world bank document€¦ · 18.1 date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016 comments (incl. %...

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003886

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(COFN-C1270, IDA-45020 TF-57303 TF-57845)

ON A

IDA CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.0 MILLION

(US$20.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

FOR A

MARKET ORIENTED SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE PROJECT

September 28, 2016

Agriculture Global Practice

Africa Region

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ii

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Exchange Rate Effective March 31, 2016

Currency Unit = Angolan Kwanza (AOA)

AOA 160.54 = US$1

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADI Agriculture Development Institute

ADP Agricultural Development Program

CDD Community Driven Development

CMC Community Multimedia Center

CSA Climate Smart Agriculture

DPA Direção Provincial da Agricultura (Provincial Directorate of

Agriculture)

EDA Estação de Desenvolvimento Agrário (Agricultural Development

Office of ADI at the Municipal Level)

EMRP Emergency Multisector Recovery Project

ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework

ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FFS Farmers’ Field School

FM Financial Management

FMR Financial Management Report

GoA Government of Angola

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GEPE Gabinete de Estatística Planificação e Estudos (Division of

Statistics Planning and Studies)

ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

IPM Integrated Pest Management

LICUS Low Income Country Under Stress

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MINAGRI Ministry of Agriculture

MIS Monitoring Information System

MOSAP Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project

NDP National Development Plan

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

O&M Operations and Maintenance

PAD Project Appraisal Document

iii

PAPAGRO Programa de Adquisição de Produtos Agropecuários (Program for

Acquisition of Agriculture Products)

PDO Project Development Objective

PHRD Japan Policy and Human Resource Development Fund

PISC Project Implementation Sub-Committee

PIU Project Implementation Unit

PPISC Provincial Project Implementation Sub-Committee

PPIU Provincial Project Implementation Unit

PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

SADCP Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization

Project

SOE Statements of Expenditure

TOR Terms of Reference

TTL Task Team Leader

UN United Nations

UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National

Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

Senior Global Practice Director: Juergen Voegele

Practice Manager: Dina Umali-Deininger

Project Team Leader: Aniceto Bila

ICR Team Leader: Melissa Brown

iv

REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project

Contents

A. Basic Information ........................................................................................................... v B. Key Dates ....................................................................................................................... v C. Ratings Summary ........................................................................................................... v D. Sector and Theme Codes ............................................................................................... vi

E. Bank Staff ..................................................................................................................... vii

F. Results Framework Analysis ........................................................................................ vii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ........................................................................ x

H. Restructuring (if any) .................................................................................................... xi

I. Disbursement Profile .................................................................................................... xii

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................................. 7 3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 12

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 22 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 24

6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 26 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners............... 27

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 28

Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 31 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 41 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................. 47

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................... 48 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 57

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 60 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 61 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 66 MAP .................................................................................................................................. 67

v

A. Basic Information

Country: Angola Project Name:

AO-Market Oriented

Smallholder

Agriculture Project

Project ID: P093699 L/C/TF Number(s):

COFN-C1270,IDA-

45020,TF-57303,TF-

57845

ICR Date: 09/16/2016 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF

ANGOLA

Original Total

Commitment: XDR 18.50M Disbursed Amount: XDR 12.95M

Revised Amount: XDR 13.00M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies:

Ministry of Agriculture

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

IFAD

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 11/28/2005 Effectiveness: 06/30/2010 09/20/2010

Appraisal: 05/06/2008 Restructuring(s):

02/15/2013

09/15/2014

12/15/2015

03/15/2016

Approval: 07/31/2008 Mid-term Review: 02/25/2013

Closing: 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately

vi

Unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing

Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project

at any time (Yes/No): Yes

Quality at Entry

(QEA): None

Problem Project at any

time (Yes/No): Yes

Quality of

Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Agricultural extension and research 9 9

General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 60 60

General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 8 8

Irrigation and drainage 9 9

Public administration- Agriculture, fishing and forestry 14 14

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Rural markets 50 50

Rural policies and institutions 10 10

Rural services and infrastructure 40 40

vii

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili

Country Director: Elisabeth Huybens Michael Baxter

Practice

Manager/Manager: Dina Umali-Deininger Karen Mcconnell Brooks

Project Team Leader: Aniceto Timoteo Bila Aniceto Timoteo Bila

ICR Team Leader: Melissa Brown

ICR Primary Author: Melissa Brown

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective is to increase agricultural production through

provision of better services and investment support to rural smallholders in selected

comunas and municipios of the Recipient's provinces of Bie, Huambo and Malange.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 :

Percentage of agricultural production increase based on crop production

index of participating smallholder farmers

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

100 (base year)

25%

10%

66%

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

This indicator attained 560%. Project restructuring in February 2013

revised targets. The crop index provides an aggregated measure of the

increase in crop production (volume). The baseline year was 2011/12 and

the crop index was measured annually.

Indicator 2 :

Number of clients who have adopted and improved agricultural

technology promoted by the project.

Value

quantitative or 0%

20,000

32,300

viii


Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Qualitative)

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Target exceeded by 155%. The project was set to reach a rate of at least 40

percent (20,000 farmers). The project reaching 32,300 farmers (61.5%).

Indicator 3 :

Number of clients who adopted an improved agricultural technology

promoted by project – female.

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0

10,000

13,621

Date achieved 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The number female farmers that adopted technology was determined

based on sample 461 farmers that adopted technology and determined that

42.7 percent were female and 57.3 percent were male.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)


Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Number of smallholder farmers that benefitted from training.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0

126,000

50,000

54,982

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Number of farmers trained was combined at project Restructuring in

February 2013. The adjusted target number was fully achieved.

Indicator 2 :

Participating smallholder farmers in the Project areas who belong to farm

organizations.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

20%

50%

100%

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Fully achieved - all project beneficiaries are members of associations.

Indicator 3 : Number of smallholder farmers in associations that benefit from grants

ix


Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

and completed their activities under the Project’s agricultural investment

component.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0

7,200

8,000

12,344

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The indicator attained 154%. This indicator was downgraded from

outcome indicator to intermediate indicator in Feb. 2013 restructuring.

Indicator 4 : Ratio of smallholder farmers’ organizations to an extension officer.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

8

associations/extension

officer

12

12

associations/exten

sion officer

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The indicator attained 100%. The policy of the ADI is to have 3

technicians per commune. At the project commencement, in 2011/2012,

there were 61 technicians in the project target area. Currently, there are 91,

amounting to an increase of 50%.

Indicator 5 :

Increase in average yield of major crops (maize, cassava, beans and

potato) of participating smallholder farmers. - MAIZE

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0.4 t/ha

0.6 t/ha

0.66

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Target exceeded by 10%. Final value measured in impact evaluation

survey.

Indicator 6 :


potato) of participating smallholder farmers. – CASSAVA.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

10.0 t/ha

11.0 t/ha

18.1

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)


survey.

Indicator 7 : Increase in average yield of major crops (maize, cassava, beans and

x


Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

potato) of participating smallholder farmers. – BEANS.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0.3 t/ha

0.4 t/ha

0.45 t/ha

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)


survey.

Indicator 8 :


potato) of participating smallholder farmers. – POTATO.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

4.0 t/ha

5.0 t/ha

7.1 t/ha

Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)


survey.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 11/30/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00

2 05/29/2009 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.00


4 05/21/2010 Unsatisfactory Moderately

Unsatisfactory 0.00


6 07/07/2011 Moderately

Unsatisfactory

Moderately

Unsatisfactory 0.30


Unsatisfactory

Moderately

Unsatisfactory 0.30


Unsatisfactory

Moderately

Unsatisfactory 0.52


Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.23

10 07/09/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.31

11 04/06/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.26



xi


15 03/30/2016 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 19.23

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring

Date(s)

Board

Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at

Restructuring

Amount

Disbursed at

Restructuring

in USD

millions

Reason for Restructuring &

Key Changes Made DO IP

02/15/2013 N MU MS 4.66

(i) partial cancellation of the

IDA Credit in the amount of

US$10 million; (ii) adjust

results indicators and targets;

(iii) reallocated Credit

proceeds; and (iv) increase

IDA credit percentages of

disbursements made

under Category 4

09/15/2014 S S 14.44

Extension of closing date

September 30, 2014 to

December 31, 2015

12/15/2015 S S 18.93

Extension of closing date

from December 31, 2015 to

March 31, 2016

03/15/2016 S S 19.23

Amendment of IFAD credit

closing date from June 30,

2016 to March 31, 2016

xii

I. Disbursement Profile

1

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. At the time of appraisal Angola was considered a Low Income Country Under

Stress (LICUS), largely because of the after-effects of the 40 year civil war following

independence from Portugal in 1975. The civil war, which only ended in 2002, resulted

in the death of 750,000 Angolans, displacement of about 4.5 million, and 450,000

refugees. The country’s physical and social infrastructure was devastated and Angola had

some of the world’s worst human development indicators, weak governance, and fragile

human and institutional capacity.

2. At the same time, Angola was (and remains) one of Africa’s most resource-

rich countries, with tremendous economic potential, endowed with mineral resources

and large stock high potential agricultural land. Prior to independence, agricultural and

food production was high and the country was a major exporter of maize and coffee.

Smallholders in the Central Highlands, the agricultural heartland of Angola, were firmly

embedded in the market economy and were the main producers for both local and export

markets. During the war agriculture fell to an almost subsistence level in most areas.

3. The Project was designed to respond to objectives of Angola’s Poverty

Reduction Strategy (PRSP), which highlighted rural development with a focus on the

improvement of food security and the re-vitalization of the rural economy. The PRSP

called for: (i) the strengthening of the production capacity of the traditional sector,

particularly food crops and fisheries; (ii) the re-launching of rural commerce; (iii) a

sustainable development of natural resources; and (iv) the reorganization of the legal

framework and public institutions. Basic underlying principles outlined in the PRSP were

a focus on smallholders; the importance of community participation; the concentration of

planning, implementation and monitoring at the municipality level; complementary

activities with donors, the private sector and NGOs; specific targeting of women,

including access to land; and HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting concern.

4. Both the World Bank’s Interim Strategy for 2007-2009 and International

Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Country Strategy Update of 2008/09

identified the need for interventions to restore productivity and revive economic

activity in rural areas. IFAD’s strategy focused on two pillars: reduction of rural

poverty, and creation of a conducive environment for private sector development. The

World Bank’s Interim Strategy focused on three main areas: (i) strengthening public

sector management and institutional capacity; (ii) rebuilding critical infrastructure and

support delivery of public services for poverty reduction; and (iii) promoting growth of

non-mineral sectors.

5. The rationale for Bank and IFAD involvement in the project was based on a

recognition that that improving agricultural productivity and competitiveness

would help to both reduce rural poverty and promote economic growth. The goal of

2

the Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Program (MOSAP) was to enable

smallholders to increase their productivity and competitiveness and to benefit from

improved access to market by focusing on the establishment of rural-urban commercial

market linkages. MOSAP was also seen as a way to build on work started under the

Bank’s Emergency Multisector Recovery Project (EMRP), which was designed to help

reestablish institutional capacity of Angola’s two agriculture research centers and rural

extension services in Malanje and Bie and in phase two was to invest in feeder road

rehabilitation in the MOSAP areas.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

6. The project development objective was to increase agricultural production through

provision of better services and investment support to rural smallholders in selected

comunas and municipios of the Recipient’s provinces of Bie, Huambo and Malange.

7. The original key indicators selected to measure the progress towards achieving the

PDO were: (i) increased agricultural production of participating smallholder farmers

based on crop index; (ii) improved smallholder access to market through contractual

arrangements with agribusinesses or traders; (iii) improved smallholder vulnerable

groups access to market with secured access to market through contractual arrangements

with agribusinesses or traders; and (iv) communities and/or associations that benefited

from grants and completed their sub-projects under agricultural investment support

component.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators

8. The PDO was not revised during implementation, however, project indicators were

revised during a February 2013 restructuring, which also included a partial cancellation

to the Credit. Three PDO level indicators and two intermediate indicators were dropped

based on the need to strengthen the focus on the PDO which was more narrowly focused

on the improvement of agriculture production. The following PDO indicators were

dropped:

(i) Percentage of participating smallholder farmers with secured market access

through contractual arrangements with agribusinesses or traders;

(ii) Percentage of participating smallholder vulnerable groups with secured access

to market through contractual arrangements with agribusinesses or traders;

(iii) Percentage of communities and/or associations that benefited from grants and

completed their subprojects under agricultural investment support component.

9. The first and second indicator were dropped as they were judged not relevant to

the PDO and the third was changed to intermediary indicator. The restructuring also

introduced a new core PDO indicator:

(i) Target clients who have adopted and improved agricultural technology

promoted by the project (disaggregated by gender).

3

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

10. Primary beneficiaries. The primary target group for MOSAP were smallholder

farmers who would benefit from technical assistance to form or strengthen smallholder

groups and associations, manage productive agricultural investment activities funded

through the second component, and improve agricultural and marketing skills. The

project originally intended to target 126,000 farmers to be direct project beneficiaries in

25 comunas within 12 municipios located in Bie, Huambo and Malanje. Each farmer was

assumed to represent a single household of five members. Project interventions were

designed to target smallholder farmers who cultivated between 1 and 2 hectares of land

under rain-fed conditions with the potential for expanding the size of their holdings to 2.5

hectares. Following restructuring the target number of direct beneficiaries was scaled

down to 50,000 farmers.

11. The three provinces included in the project area were heavily affected by the civil

war. The project area included the past headquarters of the União Nacional para a

Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) movement and portions of the population had

been displaced.

12. Indirect beneficiaries. The Project was also designed to generate benefits for

government institutions and service providers, particularly at the decentralized level.

Government institutions including the Ministry of Agriculture and its Agricultural

Development Institute (ADI), as well as local municipalities received training in

introducing or strengthening participatory processes that support project implementation,

focusing on building skills of staff in institutions involved in the project, and

improvement of office space and accommodations for extension officers. For private and

non-governmental agricultural service providers, benefits included: (a) strengthening the

capacities of private sector agencies, NGOs and CBOs to support smallholder groups and

associations to prepare development plans and investment proposals (sub-projects) for

funding under component two; and (b) strengthening the managerial and business

capacities of local micro-enterprises that support farming activities (small processors,

craftsmen and local traders).

1.5 Original Components

Component 1: Capacity Building (Total Financing: US$11.26 million; of which IDA:

US$3.42 million; IFAD: US$3.2 million; PHRD Grant: US$4.0 million and GoA:

US$0.64 million)

13. The objective of the first component was to strengthen the technical, institutional,

managerial and marketing skills of smallholders and their organizations, as well as of

services providers and other stakeholders involved in agricultural production and value

chains, to more effectively operate in a market-driven environment and to prepare for the

agricultural investment support opportunities under component 2. This was to include

investments in the following three areas: (i) building and strengthening capacities of

smallholder groups and associations through the provision of training and information;

4

(ii) capacity building support in the form of information, training, and hardware

investments (office, equipment, transport) for to IDA offices at central and local levels as

well as local government; and (iii) strengthening the capacities of private and non-

governmental agricultural service providers through the provision of training.

14. Expected results under this component were: (i) improved technical skills of

beneficiary stakeholders involved in agricultural production; (ii) improved participation

of smallholder farmers in farm organizations; (iii) improved community capacity to

prepare agricultural investments support opportunities; and (iv) improved government

capacity to support smallholder farmers in the project area. The component was also

designed to take a gender and vulnerable group sensitive approach to capacity building.

Component 2: Agricultural Investment Support (Total Financing: US$29.34 million;

of which IDA: US$23.46 million; IFAD: US$2.85 million; and Beneficiaries: US$3.03

million)

15. The objective of the second component was to improve the productivity,

competitiveness and market access of 24,000 smallholders in the project area (later

revised to 8,000 with partial cancellation and increased focus on service delivery). This

component was designed to provide demand-based support, in the form of matching

grants, to rural communities and smallholders groups, for small-scale agricultural

infrastructure, production, processing and marketing sub-projects. The design at appraisal

distinguished between three different types of sub-project investments: (i) public goods

or community assets such as small-scale irrigation, drinking water, dip-tanks, stores, spot

improvement of feeder roads; (ii) productive assets that had an element of multiplication

(seed, livestock) within communities or groups; and (iii) productive investments that

were primarily capital investments in items such as tractors, animal traction equipment

(ploughs), sprayers, pumps, grain mills, oil presses, milk chillers, and transport (ox-cart,

trailer).

