wisconsin supreme court john doe decision

7/16/2015 Frontsheet

http://wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.html?content=html&seqNo=144527 1/186

2015WI85 SUPREMECOURTOFWISCONSIN

CASENO.: 2013AP296OA&2014AP417Wthrough2014AP421W&

2013AP2504Wthrough2013AP2508WCOMPLETETITLE: StateofWisconsinexrel.TwoUnnamedPetitioners,

Petitioner,v.TheHonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoeJudgeandFrancisD.Schmitz,SpecialProsecutor,Respondents.StateofWisconsinexrel.FrancisD.Schmitz,Petitioner,v.HonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoeJudge,Respondent,EightUnnamedMovants,InterestedParty.IntheMatterofJohnDoeProceedingStateofWisconsinexrel.ThreeUnnamedPetitioners,Petitioner,v.theHonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoejudge,theHonorableGregoryPotter,ChiefJudgeandFrancisD.Schmitz,asSpecialProsecutor,Respondents.

ORIGINALACTION

PETITIONFORSUPERVISORYWRITBEFORETHESUPREMECOURT,APPEALANDBYPASSTOTHESUPREMECOURTFROM

CIRCUITCOURTORDER

PETITIONFORREVIEWBEFORETHESUPREMECOURT

OPINIONFILED: July16,2015SUBMITTEDONBRIEFS: ORALARGUMENT: SOURCEOFAPPEAL: COURT: Circuit COUNTY: Milwaukee,Iowa,Dodge,DaneandColumbia JUDGE: GregoryA.Peterson(Reserve) JUSTICES: CONCURRED:

CONCUR/DISSENT:DISSENTED:

PROSSER,J.,ROGGENSACK,C.J.(joiningSectionsIVandV),ZIEGLER,J.(joiningSectionIV)andGABLEMAN,J.(joiningSectionIV)concur(Opinionfiled).ZIEGLER,J.concurs(Opinionfiled).ABRAHAMSON,J.concursanddissents(Opinionfiled).CROOKS,J.concursanddissents(Opinionfiled).

ccccc NOTPARTICIPATING:

BRADLEY,J.,didnotparticipate. ATTORNEYS:

For the Petitioners (case nos. 2013AP2504W through 2013AP2508W and 2014AP296OA) and Interested Parties

(case nos. 2014AP417W through 2014AP421W) there were briefs by Attorney Dean A. Strang, StrangBradley, LLC,

MadisonAttorneyStevenM.BiskupicandAttorneyMichelleL.Jacobs,Biskupic&Jacobs,S.C.,MequonAttorney

Dennis P. Coffey, Mawicke & Goisman, SC, Milwaukee Attorney Matthew W. ONeill, Fox ONeill Shannon, S.C.,

MilwaukeeAttorneyJamesB.Barton,HansenReynoldsDickinsonCruegerLLC,MilwaukeeAttorneyEricJ.Wilson,



Godfrey&Kahn,S.C.,MadisonandAttorneyJeffreyJamesMorgan,LeBell,Dobrowski&Morgan,LLP,Milwaukee.

For the Respondents (case nos. 2013AP2504W through 2013AP2508W, 2014AP417W through 2014AP421W and

2014AP296OA)therewerebriefsbyAssistantAttorneyGeneralDavidC.Rice,withwhomonthebriefswasAttorney

GeneralJ.B.VanHollen(termofofficeendingDecember31,2014)andAttorneyGeneralBradSchimel(termof

officecommencingJanuary1,2015)andSpecialProsecutorFrancisD.Schmitz(Petitionerincasenos.2014AP417W

through2014AP421W),Milwaukee.

Amici Curiae briefs were filed by Attorney Benjamin T. Barr (pro hac vice), Cheyenne, WY and Attorney

StephenR.Klein(prohacvice),Cheyenne,WYonbehalfoftheWyomingLibertyGroupwithwhomonthebriefwas

AttorneyMatthewM.FernholzandCramer,Multhauf&Hammes,LLP,WaukeshaAttorneyJamesBopp,Jr.,TerreHaute,

IN,onbehalfoftheJamesMadisonCenterforFreeSpeechandonbehalfofWisconsinRighttoLife,Inc. with

whomonthebriefswasAttorneyMichaelD.DeanandMichaelD.Dean,LLC,BrookfieldAttorneyJamesR.Troupis

andTroupisLawOffice,LLC,CrossPlains,onbehalfoftheEthicsandPublicPolicyCenterAttorney Adam J.

White (pro hac vice), Washington, D.C. and Boyden Gray & Associates, Washington, D.C., on behalf of Former

MembersoftheFederalElectionCommissionLeeAnnElliot,DavidMason,HansvonSpakovskyandDarrylWoldwith

whomonthebriefwereAttorneyJamesR.TroupisandAttorneyPaulM.Ferguson,CrossPlainsAttorneyJonathan

Becker, Attorney Nathan W. Judnic and Attorney Kevin J. Kennedy on behalf of the Wisconsin Government

Accountability Board, Madison Attorney Richard M. Esenberg, Attorney Brian W. McGrath and the Wisconsin

InstituteforLaw&Liberty,Milwaukee,onbehalfofTheHon.BradleyA.Smith,CenterforCompetitivePolitics,

and Wisconsin Family Action Attorney J. Gerald Hebert (pro hac vice), Attorney Tara Malloy (pro hac vice),

AttorneyPaulS.Ryan(prohacvice),AttorneyMeganP.McAllen(prohacvice)andTheCampaignLegalCenter,

WashingtonD.C.,AttorneyFredWertheimer(prohacvice)andDemocracy21,Washington,D.C.andAttorneyDonald

J. Simon (pro hac vice) and Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry, LLP, Washington, D.C. on behalf of

CampaignLegalCenter,Democracy21,CommonCauseinWisconsinandLeagueofWomenVotersofWisconsinwithwhom

on the brief was Attorney Susan M. Crawford and Cullen Weston Pines & Bach LLP, Madison Attorney David B.

Rivkin, Jr. (pro hac vice), Attorney Lee A. Casey (pro hac vice), Attorney Mark W. Delaquil (pro hac vice),

AttorneyAndrewM.Grossman(prohacvice),AttorneyRichardB.Raile(prohacvice)andBaker&HostetlerLLP,

Washington, D.C. on behalf of Citizens for Responsible Government Advocates, Inc. with whom on the brief was

AttorneyChristopherM.MeulerandFriebertFinerty&St.John,S.C.,MilwaukeeAttorneyMatthewMenendez(pro

hacvice),AttorneyDanielI.Weiner(prohacvice),AttorneyAliciaL.Bannon(prohacvice)andBrennanCenter

forJusticeatNYUSchoolofLawonbehalfofProfessorsofLegalEthics,withwhomonthebriefwasAttorney

ThomasR.Cannon,Milwaukee.

2015WI85

NOTICEThisopinionissubjecttofurthereditingandmodification.Thefinalversionwillappearintheboundvolumeoftheofficialreports.

No.2014AP296OA&2014AP417Wthrough2014AP421W&2013AP2504Wthrough2013AP2508W(L.C.No. 2013JD11&2013JD9&2013JD6&2013JD1&2012JD23)

STATEOFWISCONSIN: INSUPREMECOURT

StateofWisconsinexrel.TwoUnnamedPetitioners,Petitioner,v.TheHonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoeJudgeandFrancisD.Schmitz,SpecialProsecutor,Respondents.

FILED

JUL16,2015

DianeM.FremgenClerkofSupremeCourt

StateofWisconsinexrel.FrancisD.Schmitz,



Petitioner,v.HonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoeJudge,Respondent,EightUnnamedMovants,InterestedParty. IntheMatterofJohnDoeProceedingStateofWisconsinexrel.ThreeUnnamedPetitioners,Petitioner,v.theHonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoejudge,theHonorableGregoryPotter,ChiefJudgeandFrancisD.Schmitz,asSpecialProsecutor,Respondents.

ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment. Declaration of rights relief granted John Doe investigation

orderedclosed.

PETITION for supervisory writ and appeal from an order of a John Doe Judge for Milwaukee County, Iowa

County, Dodge County, Dane County, and Columbia County, Gregory A. Peterson, Reserve Judge. Petition for

supervisorywritdeniedandorderaffirmed.

PETITIONforsupervisorywritandreviewofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.Petitionforsupervisory

writdeniedanddecisionaffirmed.

1 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. These cases arise from a John Doe proceeding originally initiated in

MilwaukeeCounty,andsubsequentlyexpandedtofouradditionalcounties,IowaCounty,DodgeCounty,DaneCounty,

andColumbiaCounty.Thoughnotconsolidated,theseproceedingshavebeenoverseenbyasingleJohnDoejudge

andorganizedbyasinglespecialprosecutor(FrancisSchmitz).Forthesakeofclarity,wewillrefertoall

fiveproceedingsasasingle"JohnDoeinvestigation."Theinvestigationhasbeenongoingforseveralyearsand

hasbeenthesubjectofmuchlitigation.[1]

2Accordingtothespecialprosecutor,thepurposeoftheJohnDoeinvestigationistorootoutallegedly

illegal campaign coordination between certain issue advocacy groups and a candidate for elective office. To

further the investigation, the special prosecutor sought, and received, wideranging subpoenas and search

warrantsfor29organizationsandindividuals,seekingmillionsofdocumentsthathadbeencreatedoveraperiod

ofseveralyears.Varioustargets(collectively"theUnnamedMovants")movedtheJohnDoejudgetoquashthe

subpoenasandsearchwarrantsandtoreturnanypropertyseizedbythespecialprosecutor.TheJohnDoejudge,

the Hon. Gregory A. Peterson, presiding, granted the motions to quash and ordered the return of all property

seized.ReserveJudgePetersonstayedtheorder,however,andalsohaltedtheJohnDoeinvestigationpendingour



resolutionofthecasesbeforeus.

3ThefirstcaseweaddressisanoriginalactionbroughtbyUnnamedMovantsNos.6and7,Stateexrel.

TwoUnnamedPetitionersv.Peterson("TwoUnnamedPetitioners").UnnamedMovantsNos.6and7seekadeclaration

ofrightsthatthespecialprosecutor'stheoryofthecaseisinvalidunderWisconsinlaw.Specifically,they

ask that we declare that coordinated issue advocacy of the kind alleged by the special prosecutor is not

regulatedunderWis.Stat.Ch.11(201112),[2]

Wisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw.

4Thesecondcasewereviewisapetitionbroughtbythespecialprosecutorforasupervisorywritandan

appealofReserveJudgePeterson'sdecisionandorderquashingthesubpoenasandsearchwarrants,Stateexrel.

Schmitz v. Peterson ("Schmitz v. Peterson"). The special prosecutor argues that Reserve Judge Peterson

improperlyquashedthesubpoenasandsearchwarrantsbecausetherecordsintheJohnDoeinvestigationestablish

areasonablebeliefthattheUnnamedMovantsviolatedWisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw.Thiscaseisbeforeus

ontheUnnamedMovants'petitionstobypassthecourtofappealspursuanttoWis.Stat.809.60(201314).

5Thethirdcaseweaddressisapetitionforasupervisorywritandareviewofadecisionofthecourt

ofappeals,Stateexrel.ThreeUnnamedPetitionersv.Peterson("ThreeUnnamedPetitioners").Thispetitionfor

supervisorywritwasbroughtbyUnnamedMovantsNos.2,6,and7,andbroadlychallengeswhethertheJohnDoe

investigationcanbeinitiatedinfiveseparatecountiesunderasingleJohnDoejudge,andwhetherthespecial

prosecutorwasproperlyappointed.ThecourtofappealsdeniedthesupervisorywritandUnnamedMovantsNos.2,

6,and7appealedthatdecisiontothiscourt.

