevalent view, on the other hand, that parastatalsoutside the ministerial structures were the proper vehicles for developmentefforts.

2.05 The SAR noted technical and institutional deficiencies in theadministrative structures in charge of rural development in the north andthe second set of activities was designed to address these shortcomings,with assistance to strengthen extension, credit and agricultural research,as well as regional planning and project monitoring and evaluationcapacity. As such, the project was strongly influenced by Bank integratedrural development projects being implemented elsewhere in Africa, includingin Cameroon itself.

D. Objectives and Description

2.06 The specific objectives of the project were:

(a; to provide: (i) an improved rural infrastructure, including roads,stores and marketing facilities; (ii) effective services,including input delivery, supervised credit, extension, marketing,adaptive research, and project monitoring and (iii) to supportforestry development in the North;

(b) to provide financial and technical assistance to SODECOTONrequired to discharge its broadened responsibilities, includingmanagement of the proposed project. At the same time, assistancewould be provided to facilitate a rationalization of agriculturalextension in the project area by equipping the remaining HINAGRI

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structure with the means to perform its other tasks moreeffectively; and

(c) to help existing administrative structure at the provincial levelto participate more effectively in the planning, coordination andcontrol of all development projects in the Northern Province,within the framework of national development policies; to extendthe agricultural project monitoring and evaluation unit beingformed by MINAGRI for the Northern Province; and to assist theAgricultural Research Institute for the North (IRA-North) enhanceits research efforts on food crops.

2.07 The project was comprised of two sets of activities withinwhat was then the Northern Provinces

- rural development activities in the project area itself (Center-north), including infrastructural improvements, reforestationactivities and food crop development.

- at the provincial levels (a) to establish competent institutionsfor planning and coordination of rural development in the Provinceand for project monitoring and evaluation; (b) to establish asound research base for future agriculture and forestrydevelopment in the North, including adaptive research for foodcrops.

2.08 The SAR outlined the following project components in the Centernortht

(a) strengtheni. g SODECOTON agricultural extension services in theproject area by increasing the number of its extension sectorsfrom 19 to 23, the number of its extension zones from 75 to 150and of its monitors from 560 to 600;

(b) establishing an animal husbandry extension unit within SODECOTON,employing two veterinarians and 20 livestock assistants,principally to look after the feeding and health care of draftanimals;

(c) systematic training and retraining programs for SODECOTON andMINAGRI staff of all levels; two training centers would be builtand training specialists provided;

(d) an agricultural experimentation unit within SODECOTON would beestablished to carry out field trials and demonstrations at twonew field plotc in each of the 23 sectors in the area;

(e) staff and operating costs required by SODECOTON for the provisionof these project management services.

(f) construction of additional field storage facilities to handle farminputs required for the project;

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(g) improvement of about 800 km of feeder roads in the area;

(h) improvement of rural market place facilities to ease marketing offood crops within the area;

Ci) financing of incremental costs of seasonal inputs used by farmersand prcvided by SODECOTON;

(j) financir@ cf an agricultural credit program for participatingfarmers .uquiring credit to buy draft oxen and equipment;

(k) pilot tree plantations in forest reserves for fuelwoood and polesand plantings of windbreaks in densely farmed areas to reduceerosion and improve soil fertility.

2.09 The SAR described the following project components for theNorthern Province as a wholes

(a) strengthening the provincial planning unit at Garoua (NPED) toimprove planning and coordination of development projects;

(b) support for agricultural research at IRA-North, notably foradaptive research on food crops, and to strengthen the Savannahforest research unitt

(c) purchasing additional seed handling equipment required by MIDEVIV(NSMP) to furnish improved groundnut seed required for developmentprojects in the north;

(d) providing new vehicles and improved office facilities for MINAGRI,as well as staff training;

(e) establishing a monitoring unit under NINAGRI to monitor andevaluate results of this and later agricultural projects in thenorth;

E. Proiect Organization and Management

2.10 The Project required the collaboration of eight agenciesoperating in the Center-North (SODECOTON, MINAGRI, FONADER, MINEL, MINEQ,local councils, FNFP and MIDEVIV), and two more (the Provincial EconomicDivision of MINEP and IRA-North) at the Provincial level.

2.11 SODECOTON would play the lead in assuming the execution andsupervision of all components and would be responsible for the physicalexecution of the agricultural development program and construction offeeder roads in the project area. (At the national level, responsibilityfor overseeing the implementation of project activities would rest with thecorresponding responsible Ministries (MINEP, MINAGRI, MINFIN) and othertechnical Ministries concerned such as MINEQ for roads and DGRST forresearch coordination at provincial level between the various executingagencies and other institutions involved in the project would be assured by

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a Project Coordinating Committee (PCC) to be established under theauthority of the Governor of the Northern Province.

F. Prolect Costs and Financing

2.12 Total project cost, including taxes, amounted to US$74.7million of which the Bank would finance a Bank loan of US$ 25 million andan IDA Credit of US$ 12.5 million, making a total Bank group participationof US$ 37.5 million or about 50Z of total project costs.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Effectiveness and Start-up

3.01 The project was approved in November 1980 and became effectivein June 1981. After a five-year implementation period, the project wasextended for a six-month period and closed on June 30, 1987, about six anda half years after Board Approval. Estimated targets and actualaccomplishments for key project components are given in Annex 1, Table 1.

3.02 Start-up was relatively uneventful and rapid, not leastbecause of SODECOTON's experience and management capacities. Severalexpatriates hired as experts by the project were already in Garoua workingfor SODECOTON, for example and were immediately operational. Activitiesnot directly under its control started more slowly and the SAR provedunduly optimistic regarding implementation schedules. For example,livestock assistants to be provided to SODECOTON by MINEL were notrecruited until mid 1983. The Northern Seed Multiplication Project (NSNP)proved incapable of supplying the desired quantities improved qualitygroundnut seeds and alternative sources were not sought before the 1985/86growing season. Finally, FONADER did not meet the loan condition ofsubmitting to the Bank a report on the results of loan recovery efforts inthe north indicating a recovery rate of at least 75 percent. These issuesare discussed at greater length below.

3.03 The Project Coordinating Committee (PCC) convened for thefirst time in May 1981 and again in August and appeared to play asatisfactory role in the early phases of the project.

B. Progress and Revisions

3.04 Several events occurred during project implementation thatcould not have been predicted at Appraisal but that were to have a bearingon project implementation and impact:

(1) the dollar appreciated sharply relative to the CFA franc from 1981to 1985 and depreciated just as sharply in 1986-1987, with substantialrepercussions for project finances. Appraisal had assumed a stableexchange rate of 210 CFAF per dollar throughout the life of the project.

In fact, exchange rates varied widely, climbing from a low of 206 CFAFper US dollar in the third quarter of 1980 to a high of 498 CPAF in thefirst quarter of 1985, and then back down to 260 CFAF in late 1987.

(2) the North Province was subdivided in 1984 into three provinces (Farnorth, North and Adamaoua). 80 percent of the surface of the projectwas in the new Far North Province, while the planning and evaluation andmonitoring units of the project continued to be based in Garoua, in theregional delegations for MINAGRI and MINPAT of the new North province.Further, technical assistance to MINAGRI extension was also based in theNorth Provincial Delegation at Garoua. The Bank mission of July 1985(over a year after the subdivision) proposed that these activities allbe moved to the Provincial delegations of the Far North Province inMaroua, but this was never done.

(3) The five growing seasons under the life of the project werecharacterized by well below normal precipitation levels, perturbing theagricultural cycle and SODECOTON operations, and leading to productionshortfalls, not only for cotton but also for food crops.

(4) The Appraisal had predicted modest real increases in the worldcotton price over the life of the project, from the level of 181 USCents a kilo in 1980 (Mexican strict middling 1 1/16 inch, CIF NorthernEurope). In fact, the cotton price peaked in 1980 at a little over twodollars a kilo and fell to just over a dollar in 1986. The sharpappreciation of the dollar vis a vis other major trading currenciesbetween 1980 and early 1985 protected SODECOTON's cotton revenues, sincecotton is traded in dollar terms. After 1985, the further decline inworld cotton prices combined with a large decrease of the value of thedollar in 1986-1987 led to a major financial crisis for SODECOTON,particularly since the Government's budgetary difficulties led it todecrease its level of support for SODECOTON activities.

C. Costs and Financing

3.05 Total project costs, including taxes, were estimated atappraisal at CFAF 15,690 million, or US$ 74.7 million with a foreignexchange component of 52 percent or CFAF 8,190 million (US $39.0 million),based on a exchange rate of 210 CFAF per US dollar. Actual project costsare not available except for those components of the project which werepartly financed from the Bank loan and IDA credit, which are discussedbelow. The disbursements records show that almost all project exenditureswere made in CFAF or in French Francs. It is therefore interesting toreflect that the loan generated considerably in excess of the estimatedneeds of CFAF 8 billion, as a result of the appreciation of the US dollar,even though $4.7 million was eventually cancelled.

3.06 The financing plan proposed in the SAR envisaged financialinputs from the Government, the Bank, SODECOTON, farmers and FONADER asfollows:

-8

SAR($0000)

Government 27.5Bank 37.5Farmers 9.3FONADER 0.4SODECOTON 0.0Total 74.7

3.07 There are no figures for the actual amount that was madeavailable by the Government to SODECOTON, NMINGRI and the other agenciesimplementing the project, but it is clear that from 1985 onwards theGovernment's contribution to SODECOTON was reduced, so that SODECOTONitself had to contribute towards incremental operating costs of extensionfrom its own resources in order for implementation of the project tocontinue. This lack of Government counterpart contribution was one of themost important factors affecting implementation of the project from 1985onwards. However, the reduction in Government budgetary allocation mayhave been exascerbated by the provisions of the loan agreement thatrequired a rapidly increasing Government contribution to incrementaloperating costs in the latter years of implementation. Thus, whereasinitially the Government was only required to finance 10 percent ofincremental staff salaries, the percentage increased to 30, 50 and 70percent through the project period. Even without the national financialcrisis, it might have been difficult for SODECOTON to obtain such rapidincreases in Government recurrent budget allocations.

3.08 Although actual costs are not available, the Bank'scontribution to each of the categories is available from the disbursementrecords. They are smaller than the total costs, since the Bank onlyfinanced a proportion of the costs of each component, but they can be usedto estimate costs. Moreover, since separate disbursement categories wereincluded in the loan and credit agreements for the different institutionsresponsible for implementing the project - SODECOTON, IRA, FNFP, FONADER,MINAGRI, MINEP and MIDEVIV, it is possible also to obtain some indicationof the performance of the different agencies.