16. The sub-projects were to be screened for technical, financial, social and

environmental feasibility, before approved for funding. Matching grant ratios and funding

ceilings initially required 10 percent beneficiary contribution. Rural communities/villages

were eligible to receive support, provided that the sub-project proposals result from a

community-level participatory planning exercise with a cross section of the population,

including women and youth. Smallholders groups or associations were also be eligible

for support, provided that they were either registered or informally recognized by the

local community and authorities, that they had a democratic structure and have the ability

to keep records.

17. Expenditures under this component were subject to a disbursement condition that

stipulated that subprojects would only be financed once a number of performance triggers

were met, including: (i) at least 30 qualified service providers and public agents were

certified and equipped under the project’s Capacity Building program; (ii) the baseline

survey had been completed; and (iii) the administrative capacity of Provincial Project

Implementation Units were in compliance with Bank fiduciary requirements.

5

Component 3: Project Management (Total Financing: US$8.75 million; of which IDA:

US$3.12 million; IFAD: US$2.15 million; and GoA: US$3.48 million)

18. The third component provided financing for project management and M&E

activities. The Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) was responsible for project

implementation and had delegated ADI to be accountable for the management and

oversight of the project. At the specific request of MINAGRI, a Project Implementation

Unit (PIU) was established within the ADI framework and the Director General of ADI

to be the executive level public manager of the project. The PIU included a Project

Coordinator, a financial manager, a procurement specialist, communication specialist and

an (ADI-staff) accountant, as well as a monitoring and evaluation officer. At the

provincial level, MINAGRI was to establish three Provincial Project Implementation

Units (PPIUs) within ADI, to conduct the operational management of the project. Each

PPIU was to include a Provincial Project Coordinator, a financial accountant, a

procurement office, communication specialist and a monitoring and evaluation officer. A

team of three technical staff, including an agronomist, an agribusiness specialist and a

rural infrastructure specialist, was to be based at provincial level (one based in each

province), and was to be supplemented by short term consultants according to needs.

1.6 Revised Components

19. Reallocation among components and reduction in the scale of component 2. The fundamental design and the implementation arrangements for the project components

did not change during the implementation period, however adjustment was made to the

scale of the activities to accommodate the partial cancellation of the credit and

reallocation of funding toward greater investment in capacity building and project

management. Reallocation of additional resources to component 1 and 3 was significant –

143 percent and 154 percent of appraisal estimates – and were driven in part by higher

than expected costs associated with service provision and project coordination and

management in the Angolan context. The consumer price index in Angola was 161 by the

end of 2015 (2010 = 100) –a 61 percent increase over a five year period. In contrast,

appraisal cost estimates allocated only 5.6 percent for additional price and physical

contingencies over the project life.

Components Appraisal

(USD millions)

Actual

(USD millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Component 1: Capacity Building 11.26 13.70 143

Component 2: Agricultural

Investment Support

26.31 7.74 26

Component 3: Project Management 8.75 11.61 154

Total Baseline Cost 46.32 33.05 67

20. Another factor in reallocation occurred due to delays in starting the agricultural

investment support activities under component 2, which were only initiated in 2013 and

6

left limited time for implementation. The reduction in scale in component 2 resulted in a

revision to the target number of beneficiaries and productive investment sub-projects.

The original targeted of 126,000 farmers at appraisal stage was reduced to 50,000 to

reflect this change.

1.7 Other significant changes

21. Extension of closing date. The closing date was extended for a total of 18 months

beyond the original closing date.

22. Summary of restructuring. Changes to the project were captured in four Level

Two restructurings:

(i) The first restructuring took place in February 2013 with the objective to

partially cancel the IDA Credit in the amount of US$10 million in line with a

requested by the Government of Angola on December 31, 2012, to match the

project’s implementation capacity more realistically with the time available to

complete Project activities prior to the Closing Date of September 30, 2014.

(ii) The second restructuring took place in September 2014 and the main objective

to extend the project Closing Date for a period of 15 months, from September

30, 2014 to December 31, 2015.

(iii) A third restructuring was processed in December 2015 to extend the project

closing date for a period of three months, from December 31, 2015 to March

31, 2016.

(iv) In March 2016 the project was restructured to advance the Closing Date of

IFAD co-financing Loan Agreement from June 30, 2016 to March 31, 2016

and to match the IDA and PHRD Co-financing closing dates.

7

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

23. The project preparation and design were affected by the larger country

context, which led to delays in approval and impacted availability of technical staff.

While the initial identification mission took place in 2005, Board approval occurred only

in mid-2008. The project had a relatively long preparation period prior to approval due to

a number of factors. Angola’s country reclassification and shift away from concessional

borrowing terms in 2007 led to a review of all proposed lending in the country by the

Ministry of Finance. This led to delays in the final negotiation of the credit for MOSAP

on hard IDA terms. The uncertainty around terms of the Credit also led to a halt in the

processing of project preparation funds, which had been proposed to initiate key

preparatory activities and finance the initial core set of coordination and fiduciary staff of

the PIU. In addition, legislative elections, which were held in September 2008 and

represented the first elections since 1992 and the outbreak of the second phase of the civil

war, also affected availability of key Government counterparts during final stages of

preparation and declaration of effectiveness.

24. Design drew on lessons learned within the country and in other Community

Driven Development (CDD) and smallholder agricultural development projects. The

design of the project took into account lessons learned from the implementation of the

Transitional Support Strategy from 2003-2005 and the first Interim Strategy from 2005-

2006, as well as from IFAD’s experience in implementing projects in the rural sector

from 1991-2007. The core of project design centered around the need to re-capitalize

smallholder producers and re-activate market linkages to support broad-scale and

sustainable agricultural production among smallholder farmers who comprised the

majority of the population. Following the end of hostilities many returnees in the

proposed project area were engaged in farming but had little access to services, markets

or improved technologies. At the time of appraisal it was estimated the agriculture sector

had re-absorbed 4.4 million people following the end of the civil war. The project’s

design focused on technical training, producer organizational development and

community driven development modalities in order to address the need for increased

productivity and expansion of cultivated land.

25. Project design relied up on earlier background analyses which demonstrated that

continued economic growth for Angola, as the country emerged from post-conflict period,

would have to be based on supporting a diversified economy in which agriculture could

play a small but important role. Other projects supporting smallholder production

emphasized the need to support the development market linkages and coordinated value

chain interventions.

26. Implementation capacity was considered a major risk to the project and

efforts were made to reduce project complexity and address capacity constraints.

Although Government ownership for the Project was considered to be strong particularly

within MINAGRI, implementation experience from previous Bank and IFAD projects

8

indicated that implementation capacity was extremely weak and that substantial technical

support would be required through technical assistance and supervision. Implementation

capacity risk was rated substantial. At the start of preparation, extensive discussion took

place around the capacity within MINAGRI and ADI at central, provincial and municipal

level to implement project activities. Design was adjusted to simplify and reduce the

number of sub-components and institutional arrangements put in place to bring in

technical and fiduciary staff and contract service providers to provide key technical

services.

2.2.1 Implementation

27. Delays in effectiveness and implementation led to a slow start. The project was

declared effective 26 months after Board approval in September 2010. At the time, the

average time for project to become effective in Angola was 19 months. Initially delays

were caused by the length of time required to approve the financing agreement within the

Council of Ministers, delays in the provision of the legal opinion, finalization of the

project’s operations manual, and hiring of key fiduciary staff. Lack of implementation

capacity in MINAGRI, compounded by weak leadership within the PIU contributed to

slow progress, which was reflected in low ratings of implementation progress assigned by

the supervision team beginning soon after Effectiveness (implementation progress was

consistently rated Unsatisfactory or Moderately Unsatisfactory).

28. Implementation under the second component was also affected by delays in

meeting disbursements conditions. This included establishing the baseline values for key

performance indicators and finalizing the data collection needed to guide sub-project

investments. The baseline survey was as a disbursement condition for the second

component and delays occurred in launching the selection process for a specialized firm

to conduct the planned surveys and undertake the socio-economic profiling of farmers’

organizations needed to design further investments. The baseline study was completed in

January 2013, meaning disbursements under the second component took place two years

after Effectiveness. Similarly, detailed procedures for funding sub-projects under

Component 2, including criteria and procedures for the preparation, appraisal/approval,

and implementation of each of the three financing windows under the Project were also

disbursement conditions and were submitted for Bank clearances only in December 2012.

29. Availability of service providers was at times challenging but ultimately drove

implementation under the Project. The project experienced challenges in mobilizing

service providers due to initial contracting delays but also due to the supply and quality

of available providers from civil society and the private sector. The number of qualified

service providers able to work in Angola were not as numerous as anticipated. The

challenge of the overall business environment in Angola, which was characterized by an

extremely high cost of doing business and barriers to entry in terms of difficulty

obtaining work visas – made it difficult to attract qualified international service

providers.

9

30. Service providers were contracted for a range of activities including building and

strengthening capacities of smallholder groups and associations; government institutions

to support smallholder production and marketing; and private and non-governmental

agriculture services providers. Service providers brought a range of skills and perspective

that would have likely not been available within MINAGRI, particularly at the

decentralized levels.

31. Although start-up was slow, effective project management turned around an

underperforming project and implementation in the latter years was effective.

Implementation improved significantly after the Government took action by appointing a

new Project coordinator at the end of 2011. From that point onward, the project started to

make progress, and as a result disbursements increased from US$0.3 million in February

2012 to about US$4.2 million by December 2012 and near total disbursement by project

end. The change in project management was likely one of the more significant factors

leading to a satisfactory rating and near full disbursement of the remaining Credit.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

32. Although initial M&E implementation was unsatisfactory due to the

significant delays in commissioning the baseline assessment, the overall M&E

system was sound. The project’s monitoring and evaluation systems were designed to be

focused on data collection and reporting on key performance output and impact

indicators, including targeted data collection, surveys, participatory assessments and mid-

term and final evaluations. Relevant data was gender-disaggregated. Two evaluations of

project output and impact indicators were planned at mid-term and at completion. The

project was to finance M&E costs, including the mid-term review and project completion

review.

33. Although finalization of the baseline assessment was later than expected the

project focused on improving the M&E system and several activities were undertaken to

ensure effective implementation in terms of M&E design and implementation

arrangements. These included: (i) convening workshops with various stakeholders to

build consensus and also included building capacity and common understanding of the

M&E issues; and (ii) training of M&E provincial officers in Monitoring and Evaluation

Systems: Design. On training workshops were held in each province for Estação de

Desenvolvimento Agrário (EDAs- Agricultural Development Offices of ADI at the

Municipal Level) field staff to: a) expose participants to the principles of participatory

monitoring and evaluation; b) jointly design and develop participatory tools for internal

monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of FFS as an approach for up scaling

adoption of technologies; and c) impart participants with analytical and reporting skills

for participatory measurement and evaluation. A total of 75 participants attended the

workshop;

34. The relationship between project design and impact evaluation was seen as a

good practice. The project contracted a service provider to carry out an impact

assessment of the project that included establishing a baseline in 2012 and a follow up in

10

2015. The development of baseline data also was used to set project targets and included

a review of the M&E framework and reformulation of targets to be achieved by the

Project. Each year the PDO indicators were collected to monitor progress and adjust the

actions when progress appears to be stalling. An independent assessment was done in

2015 to review progress on the Matching grants (subprojects) implementation; processes

involved, track the performance, provide specific recommendations for SADCP). The

methodology was robust (described in Annex 5) and efforts made to rigorously capture

yield data and achieve a representative sample.

35. The M&E unit (national and provincial level) conducted routine monitoring and

supervision of the execution of project activities, regularly reviewing implementation

progress. Data collection efforts were carried out at municipal level by EDAs

decentralized units and reported to the provincial level for consolidation.

36. The M&E unit helped to disseminate program results through bi-annual and annual

conferences with stakeholders. The project also prepared success stories through

newsletters, annual reports, brochures, press releases, and video.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

37. Safeguards. There were no major negative environmental social impacts and

conflicts anticipated as a result of project implementation, however it was acknowledged

that sub-projects may generate negative environmental or social impacts. The project

triggered OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment and OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. An

Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared in 2008 as part

of the design of MOSAP and was updated in July 2012 to include several mitigation

measures that had not been finalized in 2008.

38. The ESMF included a screening checklist which was subsequently included in the

project’s Operational Manual for subprojects and which required an environmental and

social screening assessment be conducted for each sub-project and that corrective or

mitigating measures be identified. The screening checklist was used in implementation

and applied by technicians of EDAs, with the support of municipality administrations.

Approval of subprojects, both by municipal governments and the provincial

subcommittees, generally followed established procedures and were based on verification

that the subproject has no environmental impact, or in the case of adverse and significant

impact, contained measures or actions to mitigate or prevent these impacts.

Implementation of the plans were intermittently followed and not always reported on,

however, and supervision missions noted there was a lack of technical capacity on

environmental management.

39. Safeguard compliance was rated moderately satisfactory for most of the

implementation period and no land acquisition and loss of livelihoods, either temporary

or permanent has been recorded. The overall recommended Safeguards rating in ICR is

also moderately satisfactory.

11

40. Financial Management. The Project was guided by a comprehensive financial

management (FM) manual; and financial management report (FMR) based reporting was

generally timely and accurate; though the project used statement of expenditures (SOEs)

as a basis for disbursement. The financial management (FM) arrangements of the project

including accounting, reporting, budgeting and staffing, internal controls and external

audit were assessed to be adequate and acceptable to the Bank through the life of the

Project. Such assessments were conducted on a regular basis during the FM

implementation support missions. Project activities were periodically reviewed by the

Internal Auditors. The audit reports were considered timely and were satisfactory in

terms of scope.

41. Initial delays in the project led to an unsatisfactory rating which was upgraded to

moderately satisfactory following improvement in fiduciary capacity. Delays in

disbursements led to a moderately satisfactory rating for the remainder of implementation.

The overall recommended FM rating in ICR is also moderately satisfactory.

42. Procurement. The Procurement activities of the Project were led by a team of five

staff, two at PIU level and three at PPIU level, who followed the World Bank

procurement procedures and the Project Procurement Implementation Manual. The

procurement management, in general, which included the leading of procuring

consultants, works and goods, reporting, and external audit were assessed to be adequate

and acceptable to the Bank in the course of the Project implementation period. The

assessments were conducted on a regular basis both by the Bank’s procurement staff,

from both country and regional levels, during their support missions to the project. A key

challenge noted by the project, both at PIU and PPIU levels, related to the limited

knowledge of the World Bank procurement procedures among most of local providers of

goods and services, which led to the need for greater oversight on the part of the PIU and

PPIU procurement team.

43. Project procurement activities were periodically reviewed by the Bank’s

procurement staff from both Country and regional level and an external procurement

audit was carried once. Initial delays in the project led to an unsatisfactory rating which

was upgraded to moderately satisfactory following improvement in fiduciary capacity.

Delays in disbursements led to a moderately satisfactory rating for the remainder of

implementation. The overall recommended procurement rating in ICR is also moderately

satisfactory

12

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

44. Despite its slow start, the project was perceived by Government and

stakeholders as contributing significantly to agriculture capacity development,

institution building and knowledge transfer in the three provinces where it operated.

It became one of the more visible projects for agricultural development in the Central

Highlands and at the request of the Angolan Government, the Bank prepared a follow up

project - The Smallholder Agricultural Development and Commercialization Project

(SADCP) – which was approved by the Board on July 5, 2016.

45. SADCP will scale up the geographic scale of MOSAP to reach additional

beneficiaries in more municipios and comunas within the same three provinces: Bié,

Huambo, and Malanje. Additionally, the project will include rehabilitation of 1,000 ha

of smallscale gravity-fed irrigation schemes as a pilot program for smallholders. Building

on lessons learned from MOSAP, the SADCP strongly emphasizes capacity building,

institutional development, and sustainability by strengthening MINAGRI’s capacity for

statistics, policy analysis, market information, irrigation development, and agricultural

extension. Also building on lessons learned, the SADCP aims to mainstream

environmental considerations and climate smart agriculture (CSA) practices into the

project design through investments in more efficient use of water resources, promotion of

soil conservation techniques, and integrated natural resource management.

