Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ReportNo: 25103

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-24560)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 18.5 MILLION (US$26.00 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

FOR A

RWANDA ENERGY SECTOR REHABILITATION AND URBAN WASTE MANAGEMENTPROJECT

November 27, 2003

Eerg UnstAfrks R-&

|lbis doommhas a resticted distribution and may be wed by recipients only in the pfomance of theirofficial duties lls oontet may not otewise be disclopw without World Bank auw on.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective )

Currency Umt = Rwanda FrancsRWF 1.00 = US$ 0.002

US$ 1 = RWF 469

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 December 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development BankBADEA Arab Bank for Economic Development in AfricaCAS Country Assistance StrategyCCCE Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (French aid agency, now Agence de

Developpement Francaise)CPPR Country Portfolio Performance ReviewDCA Development Credit AgreementEIB European Investment BankELECTROGAZ Etablissement Publique de Production de Transport et de la Distribution de l'Eau,

d'Electricite et de Gaz (the public utility company)ESRP Energy Sector Rehabilitation ProjectICR Implementation Completion ReportIDA International Development AssociationMICOMART Ministry of Commerce, Industry and HandicraftsMINAGRI Ministry of Agriculture and Animal HusbandryMINERENA Ministry of Energy, Water and Natural Resources (successor of MINITRAPE)MINITRAPE Ministry of Public Works and EnergyNGO Non-governmental organizationPCAU Project Coordination and Administration UnitPCD Project Concept DocumentPFP Policy Framework PaperPIP Project Investment PlanPIU Project Implementation UnitPMU Project Monitoring UnitPPF Project Preparation FacilityPSR Project Status ReportPVK Prefecture de la Ville de Kigali (Kigali City Hall)QAG Quality Assurance GroupSAR Staff Apraisal ReportSDR Special Drawing RightsSINELAC Societe Internationale de l'Electricite des Pays des Grands Lacs (Operator of Ruzizi II

hydro power plant)TTL Task Team LeaderUNDP United Nations Development Program

Vice President: Callisto E. MadavoCountry Manager/Director: Emmnanuel Mbi

Sector Manager/Director: Ananda CovindassamyTask Team Leader/Task Manager: Ludmilla Butenko

RWANDARwanda Energy Secor Rehabilitation and Urban Waste Wanagement Project

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 85. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 126. Sustainability 147. Bank and Borrower Performance 148. Lessons Learned 169. Partner Comments 1710. Additional Information 37Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 38Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 39Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 41Annex 4. Bank Inputs 42Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 44Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 45Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 46

Project ID: P002241 Project Name: RW Energy Sector

Team Leader: Ludmilla Butenko TL Unit: AFTEG

ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: November 27, 2002

1. Project Data

Name: RW Energy Sector L/C/TF Number: IDA-24560Country/Department: REPUBLIC OF RWANDA Region Africa Regional Office

Sector/subsector: Power (51%); Mining and other extractive (16%);Central government administration (15%);Renewable energy (10%); Oil & gas (8%)

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 02/10/1987 Effective: 01/21/1994 01/21/1994Appraisal: 03/25/1992 MTR: 01/01/2000Approval: 02/09/1993 Closing: 12/31/1998 12/31/2001

Borrower/lImplementing Agency: GOVT OF RWANDA/ELECTROGAZ; MINITRAPE (MINERENA), Prefecturede la Ville de Kigali (PVK)

Other Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Callisto Madavo Edward V. K. JaycoxCountry Manager: Emmanuel Mbi Francisco Aguirre-SacasaSector Manager: Ananda Covindassamy Michael SarrisTeam Leader at ICR: Ludmilla Butenko Richard SenouICR Primary Author: Ludmilla Butenko;

Marie-Chantal Uwanyiligira

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUnlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Neglgible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance. S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

The original Energy Sector Rehabilitation Project (ESRP), later renamed Rwanda Energy Sector Rehabilitation andUrban Waste Management Project, had an overall objective of providing comprehensive support to theimplementation of economic reform in the energy sector. The main objective, as defined in the Staff AppraisalReport (SAR) of January 13, 1993 (Report No. 11241-RW), was to promote rational energy policies whileminimizing adverse environmental implications and establish the basis for efficient utilization of Rwanda's energyresources. The four specific objectives were:

* create an enabling legal and regulatory environment;* enhance the efficiency of ELECTROGAZ's operations;* provide technical assistance and training to key sector institutions to build up investment planning capacity;

strengthen government capacity to formulate a coherent sector policy and monitor sector activities includingthose related to woodfuel, methane, petroleum productsand least-cost power supply alternatives for rural areas;

* rehabilitate key power infrastructure.

The basic principle underpinning the project was that the Government would establish the policy environment butcommercial decisions would be left to private economic agents.

The objectives of the ESRP reflected the economic policy of the Rwandan Government and fitted well into theeconomic reform program detailed in the Policy Framework Paper (PFP) for 1991-1993. The PFP placed theemphasis on recourse to market forces and private sector, aiming at: (i) creation of a climate conducive to privatesector activity; (ii) improvement and rationalization of public sector management; (iii) development of the humanresource base; and (iv) improvement of natural resources management. The objectives of the project were also inline with the draft law on Institutional Reform of Public Enterprises adopted by the Council of Ministers inDecember, 1992 and the Govemment's energy policy reflected in the Statement of Development Policy for theEnergy Sector of November 1992. The energy policy focused, inter alia, on (i) adoption of least cost solutions forinvestments in the sector; (ii) regeneration and expansion of the potential of woodfuel production; (iii) improvedefficiency in the production of electricity, water, woodfuel and charcoal; (iv) identification of altemative sources ofenergy; (v) rehabilitation of key power infrastructures; and (vi) extension of electricity supply to rural areas.

In 1993 the Govemment adopted the institutional reform program for the electricity subsector opting to contractout the operations of ELECTROGAZ, the national power, water and gas utility, to a private operator through alease contract and launched a selection process. It also agreed to implement a revised electricity tariff structure.On the investment side, in October 1991 the Govemment introduced a system of three-year rolling ProjectInvestment Plan (PIP) with a view to integrate the selection of energy projects into clearly defined sectoralobjectives and a comprehensive macroeconomic framework.

The ESRP objectives were realistic and the risks were considered low for several reasons. First, a significantamount of preparatory work supported project design, including numerous sector studies done through previousprojects and the ESRP Project Preparation Facility (PPF). Second, the Government's track record of implementingdifficult decisions to create an enabling environment for the path of reforms suggested that the risk of not takingnecessary measures, i.e. implementation of a revised energy pncing policy and restructuring of ELECTROGAZ,was not high. Third, the physical risks of the project were considered minimal, as the planned rehabilitation workwas routine. The scope and scale of the project seemed justified at the time of the project preparation. Overall, theGovernment is said to have been well perceived by the donor community, as demonstrated by the co-financingapproach adopted initially by the ESRP, and by the high level of foreign assistance to Rwanda at that time.However, the project recognized a weakness of the Govemment's administrative and financial managementcapacity and made an appropriate provision for technical assistance to support the implementation of the ESRPactivities.

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The total estimated cost of the Energy Sector Rehabilitation Project was US$ 38.95 million. It was to be financedjointly by the Intemational Development Association (IDA) - 66.76%, French aid agency Caisse Centrale deCooperation Economique (CCCE) - 6.96 %, European Investment Bank (EIB) - 20.32% and the Government -5.96 %. The IDA Credit (Cr. 2456-RW) in the amount of SDR 18.5 million (US$ 26 million equivalent) wasapproved by the Board on February 9, 1993, signed on April 21, 1993, and became effective on January 21, 1994.The original closing date of the project was December 31, 1998.

The first few months of the project implementation showed promising results but the project activities wereinterrupted by the civil war that culminated in the 1994 genocide. The general view of persons involved in theproject preparation is that there was no indication of the potential for the civil war and the ensuing genocide at thetime. This is confirmed by the absence of any reference to these factors in the available project documentationincluding the SAR and the Board minutes. The war delayed the implementation of the ESRP for almost two yearsas the project entities suffered huge losses of assets, irrecoverable dislocation of staff and cessation of projectactivities during and immediately after the genocide. The project resumed in 1995 after the country embarked on apost-war emergency reconstruction program under a new Govemment established in late 1994.

The war and the resulting institutional weaknesses had a deep negative impact on infrastructure services delivery,especially on provision of electricity and water. ELECTROGAZ was technically bankrupt despite high electricityprices (US$0.15/kWh since January 1994). Tumaround of the utility became an essential part of the newGovemment's structural and economic reforms program. From end 1995 to mid 1998 there were three attemptsmade to improve energy sector efficiency through three different time-bound proposals. Although unsuccessful,these efforts led to forging a consensus on the need for a fundamental restructuring and privatization ofELECTROGAZ.

The interruption of the project implementation and the need to adjust the project scope to the post-conflict needsand constraints called for a revision of the project objectives.

3.2 RevLsed Objective:

The ESRP was conceived before the 1994 genocide as a vehicle to improve energy sector operating efficiency. Inthe face of severe institutional capacity constraints resulting from the civil war, Government progress with thesector reform, particularly the restructuring of ELECTROGAZ, was extremely slow and the projectimplementation was substantially delayed. Country circumstances also influenced the co-financiers who, due toarrears from the Govemment, pulled out of the project. Their funding, in the amount of US$ 10.63 million (SDR7.56 million) was mostly intended for financing the infrastructure rehabilitation program and in any event was nolonger adequate after the war. The Bank remained the only financier of the ESRP with a reduced scope,maintaining a Credit of SDR 18.5 million In November 1994 the Bank organized a Donors meeting in Paris tomobilize the necessary resources to assist the Govemment in carrying out emergency reconstruction activities. Thenew program of emergency water and electricity infrastructure rehabilitation was financed outside the ESRP byother donors, mainly Canada and Germany, for an amount of about US$ 6 million.

Reflecting the difficulties in project implementation the Project Status Reports (PSRs) rated the DevelopmentObjective and the Implementation Progress of the project as unsatisfactory for over three years until mid 1998.Despite the poor implementation performance, the Government requested the Bank's not to cancel the Credit but torestructure the project instead. The Govemment proposed to retain the overall sector efficiency improvementobjective and to add a specific new objective to improve sanitation conditions within the overpopulated city ofKigali through the design and implementation of a system for solid waste collection. The Government alsorequested the Bank to focus the energy component only on the restructuring of ELECTROGAZ and to reallocate apart of the Credit proceeds to a new waste management collection component to be implemented in the city ofKigali.

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During the civil war solid waste in the streets of the capital accumulated for months. In 1994 financial assistancefor the clean-up was provided by some donors but no mechanism to sustain the activity was put in place. Thesanitary situation was exacerbated by a massive influx of refugees that created an additional problem, including thedisposal of sewage and solid waste, for the city management.

To make the project more responsive to the country's post-war situation and to reflect the new Governmentstrategy the project was restructured and the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) was amended in August,1998. The project objectives were revised in line with the management's proposal to restructure existing projects torespond better to the new situation prevailing in Rwanda. The amendment (Report No. P-7222-RW) was preparedto reallocate funds among the categories and to incorporate activities for solid waste management in Kigali into theproject. It also included a special provision for retroactive financing of collection equipment already procured bythe Borrower and for some of the operating costs. Through the restructuring of the ESRP the Bank was to assistthe Government in resolving an issue that could have developed into a serious sanitation and health problem.

As a result, the following two new project objectives were added to ESRP:

(i) contribute to the improvement of the sanitation conditions related to waste disposal in the city of Kigali;and

(ii) help Prefecture de la Ville de Kigali (PVK) to establish a minimum physical and institutional capacity forsustainable improvement of waste sector management, including a cost recovery policy.

The Credit amount of SDR 18.5 million remained unchanged and one more expenditure category was added toallow disbursements to cover operating costs. The closing date remained unchanged. In December 1998, a partialcancellation of funds (SDR 4.98 million) that were intended to finance investments in distribution was done andthe project closing date was extended to December 31, 1999 (See "Revised Components" p. 7 for more details).Later, the project was extended two more times - to December 31, 2000 and, finally, to December 31, 2001. Theproject, therefore, had an effective implementation period of five years within a seven-year life span.

3.3 Original Components:

The original project consisted of two main components:

Component A: Strengthening Regulatory and Policy Environment (US$12.40 million), including:

* institutional reform program for the power subsector (including revision of the legal framework andengagement of a private operator for ELECTROGAZ under a lease contract) (US$5.7 million);

* improvements in the charcoal subsector (introduction of incentives to rationalize and improve subsectorefficiency) (US$4.25 million);

* solar home systems (studies to design and implement a strategy for solar home systems as a cost efficientalternative for electrification in rural areas) (US$0.26 million);

* Kivu methane gas development (implementation of environmental and technical guidelines for futuredevelopment of Lake Kivu methane gas (US$1.33 million);

* technical assistance to the petroleum sector (training to strengthen the institutional capacity ofMICOMART to implement the reform of the taxation and pricing of petroleum products) (US$0.60million).

Component B: Power Subsector (US$20.28 million), that aimed at rehabilitation and improvement of key powerinfrastructure, including:

* distribution rehabilitation and extension (for five cities) (US$8.01 million);* transmission improvements (improvements in the transmission network substations including the addition

of two 110 kV bays at the Mururu I substations) (US$4.50 million);* hydro plant rehabilitation (overhaul of the Mukungwa I hydro power station, and hydraulic structures of

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the Gisenyi and Gihira hydro plants) (US$2.40 millions);* spares, maintenance equipment and tools (constitution of a reserve stock of spare parts for plants and

substations (US$2.50 million);* technical assistance and training (capacity building and training for (i) the staff of the Project

Coordination and Administration Unit (PCAU) and Project Implementation Units (PlUs) in areas ofproject monitoring and management; and (ii) strengthening of the investment planning and monitonngcapacity of the utility staff) (US$0.87 million);

* feasibility studies for hydroplants (US$ 2.00 million).

The project also included an amount of US$6.53 in physical and price contingencies. Both components of ESRPwere in line with the development objective of promoting rational energy policies and establishing the basis for theefficient utilization of Rwanda's energy resources, while minimizing adverse environmental implications. Inaddition, the Component B was complementary to the rehabilitation and improvement of power infrastructurecarried out under the Energy I Project (Cr. 1495-RW).

Project design is rated satisfactory in terms of component packaging. The weakness in the Government'sadministrative and financial management capacity was recognized during project preparation and appropriateprovisions were made for technical assistance to enhance the existing capacity. However, the project componentsshould have been better aligned to meet the development objective.

3.4 Revised Components:The Amendment of August 1998 included: (i) an urban waste management component; (ii) financing of a part ofthe project's operating costs; and (iii) retroactive financing of expenses already incurred by the Government for thewaste management and some operating costs for the project coordination unit, in the amount of US$3.6 million. Awaste management component for the City of Kigali was added to improve the disposal of solid and liquid waste byimplementing a sustainable arrangement to delegate responsibility for collection and disposal of solid wastes andseptic tanks contents to local private contractors.

The restructured project, renamed Energy Sector Rehabilitation and Urban Waste Management project, containedtwo main parts: the Energy Component and the Urban Waste Management Component.

Energy Component (SDR 15.33 million) representing 83 percent of the project costs, included:

Part A - Strengtheninz of Regjulatorv and Policy Framework:* strengthening of regulatory and policy framework, mainly technical assistance to prepare the restructuring

package for ELECTROGAZ (splitting it into three entities (electricity, water, gas);* training of charcoal and improved stoves producers;* training in maintenance of photovoltaic systems;* provision of funds to carry out a bathymetric survey and an environmental impact study of the identified

sites on the Lake Kivu;* strengthening of the capacity of MICOMART, provision of equipment and training to a small monitonng

and analysis unit for petroleum products within MICOMART;* provision of resources to the management of the project (project operating costs).