6 Our order granting and consolidating[3]

each of these cases identified 14 issues presented by the

complexnatureofthecases.TheseissuesrelatedtotheproceduralnatureoftheJohnDoeinvestigation,as

well as whether the conduct alleged by the special prosecutor is actually a violation of Ch. 11. Subsequent

briefingbythepartieshasrevealedthatthecasescanberesolvedonmuchnarrowergroundsthanthosethatwere

originallysubmitted,andwehavewrittenthisopinionaccordingly.

7Wecanresolvetheoriginalaction,TwoUnnamedPetitioners,byfirstexaminingwhetherthestatutory

definitionsof"committee,""contributions,""disbursements,"and"politicalpurposes"inWis.Stat.11.01(4),

(6), (7), and (16) are limited to express advocacy[4]

or whether they encompass the conduct of coordination

between a candidate or a campaign committee and an independent organization that engages in issue advocacy.

Second, if the definitions extend to issue advocacy coordination, what then constitutes prohibited

"coordination?"[5]

8 Next, we can resolve the supervisory writ petition in Schmitz v. Peterson by answering whether the

evidencegatheredintheJohnDoeproceedingsprovidesareasonablebeliefthatWisconsinlawwasviolatedbya

campaigncommittee'scoordinationwithindependentadvocacyorganizationsthatengagedinexpressadvocacy.[6]

9Finally,wecanresolvethesupervisorywritpetitioninThreeUnnamedPetitionersbyexamining:(1)

Whether the Director of State Courts ("Director") violated a plain legal duty in appointing reserve judge,

BarbaraA.Kluka,astheJohnDoejudgetopresideoveramulticountyJohnDoeproceeding(2)WhethertheChief

Judge of the First Judicial District violated a plain legal duty in appointing reserve judge, Gregory A.

Peterson,astheJohnDoejudgetopresideoveramulticountyJohnDoeproceeding(3)WhetheraJohnDoejudge

violatedaplainlegaldutybyconveningaJohnDoeproceedingovermultiplecounties,whichisthencoordinated

bythedistrictattorneyofoneofthecounties(4)WhetheraJohnDoejudgeviolatedaplainlegaldutyby

appointingaspecialprosecutortoperformthefunctionsofadistrictattorneyinmultiplecountiesinaJohn

Doeproceedingwhen(a)thedistrictattorneyineachcountyrequeststheappointment(b)butnoneofthenine

groundsforappointingaspecialprosecutorunderWis.Stat.978.045(1r)apply(c)nochargeshaveyetbeen

issued(d)thedistrictattorneyineachcountyhasnotrefusedtocontinuetheinvestigationorprosecutionof



anypotentialchargeand(e)nocertificationthatnootherprosecutorialunitwasabletodotheworkforwhich

thespecialprosecutorwassoughtwasmadetotheDepartmentofAdministrationand(5)If,arguendo,therewasa

defectintheappointmentofthespecialprosecutorintheJohnDoeproceedingsatissueinthesematters,what

effect, if any, would such a defect have on the competency of the special prosecutor to conduct the

investigationorthecompetencyoftheJohnDoejudgetoconducttheseproceedings?[7]

I.HOLDINGS

A.

10 In Two Unnamed Petitioners, we hold that the definition of "political purposes" in Wis. Stat.

11.01(16)isunconstitutionallyoverbroadandvagueundertheFirstAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution

and Article 1, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution[8]

because its language "'is so sweeping that its

sanctionsmaybeappliedtoconstitutionallyprotectedconductwhichthestateisnotpermittedtoregulate.'"

Statev.Janssen,219Wis.2d362,374,580N.W.2d260(1998)(quotingBachowskiv.Salamone,139Wis.2d397,

411,407N.W.2d533(1987)).However,areadilyavailablelimitingconstructionexiststhatwewillapplyand

thatwillpreventthechillingofotherwiseprotectedspeechnamely,"politicalpurposes"islimitedtoexpress

advocacyanditsfunctionalequivalent[9]

asthosetermsaredefinedinBuckleyv.Valeo,424U.S.1(1976),and

Fed.ElectionComm'nv.Wis.RighttoLife,Inc.,551U.S.449(2007)(WRTLII).Withthislimitingconstruction

inplace,Chapter11doesnotproscribeanyoftheallegedconductofanyoftheUnnamedMovants.Thespecial

prosecutorhasnotallegedanyexpressadvocacy,andissueadvocacy,whethercoordinatedornot,is"beyondthe

reach of [Ch. 11]." Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 815 (7th Cir. 2014) (Barland II).

Accordingly,weinvalidatethespecialprosecutor'stheoryofthecase,andwegrantthereliefrequestedbythe

UnnamedMovants.

11Tobeclear,thisconclusionendstheJohnDoeinvestigationbecausethespecialprosecutor'slegal

theoryisunsupportedineitherreasonorlaw.Consequently,theinvestigationisclosed.Consistentwithour

decisionandtheorderenteredbyReserveJudgePeterson,weorderthatthespecialprosecutorandthedistrict

attorneys involved in this investigation must cease all activities related to the investigation, return all

propertyseizedintheinvestigationfromanyindividualororganization,andpermanentlydestroyallcopiesof

informationandothermaterialsobtainedthroughtheinvestigation.AllUnnamedMovantsarerelievedofanyduty

tocooperatefurtherwiththeinvestigation.

B.

12 In Schmitz v. Peterson, we hold that the special prosecutor has failed to prove that Reserve Judge

Petersonviolatedaplainlegaldutywhenhequashedthesubpoenasandsearchwarrantsandorderedthereturnof

all property seized by the special prosecutor. In quashing the subpoenas and search warrants, Reserve Judge

PetersonexercisedhisdiscretionundertheJohnDoestatute,Wis.Stat.968.26,todeterminetheextentofthe

investigation. Because the purpose of a supervisory writ does not include review of a judge's discretionary

acts,Stateexrel.Kalalv.CircuitCourtforDaneCnty.,2004WI58,24,271Wis.2d633,681N.W.2d110,the

supervisorywritsoughtbythespecialprosecutorisdenied,andReserveJudgePeterson'sorderisaffirmed.

C.

13 Finally, in Three Unnamed Petitioners, we hold that the Unnamed Movants have failed to prove that

eitherReserveJudgeKlukaorReserveJudgePetersonviolatedaplainlegaldutyby:(1)acceptinganappointment

asareservejudge(2)conveningamulticountyJohnDoeproceedingor(3)appointingaspecialprosecutor.

AlthoughthecircumstancessurroundingtheformationoftheJohnDoeinvestigationraiseseriousconcerns,and

althoughtheappointmentofthespecialprosecutormaywellhavebeenimproper,suchconcernsdonotsatisfythe

stringentpreconditionsforasupervisorywrit.[10]

Putanotherway,werewetograntthesupervisorywritin

this case, we would risk "transform[ing] the writ into an allpurpose alternative to the appellate review



process,"whichwecannotdo.Id. Accordingly, we deny the supervisory writ and affirm the decision of the

courtofappeals.

II.FACTUALBACKGROUNDANDPROCEDURALHISTORY[11]

[12]

14 In the spring of 2010, a John Doe proceeding (John Doe I) was commenced for the purpose of

investigating the alleged misuse of public resources in the Milwaukee County Executive's Office. This

investigation resulted in criminal charges being filed against four individualsTim Russell, Kevin Kavanaugh,

KellyRindfleisch,andDarleneWinkinJanuary2012.[13]

15JohnDoeIalsotriggeredasecondJohnDoeproceeding(JohnDoeII),theinvestigationatissuehere.

On August 10, 2012, Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney David Robles filed a petition for the

commencementofJohnDoeIIintheMilwaukeeCountycircuitcourt.Thispetitionsoughtleavetoinvestigate

alleged campaign finance violations under Wis. Stat. Ch. 11, and requested a secrecy order to cover the

investigationinanticipationthatdocumentswouldbesoughtfromthetargetedindividuals.Insupportofhis

request,Robles'petitionreferredtoanaffidavitbyInvestigatorRobertStelter.

16 Stelter's affidavit indicates that emails obtained in response to a search warrant in John Doe I

suggested that there may have been coordination of fundraising between campaign committees and other related,

independentgroups.ReserveJudgeNealNettesheim,theJohnDoeIjudge,authorizedtheuseoftheinformation

obtainedinJohnDoeIforthepurposeofrequestingthecommencementofJohnDoeII.

17 On August 23, 2012, the Chief Judge of the First Judicial District, Jeffrey Kremers, assigned and

forwardedtheJohnDoepetitiontoReserveJudgeKluka.OnSeptember5,2012,usingaformtitled"Application

and Order for Specific Judicial Assignment," Director of State Courts John Voelker (with thenChief Justice

Shirley Abrahamson's name directly above)[14]

assigned Reserve Judge Kluka to preside over the John Doe

proceedinginMilwaukeeCounty.Thatsameday,ReserveJudgeKlukaauthorizedthecommencementoftheJohnDoe

proceedingandalsograntedtherequestedsecrecyorder.

18 On September 6, 2012, Investigator Stelter filed an affidavit in support of a request for search

warrantsandsubpoenas.Therequestcoveredawideswathofdesiredinformation,includingemails,conference

call records, and bank records, dating from 2009 to 2012. In support of this request, Investigator Stelter

provideddetailsofnumerousemailsbetweenacandidatecommitteeandindividualsand/orgroups.

19OnDecember13,2012,InvestigatorStelterfiledanotheraffidavitinsupportofarequestforfurther

search warrants and subpoenas. This affidavit provided additional details about the parties and how they

operatedincoordinationwitheachother.Thetheoryofthecase,asputforwardbythespecialprosecutor,is

twofold: (1) that the independent groups and the candidate committee worked "hand in glove" such that the

independent groups became mere subcommittees of the candidate's committee, thus triggering reporting and

disclosurerequirementsunderWis.Stat.11.10(4)and(2)thatthecoordinatedissueadvocacyamountedtoan

unlawfulinkindcontributiontothecandidatecommitteeunderWis.Admin.CodeGAB1.20.

20OnJanuary18,2013,MilwaukeeCountyDistrictAttorneyJohnChisholmmetwiththenAttorneyGeneral

J.B.VanHollentodiscusstheongoinginvestigation.DistrictAttorneyChisholmsoughttodeterminewhether,

giventhestatewidenatureandgravityoftheinvestigation,theDepartmentofJustice("DOJ")wishedtobecome

involved.OnMay31,2013,AttorneyGeneralVanHollensentDistrictAttorneyChisholmaletterdecliningDOJ

involvementintheinvestigation.AttorneyGeneralVanHollencited,amongotherthings,potentialconflictsof

interestandtheappearanceofimpropriety.

21InJuly2013,threemorepetitionstocommenceJohnDoeproceedingswerefiled:DistrictAttorneyJane

KohlweyfiledapetitioninColumbiaCountycircuitcourtonJuly22,2013DistrictAttorneyLarryNelsonfiled

apetitioninIowaCountycircuitcourtonJuly25,2013andDistrictAttorneyKurtKlombergfiledapetitionin

DodgeCountycircuitcourtonJuly26,2013.