46. At the request of the Government and based on MOSAP’s successes, IFAD has

initiated the design of a Smallholder Agriculture and Marketing Access Project

(SAMAP) - a MOSAP Follow-up Project. The SAMAP will be implemented in two

neighboring provinces of the recently approved WB-SADCP. Discussions between the

two institutions are pointing out towards harmonizing as much as possible SAMAP with

SADCP and ensuing co-financing.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

47. The focus on smallholder agriculture was relevant to the country’s post-

conflict food security, and poverty reduction priorities. During the civil war

agricultural production declined significantly and the country relied on commercial food

imports and food aid. In 2000/01 some 420,000 tons of cereals were imported on a

commercial basis and an additional 330,000 tons were received as food aid. By 2005/06

commercial imports had risen to 780,000 tons and food aid had decreased to 60,000 tons.

With large numbers of persons displaced, and many farming systems and agricultural

value chains destroyed by the war, social stability in the project area was a key concern.

Ensuring stability, a minimum level of food security, and better integration of rural based

populations within the national economy were of critical long term political importance.

48. The project continued to be relevant to the country’s priorities and the

objectives of agricultural commercialization and diversification of the economic

13

base. The project continued to be relevant to the country’s current development priorities

around expanding and diversifying the export base, which remains dominated by the oil

sector (which currently accounts for around 30 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

and, 95 percent of total export value). Following a fall in the price of oil in 2014 and a

significant drop in oil revenue the Government of Angola initiated a crisis plan that

placed a strong emphasis on agriculture as an immediate way to increase domestic

production and reduce imports.

49. Angola’s National Development Plan (NDP) 2013-17 and the Medium-Term

Agricultural Development Program 2013-17 (ADP) also place a strong emphasis on

agricultural productivity and diversification. The overall objective of the ADP is to

promote the sustainable transformation of subsistence agriculture to a commercial

orientation, with the aim of achieving food security in the country. Similarly the Bank’s

Country Partnership Strategy for FY13–16 was aimed at: (a) deepening diversification

for inclusive growth; (b) enhancing the quality of decentralization for services delivery;

and (c) building human resources capacity.

50. A CDD approach was an effective way to ensure project beneficiaries had a

say in determining project activities to meet their needs. Angola faces a number of

challenges that impact social development and economic growth. The civil war resulted

in a virtual collapse of market-oriented production and infrastructure suffered from

widespread destruction of roads, bridges and warehouses. A community demand-driven

(CDD) approach was seen as an important mechanism to support pro-poor agriculture

programs for smallholders, and target income and employment generating activities for

rural households in a way that empowered communities. Lessons learned from countries

emerging from conflicts such as Angola provided examples of channeling investments to

grass-roots level when institutional capacity was limited. The adoption of a community

CDD approach could ensure that project beneficiaries had a say in determining the

project activities that best meets their needs and could be sustained.

51. The project helped facilitate a harmonized framework among donors for

supporting smallholder agriculture in Angola. The project offered a framework to

attract and work with other development agencies active in smallholder agriculture in

Angola. The International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) agreed to support

the project and work within the same framework to reduce possible duplication and

improve the impact of development assistance. The Bank’s involvement led to the

mobilization of additional donor support through Poverty and Human Resources

Development (PHRD) grant. The project was also seen as a way to consolidate gains of

the EMRP and of other IFAD programs in the same provinces. The EMRP helped

reestablish institutional capacity of Angola’s two agriculture research centers and of rural

extension services in Malanje and Bie while the second phase supported the rehabilitation

of some 500 km of feeder roads in Malanje and Bié, most of which were located in the

same comunas and municipios selected by project.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

14

52. The degree to which the PDO is achieved is based on assessment of the main inter-

related outcomes articulated in the project design – increased agricultural production,

improved access to productive assets, and improved capacity of farmers to increase

productivity and access markets.

Increased agricultural production of participating smallholder farmers

53. The main PDO indicator on agricultural production was considered fully

achieved. The primary PDO indicator for the project measured changes in agricultural

production among beneficiaries. The original end of project target at appraisal stage was

a 25 percent increase in the crop index. This was subsequently revised in the 2013

restructuring to a 10 percent increase. Analysis of the baseline survey and end of project

survey estimated the crop index – an aggregated measure of the increase in crop

production across four commodities –showed positive trend in real terms and by 2015

was 166 (or 66 percent), exceeding the overall project target of 10 percent.

54. The crop index was constructed based on yield data collected for maize, cassava,

bean and potato production in a baseline survey in 2012, annual follow up surveys in

2013 and 2014 and a final end of project survey in 2015.

Figure 1. Crop Production Index

Source: MOSAP End of Project Impact Evaluation Survey Report

55. Yields among farmers increased among both project and non project beneficiaries

during implementation. While the project surveys showed relatively small increases in

the control group of non-project beneficiaries, difference in difference analysis was also

conducted to capture the net increase in yields among project beneficiaries discounting

for the overall yield increase experienced by all farmers. This net increase (the

difference-in-difference number – or DD in the table below) showed the highest net

increase in yield occurred in maize – where the net increase for project beneficiaries was

0.14 t/ha (or 33 percent higher than baseline yield values) followed by potato at 1.27 t/ha

(32 percent higher than baseline), beans at .06 t/ha (20 percent higher than baseline) and

cassava 2.19 t/ha (13 percent higher than baseline). These are all still above target levels

established by the project.

15

56. Although positive, gains in agricultural production in absolute terms are

modest. While the project realized gains in production that exceeded targets in

percentage terms, the very low baseline levels of production mean that absolute gains

were small in some cases. The net increase in production of maize averaged only 142

kg/ha and average yields post-project were still relatively low compared to potential. It

should be noted, however that this level of gain is sufficient to allow a household of five

to cross the threshold for subsistence production (with average per capita maize

consumption in the region assumed to be 80 – 100kg/person/year based on FAO

estimates).

Table 1. Mean Crop Yields across Control and Target Populations (t/ha)


57. The targets for adoption were considered fully achieved. The adoption

indicator was added in the 2013 restructuring and established an end of project target of

40 percent. Based on the baseline and end of project survey the project has achieved an

adoption rate of 62 percent at the end of the project. Adoption was defined as whether

the farmer applied the full package of improved farming practices and which commonly

included: (i) seed selection, (ii) sowing/seed placement; and (iii) right plant spacing for

the crops promoted by the project (maize, cassava, potato, and bean). For cassava,

selection and planting of cuttings were also included. Adoption rates were calculated for

each crop and aggregated for an overall adoption rate. Individual rates ranged from a low

of 47 percent for beans to a high of 72 percent for cassava.

16

Figure 2: Adoption rate for improved farming practices


58. Beneficiary coverage. In terms of beneficiary coverage the project provided

training to over 50,000 smallholder farmers organized in groups or associations of which

about over 22,000 farmers were on 726 farmers’ field schools. Additional training

outside the farmer field school methodology brought the total number of farmers

benefitted from training to 32,300. In addition, the project trained more than 210

technicians. At the time of the ICR all farmer field schools were considered functional as

training continued up to the closing date of the project which coincided with the end

harvest period for the 2015/16 season.

59. Training covered a range of topics including agricultural techniques and

diversification of crops (maize, beans, cassava, potato, and vegetables), crop husbandry,

methods of production and conservation of potato, seed multiplication and marketing

channels. Farmer fields schools followed a three cycle curriculum that culminated in

graduation and movement towards cooperative development and more advanced

agribusiness training. By project end more than 100 of the 726 farmer fields schools had

graduated from the third cycle and nearly 250 completed the second cycle.

Improved access to productive assets

60. The project financed 257 sub-projects and exceeded targets for beneficiary

coverage. The project financed sub-projects in 12 municipios in the form of matching

grants for production, processing and marketing related assets. Sub-projects primarily

focused on animal traction, mechanization, improved seeds and fertilizer, grinding mills,

and small scale irrigation pumps. Sub-projects covered a 12,354 smallholder beneficiaries

against an initial target of 8,000. There was no target established for number of sub-

projects at the time of appraisal.

Table 2. MOSAP Sub-Projects

Type of Sub-project

Animal traction Mechanization and seeds Mills

17

Province

Approved Financed Approved Financed Approved Financed

Huambo 92 86 0 0 0 0

Bié 28 28 33 33 17 17

Malanje 4 4 76 76 13 13

Total 124 118 109 109 30 30

Source: MOSAP

61. The majority of sub-projects were considered operational at the time of the ICR

mission and the functionality of sub-project investments were assessed as part of the

project’s M&E systems. By the time of the ICR mission 90 percent of sub-projects had

been completed and the remainder were still under the final stages of delivery or

construction. Of the project that were completed around half of all sub-projects were fully

operational and another third were operational with some minor deficiencies in

management or maintenance. Relatively few of the completed sub-projects (5 subprojects

or about 2 percent) were considered non-operational and only one sub-project had been

abandoned.

62. Beneficiaries have noted, however, that implementation and procurement of sub-

projects could have been more decentralized to allow the menu of options available for

sub-projects to be more diversified and operations and maintenance arrangements could

have been better identified. In some cases field visits identified challenges in

maintenance arrangements, particularly with grinding mills which require more complex

and sustained O&M.

Table 3. Sub-Project performance Malanje Huambo Bié Total

Total subprojects financed 93 86 78 257

Completed and fully operational 55 32 45 132

Completed and operational with weaknesses 34 45 16 95

Completed and not operational 3 0 2 5

Still under finalization 0 9 15 24

Dropped 1 0 0 1

Source: MOSAP

Improved capacity of farmers to access markets

63. The project supported market oriented training and technology adoption to

increase farmers’ long term capacity to engage in markets. The core of the project

focused on improving the productive capacity of smallholders and to enable farmer to

better develop market linkage and market orientation. The selection of commodities as

well as the capacity building and training provided to farmers were driven by a market

orientation and the opportunities to increase marketable surplus. The selection adoption

of commodities – maize, cassava, bean and potato – represented a move towards

increased commercialization as many have both food security and cash crop potential.

18

64. Farmer institutional development was an important element of capacity building in

addition to building technical knowledge and skills. For smallholders, better access to

markets is often achieved through greater farmer organization which can facilitate

learning and exchange of experience, economies of scale in marketing, and provide an

entry point for service delivery. The project generated a clear benefit in farmer

organizational development compared to non-project beneficiaries. The project supported

726 farmer field schools and trained nearly 52,000 farmers. Evidence from baseline and

end of project evaluation indicates the Project changed farmer perceptions around the

utility of joining farmers associations, which were seen to provide little benefit.

65. Training on marketing and commercialization formed a core part of the farmer

field school curriculum and is the main focus of the training in the third year cycle. It is

expected that as farmer organizations become more mature, they will serve as a tool for

increased group marketing. Already some associations have explored higher level

organizational development and have registered as cooperatives in order to put in place

more coordinated output marketing and access to credit.

Table 4: Percentage of Farmers who are Members of a Local Association

2012 Baseline 2015 end of project

Survey

% Change

Project target area 27.9 87.7 212

Control 17.7 35.0 98


66. Investments in productive assets – particularly mills – represented a step

towards greater value addition and commercialization. Project investments in small

scale maize and cassava processing represented a step towards greater market integration

and value addition. Investments in animal traction and mechanization will allow

associations to build on the initial successful technology testing phase supported by the

project and scale up production in coming seasons.

67. The project could have developed an additional focus on input market access

to complement sub-project investments and training, however, this may be

appropriate for the second phase. While project beneficiaries increased production of

all commodities (maize, bean, cassava, and potato), the availability of inputs was often

cited as a constraint. Seed and fertilizer were provided in limited quantities as part of sub-

projects but broad access to inputs is extremely limited within the project area. Increased

production will be limited so long as improved seed, fertilizer and other inputs are not

available. The project did provide training to 90 service providers and agro-dealers within

the project area and in in the last year of the project was able to source more seed locally

from the more mature farmers’ organizations. Greater attention to linkages to supply

chains and input markets, however, may have been useful.

3.3 Efficiency

19

68. Appraisal stage economic and financial analysis estimated the project would

extend capacity building, including group formation and strengthening, as well as basic

agricultural and or marketing knowledge to 126,000 smallholder farmers out of which,

some 40,000 smallholders would benefit from more intensive participatory farmer group-

based agricultural extension support and an estimated 24,000 smallholders would benefit

directly from productive investment subprojects.

69. The ICR economic financial analysis follows the same logic as the appraisal stage

analysis and assess the quantifiable financial and economic benefits generated by

increased production and productivity among project beneficiaries. Data collected

through the project’s baseline survey and impact provides evidence on yield increases

and changes in total production at the farm level among both beneficiary and control

populations. Ex ante economic and financial analysis of the follow on SADCP project

provided an updated baseline of farm and crop production models for farmers in the

project area and have been used in the ICR analysis as average production models at

MOSAP project end.

70. The project’s economic rate of return is calculated at 13 percent based on a

relatively conservative calculation of net benefits related to the value of increased

production observed at project end. This level is higher than the opportunity cost of

capital and therefore indicates the project generated a positive rate of return. It is lower

than appraisal ERR estimates of 21 percent, however, which were based on a shorter time

period for project implementation, lower costs of for service provision and goods, and

larger beneficiary coverage.

71. The ICR rate of return calculation also likely represents a lower estimate of the

project’s rate of return as additional benefits would be expected from income generated

through productive assets such grinding mills, higher value crop production under

irrigation sub-projects, and spillover effects among non-project beneficiaries. The

project’s investment in capacity building is also difficult to quantify and higher positive

returns are likely when if the planned second phase is included in the analysis.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

72. An important outcome of the project is that farmers in the project target areas have

demonstrated the potential to raise crop productivity beyond historically low levels as

long as they are provided with the appropriate supportive infrastructure and incentives.

Starting from a very low base, the project achieved its core objective and generated

benefits that will serve as a foundation for further commercialization.

73. The project is rated satisfactory based on an assessment of the relevance of the

project to Angola’s post conflict, economic and poverty reduction goals, satisfactory

achievement of its stated development objective in raising agricultural production and

evidence of the generally positive impact generated by the project, all within a

challenging country context.

20

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

74. Poverty. The project’s design was poverty focused given its focus on raising

production and ultimately incomes among smallholder farmers. Poverty data remains

extremely limited in Angola making any assessment of poverty impact difficult. Rural

poverty across Angola is currently estimated to be 58 percent compared to 30 percent in

urban areas. At the time of appraisal extreme poverty within the project area was

considered significant and in 2005 it was estimated that 68 percent of the population

central highlands were classified as food insecure. Detailed analysis on poverty impacts

was not undertaken as part of the project, however the baseline level of production

captured in project surveys indicate that many beneficiaries were operating at basic levels

of subsistence production. The demonstrated increases in yield experienced by project

participants while modest, indicate that project interventions have likely contribute to

greater food security.

75. Gender. The project was successful in targeting and supporting female

participation in training and as members of farmers associations. While there were gender

imbalances in farmer associations leadership, with men usually being in a leadership

position and women being the bulk of the members in the groups – the project was

generally well balanced in terms of gender. In total 43 percent of farmers participating in

project activities were women. Farmer field school participants were an estimated 56

percent female. Design and planning of farmer field school activities made it possible for

women to participate more in the planning of agricultural activities together with their

male counterparts.

76. Sub-project investments also had clear gender impacts in that many focused on

introducing labor saving technologies –such as grinding mills, animal traction, and

irrigation pumps. Beneficiaries cited positive gender impacts around such investments

and a reduction in time required to take on tasks.

77. Literacy training. Early in the preparation period it was determined that the low

levels of educational attainment among project beneficiaries presented a challenge to

provision of technical training. As a result, the project included and ultimately expanded

training under the first component to include literacy skills in a selected number of farmer

associations. Basic literacy skills allowed more farmers to participate in farmer field

schools and generated additional benefits beyond the project.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

78. Farmer organizational development. A key achievement of the project was to

strengthen farmer associations to empower farmers and develop organizational and

leadership skills needed to exercise ownership over project decision-making processes

and outcomes. Very few farmers had previous experience in associations and in many

cases, the implementation and management of sub-project or training activities

represented something new, which required a learning and adaptability. The project also

21

supported a few exchanges between associations, which provided a model for joint

learning and the potential for greater collective action in the future. Organized networks

of farmers’ organization also provided Government with an entry point in providing

support in the sector.