3.09 Annex 1, Table 1 presents the disbursements for each categoryand for each of the parts of- the project. The data, which is summarised inthe table below, confirms that SODECOTON was able to implement the projectmore or less as envisaged in the SAR. Incremental staff salaries and otheroperating costs, as well as specialists' services were within 10 percent ofappraisal extimates. There were some savings on vehicle costs. Costs ofcivil works, mainly the roads construction program, exceeded SAR estimatesby 60 percent. IRA was also able to utilize the funds that were madeavailable for research on food crop and trees. However, costs of theFONADER implemented medium term credit program for draft animals and

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equipment were only 30 percent of appraisal estimates, and equipmentpurchased for the MIDEVIV executed seed production program was only 40percent of the amount estimated. Moreover, the costs of the MINAGRI andMINEQ programs were only 60 percent of appraisal estimates.

Proiect Costs Financed by Cr.1075-CM and Loan 1919-CM

Proiect Component SAR Actual Actual($000) ($000) as 2 of

SAR- Provision of extension servicesby SODECOTON

- Operating Expenditures 9,552.1 10,384.7 109- Civil works 4,486.8 7,312.2 163- Specialist' services 6,056.3 5,472.0 90- Vehicles and equipment 3,928.9 3,239.5 82sub-total 24,024.1 26,408.4 110

- Strengthening of agricultural 2,707.9 2,806.6 104and forestry research by IRA

- Pilot tree plantings, and 1,386.8 1,145.6 83windbreaks by FNFP.

- Medium term credit program for 3,182.6 958.5 30animal traction

- Strengthening of MINAGRI and 1,755.3 1,036.1 65Project Monitoring and Evaluation.

- Development Planning 557.4 360.7 65by MIMEP

- Seed Production by MIDEVIV 195.8 71.2 36

Contingencies 3,690.0 0.0 -

Total 37,500.0 32,787.2 87

D. Procurement and Disbursement

3.10 The project files indicate that there were no majorprocurement problems during implementation.

3.11 Disbursements of the Credit 1075-CM started towards the endof 1981 and were completed in early 1984, at which time disbursements fromthe Loan 1919-CM commenced. Disbursements lagged somewhat behind theappraisal estimates, largely as a result of the appreciating US dollarexchange rate. As early as June 1985, it was anticipated that appreciationof the dollar would result in underspending of project funds, perhaps by asmuch as US$ 17 million (Memo, June 5 1985, p. 2). In early 1985 SODECOTONproposed that it prepare a work plan of activities to undertake for two

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additional years with these funds. Horeover, the Government and SODECOTONproposed that these funds be used to finance a ginnery at Bibemi, andprovided the Bank with detailed cost estimates for its construction.However, due to lack of availability of Government counterpart funds, therevised work plan was never fully implemented. Nevertheless, all but USS4.7 million of the loan was disbursed by project closing.

E. Reporting

3.12 According to the SAR, the project's three executing agencies,SODECOTON, MINAGRI and FONADER would each submit quarterly progress reportsto the Government and to the Bank showing actual and budgeted expenditures,statements of progress achieved and objectives for the forthcoming quarterby each project component. SODECOTON's quarterly reports were to containsummary financial information indicating the levels of its short-termborrowing and of any outstanding receivables from the Government or otherbodies with respect to budgetary allocations for the project and subsidieson production inputs. In addition, SODECOTON was to keep records for theproject consistent with sound accounting practice to reflect not only itsoverall financial situation, but also the detailed costs of operations inthe project components it was to execute. SODECOTON's existing costaccounting system was to be revamped to allow it more accurate costallocation in the context of its new role as a more comprehensivedevelopment agency. MINAGRI's project accounts were to be kept by theProvincial Delegate in Garoua, in accordance with standard goverament auditprocedures.

3.13 These procedures were followed satisfactorily. SODECOTON'sannual and quarterly reports were regularly submitted to the Bank, as weredetailed reports of expenditures. Similarly, after a slow start, MINAGRI'sevaluation and monitoring unit provided regular reporting of itsactivities. SODECOTON's accounting system was adequately modernized, andnow clearly distinguishes commercial from non commercial activities. Thenew approach has been quite useful to SODECOTON by providing precise costestimates of SODECOTON's different activities, notably the ruraldevelopment ones for which the agency receives no reimbursements from theGovernment. These estimates have been used by the Government, CCCE and theBank in the recent debates over SODECOTON's rehabilitation.

F. Proiect closing

3.14 Project activities were initially supposed to end June 1986and the initial closing date for the project was December 31, 1986.SODECOTON requested a two year extension to the project, made possible bylarge unspent funds. The ostensible justification for prolongation was tocontinue and intensify project actions to alleviate the effects of drought.In addition, the onset of SODECOTON's financial difficulties made anyadditional funding highly desirable.

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3.15 Bank missions initially agreed informally to SODECOTONproposals to extend the project with a new and revised work plan for 1987and 1988. Such a work plan was designed by SODECOTON in early 1986. Butit was soon overtaken by the deteriorating financial situation. With theGovernment's own financial situation worsening rapidly, counterpart fundsfor the project were increasingly being withheld. By mid 1986, the Bankcontinued to accept the principle of extension but now made it contingentupon agreement with the Government on a plan of action for therehabilitation of the cotton subsector and agreement on counterpartfunding. After some internal debate the Bank agreed to provide the projectwith a first six month extension of the closing date, to June 30 1987, toprovide the Government enough time to complete an in depth study ofSODECOTON's finances and rehabilitation.

3.16 In February 1987, the Bank sent the Government a telex urgingthe Government to alleviate SODECOTON's financial problems and disburseobligated funds to SODECOTON. The telex warned that if adequate measureswere not taken, disbursements would be stopped, no second extension wouldbe granted and the balance of funds under the loan would be cancelled. TheGovernment responded shortly thereafter indicating that counterpart fundingwas now assured for SODECOTON and that a ministerial review of theparastatal was underway. In July 1987, the Bank informed the Governmentthat it had not received any information concerning the ministerial review,and that consequently the loan closing date would be maintained at June 30,1987.

3.17 Undisbursed Bank project funds still totalled US$ 5.6 millionas of September 30, 1987. A Bank mission to Cameroon in October 1987 wasgiven a study, by Price Waterhouse, which included a number ofrecommendations based on a comprehensive diagnostic of SODECOTON's crisis.The mission was informed that the Government accepted most of PriceWaterhouse's recommendations and would begin implementing them. In view ofthis new information the Bank mission indicated it would reconsiderextending the closing date. After some internal debate in the Bank,however, the closing date was maintained and no further extension granted.The Bank now argued that additional finance to SODECOTON be linked to themajor policy dialogue underway in the context of proposed sectoral andstructural adjustment lending.

IV. OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND PROJECT IMPACT

A. Issues

4.01 An evaluation of project operations and their impact shouldtake into account the environment in which the project activities werecarried out. This is particularly true for the present project. First, itshould be noted the project covered only 4 growing seasons. Though it wassigned in January 1981, the project really only got started in June 1981,

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too late to have any effect on the 1981182 season. The 1982/83 season wasthe first season to benefit from project inputs, and thus at the originalproject completion date (June 1986), only 4 growing seasons (not includingthe 1986/87 season) had been concludled under the life of the project, or 5years with the additional year of cperations, which did not include allproject components, and was conducted in the shadows of the Government'sfinancial difficulties. This is little time for technology diffusion in arural environment, even when -- as in the case of cotton -- a testedtechnological package already existed at SODECOTON. For most of the foodcrops the project included a research and field test component to finalizethe development of such packages because none existed at project inception.For these crops, it is therefore not surprising that project impact waslimited in terms of production and productivity increases. The SARcontained unrealistic expectations in this regard.

4.02 In addition, the project was perturbed by a series ofnegative exogenous events, whose effect must be properly taken account of.First, precipitation levels were below average for 3 of the 5 growingseasons during the life of the project. The Appraisal argued that 700 mover the course of the June-September growing season represents a minimalrequirement for successful cotton cultivation. From 1982 through 1984, theproject zone averaged less than that, with such lows as 410 mm at Maroua inall of 1984 or 630 mm in Garoua in 1983. The drought had an effect notonly on the agricultural potential of the project area, but also on farmerincentives. In particular, drought can be expected to lower the potentialof all cultivations, albeit of some more than others. The lower level ofprecipitation apparently made maize cultivation all but impossible, forexample, but must have had a much lesser effect on millet. Moreimportantly, drought put a premium on food crops in farmer strategies,particularly when as is the case in northern Cameroon, food marketingnetworks are poorly developed. The drought could thus be expected to havehad a disproportionate effect on cotton. The drought conditions prevailingduring much of the project's existence undermined project results. Since1985, however, the rainfall levels have been satisfactory and productionlevels have increased appreciably. Indeed, the 1988/89 season providedSODECOTON with its largest cotton crop ever, some 168,000 tons of seedcotton.

4.03 Secondly, in 1985, the world price of cotton underwent adramatic and unexpected decrease. This combined with the appreciation ofthe dollar to make SODECOTON's cotton activities highly unprofitable, notleast because of the generous producer price increases the governementgranted cotton farmers between 1980-1985. SODECOTON's financialdifficulties were compounded by the Government's own budgetary crisis whichled it to reduce its support of SODECOTON, and other relevant institutions,notably of IRA. Additional projects, such as the Bank's NationalAgricultural Research Project were delayed due to lack of counterpartfunding, which undermined continuity and eroded progress made under theproject.

4.04 A final factor which perturbed project operations was theGovernment's decision to subdivide the Northern Province in 1984. Thischange was followed by indecision on the Government's part as to whether ornot project activities taking place in the ministerial Provincial

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delegation in Garoua should be physically moved to Maroua or not. Thishesitation can be expected to have perturbed planning and perhaps morale inthe Delegation at Garoua. Once the decision was made to move most of theseproject activities to Maroua, more time and energy was lost movingequipment and personnel and starting new activities from scratch at Maroua.The low degree of impact of the project activities conducted in MINAGRI andMINEP were at least in part a result of this move.

B. Proiect Components

4.05 The project included over twenty separate activities and mostwere implemented satisfactorily and on schedule. In particular, activitiesfocusing on extension agent training, seasonal credit and internalSODECOTON management proceeded smoothly. Despite this, not all of theproject objectives were achieved, or are today sustainable. The followingsections focus on some of the key issues that were raised by projectoperations, on activities which proved problematic and on the reasons whysome of the targets were not met.