Part B - Rehabilitation and Improvement of Key Power Infrastructure:

* rehabilitation and extension of the distribution network in the cities of Kigali, Butare, Gisenyi,Nyabisindu, and Ruhengeri;

* studies to determine the improvements in transmission networks substations including the addition of two110 kV bays at the Mururu I substation);

* studies to identify overhauling works in the Mukungwa I hydro power station, including the hydraulicstructures of the Gisenyi and Gihira hydro stations;

* constitution of a reserve stock of spare parts for substations and maintenance equipment and tools;

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* capacity building of the PMU and staff involved the management and monitoring of the energycomponent of the Project and training of students through scholarship;

* feasibility study for hydroplant (Nyabarongo).

Urban Waste Management (SDR 3.17 million), representing 17 percent of the project cost, included:

Subcomponent I - Collection and disposal of earbaxze and septaMe:

* design of a pilot collection and disposal scheme, limited to about 40 percent of the population of Kigali,involving local communities and private sector participation (in case of success, an extension of the pilot wasto be considered under an Urban project planned for FY03);

* studies of cost recovery/financial resource mobilization, leasing arrangements between the local privatecontractors and the PVK for the rented and/or leased equipment, with affordability/willingness to pay surveys;

* a study to establish a proper institutional framework for PVK while strengthening its financial managementcapacity through technical assistance;

* definition and implementation of a strategy for community participation and liason including sensitization,infornation and marketing programs, and training and capacity building under contractual arrangements withNGOs;

* equipment purchase, including weighing stations, and rehabilitation of bulldozers;* minimal upgrading of the existing dump site and construction of collection stations.

Subcomponent 2 - Preparation of an extension phase, with the phasing out of the existing dumpsite and theselection of a new sanitary landfill:

* a study on sanitary landfill identification and preparation, including an environmental impact study;* closing of the existing dumpsite;* study of the treatment and reuse of septage and garbage.

The following table contains revised project components financed under the Credit and the respective allocations(in SDR million):

Components Initial Revisedallocation allocation

1. ENERGY COMPONENTA - Regulatory and Sector Policy Strengthening 7.46 4.78

1. Institutional reform for ELECTROGAZ 2.80 2.802. Training of charcoal and improved stove producers 2.95 0.073. Training on solar energy 0.18 0.024. Bathymetric study of Lake Kivu 1.04 0.785. TA to petroleum sector 0.49 0.496. Project Coordination Unit 0.00 0.62

B - Rehabilitation/lmprovement of Electricity Infrastructure 11.04 10.551. Rehabilitation and extension of distribution in five cities 6.56 5.142. Improvements of transmission network 0.00 0.713. Rehabilitation of hydro power plants 0.00 0.714. Reserve spare parts and equipment 2.11 2.115. TA and training 0.74 0.746. Feasibility study: Nyabarongo 1.63 1.14

II. URBAN WASTE MANAGEMENT COMPONENT 0.00 3.171. Works 0.00 0.292. Equipment and spare parts 0.00 1.85

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3. Capacity building and training 0.00 0.804. Consulting services including Promotion and Public 0.00 0.23information

TOTAL 18.50 18.50

Due to continuing delays in project implementation and changes in the Government's sector reform strategy, by theend of 1998 it became obvious that the physical rehabilitation of the key infrastructure, as well as management ofELECTROGAZ operations by a private company would not start before the project closing date. In December1998, at the request from the Government, the project closing date was extended for one year to December 31,1999, and a partial cancellation of funds was done. The Energy Component was refocused on sector reforms andthe restructuring of ELECTROGAZ, while physical rehabilitation was left for a later stage, when the reformprocess would be more advanced and competent management of the utility would be in place. As a result of thechange in the scope of the project, an amount of SDR 4.98 million, previously allocated to infrastructure in thepower sector, was cancelled reducing the total credit amount to SDR 13.52 million. See Annex 2.

The revised objectives and resulting new components of the project reflected the IDA post-war strategy for Rwandawhich made a strong case for "...exceptional assistance to overcome the legacies of genocide and make a transitionto peace and development...", as reflected in the CAS approved by the Board on April 7, 1998. The new CASemphasized the transition from post-war emergency to sustainable growth. The energy, water and sanitationsectors were recognized as key sectors for the economic recovery and social stability. The restructuring andprivatization of ELECTROGAZ became an important part of the Government's reform program and povertyreduction efforts. Reliable energy supply was considered essential for private sector development and creation ofemployment.

3.5 Qualhty at Entry:The Quality Assurance Group (QAG) did not do an assessment of the project's quality at entry. The ICR finds thequality at entry, on balance, to be satisfactory. Project objectives and components were in line with theGovernmenfs economic reform program at the time, aimed at achieving macroeconomic stability, improvingcompetitiveness of the economy and stimulating economic recovery, which was supported by the first adjustmentcredit (SAC) approved in June 1991. The ESRP was consistent with the CAS of June 17, 1992 that accorded highpriority to: (i) supporting the country's adjustment process; (ii) developing an incentive structure for private sectorinvestment; (iii) reducing the role of the state and improving public resource management; (iv) developing humanresources, building local capacity and alleviating poverty; and (v) fostering improved management of naturalresources while protecting the environment.

The project SAR displayed carefully designed components The technical and institutional design seemed realisticand achievable. The dialogue with the Borrower during project preparation and appraisal indicated thatinstitutional development of the sector was a Government priority. The long-standing intensive dialogue on therestructuring of ELECTROGAZ that preceded project appraisal paved the way for the expected privatization of theutility. In addition, the project design included mechanisms to leverage action to achieve project objectives,including conditions of negotiations, effectiveness and disbursement.

The management of the project involved coordination between several ministries and agencies: Ministry of PublicWorks and Energy (MINITRAPE), Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (MINAGRI), Ministry ofCommerce, Industry and Handicrafts (MICOMART) and ELECTROGAZ. MINITRAPE was responsible for theoverall coordination and supervision of the program and was expected to implement directly the activities relatedto woodfuel, gas and solar systems. MINAGRI was responsible for implementation of charcoal master plan andMICOMART for the implementation of the petroleum products component. ELECTROGAZ was theimplementing agency for the power subsector components. A project coordination and administration unit(PCAU) was to be established within MINITRAPE and project implementation units (PlUs) were to be set up in allthe four implementing agencies. Recognizing the complexity of having multiple implementing agencies in theproject, a Technical Assistance and Training component was included in the project to provide capacity buildingand training for the staff of the PCAU and PlUs in areas of project monitoring and management; and to strengthen

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investment planning and monitoring capacity of the utility staff.

While the overall risk assessment seemed reasonable at the time of appraisal, the subsequent genocide and civilwar that were hard to anticipate delayed the project implementation significantly. The risks related to politicalinstability and the resulting scarcity of manpower and low implementation capability of the sector institutions werenot assessed, though during the project implementation they were the key reasons for delays in the Governmentpolicy reform program and the implementation of the restructuring of ELECTROGAZ.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

For the purpose of this rating the ICR focuses on the revised project objectives approved in the 1998 projectrestructuring. The ICR rates the overall achievement of project objectives as marginally satisfactory. This rating isbased on the project accomplishments at the time of ICR. Assessment is based on the information collected from anumber of sources: PSRs, Aide-Memoirs of Bank's supervision missions, including ICR mission of April 2002,President's Memoranda regarding proposed amendments to legal agreements, as well as interviews with somebeneficiaries and stakeholders.

The project was implemented in a very difficult period for Rwanda and, although it made an importantcontribution to the country's implementation of the energy sector reform, it achieved its development objectivesonly partially. The project was appraised before the introduction of the logical framework approach and itsevaluation is based on the indicators developed during project implementation and supervision. Annex I of theICR summarizes these outcome/impact and output indicators.

Creation of an enabling legal and regulatory environment. This objective was achieved. The content of thisobjective evolved over the life of the project. At the time of the SAR the Government strategy, aimed atimplementation of an institutional reform program for the power sector, required consulting services to revise thelaw and statutes governing the activities of ELECTROGAZ to permit contracting out the utility operations to aprivate operator through a lease contract. Two successor companies of ELECROGAZ were to be established: oneowning the assets and the other operating the utility. The operating arm of thus restructured ELECTROGAZ wassupposed to be leased out. The implementation of this strategy was interrupted by the civil war.

After the war a series of workshops and seminars with key policymakers and civil society were organized fromend-1995 through 1996 to help reach consensus on the substance and timing of the reform. By the end of 1997 theGovernment adopted a new two-stage strategy that included: (i) 12-18 months operational assistance toELECTROGAZ through a management contract, and (ii) a study of the options for privatization ofELECTROGAZ. The selection process to hire a pnvate operator was launched. A consulting company was hiredto help the Govemment with the evaluation of bids, as well as to assist with exploring options for further reformafter the management contract would terminate, preparation of a sector development strategy, electricity law andsector regulation and negotiating the management contract with the selected private operator. Hydro QuebecIntemational (HQI) was selected as the winning bidder. However, the contract was not signed as the newlyappointed Board of ELECTROGAZ disagreed with the results of the selection. Numerous discussions were heldwith the Govemment on how it intended to resolve the issues related to power sector reform.

By July 1998 the Govemment announced its new strategy, that now called for splitting of ELECTROGAZ intothree separate companies (electricity, water, and gas). The Bank was asked to finance consulting services and costsassociated with the implementation of that strategy. As a result, the operational assistance (management contract)was not required any more and negotiations with HQI terminated. It was agreed to recruit an investment bank asan Advisor to assist the Govermment in splitting the utility into three entities and initiate their privatization. AnAdvisor was recruited and the work required to change the legal framework was carried out. A new law abolishingELECTROGAZ's monopoly in generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, water and gas was approvedby the Parliament allowing participation of private operators.

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In May 2000 the Government decided to keep ELECROGAZ as a single entity that would be managed by a privateoperator for five years with subsequent privatization. The Government approved the ELECTROGAZ restructuringplan; launched in July 2000 the pre-qualification process for potential private operators; the Cabinet approved thecreation of a multi-sector regulatory authority in August 2000. The petroleum sector was liberalized as a result ofthe project and a new regulatory framework was developed. PETRORWANDA, the public petroleum company,and the petroleum storage depots were privatized.

Enhance the efficiency of ELECTROGAZ's operations.This objective was not achieved. A central part of the sector development objective was to restructureELECTROGAZ. Before the war ELECTROGAZ seemed to have sufficient capacity to carry out the plannedactivities. After the genocide the situation of the utility significantly deteriorated and the attempts to improve itsefficiency were not very successful. The utility had numerous problems: overstaffing with lack of qualifiedmanpower, absence of financial systems, controls and discipline leading to large accounts receivable with arrearsfrom the public sector and private clients, lack of maintenance, high transmission and distribution losses.Institutional capacity was non-existent to actively pursue viable options for addressing the needs of the ruralpopulation or to develop other energy sources (methane gas). As a result of these issues disbursements for thissub-component were slow and the project was rated unsatisfactory for over three years.

The Bank suggested to the Government to cancel the Credit if the project was not a suitable vehicle forrestructuring or the timing was not appropriate. After several discussions of this nature, the use of remedies wasdiscussed during two CPPRs. By end-1996, some tangible results were obtained: a new project coordination unit(PCU) was fully operational and electricity and water tariffs were adjusted to reflect the devaluation of theRwandan Franc. In April 1997, the Government took measures that positively affected ELECTROGAZ, includingthe appointment of a new minister to MINITRAPE and the replacement of the former meffective ManagingDirector of ELECTROGAZ by a new appointment with an international experience in management. The newmanagement of ELECTROGAZ established an internal audit function, and insisted on improving billing andcollection of overdue accounts and on the disconnection of non-paying consumers, including Government entities.Review of the organization structure, rules, procedures, and personnel practices was carried out. However, due tothe delays in restructuring, the performance of the utility was still not satisfactory. The objective of change ofmanagement of ELECROGAZ to a private operator was not fully achieved by the end of the project. The selectionprocess was launched under ESRP but it continued beyond December 31, 2001 under a different project.

Technical assistance and training of key sector institutions.This objective was achieved. Please refer to the assessment of the training components. However, in the light ofpost-war difficulties, the project could have included training of a larger number of staff or provide the services ofexpert institutional capacity building consultants to assist PIUs in their financial management and procurementactivities to implement and manage the project activities more efficiently.

Rehabilitation of key power infrastructure.Though retained as an objective after the 1998 ESRP restructuring, rehabilitation of infrastructure was minimized,as the Government decided to focus on the institutional aspects and not to finance physical investments for theextremely inefficient utility. The emergency rehabilitation of the power system was carried out by end-1995 usinggrant funds from other donors. The support specified by this objective was limited to various studies, which weresuccessfully carried out. This revised objective was achieved.

Improvement of the sanitation conditions related to waste disposal in the city of Kigali and related capacitybuilding.This objective was not achieved. Although a lot of progress was made on the studies, design and preparation of thescheme (the PVK defined zones and franchise for the collection of waste by private operators; a list, mapping anddesigns for 180 containers were prepared; .he topographic survey of Nyanza dump site was done and equipmentwas procured), the physical implementation of the collection and disposal of solid waste was not completed.

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4.2 Outputs by components:1. Energy Component: overall rating is marginally satisfactory.

The Regulatory and Sector Policy Strengthening sub-component is rated marginally satisfactory. Although thissubcomponent helped move forward the sector reform agenda in a period when Rwandan economy was recoveringfrom the 1994 events, the restructuring of ELECTROGAZ process was not fully completed. Despite the threeextensions of the Credit, attempts to improve ELECTROGAZ's efficiency through three different action plans wereunsuccessful. However, this long-lasting dialogue helped to reach a fundamental consensus on the restructuring ofELECTROGAZ. After a long evolution the strategy concentrated on a two-step process: an initialperformance-based management contract with a private operator and then a private concession. The selection of aprivate operator, originally planned to be completed under ESRP, is now expected to be completed under theCompetitiveness and Development Project (Cr. 3499) approved in 2001. It is expected that a private operator willbe in place by December 2002.

The training sub-components are rated satisfactory.Fifty producers of improved stoves were trained by the project which enabled them to resume stoves production.Charcoal is traditionally produced through a wasteful process leading to a loss of about 80 percent of the energycontained in wood. The training of charcoal and efficient stoves producers contributed to the reduction in theconsumption of woodfuel and charcoal reducing the related negative environmental impact of these activities.Twenty technicians specializing in the maintenance of home solar energy systems were trained. This contributedto a restoration of the number of solar systems to the pre- 1994 level. These systems are used mostly in schools,hospitals and households located in the rural areas where there is no access to other modem sources of energy. Inaddition, about 15 staff from the Ministry of Energy and ELECTROGAZ were trained in project preparation andimplementation as well as in functioning of the utility regulatory agencies.

The methane gas sub-component is rated satisfactory. The planned studies were carried out, and the project helpedin developing a package to attract potential private investors. It included: (i) a conducive regulatory framework (anact was drafted to promote the exploration, development and production of indigenous petroleum); (ii) a modelagreement for a service contract (production sharing), (iii) a complete bathymetric survey of the Lake Kivuincluding environmental impact survey of the identified sites, and (iv) a promotional document for potentialprivate investors. In addition, the project helped the Government in promoting private sector participation in thedevelopment and exploitation of the methane gas reserves of the Lake Kivu. This resulted in an expression ofinterest from some local operators. In January 2002, the Government signed a memorandum of understandingwith a local consortium to start developing and exploitation of methane gas reserves of the Lake Kivu to produceelectricity. The Consortium, formed by a local private bank (Banque de Commerce et d'lndustrie du Rwanda) anda private investor (BRALIRWA, a Rwandan branch of Heineken Intemational which is the only beneficiary of themethane gas pilot station in Gisenyi) is now carrying out a feasibility study. It is expected that the exploitation willcommence in 2003. Such undertaking has a potential to help meet the unserved demand for electricity in thecountry.