79. Because eligibility for project activities required farmer association membership,

there is a risk that associations may not be sustainable. MOSAP associations, however,

have demonstrated good group cohesion, which is expected to ensure longevity and the

follow on project is expected to support further institutional development and value

addition to collective activities.

80. Extension agents and EDAs. The project contributed to revitalization of service

delivery through EDAs in participating municipios. EDAs, which represent the lowest

administrative level in the extension system, had generally suffered from under-

investment and under-staffing. Project investments in infrastructure (housing, offices and

transport) allowed new staff to be posted to the EDA level and increase the outreach ratio

for extension staff to number of farmers reached. The project built capacity of extension

agents and provided training in technical skills as well as the principles of community-

organizing and group management skills in order to help facilitate farmers associations

and communities. These changes are expected to be sustained in the follow on project

with staff and operational costs gradually absorbed in to the Government budget.

81. ADI and MINAGRI. The project provided a useful framework for ADI to deliver

technical services and support to farmers which had in the past been relatively ad hoc and

constrained by both resources and service delivery models. The framework of farmer

association development, technical training and learning coupled with investment in

productive assets were perceived to be much more effective than previous efforts. The

project became popular at the provincial and municipal levels as a result of its grass roots

impact in communities. ADI has expressed interest in incorporating many aspects of the

farmer field school approach and farmer training more broadly in the country.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

82. Testing of alternative extension methodologies. One byproduct of the project

was the testing of variety of extension methods and the scaling up of the farmer field

school methodology in particular. Given the capacity constraints within the public

extension system the project utilized a number of service providers to fill gaps in

institutional capacity. This involved local and international NGOs as well the Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO), which had developed specialized expertise in farmer

field schools. The use of the farmer field school approach in the project was expanded

over time and by the end of the project 726 farmer fields schools had been launched.

83. Originally started as tool for learning integrated pest management in Asia, the

farmer field school approach evolved into a group-based learning process characterized

by participatory learning approaches carried out over multiple seasons. Studies of impact

are varied in their findings on the effectiveness of the approach. Because the project

22

likely represented one of the larger scale uses of farmer field schools in Africa, the

project could have (and in its second phase should plan for) more systematic and rigorous

impact assessment on the approach.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

84. Beneficiary and stakeholder consultations were held as part of the closure of

MOSAP and preparation for the follow on project with a focus on taking stock of

implementation experience and to identify lessons learned. Stakeholder perceptions of

positive and negative aspects are summarized the table below.

Table 5: Stakeholder perceptions on project implementation and impact Positive impacts or implementation experiences Negative impacts or implementation

experiences

Reducing the time spent on some essential

activities of farmers (grinding corn, cultivation of

farms);

Increase in the cultivated area;

Introduction of more effective cultivation

techniques, and thus increasing productivity and

product quality;

Development of associations, consolidation of

associations;

development of planning capacity of the

associations (project planning, feasibility simplified

calculations of viable alternatives analysis,)

Stimulation of other farmer associative

initiatives, and the emergence of new projects;

Development of cooperation activities between

associations;

Increase in negotiating capacity with public

authorities, improving the knowledge of the resources

and the limits of the bodies involved;

Better market knowledge, is the amount of

production (input suppliers, equipment, animals) or

downstream (marketing channels, transport,.

Lack of previous experience with

associations in villages ;

Shortcomings in the field of technical

staff

Slow pace of project implementation

in the early years and highly limited time to

reach the goals after the changes introduced in

2013;

Difficulties arising from the incipient

network equipment providers ( grindings ,

motor pumps ) , animals, inputs

(seeds, fertilizers ) , and limits of programs

Government supply of these inputs ;

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Substantial

23

85. Overall risk to the development outcome is considered substantial – although

approval of the follow on project SADCP could be expected to provide a mechanism to

mitigate some of the risks to development outcomes.

86. Institutional risks. Institutional risk is considered between moderate to substantial.

There are risks around integrating project successes into the larger institutional structures

of Government. The project increased the technical and operational capacity of

MINAGRI and ADI to better manage programs and improved systems, manuals and

technical training within the institution at provincial and municipal level. The project

created potential for ADI to continue to support interventions around improving the

productive capacity of small farmers even after project closing. One challenge, however,

will be in adapting models and approaches developed largely outside its systems by

external service providers into its own structures over the medium to long term. Strong

leadership within ADI and in the PIU was critical to achieving project success but may be

more difficult to replicate if personnel changes take place. The current low revenue

environment which has reduced government budgets will also likely impact ADI’s ability

to support future service delivery.

87. Risks to productivity gains at farm level. Risks at farmer level are twofold: at the

production level and at marketing level. Farmers in the project had shown potential to

adapt, adopt, and innovate, provided that they receive timely and adequate support. By

demonstrating the efficacy and value of project activities and building awareness at both

the national and local levels of the benefits of project interventions, there is a high

likelihood of maintaining production levels achieved beyond the life of the project.

Although access to inputs were a challenge, increased capacity has been demonstrated

through community seed multiplication but bears further monitoring.

88. A major risk to sustaining project achievements will be whether investments in

improving capacity and skills can be leveraged into greater commercialization and profits

for farmers. This will be influenced by Angola’s larger social and economic context,

which presents a difficult environment for smallholder farmers to boost production

significantly. The country’s weak supply chains and high margins at the retail level favor

cheap agricultural imports and result in low producer prices for smallholder farmers. In

such an environment, yield and production increases by smallholder farmers may not

always result in improved incomes.

89. Environment and Social development risks. Environmental risks are considered

low. Project investments in sub-projects have been largely small scale and created no

cumulative negative impacts. Maintenance plans have been put in place as part of the

sub-project training. Social development risks are also considered low, as larger country

risk around potential conflict and violence are minimal and the project’s use of farmer

association and community institutions have created ownership over project activities are

considered sufficient.

24

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

90. MOSAP was the first agricultural development project supported by the World

Bank in Angola. Considerable effort went into design of the project, building

relationships with counterpart institutions and understanding a complex country and

sector environment. Delays experienced in approval and effectiveness affected project

startup although there may have been few options to avoid them. Effectiveness and

disbursement conditions led to extensive delays but reflected a desire to put in place the

minimum conditions needed to ensure sound implementation capacity was in place. At

times the two year delay reinforced each other - in some cases conditions had to be met

twice (recruitment of staff had to be done twice when in some cases recruited personnel

were no longer available once other conditions had been met).

91. Engagement with IFAD on project design also took place and both the IFAD

program document and the Bank’s Project Appraisal Document (PAD) were consistent

and well aligned. Nonetheless, additional efforts was required to align World Bank and

IFAD funding, which required amending/harmonizing financing agreements.

(b) Quality of Supervision


92. The Bank undertook regular supervision with task team leader (TTL) and staff

based within the region in neighboring countries. The team displayed flexibility and was

proactive in addressing implementation bottlenecks. Potential restructuring was discussed

early on when it became clear the time available for implementation was lapsing. The

team was pro-active in engaging Government on possible cancellation of the credit and

adjusting results framework.

93. The supervision and mid-term review process allowed for course corrections and

adjustments to design. Supervision was candid in ratings of project shortcomings and

constraints. The project was rated unsatisfactory at the start due to delays in establishing

implementing capacity and revised upwards when performance improved. Development

of implementation modalities for sub-project and service provision for training took time

to finalize and were reviewed in detail during early supervision missions. Supervision of

the IFAD funds proceeded smoothly and supervision was often undertaken as joint-Bank-

IFAD missions.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


25

94. The satisfactory rating is based on a greater weighting for quality of supervision.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory

95. Although achievement of project development objectives would not have been

possible without the relatively strong ownership over the project, particularly at

provincial and municipal government levels, the 26 month delay in effectiveness had a

negative impact on the project. While lack of familiarity with Bank modalities

contributed to some delays others were due to factors within the control of Government.

Government counterpart funds, which were originally anticipated at US$4.4 million at

appraisal were US$2.1 million by project end.

96. Larger policy and institutional issues also impacted project performance,

particularly as they related to improving the competence and incentive structure for

government staff, at lower levels; the accuracy and timeliness of government statistics to

allow for more informed decision making; and the ability of senior government staff to

address structural constraints through informing and promoting agriculture sector policy

dialogue. Angola’s overall business environment also affected project performance.

Timely entry visas for consultants, contractors and Bank staff to support implementation

of the project were difficult to obtain and led to higher costs and implementation delays.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance


97. Implementing agency performance is rated moderately satisfactory. While the

project took some time to fully launch resulting in an initial unsatisfactory rating for the

project, project coordination did improve and remained satisfactory for the remaining

project period. A key factor in the change was replacement of key project staff that

provided the needed boost to manage and coordinate project activities.

98. The PIU oversaw project implementation by PPIUs and performed central

functions while PPIU implementation units provided main frontline implementation

support. The project had a reporting system based on monthly and quarterly progress

reports prepared. Progress reports were prepared for submission to the Bank and were

provide on a timely basis throughout the project implementation period.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


26

99. Overall borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory based on a balance

of the moderately satisfactory ratings for Implementing Agency performance and

moderately unsatisfactory for Government performance.

6. Lessons Learned

100. MOSAP was successful in reaching women, although more needs to be done

to ensure that women play an equal role in farmers’ organizations and influence

project investment decisions. Women had only limited influence on the choice of

subprojects, an issue that will need extra attention under the proposed project. Women’s

participation in farmers’ organizations was lower than that of men and women usually

had a secondary role, with only a few occupying leadership positions. More women could

be encouraged to get training as FFS facilitators and become community leaders, for

example by arranging training sessions to favor women’s participation.

101. The Farmer Field School (FFS) approach to agricultural extension was

effective in enhancing smallholder farmers’ capacity to generate and use new

knowledge and adopt improved agricultural practices and technology. Although the

performance of FFS needs to be evaluated in more depth, it was considered to be the

appropriate extension methodology and was found to be an effective platform for farmer

organization and empowerment, where smallholder farmers with a common interest can

gain increased production, productivity and access to market. This platform served an

important role for farmers both in terms of social and technical support. Farmers who

participate in the first phase of training of trainers become Master Farmers who facilitate

or replicate the training to new farmers, thus achieving an increase in the number of farm

families with strengthened capacities. The chances of effective FFS network to grow, can

be strengthened with greater focus on farmer-driven network development. In order to

build on best practice of using farmers as extension agents whilst ensuring their

sustainability post project, it is recommended that SADCP and SAMAP projects, should

facilitate farmer promoters to become agricultural input suppliers at the village level.

Within SAMAP, and SADCP outstanding farmers should be able to earn service fees in

delivering technological advices to their client farmers.

102. A capable and internationally experienced service provider will be required to

help farmers’ organizations develop and implement investment proposals, especially

for value chain investments. The use of small, local service providers to assist farmers’

associations in the preparation and implementation of MOSAP subprojects was

problematic because of their limited technical and organizational capacity. Improving the

quality of technical and commercial assistance and making it available to a much larger

number of beneficiaries will require recruitment of a highly capable and internationally

experienced service provider who will also train the local NGOs and private sector

subcontractors with whom they will work.

103. Financing demand-driven subproject investment proposals promotes their

sustainability. The modalities for preparing and implementing demand-driven

27

subprojects under MOSAP were generally successful, with over 70 percent of subprojects

judged sustainable by the independent evaluation. The key elements of success were (a)

creation of ownership through community participation in all stages of subproject

preparation and implementation, as well as direct community contributions (cash or in

kind); (b) farmers’ organizations’ commitment to engage in operation and management

(O&M) before disbursement of project contribution; (c) training of farmers’

organizations and assistance with establishment of user rules and cost-sharing

agreements; and (d) awareness raising and encouragement for farmers’ organizations to

identify and contract the technical assistance they need.

104. Procurement, FM, and M&E teams need to be involved in the early stages of

project design. During MOSAP implementation, the project had difficulty finding local

qualified professionals to effectively undertake the fiduciary and M&E functions. The

lack of qualified procurement staff was in part responsible for the delayed start of project

implementation. While hiring was possible within a reasonable period, the selected

consultants were not familiar with World Bank procedures.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

105. Borrower comments generally concur with the ICR and highlight the following

three lessons that will be incorporated in SADCP: (i) improved farmer organization

through groups or associations increased provision of assistance to smallholders and their

access to inputs, but continued assistance is required for increased sustainability; (ii)

development of smallholder capacity is key for increased sustainability; and good

communication and (iii) participatory planning was key for smooth implementation. Full

comment are contained in Annex 7.

(b) Cofinanciers

106. Comments from IFAD on the draft ICR have been incorporated into the final text

including planned follow up financing to MOSAP through a new planned operation

SAMAP. Full comments are found in Annex 8.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

N/A

28

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Component 1: Capacity Building 9.59 13.70 143%

Component 2: Agricultural

Investment Support 29.45 7.74

26%

Component 3: Project

Management 7.56 11.61

154%

Total Baseline Cost 42.45 33.05

Physical Contingencies 0.25

Price Contingencies 2.50

Total Project Costs 49.35 33.05 67%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal

Estimate

(USD

millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate

(USD

millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Borrower 4.12 4.40 107%

Local Communities 3.03 0.00* N/A

International Development

Association (IDA) 30.00 18.17

61%

International Fund for Agriculture

Development 8.20 6.27

76%

JAPAN: Ministry of Finance - PHRD

Grants 4.02 3.61

90%

Sub-Total (w/o local community

contribution) 46.34 32.45

Total 49.37

*not measured

29

(c) Detailed breakdown by financier1

Table 1.1 At Appraisal

Categories IDA % IFAD % PHRD % Gov % Total %

Component 1

(1.a) Consulting services and training 0.62 7% 3.2 38% 4 47% 0.64 8% 8.46 100%

(1.b) Goods and works 2.8 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2.8 100%

Component 2 Matching grants 23.46 89% 2.85 11% 0 0 0 0% 26.31 100%

Component 3

Goods, consulting services,

training& operating costs 3.12 36% 2.15 25% 0 3.48 40% 8.75 100%

Total 30 8.2 4 4.12 46.32

Table 1.2. February 2013 with the Cancellation of US$10 million


Component 1


(1.b) Goods and works 8.26 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 8.26 100%

Component 2 Matching grants 8.00 89% 2.85 11% 0 0 0 0% 10.85 100%

Component 3


training& operating costs 3.12 75% 2.15 25% 0 1.50 0 6.77 100%

Total 20.00 8.2 4 2.14 34..34

1 The following tables are sourced from the individual restructuring papers and there are some minor difference with the overall summary of project costs in the annex due to of the differences in the exchange rate between SDR and USD at time of calculation.

30

Table 1.3. September 2014


Component 1


(1.b) Goods and works 7.70 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 8.26 100%

Component 2 Matching grants 6..78 89% 2.85 11% 0 0 0 0% 10.85 100%

Component 3



Total 20.00 8.2 4 2.14 34..34

Table 1.4. December 2015


Component 1


(1.b) Goods and works 7.70 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 7.7 100%

Component 2 Matching grants 6..78 20% 4.29 80% 0 0 0 0% 11.07 100%

Component 3



Total 20.00 8.2 4 2.14 34..34

31

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1 - Capacity Building

1. This component was designed to strengthen the technical, institutional, managerial

and marketing skills of 50,000 smallholders and their organizations, as well as the skills

of services providers and other stakeholders involved in agricultural production and value

chains, to allow them to operate more effectively in a market-driven environment and

prepare for the agricultural investment support opportunities under Component 2. This

component was also designed to strengthen the capacity of the Agricultural Development

Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture at local and central level by providing periodic

training and means (such as offices, equipment, transport, and housing for extension

officers at the municipal level) to be able to assist smallholders in the Project area.

2. The Project developed six training modules that were used by the service providers

to deliver training programs for smallholder farmers. The Government also contracted the

FAO to provide training of smallholder farmers through the Farmers’ Field School.

Summary of Component 1 outputs

3. Overall, the project achieved the following results: (i) training of 54,982

smallholder farmers in community organization and leadership, organization of

production and agricultural techniques for maize, beans and Irish potatoes, and cassava;

of which over 22,000 farmers through FAO Farmers’ Field Schools; of which 1,497

graduated as facilitators and 96 as community leadership, and about 2,252 benefitted

from literacy and agribusiness; (ii) training of 210 Government technicians in community

leadership, agronomic, extension methods among others; (iii) construction of 24 staff

houses and 8 offices; (iv) provision of equipment to local agricultural offices to improve

assistance to smallholders that included 13 vehicles and 40 moto-bikes; and (v) creation

of a database of associations, service providers, and EDA technicians.