4.06 Cotton activities: The appraisal had set out an objectiveof an increase from 48,000 to 70,000 hectares of intensive cottoncultivation producing 82,300 tons of cotton seed by PY5. Instead,approximately 60,000 tons of cotton were produced on 52.500 Ha during the198511986 season, implying a 27 percent production shortfall compared withappraisal. Cotton production statistics are given in Table 1. Inaddition, yields averaged 1140 kilos per Ha, instead of the 1200 foreseenin the SAR. These totals suggest a fairly successful project. Moreover,with the return of higher rainfall levels in 1986-1989, the projectproduction targets have been met. However, to put these totals inperspective, it should be remembered that the old CFDT had produced asmuch as 70,700 tons in more or less the project area as early as 196911970and had extended its low intensity extension system over 70-80,000 hectaresthere through out the late 1960s and early 19708. The SODECOTON was not somuch introducing as reintroducing cotton to most farmers in the area, andits inability to promote intensification more successfully suggest thepresence of fundamental agro-ec-logical problems in the project area asdiscussed below. This is corroborated by SODECOTON's greater success inareas south of the project zone. Though production increased some 8.5percent a year on average in the Far North Province between 1974 and 1986,it grew by 12.4 percent in the North Province and by 10.6 percent overallfor SODECOTON. Between 1980 and 1986, the life of the project, theseproduction growth rates were -1.22, 12.62 and 5.72 respectively (See Table2) 2/.

4.07 Several factors explain this disparity between the North andFar North Provinces and seems to have been responsible for the projectnever reaching the production objectives laid out at appraisal. First,

2/ Comparisons are complicated by the fact that the Center-North projectarea is roughly 80 percent in the Far North Province and 20 percent in theBenoue Department of North Province. Data for the project area were nctavailable for the entire period. The Benoue Department, with greaterprecipitation levels, regularly outperformed the rest of the project area.

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drought hit the north of Cameroon in 1982-1984. It was particularly severein the Far North, including the project area, whereas SODECOTON areasfurther south in the Benoue valley were less affected. With lower andmore unpredictable precipitation levels, farmers have turned away fromcotton and have focused on food crops, particularly in the Haroua regionwhere food prices increased appreciably during the project period. Inaddition, there has been some out migration of farmers to the cotton areasfurther south in the Benoue Valley. Some observers were led by the droughtyears to argue that there is a secular decline in precipitation levels inthe Far North that will continue to undermine the project area's productionpotential. With the returns of three years of adequate rains, a slightlymore sanguine view may be in order. In any event, the sustainability ofthe cotton production increases achieved through the project will likelydepend on the area's precipitation levels in the future.

4.08 Food croD activities; The food crop component of the pro4ectwas no more successful at meeting project targets, albeit for differentreasons. SODECOTON was slow to undertake the full program of activitiesfor food crops listed in the appraisal, in part because of its lack cfexperience with food crop extension. The early years of the projectwitnessed some groping. For example, it first focused on wholesaleintensification of food crops on small perimeters, instead of the programof semi-intensification on large areas outlined in the SAR. Bank staffinvolved in supervision missions appear to have agreed with this departurefrom the SAR strategy though several Supervision missions did raise theissue with SODECOTON. While difficult to quantify precisely sinceSODECOTON did not provide the Bank with complete statistics for food cropsin the project area, pro,ect results were well below the objectives listedin the SAR. Target shortfalls for output of groundnuts and sorghum, werewell above 50 percent and the production objectives for maize werealtogether scrapped when it became clear that maize was not a viable cropin the project area. Project results were hampered by the droughtconditions. In general, it can be said that tested technological packagesdid not exist to promote intensification of production, at the projectoutset. For most crops, the SAR foresaw the need to begin by recommendingsimple improvements to farmers in a first stage while field trials testednew varieties and more sophisticated input use. SODECOTON's food cropintensification strategy was undermined by an initially poor understandingof farm level incentives and food crop/cash crop tradeoffs, as well as bythe exiguity of food markets in the region, and the drought conditionspreva.ling during the prject. Project results for food crops were thusslow to appear. Recent results have been much more encouraging, however,suggesting cause for a more positive assessment of the progress made underthe project. The project experience with each crop is reviewed separatelybelow.

4.09 Groundnuts: In the appraisal, it was widely felt groundnuts hadthe greatest pntential among food crops for the project area.SEMNORD had spoisored the intensification of groundnuts in theseventies before its abolition, and it was thought that farmerswould be quick to accept extension recommendations. Local marketprospects for groundnuts were better than for other food crops andsimple technical innovations were thought to be sufficient toappreciably increase output. The seed multiplication project was

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supposed to be able to provide the project area with improvedseeds. The appraisal promoted the twin approach of seekingwholesale intensification on only some 10,000 hectares by the endof project operations on the one hand and simple improvements onthe another 29,500 hectares. The latter consisted of semi-intensification and included on farm seed selection andrudimentary greater planting density, for example, but nofertilizer use. The SAR estimated that these simple improvementscould increase yields from 350 to 560-630 kilos of shelled nutsper ha. In fact, SODECOTON efforts in the early phases of projectimplementation focused entirely on intensification, leading tocriticism by several bank supervision missions. By PY5, theproject had promoted intensification on 1500 hectares, but had yetto begin the program of semi-intensification, despite Bankinsistence. In part, this slow progress can be explained by thepoor weather conditions for groundnuts and the absence of welladapted varieties for the project area.

4.10 Sorghum: Sorghum (wet and dry season or Mouskwari) represents themost important subsistence crop in the region. Under traditionalsystems of cultivation, mean yields were said to approximate 700-750 kg of threshed grain per hectare for wet and dry seasonsorghum. The project focused exclusively on wet season sorghum,though SODECOTON estimated at 75,000 Ha the acreage devoted tothis crop in the 1985/86 season (45,000 ha in 1984185). Acreagedevoted to improved sorghum cultivation was supposed to increasefrom 12,500 ha in PYO to 91.850 ha by PY5; instead, SODECOTONreported increases to 25,000 ha., a 73 percent shortfall. By wayof comparison, the 1984 Agricultural Census reports total sorghumand millets acreage at 292,000 ha in the Far North province. Inpart, marketing problems undermined production efforts. Forexample in 1986, the excellent sorghum harvest led to brutal fallin the market price paid to farmers, which went from 200 CFAF perkilo in August 1985 to 25-40 CFAF in December 1986. The goodrains in 1986 and then again in 1988 seem to have led to aquantitative jump in semi-intensive sorghum cultivation in thoseyears, however, suggesting that the project's impact on productionis tributary to adequate rainfall levels.

4.11 Maize: SODECOTON had high hopes for maize cultivation in theproject area, though it is not a traditional crop in the area andwas grown mainly as a garden vegetable (culture de case). Theproject appraisal foresaw the experimental introduction of highyielding short season varieties of maize among the area's moreprogressive farmers, essentially as a cash crop. It noted thatmaize consumption in the area was practically nil and cautionedthat current marketing outlets might be very thin. It establisheda target of some 5,000 Ha under advanced technology on 0.25 Haplots. In fact, SODECOTON abandoned this project component whenit became clear that intensive maize cultivation was not viable inthe project area under the drought conditions prevailing in theproject area. It should be noted that in the Benoue valleyfurther south, SODECOTON's efforts to promote maize have been

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successful and production ihcreases have been rapid, often at theexpense of sorghum cultivation.

4.12 Food marketing issues: The SAR had pointed to the lowproportion of food production marketed as a key development constraint ir.the project area. As well as the feeder roads component, the projectincluded a component to modernize seven rural markets as a way of improvingmarketing channels. These were not built, as SODECOTON appears to Lkvedetermined they would have little impact on marketing in the area. Tojustify this SODECOTON pointed to a number of farmer needs surveys that donot mention rural markets as a priority need. In any event, the decisionto include this component in the project can be questioned in light of thefact that the major urban centers in the north do not have permanent marketstructures. Food marketing has been very active in certain parts of theproject area, notably in the immediate radius of provincial towns likeMaroua.

4.13 A consensus has now emerged among government agencies anddonors that the biggest constraint to increasing food production in theproject area is not the production possibility frontier under existingproduction technologies, but rather the exiguity of markets. With lessthan 20 percent of food production actually marketed, most farmers in thearea are more or less self reliant. There is so little farmingspecialization that even SODECOTON's most progressive farmers continue tocultivate food crops for home consumption. Food demand comes mainly fromthe urban populations, which are small in the North and increasinglyconsuming non traditional food stuffs like bread and rice. SODECOTONefforts to promote food pro1action was not hampered by technological orecological issues (though these were present, notably for maize in the FarNorth) so much as by the lack of market outlets for the resulting output.Farmers would not expand their food crop acreage and'use modern inputs likefertilizer unless they were assured of being able to market the surplusoutput. Until 1986 SODECOTON did guarantee a purchase price for some foodstuffs, but supply soon out stripped demand and the operation becameunprofitable. It was discontinued because of SODECOTON's mountingfinancial difficulties.

4.14 The Appraisal mission was aware that marketing channels werepoorly developed, but it overestimated the demand for the surplusfoodstuffs the project aimed to produce. In retrospect, greater attentionshould have been devoted to the immediate causes of food insecurity in theproject area, the Osoudurew period every year and the failure of the rainsthat seems to occur one in three or four years. In particular, projectefforts to improve farm and village storage capacitv should have beenexpanded to address this type of insecurity. On the research level,greater efforts should have been devoted to improving storage technologyand increasing the shelf life of cereals.

4.15 Feeder roads: SAR cost estimates for feeder road constructionproved overly optimistic and revised cost estimates in early 1982 indicatedthat the CFAF 3.2 billion (USS 10.7) earmarked this component in the SARwould cover only 80 percent of the original 800 kilometers, or some 650 km.Eventually, some 600 km were built or rehabilitated over the course of four

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seasons. SODECOTON focused on the eastern and southern regions of theproject area, on the assumption that a later phase of the project couldexpand the road network north and west. By late 1986, over half of theseroads had been classified by the HINEQ and thus was included in theirmaintenance schedules. The remaining roads were classified by 1988. Afterthis component had been completed, some of the road building equipment wastransferred to MINEQ and ONAREF. The lack of operating budgets at both ofthese institutions since 1987 has led to a near total absence ofmaintenance for the feeder roads. Under these circumstances, by 1990 someof these roads will in worse conesition than at project inception.

4.16 Medium Term Credit: The project set aside US$ 4.6 million(including 3.2 million from the Bank) to allow FONADER to extend mediumterm loans to farmers to allow them to purchase oxen from SODECOTON.Implementation of this component proved problematic. The project LoanAgreement (Schedule 1, para 4 (c) and (d)) stated as a condition ofdisbursement that FONADER had to provide the Bank with a report on theresults of agricultural credit recovery efforts in the Northern Provinceshowing that arrears had been reduced to no more than 25 percent of theaggregate principal amount of such credits which were due and payable.Such a report was provided to the Bank in April 1984, two and a half yearsafter the beginning of operations, showing that arrears had been broughtdown close to 23 percent and the Bank auLhorized disbursements under thiscomponent. In fact repayment rates at FONADER appear to have continued tobe low.