22 On August 7, 2013, using a form titled "Application and Order for Specific Judicial Assignment,"

DirectorVoelker(withthenChiefJusticeShirleyAbrahamson'snamedirectlyabove)assignedReserveJudgeKluka

topresideovertheIowaCountyJohnDoeproceeding.OnAugust21,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukaenteredanorder

commencingtheJohnDoeproceedinginIowaCountyandalsoenteredasecrecyorder.

23AlsoonAugust7,2013,usingaformtitled"ApplicationandOrderforSpecificJudicialAssignment,"


topresideovertheDodgeCountyJohnDoeproceeding.OnAugust21,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukaenteredanorder

commencingtheDodgeCountyJohnDoeproceedingandalsoenteredasecrecyorder.

24 On August 14, 2013, using a form titled "Application and Order for Specific Judicial Assignment,"


to preside over the Columbia County John Doe proceeding. On August 21, 2013, Reserve Judge Kluka entered an

ordercommencingtheJohnDoeproceedingandalsoenteredasecrecyorder.

25OnAugust21,2013,DaneCountyDistrictAttorneyIsmaelOzannefiledapetitioninDaneCountycircuit

courttocommenceaJohnDoeproceeding.On August 21, 2013, using a form titled "Application and Order for

Specific Judicial Assignment," Director Voelker (with thenChief Justice Shirley Abrahamson's name directly

above)assignedReserveJudgeKlukatopresideovertheDaneCountyJohnDoeproceeding.OnAugust21,2013,

ReserveJudgeKlukaenteredanordercommencingtheDaneCountyJohnDoeproceedingandalsoenteredasecrecy

order.

26AlsoonAugust21,2013,theDistrictAttorneysfromallfivecountiessentajointlettertoReserve

JudgeKlukarequestingtheappointmentofaspecialprosecutortooverseetheentireinvestigation.TheDistrict

AttorneysencouragedReserveJudgeKlukatoappointaspecialprosecutoronherownmotionandintheexerciseof

herinherentauthority.Theirletterexpressedconcernsthatitwouldbeinefficientforfivedistrictattorneys

tohandleoneinvestigationandthattheremaybeaperceptionofbiasgiventheirpartisanaffiliations.The

letterrecommendedFrancisSchmitzfortheposition.

27OnAugust23,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukaenteredseparate,butidentical,ordersinallfiveJohnDoe

proceedings appointing Francis Schmitz as special prosecutor with jurisdiction across the five counties.

Mirroring the District Attorneys' position on the matter, Reserve Judge Kluka cited, as the basis of her

appointment,concernsofefficiencyandtheappearanceofimpropriety.ReserveJudgeKlukamadetheappointment

pursuanttoherpurported"authority"underStatev.Carlson,2002WIApp44,250Wis.2d562,641N.W.2d451,as

wellasherpurported"inherentauthority"underStatev.Cummings,199Wis.2d721,736,546N.W.2d406(1996).

Eachorderfixedthespecialprosecutor'srateofpayat$130perhourandstatedthatacopyshouldbesentto

theDepartmentofAdministration.

28OnOctober1,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukaauthorized29subpoenasducestecumto,amongothers,Unnamed

Movants Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, based on an affidavit submitted to her by Investigator Stelter. These

subpoenascompelledproductionofdocumentsevidencingtheconductofcoordinationamongthesubpoenaedparties

and a candidate committee, particularly the interaction between Unnamed Movants Nos. 1 and 2. That same day

ReserveJudgeKlukaauthorizedsearchwarrantsforthehomesandofficesofUnnamedMovantsNos.6and7.The

searchwarrantswereexecutedatapproximately6:00a.m.onOctober3,2013,inpredawn,armed,paramilitary

styleraidsinwhichbrightfloodlightswereusedtoilluminatethetargets'homes.

29Thebreadthofthedocumentsgatheredpursuanttosubpoenasandseizedpursuanttosearchwarrantsis

amazing.Millionsofdocuments,bothindigitalandpapercopy,weresubpoenaedand/orseized.Deputiesseized

businesspapers,computerequipment,phones,andotherdevices,whiletheirtargetswererestrainedunderpolice

supervisionanddeniedtheabilitytocontacttheirattorneys.Thespecialprosecutorobtainedvirtuallyevery

document possessed by the Unnamed Movants relating to every aspect of their lives, both personal and

professional,overafiveyearspan(from2009to2013).Suchdocumentsweresubpoenaedand/orseizedwithout



regard to content or relevance to the alleged violations of Ch. 11. As part of this dragnet, the special

prosecutor also had seized wholly irrelevant information, such as retirement income statements, personal

financialaccountinformation,personalletters,andfamilyphotos.

30MotionstoquashthesubpoenaswerefiledbyUnnamedMovantNo.1onOctober17,2013,andbyUnnamed

MovantsNos.2and3onOctober25,2013.OnOctober29,2013,beforerulingonthemotions,ReserveJudgeKluka

recused herself from the Milwaukee County proceeding, citing only an unspecified "conflict." The Milwaukee

CountyproceedingwasreassignedbyChiefJudgeKremerstoReserveJudgeGregoryPetersononOctober29,2013.

31Thenextday,onOctober30,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukadisqualifiedherselffromtheremainingJohnDoe

proceedings. On November 1, 2013, Chief Judge Potter of the Sixth Judicial District assigned Reserve Judge

Peterson to preside over the John Doe proceedings in Columbia County and Dodge County. On November 1, 2013,

ChiefJudgeDuvalloftheSeventhJudicialDistrictassignedReserveJudgePetersontopresideovertheJohnDoe

proceeding in Iowa County. On November 4, 2013, Chief Judge Daley of the Fifth Judicial District assigned

ReserveJudgePetersontopresideovertheJohnDoeproceedinginDaneCounty.Thereafter,onNovember4,2013,

Director Voelker (with thenChief Justice Shirley Abrahamson's name directly above) assigned Reserve Judge

PetersontopresideovertheMilwaukeeCountyJohnDoeproceeding.OnNovember11,2013,DirectorVoelker(with

thenChiefJusticeShirleyAbrahamson'snamedirectlyabove)assignedReserveJudgePetersontopresideoverthe

John Doe proceedings in Iowa County and Dane County. On November 14, 2013, Director Volker (with thenChief

JusticeShirleyAbrahamson'snamedirectlyabove)assignedReserveJudgePetersontopresideovertheJohnDoe

proceedingsinColumbiaCountyandDodgeCounty.

32AlsoonNovember14,2013,UnnamedMovantsNos.2,6,and7filedwiththecourtofappealsapetition

forsupervisorywritsofmandamusandprohibitiondirectedatReserveJudgesKlukaandPeterson(ThreeUnnamed

Petitioners). The Unnamed Movants alleged procedural defects involving the appointment of a reserve judge to

overseeamulticountyJohnDoeinvestigationandtheappointmentofthespecialprosecutor.TheUnnamedMovants

askedthecourtofappealstodeclaretheJohnDoeinvestigationvoidabinitio.

33 In an order dated November 22, 2013, the court of appeals summarily dismissed what it deemed the

UnnamedMovants'"firstandsixthclaims,"namely,thatthereisnostatutoryauthoritytoappointorassigna

reserve judge to preside over a John Doe proceeding, and that the John Doe judge circumvented the statutory

functionsoftheclerksofcourtinfivecountiesbyrequiringcertaindocumentsbesenttoapostofficebox.

Three Unnamed Petitioners, Nos. 2013AP2504W2508W, unpublished order 67 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2013).

Regarding the first claim, the court of appeals reasoned that there is no statute that limits the ability of

reservejudgestooverseeJohnDoeinvestigations.Id.Moreover,thecourtofappealsnotedthatthestatute

authorizing the appointment of reserve judges explicitly states that reserve judges "shall perform the same

dutiesasotherjudges."Id.(citingWis.Stat.753.075).Thecourtofappealsorderedtherespondentsto

addresstheremainingclaimsconcerningthelegalityofamulticountyJohnDoeproceeding,thelegalityofa

special prosecutor handling a multicounty John Doe proceeding, and the legality of the special prosecutor's

appointmentunderWis.Stat.978.045.Id.

34Whilethatcasewaspendingatthecourtofappeals,UnnamedMovantNo.6alsofiledapetitionin

DodgeCountycircuitcourtonDecember4,2013,forthereturnofthepropertytakenpursuanttotheOctober1

searchwarrant.OnDecember20,2013,UnnamedMovantNo.7filedasubstantiallysimilarpetitioninDaneCounty

circuitcourt.Afteraresponsebythespecialprosecutor,ReserveJudgePetersongrantedthemotionstoquash

thesubpoenasandthepetitionstoreturnpropertyonJanuary10,2014.ReserveJudgePetersonreasoned:

Iconcludethesubpoenasdonotshowprobablecausethatthemovingpartiescommittedanyviolationsofthecampaignfinancelaws.Iampersuadedthestatutesonlyprohibitcoordinationbycandidatesandindependentorganizationsforapoliticalpurpose,andpoliticalpurpose,withoneminorexceptionnotrelevanthere...requiresexpressadvocacy.Thereisnoevidenceofexpressadvocacy.

...



Beforethereiscoordinationtheremustbepoliticalpurposeswithoutpoliticalpurposes,coordinationisnotacrime.

...

As relevant here, acts are for political purposes when they are made to influence the recall orretention of a person holding office. Wis. Stat. 11.01(16). If the statute stopped here, thedefinitionofpoliticalpurposesmightwellbeunconstitutionallyvague.Buckleyv.Valeo,424U.S.1,77(1976).Butthedefinitioncontinues:actsforpoliticalpurposesinclude,butarenotlimitedto,making a communication that expressly advocates the recall or retention of a clearly identifiedcandidate.Wis.Stat.11.01(16)(a).InGAB1.28,theGABattemptedtofleshoutotheractsthatwouldconstitutepoliticalpurposes,butbecauseofconstitutionalchallengesithasstateditwillnotenforcethatregulation.Sotheonlyclearlydefinedpoliticalpurposeisonethatrequiresexpressadvocacy.

Thestateisnotclaimingthatanyoftheindependentorganizationsexpresslyadvocated.Therefore,thesubpoenasfailtoshowprobablecausethatacrimewascommitted.

35AsforthesearchwarrantsexecutedonthehomesandofficesofUnnamedMovantsNos.6and7,Reserve

JudgePetersonreasoned:

The same legal conclusions should apply to all parties who have raised challenges in this case.Therefore,forthereasonsstatedaboveregardingthelimitationsinthescopeofthecampaignfinancelaws,Iconcludethatthewarrantslackprobablecause.

36Thespecialprosecutorrequestedastayoftheorder,whichwasgrantedonJanuary27,2014.Inhis

ordergrantingthestay,ReserveJudgePetersonalsoclarifiedthathewasincorrectinstatingthattheprobable

causestandardappliedtosubpoenas.Nevertheless,heconcludedthatasubpoenaisnot"validwhenbasedonan

invalidinterpretationofthelaw."Asaconditionofthestay,ReserveJudgePetersonorderedtheStatenotto

examineanyofthepropertyseizedpursuanttosearchwarrants.