Table 2.1 Component 1 outputs

Intermediate indicator for

component 1

Targets Actual Percentage

Number of smallholder farmers

that benefited from training

50,000 54,982 110

Percent of participating

smallholder farmers in the project

areas who belong to farm

organizations

40 100 250

Ratio of smallholder farmers’

organizations to an extension

officer

12 12 100

32

i) Capacity Building for Farmers and Community Mobilization and

Sensitization

4. MOSAP hired four service providers to build capacity among farmers and local

services providers and to provide training for local government personnel.

5. Smallholder farmers were trained on improved production technologies for major

crops (maize, cassava, beans and potato) and management practices. Demonstration plots

were also established to make the farmer aware of the benefits of new technology and to

show the farmers how to practically use the new technology. As a result, a portion of the

trained farmers adopted the new technologies in their farming land area. A total number

of 54,982 smallholders farmers in Associations out of a target of 50,000 were trained in

all project areas, with around 42.4 percent of them being females. The training focused

on, leadership skills, finance management skills, farmers field schools, operation and

maintenance of mills, agribusiness, illiteracy, and business planning and processes.

6. One of the main activities of the first subcomponent was the use of farmer field

school (FFS) methodology developed by FAO. Farmer field school methodology aimed

to build farmers’ capacity and promoted adoption of better practices, and consequently

improve farmers’ lives in terms of agricultural outcomes, health, environment and

empowerment. A total of 726 FFS were created in three provinces, comprising of 22,432

farmers’ members, 66 trained extensions facilitators and 307 trained farmers facilitators.

7. FFS were formed either from existing farmer’s groups/associations or from scratch

through community mobilization activities, in which problems were identified and

possible solutions floated. The FFS group sizes range from 25-30 farmers. The groups

elect their own leaders; developed their own norms and rules and met once every week

from 8.00 am-12.00 pm. The FFS is run for 30 learning weeks on grants provided by

FAO. The farmer led field schools receive backstopping from EDA extension workers

from time to time. During the learning period an exchange visit was organized for the

group members. The participants of FFS also receive a certificate at the end of the 30

learning weeks.

8. The group members perceived that the farmer field schools have contributed to

creating strong farmer-based structure at the grass root level. It also developed farmer’s

capacity to understand the activities they are carrying out. However, strong facilitation

skills were required for the success of the FFS in addition to monitoring and evaluation

systems. On sustainability, it was perceived that the development of FFS networks could

help sustain the process of learning. The farmers also felt that FFS has helped to bring

Ministry of Agriculture extension workers closer to farmers as previously they were not

frequenting the locality.

9. The following were perceived by farmers to be the main components of a field

school:

Presence of a study field;

33

Payment of registration fees;

Committed members;

Willingness to learn;

Presence of trained facilitator;

Norms and rules;

Capable leaders; and

Clearly set objectives.

10. Extension workers felt that FFS has helped make them reach more farmers. The

FFS has contributed to building up a close working relationship with the extension

workers as some of the farmers had started looking for services by frequenting EDA

offices. The extension workers also perceived that their roles had gradually been

changing to that of a facilitator instead of being a teacher.

11. However, they recognized that there were some conflict with their present work

description and the demands of FFS as they were required to attend to implement other

extension methodologies of the EDAs besides the FFS. Currently, the EDA Office has

allocated five or six FFS to an extension worker.

12. The integration of FFS with a subproject helped to rationalization of resources of

EDAs, as well as, to take advantage of the best way the knowledge being taught in FFS

could be applied to implement subprojects, mainly crop production subprojects.

ii) Strengthening capacities of relevant government institutions

13. The project provided support to departments within the Ministry of Agriculture to

improve the capacity of the public sector to provide core public services required to

support enhanced smallholders’ to improve their productivity and product quality.

14. The project has expanded activities with a focus on intensively increasing the

quality of support to beneficiaries (farmers and extension workers). This was being done

by working EDAs offices in municipalities, improving the quality of support to the

beneficiaries, increasing the number of front level staff like Farmers Field Facilitators,

who interact directly with the beneficiary farmers and extension workers.

15. At municipality level, a total of 88 government extension workers including,

veterinary field who were designated to directly support the farmers were provided

training on improved production technology and management training.

16. Identified topics included refresher training on improved agricultural practices that

project was working on; how to reach and interact with target farmer associations/groups

(facilitation skills); incorporation of gender and diversity aspects into extension activities

(FFS); participatory rural appraisal formation, governance and leadership of smallholder

farmers associations/groups and health, environmental and nutrition messages.

34

17. The smallholder farmer associations were linked to the respective extension

worker through FFS and subprojects. The extension workers provided training to the

farmer groups. In this way, an enhanced extension service relation had been developed.

18. The project provided motorcycles to extension workers and to farmers’ facilitators.

In order to increase outreach smallholder farmers in remote communities, the project

constructed and equipped offices and residences for extension workers.

19. The 3-day workshops on agricultural policies was conducted for the benefit of the

central ADI, MINAGRI and other stakeholders. The aim was to give general notions

about the role of farming family on rural development and present known and validated

methodologies, by the international agencies of the United Nations, that enable partners

to obtain intervening concrete tools for their works in their regional and rural realities.

20. Training of ADI Staff on M&E. The FAO M&E expert has provided training to the

field staff on FFS data collection method and quality measures in gathering information

using the project introduced revised templates.

iii) Strengthening capacities of private and non-governmental agricultural service

providers.

21. As a means to develop a private avenue for increasing farmer access to extension,

the MOSAP Project also developed capacity of input retailers and local service providers

who conducted business with project beneficiaries in order to strengthen or increase their

capacity to provide extension services. Assistance included business planning and

processes and leadership skills. 90 service providers were trained.

Component 2 - Support to Agricultural Investment

22. This component was designed to provide demand-based support, in the form of

matching grants, to 10,000 smallholder farmers organized in groups, for small-scale

agricultural infrastructure, production, processing and marketing sub-projects. The key

results expected from the implementation of this component include: (i) enhanced

agricultural productivity and (ii) enhanced access to agricultural markets.

23. Component 2 was designed to be implemented after capacity building activities

supported under Component 1 had been initiated, to ensure that capacity exists at local

level to implement sub-projects successfully. For this reason, and given the delays

incurred in implementing the capacity building activities supported under Component 1,

only in February 2013 farmer’s associations started preparing the sub-projects, with

support from the Agricultural Development Office of Agricultural Development Institute

(EDA) and the service providers. The main activities carried out up to date include: i)

provision of financial resources to 257 sub-projects involving over 12,354 smallholder

agricultural farmers; that involved (a) provision of seeds for potatoes; maize, beans and

fertilizers; (b) support in provision of assistance for mechanized land preparation

covering over 1,500 ha and (c) provision of animal traction. This resulted in: (i) Increased

35

agriculture productivity in most crops supported under the project, (ii) increased agro-

processing of cassava; and (iii) increased income of beneficiary farmer as repotted on the

beneficiary assessment undertaken in the project.

Table 2.2 Component 1 outputs

Intermediate indicator for Component 2 Targets Actual Percentage

Number of smallholder farmers financed under

agricultural investment component

10,000 12,531 125

Number of smallholder associations that benefit

from grants and completed their activities under

the Project’s agricultural investment component

8,000 12,344 154

Average yield for major crops participating

smallholder farmers:

Maize 0.6 0.77 128

Cassava 11 18.2 165

Beans 0.4 0.47 117

Iris potatoes 5 6.9 138

Subprojects details

24. Implementation began in late 2012. Part of the delay in the implementation of

Component 2 is related to the delay in the start of training activities under the first

component only started in March 2012; and the other was related to the disbursement

conditions for component 2. The disbursement conditions were: (i) At least 30 (10 in

each province) service providers and certified public officers appointed under the Project

Training program; (ii) The basic survey completed; and (iii) the administrative capacity

of the Provincial Project Implementation Units are consistent with the fiduciary

requirements of the Bank, as certified by World Bank. These conditions were met by the

end of July of 2012.

25. Although project activity was limited between 2010 and 2012 some activities

around Institutional Development, dissemination of information around the project and

community mobilization activities took place with associations and local authorities.

During this time he operating procedures of the subprojects and conducting technical

training seminars of EDAs in "Developing Productive Subprojects of MOSAP" was

prepared.

26. EDA technicians supported small producers to develop their proposals for funding

and in consultation with communal administrations to determine the relevance of such

associations, and environmental safeguards ensured. Municipal administration/CMCS

also gave its opinion to ensure coordination with the Project MOSAP. Subprojects made

with budgets ranging from $50,000 to $100,000, an amount which included the 10

percent community contribution. Sub-projects were evaluated and approved by the

provincial and national Subcommittees.

36

Table 2.3 Eligible types of sub-projects Sub-Project Types Examples

High public interest and / or public use Agricultural infrastructure of small-scale

processing - Grinding mills

Equipment forms the dominant component Animal traction equipment, plows, sprayers.

Agricultural mechanization

Potential for further production and redistribution Animal traction

Improved agricultural technologies Inputs

Table 2.4 Subprojects prepared, approved and financed by year

27. A total of 335 subprojects were prepared in which the vast majority (68 percent)

were prepared and financed in 2013. Almost all developed subprojects were funded (97

percent). Of the 257 subprojects financed, 46 percent subprojects were animal traction,

42 percent of mechanization and seeds and 12 percent of mills. Reduction the number of

new subprojects occurred after the first and was considered due to the fact that the more

effort was given in the first year to the preparation of proposals, due to delays in the

project implementation of activities, which were soon balanced out in the last two years.

Tracçãoanimal

Mecanização e

sementesMoagens Total

Aprovados 124 109 30 263

Financiados 118 109 30 257

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Nú

me

ro

Subprojectos financiados por tipo

Ano Prepared Approved Financed

2012 54 2 0

2013 227 221 152

2014 48 16 81

2015 6 24 24

Total 335 263 257

37

28. Types of subprojects varied by province. The vast majority of livestock projects

(animal traction) were requested by small producers of Huambo and Bié, areas with a

history of animal traction usage.

Table2.5 Type subprojects financed by province

Provincia

Tipo de subprojectos

Animal Traction Mechanization and seeds Mills

Approved Financed Approved Financed Approved Financed

Huambo 92 86 0 0 0 0

Bié 28 28 33 33 17 17

Malanje 4 4 76 76 13 13

Total 124 118 109 109 30 30

Project beneficiaries Summary

29. The following table presents a summary of the beneficiaries of the subprojects

reaching a total of 12,354 beneficiary families. Taking into account an average of 5

people per family in the Project area, it is estimated that the project directly benefited

approximately 60,000 people.

Table2.6: Number of beneficiaries by type of subproject

Province

Subproject type Total

Animal Traction Mechanization and

seeds Mills

Huambo 3396 - - 3396

Bié 1530 1438 1034 4002

Malanje 199 3959 798 4956

Total 5125 5397 1832 12354

Table: Subproject Data

Província Municípios Número de

subprojectos

Famílias

beneficiárias

Numero

de Ecas

Técnicos das

EDAs

Bié

Andulo 22 1001 107 9

Catabola 16 756 104 8

Camacupa 23 1398 80 8

Chinguar 17 847 71 6

Subtotal Bié 78 4002 362 31

Huambo Bailundo 42 1517 51 6

38

Londuimbali 27 1434 55 6

Mungo 17 710 58 2

Subtotal Huambo 86 3661 164 14

Malanje

Caculama 19 992 32 8

Cacuso 23 1238 46 9

Malanje 13 701 23 7

Kiwaba Nzoji 22 1144 28 7

Kalandula 16 881 67 11

Subtotal Malanje 93 4956 196 42

Total Geral 257 12619 722 87

Table 2.7: Subproject expenditures (USD) Tipo 2013 2014 2015 Total

Mills

Huambo 37.800,00 0,00 1.850,37 39.650,37

Bié 323.798,20 270.806,25 113.947,09 708.551,54

Malanje 195.253,09 2.447,25 126.055,69 323.756,03

Total parcial 556.851,29 273.253,50 241.853,15 1.071.957,94

Reprodução Natural

Huambo 486.995,82 322.659,61 197.495,23 1.007.150,66

Bié 123.202,75 186.271,82 424.246,67 733.721,24

Malanje 68.239,17 274.531,72 115.839,59 458.610,48

Total parcial 678.437,74 783.463,15 737.581,48 2.199.482,37

Inovação Tecnologica

Huambo 274.555,74 310.042,39 598,07 585.196,20

Bié 557.723,46 422.432,88 45.252,28 1.025.408,62

Malanje 1.321.160,89 451.595,37 16.605,66 1.789.361,92

Total parcial 2.153.440,09 1.184.070,64 62.456,01 3.399.966,74

Total Geral 3.388.729,12 2.240.787,29 1.041.890,64 6.671.407,05

Operation and maintenance of subprojects

30. The project tried to put in place systems to support the preparation and analysis of

productive enterprises as well as systems for the provision of technical assistance for

maintenance and operation of investments and development of viable business plans.

Municipal EDAs were required to have technicians directly responsible for monitoring

and evaluation in order to continue to monitor and evaluate the continuity of subprojects

especially those who were operating regularly, the subprojects running and operating

with weaknesses.

31. Subprojects supporting mills and/or other recurring source of regular cash flow

were targeted for monitoring of income, account services, account opening, deposits and

39

expenses as a way of ensuring that the services of the mills were for all members instead

of benefit a few people within an association. For the maintenance, mills were

encouraged to create a spare parts store sales for the mills, with direct connection to

Sotecma, whose location and supply could provide a response to demand for maintenance

services of existing in the province in general mills. Training for technicians to service

mills were also discussed.

32. For livestock, the Veterinary Provincial Services was tasked with support for the

herd of animal traction cattle introduced by the project in line with their mandate for

provision of livestock animal health services in rural communities. A protocol of

performance between the IDA, Services veterinarians, municipal administrations and the

beneficiary communities was signed to facilitate service delivery. The EDAs were to

identify in rural communities, staff experienced in livestock training for animal traction

to increase the cultivable area by animal traction in rural areas, given that the actual cattle

introduced by the project is not the current area prepared.

Sub-project status and sustainability

33. An estimated 90 percent of the financed sub-projects were already completed at the

ICR stage, of which 51 percent are in full operation. Among the remaining 9.4 percent

were in the final stages of completion, while only 2.0 percent have stood or abandoned.

Table 2.8: Status of Sub-projects

Malanje Huambo Bié Total

Subprojects financed 93 86 78 257

Subprojects completed and operating normally 55 32 45 132

Subprojects completed and operating with deficiencies 34 45 16 95

Completed and non-operational 3 0 2 5

Still under execution 0 9 15 24

Abandoned 1 0 0 1

34. Factors that influenced positively the implementation of subprojects:

• The strategy of giving the associations the identification, implementation of sub-

projects has created real opportunities for empowerment;

• Functional organizational leadership in existence at both the Association and the

monitoring level of the project;

• Technology Adoption through field schools, replicating in their own lessons

learned;

• Existence of a system to account on revenues acquired through meetings between

the members and the subproject management group;

• Supervision and support of sub-projects by the technicians of EDAs.

40

35. Sub-projects completed and operating with deficiencies include some examples

mechanization subprojects. In some cases communities did not fulfill their obligations

clear the area, a situation that affected the mechanization of work. Mechanized service

providers in the province also had limited capacity to meet increased demand during

growing seasons. For mill subprojects, the main constraint is the weak organizational

leadership of the association and the management group, changing the operators of mills

and / or inefficient operators. As well as the constant interference of some community

leaders.

Component 3 - Project Management

36. This component was designed to support Project management to use the funds in

accordance with the objectives and procedures and monitoring and evaluation. The main

activities carried out to date include: (i) project management including preparation of the

procurement plan to procure all goods, works and equipment for the project; (ii)

preparation of the mitigation measures for the sub-projects; (iii) verification of all

indicators intermediary indicators; (iv) completion of three surveys on outcome indicators

(baseline, 2013 and 2015 and end line data); (v) completion of the audits; and (vi) sub-

projects, (vii) organization of training for staff, including for monitoring and evaluation,

the project had produced two databases: Monitoring Information systems (MIS), training

database for Government staff, and Database on farmer Field Schools.