4.17 FONADER was never able to disburse the loans at anythingclose to the levels predicated by the appraisal. Of the US $ 3.2 millionbudgeted by the Bank in the SAR for this activity, only $0.95 million wasspent by the end of operations. The reasons for this are not clear. Therewas some question as to the effective demand for such credit on the part offarmers. After 1985, SODECOTON successfully began promoting the use ofdonkey traction, and the medium term credit component was used to providefarmers with credit for donkeys rather than oxen. This appeared to fitfarmer needs better, and the donkey's cheaper cost seems to have betteradapted to farmers means. Some 3,800 donkeys were eventually distributedto farmers and trained.

4.18 Forestrys The appraisal had argued that the forestrycomponent was important to addressing the ecological problems of northernCameroon. Proposed targets in the SAR included 300 Ha of experimentaltree plantations in IRA's forestry research station in Maroua, 700 Ha ofpilot savannah plantations for fuel wood and 750 km of windbreak plantingin selected parts of the project area. In addition, forestry researchwould be actively promoted. While good progress appears to have been madeon the research front, the targets proved too ambitious. For lack ofdetermined management and strict adherence to the work program, thesavannah forest plantation lagged over 50 percent below target, with ameager 330 hectares planted, instead of the 700 planned. Technicalproblems led to a large attrition rate among young trees. The SAR hadargued that the windbreak or village plantations component of the projectwas a promising way of protecting fields from wind erosion and would leadto increased yields. Eventually, it was entirely dropped from the projectdue to lack of village level interest. In retroapect, there was inadequate

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knowledge of technical issues to embark on a planting scheduleof the sizeforeseen by the SAR.

4.19 Agricultural Research: The project was more successful atenhancing the adaptation and diffusion of existing technologies than atdeveloping new technologies, given the short life of the project and theexceptional drought conditions. The applied research program was executedat the Maroua research station and 9 substations located in the threenorthern provinces. The experimentation program was properly executed andinvolved 183 trials, including 134 on food crops, on the substations andabout 400 trials performed throughout the cotton area. Food crops testedincluded sorghum, groundnuts, maize, paddy, cow pea, soybean and yams. Dueto drought many of the trials failed. By 1984, the IRA had with theassistance of SODECOTON established 4,200 demonstration patches of aquarter hectare of Sorghum fertilized with urea to show its potentialbenefit to farmers. The impact of these research results on farmingsystems seems to depend on the precipitation levels.

4.20 Several factors seriously hampered the sustainability of thiscomponent's impact, however. The lack of counterpart funding for projectactivities was first compensated by SODECOTON's willingness to prefinancethem, but it soon stopped doing this. In addition, some of the activitieswere designed to be continued by the Bank's Agricultural Research Project,initially slated to begin operations in late 1984. That project did notbecome effective in 1988. As a consequence, much of the research begununder NPRD was in effect discontinued.

4.21 Northern Province Economic Division; the NPED, based in theMINPAT was designed by the SAR to fill a gap in regional planning bycoordinating regional interministerial forecasting activities and bycoordinating the numerous interventions of multi and bilateral donors. Itseems to have gotten off to a slow start but then to have played a usefulrole, in reporting regional trends and analyzing development constraints.Unfortunately, the NPED seems to have ended its activities with thedeparture of the expatriate expert.

4.22 Project Monitoring and Evaluation Units the PMEU establishedin the HINAGRI's regional delegation was less successful. It was meant bythe SAR to monitor the project's impact at the farmer level and eventuallymonitor and evaluate all projects in the area using a consistent andrigorous set of techniques and criteria. In fact, it was never able tocarry out a meaningful baseline survey, as it used an excessively complexquestionnaire which it waa not able to completely master, and there werecomplaints that the Regional Delegate used the unit as little more than aagricultural statistics collection unit. After a laborious start, however,the unit did provide several useful reports on the project's impact on thefarming population. Since the end of the project and departure of theexpatriate expert, the unit has been closed. Its personr.el was integratedinto the statistics division, project cars were taken away and the computerequipment was transferred to the DEP in Yaounde.

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V. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

A. Financial Performance

5.01 The financial performance of SODECOTON, the rain projectimplementing agency, was overshadowed by the fluctations in the price ofcotton. During the early 1980s, while the price of cotton was strong,SODECOTON was able to show a modest profit, but increased revenues werelargely passed on to producers in the form of increased prices for seedcotton, which increased from CFAF 80/kg in 1980-81 to CFAF 140/kg in 1985-86. This does not include the CFAF 15/kg post-harvest bonus paid by ONCPB.Throughout this period, SODECOTON subsidized seeds and fertilisers andprovided free insecticides.

5.02 In addition to the agricultural assistance to farmers forcotton, SODECOTON continued to expand its rural development activitiesduring the 1980s. It addition to the crop development programs forsorghum, maize, and groundnuts and the roads construction included in theBank financed project, SODECOTON was involved in groundnut processing andstorage and adult literacy programs through the Bank financed FSAR I and IIprojects, as well as implementing a number of other rural developemntactivities. The total cost of rural development is estimated to have beenCFAF 5.8 billion in 1985-86.

5.03 The fall in the price of cotton in 1986, combined with thefailure of the Government to provide the agreed counterpart funding for theproject related and rural development work, resulted in the acute financialcrises of 1985-86 and 1986-87 when financial deficits of CFAF 20.3 billionand CFAF 12.1 billion were recorded. Furthermore a deficit of CFAF 11.8was estimated for 1987-88. Financial audits prepared by Price-Waterhousein 1986-87 and the CCCE in 1987-88, led to recommendations forrestructuring SODECOTON, including reduction in the subsidies on cottoninputs from 56 percent in 1985-86 to 25 percent in 1986-87. In addition, athird grade of seed cotton was introduced in 1988, which reduced theaverage cost of seed cotton to CFAF 126/kg in 1987-88. Under theprovisions of the Structural Adjustment Program, it is realistic to assumethat the producer price could be reduced to about CFAF100/kg seed cotton,and other farmer input subsidies removed completely, which would permitSODECOTON to cover its variable costs. However, without some improvementin world cotton prices it is unlikely that would be much of a positivereturn on the capital employed.

5.04 Financial returns to farmers throughout the project periodwere satisfactory, with a net return of CFAF 60,000-90,000/ha equivalent toCFAF 30-50,000 per farmer. As noted above, even after the fall in worldcotton prices, farmers were largely insulated from lower returns. Inaddition the project also assisted them to increase food crop production,some of which was marketed.

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B. Economic Performance

5.05 The economic performance of the project has been much morefavorable than is suggested by the lack of financial profitability ofSODECOTON. Over the longer term, the economic viability of cottonproduction in Northern Cameroon should be satisfactory, and considerablybetter than the financial figures suggest, due in part to the fact that theprice of seed-cotton paid to farmers was not reduced when world cottonprices fell, and in part to low controlled prices for the sale cf cottonlint on the domestic market (nearly 20 percent of the total volume oflint), and cotton seed oil, all of which is sold on the domestic market atregulated prices well below border prices. Thus, the financial returns donot reflect the returns to the economy. Moreover the medium and longerterm price projections for cotton indicate some recovery, which combinedwith some recovery of the US dollar relative to the CFAF, would lead toincreased revenues from exports of cotton lint.

5.06 Throughout the 1980s farmers in the project a-ea havereceived a considerable economic rent from cotton sales. Even with aproducer price below CFAF 100/kg seed cotton, farmers can still make asatisfactory net return to land and labor after deducting all input costs,particularly in the Northern Province, where conditions are more favorableand yields are higher. In the Extreme North, where yields are lower,farmers have still been able to make satisfactory returns from cotton andfood crops, whereas without the project yields and the level of farm incomewould probably have fallen.

5.07 The project's economic rate of return has been estimatedagain to compare it with the estimates made in 1980 at the time of projectappraisal. In the SAR some 55 percent of the benefits at full productionin the 10th year, were projected to result from incremental seed-cottonproduLtion of 37,400 tons, compared with the actual production of 51,000tons in 1988-89, which was a good year. Taking into consideration thepattern of poor rainfall once every three years, incremental production isestimated at 32,400 tons of seed cotton annually, some 85 percent of thatestimated at appraisal. The value of future cotton production for theremaining 12 years of the project is projected to be CFA 7.0 billionannually, largely mitigating the effects of low cotton prices andunfavorable exchange rates in some of the early years of the project.Cotton would account for 75 percent of the net value of project benefits,assuming a cotton fibre price of US$1.55/kg f.o.b. and a future exchangerate of CFA350s$1.00.

5.08 Incremental food crop benefits were projected in the SAR toaccount for 35 percent of total project benefits at full production, withan estimated annual value of CFA 3.6 billion. Figures are not available ofthe actual increased area or production, since SODECOTON keeps completestatistics for intensive food crops only, rather than the much larger areaof semi-intensive crops. In the absence of detailed information concerningareas and yields of food crops, their incremental value at full productionhas been estimated at CFA 0.9 billion annually, some 25 percent of the SAR

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projection (para 4.08-4.11). This reduced estimate is based on the factsthat it was not possible to introduce maize as projected in the SAR, due tolower than anticipated rainfall, and that SODECOTON concentrated on a smallarea of intensive food crop production in rotation with cotton, rather thana much larger area of semi-intensive food crop production. The actual areaof cotton was smaller than estimated in the SAR (although yields increasedas projected), therefore it is likely that the area of intensive food cropproduction was also smaller. On the other hand, the SAR did not take intoaccount the benefits from niebe (cowpeas) cultivation, a crop whichSODECOTON has had some success intensifying in recent years. Food cropbenefits are assumed to account for 20 percent of total net benefits in theeconomic analysis in this report.

5.09 The remaining benefits assumed in the SAR were derived fromroads and livestock benefits. The benefits from roads construction havebeen assumed to be 75 percent of the 3AR estimate, since only 600 kms ofthe 800 kms planned were constructed. No benefits were derived from thelivestock activities to reflect the poor performance of the creditcomponent.

5.10 On the costs side, the SAR did not include many of the longterm fixed costs of SODECOTON. As discussed in Paragraphs 5.02-5.03, thesehave proved to be higher than anticipated. The Caisse Centrale estimatesof actual and future SODECOTON fixed and variable costs have been used inthe projected ERR.

5.11 Taking into account the actual performance from 1981-82 to1988-89, assuming no further production increases would result from theproject, and using current World Bank commodity forecasts, the revised ERRof the project would be about 10 percent over a 20 years project life. Theproject life has been increased from 15 years in the SAR to 20 years tocompensate for the effects of the unanticipated drought (1983-85) in theearly years of project execution (Annex 4, Table 1).