37 On January 30, 2014, the court of appeals issued an opinion and order in Three Unnamed Petitioners

addressingtheremainingissuesanddenyingthesupervisorywrit.RegardingthelegalityofamulticountyJohn

Doeproceeding,thecourtofappealsreasonedthattherewerefiveseparateproceedingsinfiveseparatecounties

and that it is not unusual for courts to hold joint proceedings or to issue joint orders in nonconsolidated

cases that share a common factual basis, raise the same legal issue, or involve overlapping parties. Three

UnnamedPetitioners,Nos.2013AP2504W2508W,unpublishedslipop.&order34(Wis.Ct.App.Jan.30,2014).

The court of appeals used the same reasoning to justify the legality of a special prosecutor handling multi

countyJohnDoeproceedings.Id.at47.AsforthelegalityofthespecialprosecutorsappointmentunderWis.

Stat.978.045,thecourtofappealsdeterminedthatthespecialprosecutorwasappointedpursuanttoReserve

JudgeKluka's"authority"underCarlson,and"inherentauthority"underCummings,notunderWis.Stat.978.045,

thespecialprosecutorsstatute.Id.OnFebruary19,2014,theUnnamedMovantsfiledapetitionforreviewin

thiscourt,whichwegrantedonDecember16,2014.

38Meanwhile,onFebruary7,2014,UnnamedMovantsNos.6and7filedapetitionforleavetocommencean

originalactionintheWisconsinSupremeCourtunderArticleVII,Section3(2)oftheWisconsinConstitution[15]

(Two Unnamed Petitioners). The original action sought a declaration confirming the ruling of Reserve Judge

PetersoninhisJanuary10,2014,order.ThespecialprosecutorfiledaresponsetothispetitiononFebruary

25,2014.WegrantedtheoriginalactiononDecember16,2014.

39On February 21, 2014, the special prosecutor filed a petition for a supervisory writ and a writ of

mandamusinthecourtofappeals(Schmitzv.Peterson).Thespecialprosecutorsoughtthesupervisorywritin

ordertovacateReserveJudgePeterson'sJanuary10,2014,orderandtodirectReserveJudgePetersontoenforce

the subpoenas and search warrants. Unnamed Movants Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 filed responses to the

petitiononMarch31,2014.Shortlythereafter,theUnnamedMovantsbroughtapetitiontobypassthecourtof

appeals.WegrantedbypassonDecember16,2014.

40Finally,onNovember3,2014,UnnamedMovantsNos.6and7filedamotionwithReserveJudgePeterson

requestinganordertoshowcauseastowhytheJohnDoeproceedingshouldnotbeended.ReserveJudgePeterson

denied that motion but concluded that if appellate courts agreed with his interpretation of Ch. 11, the



"consequencewillnodoubtbetheendoftheJohnDoeinvestigation."

III.TWOUNNAMEDPETITIONERS

41WeturnfirsttoTwoUnnamedPetitioners,theoriginalactionfiledwiththeWisconsinSupremeCourt.

ThiscaserequiresustointerpretWisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw,Wis.Stat.Ch.11.Byitsverynature,this

task involves fundamental questions regarding the scope of the government's ability to regulate political

speech.Toresolvethiscase,wemustengageinstatutoryinterpretationofthephrase"politicalpurposes,"

whichincludesallactivities"doneforthepurposeofinfluencing[an]election."Wis.Stat.11.01(16).We

conclude,consistentwiththeFirstAmendmentoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionandArticleI,Section3ofthe

Wisconsin Constitution, that the plain language of "political purposes" in Wis. Stat. 11.01(16) is

unconstitutionallyoverbroadandvagueifitisnotgivenalimitingconstructionandappliedtoonlyexpress

advocacyanditsfunctionalequivalent.Thisconclusioninvalidatesthespecialprosecutor'stheoryofthecase

and ends the John Doe investigation. Therefore, we agree with the Unnamed Movants and grant their requested

relief.

A.StandardofReview

42Statutoryinterpretationisaquestionoflaw,whichthiscourtreviewsdenovo.CovenantHealthcare

Sys.,Inc.v.CityofWauwatosa,2011WI80,21,336Wis.2d522,800N.W.2d906.Inthiscase,ourstatutory

interpretationimplicatestheconstitutionalityofspecificprovisionsinChapter11,whichisalsoaquestionof

lawwhichwereviewdenovo.Janssen,219Wis.2dat370.

43Statutesarepresumedtobeconstitutional,"andthepartyseekingtoovercomethepresumptionmust

provethestatuteunconstitutionalbeyondareasonabledoubt."Id.Whenthestatuteimplicatestheexerciseof

FirstAmendmentrights,however,"[t]heburdenshiftstotheproponentofthestatute."Id.at37071.Here,

theproponentisthespecialprosecutor.

B.TheFirstAmendmentandtheDoctrinesofVaguenessandOverbreadth

i.FirstAmendmentPrinciples

44InaddressingthescopeofWisconsin'scampaignfinancelawwearekeenlyawarethatthistaskbears

directly on the ability of all citizens in our State to engage in the democratic process. The special

prosecutor's theories implicate one of the foundational principles of our nation: the freedom of speech,

specifically,politicalspeech.WethereforebeginouranalysiswiththewordsoftheFirstAmendment:"Congress

shallmakenolaw...abridgingthefreedomofspeech."U.S.Const.amend.I.[16]

ArticleI,Section3ofthe

WisconsinConstitutionguaranteesthat:"Everypersonmayfreelyspeak,writeandpublishhissentimentsonall

subjects,beingresponsiblefortheabuseofthatright,andnolawsshallbepassedtorestrainorabridgethe

libertyofspeechorofthepress."

45WhiletheFirstAmendmentprotectsabroadrangeofspeechandconduct,"thereispracticallyuniversal

agreementthatamajorpurposeofthatAmendmentwastoprotectthefreediscussionofgovernmentalaffairs...

.ofcourseinclud(ing)discussionsofcandidates...."Buckley,424U.S.at14(quotingMillsv.Alabama,

384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). Indeed, "[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use



informationtoreachconsensusisapreconditiontoenlightenedselfgovernmentandanecessarymeanstoprotect

it."CitizensUnitedv.Fed.ElectionComm'n,558U.S.310,339(2010)."Inarepublic[suchasours]wherethe

people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is

essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a

nation."Buckley,424U.S.at1415.Thesevaluesreflectour"profoundnationalcommitmenttotheprinciple

thatdebateonpublicissuesshouldbeuninhibited,robust,andwideopen."N.Y.TimesCo.v.Sullivan,376U.S.

254,270(1964)(emphasisadded).

46Ourprotectionofthefreedomofpoliticalspeechreflectsourfirmbeliefthat"[d]iscussionofpublic

issuesanddebateonthequalificationsofcandidatesareintegraltotheoperationofthesystemofgovernment

establishedbyourConstitution."Buckley,424U.S.at14."Atthefounding,speechwasopen,comprehensive,

and vital to society's definition of itself there were no limits on the sources of speech and knowledge."

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353. Therefore, "[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest protection to []

political expression in order 'to assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of

politicalandsocialchangesdesiredbythepeople.'"Buckley,424U.S.at14(quotingRothv.UnitedStates,

354U.S.476,484(1957)).

47Accordingly,"theFirstAmendment'hasitsfullestandmosturgentapplicationpreciselytotheconduct

ofcampaignsforpoliticaloffice.'"McCutcheonv.Fed.ElectionComm'n,134S.Ct.1434,1441(2014)(quoting

MonitorPatriotCo.v.Roy,401U.S.265,272(1971)).Thereexists"norightmorebasicinourdemocracythan

the right to participate in electing our political leaders." Id. at 144041. Political speech is thus a

fundamental right and is afforded the highest level of protection. Indeed, freedom of speech, especially

politicalspeech,istherightmostfundamentaltoourdemocracy.Tothatend,wemustconductaparticularly"

[c]loseexaminationofthespecificityofthestatutorylimitation...where,ashere,thelegislationimposes

criminalpenaltiesinanareapermeatedbyFirstAmendmentinterests."Buckley,424U.S.at4041."TheFirst

Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic

marketingresearch,orseekdeclaratoryrulingsbeforediscussingthemostsalientpoliticalissuesofourday.

Prolixlawschillspeechforthesamereasonthatvaguelawschillspeech:People'ofcommonintelligencemust

necessarilyguessat[thelaw's]meaninganddifferastoitsapplication.'"CitizensUnited,558U.S.at324

(quotingConnallyv.Gen.Constr.Co.,269U.S.385,391(1926)).

48 However, there are certain, limited circumstances in which the government may regulate and impose

burdens upon the exercise of free speech. In the campaign finance context, these include disclosure and

reportingrequirements,aswellascontributionlimitstocandidates.[17]

Thejustificationforimposingsuch

restrictionsisto"prevent[]corruptionandtheappearanceofcorruption."WRTLII,551U.S.at478(quotations

omitted). The interest in preventing the corruption of public officials, however, does not justify the

regulationofallpoliticalspeech.Rather,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasdrawnanimportant"distinction

betweendiscussionofissuesandcandidatesandadvocacyofelectionordefeatofcandidates."Buckley,424U.S.

at42.Thecompellinggovernmentalinterestthatjustifiestheregulationofexpressadvocacy(thepreventionof

quidproquo[18]

corruption)"'mightnotapplyto'"theregulationofissueadvocacy.WRTLII,551U.S.at471

(quotingMcConnellv.Fed.ElectionComm'n,540U.S.93,209n.88(2003)).Indeed, "[s]pending large sums of

money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an

officeholder'sofficialduties,doesnotgiverisetosuchquidproquocorruption."McCutcheon,134S.Ct.at

1450."Nordoesthepossibilitythatanindividualwhospendslargesumsmaygarner'influenceoveroraccess

to'electedofficialsorpoliticalparties."Id.at1451(quotingCitizensUnited,558U.S.at359).

49AkeyreasonthatissueadvocacyisaffordedgreaterprotectionundertheFirstAmendmentisthat"

[f]reedomofdiscussion,ifitwouldfulfillitshistoricfunctioninthisnation,mustembraceallissuesabout

whichinformationisneededorappropriatetoenablethemembersofsocietytocopewiththeexigenciesoftheir



period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). "Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply

becausetheissuesmayalsobepertinentinanelection."WRTLII,551U.S.at474.

50Inordertogivethefullestprotectionpossibletotherighttotheexerciseofpoliticalspeech,"the

government'sauthoritytoregulateinthisareaextendsonlytomoneyraisedandspentforspeechthatisclearly

election related[, that is, express advocacy] ordinary political speech about issues, policy, and public

officials[,thatis,issueadvocacy,]mustremainunencumbered."BarlandII,751F.3dat810(emphasisadded).

Thus, in order to avoid a chilling effect on otherwise protected speech, "when the regulatory scheme reaches

beyond candidates, their campaign committees, and political parties. . . . [the] government may

regulate...onlywithnarrowspecificity."Id.at811(quotationsomitted)."Inshort,[we]mustgivethe

benefitofanydoubttoprotectingratherthanstiflingspeech."WRTLII,551U.S.at469seealsoMcCutcheon,

134S.Ct.at1451(quotingWRTLII,551U.S.at457)("'[T]heFirstAmendmentrequires[courts]toerronthe

sideofprotectingpoliticalspeechratherthansuppressingit.'").

51Tothatend,"inthedomainofcampaignfinancelaw,theFirstAmendmentrequiresaheighteneddegree

ofregulatoryclarityandaclosefitbetweenthegovernment'smeansanditsend."BarlandII,751F.3dat808.