Technical assistance to Petroleum sector sub-component is rated satisfactory. Under the project, the sector wascompletely liberalized and a new regulatory framework was developed and enacted. PETRORWANDA and thepetroleum storage depots were privatized and transferred to a reputable intemational petroleum company, ShellInternational, through a concession arrangement done in a transparent manner. State pricing control waseliminated and prices are now set by the market. The role of the Government was reduced to monitoring aspects,through the Ministry of Commerce. A small petroleum monitoring and analysis unit within MICOMART wasestablished. However, although the equipment for the unit was bought and the existing staff was trained, by theend of the project the unit was still not fully operational due to insufficiency of qualified personnel.

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Project Coordination Unit subcomponent is rated satisfactory.Originally, the DCA did not include an "operating costs" category as the overall project implementation was theresponsibility of government departments and agencies involved. The PCAU that was established for the projectcoordination was the responsibility of the MINITRAPE and comprised the Director of the Directorate of Energyand Petroleum Products of the MINITRAPE (Head of the PCAU), one representative from MICOMART,MINAGRI and MINITRAPE each, and a representative of ELECTROGAZ. The Head of the PCAU coordinatedthe overall implementation of the project while the day-to-day implementation was done by each ProjectImplementation Unit (PIU) established within each Ministry and Agency involved.

After the 1994 genocide and civil war, the Government capacity was weakened and the project implementation wasseriously hampered. To remedy this, it was agreed with the Government that a Project Management Unit (PCU),independent from MINITRAPE and all the involved agencies, would be created. This was done in mid-1995 whenproject implementation was resumed. Given the Government budget constraints, it became necessary to supportthe PMU related expenses. An amendment to the DCA was, therefore, initiated to create an "operating costs"category, as well as to restructure the project as necessitated by the new conditions in the country. However, theretrofitting/restructuring process was completed only in mid-1998. At that time, the project was rated as a problemproject and it was not possible to ask the Board to restructure ESRP and at the same time provide retroactivepayment of PMU operating costs for more than three years. As agreed with the Government, the 1998 amendmentprovided the financing (US$ 340,000) of the operating costs incurred between January 1, 1998 and August 6, 1998,the amendment effectiveness date. An amount of US$ 500,000 disbursed from the Special Account to cover theoperating costs of the PMU over the period of 1995-1997 was not included in the amendment.

In 1999 the Government has established a steering committee to pilot the institutional reform of ELECTROGAZ.The Committee, headed by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Energy, Water and Natural Resources,comprised representatives from the Ministry of Finance (2), the Ministry of Energy (1), and ELECTROGAZ (2).While the Govemment delivered on its promises to speed up reforms as agreed in the 1999 action plan and toimprove the project management as a whole, due to severe budget constraints it failed to refund the US$500,000mentioned above. In 1999, government revenue was only about 10 percent of GDP while the budgetary needs ofrebuilding the shattered economy amounted to 20 percent of GDP The non-replenishment of the Special Accountdue to the non-reimbursement of the "ineligible" expenses by the Govemment handicapped projectimplementation and delayed some of the activities included in the action plans. In April 2000 an amendment toDCA was approved to reallocate funds to cover the expenses of US$500,000 already incurred. From 2000 theGovemment contributed the 5 percent in counterpart funding as required by the DCA. All these actionssubstantially improved the progress of project implementation.

Rehabilitation of electricity infrastructure sub-component.The ICR did not do an assessment of the outcome for rehabilitation/improvement of electricity infrastructuresub-component, as most of the planned activities were dropped during the 1998 project restructuring, and therelated project proceeds canceled. Only preparatory studies were completed, namely the studies related to therehabilitation, extension of distribution and transmission lines in five cities, as well as the feasibility study of ahydro site on the Nyabarongo river. These studies are planned be used as a basis for the preparation of the nextenergy operation planned for FY04.

II. Urban Waste Management Component: overall rating is unsatisfactory.

Although all the studies were carried out and the equipment was purchased as originally planned, the physicalimplementation of the collection and disposal of solid waste was not completed. A total amount of US$ 2.5 millionwas spent to procure the required equipment, including eight trucks, 200 containers and a transfer station. Theequipment was delivered but was not efficiently utilized. The transfer station, of a total cost of US$ 0.8 millionwas never installed and was subsequently damaged due to a lack of proper maintenance by the City of Kigali. Allthe generators, of a total value of US$ 0.2 million, deteriorated as they were not properly stored. Moreimportantly, the pilot phase was not implemented and the private sector and community involvement, foreseen asthe innovative way of sustaining the process, did not materialize. The main reason for that was a lack of ownership

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of the program by the PVK. After the design of the pilot was completed and approved, there was a very highturnover of the city officials who questioned the design during implementation. The most controversial point wisthe relevance of a transfer station to the needs of a small city with a weak technical and managerial capacity. Thisprecluded the implementation of the designed collection system.

The Bank, supported by the UNDP/Bank Sanitation Group, based in Nairobi, advised the City of Kigali ondifferent alternatives which would allow PVK to adopt a new scheme while taking advantage of the alreadypurchased equipment but the Government failed to agree to any of them. Today, the collection of solid waste isstill done by each of the eight districts of the City of Kigali without private sector participation, using the availableequipment inefficiently and providing a poor service to the community. The collection is still subsidized by thePVK and the recommendations of the cost recovery study, done under the project, were not implemented. The ICRconsiders that this project component did not meet its development objective.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

The SAR projected an estimated economic rate of return of 19% the for physical investments. The ICR did notcarry out an analysis of the actual rate of return because the originally planned investments were cancelled inproject restructuring.

4.4 Financial rate of return:

The financial rate of return is not applicable.

4.5 Institutional development impact:

The project was able to improve to a certain extent the Government's ability to make more effective use of theirhuman and financial resources through the provision of training and technical assistance. In addition, legal andtechnical advisory support in preparation of the contract for the private management operator helped to strengthenthe Ministry's of Energy and ELECTROGAZ's understanding of private sector transactions. The trainingsub-component made an institutional contribution by restoring the capacity of producers of the improved stovesand solar systems maintenance technicians. By the end of the project, some of the Government andELECTROGAZ staff acquired skills in project preparation and implementation, and were trained in functioning ofwater and electricity regulatory agencies. Additional capacity building will be required, however, to enforce thenew regulatory framework.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:The single most significant factor that affected the implementation and outcome of the project was the genocide of1994. Effects of the war included physical destruction of the infrastructure, death and displacement of population,and loss of institutional memory and records. In addition, as a result of the genocide, the project was affected byfactors which under normal circumstances would be generally subject to the Government control, such asimplementation capacity. Country circumstances also influenced the external partners of the project.Co-financiers cancelled their participation in 1995.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:The exceptional situation described above hinders the assessment of the factors that were really under theGovernment control. However, a number of factors identified can be mentioned.

Slow pace of reforms. It took a long time to achieve consensus on the substance of the sector restructuring andinitiate its implementation. However, the Government showed commitment to economic reform and by the end ofthe project the restructuring strategy for ELECTROGAZ was adopted and the implementation started. Althoughthis process was not completed under the ESRP as planned, it was a positive step toward the achievement of theproject objective of improving the efficiency of the energy sector.

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Otherfactors. Implementation was delayed throughout the life of the project as a result of frequent changes ofsenior staff, delays in selecting and implementing the restructuring strategy for ELECTROGAZ, delays inprovision of counterpart funds and slow administrative procedures (e.g. procurement). These factors caused majorsdelays, which, coupled with the interruption introduced by the conflict, required three extensions of the project.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:In summary, the following factors were identified: limited knowledge of the Bank's procedures and fiduciarycompliance.Familiarty with the Bank's procedures. During the pre-conflict period the implementing agency, the Directorateof Energy, demonstrated strong capacity in project management, with a very competent Head of Department. Theselection of a private operator for ELECTROGAZ was almost completed and contract negotiations were underway.Accounting and financial management were satisfactory. In the post-conflict period the Directorate of Energy lostmost of its institutional capacity and was badly understaffed. Eventually, the situation improved following theestablishment of an independent project management unit, comprising a competent project coordinator, anaccountant and two support staff; and training of its staff.

However, starting from 1997, due to a high turnover of project staff, the performance of PMU varied considerablyand the leadership in the project management was provided by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Energy.This intervention was instrumental for the process of restructuring of ELECTROGAZ.

Fiduciary compliance. Overall, the Bank fiduciary requirements were implemented satisfactorily. On theprocurement side, the establishment of the National Tender Board improved the performance of the project withrespect to procurement. Delays of meeting audit requirements in the last years of the project were fully addressedafter the project closing.

5.4 Costs andfinancing:The actual cost of the project was about US$14.9 million (SDR 10.9million) compared to the estimated originalcost of US$26.0 million (SDR1 8.5 million) at appraisal. As a result of the 1998 project restructuring, the totalproject cost was reduced from SDR 18.5 million to SDR 13.52 million after the cancellation of the amount ofSDR4.98 million. (See Annex 2). As the physical infrastructure rehabilitation component was not planned to becarried out, the withdrawal of the co-financiers in 1995 did not affect the implementation of the revised project.

The 1998 Amendment of the DCA acknowledged the inability of the Govemment to provide significantcounterpart funding by increasing the disbursement percentages to 100 percent for all categories, except for thelocal expenses (95%). The Amendment also introduced a new category dedicated to operating costs to finance thePMU expenditures.

The last disbursement took place on June 25, 2002. The undisbursed balance of SDR 2,611,769 in the Creditaccount were cancelled. The reason for the underrun is that the contract with the private operator for themanagement of ELECTROGAZ was not effected under ESRP and no payments to the operator were made. Actualdisbursements show that 80.7 percent of the total Credit amount was utilized out of which 71 and 29 percent werefor the energy and waste management components respectively.

For the on-lending portion, ELECTROGAZ failed to service its debt obligations vis-a-vis the Government and theoutstanding debt stands at FRW 14 billion. Overall, outstanding short-term and long-term debts ofELECTROGAZ amount to FRW 52 billion, while the Government debt vis-a-vis ELECTROGAZ (non-paymentfor electricity and water) amounts to RWF 22 billion. The on-going financial restructuring study forELECTROGAZ, which forms an essential part of the restructuring of the utility, funded under Competitivenessand Enterprise Development Project (Cr.3499-RW) will provide accurate figures.

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6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationalefor sustainability rating:

In view of the creation of the enabling policy environment and present commitment of the Government to reformthe sector, sustainability of the project is likely. Furthermore, IDA will continue to support this reform programthrough the on-going Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project and other sector investment operationsfunded by the Government and donors, including IDA.

Government commitment. Notwithstanding the changes in the Government during the life of the project, since theearly 1990s it demonstrated commitment to the development of the energy sector by the private sectorparticipation. Throughout the life of the project, the policy, legal and regulatory framework evolved in response tothe changes in the country and the sector.

Sector policy. Throughout the life of the project, the Government showed a willingness to adapt and modernize itssector policy. A major achievement was the adoption by the Cabinet in May 2000 the ELECTROGAZ'srestructuring program, an agreement on a fundamental restructuring and privatization of ELECTROGAZconsisting of an initial performance-based management contract with a private operator, to be followed by aconcession. Further support, including the selection and partial financing of the private operator, will be providedunder the Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

The dialogue regarding further IDA support to the energy sector has been on-going since mid 2000. In December2001, the Government submitted for IDA consideration a draft project proposal. In February 2002, theGovernment expressed and IDA recorded the request for support for an energy and water investment operation.Currently, the Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project is serving as a bridge financing for thepreparation of the new operation. It will finance payments for the management contract with the selected privateoperator during the first two years of the contract and a minimum capital investment required to improve sometechnical and commercial aspects of the utility's operations. It is expected that by end of the second yearELECTROGAZ operations would generate enough cash flow to finance its operating costs. It is also expected thata sectoral operation, planned for FY04, will follow facilitating the transition to a concession In addition, theCompetitiveness and Enterprise Development Project will support the implementation of a multi-sector regulatoryagency. Other donors, such as AfDB and BADEA, are preparing sector investment operations, both in electricityand water sectors, to accompany the sector reform and the restructuring of ELECTROGAZ, in consultation withthe Government and IDA. Also, EIB is considering financing the development of hydro sites in Rwanda toincrease the country's generation capacity.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:The Bank's performance in the identification, preparation and appraisal of the project is evaluated as satisfactory.During identification and preparation, the project took into account the Govemment's development priorities andthe Bank's assistance strategy. The design incorporated lessons learned from the previous investment energyoperation and included mechanisms to leverage action including conditions for effectiveness and disbursement.The technical and financial design, including projections for ELECTROGAZ, were adequate at the time ofappraisal. The project design also included performance indicators for the lease contract for ELECTROGAZ.However, since several diverse components were included in this project, the bank could have made more effortduring preparation to establish a clear link between the components and the overall development objective.

The Bank showed flexibility in adapting the Credit to the needs of the country in the post-war period by

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restructuring and extending the project several times.

7.2 Supervision:The Bank's supervision performance was marginally satisfactory. Prior to the genocide, implementation progresswas adequately reported and problems identified were brought to the Borrower's attention along with the proposedremedies. Throughout the post-conflict implementation, supervision efforts focused on the sector reform,mobilization of donor funds to finance the immediate rehabilitation needs of the power utility, as well as buildingproject management capacity of the implementing agencies. The Bank demonstrated flexibility and endurance inpursuing the sector reform dialogue. This flexibility allowed the restructuring of the project in August 1998(including the addition of a new objective and components tailored to the post-conflict situation); approval of threeextensions of the project closing; re-allocation of the proceeds among the categories of the credit. Moreimportantly, this flexibility led to an agreement on one of the most crucial sector reforms undertaken in theinfrastructure sector - the restructuring and privatization strategy for ELECTROGAZ

Throughout the project life, the project progress was monitored through regular supervision missions (see Annex4). From 1994 to 2001 supervision missions visited Kigali on average twice a year. Supervision teams usuallycomprised Energy Sector Specialist, Financial Analyst and Operations Officer. The project had three Task TeamLeaders over the project life. The first change of TTL occurred in 1998 and the second -just before the closing ofthe project. Continuity was maintained through the staff of the Rwanda Country Office. During 1999-2000supervision by the TTL was done only by correspondence and video-conferences. No missions were undertaken bythe TTL which might have affected the dialogue with the Borrower. This effect was compensated by the leadershipprovided by the Rwanda Country Manager and the staff of the Resident Mission. An ICR mission was undertakenby the new TTL in April 2002 after the project closing. The Borrower's assessment of the Bank's supervisionperformance is provided in the "Partner Comments" section of this ICR (p. 25 and p. 29).

The reports of the supervision missions reflected their findings, and the aide-m6moire provided a candidassessment of the situation and advice for improving the performance and correcting the shortcomings of theproject's components. The PSRs were not very informative. Initially, the Implementation Progress andDevelopment Objective of the project were mostly rated unsatisfactory reflecting the reality on the ground, and thecorrective measures were taken by the Bank and the Borrower to tum this project from a problem project into asatisfactory one. However, the restructuring of the project should have been carried out much earlier in the projectimplementation. Also, it appears that the Bank's advice might have lacked the consistency needed to guide theGovernment in the implementation of this complex project.

7.3 Overall Bankperformance:Overall, the Bank's performance is assessed as satisfactory. The original design was technically feasible,consistent with the Government's and the Bank's strategy and measurable. The Bank demonstrated the necessaryflexibility in restructuring the project objectives and scope to respond to the post-conflict realities.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:During preparation, the Borrower performed satisfactorily. Preparation was done within the context of theeconomic structural adjustment and the development plan for the sector agreed upon with the Bank and the IMF in1991. The Govemment revised its sector development policy which was included as an annex to the SAR. It alsoundertook the upfront measures required to achieve the utility's financial performance and sector reform objectives,including tariff increases and major staff reductions at ELECTROGAZ

7.5 Government implementation performance.The implementation performance of the Government is marginally satisfactory. Although there was a continuedcommitment to the sector reform and facilitation of private sector participation, due to constant changes of projectcounterparts the Government was very slow in adopting the final privatization strategy for ELECTROGAZ whichhindered the project implementation.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

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After the events of 1994 the implementation capacity of the implementing agencies was weakened. Theimplementing agency performance showed incremental improvement over the life of the project. Theestablishment of a well-staffed PMU provided the required institutional capacity and resulted in improvedperformance. Capacity problems in ELECTROGAZ delayed the preparation of the Request for Proposals for aprivate operator for ELECTROGAZ, but this was overcome by the hiring of a privatization Adviser who helped theGovernment in preparing the tender documents. Delays in providing audits to IDA, particularly forELECTROGAZ, caused compliance problems that later were resolved by hiring auditors on a three-year basis. Atpresent, there are no audit reports outstanding. With respect to the urban waste management component, the PVKperformance was not satisfactory. The overall performance of the implementing.agencies is marginallysatisfactory.