41

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

Appraisal stage assumptions

1. Appraisal stage economic and financial analysis was based on analysis of the

anticipated financial returns to farmers participating in the project and the overall

economic rate of return generated by increased crop production. It was assumed the

project would extend capacity building as well as basic agricultural and or marketing

knowledge to 126,000 smallholder farmers out of which, some 40,000 smallholders

would benefit from more intensive participatory farmer group-based agricultural

extension support (farmer field schools) and an estimated 24,000 smallholders would

benefit directly from productive investment subprojects.

2. The project was expected to increase crop production as a result of: (a) higher

productivity per unit of labor and land in the crop and farm models as applied to

smallholders with project as compared to smallholders without project; and (b) an

increase of the cropping intensity (i.e. area cropped) for smallholders with project as

compared to without project.

Table3.1: Cropping pattern of farm models

Beneficiary type Area in ha (Huambo/Bie model) Yield ton/ha, year 3 with project

Maize Beans Potato Total Maize Beans Cassava Total

Without project 1.20 0.15 0.15 1.50 0.50 0.30 2.50 2.80

Capacity building

& sub-projects

1.80 0.25 0.25 2.30 1.50 0.40 7.50 3.10

Capacity building

w/FFS

1.60 0.20 0.20 2.00 1.00 0.35 5.00 3.00

Capacity building

- basic

1.20 0.15 0.15 1.50 0.65 0.32 3.25 2.90

Table 3.2: Financial profitability of the farm models (Huambo/Bie model)

With/out project Without

project

Capacity building

& sub-projects

Capacity

building w/FFS

Capacity

building - basic

Net income in

US$

118 1 009 445 205

Increase in

income in US$

0

890

327

87

Increase in

income in %

0

755

277

73

Net income per

day in US$

1.5

6.4

3.7

2.6

Increase in

income per day in

US$

0

4.9

2.2

1.1

Increase in

income per day in

%

0

326

147

73

NPV in US$ 5 037 1 897 524

FIRR in % 156 217 9 101

42

3. The appraisal stage analysis showed high financial rates of return to increased crop

production and an Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of 21.1 percent.

Table 3.3: Total estimated impact on production

Groups of Products

Annual production

w/o the project - mt

Annual production

with the project - mt

Increase

%

Cereals (maize) 63 000 148 300 135

Pulses (beans) 5 198 7 458 43

Tubers (potatoes) 35 438 86 419 144

Roots (cassava flour) 88 200 111 850 27

Table 3.4. Net income Total Project

(126,000 families)

W/o Project

US$ per year

With Project

US$ per year

Increase

%

Gross production value 62 165 000 111 061 000 78

Production Costs 29 478 000 40 795 000 38

Net financial Incomes 32 687 000 70 266 000 115

ICR Economic and Financial Analysis

4. Approach. The ICR economic financial analysis follows the same logic as the

appraisal stage analysis and assess the quantifiable financial and economic benefits

generated by increased production and productivity among project beneficiaries.

5. Data collected through the project’s baseline survey and impact evaluation is

sufficient to undertake a basic economic and financial analysis. The baseline and impact

evaluation data provides evidence on yield increases and changes in total production at

the farm level among both beneficiary and control populations. Ex ante economic and

financial analysis of the follow on SADCP project provided an updated baseline of farm

and crop production models for farmers in the project area and have been used in this

ICR analysis as average production models at MOSAP project end. The sample size of

the impact evaluation is considered to be sufficient to generate a reliable picture of

production impact and average production values.

6. Outputs achieved by project completion stage. MOSAP beneficiaries

experienced higher average yield increases across all crops targeted by the project.

Annual surveys and the final impact evaluation also assessed increases in overall

production due to both increased yield and expansion of area under cultivation. Because

farming systems and production patterns differed across provinces data remains

disaggregated for purposes of the economic and financial analysis. While beans and

potato were grown across all three province cassava was promoted in Malanje, a drier

area where maize was less viable.

43

Table 3.5 Yield levels achieved Beneficiary

type

Yield ton/ha, baseline Yield ton/ha, year 3 with project

Maize Beans Potato Cassava Maize Beans Potato Cassava

Target 0.43 0.28 3.37 15.4 0.52 0.37 5.20 15.0

Control 0.43 0.30 3.99 16.4 0.66 0.45 7.10 18.2

Source: MOSAP Impact Evaluation Report

Table 3.6 Average production in target and control beneficiaries

Beneficiary

type

Average production per farmer –

baseline (tons)

Average production per farmer –year 3

with project (tons)


Malanje

Target na 0.06 0.87 14.9 0.06 1.05 20.4

Control na 0.04 0.39 6.4 0.05 0.48 8.6

Huambo

Target 0.59 0.24 0.7 na 0.83 0.42 1.59 na

Control 0.62 0.20 0.9 na 1.08 0.26 3.02 na

Bie

Target 0.51 0.15 0.6 na 0.77 0.36 1.28 na

Control 0.36 0.11 0.4 na 0.55 0.18 0.90 na

na= data not available or production level negligible

Source: MOSAP Impact Evaluation Report

7. Only the incremental production generated by project beneficiaries is used in the

analysis in order to capture the portion of production increases that can be attributed to

MOSAP rather than the general rise in production experienced by both project and non-

project beneficiaries. In most cases both target and control groups increased production

although MOSAP beneficiaries increased production to levels higher than the control

group. Table 3.7 shows the “before and after” change in production within the target

group (project beneficiaries) and control populations as well as the net change

experienced by the target group above the control. These amounts are then applied to

beneficiary population within the provinces to generate an overall picture of the total

volume of incremental production generated by the project.

44

Table 3.7 Net production attributable to MOSAP interventions

Beneficiary

type

Net increase in production per farmer

(end of project average production minus

baseline average production)

(tons)

Incremental production per farmer

beneficiary attributable to MOSAP

(target group net increase in production

minus control group net increase in

production)

(tons)


Malanje

Target na 0 0.18 5.5 na 0 0.09 3.3

Control na 0.01 0.09 2.2

Huambo

Target 0.24 0.18 0.89 na 0.24 0.12 0.89 na

Control 0.46 0.06 2.12 Na

Bie

Target 0.26 0.21 0.68 Na 0.07 0.14 0.18 na

Control 0.19 0.07 0.5 na

na= data not available or production level negligible

Source: calculated based on MOSAP Impact Evaluation Report

Table 3.8: MOSAP Beneficiary coverage # benefitting

from Sub-

Projects

# benefitting

from FFS

Total # benefitting from

project: Sub-projects, FFS

or general

training/extension support

Total # of farmers

in project area

comunes

Malanje 4,956 5,703 17,786 49,864

Huambo 3,661 5,491 14,705 47,787

Bie 4,002 11,238 22,491 103,134

12,619 22,432 54,982 200,785

Source: MOSAP Project Reports, MOSAP PAD

8. Economic rate of return. The stream of net income generated by the project is

calculated by applying the cost of production and current output prices to the incremental

production levels generated from the data above. The value of family labor is included to

incorporate the opportunity cost of labor. Because the productivity for both maize and

beans are low and labor costs are high, this latter calculation renders economic benefit

positive only for potato and cassava. Nonetheless, the stream of net benefits remains

positive and the net economic value of production is used to calculate the rate of return.

Table 3.9: Economic Value of incremental MOSAP Production

Maize Beans Potato Cassava

Total volume of

incremental annual

production

Malanje (tons) 0 0 1,601 58,694

Huambo (tons) 3,529 1,765 13,087 0

Bie (tons) 1,574 3,149 4,048 0

Total incremental

production (tons) 5,104 4,913 18,737 58,694

45

Average farmgate

price/kg (AOA) 26 92 61 20

Variable Production

Cost /kg (family labor

not valued) AOA *

25.7 53.7 18.0 3.0

Variable Production

Cost / kg (family labor

valued) AOA *

55.3 129.5 33.0 9.3

Net value of

production

Net Economic Value

of production (family

labor valued) AOA

-149,464,386 -185,017,421 528,683,550 650,861,568

Net Economic Value

of production

(USD)**

-931,010 -1,152,469 3,293,158 4,054,202

* Variable production costs estimated from updated farm budgets developed under SADCP baseline

scenario ** March 2016 official exchange rate: 160.5 AOA/USD

Table 3.10: Net benefit stream generated by MOSAP

9. The project’s economic rate of return is calculated at 13 percent based on a

conservative calculation of net benefits related to the value of increased production

observed at project end. This level is higher than the opportunity cost of capital and

therefore indicates the project generated a positive rate of return. It is lower than

appraisal estimates, however, which were based on a shorter time period for project

implementation, lower costs of for service provision and goods, and wider beneficiary

coverage.

10. The ICR ERR also likely represents a lower bound estimate of the project’s rate of

return as additional benefits would be expected from income generated through

productive assets such grinding mills, higher value crop production under irrigation sub-

projects, and spillover effects among non-project beneficiaries. The project’s investment

in capacity building is also difficult to quantify.

Table 3.11 Economic Rate of Return and NPV ICR stage Appraisal stage

ERR 13.1% 21.1%

NPV $5,347,126

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017-30

MOSAP

Disburseme

nts (USD)

300,000 26,344 3,339,512 11,346,389 7,090,182 5,789,532 3,362,857

Net value of

production

(USD)

5,263,880 5,263,880

Net income

stream

(USD)

-

300,000 -26,344 -3,339,512 -11,346,389 -7,090,182 -5,789,532 1,901,023 5,263,880

46

Efficiency in achieving other project outcomes

11. The efficiency of service delivery and capacity building was not assessed but the

project’s indications are that despite the challenges of Angola’s high cost environment

made cost effectiveness was prioritized to the extent possible through the use of

competitive service providers and in the case of FAO, some cost-sharing for service

delivery of farmer field school technical assistance.

47

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Lending

Arbi Ben Achour Consultant GSU11

Slaheddine Ben-Halima Consultant GGO05

Serigne Omar Fye Consultant GENDR

Luisa Moises Matsinhe Senior Executive Assistant AFCS2

Domingas de Fatima Rego

Pegado Program Assistant AFMAO

Franco Russo Senior Operations Officer GED02

Daniel Liborio Da Cruz Sousa Consultant GFADR

Joao Tinga Financial Management Specialist GGO13

Supervision/ICR

Pedro Arlindo Agric. Economist GFA07

Andrew Osei Asibey Consultant SACKB

Cary Anne Cadman Senior Environmental Specialist GEN02

Antonio L. Chamuco Senior Procurement Specialist GGO07

Meseret Kebede Senior Program Assistant LEGES

Mohinder S. Mudahar Consultant GWA01

Domingas de Fatima Rego

Pegado Program Assistant AFMAO

Joao Tinga Financial Management Specialist GGO13

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)

Lending

FY05 77.79

FY06 190.35

FY07 407.48

FY08 176.03

Total: 851.65

Supervision/ICR

Total: 0.00

48

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

(MOSAP End of Project Impact Evaluation Survey Report: Executive Summary)

Objectives of the final evaluation

1. As the Market Oriented Smallholder Project (MOSAP) draws to an end, the

Project’s Management Unit (PMU) commissioned an end-line study, which would assess

and document the final project outcome in 2015 against the baseline values of 2012. It is

essentially a comparison of pre- and post-project intervention.

2. The study also intends to identify promising practices; challenges faced during

implementation and how those were overcome and addressed. As the final monitoring

and evaluation exercise, the report combines the annual performance indicator

monitoring together with the impact evaluation of the project. The study includes

qualitative and quantitative approaches with a variety of primary data sources including

participatory methods, which were the main focus on the identification and classification

of promising and best practices.

3.

4. The project's development objective is to increase the agricultural production

through provision of better services and offer investment support to rural smallholder

farmers in selected districts of Malanje, Huambo, and Bié provinces. The outcome

performance indicators that reflect the impact the project aims to produce, include, (i)

40% of the target smallholders adopting a set of improved agricultural technology

promoted by the Project; and (ii) an average increase of 10% of smallholder agricultural

production in the target areas. Thus, the report focuses on four key project indicators: (i)

percentage of project beneficiaries who have adopted an improved agricultural

technology promoted by the project; (ii) average yield of the main crops (maize, cassava,

beans and potato) of participating smallholder farmers; (iii) percentage increase in

agricultural production based on the crop index for the project area; and (iv) the

promising and best practices (PBP) promoted by the project.

Methodological overview

5. The methodology employed in the survey was developed with the view of ensuring

that the dataset structure for key project indicators is consistent with the baseline survey.

The current survey therefore applied the sample frame of 1,500 smallholder farm

families, distributed in proportions corresponding to the size of the intervention per

province as follows: 48% in Bié, 32% inMalanje and the remaining 20% in Huambo. The

total sample was divided into 30 clusters, spread in 25 wards (comunas) in the project

target areas and 25 areas identified as the control. Splitting the sample between target and

control areas has enabled the application of the Double Difference method of impacts

evaluation.

6. The data for this assessment was collected through a combination of quantitative

and qualitative methods, so as to provide the most accurate reading of the indicators. The

49

data quality concerning accuracy, reliability and validity was assured by a team of senior

agriculturalists with a vast experience in administration of field surveys.

7. Adoption rate in the context of MOSAP is defined as the proportion of beneficiary

farmers applying a given set of recommended, improved farming practices (IFP) per crop

during the growing season. A farmer was considered an adopter in Year 1, 2, and 3 if he

or she was found applying all three of the following practices grouped together in a

bundle, that comprise the technology adoption indicators: (i) seed selection; (ii) seed

placement i.e. the right amount of seeds per hole or the correct placement of cassava

cuttings on the ridge; and (iii) the proper plant spacing, both between and within rows.

8. Crop yield and production data were collected through a combination of cutting

and weighing methods together with the farmer reported harvest. The combination of the

two methods is justified because it balances off the drawbacks of either one.

9. A set of qualitative data collection instruments was used primarily for the

identification and classification of promising and best practices, promoted by the project.

These include focus group interviews with farmers organized in associations, and the

Discussion Oriented Self-assessment (DOSA) conducted together with the project’s

office and field staff.

Key project achievements

Adoption of improved farming practices – technologies

10. The project’s target was set to reach a rate of at least 40% adoption of improved

agricultural technology among project beneficiaries. The objective was met successfully,

in quantitative terms, reaching 61.5% adoption at the end of the project.

11. The adoption of maize seed selection practices has been reportedly high since the

first year of implementation. The final survey results show a 97.5% rate of adoption for

seed selection in Huambo and Bié, but it reaches universal levels in Mungo and

Londuimbali. In Bié, the districts of Chinguar and Andulo fall behind by only one

percentage point. All other districts reported seed selection adoption rates well above

85%. Maize planting (sowing) produces very little adoption with only one in five farmers

reporting the adoption of the recommended practices.

12. The adoption of cassava farming practices includes: the selection of the right size

of cutting; placing the cutting on the ridge in the right position; plant spacing, both within

and between rows; ensuring that the cutting has the right number of nodes; and checking

its humidity content. On average, only one in three farmers applied the correct plant

spacing. The adoption rates for the size of cassava cuttings is also low (37.9%),

indicating variations on the type of vegetative material available for planting. The

number of nodes has been adopted by a reasonably high proportion of farmers (59.6%).

The data shows that the humidity content and mode of planting are quickly adopted by

farmers, with the adoption rates situated above the 90% mark.

50

13. The adoption of seed selection practices on beans has reached almost universal

rates in all three provinces, but sowing and plant spacing fall below the average target of

40% in Huambo and Bie. Farmers in Malanje have done better on bean sowing rates

(47.2%), but plant spacing is below 6% adoption in all the districts.

14. The adoption of improved potato farming practices shows a clearly distinct and

rather unusual pattern. As with the other crops, the adoption of seed selection practices

has reached universal levels in a significant number of districts, particularly in Malanje.

Potato planting methods have reached high rates of adoption in all three provinces with

figures ranging from 64% in Bié to 91.1% in Malanje. The adoption of plant spacing

practices in potato production is less problematic that in the other three crops. In Malanje,

nearly 30% of the farmers have adopted the right spacing, whereas rates of 42.8% and

48.5% have been reached in Huambo and Bié respectively.

