wolz, henry g. - plato's doctrine of truth - orthótes or alétheia

7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia

1/27

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Plato's Doctrine of Truth: Orthtes or Altheia?Author(s): Henry G. WolzSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Dec., 1966), pp. 157-182Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105357

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2/27

PLATO'S

DOCTRINE

OF

TRUTH:

ORTHOTES

OR

AL]tTHEIA?

The

stagewhich

the

interpretation

f

the Platonic

writings

has

reached

is very

odd

indeed. If

we divide

the

dialogues

roughly nto

three

groups,

then

we

find that

the

early dialogues,

with their

emphasis

on

search,

are generally

said

to

be

animated

by the liberal spirit

of the

living

Socrates.'

But the

very attempt

to find a

definition

for such

terms

as

courage, self-mastery, r virtue tself, suggestsa belief in the possi-

bility

of rigid

standards

or the

conduct

of life

which

belies that

spirit.

The

dialoguesof

the second

group

are

ascribed o

the

period of

Plato's

supreme excellence

as a dramatist.

Here

one

would expect

to find

the playwright's

eachingby

indirection,

he stimnulation

f thought

which

is usually

associated

with

the

Socratic method.

Instead

the

dramatic

elements

are completelyneglected

by the

commentatorsor

relegated

to

the byplay,

and the main

purpose

of the

dialogues

s

seen in

the presen-

tation

of such

Platonic

doctrines

as

the theory

of ideas

in the

Phaedo

which serves

as the basis for a rigorousdemonstrationof the immor-

tality

of the

soul, and

the rule

of the

philosopher-kings

n the Republic,

whose insight

into the

ultimate

meaning

of the world

enables

them

to

judge

with

infallibility

in matters

both

private

and

public.

The

late

dialogues

which

are

characterized

by

a marked

decline

of

dramatic

power

one

would

associate

with

a more

straightforward

xposition

and perhaps

a

more dogmatic

attitude.

This anticipation

would

be in

keeping

with the

reason

which

is customarilygiven

for the

more

rigid

outlook of the second group as againstthe first. For if this change is

rightly

attributed o

the decline

of

the memory

of Socrates

in

the

mind

of

Plato,

then the

last

group

would

be

likely

to continue

this

trend.

Curiously

enough

it has of

late

become

fashionable

to

see much

of

the

Socratic

method

and

spirit

in

the late

dialogues.

Cornford's

om-

mentary

on

the Parmenides,

or

instance,

is

replete

with remarks

such

1

E. A.

Taylor

refers

to them

as

Socratic

dialogues.

(Plato,

The Man

and

His

Work.

Sixth

Edition.

London:

1949,

p.

XI.)

Hermann Gauss

calls

them

Friih-

dialoge and distinguishesthem from the Dialoge der literarischenMeisterschaft

and

the

Spidialoge.

(Philosophischer

Handkommentar

zu

den

Dialogen

Platos.

Bern:

1961.)

2

E.

A.

Taylor,

op. cit.,

p. 20.

3

Ibid., p.

19.

157

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3/27

158 PHILOSOPHY

NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

ESEARCH

as these: Faithful

o Socrates,

he would

rathermake

us think for our-

selves than tell

us what

to think. We

are ... to

draw for ourselves

the necessary

nferences. Cornford

goes,so far as, to say that at

times

Plato'spurpose is to puzzle the reader by apparent contradictions

or

that differentmeanings,

of the supposition

have

been disguised

and that he leaves

it to

us to

discover

the

relevant sense or aspect.

Hermann

Gauss, in his

six-volume

Handkommentar

nterprets

Philebus

65a

to mean

that Plato no longer

regards.

he supreme,

Good

as

directly

accessible.9

He finds that

in the-Laws

Plato has become

much

more

liberal

as

compared

with

the Republic where

he advocated

state

control of the

arts,'0 and that he

now

holds

that the founder of

a

new

state cannot simply look to the ideal but must have

regard for various

aspects of the

specific

situation, such as

the geographical

onditions

of

the site he has

chosen,

as well as the historical

tradition

n which

the

prospective

colonists have

been raised.

In fact Gauss

attempts

o

trace

a process,of

maturation

and liberalization

of Plato's

philosophy,which

finds its consummation

n the dialogues

written

toward the end

of

his

life:

It seems that when

Plato

wrote the Sophist

he

had not

yet

altogether

freed

himself from the illusion

that a

kind of permanent

knowledge

might

after

all

be accessible to us. He has not yet reached the height which he will reach

in

the

Timaeus where all our

assertions

about

reality

are

regarded

as no more

than

eik6tes

mythoi,

that is as tentative and

merely probable

assertions,

which

in principle

can be

overthrown and of

which,

in the

name

of

philosophy,

we

must

hope

that

sooner

or

later they

will

in

fact be

overthrown

and

surpassed.12

It

was,

difficult

enough

to

accept the

old

view

which

maintained

hat

one and the

same author who

so successfully portrayed

the

spirit

of

Socrates

n

the

early

dialogues

had become

so

utterly

inflexiblein

later

life. But the new

one,

which would have

us

believe

that

the wine

turned

4

F.

MacDonald

Cornford,

Plato

and

Parmenides.

New York, 1951,

p.

111.

5

Ibid.,

p. 107.

6

Ibid.,

p. 163.

7

Ibid., p. 217.

8

Ibid., p. 154

Note

also:

They

(the

students

of the

Academy)

are

expected

to

compare

the

arguments

of each

Hypothesis

with

those

of the

others and

to

find

out

for

them-

selves

the

distinctions

that

must

be drawn.

(Ibid., p.

130.)

9

Zuerst

werden

wir

darueber

nicht

erstaunt

sein,

wenn es

von

diesem

obersten

'Guten' heisst, dass wir zu ihm keinen direkten Zugang haben. Das ist, was

wir

beim

spaten

Plato seit

dem

Parmenides

ohnehin

erwarten.

(Hermann

Gauss,

Handkommentar

zu

den

Dialogen

Platos. 3. Teil. Zweite

Haelfte.

Bern,

1961,

p.

43.)

10

Ibid.,

p. 70.

11

Ibid.

12

Op. cit.,

3.

Teil.,

Erste

Haelfte, p.

223.

My

own

translation.




4/27

PLATO'S

DOCTRINE

OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES

OR

ALEiTHEIA?

159

sour had miraculously egained

ts

sweetness,

places

an unbearable

train

on

our

credulity.

A

field

of inquiry

which has reached

such

a state

of

confusion

calls for

a

radically

new

approach.

To many interpretersof Plato, Heidegger's essay entitled Platons

Lehre von

der

Wahrheit

3

seemed

to open

the

way toward a radical

reappraisal

of

the dialogues.

For

when

coming to

terms

with the great

thinkers

of

the Western

tradition,

Heidegger

does

not rest content

with

surface

meanings,

but penetrates

o the very

foundation,

o the

usually

unexpressed round

upon which

the philosophy

under consideration

ests:

Die Lehre eines

Denkers

ist das in

seinem

Sagen Ungesagte,

dem der

Mensch

ausgesetzt

wird, auf dass

er

daffir sich verschwende.