7.7 Overall Borrowerperformance:The Borrower's overall performance is marginally satisfactory. The Government overcame a tragic situation toresume service provision in the water and electricity sectors while pursuing the sector reform to improve sectorefficiency but project implementation was marked by substantial delays and sometimes compliance problems (e.g.delays in providing audited financial reports for ELECTROGAZ).

8. Lessons Learned

Instruments need to fit country circumstances. The experience of the ESRP shows that there must be a highdegree of flexibility in adjusting existing projects to a post-conflict environment. The ESRP was restructured toadapt its scope to the changed implementation capacity and priorities of the Government and, although the successof outcomes varied, particularly for the new waste management component, such a flexibility was key in achievingthe project objectives.

Response time to the changes in the country environment is key. The project objectives could have been fullyachieved had the Bank reacted to the changes earlier and restructured the project more promptly.

Supervision and monitoring of implementation progress must be proactive. The recently introduced projectimplementation reports would be instrumental in ensuring the pro-activity on the part of the Bank and theBorrower.

Better selectivity. For the post-war Rwanda even the restructured ESRP seemed a bit too complex in terms ofvariety of components and the required coordination, especially given the lack of implementing capacity of theGovernment agencies.

Sector reform agenda. Although the reform agenda of Rwanda was well advanced before the conflict,implementing sector reforms takes time and significant coordinated institutional support. It was only after a longsector dialogue (over 10 years) that the final agreement was reached on the restructuring/privatization strategy forELECTROGAZ. In addition, due to the rapid pace of change in the market, the policy, legal and regulatoryframework must be updated regularly. Although the project did include legal and regulatory aspects, and the legalframework was prepared, it was not implemented due to limited capacity within the Government and its slownessin reaching agreement on the sector reform strategy.

Government commitment. Strong and consistent Government commitment and ownership of the project,particularly for projects involving deep sector reforms, is key for achieving project objectives.

Implementation arrangements. Special attention should be paid to implementation arrangements when projectsare being redesigned, particularly in a conflict or post-conflict country. Given the Borrower's capacity, it isimportant to provide appropriate support to the implementing agency to ensure proper financial management,procurement, and overall project management. The establishment of a well-staffed project coordination unitsignificantly improved the post-conflict implementation of the ESRP. Procurement was also improved due to theestablishment of the National Tender Board.

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9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:PROJET DE REHABILITATION DU SECTEUR DE L'ENERGIE ET DE GESTION DES

DECHETS URBAINS (PRSE&GDU)Mai 2002

1. Introduction

Les institutions du secteur Energie au Rwanda

Les principales sources d'6nergie au Rwanda sont les combustibles ligneux, les sous-produits agncoles et lesproduits petroliers importes. Elles constituent 93 % de l'offre nette en besoins energetiques alors que l'electricite, lemethane et la tourbe se partagent le solde.

De part la diversite de 1'energie utilisee, plusieurs entites administratives interviennent dans la gestion du secteurde l'energie. 11 y a lieu de citer le MINERENA, ELECTROGAZ et UPEGAZ pour l'electricite et le methane, leMINAGRI et le MINERENA pour la biomasse 6nerg6tique ainsi que le MINICOM pour les produits petroliersimportes.

Pour ce qui est de l'electricite et du gaz methane, le MINERENA exerce les fonctions de definir la politiquegen6rale, 1'elaboration de la reglementation et des normes ainsi que la programmation des investissements et larecherche de fmancements.

A l'instar des autres pays afrncains sub-sahariens, le secteur electrique au Rwanda est entre les mains d'unoperateur national unique, en situation de monopole public. Cette structure, jusqu'il y a peu, etait en partie fond6esur une conception de 1'electricite comme produit strategique et sur l'idee que la population a droit a l'energieelectrique de bas prix. Le r6le d'ELECTROGAZ se linite a la gestion technique des infrastructures electriques etd'eau ainsi qu'a la gestion des activit6s connexes notamment cominerciales. L'UPEGAZ, quant a elle, s'occupe dela gestion des installations du Cap Rubona, de la promotion et de l'exploitation du gaz methane du Lac Kivu. LeMINAGRI a pour mission de definir la politique et la production en rapport avec l'offre de la biomasse alors que leMINERENA, dans ce domaine, est charg6 de sa gestion rationnelle. En principe, toutes les activites libes ausous-secteur des produits petroliers telles que la fixation des prix a la pompe ou les taxes y afferentes sont du ressortdu MINICOM.

Diagnostic des institutions du secteur de I'energze

Selon les textes officiels, il existe norrnalement un partage des r6les entre les diff6rentes institutions intervenantsdans le secteur de l'energie. Mais en pratique, on assiste surtout dans les sous-secteurs de l'electricit6 et desproduits p6troliers a des dysfonctionnements et/ou des chevauchements entre les services lies en grande partie al'absence d'une politique sectorielle globale appropri6e et A un manque de coordination adequate.

Ces incoherences sont plus prononcees dans le domaine de l'electricite ob l'Etat joue A la fois le role de proprietaireet celui d'operateur. Ainsi, le MINERENA et ELECTROGAZ se rejettent mutuellement la responsabilite de lamauvaise gestion de ce sous-secteur.

En effet, d'une part, parmi les points saillants de divergence entre le MINERENA et ELECTROGAZ, on peutretenir -

o Le poids direct du Gouvemement sur la marche d'ELECTROGAZ via le Conseil d'Administration etcelui du Conseil des Ministres;

o L'absence de concertation reelle en matiere de programmation et d'investissements;o La realisation d'etudes et travaux souvent non rentables sur fonds propres de I'Etablissement;

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o La fixation des tarifs.

D'autre part, ELECTROGAZ est une societe d'etat a vocation publique qui fonctionne comme tous les services del'Administration centrale ou les notions de performances et d'efficacite font d6faut. Les inconvenients majeurs liesa ce type de societe sont en general:

o Absence de liberte de manoeuvre pour le statut de son personnel et pour la remuneration de celui-ci;o Manque d'efficacite qui est constat6 dans toutes les societes para-etatiques qui conduit a des

performances generalement mediocres;o Incapacite d'appliquer une politique de recouvrement ferme;o De part son statutjuridique, ELECTROGAZ ne court pas le risque de deposer son bilan meme si la

situation financiere est mauvaise ; donc il n'a pas d'obligation r6elle de reussite;o Grande difficulte A changer les esprits et les comportements de la hierarchie qui a souvent tendance a

privilegier les interets personnels sur ceux de la societe;o Tentation des echelons superieurs a utiliser les prestations et les services de la societe comme moyens

de trafic d'influence ou de promotion politique.

En ce qui conceme le sous-secteur petrolier, le premier probleme institutionnel qui se pose est de savoir si lesproduits petroliers doivent 8tre consideres comme des produits energ6tiques et donc du ressort du MINERENA oualors comme des produits de commerce (consommation) et partant du ressort du MINICOM.

N6anmoins meme si les produits petroliers sont pris comme des produits de commerce, il est a noter que leMINICOM n'est pas apte a suivre 1'6volution du march6 petrolier international et sa capacite de contr6ler lequantitatif et le qualitatif des produits p6troliers importes reste limit6e.

Le mandat confie naguere a PETRORWANDA de g6rer les depots petroliers de GATSYATA, lesquels dep6tsconstruits par le MINITRAPE de l'epoque, a ete repris par une societe privee d'importation de produits petroliers <SHELL >.

Ce diagnostic montre bien qu'il est imperatif de mettre en a:uvre des mesures susceptibles de rem6dier a lasituation qui prevaut dans le sous-secteur de l'electricite.Ces mesures impliquent principalement une reforme institutionnelle pour une clarification des roles des differentsintervenants et une meilleure efficacit6.

Les mesures A appliquer doivent s'appuyer sur un certain nombre de principes directeurs suivants:

o ELECTROGAZ assure un service public et doit A ce titre repondre a des exigences de qualite dans lafourniture et les services prestes;

o Pour assumer pleinement cette vocation, ELECTROGAZ doit etre efficace et performante dans tous lesdomaines de la gestion financiere, technique, commerciale et des ressources humaines;

o Pour cela, ELECTROGAZ doit se degager des contraintes, freins et pesanteurs d'etablissement publicqui ne lui permettent pas de repondre a sa mission.

Les objectifs vises dans la mise en place d'une r6forme institutionnelle concement:

o La notion d'equilibre global du secteur par les tarifs qui doivent couvrir les charges d'exploitation et !eservice de la dette;

o La necessite de rechercher, a chaque niveau du secteur, la meilleure efficacite possible.

LE PROJET DE REHABILITATION DU SECTEUR DE L'ENERGIE (PRSE)

Le PRSE constitue un cadre approprie pour la mise en place des mecanismes d'elaborer la reforme institutionnelleattendue dans le secteur de 1'energie. Le PRSE est une des principales composantes du vaste Programme

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d'Ajustement Structurel PAS amorce en 1990 en vue de corriger les des6quilibres 6conomiques causesessentiellement par la chute brutale des cours du cafe en 1987 suite aux conditions climatiques defavorables qui onttouche la production agricole.

Les objectifs macro-economiques de base du PAS tels que decrits pour certains dans I'Accord de CreditN°21 13-RW (Projet de reforme des Etablissements Publics) signe le 07 mai 1990 sont le retour accelere a uneposition financiere ext6rieure et interieure viable, ainsi que la realisation d'une croissance 6conomique durableaccompagn6e d'un faible taux d'inflation. Ils visent a retablir une croissance economique progressive tout enassurant une certaine stabilit6 en ce qui conceme le budget et la balance des paiements, a limiter les transfertsdirects et indirects accord6s par l'Etat, a desengager l'Etat des entreprises non-strategiques et a ameliorer laperformance operationnelle des Etablissements Publics restants en leur octroyant une plus grande autonomie et enleur assignant des objectifs clairs.

Dans le contexte du secteur electrique, les priorites de la r6forme devraient s'orienter vers:

o L'amelioration de l'efficacit6 de la fourniture d'electriciteo L'am6lioration de l'efficacite de l'utilisation d'electriciteo Le contr6le de l'impact des activites 6lectriques sur l'environnemento La mobilisation des capitaux requis pour l'expansion du secteur

Pour appuyer le Gouvemement rwandais dans ses efforts d'elaborer la politique gen6rale du secteur et d'etablir lescadres de l6gislation et de regulation, I'Accord de Credit N°2456-RW portant creation du PRSE a e signe le 21avril 1993 et est entre en vigueur le 21 janvier 1994.L'achevement du Projet etait initialement prevu pour le 30 juin 1998.

2. Description des objectifs

L'annexe 2 de cet Accord de Credit reprend en details la description du Projet.

Les objectifs du Projet sont:

o Creer un environnement administratif et reglementaire favorable;o Accroitre l'efficacite des activites d'ELECTROGAZ;o Fournir une assistance technique et une action de formation aux institutions sectorielles cles pour

renforcer la capacite de planification des investissements ainsi que celle du Gouvernement a formulerune politique sectorielle coherente et a suivre les activite sectorielles liees au bois de feu, au gazmethane, aux produits petroliers et aux possibilit6s d'alimentation en electricite des zones rurales aumoindre cofit; et

o Remettre en etat la principale infrastructure d'electricite.

Sous reserve des modifications que l'Emprunteur et l'Association pourraient convenir de lui apporter en vued'atteindre lesdits objectifs, le Projet est articule sur deux grands axes:

Partie A: Renforcement du Cadre reglementaire et Administratif

Les actions retenues sont en rapport avec:

o Restructuration d'ELECTROGAZ pour permettre la sous-traitance de ses activites a un operateurprive, comprenant la preparation des statuts et des responsabilit6s d'ELECTROGAZ et la preparationdes documents d'appel de candidatures pour la selection d'un operateur prive;

o Application d'une serie de mesures preparatoires pour attirer des operateurs prives qualifies;o Introduction de mesures d'incitations pour rationaliser et amrliorer l'efficacite du sous-secteur du

charbon de bois grice a la fourniture du materiel et des services requis pour etablir un programmefinancierement autonome, notamment a travers : (i) preparation de la projection de la demande

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concemant l'energie basee sur le bois ; (ii) collecte des donnees sur les ressources disponibles;preparation de la projection de la demande concemant les usagers du bois, autres que mentionne auparagraphe (i) ci-dessus, preparation et execution des plans de gestion de la consommation de boisdes villages ; et modernisation de la filiere de charbon de bois;

o Fourniture de fonds pour: i) la preparation d'un manuel avec des specifications techniquesstandardisees appropriees comprenant les aspects environnementaux, les arrangements voulus enmati6re de concessions, la structure tarifaire et les redevances, et un cadre juridique approprie pourl'exploitation a l'avenir du gaz methane du Lac Kivu ; ii) la mise en place d'un systeme de suivi de lachimie des gaz dissous dans le lac Kivu et de l'activite volcanique de la region ; iii) la formation descientifiques et de techniciens ; iv) I'etablissement d'un systeme d'avertissement et d'un pland'evacuation en cas de catastrophe ; et v) 1'execution d'un leve bathym6trique et d'une etude deseffets sur l'environnement des sites du lac identifies

o Execution d'etudes pour concevoir une strategie pour des systemes solaires individuels, y compris uneetude de marche et des propositions pour des plans de financement innovateurs

o Renforcement de la capacite du MICOMART pour simplifier la structure des imp6ts et des prix, etliberaliser les pris des produits petroliers et foumiture de materiel et action de formation destinmes a lapetite unit6 d'analyse et de suivi pour le petrole.

Partie B Remise en etat et amelioration de la principale infrastructure d'electricite

Sous ce second volet, les actions planifiees sont:

o Remise en etat et prolongation du reseau de distribution dans les villes de Kigali, Butare, Gisenyi,Nyabisindu et Ruhengeri;

o Amelioration des postes du reseau de transport et de repartition y compris le montage de deux cellulesde I IOkV au poste de Mururu l;

o Remise en etat de la centrale hydroelectrique Mukungwa 1, y compris des travaux sur les structureshydrauliques de la centrale hydroelectrique de Gisenyi et Gihira;

o Execution d'etudes de faisabilite des centrales hydroelectrique;o Constitution d'une reserve de pieces detachees pour les centrales et les postes et de materiel

d'entretien et d'outils;o Renforcement des competences du personnel de l'UCAP et de l'UEP en matiere de gestion et de suivi

de projets, et actions de fornation grace a des bourses accordees aux etudiants.

Un accord de pr8t subsidiaire du PRSE portant retrocession a ELECTROGAZ d'un montant de 13 440 000USD a et signe le 24 aofut 1993 pour fmancer les parties BI et B5 de l'Accord de Credit.

Apres la guerre d'avril-juillet 1994, ces objectifs ont ete reformules et ils se declinent comme suit:

L'objectif principal du PRSE actualise est d'appuyer le gouvernement rwandais a rehabiliter le secteur del'energie, a promouvoir des politiques energetiques rationnelles, d'etablir les bases d'une utilisation efficacedes ressources energetiques du pays et de mimniiser les atteintes a l'environnement et d'ameliorer lesconditions d'assainissement de la Ville de Kigali.