Factors influencing rates of adoption

15. Having a functional association with effective leadership has been a determinant

for the adoption of IFP, as well for the overall success of the project. Both the

quantitative and qualitative data provide supporting evidence for the fact that the

project’s strategy of organizing farmers in associations has enhanced the provision of a

comprehensive training package on Improved Farming Practices (IFP) as well as on

leadership skills.

16. This report shows the distinctive effect of the project, regarding reaching out to

farmers in the target areas through the associations. In 2012, not all farmers were keen to

participate in agricultural organizations – a behavior which seemed to be determined by

the perception of a lack of tangible benefits to be derived from the participation. The

situation has changed in the target areas over the last four years. The proportion of

villages with functional associations has grown from 44.5% in 2012 to 85.6% in 2015 in

the target areas. This is consistent with the percentage of farmers with association

membership, which rose from 27.9% in 2012 to 87.1% in 2015. This has had a positive

influence on the adoption rates which grew from 34% in 2013 to the current level of

61.5%.

17. A Decision Tree Analysis (DTA) model was used to identify key variables that had

a significant influence on the rate of adoption. Results have shown that, as in the previous

DTA model, the training provider is a strong determinant of adoption. It is found that

farmers who received training in Farmer Field Schools, in association with the local

Agricultural Development Stations (EDA) extension officers, were highly likely to adopt

the technology. Having previous knowledge of the improved farming practices was the

second-highest predictor of adoption. The results show that farmers who had some

knowledge of the improved agricultural practices before training were more likely to

become full adopters. The innovation factor was also found to be significant. Farmers,

who considered the IFP as an innovation to them, were highly likely to adopt the

prescribed recommendations. Farmer-to-Farmer extension is beginning to play a role in

51

adoption. Farmers who have received the training on improved farming practices from

other farmers (including FFS facilitators from a different village) had high adoption rates

with a significant predictive value for the model.

Crop Production Indicators

18. The crop production index is the key performance indicator, which provides an

aggregated measure of the increase in crop production in real terms. The 2011/12. The

three-year index trend shows a progressive increase in production of maize, cassava,

beans and potatoes. At the end of the project in 2015, the overall CPI was calculated at

166. However, CPI varied largely across individual crops.

Maize crop outcome indicators

19. The maize crop production Index at the end of the project is 142, which is

primarily attributed to production increases in Huambo and Bié. In Malanje, despite the

potential for high yields, maize cultivation remains limited to a few square meters per

farmer and the production is sold for the most part as green mealies. The Index for the

control areas is calculated at 102 representing a very modest growth from the year of the

baseline. The difference of 40 percentage points between the target and control areas

represents the impact of the project on maize production

20. Farmers in Huambo and Bié have not only recovered from years of poor crop

yields, but they have experienced growth in real terms. In 2012, the mean yield was

estimated at 0.43t/ha for farmers in both target and control areas. The current mean yields

are estimated at 0.75t/ha for Huambo and 0.77 t/ha for the province of Bié, an increase of

53.6%. The average yield in control areas is calculated at 0.52t/ha., an increase of 20.5%

over the same period. As a result, of the project’s intervention, farmers in the target areas

of Huambo and Bié have harvested on average 142kg more maize hectare than their

counterparts in the control areas – and this is the real impact of the project as far as maize

yield is concerned.

Cassava crop outcome indicators

21. Due to the self-commitment of farmers in Malanje, the cassava crop production

Index reached 151 at the end of the project. Farmers in control areas have also recovered

from poor crop years, yielding a crop Index of 130. This performance results in a 21

percentage point difference between the two areas, which considered the impact of the

project on cassava production. Although the impact is positive, this index level does not

reflect the full potential of cassava farmers in the target areas of Malanje. As a semi-

perennial crop, the project could not develop a comprehensive strategy to improve both

the yields and production to regional standards within the limited timeframe of the

project. And for the same reason, the efforts to improve cassava production was limited

to the target areas in Malanje province, whereas in Huambo and Bié the crop maintained

its marginal status for the entire life of the project.

52

22. The final assessment data for cassava has estimated the yield of 18.2t/ha – a 10.9%

increase which was achieved only towards the end of the project. However, cassava

yields have fluctuated greatly during the project across all the target areas with the district

of Kiwaba Nzoji reporting a declining trend. A similar trend has been observed in control

areas with yields maintaining close to the baseline value of 15t/ha. Due to the

intervention of the project, farmers in the target areas have realized a real increase of 2.2t

of cassava per hectare on average.

Bean crop outcome indicators

23. The 2015 bean crop Index is calculated at 223, with farmers in Malanje

contributing the largest share of real growth. However, a bean crop production index of

166 in the control areas does indicate that farmers, in general, did make an effort to

increase their production. The difference in the crop production indexes between the two

areas is of 57 percentage points, representing in real terms, the impact of the project on

beans production.

24. It is irrefutable that the increase in bean production in the target areas is a major

consequence of the project’s intervention. The average area under cultivation per farmer

increased from 0.47 ha in 2012 to 0.64 ha in 2015. The previous monitoring and

evaluation reports indicate that many farmers became more seriously involved in bean

cultivation for the first time in 2013.

25. During the project, farmers in the target areas of Huambo and the Bié not only

recovered from the consecutive years of poor bean yields but they have also experienced

a reasonable increase in real growth. At the end of the project, the mean bean yield is

0.45t/ha, an increase of 46.9% from the base year. Without the project intervention – i.e.

in the control areas – the average bean yields is estimated at 0.37 t/ha, representing an

increase of 25.6% from a weak base year. As a result of the project, farmers in the target

areas have harvested on average 69.7Kg more beans per hectare than those in the control

areas.

Potato crop outcome indicators

26. Potato growers have realized the highest real growth, with a crop production Index

calculated at 394. This was also true for control areas where the Index is calculated at

576. Farmers in Huambo were largely responsible for the steep growth in potato

production in both areas. In fact, it is worth noting that the real growth of potato

production in Huambo is nearly twice as higher in the control areas as compared to target

areas – an outcome that was already predicted in the midterm monitoring and evaluation

performance surveys. The differential growth is 182 for the control areas, implying no

real impact of the project on potato production. However, the proportion of farmers

participating in potato production, as a result of the project, has doubled, contributing

further to the high volume of production recorded in the target areas. Even so, this was

not enough to outperform the good farmers in control areas who have brought large areas

under cultivation.

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27. On a rather positive note, potato yield in the target areas has grown from an

average of 3.9t/ha in 2012 to 6.9t/ha in 2015, whereas in the control areas yields have

grown from 3.2t/ha to 5.0t/ha over the same period. The overall differential impact of the

project is 1.3t/ha –an incremental growth that would not have been achieved without the

project.

Promising and Best Practices

28. Promising and best practices were identified through a combination of methods i.e.

the PBP Classification Scale and the Discussion-Oriented Self-assessment framework

(DOSA). The leading practices under review include: technical staff development;

staffing levels to ensure adequate monitoring of field activities; timely and participatory

planning of subprojects; women’s participation in project planning; delivery of extension

services through farmer field schools; and strengthening organizational capacity through

farmers training. The project’s model (design and implementation), though it is not a

practice as such, was also included in the PBP assessment.

29. The PBP classification scale ranges from 2 to 10 points, whereby a 2-point scale

means that a given practice is sufficiently innovative, and benefits have been identified.

The highest level of 10 means that a particular practice has reached full maturity, it is

deemed essential, and value has been proven.

30. As far as staffing requirements and project delivery are concerned, the PBP overall

classification is 7.9. This indicates that the project has made resources available for skills

development and enhance best technical practices. However, staffing levels were kept

low, to the point of compromising the practical implementation of monitoring and

evaluation activities. It did not reach the stage of a best practice but it is highly

promising, and it is close to maturity.

Another high-rank practice includes the provision of training to technical staff to enable

them to work more efficiently towards the strategic goals of the project. This practice

earned the classification of 7.0.

31. Staffing levels, to allow a timely monitoring of field activities, was largely

compromised during the project and therefore, the resulting PBP classification for this

practice is 5.5. Staffing levels have affected the monitoring of the utilization of inputs

distributed to farmers, a practice which is classified at 6.9. The monitoring of factors

hampering the adoption of the improved farming practices carries the lowest

classification score of 4.0.

32. On project programming practices, the classification of 8.1 was achieved for the

efficient delivery of extension services through farmer field schools. Participatory

identification and planning of projects were second with a classification of 7.0. The

practice of making project management decisions based on results from regular

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monitoring exercises began to develop late in the project cycle hence a low classification

of 5.1.

33. The creation of active farmers associations is considered an important practice of

the project, but it carries a low classification of 5.6. However, results of the focus group

interviews indicate that there is potential to advance into a best practice.

34. The implementation of the project through farmer’s associations has made it

possible for women to participate more in the planning of agricultural activities, together

with their male counterparts. The fact that women took seats in the subprojects selection

and approval committees, was considered as one of the best practices on gender

awareness, earning a PBP classification of 6.9. But the project did not go very far

regarding developing specific messages to improve women's farming practices, yielding a

low PBP classification of 5.5. Nonetheless, there is agreement that more female-headed

households had access to production resources than never before, a practice, which

produces a PBP classification of 6.6.

35. With a PBP classification of 8.5, it is agreed that the project’s design and

implementation model is sufficiently solid and consistent to be replicated in other parts of

the country.

Concluding Remarks

Despite the variations in the crop production index across districts, the project’s target

objectives were largely achieved. In fact, farmers have shown potential to reach higher

goals.

36. The first two performance evaluation surveys already provided an indication that

the project was on the right path to meet its target objectives. Looking at the 2015 crop

data, one could say that the project management team was conservative in setting its

goals – at least as far as crop production is concerned. Although smallholder crop

production is somewhat dependent on the rainfall distribution, these results indicate

clearly that this sector has the potential to reach much higher levels of production,

provided that farmers have the right commercial incentives. Farmer skepticism about

increasing crop production (cassava and potato in particular) beyond their current

marketing capability was also noted and documented. It suggests that any attempt to

increase the production of what is considered locally as a cash crop, with no provisions

for a secure market outlet, is likely to yield poor results.

The project has achieved a high rate of adoption given a four-year implementation

time frame. However, the regional pattern of adoption is highly pronounced, which

calls for a review of the current approach.

37. The adoption of farming practices of 61.5 percent is well above the project target

of 40%. However, one of the lessons that we take from monitoring the adoption rates

over the years is that the adoption of a given IFP is determined primarily by the weight of

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the crop in the farming system. This was very clear in the behavioral pattern of adoption

of maize and cassava IFP within Malanje and Huambo respectively. Therefore,

measuring the adoption rates for cassava in Huambo and Bié would make sense if the

project had a particular strategy to promote the production of this crop in the target areas.

38. A strategy to encourage the production of crops should go beyond the provision of

inputs; but include a service which supports the farmers to help them develop storage,

processing, and overall marketing strategies. Farmers need to understand the competitive

advantage of producing a new crop in order to adapt and adopt improved farming

practices. Since it was not the case, cassava kept its marginal status in a maize dominated

farming system, and vice versa. And this led to the second major lesson in adoption

indicators: unless the project has a comprehensive strategy to promote “foreign” crop

within a given farming framework, this crop should not be included in the training for the

adoption of IFP.

The adoption of some but not all of the IFP will be maintained in the years ahead.

39. The adoption rates for the IFP has shown a somewhat consistent pattern over the

past three years of project implementation. The 2015 final assessment data shows more

clearly that the adoption of seed selection techniques for all crops (including the selection

of cassava cuttings) has the potential to reach almost universal rates. It is most certain

that the newly acquired practices of seed selection will be maintained long after the

phase-out project stage. But the same cannot be said for the adoption of sowing (or seed

placement) and plant spacing practices.

The question regarding whether local farmers will be able to maintain the association

function after the project is complete, remains to be addressed. However, the presence

of strong leaders and the absence of multiple hierarchy structures at village level are

necessary conditions for the associations to remain functional

40. Perhaps the most important outcome of this project is that farmers in the project

target areas have demonstrated the potential to raise crop productivity far beyond the

historically low levels, as long as they are provided with the appropriate supportive

infrastructure and incentives. But the development of organizational and leadership skills

is as important as the supplying the production inputs to farmers. Effective membership

has grown substantially in the last three years in response to the increased supply of

production inputs – predicted in 2012. This type of supply-driven participation prompts

one to question the sustainability of the associations in the absence of the project.

41. The organizational and leadership skills training that farmers received in 2013

should continue, in order to reach members of the associations that did not have the

opportunity to participate. Refresher sessions could be introduced in Farmer Field

Schools (FFS) during the lean season. This may not be a sufficient condition to ensure the

associations continue to function, but a necessary element, reinforcing that the

association is not just a platform through which farm inputs are provided. In addition, the

number of members per association is critical for ensuring functional sustainability.

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Associations with strong leadership have limited the number of members to levels

between 30 and 50 and they have achieved better results than the larger associations. In

the event of a second project, MOSAP-2, these associations should be given an

opportunity to continue strengthening the internal organizational capacity and generate

the resources to enable further growth.

The relationship between project design and impact evaluation, developed by the

project is a lesson worth documenting and recommending for adoption across the

sector in Angola.

42. One of the most important attributes one of MOSAP, which deserves the

classification of a Best Practice, is the relationship the project has established between the

baseline survey and the post-project evaluation. The project implementation design took

into serious consideration the need to conduct a baseline study and an end of project

impact evaluation, which would assess, not only the performance of the impact indicators

over time, but it also attempt to provide answers to questions like what would the

productivity outcome of farmers in the target areas have been without a structured

intervention? This approach to project evaluation implies, in principle, that without the

intervention the impact of the variables (productivity and production) would be the same

for farmers in both control and targets areas. This dimension of evaluation is often taken

for granted in agricultural development projects in Angola. It is unquestionable that

MOSAP provides a valuable experience worth recommending for wide scale adoption in

the agricultural sector in this country.

The monitoring and evaluation of process, and impact indicators were one of the main

challenges of the project. Low staffing levels and reduced capacity to align the

planning and implementation of subprojects together with the M&E framework were

the main limitations, leading to an inadequate flow of data to inform programming

decisions.

43. The three years of field data collected from standard survey design does not

produce the best set of data for an accurate monitoring of crop productivity indicators.

The design methodology has to take into account the fact that the four crops promoted by

the project follow different growing cycles. Also, with the probable exception of some

areas in Malanje, most of the beans and potato crops are produced in two growing

seasons. Depending on the rainfall pattern, the crop grown in the two seasons produce

different yields, and much of the second season crop data is lost.

44. The 2015 survey provides more accurate estimates of potato yields because the

researchers made a unilateral decision to conduct the field data collection in two stages.

This approach is appropriate for the assessment of by-seasonal crops, but is not the case

with cassava, as the monitoring of production indicators poses a much greater challenge.

The fact that there is not a single cassava harvest season and uprooting follows specific

consumption and marketing needs, makes crop harvest estimates less accurate. Therefore,

the introduction of a cassava harvest diary needs to be introduced to improve

measurement of production indicators.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

(Report of stakeholder workshop in identifying lessons from MOSAP, translated from the

Portuguese)

1 Positive aspects of MOSAP

1. MOSAP was the first community investment project in the areas where it was

implemented and had several positive impacts:

• Increased the efficiency of using of time for productive purposes by reduction of

time spent on some activities such as grinding maize mail as the project provided

grinding meals;

• Increased in the cultivated area;

• introduction of more effective technologies of cultivation and therefore increase

the productivity and quality of the products;

• development and consolidation of associations;

• development of planning capacity of associations (preparation of project

proposals for funding, simplified feasibility studies among other activities);

• stimulated new development initiatives and emergency of new projects;

• emergency of some activities in cooperation with other associations

• increased capacity for negotiations with public support, improved responsibility

• improved knowledge of the market for acquisition of inputs and

commercialization such as PAPAGRO

2. In summary the project has achieved the following:

• increased income of the beneficiaries;

• increased the technical empowerment of the beneficiary farmers

• increased the capacity development of the associations and beneficiary farmers

• development of associations

• increased social capital

3. It will up to the SADCP project to capitalize and increase the positive impacts

achieved under MOSAP.