Damit wir

das

Ungesagte

eines Denkers, welcher

Art es

auch sei,

erfahren und

inskiinftig

wissen k6nnen, miissen

wir sein Gesagtes

Bedenken.'4

In

his essay

Heidegger

sets

out

to show that

the

unheralded

but fateful

event

in

the dialogues

ies

in the transition

o a new conception

of truth,

a

conception

which

has controlled

philosophic

hinking

o this

very day.

Truth as

aletheia

(unhiddenness),

according

to

Heidegger, is

the older

and more basic

notion.

It is

situation-directed

nd hence

requires

a

flexible

mind,

sensitive to

the flux

of things.

Truth

as orthotes

(correct-

ness) presupposes

fixed standards

of

judgment

and

is therefore

likely

to foster a certainrigidityof outlook.'5 Heideggerfurtherclaims that

13

Martin Heidegger,

Platons Lehre

von der

Wahrheit. Zweite

Auflage,

Bern,

1954.

14

Ibid., p. 5.

The 'doctrine'

of a thinker

is that which

is left unsaid in

what

he says,

to which man is

exposed in

order to expend himself

upon it. In order

to

learn and henceforth

know what a thinker

has left unsaid,

whatever

it

may be,

it

is necessary

to consider

what he has

said.

(Transl.

by John Barlow in Philosophy

in the

Twentieth Century ed. by William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken.

New

York,

1962, p. 251.) Translations

cannot adequately

reflect the power

and

suggestiveness

of Heidegger's language. It seemed therefore justified to cite the original German

in the

text of this paper and

add the

translation in the

footnotes

as an aid to the

reader.

'5

It should be

noted that

Heidegger does

not simply

substitute one conception

of truth for another.

Instead

he tries to show

that truth

as orth6tes or correctness

is merely

part

of or derivative from

a more

integral -phenomenon,

namely,

truth

as

aletheia.

Consider,

he

suggests in Sein

und Zeit (Sechste

Auflage.

Tfibingen,

1949,

p. 217) a man with

his back

turned toward the

wall making

the assertion:

The picture

on the wall does

not hang

straight. The assertion

is found

to be true

if, upon

facing

the wall, the man discovers

the

picture in the condition

described.

The assertion -does not refer to representations or images, but to the concrete

situation

and

nothing else:

Jede Interpretation,

die hier

etwas anderes einschiebt,

das im

nur

vorstellendenAussagen

soil gemeint

sein, verfilscht den

phenomenalen

Tatbestand

dessen,

worilber ausgesagt

wird.

(Ibid., pp. 217-218.)

The

assertion

may

be merely thought;

or

it

may

be expressed in

a

sentence

which

allows another

to

share

in

the view of reality

to

which

the assertion leads.

The

sentence may be

passed

on

from

person to person,

without a

renewal of the contact

with

reality.




5/27

160

PHILOSOPHY

NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

ESEARCH

becauseof

the decline

of aletheia

and the simultaneous

ise of

orthotes

there

is in Plato's

writings

a persistent ambiguity.'6 Now if

Heidegger's

findings should prove

correct,

then one

would

expect the confusion

in

the conceptionof truth to be reflectedin Plato's attitudeof mind, and

we

would

then be able to

put our

finger on the

cause of the

perplexing

fluctuation

between

a liberal and

a dogmatic

spirit which seems to

run

through

all the dialogues.

The subtlety

of Heidegger's

analysis

and the

suggestiveness

and rich-

ness

of his

thought sorely

tempt

the reader simply

to

accept his con-

clusions. But were

he to

do so, he would

overlook

the fact

that

the

Allegory

of

the Cave, a

small and

relatively

unimportant

portion of

a

single dialogue, forms the main basis of Heidegger's argument. In order

to do justice

to his

claim, Heidegger,

as

he himself admits,

would have

to

examine

all the dialogues.'7

So quite apart

from

the light which

all

of Heidegger's discussions

of other thinkers

shed

on

his

own

thought,

the

'essay on Plato

can be

considered

as no

more than a

Hinweis,

an

indication

as to a possible

fresh

approach

to Plato.

And of these

Hinweise Heidegger

himself

has said in

another

connection hat

they

are

too

often unthinkingly

passed on

as the opinions

of

their

author when

they

should serve as

Weisung

... sich selber

auf den Weg

zu

machen,

um der gewiesenenSache selbst nachzudenken directions or the road

of

independent

reflection on

the

matter

pointed

out which

each

must

travel for

himself.)

18

What militates

most

strongly,

however, against

an uncritical

accept-

ance

of the

result of

Heidegger's

investigation,

is the

fact

that

he

approaches

Plato as

he

had

previously

approached

Aristotle,

Descartes,

and

Kant. These thinkers

make

an effort

to

give

a

clear

account of

their

position,

and so

it

is

proper

for

Heidegger

to

start with

their

explicit

utterancesand then attempt to penetrate

to, the

implied, unexpressed

ground.

Plato, by

contrast,

not

unlike

the

great

tragedians,

eaches

by

While

it still

refers

to

things,

to

concrete situations,

these

are no

longer

experienced

by the

one

hearing

or

seeing

the sentence.

The assertion

now

hardens

into

some

sort

of

independent

reality,

and

in

that independent

state

it

may

be

said

either

to

conform

or

not to

conform

to

things.

Only

in that secondary

sense can

it be

said

that

truth

lies

in the

assertion.

But to regard

truth

of the

assertion

as the

only

truth

is to

lose

sight

of the original

heuristic

and

apophantic

function

of

the

asser-

tion:

Die

Aussage

ist wahr,

bedeutet:

sie

entdeckt

das

Seiende

an

ihm

selbst.

Sie

sagt aus, sie zeigt auf, sie 'Thsstsehen' (apophansis) das Seiende in seiner Ent-

decktheit.

Wahrsein

(Wahrheit)

der

Aussage

muss

verstanden

werden

als ent-

deckendsein.

(Ibid.,

p.

218.)

16

Heidegger,

Platons

Lehre Von

Der Wahrheit,

p.

42.

17

Ibid., p.

5.

18

Heidegger's

Preface

to:

William

J.

Richardson,

S.

J.,

Heidegger:

Through

Phenomenology

to Thought.

The

Hague,

1963,

pp.

viii-ix.




6/27

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALETHEIA?

161

indirection.

As

a result he usually does

not immediately eveal his posi-

tion, for

he is concerned more with

the stimulation

and subsequent

direction

of thought rather

than with the advocacy

of specific

doctrines.

And so the insight which Plato is tryingto convey is somethingwhich

must happen

in the

mind of the reader, as the result

of a clash

of ideas

which

occurs in the dialogue.'9

It is doubtful whether

the dramatic

aspects of Plato's dialogues

can

be ignored

with impunity.