This"closefit"requirementisintendedtopreventthedangerouschillingeffectanunclearorimpreciselawhas

on protected speech. Id. at 835. To guard against inhibiting protected political speech, courts use the

overbreadthandvaguenessdoctrines.Thesedoctrines"reflect[]theconclusionthatthepossibleharmtosociety

fromallowingunprotectedspeechtogounpunishedisoutweighedbythepossibilitythatprotectedspeechwillbe

muted."Janssen,219Wis.2dat372(citationomitted).

ii.OverbreadthandVagueness

52"Astatuteisoverbroadwhenitslanguage,givenitsnormalmeaning,issosweepingthatitssanctions

maybeappliedtoconstitutionallyprotectedconductwhichthestateisnotpermittedtoregulate."Id.at374

(citation omitted). The overbreadth doctrine "recognize[s] that broadly written statutes substantially

inhibitingfreeexpressionshouldbeopentoattackevenbyapartywhoseownconductremainsunprotectedunder

theFirstAmendment."Statev.Stevenson,2000WI71,11,236Wis.2d86,613N.W.2d90."Thedangerinherent

inoverbroadstatutesisthatsuchstatutesprovide[thegovernmentwith]practicallyunbridledadministrative

and prosecutorial discretion that may result in select[ive] prosecution based on certain views deemed

objectionablebylawenforcement."Id.,13.Thus,"[o]verbroadstatutesmayundesirablydissuadepersonsfrom

exercising their rights by 'chilling' their protected speech or expression." Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 372

(citation omitted). In other words, the threat to free expression created by overbroad statutes is that, by

potentiallysweepinginconstitutionallyprotectedactivity,individualsandgroupsmayselfcensoroutoffear

ofvindictiveorselectiveprosecution.

53Whenfacedwithanoverbroadstatute,courtshaveseveraloptions.

First,courtsmayapplyalimitingconstructiontorehabilitatethestatutewhensuchanarrowingandvalidating construction is readily available. Second, courts may cure the constitutional defect bysevering the unconstitutional provisions of a statute and leaving the remainder of the legislationintact. Finally, courts may determine that the statute is not amenable to judicial limitation orseverance and invalidate the entire statute upon a determination that it is unconstitutional on itsface.

Stevenson,236Wis.2d86,15(internalcitationsomitted).

54Relatedtotheoverbreadthdoctrineisthevaguenessdoctrine,[19]

which"requireslegislaturestoset

reasonablyclearguidelinesforlawenforcementofficialsandtriersoffactinordertoprevent'arbitraryand

discriminatoryenforcement.'"Statev.PrincessCinemaofMilwaukee,Inc.,96Wis.2d646,657,292N.W.2d807

(1980)(quotingSmithv.Goguen,415U.S.566,57273(1974)).Avaguestatute"isonewhichoperatestohinder

freespeechthroughtheuseoflanguagewhichissovagueastoallowtheinclusionofprotectedspeechinthe

prohibitionortoleavetheindividualwithnoclearguidanceastothenatureoftheactswhicharesubjectto

punishment."Id.at656."WhereFirstAmendmentrightsareinvolved,aneven'greaterdegreeofspecificity'is



required." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77 (citations omitted). Thus, when a criminal statute implicates First

Amendmentrights,thestatutorylanguagemusthavethe"utmostclarityandexactitude."Stevenson,236Wis.2d

86,30.Thus,thevaguenessdoctrineconcernsthe

imping[ement]uponthreefirstamendmentvalues:(1)itdoesnotprovideindividualswithfairwarningof what is prohibited (2) lacking precise or articulated standards, it allows for arbitrary ordiscriminatory enforcement and (3) it causes citizens to 'forsake activity protected by the FirstAmendmentforfearitmaybeprohibited.'

Statev.Thiel,183Wis.2d505,521n.9,515N.W.2d847(1994)(quotingM.S.NewsCo.v.Casado,721F.2d1281,

1290(10thCir.1983)).In other words, "[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,

governmentmayregulatein[this]areaonlywithnarrowspecificity."BarlandII,751F.3dat811(quotations

omitted).

C.TheDefinitionof"PoliticalPurposes"inWis.Stat.11.01(16)isOverbroadandVagueUnlessLimitedto

ExpressAdvocacyandItsFunctionalEquivalent.

55 The special prosecutor alleges that the Unnamed Movants engaged in illegally coordinated issue

advocacy.However,thebasisforhistheoryhasevolvedoverthecourseofthevariouslegalchallengestohis

investigation,andheappearsunabletodecidejusthowtheUnnamedMovantshavebrokenthelaw.[20]

56Today,thespecialprosecutorallegestwotheoriesofillegalcoordination:(1)thatthecoordination

betweentheUnnamedMovantsissoextensivethatthesupposedlyindependentgroupsbecamesubcommitteesforthe

candidate'scampaignunderWis.Stat.11.10(4)and(2)thatthecoordinatedissueadvocacyamountstoanin

kindcontributionunderWis.Admin.CodeGAB1.20.Thespecialprosecutor'stheories,ifadoptedaslaw,would

requireanindividualtosurrenderhispoliticalrightstothegovernmentandretaincampaignfinanceattorneys

beforediscussingsalientpoliticalissues.SeeCitizensUnited,558U.S.at324.Wefindnosupportforthe

special prosecutor's theories in Wis. Stat. Ch. 11. Chapter 11's definition of "political purposes," which

underliesWisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw,isbothoverbroadandvagueandthusunconstitutionallychillsspeech

because people "'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the law's] meaning and differ as to its

application.'"Id.(quotingConnally,269U.S.at391).

57 However, by limiting the definition of "political purposes" to express advocacy and its functional

equivalent,weensurethatallissueadvocacywillremainunencumbered.Thislimitingconstruction[21]

allowsus

toprotectpoliticalspeech,avitalFirstAmendmentright,andallowsustoguardagainstthetheoriesofthe

special prosecutor and those who would rely on overbroad and vague statutes to silence those with whom they

disagree.

i.TheDefinitionandScopeof"PoliticalPurposes"inWis.Stat.11.01(16)MustBeLimitedtoOnlyExpress

Advocacy.

58WebeginouranalysisbynotingthatWisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw"islabyrinthiananddifficultto

decipherwithoutabackgroundinthisareaofthelaw."BarlandII,751F.3dat808.Indeed,"[t]oalayreader

[Chapter 11] require[s] almost any group that wants to say almost anything about a candidate or election to

registerasapoliticalcommittee."Id.at810(citingWis.RighttoLife,Inc.v.Paradise,138F.3d1183,1184

(7thCir.1998)).However, in analyzing the statutes, it becomes readily apparent that the entire regulatory

schemedependsonbutafewkeyterms:"committee,""contribution,""disbursement,"and"politicalpurposes."

59 "Committee" is defined in Wis. Stat. 11.01(4) as "any person other than an individual and any

combination of 2 or more persons, permanent or temporary, which makes or accepts contributions or makes

disbursements,whetherornotengagedinactivitieswhichareexclusivelypolitical,exceptthata'committee'

does not include a political 'group' under this chapter." As one can see from the statutory definition,

committee status under Wisconsin campaign finance law depends on the definitions of "contributions" and

"disbursements."

60 "Contribution" has a very lengthy definition, but the relevant portion is contained in Wis. Stat.



11.01(6)(a)1,whichstatesthat"contribution"means

[a]gift,subscription,loan,advance,ordepositofmoneyoranythingofvalue,exceptaloanofmoneyby a commercial lending institution made by the institution in accordance with applicable laws andregulations in the ordinary course of business, made for political purposes. In this subdivision"anythingofvalue"meansathingofmerchantablevalue.

(emphasis added). The definition of "disbursement" largely parallels the definition of "contribution," the

relevantportionofwhichstatesthata"disbursement"is

[a] purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value,exceptaloanofmoneybyacommerciallendinginstitutionmadebytheinstitutioninaccordancewithapplicablelawsandregulationsintheordinarycourseofbusiness,madeforpoliticalpurposes. Inthissubdivision,"anythingofvalue"meansathingofmerchantablevalue.

Wis. Stat. 11.01(7)(a)1 (emphasis added). It is apparent from the emphasized language that whether or not

somethingisacontributionordisbursementdependsonthedefinitionof"politicalpurposes."

61"Politicalpurposes"isdefined,inrelevantpart,asanact

doneforthepurposeofinfluencingtheelectionornominationforelectionofanyindividualtostateorlocaloffice,forthepurposeofinfluencingtherecallfromorretentioninofficeofanindividualholding a state or local office, for the purpose of payment of expenses incurred as a result of arecountatanelection,orforthepurposeofinfluencingaparticularvoteatareferendum.Inthecase of a candidate, or a committee or group which is organized primarily for the purpose ofinfluencingtheelectionornominationforelectionofanyindividualtostateorlocaloffice,forthepurposeofinfluencingtherecallfromorretentioninofficeofanindividualholdingastateorlocaloffice, or for the purpose of influencing a particular vote at a referendum, all administrative andoverheadexpensesforthemaintenanceofanofficeorstaffwhichareusedprincipallyforanysuchpurposearedeemedtobeforapoliticalpurpose.

(a)Actswhicharefor"politicalpurposes"includebutarenotlimitedto:

1.Themakingofacommunicationwhichexpresslyadvocatestheelection,defeat,recallorretentionofaclearlyidentifiedcandidateoraparticularvoteatareferendum.

Wis.Stat.11.01(16)(emphasisadded).

62 Thus, the lynchpin of Wisconsin's campaign finance law is whether an act is done for "political

purposes."Chapter11regulates"disbursements"and"contributions,"andthephrase"politicalpurposes"isused

in the definition of each of those words. See Wis. Stat. 11.01(7) (defining "disbursement"), 11.01(6)

(defining"contribution").Ifanactisnotdonefor"politicalpurposes,"thenitisnotadisbursementora

contribution,anditthereforeisnotsubjecttoregulationunderCh.11.

63TheSeventhCircuitinBarlandIIheldthatthephrase"politicalpurposes,"asdefinedinWis.Stat.

11.01,isbothvagueandoverbroad.BarlandII,751F.3dat833.ThecourtreasonedthattheU.S.Supreme

CourtinBuckleyheldthatthephrase"influenceanelection,"whichalsoappearsinthedefinitionof"political

purposes,"isvagueandoverbroad.Id.at833("The[Buckley]Courtheldthatthiskindofbroadandimprecise

languageriskschillingissueadvocacy,whichmaynotberegulatedthesamereasoningapplieshere.").Further,

thecourtconcludedthephrase"includebutarenotlimitedto"rendersthedefinitionof"politicalpurposes"

vagueandoverbroadbecause"[t]he'notlimitedto'languageholdsthepotentialforregulatorymischief."Id.

seealsoElectionsBd.ofStateofWis.v.Wis.Mfrs.&Commerce,227Wis.2d650,677,597N.W.2d721 (1999)

(WMC)(concludingthattheexpressadvocacystandardunderWis.Stat.11.01(16)(a)1muststillbeconsistent

withBuckley,lestitbecomeatrapfortheinnocentandunwary.)

64Thespecialprosecutorhascompletelydisregardedtheseprinciples.ThelackofclarityinCh.11,

whichthespecialprosecutorreliesupon,leadsustotheunsettlingconclusionthatitislefttogovernment

bureaucrats and/or individual prosecutors to determine how much coordination between campaign committees and

independentgroupsis"toomuch"coordination.Inessence,underhistheory,everycandidate,ineverycampaign

in which an issue advocacy group participates, would get their own John Doe proceeding and their own special

prosecutortodeterminetheextentofanycoordination.Thisisnot,andcannot,bethelawinademocracy.