Les objectifs specifiques devant etre atteints par le Projet:

o La creation d'un environnementjuridique et rbglementaire favorable a l'amelioration du secteurde l'energie et des conditions d'assainissement de la Ville de Kigali;

o L'accroissement de l'efficacite des activites d'ELECTROGAZ;o La fourniture d'une assistance technique et des actions de formation en appui aux institutions

sectorielles cles pour renforcer la capacit6 de planification en matiere d'mvestissements;o La rehabilitation des principales infrastructures electriques

Ainsi, la philosoplue du PRSE repose sur le principe de promouvoir l'accroissement de l'acces de la

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population A plus d'6nergie et une rationalisation de la gestion du secteur dans son ensemble, afin depromouvoir le developpement socio-economique, tout en veillant a la sauvegarde de 1'environnement.

Pour atteindre ces objectifs, les actions a initier pour relever les defis du secteur energie visent a:

o Adopter des solutions les moins couiteuses en matiere d'investissement;o Etablir une cooperation regionale;o Diversifier les sources d'energie accessibles;o Utiliser rationnellement les ressources energetiques;o Creer et entretenir un environnement propice au secteur prive plus apte a assurer une bonne

qualite de service tout en generant les ressources financieres indispensables a l'essor du secteur;o Identifier les besoins energetiques de base pour reorienter la demande vers des sources d'energie

plus accessibles et dont l'impact sur l'environnement est maitrisableo Reconstituer et conserver le couvert forestier;o Ameliorer l'efficacite de la production d'6lectricite et d'eau;o Renforcer les institutions du secteur y compris l'ELECTROGAZ;o Mettre en place des tarifs appropri6s pour l'electricite, 1'eau et le gaz; et promouvoir des prix

rationnels pour le bois, le charbon de bois et les produits petroliers tout en reduisant l'impact deleur utilisation sur 1'environnement.

Pour le volet << Gestion des dechets urbains )), I'assistance de la Banque devrait comprendre

o Les travaux de decharge sur le site existant et le nouveau site;o Les equipements de collecte et les pieces de rechange;o Le renforcement des capacites institutionnelles;o Les services de consultants.

L'Accord de Credit a connu trois modifications depuis sa signature le 21 avril 1993:

o Sur demande du Gouvernement rwandais, pour toutes les deipenses locales, I 'Association aaccepte, dans sa lettre du 29 juillet 1996, d 'augmenter sa part qui est passee de 90 ti 95 % aveceffet a partir du 19 octobre 1995;

o L 'amendement de I 'Accord de Credit intervenu le 28 septembre 1998 pour inclure lacomposante PVK dans le PRSE et creer une nouvelle categorie de depenses ( Frais defonctionnement )).

O En date du 04 mai 2000, la Banque accepte de rendre eligibles les depenses encourues au titredefrais defonctionnement avec effet retroactif au lerjanvier 1995.

Aprbs ces reajustements, la repartition par categories de depenses a evolue tel que decrit a l'Anne.xe A.

3. Etat d'execution du Projet par objectifs

Le Projet de Rehabilitation du Secteur de l'Energie (PRSE), comrne tous les autres projets financ6s par la BanqueMondiale, a suspendu ses activit6s suite a la guerre d'avril-juillet 1994 pour les reprendre le ler aout 1995.

Etant donne que les operations du PPF n'avaient pas fait l'objet d'aucune comptabilisation, la premibrepreoccupation a ete de porter dans les comptes les operations effectuees dans le cadre de la preparation du Projetconformnment aux dispositions de la Lettre d'agrement PPF N° P 701- 0 Rw du 11 octobre 1991.

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A. ENERGIE

i) Creation d'un environnement legal et reglementaire favorable

Sous-secteur ElectriciteLe programme de reforme institutionnelle du sous-secteur electricite initialement concu devait deboucher sur lacreation d'une Societe Nationale de Patrimoine (SNP) et d'une Societe Privee d'Exploitation (SPE). Lesevenements tragiques d'avril-juillet 1994 se sont produits avant la concretisation de ce programme. A lareouverture du Projet, la reforme institutionnelle a progresse pour completer les actions entreprises auparavant dansle cadre du PPF:

* Etude de redressement d'ELECTROGAZ par SAUR AFRIQUE (1986-Edition provisoire marsl992);* Mise a jour des donnees financieres d'ELECTROGAZ par CASTALIA (1995);* Etude de reforme institutionnelle des secteurs et restructuration d'ELECTROGAZ par

BOOZ.ALLEN&HAMILTON (1999);* Audits comptable et financier annuels par des cabinets d'audit extemes independants.

Sous-secteur produits petrohzersDans le souci d'ameliorer le contr6le qualitatif et quantitatif des produits petfoliers, il a ete convenu de transferer lagestion des entrep6ts publics a une societe privee.Les actions concretes menees dans ce cadre sont:

* Mise A jour des donnees sur le secteur petrolier par Moctar THLAM;* Consultation secteur petrolier par Michel PATOU;* Proposition de lois sur le secteur petrolier par l'Association NKURUNZIZA-RWABUKWISI.

Sous-secteur Gaz methane

Il s'agit de definir un cadre institutionnel se rapportant notamment a l'application des directives environnementaleset techniques pour le developpement futur des ressources en gaz methane. Un texte reglementaire decrivantl'exploitation a ete redige par TECHNITAS. Des etudes sur le developpement et la promotion du gaz methane ontete menees par Dr. HASSAN et Dr. TIETZE et un seminaire a ete organise A l'intention des investisseurs potentielsrwandais du 31 juillet au 1 er aofit 2000 A Kigali.

Agence de r6gulation

Projet de loi portant creation de l'Agence de Regulation Multisectorielle prepare sur les fonds du Projet.

ii) AccroStre l'efficacite des operations d'ELECTROGAZ

Du materiel electrique et un lot de vehicules ont ete achetes A cette fin.Electrification du Village de Nyarutarama

iii) Renforcer les capacites de planification et de formulation d'une politique sectorielle et suivre les activitesrelatives A l'energie

Renforcement des capacitesSeminaires et stages

Bois defeuDans le souci de rationaliser I'approvisionnement du charbon de bois en milieu urbain, le Projet devait foumir lesequipements et les services necessaires a l'etablissement d'un programme autofinance. La prise de photos aeriennesdu patrimoine forestier n'a pas ete faite alors que c'etait un prealable important.

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Quelques activites cependant on e enregistrees:* La formation des artisans dans la fabrication de foyers am6liores;* La formation des techniciens en methodes de carbonisation.

Gaz methaneLe but poursuivi est d'encourager la participation des prives dans 1'exploitation et le developpement du gazm6thane.Des etudes de leves bathymetriques du Lac Kivu ainsi que des analyses chimiques sur des echantillons d'eau de ceLac ont e financees par le Projet.

Energie solaire11 6tait prevu des etudes pour promouvoir des systemes photovoltaiques autonomes a travers la campagne. Ellesn'ont pas eu lieu, seule une formation a et dispensee en faveur des techniciens en installation, entretien etmaintenance des panneaux solaires.

ElectricitePour augmenter la production d'energie electrique, une 6tude de faisabilite de l'amenagement hydroelectrique surla riviere Nyabarongo a e conduite jusqu'au stade d'APD et de DAO.

Produits petroliersLe Projet devait appuyer le Ministere du Commerce a mettre en ceuvre les r6formes n6cessaires pour l'etablissementdes prix a la pompe et les taxes.On retiendra la mise en place d'une cellule de suivi de I'approvisionnement du pays en hydrocarbures ainsi quel'audit comptable et l'expertise technique des entrep6ts petroliers en vue de leur rehabilitation

iv) Rehabiliter et 6tendre les infrastructures electriques

Seules les etudes d'expertise ont ete men6es:* Les premi6res par le Groupement BEROCAN-BBA:* Etudes d'ingenierie d6taill6e et pr6paration du dossier d'appel d'offres pour la r6habilitation dur reseau de

transport (postes sources et lignes HT);* Etudes d'ingeniene d6taillee et preparation du dossier d'appel d'offres pour la r6habihtation et 1'extension des

reseaux electriques des cinq centres de distnbution* Les deuxiemes par DECON et RMD-CONSULT:* Etudes techniques detaillee et pr6paration du dossier d'appel d'offres pour la rehabilitation des centrales

hydroelectriques Mukungwa, Gihira et Gisenyi;* Etudes techniques detaillees et pr6paration du dossier d'appel d'offres pour la modification du poste de

transformation 6 6/30/110 kV de Mururu 1.

11 y a eu aussi I 'expertise des equipements de protection et de teletransmission du reseau HT d'ELECTROGAZpar LAHMEYER International.Pr6paration d'un nouveau Projet d'investissement dans les secteurs Eau, Electricite et Gaz: une premiere mouturedu Project Concept Document (PCD) est disponible.

B. GESTION DES DECHETS URBAINS

Au depart, I'idee etait de creer un projet pilote qui jetterait les bases d'une structure de ramassage et de gestion desordures de la capitale par des prives et faciliterait ulterieurement l'amenagement d'une nouvelle decharge.

Sur le plan des etudes, on peut citer la campagne de sensibilisation de la population urbaine confiee a AFRICARE,I'etude de CARL BRO, de ROUMENS, de LUKMAN, l'organisation des seminaires a Kigali ainsi que les stages al'etranger des cadres de la Ville de Kigali.

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Le PRSE a egalement fourni a la Ville de Kigali du materiel et des 6quipements de collecte des dechets comprenantdes camions, des bacs a immondices, des compacteurs avec groupes electrogenes, un poste de transfert et descitemes de vidange.

Les bacs reposent desormais sur des plate-formes en beton construites a travers les sept districts pour faciliter leurchargement sur les camions roll on/off.

Le recapitulatif des contrats passes par le PRSE depuis 1995 jusqu'a sa cloture est detaill a lA'Annexe B

4. Problemes majeurs rencontr6s

i) Frais de fonctionnement

L'Accord de Credit N°2456-Rw ne prevoyait aucune categorie pour financer les frais de fonctionnement du Bureaude Coordination. L'Unite de Coordination et d'Administration du Projet qui est en place depuis aofit 1995 a dofaire face a de nombreuses depenses de fonctionnement (sur le plan juridique consider6es ineligibles entre 1995 et1997) qui etaient imput6es sous la categorie 2-C pour les besoins de la comptabilite. En septembre 1998, la BanqueMondiale a exige le remboursement des frais qui s'elevaient a 156 437 281 Frw. Pendant toute l'annee 1999, lePRSE a et6 mis en quarantaine financiere et a connu des difficult6s de tresorerie parce que Washington avaitdecid6 de suspendre le reapprovisionnement du Compte special en attendant l'engagement du Gouvemementrwandais a restituer cet argent.Le probleme a 6te resolu grice a la signature d'un amendement a I'Accord de credit en date du 04 mai 2000 qui arendu admissibles au financement de l'IDA toutes les depenses encourues au titre de frais de fonctionnement avantle 01 janvier 1998.

ii) Evolution institutionnelle d'ELECTROGAZ et du secteur de l'energie electrique

Dans l'Accord de Credit initial, il 6tait question de dedoubler ELECTROGAZ en deux entites: une soci6t6Nationale de Patrimoine et une societe Privee d'exploitation li6es par un contrat d'affermage. Apres la guerre,l'option de privatisation totale d'ELECTROGAZ a ete ecartee, car il n'existait ni investisseurs locaux ayant lescapacites financieres requises pour acqu6rir les immobilisations ni investisseurs etrangers dispos6s a reprendre lasoci&e dans son 6tat de sante febrile. Par la suite, d'autres scenarios ont ete explores : (i) la possibilite de conserverELECTROGAZ comme seul operateur dans le secteur; (ii) la scission d'ELECTROGAZ en deux societes separees,l'une s'occupant des operations d'eau et l'autre des operations d'&Iectricit6 ; (iii) l'introduction d'un contrat degestion base sur les performances d'un operateur prive exterieur; et (iv) i'cctroi des actifs du secteur a un operateurprive. C'est dire que la reforme institutionnelle aura marque toute la vie du Projet. Le desengagement de l'Etat dessecteurs Eau et Electricite est une recherche continuelle menee pour trouver des reponses adequates aux problemesinstitutionnels, oprationnels et financiers de ces 2 secteurs (Annexe C). Le Projet qui a cloture le 31 decembre2001, aura connu trois prorogations pour mener jusqu'au bout le processus de restructuration d'ELECTROGAZ.

iii) Missions de supervision

La demiere mission de supervision du PRSE par son Task Manager remonte z 1998. La conduite du Projet sefaisait par correspondance alors que dans bien de cas, une visite sur le terrain est plus productive que la voieepistolaire. II faut remarquer en plus que beaucoup de lettres adressees a Washington sont restees sans reponse,situation imputable peut-8tre a cette meconnaissance de 1'etat des lieux de la part du Chef de Projet.

iv) Defmition des objectifs

Les objectifs du PRSE sont varies et multiples voire ambitieux, d'oui l'implication de plusieurs intervenants:MINERENA, MINICOM, MINAGRI, MINITERE, ELECTROGAZ, VILLE DE KIGALI. Cette diversite d'acteursn'a pas rendu ais6e la coordination des activit6s. Vers la fin de l'annee 1998 (date de cl6ture initiale du Projet), surdemande du Gouvemement Rwandais, la date de cl6ture a ete prorogee jusqu'au 31 decembre 1999. A cetteoccasion, etant donne que le Projet etait limite a deux composantes : la reforme institutionnelle et la gestion des

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dechets solides, le Credit a 6t6 ampute d'un montant de 4 980 000 DTS en janvier 1999, originellement destine ala r6habilitation des infrastructures essentiellement. 11 faudrait conserver des objectifs modestes en raison desressources limitees et dimensionner ces objectifs aux moyens potentiellement mobilisables pour leur r6alisation.

v) Etudes non suivies d'execution

Le PRSE compte a son actif toute une serie d'6tudes qui devaient normalement deboucher sur 1'execution physiquedes travaux qui devait constituer le second axe prioritaire de la double mission du Projet. Ces 6tudes souventcofiteuses, mais non suivies d'effet et qui dornent dans les tiroirs risquent d'Etre d6passees faute de n'avoir pas etemises en ceuvre dans un dMlai raisonnable, d'oui cofits additionnels d'actualisation.

vi) Gestion des Dechets Urbains

Le ramassage des dechets urbains a e completement arrhte pendant les ev6nements tragiques de 1994 et il n'arepris qu'en 1995 avec le concours d'AFRICARE de juillet 1994 jusqu'au 31 mars 1995, celui du PNUD d'avriljusqu'au 31 octobre 1995 et celui de l'USAID de novembre 1995 jusque fin avril 1996. Pour aider la Prefecture dela Ville de Kigali a faire face aux nombreux problemes d'assainissement de la capitale, la Banque Mondiale aaccepte en 1997 d'octroyer une assistance technique et financiere a travers le Credit PRSE pour: (1) la mise enplace d'un service capable d'organiser et superviser la collecte des dechets solides, le vidange des fosses septiqueset la gestion de la decharge ; (2) la formation du personnel.

Avec la cloture du PRSE, force est de constater que:Les travaux d'amelioration du d6potoir de Nyanza et les travaux d'arnmnagement d'une nouvelle decharge n'ontpas ete r6alises.La mise en place d'un service efficace de collecte et d'elimination des dechets solides n'a pas eu lieu.11 6tait egalement prevu de passer un contrat avec des entreprises locales et en mame temps preciser la redevance ademander aux usagers pour permettre la perennisation du service.Une canpagne de sensibilisation a Wt6 organisee pour mettre a jour la population urbaine qui sera appelee un jour acontribuer une fois terminee l'etude de recouvrement de cofits aupres des ben6ficiaires.11 serait maintenant difficile d'interesser les operateurs prives puisque le mat6riel et les equipements acquis pour lacollecte et le traitement des dechets ne sont pas en etat de marche pour la plupart (poste de transfert, compacteurs,groupes electrogenes, camions roll on/off). Le poste de transfert n'a jamais ete installe pour tester sonfonctionnement et il est expose aux intemp6ries et aux larcins. Des doutes serieux persistent actuellement sur sonetat de marche et celui de ses accessoires. Les camions roll on /off sont essouffles et doivent 8tre remplac6s. L'appeld'offres international pour la fourniture devait comporter egalement l'installation et la mise en service des6quipements livres, cette lacune dans le dossier d'appel d'offres est lourde de cons6quences (Annexe D).

vi) Fonds de contrepartie

Les fonds de contrepartie sont vers6s avec beaucoup de retard entrainant ainsi un cumul d'arrieres qui met des foisle PRSE dans une situation inconfortable vis-&-vis des tiers.