5.12 Another set of calculations has been made to determine howsensitive the ERR is to changes in production, in which the return ofdrought conditions over the project area has been assumed, such as lateonset or partial failure of the rains, giving rise to higher food cropprices, and an increase in the area of food crops planted, to try tocompensate for lower yields. Under these conditions, the value ofincremental food crop production has been assumed to remain at CFA 0.9billion/year, with incremental cotton production falling from 32,400 tonsto 20,400 tons, resulting in an ERR over a twenty year period estimated at7 percent (Annex 4, Table 2). If the value of food crop benefits was alsoto fall by 25 or 50 percent, the ERR would fall to 5 or 2 percentrespectively, indicating that the project is rather sensitive to changes inthe value of food crop benefits.

5.13 The implication of these calculations is that projectperformance was adequate, albeit not as strong as foreseen by the SAR, andthat future economic performance of cotton will be highly dependent onweather patterns in the North. Though project benefits were not weightedaccording to social criteria, it should be clear that project results wouldbe even more valuable to the region, and to its social welfare, if drought

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conditions do prevail in the near future, since the project did makepeasants less vulnerable to the effects of drought. Had the project outputbeen valuated taking this into account, its rate of return would have beenhigher. Finally, it is important to note that the economic assessment ofthe project is not directly related to that of SODECOTON, whose large fixedoverheads are by definition not considered in the incremental cost andbenefit estimates used in the project economic calculations.

VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

6.01 The institutional problems in northern Cameroon identified bythe SAR do not appear to have been relieved by the project. Though thephysical goals for cotton production were largely met at high financialcost by SODECOTON, other institutions involved in project implementationwere less satisfactory and the project's institutional developmentobjectives were not achieved. As a result, policy making and implementingstructures in north Cameroon remain largely deficient. The lack ofprogress during the project has now been compounded by the Government'sinability to continue funding operating expenditures.

6.02 SODECOTON was and remains an effective cotton developmentagency. During the course of the project it demonstrated thiseffectiveness by meeting many of the physical targets of the project withminimal delays. The infrastructural components of the project (roadbuilding, rural markets etc) were all executed on time. Training ofextension agents was similarly satisfactory. The shortfall in meetingcotton production outputs can be blamed on the drought rather than onSODECOTON.

6.03 On the other hand, the project helped SODECOTON improve thescope of its non cotton activities, notably in the area of food crops, evenif they remain secondary to its cotton activities. SODECOTON was nottransformed into a rural development agency, but it did begin to integraterural development activities in its promotion of cotton based farmingsystem. During the project implementation period, SODECOTON expanded itsintegrated rural development activities, and acquired new or enhancedexperience in such areas as credit distribution, road building and foodcrops research and extension. Much of this institutional growth hascontinued since the end of the project, though it is jeopardized by thecotton sector crisis as well as its and the Government's fiscaldifficulties.

6.04 The performance of the rest of the institutional apparatus inthe north does not appear to have undergone sustainable improvements duringthe life of the project. The project decision to decrease duplicationbetween HINAGRI and SODECOTON extension efforts by placing all extensionactivities under the competence of the latter did not improve MINAGRIefforts in other areas (moreover, MINAGRI extension staff levels for theproject area were not decreased correspondingly as agreed to atnegotiations). It may also have undermined MINAGRI's extension efforts inareas adjacent to, but not covered by the project area, notably the Mandaramountains. Monitoring and evaluation capacity in the provincial delegationof MINAGRI was not noticeably improved beyond the life of the project, nor

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was provincial planning and coordination efforts by the MINEP's provincialoffices, despite a promising start. If anything, with the onset ofbudgetary cuts after 1986, the provincial ministerial structures at MINAGRIand MINPAT have suffered institutional decay.

6.05 Some progress in institutional development was made, notablyin the area of agricultural research where the project trained localpersonnel, improved coordination efforts between projects and undertookuseful and time consuming field trials for a number of crops. Cooperationbetween IRA and SODECOTON was enhanced during the project and has beensustained. Valuable experience was gained during the course of fourgrowing seasons (1982/83 - 1985/1986). This progress was then greatlyundermined by the termination of those activities, the endless delays inbeginning implementation of the Agricultural Research Project and the majorcuts in government funding for the IRA after 1986 as these have fallendisproportionately on its field offices.

VII. BANK PERFORMANCE

A. Prolect Justification and Obiectives

7.01 The Government's development priorities for the north werenot clearly or precisely outlined at the time of appraisal and combinedinconsistent social and commercial objectives. The project was justifiedby the perceived need to enhance development efforts in the Par Northprovince, by far the poorest region of the country, to reach the poorestfarmers and to promote the country's third most important agriculturalexport, cotton. In addition, the project area's ecological deteriorationneeded to be reversed. The SAR properly identified these issues, but theresulting project design effectively focused more on the commercial andenvironmental issues than on the social ones. The project for exampleexcluded the poorest area in the region, the Mandara Mountains, becausecotton is not produced there. More generally, by focusing on the cottongrowing areas, the project excluded the poorest farmers even in the cottonregion, who typically do not cultivate cotton.

7.02 The criteria behind the delineation of the project area arenot clear. By Appraisal, it was clear that the Center-North was not a highpotential area for cotton, and that SODECOTON's future growth lay in thehigher potential Benoue Valley. The Appraisal noted this point but arguedthat Bank assistance could reverse or at least slow down the region'sdecline, and that social welfare arguments justified intervention.However, the project area included Guider, an arrondissement in the BenoueDepartment with higher precipitation and income levels which consistentlyoutperformed the other project zones, and excluded the poorest areas of theFar North Province. In retrospect the Bank seemed ambivalent aboutemphasizing commercial criteria, by focusing exclusively on cotton in thehigher potential areas further south, or concentrating on social objectivesby pursuing integrated rural development objectives all over the Far North.SODECOTON's geographical area of activities seems to have influenced the

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choice of the project area; the Center-North was the only major sector ofits activities where SODECOTON did not already have a foreign fundedproject.

7 *'3 The choice of SODECOTON as the lead implementing agency wasstrongly supported by the Government throughout negotiations. It didreflect the Bank's preference for short term advantages in projectexecution capability to longer term institution building. At the sametime, it was justified by the fact that SODECOTON was the most if not theonly effective rural development institution in Northern Cameroon. The SARdid nonetheless attempt to balance the short and long run considerations byentrusting the bulk of project implementation to SODECOTON, while alsoincluding several project components that would in the long run serveinstitution building objectives in the central administration. Inretrospect, the project design did not devote nearly enough resources toensure the success of these non cotton objectives. Moreover, theseobjectives were slowly forgotten during implementation and SODECOTON'scomponents became the focal point of most supervision missions,particularly after the onset of the cotton crisis. Indeed, successivesupervisions progressively lost sight of the project's rural developmentobjectives for the Center North area and concentrated on SODECOTON's cottonactivities in both northern provinces. The last two supervision missionreports confuse overall SODECOTON output goals with those of the projectfor example. By the end of execution, it is fair to say that the Bankconsidered the project a cotton project based in SODECOTON.

7.04 The Bank actively sought the increase of cotton producerprices during appraisal and negotiations, in keeping with its view thatswings in world commodity prices should be transmitted to farmers. InCameroon, this led to a rapid increase in the producer price, which wentfrom 80 CFAP per kilo in 1980/81 to 140 in 1985186 (excluding theadditional 15 CFAP provided by the ONCPB). The Government imposed theseprice 1-creases on a recalcitrant SODECOTON, while maintaining thesubsidies on fertilizers and pesticides. The Government refused todecrease the producer price after 1986, however, to reflect the decrease inworld prices. The high prices are a major reason for SODECOTON's financialdifficulties since then. The lesson for the Bank is that producer pricesare likely to be 'sticky, downwards when the marketing parastatal does nothave price setting authority. Political pressure and the slow speed ofgovernment decision making can have as a consequence the rapid accumulationof deficits for the parastatal, which does not control the parameters ofits own profitability.

B. Bank Supervision

7.05 There were nine Bank supervision missions. The firstsupervisions focused on start up issues and were effective in prodding thedifferent actors to implement agreed to measures. The Bank was quick toremedy minor appraisal weaknesses and agree to revised targets when theseseemed more reasonable. This was notably the case with the feeder roadscomponent, where the target was brought down from 800 to 600 km of roads,when it became clear the former was too ambitious. After 1985,supervision missions were increasingly focused on SODECOTON's financial

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difficulties, the absence of counterpart fundinA and on the project'sextension with undisbursed funds. These missions were much more lax inmonitoring project activities not controlled by SODECOTON and paid littleor no attention to the output targets established in the SAR. Thus, it isimpossible to determine from supervision mission reports the number ofloans made by FONADER, the quantity of groundnuts and sorghum produced inthe project area in PY5 or the area and yield of cotton in the Center-NorthProject Area.

7.06 The Bank paid insufficient attention to the sustainability ofproject results. By 1986, it was clear that many of the project activitieswould end with the end of Bank funding, as continued counterpart fundingwas increasingly unlikely, and would undermine project results withsizeable recurrent expenditure implications. It was foreseable that theproject's end implied the slow decay of the feeder roads built orrehabilitated by the project for example.

VIII. CONCLUSION

8.01 The success of this project was undermined by a series ofexogenous events which could not have been predicted or controlled.Drought, the wide swings in the value of cotton and of the CFAF, and thegrowing government financial crisis undermined project implementation andthe sustainability of its achievements.

8.02 Project design was consistent with the Bank's policy forrural development projects at that time, though it did not pay enoughattention to institution building and it overestimated the project area'slong term cotton potential. More successful institution building wouldhave required greater attention to the long term needs of the centraladministration. instead of emphasizing the strengthening of SODECOTON.Project components of regional planning, project monitoring and evaluationbased in MINAGRI and MINPAT were inadequate in this respect. The meagerresults of these project components did not last beyond the end of projectoperations. The project design followed Bank and government policy inCameroon at that time of implementing the project through the existingrelatively efficient and experienced SODECOTON, rather than using theproject for the longer run objective of increasing implementation capacityin the central administration. While it would have been counter productivenot to use SODECOTON's existing capabilities for rural development in theregion, in retrospect the project's emphasis was excessively tipped againstthe needs of the central administration, and institution building in NorthCameroon was delayed. This policy of relying on project authorities forrural development has since been reversed by the Government and the Bank,which has begun more substantial institution building efforts in theMINAGRI, notably through the National Agricultural Extension and Trainingproject, and the earlier Technical Assistance project.