We propose, therefore,

to test

Heidegger's

theory

of a change in

the conceptionof truth in

the light of

an inter-

pretation

which attempts to allow

full sway to

the dramatic elements

of

the

dialogues.And

if we take as our point of

departure

a

view which

emerges from the dialectical interplay of opposing positions, we are

likely to

reach conclusions

which are quite different

from those

which

Heidegger derives from

a literal

reading.

In

fact it might well

be

that

Plato

and Heideggerare then found

to be allies

rather than adversaries

in the

struggle to

attain to

a

satisfactory

conception of

truth. Since

a

considerationof

all

the dialogues

is

impossible,

we

shall

try

to do

the

next best thing, namely

to discuss

those dialogueswhich

most

obviously

seem to confirm Heidegger's

contention.

But

first, merely

by way

of

reminder,

a few words about Heidegger's

analysis

of the Allegory of

the

Cave.

The

very locale

of the allegory,

as

Heidegger

points out,

suggests,

ruth

as unhiddenness:

he

dark cave, the sunlit world

outside,

various

levels

of

light

and darkness between

the two.

Each

stage

in the

paideia

of

the inhabitants

of the

cave has

its own

truth,

its own

revela-

tion of

reality. The

shadows which

the

chained

prisoners

see on

the wall

are not simply nothing.

These

shadows

offer

themselves

or their

reality

to

the

understanding

f

the

prisoners.

The latter

perceive

19This

is clearly

enough

stated in the Seventh

Letter,

which

is

generally

regarded

as

authentic:

....

in regard

to ...

the subjects to which

I

devote

myself

-...

I

certainly

have composed

no

work

in

regard

to

it,

nor

shall

I ever

do

so in

the

future,

for there

is no way of putting

it in

words

like other

studies.

Acquaintance

with

it comes

after

a long

period

of attendance

on instruction

in the

subject

itself

and

of close

companionship,

when,

suddenly,

like

a

blaze

kindled

by

a

leaping

spark,

it is

generated

in

the soul

and at

once

becomes

self-sustaining.

(Seventh

Letter,

par.

341c-d. Translated

by L. A. Post.

The Collected

Dialogues

of

Plato.

Including

the

Letters,

edited

by Edith

Hamilton

and

Huntington

Cairns.

Bollingen

Series LXXI, New York, 1961, pp. 1588-1589.) Italics added.

Note

also the

remarks

on

the

indirect

method

of

teaching

in

Republic,

Book

VII,

par. 518;

Vol. I,

p.

777;

Apology

par.

31,

Vol. I, p. 414;

Theatetus

par.

149,

Vol.

II,

p. 150.

The Dialogues of Plato,

translated

by

B.

Jowett,

in two

volumes.

New

York,

1937.

Unless

otherwise

indicated,

all

quotations

from

Plato's

dialogues

refer to

this

edition.

20

Platons

Lehre

von

der

Wahrheit,

p. 33.




7/27

162

PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCH

them, but do not or cannot inquire into the

ground of their

being,

that

is, the fire and the objects which make them

mere shadows. The cave

dweller who is released from his, chains,but

confused by the brightness

of the fire in the,cave does not at once experience

a higherkind of truth

or

reality;

in fact he considers. he shadows

which he saw before his

release as more true and more real than what confronts and

bedazzles

him now. It is only when he gets outside the cave and becomes accus-

tomed to the sun in whose light real things present themselvesthat he

is face to face with genuine truth and reality.

After he has reentered

the cave and overcome the first few moments

of confusion, he sees the

shadows again,

but

now he knows them as shadows, with merely

a

borrowedkind of reality.

There

is, however, also the fire, the

things outside the cave which

stand

for the ideas and the sun which represents

he

idea

of

ideas,

the

source of intelligibility and reality for all

things. The ideas are

the

standardson a higher level to which beings

on a lower level

must

con-

form. And

according o Heidegger he emphasis

s being placed,

not on

the levels of truth, but on the ideas:

Die

Unverborgenheit wird zwar

in

ihren verschiedenen Stufen genannt, aber

sie wird nur daraufhin bedacht, wie sie das Erscheinende

in seinem Aussehen

(eidos) zugiinglich und dieses Sichzeigende (idea) sichtbar macht. Die eigent-

liche

Besinnung geht

auf das in der Helle

des Scheins gewiihrte Erscheinen

des Aussehens. Dieses gibt die Aussicht auf

das, als was jegliches Seiende

anwest. Die eigentliche Besinnung gilt der idea.21

A

more

shift of

emphasis

alone

would,

of course,

not

be

very

con-

vincing,

and

so

Heidegger

points

to the well-known

heory

of

ideas,

and

especially

to

a

passage

from Book VI

of the

Republic

which

seems

to

eliminate

all

doubt.

There

the

philosopher-kings

re,

described

as

men

who have

in their soul a clear

pattern

of

perfect truth,

which

they

might study

in

every

detail

and

constantly

refer

to,

as a

painter

looks

to his model, before they proceed to embody

notions of justice, honour,

and

goodness

in

earthly

institutions.

2

The paideia

is now

understood

to consist

in

turning oward

and

steadfastly

adhering

o

the

ideas,which

21

Ibid., p. 34.

To be sure unhiddenness

is named in

its

various stages,

but one can only

con-

sider it in

the way it makes

the

phenomenal

accessible

in its outward appearance

(eidos) and

the way

it makes this

emerging

(idea) visible.

Consciousness,

properly

speaking,

has to do with

the

way outward

appearance

manifests itself

and is

preserved

in the brightness

of

its steady appearance. Through

this

one can

view

whatever each being

is present

as. Consciousness,

properly

speaking,

applies

to

the

idea.

(Transl.

John

Barlow, in

Barrett

and Aiken,

op. cit.,

p. 261.

22

The

Republic

of Plato. Trans. by F. M. Cornford.

New

York, 1945,

Book

VI,

par.

484, p.

190.




8/27

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR

ALETHEIA?

163

serve as a standard

n the light of which

all

human activity

is to be

evaluated:

Die Befreiung

ergibt sich

nicht schon aus der

Losldsung

der

Fesseln

und

besteht nicht in der Zuigellosigkeit,sondern beginnt erst als die stetige Ein-

gewdhnungin das Festmachen

des Blickes auf

die festen Grenzen der in

ihrem

Aussehen feststehenden Dinge.

Die

eigentliche

Befreiung ist die Stetigkeit der

Zuwendungzu dem, was in

einem

Aussehen

erscheint und in diesem Erschei-

nen das Unverborgenste ist.23

The notion

of truth inherent in the theory

of ideas, together with its

corresponding

attitude of

mind, seems in fact to be the very

opposite

of aletheia. Instead of turning

to things,

to'

the concrete,

ituation, the

inquirerturns.

o the

ideas;

instead of flexibility

and malleability,

here

is now rigid adherenceto set standards.Heidegger'sconclusion seems

inescapable:

Indem Platon von

der idea sagt, sie sei

die Herrin, die Unverborgenheit

zulasse,

verweist

er in

ein Ungesagtes,

dass namlich

fortan sich das Wesen

der Wahrheit

nicht als das Wesen der Unverborgenheit aus

eigener Wesen-

fiulle

entfaltet,

sondern sich auf

das

Wesen

der

idea

verlagert.