5. Lecons tir&es et recommandations

La r6forme institutionnelle des secteurs fait son chemin depuis janvier 1994. Elle devrait prendre corps ennovembre 2002 avec la signature du Contrat de gestion avec un op6rateur prive.

Apres avoir ced6 quelques entreprises publiques au secteur prive, le Gouvernement rwandais, encourag6 par laBanque Mondiale et le FMI, s'est donc resolu a privatiser la Societe Nationale d'Electricite, ELECTROGAZ.

Attendue par les operateurs economiques, la cession de la societ6 etatique de distribution d'eau et d'electricitedevrait donner au pays les moyens de confirmer sa determination a se desengager progressivement des entreprisespubliques. En se dessaisissant de ses prerogatives et competences, I'Administration perd des sources de revenus

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non negligeables. Mais en contrepartie, les secteurs privatises vont beneficier des investis, ements necessaires a leurremise a niveau. Avec en ligne de mire, I'accroissement qualitatif et quantitatif des facteurs de productiondisponibles, le renforcement de la croissance et la reduction de la pauvrete.L'objectif global, attendu du Contrat de gestion d'ELECTROGAZ, sera d'ameliorer la situation financiere,technique et operationnelle d'ELECTROGAZ. Les objectifs specifiques etant:

* Financier: realiser la solvabilite financiere de la Societe. A long terme, les tarifs devraient etre au moinscomparables a ceux pratiques dans les autres soci6tes semblables en Afrique;

* Technique: augmenter la production et ameliorer la fiabilite du reseau de facon a satisfaire la demande;* Op6rationne: ameliorer l'efficacite d'ELECTROGAZ dans ses activit6s en reduisant les cofits et en augmentant

la productivite par employe.

En resum6 pour ameliorer la performance du secteur electrique, il faut que:* La gestion des entreprises publiques d'electricite soit revue de facon a ce que celles-ci soient assujetties aux

normes de fonctionnement des marches financiers;* La concurrence soit introduite;* La regulation du marche electrique puisse reposer sur des principes incitatifs et s'exercer de maniere

transparente;* Le secteur prive apporte l'investissement, la technologie et l'expertise pour reformer et developper le secteur de

l'energie electrique.

La biomasse n'a pas eu la place qu'elle mente dans le Projet alors qu'elle compte pour plus de 94% de laconsommation totale d'6nergie. Elle a disparu du plan d'actions du PRSE a partir de 1999 et la formation descharbonniers et des artisans de foyers ameliores n'a pas et suivie de la vulgarisation des techniques aupres de lapopulation. Pourtant, la pression sur la for8t est si forte qu'il faut mettre en place un programme de developpementdes produits de substitution. C'est pour repondre a ce souci que le Gouvemement Rwandais a decide de confier ledeveloppement de nouvelles unites de production d'electricite dont la centrale thermique utilisant le gaz methaneaux Producteurs Independants d'Electricit6 (PIE). La production d'energie electrique est ouverte a la concurrence,ce qui permet aux operateurs independants de se lancer sur ce creneau. Rien n'emp8che un op6rateur prive des'equiper d'une centrale de faible capacite et de distribuer du courant electrique dans une agglomeration qui en estdepourvue, ou de la vendre a une industrie qui ne peut obtenir ce service du fournisseur national. Pour des localiteseloignees du reseau ELECTROGAZ ou defavorisees en energie electrique, il faut imaginer une electrificationdecentralisee, diesel, solaire, eolienne, hydraulique ou par valorisation de la biomasse.

Sur le plan institutionnel, une (< agence d'electrification rurale )> pourrait &tre creee pour promouvoir ledeveloppement de l'electrification rurale en fournissant une assistance technique et financiere aux consommateursou aux promoteurs prives.La compeitivite des investisseurs au Rwanda dependra de la disponibilite de facteurs de production de qualite eten quantite suffisante.

6. Performances de l'emprunteur

Liberalisation de I'&conomie etprivatisation au Rwanda

L'appel d'offres pour le contrat de gestion d'ELECTROGAZ est a placer dans le contexte global des reformes encours sous-tendues par un programme de liberalisation de l'economie qui vise a attirer des investisseurs etrangers,a developper le commerce des biens et services et a creer une economie plus dynamique. Ce programme existedepuis plusieurs annees et enregistre deja des progres significatifs. Dans un contexte de fort recul de l'aidepublique au developpement, il faut absolument renforcer le partenariat entre secteurs public et prive dans ledeveloppement des infrastructures comme l'eau, 1'energie, les t6lecommunications, etc.

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Promotion de l'investissement

Par la loi N°14/98 du 18 decembre 1998, il a ete cree l'Office Rwandais pour la Promotion de l'Investissement dontle mandat est de faciliter le developpement des complexes industriels et les zones de libre-echange d'exportation,assister les investisseurs, conseiller le Gouvernement sur les politiques et les programmes destines a ameliorer1'environnement pour la communaute des affaires et instaurer de veritables garanties juridiques.

Privatisation

Au centre du programme economique se trouve la privatisation des etablissements publics. Le Secretariat dePrivatisation s'emploie a superviser l'introduction du secteur prive dans les usines theicoles et dans les servicesd'utilit6 publique. Le Secretariat de Privatisation ainsi que le National Tender Board ont mis en place desprocedures transparentes pour conduire tout le processus de passation de marches.

Cadre legal et reglementaire

La loi N° 39/2001 du 13/09/2001 portant creation de I'Agence de Regulation des Services d'utilite publique a epubliee dans le Journal Officiel N° 20 paru le 15 octobre 2001. La loi sur les telecommunications existe egalement,preuve que le Gouvernement est determine a ameliorer les infrastructures nationales pour assurer la croissanceeconomique. De meme, les lois sectorielles doivent etre preparees pour completer la reforme institutionnelle dessecteurs et la restructuration operationnelle et financiere d'ELECTROGAZ (Annexe E). Les termes de r6f6rencerelatifs a la mise a jour des lois surannees sont disponibles et la procedure de recrutement de consultants peut etreentamee en vue de disposer d'une reglementation appropnee en la matiere.

Etude de Restructuration Financtere d'ELECTROGAZ

La cl6ture du PRSE arrive au moment oii cette etude allait demarrer. Le Consultant recrute a cet effet devra faireune analyse des creances d'ELECTROGAZ sur l'Etat, une analyse de l'endettement d'ELECTROGAZ enversl'Etat et des autres dettes importantes vis-A vis des principaux foumisseurs. A partir de ce rapport diagnostic,I'expert va proposer a l'Administration un plan de restructuration de la dette et du capital. La decision duGouvemement Rwandais (traitement de la dette et des impayes) sera primordiale pour les soumissionnaires auContrat de gestion d'ELECTROGAZ dans la preparation de leurs projections financi6res et de leur business plan.Cette etude sera financee par le < Projet CompktitivitM et Developpement de I'Entreprise >>, connu sous l'acronymeanglais CEDP.

Pr6paration du Nouveau Projet d'investissement en energie, eau et gaz

Le Project Concept Document (PCD) de ce Projet en gestation est dispomble dans sa version provisoire. Le Projetenvisage devrait comporter quatre composantes:

o Ameliorer et augmenter l'acces de la population aux infrastructures modemes;o Mettre en place des infrastructures energetiques en milieu rural;o Exploiter et developper le gaz methane;o Appuyer l'Agence de Regulation des Services d'utilite publique dans le secteur energie.

Le PPF devrait @tre disponible au cours de l'annee 2002 pour supporter certaines depenses necessaires A lapreparation du nouveau Projet d'Investissement que la Banque Mondiale a accepte de financer, maintenant que lalourde hypotheque sur le programme de rehabilitation des infrastructures est enfin levee.La longueur des procedures a la Banque Mondiale pourrait @tre un facteur penalisant qui retarderait le lancementde ce Projet avant la fin de l'annee en cours.

Fonds de contrepartie

La contribution du Gouvemement Rwandais au budget du PRSE (1995-2000) s'eleve a 62 290 419 Frw.

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7. Performances de la Banque

Le PRSE a et finance par un Credit IDA N° 2456-Rw d'un montant de 13 520 000 DTS en contrepartie duquel leGouvemement Rwandais devait supporter les depenses locales a hauteur de 5 % afin de s'assurer que les fonds duCredit ne sont pas utilises pour payer les taxes notamment. Les decaissements effectu6s se presentent comme suit(au 30 avril 2002):

Montant decaisse: 10 823 108,100 DTSMontant non d6caiss6 : 2 696 891,900 DTS

La Banque a r6gulierement envoye a Kigali des missions de supervision conduites par le Task Manager du PRSEpour evaluer I'etat d'avancement du Projet tandis qu'une del6gation rwandaise s'est rendue i Washington a deuxreprises dans le meme but. A l'issue de chacune de ces missions de supervision, la Banque Mondiale prepare uneaide-memoire qui rassemble les observations, recommandations et le plan d'actions ulterieures pour ameliorer lesresultats techniques et financiers du Projet et la mise en oeuvre d'une facon generale.

Les audits comptable et financier du PRSE d'une part et d'ELECTROGAZ d'autre part ont ete effectues par descabinets extemes independants recrutes suivant les directives << selection et emploi de consultants par lesemprunteurs de la Banque Mondiale >>.

La Banque a accord6 3 extensions (1999, 2000 et 2001) et une periode de grice de quatre mois pour donner letemps de cl6turer tous les dossiers.

Une fois par an, la Banque Mondiale organise a Kigali la revue de la performance du portefeuille (CPPR) . Laderni6re en date s'est tenue a Kigali du 16 au 17 juillet 2001 et ce forum est une occasion de faire le tour desproblemes rencontres dans l'execution des projets.

De meme, le CEPEX organise tous les trois mois une reunion de coordination des projets finances par la BanqueMondiale pour faire le point ensemble sur le deroulement des activites de chaque projet.

Dans le cadre du contrat conclu avec BOOZ.ALLEN&HAMILTON, la Banque Mondiale s'est reellementimpliqu6e pour combler des lacunes, des carences et des insuffisances de fa9on a produire un dossier de demandede propositions (RFP) bien ficele qui se faisait desesperement attendre pour les soumissionnaires. Dans ce registre,la visite a Kigali de Mme Lucy FYE, TTL CEDP, en f6vrier 2002 et celle de Mme Ludmila BUTENKO, TTLPRSE, en mars 2002 ont permis de mettre la demiere main sur le RFP pour lequel la non-objection de la Banqueest intervenue le 03 mai 2002.

De m8me, le Project Concept Document (PCD), document de base pour le montage du Nouveau Projetd'investissement dans les secteurs electricite, eau et gaz est en cours de finalisation grace aux efforts conjointsBanque Mondiale et MINERENA.

Concernant le renforcement des capacites, la Banque a finance la participation des cadres rwandais a desformations de courte duree et a des seminaires organises localement ou a l'etranger.

Dans le souci de traiter rapidement les demandes de non-objection confrontees a la lourdeur bureaucratique deWashington D.C., la Mission Residente commence a aller au-dela du simple role de courroie de transmission et aprendre certaines decisions en vue d'abreger le temps de reponse relativement long quelques fois.

AMin d'augmenter l'efficacite de ses services aupres des principaux partenaires, la Banque Mondiale a fait circulerun questionnaire qui a ete rempli par les Coordinateurs de Projet. Ces derniers attendent en retour le feed back quiva contribuer a 1'etablissement des relations de travail de plus en plus fructueuses.

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8. Impact du projet (b6neficiaires, environnement, institutionnel)

Le Gouvernement Rwandais est l'Emprunteur, tandis que le MINERENA est responsable de la coordination et dela supervision des activites en sa qualit6 d'Agence d'execution. L'Unite de Coordination et d'Administration duProjet (UCAP) s'occupe du suivi quotidien de toutes les activites relevant du PRSE.

Dans son programme initial, le PRSE prevoyait l'extension du reseau de distribution de facon a permettre a lapopulation surtout en milieu rural d'acceder au courant electrique. Concemant 1'extension du reseau dedistribution de la Ville de Kigali, un nouveau quartier dans la periph6rie du Centre Ville a ete raccorde au reseau6lectrique et alimente en eau.

L'6nergie domestique consomm6e est sous forme de bois de feu ou de charbon, il en resulte des effets n6gatifs surl'environnement provoques par la deforestation.Les sous-produits agricoles constituent egalement une source importante d'energie pour les besoins menagers. LeProjet a finance la formation des charbonniers de facon A reduire la surexploitation du bois, a rationaliser etameliorer l'efficacite du charbon de bois.

Les etudes de leves bathymetriques du Lac Kivu font etat de reserves en gaz methane exploitables d'un volume de55 milliards de Nm3, mais l'extraction du gaz methane doit se faire dans des conditions de securite suffisantes etsans etre un danger pour l'environnement. Les directives environnementales et techniques en vue de l'exploitationde ce gaz ont &t6 elaborees par l'UPEGAZ.

Dans le cadre de l'etude de faisabilit6 d'une centrale hydroelectrique sur la Nyabarongo, le rapport d'impactenvironnemental et socio-economique permet d'estimer le cout d'un plan de compensation.

Sur le plan de la reforme institutionnelle des secteurs, le monopole confer6 a ELECTROGAZ par decret-loi 1876du 20/04/76 lui a ete retire pour permettre aux professionnels operateurs priv6s exp6riment6s dans les secteursd'assumer les op6rations de l'Etablissement

Concemant la r6forme du secteur p6trolier, mdme si le projet de loi portant r6glementation du secteur n'a pasconnu de lendemain, le secteur est completement lib6ralis6 depuis la liquidation de PETRORWANDA et la gestiondes entrepots est graduellement confi6e aux prives.

La Cellule de Suivi de l'Approvisionnement du Pays en Hydrocarbures (CSAPH) , en plus de la collecte desdonn6es a l'origine et en transit, s'est occup6 des travaux de reg6n6ration du stock strat6gique de carburant deI'Etat entrepos6 A Butare (3 438 501 litres). Pour Aviter la d6t6rioration croissante de ces produits, le MINICOMs'est charg6 de la location des camions-citemes et de la main-d'ceuvre entre Rwabuye et Gatsata (les deux localitesetant s6par6es de 140 kms) tandis que le PRSE a pris en charge les frais de subsistance de la Cellule qui assurait lasupervision des travaux sur tout le parcours.

Ce stock strat6gique de carburant devrait etre retourn6 aux d6p6ts de Rwabuye sans d6lai, car les d6p6ts de Gatsatasont utilis6s 6galement par les operateurs pnv6s du secteur p6trolier. Faute de capacit6 suffisante de stockage desproduits petroliers au Rwanda, il serait bon d'approcher la Banque Mondiale pour apporter son appui a un projet der6habilitation des entrepots de Bigogwe et Butare dont l'expertise a &t& r6alis6 sur les fonds du PRSE et a la Cellulequi mene son travail regulierement avec les operateurs priv6s oeuvrant dans le secteur p6trolier pour examiner lastructure des prix des produits p6troliers et tient periodiquement des r6unions avec la Commissioninterminist6rielle Alargie a la BNR, a I'ASSIMPER, a la FRSP et A I'ASCORWA.