65Morefundamentally,however,thefactthatthesequestionsariseatallisproofthatthedefinitionof

"politicalpurposes""holdsthepotentialforregulatorymischief.Perhaps[theexpressadvocacylanguage]was

includedtoleaveroomforregulationofthe'functionalequivalent'ofexpressadvocacyasthattermwaslater



explained in [WRTL II]. Beyond that, however, the language contains persistent vagueness and overbreadth."

BarlandII,751F.3dat833.Infact,theGovernmentAccountabilityBoard("GAB")concededthispointinBarland

II and suggested a limiting construction to the Seventh Circuit that would "confine the definitions [of

"political purposes"] to express advocacy and its functional equivalent." Id. That is precisely the

constructiontheSeventhCircuitadopted,andweconcludethatsamelimitingconstructionshouldapplyhereas

well.

66Tobeclear,thereasonthatthedefinitionof"politicalpurposes"in11.01(16)isunconstitutional

is because the phrase "influencing [an] election" is so broad that it sweeps in protected speech, as well as

speechthatcanbesubjecttoregulation."Influencing[an]election"obviouslyincludesexpressadvocacy,but

withoutalimitingconstructionitcouldjustaseasilyincludeissueadvocacyairedduringtheclosingdaysof

an election cycle. This is precisely the kind of overbroad language that the Supreme Court has repeatedly

rejected. "Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also be pertinent in an

election."WRTLII,551U.S.at474(emphasisadded).Wemusthaveclearrulesthatprotectpoliticalspeech,

andwemustcontinuetorejecttheideathatsomeprotectedspeechmaybechilledorrestrictedsimplybecauseit

is"difficulttodistinguishfromunprotectedspeech."Id.at494(Scalia,J.,concurring)."[L]awstargeting

political speech are the principal object of the First Amendment guarantee. The fact that the line between

electoraladvocacyandissueadvocacydissolvesinpracticeisanindictmentofthestatute,notajustification

ofit."Id.

67 We therefore hold that the definition of "political purposes" in Wis. Stat. 11.01(16) is

unconstitutionallyoverbroadandvague.Inordertocurethisoverbreadthandvagueness,weadoptaconstruction

of 11.01(16) that limits the definition of "political purposes" to include only express advocacy and its

functional equivalent, as those terms are defined in Buckley and WRTL II. This construction is "readily

available"duetotheSeventhCircuit'sdecisioninBarlandII.SeeStevenson,236Wis.2d86,15BarlandII,

751F.3dat834(explainingthat"[t]he[WisconsinSupremeCourt]and[]AttorneyGeneralhaveacknowledgedthat

when Chapter 11 is applied beyond candidates, their committees, and political parties, it must be narrowly

construed to comply with Buckley's expressadvocacy limitation the administration of the state's campaign

finance system has generally reflected this understanding for many decades.").[22]

Given that Chapter 11's

requirementsdependonwhetheranactisdonefor"politicalpurposes,"theeffectofthislimitingconstruction

places"issueadvocacy...beyondthereachof[Wisconsin's]regulatoryscheme."BarlandII,751F.3dat815.

ii.TheSpecialProsecutor'sTheoriesofCoordinationDependonCoordinatedIssueAdvocacy,WhichIsNot

RegulatedUnderChapter11.

68HavingreachedourconclusionaboutthescopeofconductregulatedbyChapter11,wenowturntothe

specialprosecutor'stheoriesofcoordinationandwhethertheallegedconductisregulatedunderWisconsinlaw.

[23] The special prosecutor has disregarded the vital principle that in our nation and our state political

speech is a fundamental right and is afforded the highest level of protection. The special prosecutor's

theories,ratherthan"assur[ing][the]unfetteredinterchangeofideasforthebringingaboutofpoliticaland

socialchangesdesiredbythepeople,"Roth,354U.S.at484,insteadwouldassurethatsuchpoliticalspeech

willbeinvestigatedwithparamilitarystylehomeinvasionsconductedinthepredawnhoursandthenprosecuted

andpunished.In short, the special prosecutor completely ignores the command that, when seeking to regulate

issue advocacy groups, such regulation must be done with "narrow specificity." Barland II, 751 F.3d at 811

(quotationsomitted).

69 The limiting construction that we apply makes clear that the special prosecutor's theories are

unsupportableinlawgiventhatthetheoriesrelyonoverbroadandvaguestatutes.Bylimitingthedefinitionof

"political purposes" to express advocacy and its functional equivalent, political speech continues to be

protectedasafundamentalFirstAmendmentright.



70Thespecialprosecutor'sfirsttheoryofillegalcoordinationisthatostensiblyindependent,advocacy

groupsoperated"handinglove"withthecandidate'scommittee,whichmadetheindependentgroupssubcommittees

underWis.Stat.11.10(4).Therelevantpartofthisstatutestatesthat

[a]ny committee which is organized or acts with the cooperation of or upon consultation with acandidate or agent or authorized committee of a candidate, or which acts in concert with or at therequest or suggestion of a candidate or agent or authorized committee of a candidate is deemed asubcommitteeofthecandidate'spersonalcampaigncommittee.

Wis. Stat. 11.10(4) (emphasis added). The special prosecutor argues that coordinated issue advocacy is

prohibited under this provision because the statute itself only requires cooperation between a candidate's

committeeandanothercommitteeandthatthestatutedoesnotrequirethatsuchcooperationbelimitedtoexpress

advocacy.

71Thefirstflawinthespecialprosecutor'stheoryisthatitislefttothewhimofeachregulatory

bureaucratand/orprosecutortosubjectivelydeterminehowmuchcoordinationis"toomuch."Indeed,thespecial

prosecutor,becausehereliesonvagueandoverbroadstatutes,willbetheonlyonetoknowhowmuchcoordination

is"toomuch."Thiscannotbesuchaninterpretationof11.10(4)isunconstitutionallyoverbroadandvague

undertheFirstAmendment.SeePrincessCinema,96Wis.2dat657(citationsomitted)("Thevoidforvagueness

doctrine '. . . incorporates the notions of fair notice or warning. . . . (i)t requires legislatures to set

reasonablyclearguidelinesforlawenforcementofficialsandtriersoffactinordertoprevent"arbitraryand

discriminatoryenforcement."'").

72However,thereisanother,moreobviousflawinthespecialprosecutor'stheory.Wisconsin Stat.

11.10(4)referstoa"committee"thatcoordinateswithacandidate'scommitteeandinordertobea"committee,"

anentitymust"make[]oraccept[]contributionsormake[]disbursements."Inordertocomewithinthepurview

of regulated acts both "contributions" and "disbursements" must be "made for political purposes." Wis. Stat.

11.01(6)(a)1 11.01(7)(a)1. Applying the necessary limiting construction to the phrase "for political

purposes,"weconcludethatinordertomeetthestatutorydefinitionof"committee,"acommitteemustengagein

express advocacy and its functional equivalent. This conclusion is fatal to the special prosecutor's

subcommitteetheorybecausehedoesnotallegethattheUnnamedMovantsengagedinexpressadvocacy.Putsimply,

because the Unnamed Movants did not engage in express advocacy, they could not be considered a "committee"

subjecttoChapter11'sregulation.

73Thespecialprosecutor'ssecondtheoryofillegalcoordinationisthatthecoordinatedissueadvocacy

shouldhavebeenreportedas"inkindcontributions"bythecandidate'scommittee.This"inkindcontribution"

theoryrestsontheassumptionthatanyissueadvocacyengagedinbytheUnnamedMovantswasdoneforthebenefit

ofthecandidateandthereforeshouldhavebeenreported.Onceagain,thespecialprosecutor'stheoryfails.

74An"inkindcontribution"isdefinedintheGAB'sregulationsas"adisbursementbyacontributorto

procure a thing of value or service for the benefit of a registrant who authorized the disbursement." GAB

1.20(1)(e)(emphasisadded).By its plain language, the definition of an inkind contribution depends on the

makingofa"disbursement."Asaresultofthelimitingconstructionof"politicalpurposes,"therecanbeno

"disbursement" under Chapter 11, or the corresponding regulations, without express advocacy or its functional

equivalent. Even assuming that the special prosecutor is correct and the Unnamed Movants engaged in issue

advocacyatthespecificrequestofthecandidateorthecandidate'scommittee,thoseactionsdonotgiveriseto

areportable"inkindcontribution"becauseunderCh.11issueadvocacycannotbea"disbursement."

75Insum,weholdthat,consistentwiththeFirstAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitutionandArticle

I,Section3oftheWisconsinConstitution,thedefinitionof"politicalpurposes"inWis.Stat.11.01(16)is

unconstitutionallyoverbroadandvaguebecauseitslanguage"issosweepingthatitssanctionsmaybeappliedto

constitutionallyprotectedconductwhichthestateisnotpermittedtoregulate."Janssen,219Wis.2dat374.

However,thereisareadilyavailablelimitingconstructionthatwillpreventthechillingofotherwiseprotected

speech,andweholdthat"politicalpurposes"islimitedtoexpressadvocacyanditsfunctionalequivalentas



thosetermsaredefinedinBuckleyandWRTLII.Withthislimitingconstructioninplace,Chapter11doesnot

regulate the alleged conduct of the Unnamed Movants. The special prosecutor has not alleged any express

advocacy, and issue advocacy, whether coordinated or not, is "beyond the reach of the regulatory scheme."

BarlandII,751F.3dat815.Accordingly,wegrantthereliefrequestedbytheUnnamedMovants.

76Tobeclear,thisconclusionendstheJohnDoeinvestigationbecausethespecialprosecutor'slegal

theoryisunsupportedineitherreasonorlaw.Consequently,theinvestigationisclosed.Consistentwithour

decisionandtheorderenteredbyReserveJudgePeterson,weorderthatthespecialprosecutorandthedistrict

attorneys involved in this investigation must cease all activities related to the investigation, return all

propertyseizedintheinvestigationfromanyindividualororganization,andpermanentlydestroyallcopiesof

informationandothermaterialsobtainedthroughtheinvestigation.AllUnnamedMovantsarerelievedofanyduty

tocooperatefurtherwiththeinvestigation.

IV.SCHMITZV.PETERSON

77Weturnnowtothesecondcasepresentedforourreview,Schmitzv.Peterson.Thiscaseisbeforeus

onpetitionstobypassthecourtofappealsfiledbytheUnnamedMovants.Inthiscase,thespecialprosecutor

seeksasupervisorywritinordertoreverseReserveJudgePeterson'sdecisiontoquashthesubpoenasandsearch

warrantsissuedbyReserveJudgeKluka.Thespecificissuepresentediswhethertheevidencegatheredinthe

JohnDoeproceedingsprovideareasonablebeliefthatWisconsin'scampaignfinancelawwasviolatedbyacampaign

committee'scoordinationwithindependentadvocacyorganizations.

78WeholdthatthespecialprosecutorhasfailedtoprovethatReserveJudgePetersonviolatedaplain

legaldutywhenhequashedthesubpoenasandsearchwarrantsandorderedthereturnofallpropertyseizedbythe

special prosecutor. In quashing the subpoenas and search warrants, Reserve Judge Peterson exercised his

discretion under the John Doe statute, Wis. Stat. 968.26, to determine the extent of the investigation.