Das

Wesen

der

Wahrheit

gibt

den

Grundzug

der

Unverborgenheit preis....

Wahrheit

wird

zur

orthotes,

zu

Richtigkeit

des Vernehmens

und

Aussagens.24

The

theory of ideas is generally regarded

as established

Platonic

doctrine,so that a contention,such as Heidegger's,which is implied by

it, should

have no difficulty

in

finding

acceptance.

But what happens

if

we

tear ourselves oose

from

the accustomed iteral

reading

of the

text

and hold ourselves

open

and

receptive

to

the

possible

effects of the

dialectical

nterplay

of idea?

The

Euthyphro

seems

particularly

uitable

for

making

the

experiment;

it contains

strong

evidence in favor of

Heidegger's thesis

and

at the same

time

is not

lacking

in dramatic

elements.

The dialogueshows us Socratesengagedin the search for the defini-

23

Platons

Lehre

von

der Wahrheit,

p.

30. Italics

added.

Liberation

does

not take

place

in

the mere act

of getting

free from

the

chains

and

does

not consist

merely

in being

untrammeled,

but

begins

first

as

the

steady

orienting

of

oneself

so

that

one's

gaze

is made

fast to the

firm

limits

of the

things

standing

fast

in

their

outward

appearance.

Actual

liberation

lies

in the

steadiness

with

which

one turns

towards

what manifests

itself

in its outward

appearance

and

is in

this

manifesting

the

most unhidden.

(Transl.

by

Barlow,

in

Barrett

and

Aiken,

op. cit.,

p.

259.)

24

Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit,pp.

41-42.

When

Plato

says

that

the

idea is

the master permitting

unhiddenness

he

banishes

to something

left

unsaid the

fact

that

henceforth

the

essence

of

truth

does

not

unfold

out

of

its own

essential

fullness-as

the

essence

of

unhiddenness,

but

shifts

its abode

to the

essence

of

the idea.

The essence

of

truth

relinquishes

the.

basic

feature

of

unhiddenness....

Truth

becomes

orth6tes,

correctness

of the

ability

to

perceive

and to

declare something.

(Tr.

Barrett

and

Aiken,

p.

265.)




9/27

164

PHILOSOPHY

NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

ESEARCH

tion

of

a

virtue,

namely

piety. Euthyphro,

who

is not very bright,

needs

to

be

told

what

a definition

is:

Is not piety in every

action

always

the same? And

impiety,

again

-

is it

not

always

the

opposite

of

piety,

and

also

the

same with

itself, having,

as

impiety,

one

notion

which

includes

whatever

is

impious.25

And

then Socrates

describes

the

function

of

a

definition,

which

when

found

would

make

moral judgments

so simple

and so

reliable:

Tell me

what is

the

nature

of this

idea,

and

then

I shall have

a

standard

to

which

I

may look,

and

by

which

I

may

measure

actions,

whether

yours

or

those

of any

one

else,

and then

I shall

be able

to say

that such

and

such

an

action

is

pious,

such

another

impious.26

The enquiryhas beenoccasionedby a concretemoralproblem.Euthyphro

is

about

to institute

proceedings

against

his father

for causing

the

death

of

a

serf

through

gross

negligence.

To

the

objections

of

his family

that

a

son

is impious

who

prosecutes

his

father,

he replies

with

an

appeal

to

the behavior

of the

gods.

Do

not

men,

he

argues,

regard

Zeus

as

the

best

and

most

righteous

of

the gods?

-

And

yet they

admit

that

he

bound

his

father (Cronos)

because

he

wickedly

devoured

his

sons,

and

that

he

too

had

punished

his

own

father

(Uranus)

or

a similar

reason.

7

Through

his

insistence

on a

definition

as a

norm

of

judgment,

Socrates

extricatesthe problemfrom the realm of religion and mythology and

raises

the

discussion

to

the

level

of

rational

inquiry.

And

what

if

Euthyphro

does

prove

to me,

he

asks,

that

all the gods

regard

the

death

of the

serf

as

unjust,

how

do

I

know

anything

more

of

the

nature

of

piety

and

impiety?

28

From

Mythos

to

Logos

one

might

be

inclined

to name

the

theme

of

this

brief

dialogue.

Of course,

a definition

is not actually

found,

but

this

is usually

thought

to be

attributable

to the Socratic

method:

Socrates

meansus to find the definitionfor ourselves.As againstthe doctrinaire

position

of

Euthyphro,

Socrates'

call

for a definition

is very

alluring.

Leaving

dark superstition

ar

behind,

one

feels transported

nto the

clear

light

of

reason.

The

fact,

however,

that we

have

left behind

not

only

superstition

but the

concrete

situation

as well should

give

us

pause.

Just

how,

we

might

ask,

would

the

definition

of a moral excellence

function

in

the

kaleidoscopic

lux of

human

relationships?

Would

it tell

us

that

such

and

such

an

act is

good

or

bad and therefore

ought

to

be

pursued

or

shunned regardless

of

the

consequences?

What

would

happen

to

human responsibility?Could we simply say that our task is to adhere

25

Euthyphro,

par. 5,

op.

cit.,

Vol.

I,

p.

386.

26

Ibid., par.

6, p.

387.

Italics

added.

27

Ibid., par.

5-6,

pp.

386-387.

28

Ibid.,

par.

9,

p.

390.




10/27

PLATO'S

DOCTRINE

OF

TRUTH:

ORTHOTES

OR ALETHEIA?

165

to

the

definition

or rule, and

that

the

consequences

are

not our

concern?

Does

not the

successful

use

of a fixed definition

presuppose

a

stable,

unchangeable

world,

that

is,

one

in which

we clearly do

not live?

More

often than not we must choose not betweengood and evil, but between

the

greater

of two

goods

or

the lesser

of two evils.

But just

what

will

turn

out to

be

the

greater

good

or lesser

evil only

the given

circum-

stances

will reveal.

Unless,

he

whole

history

of the

world

is spread

out

before

us,

we

can

never

say

once

and for

all that

such and such

an

evil

will

never

be outdone

by

a greater

evil and therefore

must be

shunned

always

and

no matter

what the

circumstances.

Let

him know

how

to

choose

the mean

and

avoid the extremes

on

either side, as far as possible,

9

Socrates warns

at the end

of

the

Republic.

But in

the

Euthyphro

he

himself

proposes

an

extreme.

Shall

we

say that

when

Plato

wrote

this dialogue

he

had

not

yet

attained

to

the wisdom

shown

in

the

Republic?

Or would it

be more reasonable

o

assume

that he

had

Socrates

play

the

devil's

advocate?

Then

the

Socratic

method would

not be

directed

at

Euthyphro,

who

evidently

learns

nothing

from

his

encounter

with

Socrates,

nor would

it consist

simply

in the question

and

answer

method.