2 Negative signs and delayed opportunities

a) Negative signs

4. MOSAP was executed under specific conditions which explain the negative points

mentioned below which are worth to register:

• Lack of previous experiences with producer associations in the villages;

• Lack of field technical team;

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• Slow start up of the project of the project and unable to achieve any result before

changes in 2013;

• Lack of services providers to supply goods such as grinding mills and water

pumps, animals and inputs such as seeds and fertilizers and limitation of the

government programs to complement the project with its own resources.

5. However, some of the project norms and strategies may have provided negative

signs and stimulate negative behavior which contributed to the difficulties observed by

technicians and leaders.

6. The associations had very little participation in the preparation of the sub-projects

and most instances was enough to present a desire (“we want grinding mill”), without a

requirement to full formulate the project with a budget, implementation timeframe,

objectives and targets, projection of revenues and costs of production. Could be said that

the association were not stimulated to do this exercise.

7. During the implementation of the sub-projects, the associations had very little

participation. For most items (inputs and equipment), meanly those that were procured at

the central level, the associations were not asked to look for their own suppliers, examine

different options for procurement, etc. In some cases the associations never got in contact

with the supplier, which create problems for maintenance when the equipment required

technical assistance which create complete dependence on MOSAP intermediation.

8. Also during implementation, the associations were not stimulated to organize and

take part on the utilization of resources and look for solutions that would decrease the

cost. This was lost opportunity to participate in the management of a project that would

have enable them to participate in the registration of revenues and learn that they have to

be accountable.

9. The project also had a very small menu of sub-projects which in some cases

limited the support that the community was looking for from the project. In most cases

the project had informed that the sub-project that they were looking for is not part of the

list of the sub-projects support by MOSAP.

10. In some cases the beneficiaries reduced the cultivated area due to difficulties in

obtaining seeds and fertilizers at competitive prices, or they had reduced productivity as

the inputs arrived late. In addition the distribution of seeds and fertilizers by the

government bringing dependency and insecurity: the associations were not certain if they

will continue receiving the inputs, not sure about the criteria used to determine the

quantities for each associations and even if they want to pay not sure how payment could

be made to government.

11. With the objective to help the associations, MOSAP made a tremendous effort to

resolve the problem faced by associations (repair of equipment, acquisition of spare parts,

mobilization of technical staff and suppliers to resolve the problem). In most cases the

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project effort was critical for the success of the investment. But there was no clear

guidelines in the project to the beneficiaries to solicit this support.

12. This form of support in Brasil is called “dar um jeitinho-- giving a favor” which in

general increase the recognition of the people responsible for the project but does not

increase the growth of the association.

b) Training: Some delayed opportunities

13. The training provided by MOSAP may have left some opportunities:

14. First there is some disconnect with various capacity building initiatives. In the

Farmers Field Schools there is training, at the startup of the project there were other

trainings and also many other trainings provided by private consultants.

15. It is difficult to understand the training provided at various stages with various

service providers, how they link together. It is difficult to understand from the project this

link and how it contributed to the consolidation of the associations.

16. On the other side, apparently the training is done using traditional training

methods, teaching, a trainer providing training without knowledge of the real difficulties

of the target group and without promoting exchange among the groups. In this way it was

lost an opportunity to create space for cooperation between associations for knowledge

exchange.

17. Last MOSAP paid for the transport of participants. While the groups are low

income this may create dependency and if not paid do not participate.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

(MINAGRI Comments)

1. The ICR reflects well the main challenges faced by the project since its inception

to completion, including the results achieved. We would like to add the following lessons

learned as will be important for the implementation of SADCP project:

2. Improved Farmers organization through groups or associations increased

provision of assistance to smallholder and access to inputs, but continued assistance

is required for increased sustainability. It is a known fact that effective membership in

the farmers organizations and associations has grown substantially in the last three years

in response to the increased project assistance specifically on access to production inputs

but the farmers associations seem to be still in development stage and much more work is

required, particularly to ensure that all the members see the association as theirs. Farmers

have begun to realize that the development of organizational and leadership skills is as

important as access to the production inputs. In addition, the presence of strong leaders

and the absence of multiple hierarchy structures at village level are necessary conditions

for establishing and mainlining functional associations.

3. Development of smallholder capacity is key for increased sustainability. The

development of new capacity was the key to the success and sustainability of the actions

supported by the project. It allowed the strengthening of small farmers associations,

incorporate technological innovations, start new activities, manage production units in a

more efficient way and helped to reach markets in better conditions, using, for such, new

capabilities that remain after the project end. The experience demonstrates that only

associations consisting of small strong and solid agricultural farmers can identify their

own problems and solve them and, on the other hand, no poverty can be reversed without

generating income in a sustainable manner

4. Good communication and participatory planning was key for smooth

implementation. Meetings organized by the project implementation team with different

stakeholders involved in the implementation of the project during the implementation of

the project proved to be valuable opportunities for reflection by the various actors on

their own experiences and learning. People involved could speak openly about their

concerns; raise problems and dilemmas they were facing; and discussions emerged.

Several meetings were undertaken in order to identify communication bottlenecks in the

documentation system. These meetings also helped identify who was responsible for the

different information flows and established necessary frequency and deadlines for report

submission. By discussing and planning for these issues, the documentation system was

more likely to operate smoothly. Also, promoting networking by exchanging knowledge

and information, thereby increasing cooperation among different organizations. The

sharing of the information makes all involved in the project realize their participation and

feedback is indispensable in making needed improvements.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

(IFAD Comments and Lessons Learned)

1. The two IFAD and World Bank missions held consultations and interactions to

learn more about MOSAP’s achievements and lessons that could serve in shaping the

SAMAP design and fine-tuning the design of SADCP. In addition, A VC meeting was

organized between the IFAD’s Country Director, Ms. Abla Benhammouche and the WB

Senior Agriculture Specialist, TTL, Mr. Aniceto Bila.

2. The implementation of MOSAP was slow initially, with field activities having

started around mid-2012, some 2.5 years after effectiveness. Nonetheless, its

implementation progress has been encouraging since February 2012, when a new

coordinator and project team was designated to take over the project coordination and

implementation.

3. A field visit was organized in the three provinces where MOSAP was

implemented, i.e. Malanje, Bié and Huambo. The field visit lasted full three days and

included meetings with IDA, Municipal Administrators, Director Provincial Department

of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Extension and a large number of beneficiaries

at several locations in different municipalities. These meetings and field visits were

extremely valuable in reviewing the achievements under MOSAP as well as drawing

important lessons for the current design of the IFAD’s financed SAMAP (follow up

project under preparation by IFAD).

4. The main achievements were noted in the strengthening of the capacity of famers’

groups and associations, the strengthening of IDA technical staff through provision of

training in Participatory planning, Farmers’ Field Schools (FFS) and support to

investment for farmers through provision of financial resources to 282 sub-projects

benefiting 14,439 smallholder farmers. The activities financed include: Animal traction;

support to mechanized land preparation; and agricultural processing mainly grinding

mills.

5. The main results include: Increased in productivity in most crops supported under

the project, increased agro-processing of cassava and increased income of beneficiaries.

6. The main challenges after the project completion remain with the lack of exit

strategy, poor maintenance of the equipment provided to producers mainly grinding

mills, lack of veterinary services in places where farm animals have been provided, weak

ownership with farm associations and therefore overall sustainability.

7. Looking forward, for the design of SAMAP and SADCP projects, important

lessons should be considered, based on the preliminary findings of the joint WB and

IFAD ICR mission. Based on the MOSAP impact assessment report, PCR and

discussions held with the MOSAP management team, the Government, IFAD, the World

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Bank and other stakeholders, a number of important lessons learned emerged that are

particularly relevant for the design of the SAMAP and SADCP projects.

Lessons learned from MOSAP

8. Performance of the PCU. Effective project implementation requires good project

management and intensive supervision, including functioning and sound monitoring

evaluation system. MOSAP was not able to deliver until 2013, when the management

team was replaced. Managerial and organizational problems seriously undermine the

implementation of MOSAP. For this reason, building coordination and management

capacity is crucial for delivering services of value to the beneficiaries.

9. It is critical that contracts allow for regular review of performance and

opportunities for renewal or termination, according to performance. There has also been

insufficient collaboration and learning between projects and till recently, inadequate

follow-up and support from IFAD.

10. Special attention should be devoted to improved monitoring and evaluation

systems that facilitate and document progress towards sustainability. Effective M&E of

field operations supports sustainability in multiple ways. First and foremost, it identifies

strengths and weaknesses in project implementation, which makes possible needed

adjustments in response to changes in the operating environment. Second, it can highlight

potential linkages among individual project components that enhance the overall impact

of programme interventions. Finally, it can establish reliable indicators of project

sustainability, which is a critical step in gauging progress towards key benchmarks and

formulating effective exit strategy.

11. Opportunities for knowledge management and learning are lost when M&E is not

used as a project management tool. Overall, Project M&E systems was not used as

project management tools. While the project regularly tracked outputs (training,

infrastructure projects, agricultural demonstrations, FFS, etc.), they were not actively

engaged in tracking outcomes or impact of project activities. Thus opportunities for

knowledge management and learning were often lost.

12. Exit Strategy. Among the most common and detrimental findings regarding the

sustainability of MOSAP is the prevailing lack of an exit strategy in the design document

and implementation plan. SAMAP (MOSAP follow up project under preparation by

IFAD) and SADC should lay out a comprehensive exit strategy linked to IFAD’s Angola

COSOP and WB Country Strategy framework. The Exit Strategy should include

identification of institutional capacity-building needs, a description of benchmarks for

measuring progress towards project objectives, specific action plans for achieving the

benchmarks, and a reasonably flexible timeline within which benchmarks will be met. It

is also important that an exit strategy draw on a range of specific exit criteria. In addition,

in order to put SAMAP and SADCP in the path of sustainability, the designs should

incorporate context-specific risk management measures into all activities.

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13. Sustainability. Sustainability relates to the likelihood that the benefit streams

generated by the project would continue after the project closure. While the project

embarked on important initiatives there are a number of issues and concerns with regard

to sustainability. One of the main issues with sustainability is that the participatory

approach has not been mainstreamed into government's regular development planning

and budgeting processes: in other words, the efforts for identification of community

needs based on a bottom-up approach are undertaken only when there is a "project".

Furthermore, the rushed implementation in the latter years prevented MOSAP from

giving enough time and attention to consolidate their support to farmer organizations and

thus their sustainability. However, the seven year-period of implementation cannot be

considered a reasonable time frame to ensure the sustainability of all the results produced

by the project.

14. Despite the benefits and positive views by the communities as well as the

government staff, the participatory development approach has still remained "project-

centered" and has not been mainstreamed into government planning. in addition, a

number of institutional and technical factors influenced the sustainability of MOSAP

component 2 i.e. Agricultural Investments. Sustainability of sub-projects assisting

farmers with agricultural production, processing and marketing should be ensured by

promoting community ownership and by building capacity of farmer groups to operate

and maintain equipment prior to hand-over.

15. In order to improve the SAMAP sustainability, the temptation to focus solely on

the achievement of physical and financial targets should be avoided. As seen during the

field visit, this has led to a failure to promote community ownership and to the premature

granting of responsibility for equipment maintenance to beneficiaries. It is also important

that the design and implementation of sub-project investment in agriculture be based on

an analysis of the technical capacity of beneficiaries. This may help define capacity-

building needs that will ensure that beneficiaries are able to adequately operate and

maintain equipment’s once the project ends.

16. Capacity building. Institutional and organizational support is often mistakenly

equated with training. Training is a part of institutional and organizational support but

cannot be identified with it exclusively. Institutional and organizational support should be

understood as a complex set of different activities, including the provision of incentives,

equipment, infrastructure and training, and also the implementation of policy-dialogue

activities aime at promoting an enabling environment for broader institutional

innovations and organizational expansion to facilitate scaling up.

17. Within the SAMAP and SADCP capacity strengthening should be demand-driven,

gradual and dynamic. Flexibility should always be integrated into project design in order

to allow room for learning and adjusting to changing circumstances. Trained individuals

need good leadership, support tools, equipment and operational budgets to enable them to

perform within the established procedures (planning, reporting and accountability), rules

and by-laws. However, even a farmer association, that has acquired the ability to plan,

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implement and monitor its own development plan, may become frustrated and feel

abandoned in the medium run if no financing is available to implement the plan.

18. Farmer Field School (FFS). Although the performance of FFS needs to be

evaluated, they are considered to be the right extension methodology and it was found

that the Master farmers as well as some members of the associations have grasped the

techniques for different crops. FFS is an effective platform for farmer organization and

empowerment, where smallholder farmers with a common interest can gain increased

production, productivity and access to market. This platform served an important role for

farmers both in terms of social and technical support. Farmers who participate in the first

phase of training of trainers become the Master Farmers (FFS-MF) who facilitate or

replicate the training to new farmers, thus achieving a geometric increase in the number

of farm families with strengthened capacities.

19. The chances of effective FFS network to grow, can be strengthened if care is given

in the SAMAP and SADCP to farmer-driven network development. Furthermore, in

order to build on best practice of using farmers as extension agents whilst ensuring their

sustainability post project, it is recommended that SADCP and SAMAP projects, should

facilitate farmer promoters to become agricultural input suppliers at the village level.

Within SAMAP, and SADCP outstanding farmers should be able to earn service fees in

delivering technological advices to their client farmers.

20. Value Chain. SADCP and SAMAP projects, should support a demand pull

strategy for agriculture. In order for farmers to meet consumer preferences with higher

returns and improved household incomes, future initiatives should be value chain

anchored as well as production-oriented. By focusing on both production and

consumption, it is possible to work for a “double win” scenario where the emerging

global market is taken into consideration.

21. Therefore, future operations in Angola should support market linkages and value

chain approach. Marketing under the MOSAP project was touched upon very slightly,

mostly in connection with the component 2. Analysis of market opportunities should be

carried out before investing in production systems, and training on business and

marketing aspects should complement production-oriented training. Long-term success

requires not only improved on-farm productivity but also opportunities for farmers to

have access to, and compete in, output markets. SADCP and SAMAP projects need to

provide institutional support for various marketing activities at several levels, including

assistance to farmer groups, members of groups or entrepreneurs for establishment and

initial operation via credit of marketing associations of agricultural produce or purchase

of inputs, private small and medium scale processing plants, equipped with storage

facilities and quality testing. Development interventions that support market linkages and

the value chain approach can stimulate diversification and investments that would lead to

availability of market produce and the strengthening of rural enterprises. They would,

further, bring closer the rural entrepreneurs to the market and would contribute to the

development of efficient schemes that will incorporate technical support, financing,

management and quality control.

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22. Consolidation. There is a need to strengthen the MOSAP sustainability, through a

consolidation phase to be considered in SADCP and SAMAP projects. This phase should

include: (i) improving the capacity of farmer associations, to manage their own sub

projects, while continuing to strengthen and supervise the recently established FFS which

are at different stages. More advanced training in managerial competency should be

provided, to strengthen farmer technical capacity, managerial competence; marketing

skills and organizational structures.

23. The organizational and leadership skills training that farmers received should

continue, in order to reach members of the associations that did not have the opportunity

to participate. Refresher sessions could be introduced in Farmer Field Schools (FFS)

during the lean season. This may not be a sufficient condition to ensure that the

associations continue to function, but a necessary element, reinforcing that the

association is not just a platform through which farm inputs are provided.

24. In addition, Sub-projects that largely consists of equipment requires close

examination to increase sustainability. The SADCP and SAMAP should increase the

support to farmers in preparation of business and management plans to increase

sustainability of these investments.

25. All these activities are key to increase the sustainability of the project after closing.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Document (July 2008)

2. Restructuring paper (February, 2013)

3. Operations Manual

4. IFAD Credit Agreement

5. Aide Memoire (October 2008)

6. Aide Memoire (October 2009)

7. Aide Memoire (Oct-Nov. 2010)

8. Aide Memoire May/2010)

9. Aide Memoire (August 2011)

10. Aide Memoire (Jan – Feb 2012)

11. Aide Memoire (June 2012)

12. Aide Memoire (April 2013)

13. Project Progress Reports (2010-2015)

14. Government ICR (2016)

Project and M&E studies

15. Baseline Survey (2012)

16. Resumo das Lições Aprendidas e Sugestões para o SADCP (2015)

17. End of Project Impact Evaluation Study (2015)

18. Relatorio Fnal do Acordo IDA/MOSAP/FAO (2016)

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MAP