Becausethepurposeofasupervisorywritdoesnotincludereviewofajudge'sdiscretionaryacts,Kalal, 271

Wis.2d633,24,thesupervisorywritsoughtbythespecialprosecutorisdenied,andReserveJudgePeterson's



orderisaffirmed.

A.StandardofReview

79ThedecisionsofJohnDoejudges"arenotsubjecttodirectappeal"tothecourtofappeals"becausean

orderissuedbyaJohnDoejudgeisnotanorderofa'circuitcourt'ora'courtofrecord.'"InreJohnDoe

Proceeding,2003WI30,23,41,260Wis.2d653,660N.W.2d260.Nonetheless,apartymayseekreviewofa

John Doe judge's actions "pursuant to a petition for supervisory writ." Id., 41 see also Wis. Stat.

809.51(1).

80 It is well settled that "[a] writ of supervision is not a substitute for an appeal." Kalal, 271

Wis.2d633,17(quotationsomitted).Inordertoprevailonasupervisorywrit,thepetitionermustprovethe

following:"(1)anappealisaninadequateremedy(2)gravehardshiporirreparableharmwillresult(3)the

dutyofthetrialcourtisplainanditmusthaveactedorintendstoactinviolationofthatdutyand(4)the

request for relief is made promptly and speedily." Id. (quoting Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 9697, 589

N.W.2d 21 (1999)) (emphasis added). "A plain duty 'must be clear and unequivocal and, under the facts, the

responsibility to act must be imperative.'" Id., 22 (quoting State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42

Wis.2d368,37778,166N.W.2d255(1969)).

81"Asupervisorywrit'isconsideredanextraordinaryanddrasticremedythatistobeissuedonlyupon

somegrievousexigency.'"Id.,17(citationomitted).Theobligationofajudgetocorrectlyfindfactsand

applythelawisnotthetypeofplainlegaldutycontemplatedbythesupervisorywritprocedure,"asitwould

extendsupervisoryjurisdictiontoavirtuallyunlimitedrangeofdecisionsinvolvingthefindingoffactsand

applicationoflaw."Id.,24.Instead,

[t]heobligationofjudgestocorrectlyapplythelawisgeneralandimplicitintheentirestructureof our legal system. The supervisory writ, however, serves a narrow function: to provide for thedirect control of lower courts, judges, and other judicial officers who fail to fulfill nondiscretionaryduties,causingharmthatcannotberemediedthroughtheappellatereviewprocess.Toadopt [a contrary] interpretation of the plain duty requirement in supervisory writ procedure wouldtransformthewritintoanallpurposealternativetotheappellatereviewprocess.

Id.(emphasisadded)(citationsomitted).

B.NatureofJohnDoeProceedings

82BeforeanalyzingReserveJudgePeterson'sdecisiontoquashthesubpoenasandsearchwarrants,itis

necessaryforustoprovidebackgroundregardingtheproperconductofJohnDoeproceedings,whichhavebeenin

useinWisconsinsinceitsdaysasaterritory.InreDoe,317Wis.2d364,13.Thisdiscussionisnecessary

toeducatethepubliconthenatureofthisimportantinvestigatorytool,andalsotoprovideguidancetothe

lowercourtsontheproperconductofJohnDoeproceedings.

83Wisconsin'sJohnDoeproceeding,codifiedinWis.Stat.968.26,servestwoimportantpurposes.State

exrel.Reimannv.CircuitCourtforDaneCnty.,214Wis.2d605,621,571N.W.2d385(1997)."First,andmost

obvious,aJohnDoeproceedingisintendedasaninvestigatorytoolusedtoascertainwhetheracrimehasbeen

committed and if so, by whom. Second, the John Doe proceeding is designed to protect innocent citizens from

frivolousandgroundlessprosecutions."Id.(citationsomitted).Inordertofulfillthedualpurposesofthe

JohnDoestatute,aJohnDoejudge

serves an essentially judicial function. The judge considers the testimony presented. It is theresponsibilityoftheJohnDoejudgetoutilizehisorhertraininginconstitutionalandcriminallawand in courtroom procedure in determining the need to subpoena witnesses requested by the districtattorney,inpresidingattheexaminationofwitnesses,andindeterminingprobablecause.Itisthejudge'sresponsibilitytoensureproceduralfairness.

Statev.Washington,83Wis.2d808,823,266N.W.2d597(1978)(footnoteomitted).

84 "Wisconsin Stat. 968.26 outlines a fourstep process for John Doe proceedings." In re Doe, 317

Wis. 2d 364, 14. "First, the judge must determine whether a complainant has alleged 'objective, factual

assertionssufficienttosupportareasonablebeliefthatacrimehasbeencommitted.'"Id.(citationomitted).

Second,ifthecomplainantmeetsthisburden,"thejudgemustproceedwithahearingatwhich'thejudgeshall



examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses produced by him or her.'" Id., 15 (quoting Wis. Stat.

968.26(200708)).Third,whenthishearingisover,"ajudgemustdeterminewhetherprobablecauseexistsas

to each essential element of the alleged crime." Id., 16. "Finally, if the judge determines that probable

causeispresentthatis,thatacrimeprobablyhasbeencommittedandwhotheperpetratoroftheallegedcrime

is,thejudgemayorderthatacriminalcomplaintbereducedtowriting...."Id.,17.Thisprocessgivesa

JohnDoejudge"broaddiscretiontodecidewhethertofileacriminalcomplaint,evenuponafindingofprobable

cause."Id.

85InordertocommenceaJohnDoeproceeding,thecomplainant,whetheritbethedistrictattorneyor

anyone else, must demonstrate to the John Doe judge "that he has reason to believe that a crime has been

committedwithinthejurisdiction."Statev.Doe,78Wis.2d161,165,254N.W.2d210(1977). If "the judge

findsthatthecomplainanthasfailedtoestablish'reasontobelieve[]'[thatacrimehasbeencommitted,]that

judgemaydenytheJohnDoepetitionwithoutconductinganexamination."Reimann,214Wis.2dat625.Thus,the

JohnDoejudgemustactasagatekeeperandscreenout"petitionsthatarespurious,frivolous,orgroundless."

Id. at 624. "In determining whether the petition is worthy of further treatment, a circuit court judge

[presiding over a John Doe proceeding] must act as a neutral and detached magistrate." Id. at 625 (emphasis

added).

86Therefore,fromtheearlieststagesoftheproceeding,totheconclusionoftheinvestigation,"[t]he

proceedingsoftheJohnDoeareconstantlyunderthescrutinyofajudge."Doe,78Wis.2dat165.TheJohnDoe

judgedoesnotactas"chiefinvestigator"orasamerearmoftheprosecutor.Washington,83Wis.2dat823.

Rather, the John Doe judge serves as a check on the prosecutor and on the complainant to ensure that the

subject(s)oftheinvestigationreceive(s)dueprocessoflaw.SeeDoe,78Wis.2dat16465.

87Inthisway,Wisconsin'sJohnDoeproceedingisverydifferentthanagrandjury,andwhenconducted

appropriately,providesmuchgreaterprotectionstothetargetofaninvestigation.Id.at165.Thisisduein

nosmallparttotheroleplayedbytheJohnDoejudge,whichistoensurethattheinvestigationstaysfocused

ontheconductallegedinthepetitiontocommencetheJohnDoeproceeding.Washington,83Wis.2dat84142.

Further,

[a]nyonefamiliarwiththefunctionsofthegrandjuryorwhohasdealtwithitknowsthehazardsofarunawaygrandjury,whichcangobeyondtherestraintsoftheprosecutor,theexecutive,orofthejudiciary.SuchhazardsdonotexistintheWisconsinJohnDoe.WhileJohnDoeproceedingscanbeabused, the document produced by a John Doe does not ipso facto force the defendant to trial. Thecomplaint which emanates from it is issued under the aegis of a judge but nevertheless mustsubsequently stand the scrutiny of an open court inspection in an adversary proceeding at thepreliminaryexaminationasaprerequisitetothefilingofaninformation,arraignment,andtrial.

Doe,78Wis.2dat17071.Thus,"[a]JohnDoeproceeding...servesbothasaninquestintothediscoveryof

crimeandasascreentoprevent'recklessandilladvised'prosecutions."Reimann,214Wis.2dat621(citation

omitted).

88ThetextoftheJohnDoestatutegivestheJohnDoejudgebroadpowers.Withinhisdiscretion,the

JohnDoejudgeisabletodeterminetheextentoftheinvestigationandwhethertheinvestigationisconductedin

secret.Wis.Stat.968.26(3).[24]

WehavelongrecognizedtheneedforsecrecyinJohnDoeproceedingsand

haveidentifiedseveralreasonsthatjustifysuchsecrecy.Cummings,199Wis.2dat736.

These include: (1) keeping knowledge from an unarrested defendant which could encourage escape (2)preventing the defendant from collecting perjured testimony for the trial (3) preventing thoseinterested in thwarting the inquiry from tampering with prosecutive testimony or secreting evidence(4) rendering witnesses more free in their disclosures and (5) preventing testimony which may bemistakenoruntrueorirrelevantfrombecomingpublic.

Id.ThesereasonsillustratehowimportantaJohnDoeproceedingcanbeasaninvestigativetool.Thesecrecy

ordersavailabletoaJohnDoeproceedingservetoprotecttheintegrityoftheinvestigation.[25]

Suchorders

help encourage witnesses who may be reluctant or fearful to testify by keeping their testimony secret. The

secrecy of a John Doe investigation also protects innocent targets of the investigation by preventing the



disclosureof"testimonywhichmaybemistakenoruntrue."Id.

89Consistentwiththisbroadauthority,"[t]heJohnDoejudgeshouldactwithaviewtowardissuinga

complaintordeterminingthatnocrimehasoccurred."Washington,83Wis.2dat823.Accordingly,thescopeof

anyJohnDoeinvestigation"isessentiallylimitedtothesubjectmatterofthecomplaintuponwhichtheJohnDoe

iscommenced."Id.at822seealsoInreDoe,317Wis.2d364,23."TheJohnDoejudgehasnoauthorityto

ferretoutcrimewhereverheorshethinksitmightexist."Washington,83Wis.2dat 822 (emphasis added).

This final limitation is crucial to the fair administration of a John Doe proceeding. Without it, John Doe

proceedingscouldeasilydevolveintojudiciallysanctionedgeneralwarrants.

90ThepurposeoftheFourthAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution[26]

andofArticleI,Section11

oftheWisconsinConstitution[27]

"wastoabolishsearchesbygeneralwarrants,whichauthorizedsearchesinany

placeorforanything."Stateexrel.CityofMilwaukeev.Newman,96Wis.258,267,71N.W.438(1897).Such

general warrants, also known as Writs of Assistance, "were used in the American colonies to search wherever

governmentofficialschosewithnearlyabsoluteandunlimiteddiscretion."Statev.Tye,2001WI124,8,248

Wis.2d530,636N.W.2d473."Theseearlywarrantslackedspecificityandallowedgovernmentofficersinthe

late eighteenth century to enter homes, shops, and other places, and in the event the officers encountered

resistance, they could break down doors and forcibly search closed trunks and chests." In re John Doe

Proceeding, 2004 WI 65, 36, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792. To combat such unchecked power, the Fourth

Amendment requires reasonable searches and mandates that warrants "particularly describ[e] the place to be

searched."U.S.Const.amend.IV.