8.03 In addition, what was designed to be a rural developmentproject with cotton as the most important crop turned into a cotton projectwith few substantial non cotton activities. The SAR overestimated the

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viability of expanding food crop production, as well as the incentives tofarmers to do so. It overestimated SODECOTON's ability to diversify itsactivities away from a narrow concern with cotton to the other crops --sorghum, groundnuts and cowpeas -- associated in the crop rotation. Maizecultivation turned out not to be practical under prevailing precipitationlevels while sorghum and groundnuts production growth was constrained bylimited marketing possibilities. SODECOTON needed to develop experienceand technical expertise before it could support these new activitieseffectively. During implementation of the project little was done topromote agricultural extension in the non-cotton growing areas. Althoughpersonnel were not removed from MINAGRI's extension service as agreed toduring negotiations, its agents never implemented any extension program inthe regions left out of SODECOTON's program. By 1986, the lack of arecurrent expenditure budget in MINAGRI excluded the possibility of anymeaningful action on its part.

8.04 The financial calculations at appraisal proved to beexcessively sanguine regarding the financial viability of SODECOTON. It isunlikely that SODECOTON can become a profitable parastatal in strictlyfinancial terms, in the near future.

8.05 The Appraisal was too optimistic about the likely evolutionof the world cotton price. More serious it did not predict the exchangerate volatility that has characterized the last decade. The exchange rateused at appraisal of 210 CFAF per US dollar turned out to be just about thehighest level for the CPA franc ever, and actually underestimated theSODECOTON's profitability once the dollar began to appreciate. SODECOTONenjoyed its best years in 1983 and 1984 as a consequence, but its windfallprofits were passed on to the farmers through generous producer priceincreases and the maintenance of input subsidies. These were imposed bythe Government despite SODECOTON's opposition. SODECOTON also financed anincreasingly expensive administrative structure and took on a series ofunprofitable rural development activities. When the dollar peaked andbegan to decline after 1985 and world cotton prices tumbled simultaneously,SODECOTON accumulated losses. A recent Caisse Centrale report on SODECOTONsuggests that the parastatal would continue to lose money even after majorinternal reforms and a decrease of the producer price granted farmers toaround 100 CFA/kg.

8.06 SODECOTON is generally considered one of the most effectivepublic institutions in Cameroon. It expanded into a number of non cottonactivities, often at the behest of international donors like the Bank,because of the deficiencies of the central administration. Thus, itfinanced expensive activities such as extension, training, industrialtraining, village level infrastructure, food crop marketing and roadmaintenance. No other public institution was providing these criticalpublic goods for sustained rural development, that were in any eventpreconditions for SODECOTON's program of cotton intensification. As aconsequence, the major questions posed by this project for the cottongrowing areas of the North and Extreme North Provinces are whetherSODECOTON is the institution best suited to provide these public goods, andif so, does this justify subsidizing SODECOTON's rural developmentactivities for the foreseable future?

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8.07 Tt is difficult to attach an economic value to SODECOTON'saccumulated e..perience in these areas, but one of basic indicators of thesuccess of a project relates to its replicability to the other two-thirdsof non-cotton producing farmers in the region. Unfortunately, it is notlikely that much of the experience gained by SODECOTON in rural developmentwith cotton growing farmers can be readily utilized by the other Governmentimplementing agencies to benefit the majority of non-cotton growing farmersof the North and Extreme-North Provinces. Financial considerations dictatethat SODECOTON will have to concentrate its efforts on cotton and cottonfarmers for the forseeable future, and separate plans will have to be madefor MINAGRI and associated Government institutions to assist the other two-thirds of the regicn's farmers.

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Annex 1Table 1Page 1 of 3

Disbursements by Project ComDonenet and Disbursement CategoryLoan 1919-CM and Credit 1075-CM

CateRorY Allocated Disbursed Proiect Conoonent($000) ($000)

Part A (ii) of the Proiect - Provision of extension services...

3 Ln. 6,460.0 6,132.2 Operating Expenditure of SODECOTONCr. 3,092.1 4,252.5 and of PCC for ProjectTot. 9,552.1 10,384.7 Administration under Parts A (ii)

and B of the Project (includinglocal staff salaries).

1 Ln. 3,000.0 5,349.4 Civil Works under Part A (ii) ofCr. 1,486.8 1,962.8 the ProjectTot. 4,486.8 7,312.2

15 La. 4,030.0 3,548.1 Specialist's ServicesCr. 2,026.3 1,923.9Tot. 6,056.3 5,472.0

2 Ln. 2,600.0 955.2 Vehicles and Equipment under PartCr. 1,328.9 2,284.3 A (ii) of the ProjectTot. 3,928.9 3,239.5

Sub-total Part A (ii)La. 16,090.0 15,984.9Cr. 7,934.1 10,423.5Tot. 24,024.1 26,408.4

Part D of the Proiect - Strengthening and support of agricultural researchby IlA, and Part E (i} - Strengthening of the Savannnah forest researchunit of IRA,

8 La. 1,200.0 1,031.0 Operating Expenditures includingCr. 605.3 337.5 local salaries uncer Parts D and ETot. 1,805.3 1,368.5 (i) of the Project.

7 Ln. 600.0 937.5 Civil Works, vehicles andCr. 302.6 500.6 equipment for Parts D and E (i) ofTot. 902.6 1,438.1 the Project.

Sub-total Parts D and E (i)Ln. 1,800.0 1,968.5Cr. 907.9 838.1Tot. 2,707.9 2,806.6

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Annex 1Table 1Page 2 of 3

Parts E (ii) and E Uiii) of the Proiect - Pilot tree plantings andwindbreaks to be implemented by FNFP.

10 Ln. 400.0 403.4 Operating expenditures includingCr. 210.5 266.0 staff salaries under Part E (ii)Tot 610.5 669.4

9 Ln. 500.0 80.9 Civil Works, vehicles andCr. 276.3 395.3 equipment for Parts E (ii) andTot. 776.3 476.2 (iii)

Sub-total Parts D and ELa. 900.0 484.3Cr. 486.8 661.3Tot. 1,386.8 1,145.6

Part A (iii) of the Proiect - A medium term credit program to finance theprovision of draft animals and agricultural equipment to farmers.

5 Ln. 930.0 948.7 Animals for Part A (iii)Cr. 460.5 0.0Tot. 1,390.5 948.7

4 Lu. 1,200.0 9.8 Agricultural equipment - Part ACr. 592.1 0.0 (iii)Tot. 1,793.1 9.8

Sub-total Part A iii)

Ln. 2,130.0 958.5Cr. 1,052.6 0.0Tot. 3,182.6 958.5

Part F of the Proiect - Strengthening of MINAGRI and Project Monitoring andEvaluation.

12 Ln. 570.0 460.8 Operating E*penditures, includingCr. 289.5 249.4 local staff salaries, under Part FTot} *859.5 710.2 of the Project.

11 Ln. 580.0 142.2 Civil Works, vehicles andCr. 315.8 183.7 equipment under Part FTot. 895.8 325.9

Sub-total Part FLn. 1,150.0 603.0Cr. 605.3 433.1Tot. 1,755.3 1,036.1

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Annex 1Table 1Page 3 of 3

Part G of the Project . Development Planning

14 Ln. 160.0 186.4 Operating Expenditures,Cr. 92.1 52.2 including salaries underTot. 252.1 238.6 Part G

13 Ln. 200.0 96.0 Civil works, vehicles andCr. 105.4 26.1 equipmentTot. 305.4 122.1

Sub-total Part GLn. 360.0 282.4Cr. 197.4 78.3Tot. 5S7.4 360.7

Part C of the Proiect _ Seed Production

6 Ln. 130.0 5.5 Equipment for Part CCr. 65.8 65.7Tot. 195.8 71.2

ContinaenciesLn. 2,440.0. 0.0Cr. 1,250.0 0.0Tot. 3,690.0 0.0

TOTAL DISBURSEMENTSLn. 25,000.0 20,287.2Cr. 12,500.0 12,500.0Tot. 37,500.0 32,787.2

- For Credit 1075-CM, the same rate of conversion of SDR 1.00 - $1.3158has beei' uded for the purposes of comparing appraisal estimates with actualdisbursements. Due to strengthening of the US dollar against the SDR overthe disbursement period, a US dollar equivalent of US$10.1 million wasdisbursed, but since most expenditures were in CFAF or French Francs, theCFAF equivalent was similar to the CFAF 2.6 billion estimated in the SAR.

2/ - Annex 1, Table 1 presents the disbursement information for the Creditand the Loan separately, since the detailed data is not readily availableelsewhere because the disbursements file for Credit 1075-CM has beenmisplaced.

Camarsa Northern Proviso Rural ivel_pset Project: Selete Annual Prodution Indicators

61^/ 12/01 0/64 64/86 "5/P11 P12 PS P14 PC

App. Lob. App. Acb. App. Ach. Ap. Lch. App. Ach.

I. Pasr pased l.t rjet ('lo) 1/ 16 181 148

arealdast 1i U 8 as

Naom,.uwthCott" so 77 n2 7 92

Oa-dras withCoett" 16 17.5 19 2.6 22

tot settee 95 94 114.6 so U1 IIJ 142.5 i6 16S 1i

U1. Area Unr Citivatleo ('M lb)a. seteeo traditisal 21 8.6 6.1 2.6 7.1 2.0 5.6 2.6 5.6 2.0 4.7

Cott" to4al Iteasivo U6.6 89.6 66.6 26.6 09.6 41.1 64.0 40.1 66.0 47.6

Total Cetten 54.2 45.0 68.6 85.4 62.6 46.9 00.6 46.6 76.O 62.6

b. ied orm (et iee.)Ia Sote loe wIth Cetdt 22.2 16.4 * .6 27.5 86.7 16.9 46.6 24.6 U2.7

In letetlee wlith Croeedmt 2.2 5/ 7.6 12. 190.3 2.8

TOtal Sorgbh 24.4 16.4 57.1 27.5 11.5 16.9 66.5 24.6 79.0 25.0

c. lbenro" eved Orawa e 2.2 19.6 27.5 23.6 29.5

Isteaslfifed Groomig" 1, 6.4 2 6.6 8 6.6 7.4 1.8 1i 1.5

ToteS Or osw st 8.2 0.4 21.1 6.6 66.6 6.6 3 1.5 59.5

d. Improwe 1Iba 0.7 6.4 1.5 4/ 2.6 8.3 w

III. iProdiactios '6

Seed Cott". 65.9 62.6 65.1 4J.9 76.8 66.6 76.6 54.4 S2.8 6.6

ixe, 1.8 0.4 2.6 0.6 4.2 4/ 0.4 6.6

IV. Asime_ Trestle ('_Tote 1xistIag 16 18.9 17.5 14.4 10 18.4 2U.S 15.5? 22 16

PaIrs Of trOe *xeA - - - 6.05 -6.214 - 6.488 - .609

Pairs of traleed fow..total 16 18.9 17.5 14.4 10 18.6 26.6 15.6 22 16.69

total wO"Is deo"ps 1.5 2.6 1.6 2.? 1.9 2.06 2.2 X.7? 2.5 3.97

There are umepleiloe slight differemoes to totals betsweena SODECOTOanI reports cnd Supervision reports

atotals lis* I Supvleol. reports. Rne used figures from latter, ecept for 1886/1 yer

1/. Accordng to ses as crap.21. Supsviis report. ree to 'nprove tdi)tioal'. 5/. PIgmaros net reported by SCDECOTO PU ws supposed to report thm but nevr did.