It would

rather

seem

that

by

pitting

one

extreme

against

the

other,

Plato

is trying

to make

the

attentive

readersee that it is not enoughto abjuresuperstitionand have recourse

to

reason.

For

the appeal

to

a

rule

divorced

from

life

can

spring

from

as

ruthless

an attitude

as that

inspired

by

superstition.

And

just

as

Euthyphro's

unshakeable

onviction

s

unjustified

ince it implies

famili-

arity

with

the will

of the gods,

so

intellectual

certainty

n moral

matters

presupposes

a

definition

which

the

world

in which

we live

does

not

allow.30

Toward

the end

of

the

dialogue,

Socrates

suggests

that piety

be

defined

as

a kind of

justice

or

ministration

with reference

to

the

gods.

But what

benefits can possibly accrue to the gods from the,deeds of

men?

Is

there

anything

which only

men

can do? Tell

me,

oh

tell

me,

Socrates

urges,

what

is

that

fair work which

the

gods

do by

the

help

of

our

ministrations ?

1

Euthyphro,

of course,

does

not know

the

answer,

and

Socrates

refuses

to

give

it.

It seems

plausible,

however,

that

this

task

has

something

to do with

bringing

order into one's,

own

life

and

helping

in the

establishment

and maintenance

of order

in the

com-

munity.

For

neither

the individual's

ife nor the life

of the

community

29

Republic,

Book

X,

par.

619,

p.

876.

30

Plato

says

as

much

explicitly

in

a

later

dialogue:

The

difference

of

men

and

actions,

and

the endless

irregular

movements

of

human

things,

do

not

admit

of

any

universal

and simple

rule.

And

no

art

whatsoever

can

lay

down

a

rule

which

will

last

for

all

time.

Statesman,

par.

294,

Vol.

II,

p.

322.

81

Euthyphro,

par.

13,

p.

396.




11/27

166 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCH

is provided n a ready-made orm. And how

can there be free

men in

a free society, unless they are accountable

or their own way

of life? It

is as if the, gods

who are responsiblefor

the order in the world, had

stopped short of humanaffairs and imposedupon men the task of com-

pleting the ordering

process..

To bring about

and preserve proper relations,among men

is a con-

tinuous,never-ending

ask. Neither cherished raditions, or deeply rooted

desires are

a

reliable

guide. We must tear

ourselves, oose from habitual

modes

of

behavior

and from the immediateneeds arisingout

of the con-

crete

situation n order to gain

a

wider

perspective or successfulaction.

But neither can we expect to discoverfinal

answers in an abstract

realm

of ideas. Only the kind of reflection which allows for the intricate

interplayof idea and situation offers any

hope for the establishment

of

satisfactoryhuman

relations.

If we are willing to accept this, nterpretationhen we identify Plato's

position with neither

of the two adopted

by the participants o

the

dis-

cussion. We would

rather see it midway between the blind

superstition

and traditionalism

f Euthyphroand the rigid rationalismwhich

in this

dialogue Plato chooses to place into

the mouth of Socrates.

And then

the Euthyphro would

not confirm the, findings

of

Heidegger

in the

Allegory of the Cave. For while Heidegger there sees aletheia under the

yoke

of the

idea,32

it now

appears

hat the idea stands in the

service of

aletheia, helping the

truth of things to

shine forth in its own light.

While

the

Euthyphro,

on a literal

reading,

would

place

moral

behavior

under the

control of

a

definition,

the

Crito

would subject

the

individual

to the rule of law.

Socrates

s,

usually

thought to have

died rather

than

break

the law which

condemnedhim to death

in

spite

of

his

innocence,

and this

view

can

be amply supported

by

references o

the text. Socrates

stresses

the

importance

of

the

laws

for

the welfare

of the citizens.

They

regulate the

marriage aws

and

provide

for the education

of the child.

Well

then,

since

you

were

brought

into the world

and nurtured

and

educated

by us, Socrates

has

the laws

say,

can

you deny

in the

first

place

that

you are

our child and slave,

as

your

fathers,

were

before

you?

And if this is true

you

are

not

on

equal

terms

with

us;

nor

can

you

think

that you have

a

right to do to us what

we are doing

to

you

...

Has

a

philosopher

ike you failed to

discover

that our

country

is more to

be

valued and

higher

and holier

far than

mother or

father or

any

ances-

32

Indem

Platon

von

der

idea

sagt,

sie

sei

die

Herrin

die

Unverborgenheit

zulasse,

verweist

er

in

ein

Ungesagtes,

dass

niinlich

fortan

sich

das

Wesen

der

Wahrheit

nicht als

das

Wesen

der

Unverborgenheit

aus

eigener Wesensfillie

ent-

faltet, sondern

sich

auf

das Wesen

der idea verlagert.

Das Wesen

der

Wahrheit

gibt den Grundzug

der Unverborgenheit

preis.

Platons

Lehre

von

der Wahrheit,

p.

41.




12/27

PLATO'S DOCTRINE

OF TRUTH:

ORTHOTES

OR ALEfTHEIA?

167

tor...

. 33 The

modem reader

might

stir uneasily

at this

point, for

he

is wary

about too

submissive

an

attitude

toward

the state. But

the

next

few

lines are

bound to make

him cry out in

dissent:

And

when we

are

punished

by

her, whether

with

imprisonment

or stripes,

the

punishment

is

to be

endured

in silence;

and if she leads

us to wounds

or

death

in battle,

thither

we

follow

as

is right;

neither

may any

one yield

or

retreat

or

leave

his

rank,

but whether

in battle

or in

a

court

of law,

or in any

other

place,

he must do what his

city

and his country

order

him.34

Such

a

principle

could

have

exonerated

he worst of

the war

criminals

after

the

last war,

aside

from

the

dictator

himself.

It is true that

the

imaginary

aws

try

to

mitigate

the

harshness

of their

demand

by

pro-

claimingto any Athenian

by

the

liberty

which

we allow

him, that if

he

does

not

like

us

when

he

has become

of

age

and has

seen

the ways

of

the

city,

and

made

our

acquaintance,

he

may go

where

he pleases

and

take

his goods

with

him.

35

But

even

with

the best

of laws

it

can

come

about

that

strict

application

of the

law

would

work

an

injustice

so

severe

as

to

make

disobedience

a

moral

obligation.

Nor can

it be

rightly

claimed,

as the

laws

do,

that

he

who has

experience

of the

manner

in

which

we

order justice

and administer

he

state,

and still

remains,

has

entered

nto

an

implied

contract

hat he

will

do

as

we command

him.

36

A citizen can never, without forfeitinghis freedom and responsibility,

give

such

a blank

pledge

of

obedience

in

complete

disregard

of

existing

circumstances.

Even

more

embarrassing

o

a literal

interpretation

s

the

fact

that

at

the

beginning

of

the

dialogue,

just

before

the discussion

with

Crito gets

under way,

Socrates

adopts

a

position

which

is the very

op-

posite

of

an

unquestioning

ubmission

o law:

And

therefore

we

ought

to

consider

whether

I shall

or shall

not do

as

you

say.