Pour la Ville de Kigali, les Atudes recommandent que le secteur prive reprenne en mains la collecte et la gestion desd6chets solides urbains. La Ville de Kigali devrait continuer les camnpagnes de sensibilisation dans les quartiers deKigali afin de preparer le terrain psychologique de la population utbaine qui sera appel6e A participer un jour aupaiement du service rendu.

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Concemant le renforcement des capacites, plusieurs seminaires ont e organises a Kigali et les agents de l'Etat ontpu beneficier egalement de stages de formnation et de perfectionnement a l'exterieur.

SINELAC gere la centrale communautaire de Rusizi 11(27.5 MW) qui appartient au Rwanda, au Burundi et auCongo (RDC) Conmme la centrale joue un role important dans les trois pays essentiellement au Rwanda et auBurundi et que l'etude de reforme des societes d'electricite du Rwanda et du Burundi est en cours, il faut quel'etude de reforme de SINELAC soit egalement menee afm d'avoir une vision globale de l'evolution du secteurdans la sous-region. Les termes de reference de l'Etude de Restructuration de SINELAC sont disponibles.

Concemant le gaz methane du Lac Kivu, la viabilite technique et financiere du projet d'exploitation et dudeveloppement de ce gaz est admise par les bailleurs et les investisseurs potentiels. 11 faudrait mettre sur pied uncadre de concertation interminist6riel qui serait charge d'etudier le cadre juridique devant r6gir le secteur gazier,d'identifier des priorites a court et a moyen terme et d'evaluer le risque environnemental qui proviendrait dudesequilibre du Lac Kivu suite a une exploitation non contr6lee.

Dans la perspective d'une restructuration financiere d'ELECTROGAZ, il serait possible d'envisager une reductiondu prix du kWh a condition de transferer a l'Etat toute la partie amortissement et dettes envers l'Etat relative auxinvestissements non rentables effectues dans le passe. Une telle decision s'impose pour permettre a la Societe de serefaire une sante financiere et de repartir sur des bases saines.

Par ailleurs une etude tarifaire est a faire pour recommander une structure tarifaire qui puisse assurer la rentabilitedes secteurs eau et electricite, permettre a ELECTROGAZ de satisfaire les objectifs financiers et a la fois derespecter le contrat passe avec SINELAC.

9. Durabilite et viabilite des realisations du Projet

Categorie << TRA VA UX))

L'Entrepreneur a realise sur le site de Nyarutarama des travaux de genie civil comprenant essentiellement laconstruction de deux cabines MT/BT ainsi que le montage des equipements electriques. 11 appartient aELECTROGAZ et aux habitants de ce village d'assurer l'entretien des ouvrages et des installations.

Les plate-formes pour les bacs a dechets sont r6parties dans les 5 districts de la Ville de Kigali aux fins de faciliterle chargement des bacs sur les camion roll on/off.

Categorie < Fournitures v

Les vehicules, le materiel bureautique et informatique sont des outils de travail, certes. Le materiel roulant s'use,l'informatique, quant a elle, est en perpetuelle innovation technologique.Avec la fermeture de cette categorie en 1999, le PRSE n'a pas pu renouveler certains equipements usages.

Quant aux equipements et matenel achet6s pour la collecte des dechets urbains, il est regrettable de constaterqu'une partie n'est pas oprationnelle et se degrade au fil du temps a cause des mauvaises conditionsd'entreposage. C'est une composante qui a ete mal planifiee et executee. II revient a la Ville de Kigali d'elaborerune strategie pour mettre en valeur les equipements non utilises (Annexe D).

Cat6gorie << Etudes et Services de Consultant))

On ne peut mieux apprecier la valeur des etudes qu'au vu de I'action deployee pour leur concretisation. Les etudesd'expertise des infrastructures energetiques sont disponibles, mais leur rehabilitation et extension n6cessitent desfonds supplementaires

Les cadres du Ministere qui ont beneficie d'une fornmation ou de stages devraient continuer a partager lesconnaissances acquises avec leurs pairs et a diffuser les leqons apprises.

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Categorie < Frais defonctionnement ))

Fin 1998, le MINITRAP d'alors a decide de confier la coordination des projets dont elle avait la tutelle a desfonctionnaires du Ministere pour que ceux-ci capitalisent de 1'exp6rience dans la conduite des projets de sorte qu'ala fm de tels projets l'Administration dispose encore des gens outill6s et competents avec des acquis et des capacitessuffisantes pour le suivi.

Pour 1'execution du Projet, l'Unite de Coordination Administrative du PRSE a vu sa composition se reduire au fildes ann6es pour se retrouver avec une petite equipe dirigee par un coordinateur, cadre du MINERENA, assisted'un chef comptable et d'une secretaire.

Les projets de developpement sont incertains. Les echecs sont plus nombreux que les succes.Il existe un droit A l'erreur A conceder aux acteurs de developpement, mais A ce droit est associe l'obligationde ne pas repeter ces erreurs.

Annexe A

La repartition par categories a 6volue commne suit:Retrait de fonds du credit

Credit initial , Montants annules et revises apres r6affectation

Categorie Description de la Montant Montants Montants du Montants du Montants duCategorie initial annules Credit apres Credit revises Credit revises

(000 DTS) (000 DTS) annulation (000 DTS) (000 DTS)(000 DTS) au Reaffectation au R6affectation31 Decembre 31 Decembre au 4 mai 2000.

___________________ ~~~~ ~~98 99

1. Travauxa) Partie B. l du 650 650 650 30projet 450 450 450 450b) Autres

2. Foumituresa) Partie B.l du projet 4,550 2,136 2,414 619 200b) Partie A.6 du 340 340 340 114projet 2,540 2,540 2,540 3905c) Autres

3. Service de consultant,assistance technique etformation

a) Partie A.6 du 160projet 6090 160 160 380b) Autres 6090 7590 7270

4. Remboursement de 540 114 426 421 421I'avance pour lapreparation du projet

5. Frais de fonctionnement 250 _ 250 750 7506. Non affecte 2,930 2,730 195 0 0

TOTAL 18,500 4,980 13,520 13 520 13 520

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Annexe B

Recapitulatif des contrats

Annexe C

ELECTROGAZ en bref et quelques dates clWs

Le bilan des exercices ecoules est riche d'enseignements. En effef, la reforme institutionnelle des secteurs fait sonchemin depuis janvier 1994. Elle devrait prendre corps en novembre 2002 avec la signature du Contrat de gestionavec un operateur prive.

Les realites socio-economiques du terrain apres juillet 1994 ne jouaient pas en faveur d'une privatisation immediated'ELECTROGAZ alors qu'il fallait en premier lieu remettre en etat l'infrastructure energetique qui venait de patirdes devastations. Les conditions necessaires a sa reussite n'etaient pas en place.

ELECTROGAZ n'arrive plus a satisfaire la demande en electricite, en augmentation de 4% par an, alors que lesressources gazieres du Lac Kivu inexploitees sont loin d'etre negligeables et qu'il existe des sites identifies sur leterritoire rwandais qui offrent un potentiel hydraulique interessant. Les investissements de rehabilitation et derenouvellement des equipements cumules sur la periode de 2001 a 2010 sont estim6s a 164 millions de dollars USpour le secteur de l'electricite et a 50 millions de dollars US pour le secteur de l'eau. Quant a son endettement, ilest chiffrf a 105 millions de dollars US (dette a long terme) et A 30 millions de dollars US (dette a court terme).

L'eau, 1'electricite et les telecommunications sont des facteurs de production qui couitent relativement cher et nesont souvent pas disponibles en quantit6 suffisante.Dans le domaine de l'energie notamment, certaines industries connaissent des pertes financieres, fauted'approvisionnement suffisant en courant electrique. Par ailleurs, il n'est pas rare que des variations de tensionprovoquent des degats sur les materiels connectes sur le secteur. Idem pour l'eau ou les tel6coms (dans unemoindre mesure), secteurs ou de graves lacunes se font egalement sentir.

Le Gouvemement Rwandais doit trouver un equilibre entre ses objectifs socio-economiques et son souci de faired'ELECTROGAZ une societe rentable le plus vite possible. Pour que dans un avenir proche un operateur privepuisse considerer ELECTROGAZ corrme une entite financierement viable, la soci6te doit etre a meme de genererdes recettes semblables a celles que les investisseurs estiment pouvoir obtenir dans d'autres societes sous leurcontrole. Outre l'aptitude a generer des benefices, ELECTROGAZ doit etre capable de produire de bons ratios detresorerie et de solvabilite, le plus important d'entre eux etant sans doute le taux de couverture de la dette. Parmiles projets realisables a plus breve echeance, les autorites croient fermement a l'exploitation des reserves de gazmethane pour alimenter des centrales thermiques.

ELECTROGAZ etait jusqu'il y a peu un monopole public charge de la production, du transport et de la distributionde 1'electricite, de l'eau et du gaz. Dote de la personnalite morale et de l'autonomie financiere, il a e crec dans saforme actuelle par le decret-loi N°18/76 du 20 avril 1976 et est regi par le decret-loi N°39/75 relatif auxEtablissements Publics. II est dirige par un Conseil d'Administration et un Directeur nomme par le President de laRepublique Rwandaise. L'Etablissement est soumis a la tutelle technique du Ministere de l'Energie, de l'Eau et desRessources Naturelles et a la tutelle fmanciere du Mmistere des Finances et de la Planification Economique.

Le Gouvemement Rwandais a signe le 13 septembre 1999 un contrat avec BOOZ.ALLEN&HAMILTON,Consultant charge de d6velopper et d'executer un plan de restructuration fonde sur une participation du secteurprive dans les operations d'ELECTROGAZ. Au vu des resultats du Rapport de diagnostic technique et a la lumieredu Business plan (2000-2010) deposes par le Consultant, le Gouvemement Rwandais et la Banque Mondiale semettent d'accord en mai 2000 sur un Contrat de gestion d'ELECTROGAZ pendant cinq ans. Ce contrat de gestionavec un operateur prive s'articule sur deux phases:

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Phase I: PreselectionCette phase a et6 conduite avec succes avec la qualification de six societes:ESKOM, LAIMEYER, TPF, TATA, MANITOBA&ROCHE et SAUR Intemational. Cette derniere s'est retir6e dela course pour des raisons propres. Ces soumissionnaires sont restes plonges dans l'attentisme depuis f6vner 2001jusqu'au 10 mai 2002.

Phase 11: Dossier d'appel d'offres pour le Contrat de gestionLa proc6dure de passation de march6s est un appel d'offres restreint apr6s pr6-qualification. Cette phase a demarr6avec la conference des soumissionnaires organis6e a Kigali du 26 au 28 fevrier 2001 pour permettre a ces derniersde se rendre compte des r6alites du terrain. Dans l'entretemps, il y a eu formation d'associations pour les firmes quin'etaient specialisees que dans un seul secteur pour etre eligibles a cette deuxieme phase. 11 s'agit de

o ESKOM/SNC-LAVALIN/UMGENI Water Board;o MANITOBA/ROCHFRAND WATER;o TATA Power Company Ltd/TCE Consulting Engineers LtdlTATA Iron and Steel Co.Ltd;o LAHMEYER IntemationallHamburger Wasserwerke GmbhIVEAG;o TPF/SWDE/ALE/SPE.

Ce contrat de gestion doit b6n6ficier d'investissements suffisants pour pouvoir assurer un service comp6titif. Lesecteur de l'energie qui 6tait verrouille par un monopole a e liberalis6 a la suite de la loi N°18/99 du 30/08/1999portant modification du decret-loi N' 18/76 du 20 avril 1976 qui retire l'exclusivite au fournisseur nationald'electricit6. Le repreneur d'ELECTROGAZ , dans un premier temps, devra rehabiliter 1'existant et proceder aquelques extensions.

Sur le terrain de la reformne institutionnelle, plusieurs scenarios ont et echafaudes pour determiner celui qulrepondrait le mieux aux realites du pays:

En novembre 1994, il se tient a Patis une table ronde des bailleurs de fonds a l'issue de laquelle un programmed'urgence qui doit se terminer en decembre 1995 est adopte et en meme temps il est demande aux differentsintervenants d'exaininer les possibilites de relancer le contrat d'affermage.Du 11 au 14 aoAt 1995, a eu lieu a Kigali un seminaire sur la rehabilitation et le developpement du secteur .Du 28 au 31 janvier 1996, un seminaire national sur la reforme institutionnelle d'ELECTROGAZ est organise aKigali.En octobre 1996, i1 est propose un contrat de d6Iegation globale de la gestion d'ELECTROGAZ pour une phasetransitoire de 2 a 3 ans.En juillet 1997, le Gouvemement abandonne I'affermage et adopte une approche en 2 phases 10) I'assistanceoperationnelle 20) 1'elaboration d'un cadre reglementaire ouvrant le secteur aux investissements prives.En juillet 1998, Ic Gouvemement rejette l'assistance op6rationnelle et d6cide d'envisager la scissiond'ELECTROGAZ en trois societes, operer la reforrne au sein de chaque societe et ouvrir le capital aux prives.En mai 2000, ELECTROGAZ reste une seule entite dont la gestion sera confiee a un operateur prive pour unep6riode de cinq ans.

Annexe D

Composante << Gestion des Dechets Urbains >

RAPPORT DE VISITE

Le jeudi 21 fevrier 2002 a eu lieu une visite des 6quipements de collecte des dechets urbains achetes dans le cadrede la composante (< Gestion des Dlchets Urbains )>, du Projet de Rehabilitation du Secteur de l'Energie (PRSE).L'objet de la visite etait de faire un constat de l'etat de ces equipements, etant donne que certains ne sont pasencore utilises jusqu'a present et sont stock6s dans le garage de la Ville de Kigali .

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Participaient a la visite:1. Mr RUBERANGEYO Theophile: Directeur de la Planification au MINERENA, Representant du SecretaireGeneral dudit Ministere empechM2. Mr KANYAMUHANDA Emmanuel: CEPEX3. Mr KARANI Alexis: Coordinateur du PRSE4. Mr AKINGENEYE Bertin : CEPEX5. Mr GASHUGI Innocent: Fonctionnaire Dirigeant/ Gestion des D6chets Urbains, Ville de Kigali6. Mr DUSABEMUNGU Aloys: Chef de Garage, Ville de Kigali.

Les participants a la visite ont passe en revue tous les equipements stockes dans le garage et ont pose desquestions pour savoir la cause de cette situation (pourquoi tous les equipements ne sont pas operationnels). Voustrouverez en annexe du present rapport de visite la liste de tous les equipements achetes dans le cadre du contratpasse entre la Societe Classica International Ltd et le MINITRAP.

Monsieur GASHUGI Innocent a donne une breve historique de la composante << GDU >>, et explique les raisons quiont conduit a la situation existante, a savoir:

o le poste de transfert n'est pas jusqu'a present installe et se trouve en plein air;o tous les bacs achetes ne sont pas tous deploy6s, presque une centaine de ces bacs sont encore stock6sdans le garageo les 4 compacteurs ( 3 compacteurs de 14 m3 et un compacteur de 24 m3) ne sont pas aujourd'huiutilises.

Monsieur DUSABEMUNGU Aloys a informe les visiteurs que certains equipements qui manquent a I'appel onte affectes ailleurs:

o 3 generateurs achet6s pour autonomie des trois compacteurs qui existaient deja ont 6t6 affectes ad'autres fins : un est utilise par la Ville

de Kigali pour suppleer aux coupures eventuelles d'Electrogaz, le 2eme est utilise par le Departementdes Travaux Publics pour

les travaux de voirie , le troisi6me ete envoye dans la province d'Umutara.

Equipements stockes dans le garage de la Ville de Kigali:

o 3 compacteurs de 14 m3o 1 compacteur de 24 m3o Une centaine bacs a dechetso Pont bascule et ses accessoireso Poste de transfert avec ses accessoires.