4/. ProJect act deold x

See Cotton Prodwtise, Acreg and Yields, Caesroon: 107s-1m

Tl 862C016N : Extreme North Pronce a Nort ProvIn am Cse.r-Wlrt&year Sfla Prodctlo Yields: Surface Produ)om Yields: Surf* ProoducION Yields: Surtae Production Yields:,(In lb.) (tee) No/be :(t He.) (tees) o/he s:(n lb.) (toes) Kg/ha :(In sl.) (ton) Kg/ae1190/26 1581Sr64U 9188 4 *44f WM 7sm 27 a 27584 238 749 : 90441 625 In81076/171 16666 U8o*So4 70s t74544 s6m 8 * 27511 1101t 48U a *9142 sU8K2 87M1071/1072 46sow 48197 48 6 71917 21918 891 s 27 @ 1ism4 Us : MOI5 87857 416 :U7108/11 P 9079 4523 51? 02t69 2854 458 a 26 107m6 SW9 t 7416 877 495108/127t4 01S70 17687 466 a 8SO21 1168i1 S 2 n86s 15376 748 * 56327 70 84 :1274/1273 04432 4002 022 a 42012 21156 472 no m 127 9QC 58191 2740 ' s64107Lv10 mn78170 48461 070 : 2877 25074 464 t 2GM1 24146 1160 : 01044 8a96m 5o l12o970077 _908s 477 727 : 42816 25916 612 t 17615 216s 1241 : 4915 82684 664 :1277/3078 48486 4686 9867 a 88865 36i2 64 t 14J1 1776 1217 : 823 2721 096 108/1909 4718U 56427 1202 s 81789 8566 116 a 1u 28O44 18 : 85688 41156 1158108/106 i@5694 mm8 1419 8 $6846 46789 1219: 19749 880m 17M1 : 42085 :1966/191 6646U" 844o8 1298 s 42287 45467 175 a 2865 8*960 1092 :1061/1162o 08848 70619 1168 a 89867 42466 170w 2970 7158 1C55 : 4636 520M 1146:1961/1268 540 726 15 195 822 16 24764 4J111 16 864K 4891 1165:1808/1984 73992 4566 1886 a7 9 8o5 41907 164 a SI6 SM 18 406 60 118:16/1 7 073* 186 8M n4 1 1 876 0171 1640 48 6_ 1111196soo966 66282 116544 16 42411 4179 114 s 401 67420 1441: 621 _9 1148 a1@06/3187 4469 1 U_11011 18a 45110 4 J I76 I 4Y58 s 466U 6 10 s 65100 540 SW

s sobEelm ~ ~ ~ ~ a * a

$00root SOKC91011 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~o

w

Cameoon Seed Cotton

soz -

10 -

uvwo 9 73474 ^ Se x

o3 Totd+ Fw Nort Not

CAMERM #01FITHE-N RIPAL De NW WFRO eT - RRECIIC RTE OF 1E83 W - OM6 CASE *4LYS.Sincreemntol Production table aedecoton ttl ic r* nrpjt poetfixi pr ctopion soo sltareo * e tf*itm *rJ *ilmt pr withow1bf r; *Il rhoj sifA, project -ith projet project isar. _as _" r"to conr-nrAb total orodi f;S cam

:0 1*14 (tam g prod.o (WMe ~naduct4t9 prod. (twon CP4bi Iion ton twoCMbllo1".0/01 wt " e&;))t tl-t < C

ren 'i; ° OD A. i.04 7n619.0 0 0.00 0.00 0 00n19311 4~~44.0 a ::: 00 00

0.000.1001 44010.00 1.04 41041.00 45900.00 1.U i 9601.40 675.40 0.04 72851.00 S.O 0.09 078am 0M.00 1.01 8664.80 85410.00 1.U1 4066.00 69:9.20 6.04 946.00 68.S 0 0.06 0.48i99 440000.0 0.97 416.400 46900.00 1.18 892w7.00 wa,.00 8.04 97600.00 102.00 0.10 0.041aid 4400.00 0.94 4111.00 410100.0, 1.1 4996.00 77.00 0.04 111544.00 6767.01 0.06 0.61m 441-000.00 0.0 8O0.00 _ 0.00 1.14 6 .60 SOW.8o 6.12 1108-000 204o.8o 0.19 1.60SW uoo.oo O." 2"o.oo 4211.0 1.15 606178.00 SW 7.00 7.38 12110600000 90775.00 0.19 1.85137 44100.00 0._0 6 9600.0 8519.00 1.15 656.O 956.00 6.90 1106100-00 38.c00 0.2 1.49am0 46010.00, 0.90 8SO00.0 604695.00' 1.40 90418.00 8067500 6.87 11000r .00 JIM .400 0.46 8.08193 46010.00 0.00 6 0.00 60000.00 1.0 790.00 59600.00 6.97 110600.00 524C0.00 0.20 1.641lo0 4400.00 0."0 66190.0 6000.00 1.90 79000.040 8491010.00 6.27 110100.0 59400.00 0.29 1.54

$10M WO A IOcveMtel PeP0elk 0e I *t 52.400 tone, 4o reflect on. bad Fear ir four rdflct me bad yer in fouECOSIONIC COST PiCt K0 OF PlEO PROJECT ECONOMIC COSTS (BILLION CFA)_adegeton dsoeo ferm laIor _ cme roductio .odemton endecoto fate Iabor totawerible emet fied eme lpoe pe" kg fibre garble ael flid me lapte oiAfbre WaseOl billio nCPA bi IIont bA hill;onCF biI. CfA birl ion CFA1460/61 SIC900 178.00 61.0111 1.00 661.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001461 91.0O 178.00 6.00 111.00 651.00 701.85 0.65 0.78 0.10 0.99 1.77Am m11o.00, 178.00 6.00 10.00 8l.5100 9195.66 0.42 0.4 0.14 0.28 1.25m 99.00, 1178.00 61.00 101.0eo 81.00 409.60 0.8 0.6u 0.97 0.44 2.1116" 9561.00 178.00 66.00 101.00 851.00 850-.1o 0.n 0.61 0.92 0.85 1.98am9 11111.o1 176.00 6.00 11611.00 651.00 6165.0 I.651 1.80 0.54 0.66 4.87t° W.0 t .0 1101.0 5.o an00 8810.00 1.5 1.85 0.44 0.O 4. 21sm 100. 1.613.00 46.0 140:.00 445.:00 9S518.0 1.11.490 0.:40 1.06 4.611sm 11.61 146B.00 4.00 106.00 412.00 20915.00 2.77 8.06 u.n 2.20 6.8146 21185.00 199.0 45.00 1016.00 418.00 199610.00 1.76 1.164 0.54 1.40 58am9 au.o0 11811.01 45.00 11111.00 40.4.0 199610.00 1.78 1.84 0.86 1.40 5.85b4enf "O I 0t incrumntel_,enue per BbI of fibre CPA bill lop Cotm projec Investment production lcaeenntel em reenueincA, uec$ts t of n"/S cfeA net , meotrtonFw _ Inrt reree billionas -a wr he i~p1. UIS C. billim teO (CFA r kg)

1l63/61 185.00 170.95 t126.00 SP -164 0.00, 0.C0 0.00 0.00 67.49 0.001461 186.0O 14.110 95 1.0 a7 -154 4.41 9.40 0.76 91.85 8.44 1.07am a11.o0 170.90 mO. M 11 0.02 7.9o 9.41 S6." li 11.4 1.18am m.oo 168.46 410 as M 0.51 6.70 1.78 40911.60 675.19 2.741464 S11.01 211.44 471.00 M 21 0.0r 6.80 9.9 8506.0 571.4 2.01am au1.eO u.S2 S.PA W7 -174 -1.42 6.*0 2.66 6160.00 817.40 0.001466 164.8 166. .481.SH 4Ot -Ot 4.009 7.00 9.C5 8.01 0.00 461.81 4.00193 1410.00 19.3 912.00 we -UT -1.11 9.70 0.79 66.15.9 876.10 8.60am us.oi 18.16 N.00 do -a 4.46 960=.00 4019.46 -. 1 LO1009 163.00 184.66 86.00 641 196 1.68 190111.06 84.66 7.01100 1.00 111110.01 a" SW 1.78 1966.00 540."6 7.01

net . et Ret IVe" P"Mject 500011 totel TOt. Pood crnp Food cr.Co4tt" rod few d EJp net Iaioemte PRead onete cmet Not benefit. benefi to

Va. ~ boneelt. e ben benFi. enfit. CPA bWllio CPA bilIlion CP ~blIIion benefit roedued reducedCPA io bi$a m aIIton P 6 I bilio CF billion CFAbi IISon byU bpSO1960/61 1461 0:00 o0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00100 0.00 0.00

lift .00 0.00 ~~0.06 0.78 0.78 1.58 -1.46 -1.48 -1.46low 0.319 0.00 0.8911 2.41 0.45 9.85 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47am 1.90 0.24 O.80 2.8l 2.78 0.6 3."5 -1.2 -1.45 -1.67seat o. " 0.24 0.00 4.411 2.7 0." 16.51 -1.75 -1.97 -2.91Xam O.a" e. 0.46 1.18 9.6 1.11 4.18 -2.tO -8.95 -8.48193 1.10 0.94 0.46 9.96 .2.9 1.68 8.69 -1.38 -1.00 -1.88SW 0.44 0.94 0.03 1.66 0.79 1.49 9.95 40.70 40.98 -1. issm a.4 0.94 0.00 5.8 J1.010 8.06 0.60 0.36 0.1is1Ion S.83 0.94 0.60 4.45 1.54 1.64 9.60 2.85 9.151110 S.AO 0.94 0.40 4.45 1.96 1.64 9.00 2.8511 2.18*1 4.8D 0.94 0.00 4.40 1." 1.14 2.00 2.J3 2.151099 6.60 0.94 0.90 4.45 1.64 1.64 2.60 9.38 2.1is1901 8.85 0.94 0.00 4.45 1.64 1.64 2.00 2.35 2.151le6 6.10 0.94 0.90 4.45 1.54 1.64 2.60 2.85 2.15lmw 8.30 0.9 0.46 4.45 1.6 1.64 2.60 2.38 2.15iom 811.9101 0.94 0.00 4.45 1.64 1.04 2.0 2.85 2.28107 81.801 0.94 0.90 4.45 1."4 1.64 2.60 2.85 2.15 low S.SO 0.94 0.00 4.45 1.64 1.84 2.60 2.85 2.151t" 6.60 0.94 0.90 4.45 11.44 1.68 2.00 2.16 2.1is