For I

am

and

always

have

been

one

of those

natures

who must

be

guided

by

reason,

whatever

the

reason may

be which

upon

reflection

appears

to me to be the best.37

And just

as

the Eichmanns,

if

unquestioning

submission

to

the

law

is

made

a

virtue,

can

shift

responsibility

o,

higher

authority,

so

the

Oswalds,

if

individual

reason reigns

supreme,

can

justify

their

misdeed

by

appealing

o

the

outcome

of

their own

reflections.

In the

Crito,

even

more

so

than

in the

Euthyphro,

he

two

extremes

are clearly

stated.

It

is

reasonable'

o assume

that they serve

Plato

to

bring

home

the

paradoxical

nature

of civic

virtue.For

a

good

citizen

at

33

Crito,

par.

50-51,

pp.

434-435.

34

Ibid.,

par.

51,

p.

435.

Italics

added.

35

Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37

Ibid.,

par.

46,

p.

430.

Italics

added.




13/27

168

PHILOSOPHY

NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

ESEARCH

one

and the

same time must

be

obedient

and yet hold himself

responsible

for the

consequences

of his

acts. If

we ask

how this

is

possible,

we

will

find no

direct

answer in the

dialogue.

We might,

however, discover

a

hint, such as the one containedin the followingremarkmade by the

laws:

We

do

not

impose

(our

commands)

rudely, but give

him

the alternative

of

obeying

or convincing us ... that

our

commands

are

unjust.38

To convince

the ideal

laws, which

Plato

elsewhere

identifies

with

reason,39 can

only mean

that

we must

show

disobedience

to constitute

the lesser

evil.

Vital

as the

laws

may be

to

the maintenance

of order

and hence

to the

existence

of

the state,

there

may be

occasions

when

the harm which comes from the disregardor suspensionof the, law is

outweighed

by

the evil

consequences

which would

follow upon

enforce-

ment of

the

law. So laws

have

no absolute

power.

And now

in order

not to

give reason

unrestricted

ontrol

we must

add

that the

sheer

fact

that a law exists

ought

to weigh

heavily

in

the

determination

of the

greater

good

or the lesser

evil. So both

law and reason

must control

our

actions

but

in such

a

way

as to make

one

restrain

he

other. However,

as we

have seen

in

the Euthyphro,

he greater

good

or the

lesser

evil

are not

discovered

by looking

to

a

definition

or idea.

They

arise

out of

the

interrelations

of

the

various

goods,

and

evils

which are present or

likely

to occur

under given

circumstances.

And

so

by trying

to resolve

the

paradox

presented

n

the

dialogue,

and following

the

suggestion

of

Socrates to

their

natural

conclusion,

we

are led back

to the

concrete

situation.

But

this

means

that Plato's

thought

takes,

a

direction

which

is

the very

opposite

of

the one

it is

said

to

take

in the

opinion

of Martin

Heidegger.

So

far

we

have

dealt

only

with

two

of the earlier

dialogues,

n

which

the liberalspiritof Socrates s said to be still alive. In the later dialogues,

the

more

dogmatic

character

of

Plato's own

philosophy

is,

alleged

to

come to the

fore. So

it

may

well

be

that we have not as

yet

come

to

grips with

Plato's doctrine

of truth. Since

the theory

of ideas forms

a

prominent

part

of

Heidegger's

argument,40

a

brief examination

of

it,

especially

as

it

appears

n the

Phaedo,

becomes

unavoidable.

A

full

discussion

of the Phaedo

is,

of

course,

not

possible.

But

the

theory

of

ideas,

which

has

traditionally

been

regarded

as its main

philo-

sophic

yield,

should

at

least

be

placed

into

its immediatecontext.

The

38

Ibid.,

par.

52,

p.

436.

39

We

must

...

regulate

our

cities

and

houses

according

to

law, meaning

by

the very

term

'law'

the distribution

of mind.

Laws,

Book IV,

par.

713,

Vol.

II,

p.

485.

40

Platons

Lehre

von

der

Wahrheit,

esp.

pp.

20

ff.

and

pp.

38 ff.




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PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR

ALUTHEIA?

169

theoryoccurs

in Socrates'discussionof his method of inquiry.He relates

how

in

his

youth he was taken in by

the nature

philosophers who

sought

for principlesof explanationamong.physical

hings.

Is the blood

the element with which we think, or the air, or the

fire?

41

these are

questions of the kind which

Socrates

said agitated him. But instead

of

seeing more

clearly he

became more confused; or rather,

becoming

aware of

the distinction between factual

juxtaposition

and causal or

necessary

connections,

he

recognized hat

what he took

to be all expla-

nation was no explanation

at all:

For I was fascinated by

them to such

a degree that my eyes grew blind

to

things

which

I

had seemed to myself,

and also to others, to know quite

well;

I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths;e.g. such a fact as that

the growth of man is

the result of eating

and drinking; for when

by the

digestion

of food flesh is added to flesh

and bone

to bone, and whenever

there

is an aggregationof congenial elements,

the lesser

bulk becomes larger

and the small man great.42

While

necessary

connections cannot be

observed

between

things,

they

can be detected

between ideas:

I was afraid that

my

soul

might

be blinded

altogether

if I looked at things

with my eyes

or tried to

apprehend

them

by

the

help

of the senses. And I

thought

that I had

better

have recourse

to the

world of mind and seek there

the truth of existence.4s

But this appeal to ideas,

as he soon

found

out,

was

not without

serious

limitations. The

ideal would

be

to, discover

an

ultimate

principle

of

explanation,

which would

assign

to

each

thing

its

proper place

in the

total scheme.

To such

a

principle

he had

hoped

to

be

introduced

by

Anaxagoas who had

said that

mind

was

the

disposer

and cause

of

all.

44

But

Anaxagoras

disappointed

him

because

he had

recourse o

air, and ether,

and

water,

and

other

eccentricities.

5

Having

to

fall

back on his own resources,Socratescould do no better than assume

some likely

principles of

explanation

and

test them

by

means

of their

synthesizingpower:

I

first assumed

some

principle

which

I

judged

to be

strongest,

and

then

I

affirmed

as true whatever

seemed

to

agree

with

this,

whether

relating

to

the

cause

or to

anything

else;

and

that

which

disagreed

I

regarded

as

untrue.46

41

Phaedo, par. 96,

Vol. I, p. 481.

42 Ibid.

43

Ibid., par. 99-100, p. 484.

44

Ibid.,

par. 97, p.

482.

Anaxagoras,

Socrates

thought,

would

give

him a

per-

fect explanation,

that

is,

he would

tell

him,

for

instance,

whether the earth

is

flat

or round,

and then

he would

explain

why

it is necessarily

so and

why

it is

best

that it should

be

so.

45

Ibid.,

par. 98, p.

482.

46

Ibid.,

par. 100, p.

484.