Les participants a la visite ont constate avec regret que certains equipements sont en mauvais etat parce qu'ils ontet exposes en plein air (poste de transfert, compacteurs) et DUSABEMUNGU a inform6 les participants a la visiteque aussi bien les compacteurs que le poste de transfert n'ont jamais ete mis a marche et il pense qu'ils nefonctiomient pas.

Un representant du CEPEX a demande des informations sur le systeme qui avait e planifie pour la gestion de cesequipements.

Le FD a repondu que ces equipements devaient etre geres par des prives, mais que cela a change suite auxmodifications intervenues dans la planification du systeme de gestion des dechets.

Le poste de transfert n' a pas ete installe parce que, apres une etude faite par Carl Bro Uganda Ltd en 1998, lesautorites ont e informees que ce type de materiel a sa raison d'etre au cas ou la decharge finale se trouve a plusou moins 40 km du centre ville, ce qui n'est pas le cas pour la ville de Kigali (la decharge publique de Nyanza se

-34 -

trouve a une quinzaine de kilometres du centre Ville)Concemant les compacteurs l'inquietude est venue du probleme qu'on eprouvait pour gerer les trois compacteursdejA existants, ce qui n'a pas encourag6 les autorites prefectorales d'alors a installer ces equipements.

Les participants a la visite ont conclu que, cette composante a et mal planifi6e et mal executee. Iis ont constateavec regret que les equipements non utilises sont expos6s aux intemp6ries et peuvent par consequent se deteriorerencore plus. Ils ont recommande ce qui suit:

o mettre a l'abri les 6quipements non utilise6s, specialement le poste de transfert et lescompacteurs

o elaborer une strategie pour rentabiliser ces equipements encore en stock

La visite qui avait debute a 10 h 30 a ete clotur6e a 12 h 30.

LISTE DES EOUIPEMENTS

DESIGNATION NOMBRE ETAT ACTUEL OBSERVATIONSNissan ECO-200 de 15 6 1 carnions est en bon etat, sont Actuellement ces camions sont ger6stonnes op6rationnels mais souvent en panne I ar les Districts avec la

et en presque declasse decentralisationUne centaine de ces bacs sont

En bon etat d6ployes dans les differentsBacs a dechets de 10 m3 200 quartiers de la ville, les autres sont

en stockUn poste de transfert avec Necessite un check up avant son Non encore utilise: voir la note enses accessoires I utilisation basCamion NISSAN CBW 3 Assez bon etat520 de 26 tonnes avec Le Fonds d'entretien routier acontainers accepte de faire la reparation de ce

camionNecessite un check up avant son Non encore utilise : voir la note en

Compacteurs de 24 m3 1 utilisation basNecessite un check up avant leux Non encore operationnel

Compacteur de 14 m3 3 utilisationCitemes de 50001 pour levidange pour les fosses 2 En bon etat Utilis&es actuellement pour leseptiques vidange des fosses septiques

Un gen6rateur est utilisAGenerateurs de 24 KVA actuellement par la Mairie, lespour les compacteurs de 3 En bon etat deux autres sont utilis6s14m3 deja existants ponctuellement par le departement

I_des travaux publicsRemorque a quatre roucs II est utilis6 dans la collecte des

1 En bon etat dechets par un tracteur de laMairie

N B Tous ces equipements sont dotes du systeme roll on roll off.

Annexe E

Demarche evolutive et progressive de P'Etat

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Concemant la reforme institutionnelle des secteurs et la restructuration des secteurs, un comite de pilotage, presid6par le Secretaire Gen6ral du MINERENA, a ete mis sur pied le 19 mars 1999 pour coordonner le plan d'actions decette restructuration. Ce comite a et renforce plus tard et rebaptise Comite de coordination de la restructurationd'ELECTROGAZ le 21 aouit 2000. II est compose de six membres dont le Ministre de I'Energie, de I'Eau et desRessources Naturelles en qualite de President.

L'engagement du Gouvemement Rwandais dans le processus de reforme peut etre illustr6 par trois decisionsimportantes prises en 2000 et en 2001.

Par la loi N°18/99 du 30/08/1999, I'article sur le monopole dMtenu par ELECTROGAZ a ete abroge.

A l'issue de la seance du Conseil des Ministres du 24 mai 2000, des orientations sont donnees pour accelerer leprocessus de restructuration d'ELECTROGAZ:

o Le secteur de 1'electricite et celui de 1'eau restent ensemble, mais separes de celui du gaz;o La participation du secteur prive doit revetir la forme d'un contrat de gestion avec des indicateurs deperformance;o Annulation d'une partie de la dette retrocedee a ELECTROGAZ;o Necessite de creer une agence de regulation multi-sectorielle.

Dans le meme temps, le Gouvemement a mis un point d'honneur a ne pas toucher aux prix de l'eau et del'electricite tout au moins la premiere annee du Contrat de gestion d'ELECTROGAZ avec un operateur prive. Letemps de conduire une etude tarifaire qui va proposer une structure tarifaire a meme de permettre aELECTROGAZ de satisfaire les objectifs financiers de l'entreprise et d'honorer les engagements contractuelsenvers SINELAC.

En sa s6ance du 16 juillet 1999, le Conseil des Ministres approuve la creation de l'UPEGAZ, Unite pour lapromotion et 1'exploitation du gaz methane du Lac Kivu, dont les attributions precises feront l'objet d'un arret6mninisteriel.

Le 21 novembre 2001, le Conseil des Ministres a reitere son engagement a poursuivre la strategie de privatisationd'ELECTROGAZ qui devrait deboucher sur la signature d'un contrat de gestion avec un operateur priv6.

Le 12 decembre 2001, des directives a peu pres similaires sont formulees a 1'endroit de SINELAC.

Avec le concours de la Banque Mondiale, les video-conferences sur le dossier ELECTROGAZ ont ete organisees lapremiere fois le 09 fevrier 2001 et en juin de la meme annee aux fins d'accorder les violons de Kigali et deWashington D.C. sur les sujets a controverse. Apres avoir arrondi les angles, les deux parties se sont entendues surle dossier de demande de propositions (Request for Proposals) et la Banque Mondiale a accorde la non-objection surle document que le MINERENA, a son tour, a envoye aux soumissionnaires le 10 mai 2002.

La reussite de ce contrat de gestion suppose qu'au bout de sa mission de cinq ans, l'operateur prive sera parvenu afaire des secteurs electricite et eau un chanp d'action attrayant pour les investissements etrangers qui constituent lacle de voute du plan de restructuration d'ELECTROGAZ.

(b) Cofinanciers:

N/A

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

N/A

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10. Additional Information

N/A

- 37 -

Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

The project pre-dates the introduction of the logical framework approach and therefore has to be evaluated basedon indicators developed during the 1998 project restructuring process.

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- 38 -

Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)Appralsal ActuatLatest Percentage ofEstimate Estimate Appraisal

Project Cost By Component US$ million US$ millionENERGY COMPONENTA. Regulatory and Sector Policy Strengthening1. histitutional Reform for Electrogaz 5.70 3.93 692. Improvements in Charcoal Subsector 4.25 0.10 23. TraLiing on Solar Energy 0.26 0.03 124. Bathymetric Study on Lake Kivu 1.33 1.08 825. TA to Petroleum Sector 0.60 0.69 1156. Project Coordination Unit 0.00 0.87

B. Rehabilitationllinprovement of ElectricityInfrastructure

1. Rehab.Extension of Distribution in Five Cities 8.01 0.24 32. Improvements to Transmission Network 4.50 1.00 223. Rehabilitation of Hydro Power Plants 2.40 1.00 424. Reserve Spare Parts and Equipment 2.50 2.95 1185. TA and Training 0.87 1.04 1206. Feasibility Studies Hydro 2.00 1.60 80

URBAN WASTE MANAGEMENT COMPONENT 0.00 4.47

Total Baseline Cost 32.42 19.00Physical Contingencies 3.35 0.00 0Price Contingencies 3.18 0.00 0

Total Project Costs 38.95 19.00Total Financing Required 38.95 19.00

Project Costs by Procureme nt Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Procurement Method1Expenditure Category ICB N.B.F. Total CostNCB Other2_____

1. Works 0.00 0.00 2.42 7.92 10.34

(0.00) (0.00) (1.86) (0.00) (1.86)2. Goods 9.37 0.00 3.32 0.00 12.69

(9.37) (0.00) (3.32) (0.00) (12.69)3. Services 0.34 0.00 9.26 1.75 11.35Consultants and Training (0.34) (0.00) (9.01) (0.00) (9.35)4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 2.94 1.63 4.57

(0.00) (0.00) (2.10) (0.00) (2.10)5. Operating costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)6. Refund of PPF

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0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Total 9.71 0.00 17.94 11.30 38.95(9.71) (0.00) (16.29) (0.00) (26.00)

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (ActuallLatest Estimate) (US$ million equival nt)

.~pendlture Category Procurement Method'Expenditure~ Categ6y ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost

NCS ~Other _____

1. Works 0.64 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.86(0.64) (0. I 9) (0.00) (0.00) (0.83)

2. Goods 5.78 0.22 0.00 0.00 6.00(5.78) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (5.98)

3. Services 9.75 0.30 0.60 0.00 10.65Consultants and Training (9.75) (0.25) (0.60) (0.00) (10.60)4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)5. Operating costs 0.00 0.00 1.01 0.00 1.01

(0.00) (0.00) (1.01) (0.00) (1.01)6. Refund of PPF 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.58

(0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.00) (0.58)Total 16.17 0.74 2.19 0.00 19.10

(16.17) (0.64) (2.19) (0.00) (19.00)

"Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies.

S Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staffof the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i)managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by C mponent (in US$ million equivalent)Percentage of Appraisal

C-omponent Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estiuate]IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF.

Energy 26.00 2.32 10.63 14.54 0.13 0.00 55.9 5.6 0.0Urban Waste Manangm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.46 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

Not applicable due to major changes in Project objectives and cancellation of the main physical investment afterthe 1998 project restrucrtuing.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating

(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation DevelopmentMonth/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective

Identification/Preparaffon1990 6 Economist, Power Engineer

Consultants (4)1991 1 Economist

Appraisal/Negotiation1992 5 Power Engineer, Financial

Analyst, Rural EnergySpecialist, Consultants (2),

1993 3 Power Engineer, Economist,Consultant

1993 6 EconomistPower EngineerResident RepresentativePrivate Sector DevelopmentSpecialist, Financial Specialist(1)

Supervion1994 5 Consultant U U

Power EngineerResident RepresentativeFinancial AnalystRural Energy Specialist

1995 3 Energy Economist U UFinancial AnalystLead Specialist

1996 3 Sector Reform Specialist U UEnergy EconomistFinancial Analyst

1997 3 Lead Sector Reform Specialist U SWater SpecialistFinancial Analyst

1998 2 Financial Analyst S UOperations Officer

1999 3 Operations Officer S SEnergy EconomistSanitation Specialist

2000 3 Operations Officer S SLead Energy EconomistSanitation Specialist

2001 2 Lead Water and Sanitation S SSpecialist, ResidentRepresentative

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ICR2002 3 Operations Officer S S

Financial Analyst

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 80.7 163.9Appraisal/Negotiation 70.08 108.1Supervision 195.93 318.88ICR 18.80 28.67Total 365.51 619.55

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)Rating

0 Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NAF Sector Policies O H * SU O M O N O NAO Physical O H OSUOM O N * NAO Financial O H OSUOM O N * NAX Institutional Development 0 H O SU *M 0 N 0 NA

Environmental O H OSUOM O N O NA

SocialOI Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N * NAE Gender OH OSU0M ON *NAOII Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA

O Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NAE Public sector management 0 H O SU * M 0 N 0 NAL Other (Please specify) O H O SU O M O N * NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bankperformance Rating

ER Lending OHS OS OU OHUz Supervision OHS OS O U O HU2 Overall OHS OS O u O HU

6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating

• Preparation OHS OS O U O HU• Government implementation performance O HS * s 0 U 0 HUs Implementation agency performance OHS OS 0 U O HU2 Overall OHS OS O u O HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. Staff Appraisal Report2. Aide Memoirs and Back-to-Office Reports3. Project Progress Reports4. MOPs on the project restructuring5. Borrower's Implementation Completion Report (May 2002)6. Consultant Studies included in the project

List of Consultant Studies included in the projectI Etude de redressement d'ELECTROGAZ, SAUR-AFRIQUE, March 19922. Etude du Plan Directeur d'Electrification du Rwanda a l'horizon 2010 HYDRO-QUEBEC Int, October 19933. Etude de rehabilitation du reseau de distribution, HYDRO-QUEBEC Int4. Mise a jour des informations financieres, operationnelles et commerciales concemant ELECTROGAZ, CASTALIA,

September 19955. Organisation et procedures administratives du PRSE, ECUATOR, September 19956. Implementation of Institutional Reforms of the Electricity and Water Sectors and Restructuring of ELECTROGAZ,

BOOZ.ALLEN&HAMILTON September 19997. Multi-sector utility regulation law, ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, January 20008. Etude de faisabilite de la Centrale hydroelectrique sur la Nyabarongo, SOGREAH9 Lev6s bathymetriques du Lac Kivu

10 .Rationalisation de l'approvisionnement des villes en charbon de bois, Albert BUTARE11. Expertise des 6quipements de protection et de teletransmission, LAHMEYER Intemational12. Expertise et etudes techniques pour la rehabilitation et l'extension des reseaux electriques de 5 centres de

distribution (Lot 4), Groupement BEROCAN et BRETON BANVILLE Associates13. Etudes pour la remise en etat des lignes haute tension et des postes sources du Reseau Interconnecte (Lot 2),

Groupement BEROCAN et BRETON BANVILLE Associates14. Expertise et 6tudes pour la rehabilitation des centrales hydroelectriques de Mukungwa, Gihira et Gisenyi (Lot 1),

Groupement DECON&RMD15. Modification du poste de transformation 6.6/30/110 kV de Mururul (Lot 3)16 Elaboration des textes r6glementaires du secteur petrolier, Association NKURUNZIZA/RWABUKWISI17. Audit comptable des entrep6ts publics des produits p6troliers, AUGECO-IDS18. Expertise technique des entrep6ts publics des produits petroliers, Groupe CHANIMETAL19. Evaluation du secteur petrolier, Moctar THIAM, September 199520. Definition des composantes du volet petrolier a etre inclus dans le PRSE,Michel PATOU, July 199221. Etude sur la recuperation des cofits et l'amenagement de la nouvelle d6charge, Carl BRO22. Etude sur l'implication du secteur prive dans la gestion des dechets solides et la mise en place d'un systeme de

recouvrement des cofits, PARIS/LUKMAN/CISSE, July 199923. Preparation d'un plan strategique d'assainissement, Carsten SKOV, April 199924. Campagne et sensibilisation de la population, AFRICARE 1997-199825. Surveillance des travaux de construction des plate-formes pour bacs a dechets, Jean NDAGIJIMANA26. Leves topographiques du site de la decharge de Nyanza, GEOTOP, September 200027. Preparation d'un plan d'amenagement de la decharge de Nyanza, Jean Bosco BIZIMANA, September 200128. Definition des composantes du volet petrolier a etre inclus dans le PRSE, July 199229. Elaboration des textes reglementaires devant regir la gestion du gisement et l'exploitation industrielle et

l'exploitation du gaz m6thane du Lac Kivu, TECHNITAS ,November 199330. Lake Kivu Gas Development and Promotional Related issues: Technical, economic and financial assessment,

Moiffak HASSAN, June 200031. Lake Kivu Gas Development Policy Framework and Promotional Campaign; Policy, contractual and Promotional

issues, Moiffak HASSAN, February 200132. Lake Kivu Gas Development and Promotional Related Issues: Environmental issues, Klaus TIETZE, June 200033. Audits comptables et financiers du PRSE, FAA et KPMG34 Audits comptables et financiers d'ELECTROGAZ, COOPERS&LYBRAND, PRICEWATERHOUSE et AG & et

ASSOCIATES DELOITTE & TOUCHE

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