17.99gene Ce.. Aeelple - With Project Amea * 0.000 be. endIncremental cotto productio a 59.400 tone. (pile 0919411.ebl) NVev 606 -0.276 -1.00 -2.916M 0.098 0.076 0.0642

CuM N- MUAL oevAouer ioi - IIGSMC RAT9 OF 1ER5 Wm - MSITT AL751

eadecotom total itcc, .rodn sner 9rjct proj*CV6~locrementl P1rodoction Tablo fixed produclic. seed cotton a,odn as U shoa., of

Withot C, ile wis rj Wib rl Wthpels Wilb projoe project nro J camt " ncot. centr*o-a 'l trstan prnodn timsod cots

, Joo , ~~~~~~~~V*odmJ6 or" -awe) yi ld { t6t.s proda (tms pr o (o CFAbillii9 twome CIFA bAtio

i 4418° °O 0 41gW OO 4UDDa 0 "l1?".9D 8.04 79610.00 0.0D 8:o 00 0 1d440Co. O.4 46 .00 50.OD 1.15 5201.460 711?6D.410 IIA 721.O0 576.40 0 09 a 75

1412 $40.00 1.01 a"6?.00 81114010.00 1.14 40667.00 281011.2011 0.06 94560.0-00 2100 0.4"Is" 44000.00 0.907 4 .00 40o.00 1.18 61097.00 l1m1.s 3.04 9750I.00 30229.00 O 190 14

1"6 440O10.00 0.O4 411.001 46D00.00 1.11 409W5.00 067.OD 0.06 115644.00 71.00 0 61

1 C 44000.00 0.40 C 0 0.00 F60.00 3.14 60007.50 2F01*0 0.12 110600.00 20407.50 0 19 I so

11 44000.00 0.00 800.00 62.O00 1.15 610.00 20771..00 7.85 10 20775.00 0 le 1 30

Iv 440400. 100 0."0 9.600.00 15120.00 .O 6 0.00 2.0 4. o 110200. M 022 4 4

If" X 00 .00 0 .40 NN.S.too40 * 047150. 1005.00 0.57 110600.00 675.00 04" 3030 40100 0.00 8 I0 0.00 100.00 4.0D 5D.O 1.10 *.27 11000.00 200.00 0 IS I IS

im 4100.01, 09.. O.0 SM.011 OW01 sm0 0.37 110600.0 2040.00 0.1 I 115NM;3 We aeam IrArmamtel leePob4lOm I sIs O% Wed40 tmom. to rafSec% me0 ba yewr a four reflect one bed moor on too.

icosioewc COST a iG plan o*u a 0 PUo aEc sECOwowtC COSTS (BILL ION C FA )oeodeot= godeo6m farm labor agat crodwlliom eadIactm Todecotm fare labor total

earblOe oGM% flied mat lopote Bog6 fibre warble coat fiened MAt trotlscst1ibr was 0 Im $&twCFA billionCA hillB CF billion CFA 6iCin a i CFA

1,6001 202.s0 ITS500 0.01 1.00 601.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00,1101, 1102:00 175.00 99,00 10.00 161.00 270.66 0.6.75 0.16 0.29 1.17sin SM.0 150 66.00 111.00 551.0 26.6 0.42 0.45 0.14 0.21 1.23

am0 26.00 175.00 66.d0 10.00 5611.00 4001.60 0."6 0.2.7 0.44 2.301104 20. 1.0 0 99.00 106. 00 111.00 6600.60 0.71 0: 0.21 0.10 1.93Sim6 02.00 1751.00 66.60 110116:0 51:100 #13OOI04 .0 0.34 0.66 4.57,

1107 o. " us. ." ." l m.m *s.U 29-10-

1*0 SU* °f 111100 MAD8 20000 , .u *.0 u 2.2t .U1

WAS§" 31911.011, a go gSS as 4U15.00 " 001.1 1.1511 0.64 0.60 8.40

1910 18.00 110.00 40.00 11010. 404.00 6160.0 1.10 1.14 O." 85* 8.41

REVENUES PEAI K I LO bemefits nrmnaRawemum wr ki lo of fibr CFA bUll..m "NAT DWO1IiT wrodctios Incremental AO" eoIItO

411011 GIs^w -- "kg Cott" IPbilroaentn l*n, r beus "'DIAN ne"Al VWetF *a 9 D R. ffllc i lA b Iiotome 000 (CPA pool 0o0)

115.00 170.20 210~~~.00 -w -3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00i 857.42 0.00sin0 110 10.00 14.=0 110.011 86?-w 4.41 1.00 0.76 2701.36 897.44 1.07

Iam Iuse 170.2 16.03 s1 :.00 7.40 1.43 200.6 56.6 1.10

INS 179.00 0..00 00D 0So 14 0.51 0.70 21.7 4051.602 675.11 2.76 1164 10.40 11.4 411.00 57 1 0.07 6.80 1.97 6306.00 571.00 2.01

INS 31001.001 91a 15111.00 W -174 .1.411 0.00 2.4111 01683.00 877.40 3.001466 184.00 1:.0 8119.0118 4n -. 19 7.40 2.21011 610.00 401.51 4.00 .

11117 140.00 12.6 20.07 -117 -1.1I 1.70 0.9O61.M Va4.10a 3 M0

som 140.00 to.1 800.00 406 -141 64.10 2060.00 400.40 0.81I1000 ' 16.0 184.6 86.d0 5411 120 1.00 0100.00 5140.961 4 411100 165.00 63.00 541 W8 1.3It 0100.00 540.96 4 41

eat e ma" Beat. eabtatel 6inrim total Total Food crow Food cropSeatson red tfaw aroeam Foe i rjc loed oat, not, bonfita beef ito

VW0 Iea o be o 15s S esit ot bne t eue , reduced bogUAbIllIemUAbllBlom~~~AblBli.5 CA bII Ion CGA IIBBi.. CGA biBI Io GFAOIbiio GFA belIIeon Sprerent SO percent

CPA U II Io0.00 VI 0.0 0.00 0 II.0.00 .000.0 000 0.00 0 0s

141 .0 0.0 0 0.00 0.0'.s 1.60 -'1.40 -1.40 .1 40106 .9 0.00 0.99 2.4 04112.6 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47

am 1.201 0.16 0.00 1.SF 1.75 0.04 8.00 -1." -1.45 .1 671O4 ." 0.14 0.00 1."0 1.07 0.01 8.0-1.75 -1.07 .2.20

Gm ." 0.214 0.60 1.18 1.06 1.60 41.181 -2 90 -8.20 .3 431m to 0.34 0.00 1.16 1.23 1.66 5.62 -1.39 -l 60 -1.65G17 ." 0.34 0.00 1."001 1.40 2.6111 40.70 4003 -1.15

1100 1.40 0.16 0.00 5.60 81.011 01.08 0.60 0.50 0.15

1at0 2.00 0.14 0.00 8.20 1.10 1.16 2305 1.64 1.311MG 2.00 0.24 0.00 0.20 1.1s62 146 2.011 1.54 1.61

11101 1.00 0.34 0.00 8.20 . .Is20I.1-11

9111,2 2.00 0.34 0.00 .0u 1.10 3.10 2.05 1.04 1.61 :

1le" 2.00 0.24 0.00 01.21 1.10 1.16s 2.06 1.04 1.61

114 .06 0.24 0.00 0.40 1.16 1.16 2.06 1.04 1.1I115 .00 0.16 0.0 11.21 1.164 11.161 2.06 1.04 1.61 ~ 106 2.00 0.16 0.00 0.20 1.30 1.1as 2.00 3.54 3.5 III

110711 1.00 0.16 0.00 8.20 1.16 1.20s 2.06 1.64 1 SI1100 2.010 0.16 0.00 8.20 1.10s 1.16 2.06 1.04 1 01 I4

0" to bfA sBA.alasi - With. Project Area e 60 000 Is medinreena celtom produallom a 20.400 bose. FiPle l&Ociea.ebl) WV mg6 5 -1.168 -3.124 -4.400

EU 0.0102 0.0411 0 0am

MALI 22~ . -~ tI / ~~N I G E R /- ,d, c~ - 4 ;t 5ZJU

rh t~Y~C~S SUDAN

SLIRKA / usc H A D t.FASOi\

, NIGERIA r '> _I

gio~ />v, i CENTRAL AFRICAN 1~~"~' -' REPUBLIC ~CAMEROON \ I r :

G yf S @ \ N S j KILOMETERS 2, 40 K0 50 1e 0 120 140 160 eLOGONE-

EOIa OA . MILES 0 20 40 60 go 100

.Of THE 1ATANrAc oCEAN GABON t"cNO ZAIRE )I-

^jt ~~~~~~~~~~~~AMAn~j g t; ,. N I G E R A S A

CAMEROON iM-AYO- DI roAwE

REGIONS AND MAIN CROPS

MAJOR EXPORT CROPS BY PROVINCE:ID* Arabicr Crafrt ee 'LOU i) -.Arbi C .ff _C.

R.bust Coffe.Cotton

OTHER MAIN CROPS:PLANTAIN CASSAVA EANSC H A D

MILLET TARO YAMS

MAIZE RICE GROUNDNUIS

* National Copital % N C;• Province CapitalsO Division Capitals M I L

Rivers ,

-Dwivisin Boundaries MV-E- Pravince Bounrjaies,E ,_ MILLET \

- - Intesnational Boundories

FARO-E- DTEC/_0

N I G E R I A +tSV/ W-N

MAt E r\DO @EEtNGA N R

8' . 9NYU MOMO MEAM BEANS 0 t U~~~~~~~~~~O Au , YO MILLET~ Z

N0j4 ( EME CASAAf sCv OMf-DEf CASSA

4_; , cP,'/t YAMi 9 S o;CBN RM Y AMSTRA

' EsQUATORIA ....... LANTAFN SSAVA ,J, T

iNULAR GU*RIN4 iti cA MC OO< ° . i

A TtC' , /GROUNDNUtS 5DA SAVA

0¢e v 7 5 5 ASVA SAVA SSA >

mg

Yr / (CONTIENTAL GUINAA]S N!R E 2 O F T H E CO N GO si

oo~~ ~ ~ ~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~ I' §v GA-i

I ! . .1 IS !E V{ h_ s l;r / / M * tMt E MA'''EtE