15/27

170

PHILOSOPHY

NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

ESEARCH

This

second

best mode

of

inquiry as

Socrates

calls

it, cannot

lay

claim

to certainty,

since

it is not

in

possession of the ultimate

principle

nor

even of principles

or ideas

necessarily

reflecting

the essence

or

nature

of things.Someof them mightperhapsbe derived rom a higheror more

comprehensive

principle,

but the

test

would always

be in reference

to

experienced

eality:

If anyone assails

you

there (i.e.,

questions

your

principle),

you would

not

mind

him or answer

him until you

had

seen whether

the

consequences

which

follow

agree

with one

another or

not, and when

you

are further required

to give

an

explanation

of this

principle,

you would

go

on

to

assume

a higher principle,

and a

higher,

until you found

a resting-placein the

best

of the

higher.47

It would appear,therefore,that if the strictlyphilosophicalpart of

the

Phaedo

were

to

end with the

exposition

of Socrates'

second-best

method of

inquiry,the

dialogue

could

hardly

be called

upon to support

Heidegger's

contention.

For the

ideas

to which

Socrates

here refers

cannot

be said

to contain

the truth of

things.

They

are

merely postulates

which are

somehow

derived

from experience

and

whose

function

it

is

to help us

discover some

orderly

relationship

between the

elements

of

experience.

Heidegger

could,

however,

appeal

to the

argument

which

follows

and to which

the

exposition

of

the method

appears

as

a

prelude.

For oddly enough the argumentproceeds as if the second-best were

the ideal method,

as if

the

postulates

were

the essences

of

things. Only

if

Socrates

could

claim

to

possess

insight

into the very

nature

of

the

human

soul

would

it make

any

sense

for

him

to

maintain

that

death-

lessness

is one

of

its

necessary

attributes.

The

difficulty

can

not be

eliminatedsimply

by

saying

that Plato

was

unaware

of the

implications

of

Socrates'

second-best

method.48

For in

the brief

interval

between

the

exposition

and

the

final

argument,

Socrates

uses

the

method

as if

he

had a

proper

understanding

f it.

When

Simias

raises

an

objection against

Socrates'

irst set of

arguments

by

offering

a

rival hypothesis,

namely

the harmony theory,

which

would

imply

the

mortality

of

the soul,

Socrates

refutes

it

precisely

as

one

would a

mere

postulate.

He shows

that

it lacks

consistency,

that its

consequences

do

not

agree

with

the

observed

facts,

that

it is

in

conflict

with

other

postu-

lates

which

Simlias

has accepted.49

47

Ibid.,

par.

101,

p.

485.

48

Note for instance: His hypothetical method, if our analysis of the Phaedo

has

been correct,

can never

attain to

absolute

knowledge

...

but, when

we

recall

that

(Plato)

believed

in the

possibility

of absolute

knowledge

...

we must

certainly

wonder

why he

devoted

so

much

space to

its elaboration

...

(Richard

Robinson,

Plato's

Earlier

Dialectic.

Second Edition,

Oxford, 1953,

p.

146.)

49

Socrates'

refutation

can

be

summarized briefly

as follows:

The

harmony

theory leads

to absurd

consequences

since

it would

make

us

say

that

the soul

as




16/27

PLATO'S

DOCTRINE

OF TRUTH:

ORTHOTES

OR

ALETHEIA?

171

Before

we come

to grips

with the problem

which

arises

out of

the

discrepancy

between

Socrates'

exposition

of

his method

and its, use

in

the final argument

of the

Phaedo,

we

may perhaps

be allowed

a

brief

reference o the Protagoras.For this dialogueoffers a furtherexcellent

illustration

of

the proper

use of the method.

There Socrates

challenges

Protagoras'

claim

of

being

able to

teach political

virtue to

the

young

men

of the city,

on

the

ground

that

virtue

is

incapable

of

being

taught.

It

is significant

hat

Socrates.

does

not

turn

to

the idea

of virtue

in

an

attempt

to show

that

teachability

s

incompatible

with

it.

Instead

he

examines

the

social

situation,

or,

more

specifically,

the

behavior

of

the

Athenians

in

the

Assembly

and

the attitude

of

the great

statesmen

toward

their

offspring.

The

latter,

observes

Socrates,

gave

(their

sons)

excellent

instruction

n all

that

could

be learned

from

masters,

but in

their own

department

of

politics

neither

taught

them,

nor

gave

them

teachers.

0

The

former

accept

advice

in

technical

matters

only

from

experts,

such

as

architects

and shipwrights,

but

when

the

question

is

an

affair

of

state,

says Socrates,

everybody

s

free

to

have

a

say

-

carpenter,

tinker,

cobbler,

sailor,

passenger;

rich

and

poor,

high

and

low

-

any

one

who

likes

gets

up,

and

no one reproaches

him,

as in

the

former

case,

with

not

having

learned,

and

having

no teacher,

and yet

giving advice.

1

The reason for this unconcernabout instructionand

training

n

political

virtue

must,

according

o Socrates,

be

sought

in

the

fact

that this

virtue

cannot

be

taught.

All

that

Socrates

does

and all

that

he

legitimately

can

do is

to

show

that

on

the

assumption

hat

virtue

cannot be

taught,

the

behavior

of

the

members

of the Assembly

and

of

the

great

statesmen

which

first appeared

very

odd

indeed,

now

makes

better

sense.

Protagoras

n turn refutes,

Socrates

by appealing

ikewise

to

the social

situation,

although he

refers

not

to the

behavior

of

the

Athenians

alone

but to

intelligent

men

in

general.

He claims

that

virtue

is innatein all men,52at least as a capacity,andthat it requires eachers

to realize

that capacity.

To Socrates'

objection

that there are

no

special

teachers

as in

the other

arts,

he

replies

that

all the citizens

help

in

the

a

harmony

contains

within

itself a

discord

or a

harmony,

according

as

it

is

vicious

or

not;

its

implications

are

contrary

to

known

phenomena,

inasmuch

as

the

soul

to

some

extent

leads

and controls

the

body,

while

a

harmony

is

dependent

on

the

instrument;

it is

incompatible

with

the

theory

of recollection

accepted

by

Simmias,

according

to

which

the

soul

exists prior

to

its

entry

into

the

body,

while

a

har-

mony appears after the

instrument

has

come

into

existence.

(Cf.

Phaedo,

par.

91-95;

pp.

476-479).

50

Protagoras,

par.

320,

Vol.

I,

p.

91.

51

Ibid.,

par.

319,

p.

91.

52

For

the

manner

in

which

Protagoras

arrives

at

the

innateness

of

virtue,

see

H. Wolz

The

Protagoras

Myth

and

the

Philosopher-Kings,

The

Review of

Metaphysics,

Vol.

XVII,

No.

2,

December,

1963,

pp.

219ff.




17/27

172 PHILOSOPHY

NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

ESEARCH

education

of

the young;

and

therefore

it

is difficult

to find a teacher

such as Protagoraswho has the skill to add the finishing

ouches to what

the others have done.

And

if everybodypossesses political

virtue, every-

body should be allowed to speak on political mattersin the Assembly.

Thus the view of Protagoras

also casts a measureof reasonableness ver

the behavior of the Athenians.

But the theory of

Protagoras

surpasses

that of Socrates n synthesizing

power, for it can accountfor phenomena

which

Socrates,

from his position, must leave unexplained.

Why, for

instance, do we not chastize

or instruct he ugly, or the diminutive,or

the feeble, asks Protagoras,

but hold men responsible for political

virtue, except

under the assumption that the latter are capable of

improvement by study and exercise and teaching,

3

Why do people

not blame a man when

he admits a lack of skill in

any particularart,

but when he lacks honesty

..

or some other political

virtue

54

and

publicly tells

the

truth

about himself, they think he

must be out

of

his

mind. For

they

consider

his virtue as so essential o

community

ife that

not even the wickedarewhollydevoid

of it. And finallyProtagoras ppeals

to the theory of punishment

which, he says, is held by all reasonable

people.

For he

who desires to

inflict

rational

punishment

does

not

retaliate for

a

past wrong

which cannot be undone,

(but)

has

regard

to

the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished,and he who

sees him punished, may be deterred from doing

wrong again

...

thereby

clearly implyingthat virtue

is capable of being

taught.

5

Thus Protagorashas won the

first

roundof

the

argument

with

Socrates

not by showing that he is right and his opponent

wrong in the

light

of

some set standard,but

by leading his audienceto

a

point of view

from

which

they discover

a

higher degree

of

intelligibility

over

a

wider

range

of

human

experience

than was obtainablewith

the

theory

of Socrates.

Both attack and defense show

a

keen awarenessof

the

interplay

of

fact

and

idea.

The

idea does not impose

a

structureupon

reality,

but

merely

aids

in the

discovery

of whatever structure he

concrete situation

may

exhibit.

The digression o

the

Protagoras

seemed

necessary

n order to direct

the spotlight of attention on

the

conception

of

truth which

is

implied

by Socrates'

so-called second-best

method of

inquiry.

For those

who

see the

Phaedo

mainly as the

source

of

the

theory

of ideas

usually

over-

look

or

minimize

the

importance

of this

conception,

and

consider

only

or at least place the main stress on the other conception which is

implied by

the final argument

for the

immortality

of the

soul. These

53

Protagoras,

par.

323,

p.

94.

54

Ibid.

55

Ibid.,

par.

324, p.

95.




18/27

PLATO'S DOCTRINE

OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES

OR ALUTHEIA?

173

two conceptionsare not

intermingled o that

one could seek a way out

of

the difficultyby

maintainingPlato

confusedthem. In fact the change

from one to

other is so abrupt56 that one

can hardly

help seeing in

this juxtapositionof incompatibleviews an analogue to the juxtaposi-

tion of

traditionalismand

rationalism n the Euthyphro

or of radical

freedom and

responsibilityas against

unquestioning

obedience to

law

in the Crito. The present

problem is

complicated,however, by the fact

that we are

confrontednot

with two extremeswhich of

themselves sug-

gest

a

mean,

but with an authentic and

an

unauthenticconception

of

truth.

We

should

now

be willing

to

face

both aspects of the

paradox which

Plato creates

by having Socrates

expound

a

method operating with

postulates and having him

use it in an

argument which presupposes

insight into

essences. And

with the fuller understanding f

the problem

at hand, we

should now also have a better

chance of

finding a satis-

factory

solution.

When

Socrates,

after his

disappointmentwith the nature

philosophers

and expecially with

Anaxagoras,had

decided that he had better have

recourseto the world of

mind and

seek there the truth,of

existence,

7

he

might have

done so for one of two

reasons:He might

have expected

to find in the ideas the true reality or the essence of things, and truth

would then

have

become

the

conformity

of the

mind

to

the ideas.

In

Heidegger's

erminology, ruth would have

become correctness

Richtig-

keit,

orthotes).

By contrast

he might have seen the ideas.

as devices, as

instruments

which, though

rooted in reality, have as their

primary

unc-

tion

to stimulate

and

direct

thought, so that

it

places itself

in

the

proper

perspective

and

thus

discovers

he truth shining forth from

things.

Then

the ideas would be in

the

service

of

truth,

and

the truth

thus conceived

would be

Heidegger's

ale'theia

r unhiddenness.

In spite of the seeminglyradicaldifferencebetweenthe two views of

truth, they are not

unrelated.

History

has in fact

shown

that

one

can

easily

lead

to

the

other. Scientific

postulates,

for

instance, may.

at

a

given period

and in

regard

to specific aspects

of nature

appear

so suc-

cessful that

the

inquirer

s

temptedto, regard

hem

as

revealing

he

very

essence of

things. This temptationmay

prove irresistible

when coupled

with the common

tendency of

the

scientist to allow

as real

only

that

5

In this connection note: It is well that we should be reminded that the

doctrine of Forms as

causes is put forward by Socrates as a second-best doctrine

relative.

to that which

he had hoped to build on the principle

suggested by

Anaxagoras. Nevertheless

Plato seems, in our

present section, and indeed through-

out the rest of the argument which gives his

final proof of immortality,

to have

forgotten

this.

(R.

Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo.

Cambridge, 1955, p. 146.)

57

Phaedo, par. 99-100,

p. 484.




19/27

174 PHILOSOPHY

ND

PHENOMENOLOGICAL

ESEARCH

which

falls within the range

of his method and conforms

to his

postu-

lates,

and

to regard

as

'mere' appearance

that

which does not.58

To

those

who

believed themselves

n the

possession

of definitive

ruth

about

the cosmos, Galileo was a dangerousheretic;and many of those who

felt

comfortably

at home

in the

world of Newton must have looked

upon

Einstein

as a subversive

ntruder

and a disturberof the scientific

peace.

Now

it is

hardly necessary

to point

out

that Socrates

devoted

his

life

to the

task

of ferreting

out

and exposing

the, false pretenders

to,

wisdom.

But it

is perhaps,

ess

readily

recognized

hat at

least

the first

half

and

probably

the

whole

of the

Phaedo

concerns

itself

in

the main

with

the

flaw

of overconfidence

based

on the

wrong

conception

of

truth

and the

baneful effects it may have on inquiry.This will not become,evident,

however,

unless we

are willing

to call into

play

the usually

neglected

dramaticelements

of the

dialogue.

Far

from

promising

a

compelling

demonstration

or the

immortality

of the soul,

Socrates

at

the,

outset had

merely

wanted

to converse

a

little

of the

probabilities

of these

things.

59

One

of his

two

young

Pythagorean

riends

warned

that

it

requires

a

great

deal of

argument

and

many proofs

to

show that

when

the

man is dead

his soul

yet

exists,

and has any

force

or intelligence.

0

And

after

the first set of proofs

the otherremarkson howhard or ratherimpossible s the attainment

of any

certainty

abou

wolz, henry g. - plato's doctrine of truth - orthótes or alétheia

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