91 Reasonableness and particularity are not just requirements of search warrants, however. Subpoenas

issued by courts, and by extension John Doe judges, must also satisfy these requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.InreJohnDoeProceeding,272Wis.2d208,38.AJohnDoeproceeding,withitsbroadinvestigatory

powers,mustneverbeallowedtobecomeafishingexpedition.

92Itisdifficult,ifnotimpossible,tooverstatetheimportanceoftheroleoftheJohnDoejudge.If

hedoesnotconducttheinvestigationfairly,asaneutralanddetachedmagistrate,theriskofharmtoinnocent

targets of the investigationand we remain mindful that all such targets are presumed innocentis too great.

ThroughtheuseofaJohnDoeproceeding,"lawenforcementofficersareabletoobtainthebenefitofpowersnot

otherwiseavailabletothem,i.e.,thepowertosubpoenawitnesses,totaketestimonyunderoath,andtocompel

thetestimonyofareluctantwitness."Washington,83Wis.2dat82223.Suchpowers,ifnotwieldedwithcare

and skill may serve to transform a John Doe proceeding into an implement of harassment and persecution by a

vengefulorunethicalprosecutor.Thus,JohnDoejudgesmustbemindfulofthisdangerandzealouslyguardthe

rightsofallcitizensagainstoverreach.

93TheforegoingdiscussionemphasizesthatJohnDoeproceedingsareanecessaryinvestigativetool"to

'ascertainwhether[a]crimehasbeencommittedandbywhom.'"Cummings,199Wis.2dat736(quotingWolkev.

Fleming,24Wis.2d606,613,129N.W.2d841(1964)).JohnDoeproceedingshavebeenutilizedinWisconsinsince

itwasaterritoryandhavenodoubtservedourstatewell.ButthesimplefactthattheJohnDoeproceedinghas

alongandnearconstantuseshouldnotblindustothepotentialforabuse.Wemustbemindfulofthepurpose

oftheJohnDoeproceedingandwhyitwasoriginallyinstituted.Thispurposewasaptlyexplainedbythiscourt

morethan125yearsago:

Whenthisstatutewasfirstenactedthecommonlawpracticewasforthemagistratetoissuethewarrantonacomplaintofmeresuspicion,andhewasprotectedindoingso.Thiswasfoundtobeaveryunsafepractice.Manyarrestsweremadeongroundlesssuspicion,whentheaccusedwereinnocentofthecrimeandtherewasnotestimonywhateveragainstthem.Thelawdelightsasmuchintheprotectionoftheinnocentasinthepunishmentoftheguilty.Thisstatutewasmadetoprotectcitizensfromarrestandimprisonmentonfrivolousandgroundlesssuspicion....'Ourstatuteisframedsoastoexcludeinagreatmeasuretheabusestowhichsuchapracticemightlead,andundoubtedlywasdesignedtothrowthedutyofjudging,inthisrespect,entirelyuponthemagistrate.Itshouldnotregardmereallegationsofsuspicion,butthegroundsofthesuspicionthefactsandcircumstancesmustbelaidbeforehim,and



theseshouldbesufficienttomakeitappearthatacrimehasbeenactuallycommitted,andthatthereisprobablecauseforchargingtheindividualcomplainedoftherewith.'

Statev.Keyes,75Wis.288,29495,44N.W.13(1889)(citationsomitted).

94Insum,Wis.Stat.968.26grantsJohnDoejudgesbroadauthoritytoconductaninvestigationinto

allegedcrimes.AJohnDoejudgeisalsogiven"thosepowersnecessary"tocarryoutthisduty.Cummings,199

Wis.2dat736.Nevertheless,"[a]stoallaspectsoftheconductofthejudicialfunction,the[JohnDoe]judge

is the governor of the proceedings, and as such is responsible for maintaining the good order, dignity, and

insofarasitiscompatiblewiththeadministrationofjustice,efficiencyofthoseproceedings."InreDoe,317

Wis.2d364,22.ThisdutyapplieswithequalforceinallJohnDoeproceedings,regardlessofthetarget's

stationinlife,orthecrimealleged,beitdrugtraffickingintheinnercity,malfeasanceinthecorporate

boardroom,orcorruptioninthehallsofgovernment.

C.ReserveJudgePetersonDidNotViolateaPlainLegalDutyWhenHeQuashedtheSubpoenasandSearchWarrants

IssuedinThisCase.

95Asisclearfromtheabovediscussion,JohnDoejudgesaregivenenormousdiscretiontocontrolthe

scopeandconductofaJohnDoeproceeding.Withthisimportantpointinmind,wenowturntothespecificissue

beforeus:whetherReserveJudgePetersonviolatedaplainlegaldutywhenhequashedthesubpoenasandsearch

warrantsandorderedthereturnofallseizedproperty.Hedidnot.

96"Aplainduty'mustbeclearandunequivocaland,underthefacts,theresponsibilitytoactmustbe

imperative.'"Kalal,271Wis.2d633,22(quotingKurkierewicz,42Wis.2dat37778).Althoughasupervisory

writisthepropervehicleforthespecialprosecutortoseekreviewofReserveJudgePeterson'sdecision,the

writprocedureservesaverynarrowfunctionwhichisdistinctfromthenormalappellateprocess.Id.,24.The

purposeofasupervisorywritis"toprovideforthedirectcontroloflowercourts,judges,andotherjudicial

officerswhofailtofulfillnondiscretionaryduties,causingharmthatcannotberemediedthroughtheappellate

reviewprocess."Id.(emphasisadded).

97 Here, the special prosecutor argues that Reserve Judge Peterson failed to comply with his duty to

correctly apply the law and erroneously concluded that Wisconsin campaign finance law does not regulate the

Unnamed Movants' alleged conduct. The special prosecutor essentially argues that Reserve Judge Peterson

misapplied the law and prematurely ended the John Doe investigation. This argument misses the point of the

supervisorywritprocedureandasksustoadoptastandardofreviewthatweexplicitlyrejectedinKalal.See

id.,2324("Inessence,theKalalsarguethatthejudge...hasaplaindutytocorrectlyfindfactsand

applythelaw.Wecannotacceptthisproposition,asitwouldextendsupervisoryjurisdictiontoavirtually

unlimitedrangeofdecisionsinvolvingthefindingoffactsandapplicationoflaw.").AswasthecaseinKalal,

ifweweretoadoptthespecialprosecutor'sunderstandingofaplainlegalduty,we"wouldtransformthewrit

intoanallpurposealternativetotheappellatereviewprocess."Id.,24.Thiswewillnotdo.

98A John Doe judge is given the discretion to determine the extent of the investigation. Wis. Stat.

968.26(3).Indoingso,heorshe"shouldactwithaviewtowardissuingacomplaintordeterminingthatno

crimehasoccurred."Washington,83Wis.2dat823.Inhisdecisiontoquashthesubpoenasandsearchwarrants,

ReserveJudgePetersonconcludedthatthesubpoenasandsearchwarrantsdonotprovideareasonablebeliefthat

the Unnamed Movants "committed any violations of the campaign finance laws." Reserve Judge Peterson further

concludedthat"[t]heStateisnotclaimingthatanyoftheindependentorganizationsexpresslyadvocated.[28]

Therefore the subpoenas[29]

fail to show probable cause that a crime was committed." In a subsequent order

grantingastayofhisdecisiontoquash,ReserveJudgePetersonclarifiedthat,althoughhemistakenlyphrased

hisdecisioninthecontextofwhetherthesubpoenasshowedprobablecause,thesubpoenasandsearchwarrants

were premised "on an invalid interpretation of the law. That . . . was the underlying problem with the

subpoenas."[30]



99ReserveJudgePeterson'sdecisionisconsistentwithhisdiscretiontodeterminetheextentoftheJohn

Doeinvestigation.Inaddition,"[i]tiswithinthediscretionofthetrialcourttoquashasubpoena."State

v.Horn,126Wis.2d447,456,377N.W.2d176(Ct.App.1985),aff'd,139Wis.2d473,407N.W.2d854(1987).

Because supervisory writs are not appropriate vehicles to review a judge's discretionary acts, see Kalal, 271

Wis.2d633,24,thespecialprosecutorhasfailedtoshowthatReserveJudgePetersonviolatedaplainlegal

duty by quashing the subpoenas and search warrants. Therefore, the supervisory writ sought by the special

prosecutorisdenied,andReserveJudgePeterson'sorderisaffirmed.[31]

V.THREEUNNAMEDPETITIONERS

100Finally,weturntoThreeUnnamedPetitioners,inwhichtheUnnamedMovantsappealanopinionandorder

of the court of appeals denying their petition for a supervisory writ. This case requires us to determine

whethereitherReserveJudgeKlukaorPetersonviolatedaplainlegaldutyby:(1)acceptinganappointmentasa

reservejudge(2)conveningamulticountyJohnDoeproceedingor(3)appointingaspecialprosecutor.[32]

101WeaffirmthedecisionofthecourtofappealsanddenytheUnnamedMovants'petitionforasupervisory

writ. We hold that the Unnamed Movants have not met the burden of proof required for a supervisory writ.

Specifically,theyhavenotestablishedthateitherReserveJudgeKlukaorPetersonviolatedaplainlegalduty

by:(1)acceptinganappointmentasareservejudge(2)conveningamulticountyJohnDoeproceedingor(3)

appointingaspecialprosecutor."Theobligationofjudgestocorrectlyapplythelawisgeneralandimplicitin

theentirestructureofourlegalsystem."Kalal,271Wis.2d633,24.TheUnnamedMovants'argumentdoesnot

fitthepurposeofasupervisorywrit,whichrequiresa"clearandunequivocal"dutytoactonthepartofthe

judge.Id.,22.IfweweretoadopttheUnnamedMovants'argument,we"wouldtransformthewritintoanall

purposealternativetotheappellatereviewprocess."Id.,24.BecausetheUnnamedMovantshavenotidentified

aviolationofaplainlegalduty,theirpetitionforasupervisorywritisdenied.

A.StandardofReview

102 "[T]he authority of both judges and prosecutors in a John Doe proceeding[] . . . are questions of

statutory interpretation which this court reviews de novo without deference to the circuit court or court of

appeals."Cummings,199Wis.2dat733.Thus,"[w]hetheraJohnDoejudgehasexceededhisorherpowersisa

question of law that this court determines independently." State ex rel. Individual Subpoenaed to Appear at

WaukeshaCnty.v.Davis,2005WI70,17,281Wis.2d431,697N.W.2d803(citingCummings,199Wis.2dat733).

103Forasupervisorywrittoissue,thepetitionerforthewritmustestablishthat:"(1)anappealisan

inadequateremedy(2)gravehardshiporirreparableharmwillresult(3)thedutyofthetrialcourtisplain

and it must have acted or intends to act in violation of that duty and (4) the request for relief is made

promptlyandspeedily."Kalal,271Wis.2d633,17(emphasisadded).

104A"'writofsupervisionisnotasubstituteforanappeal.'"Id.(citationcommitted)."Asupervisory

writ'isconsideredanextraordinaryanddrasticremedythatistobeissuedonlyuponsomegrievousexigency.'"

Id.(citationomitted).

105Althoughacourtexercisesitsdiscretionindecidingwhetherornottoissueawrit,"[t]heexercise

of that discretion often involves . . . resolving questions of law in order to determine whether the circuit

court's duty is plain." State ex rel. Kenneth S. v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2008 WI App 120, 9, 313

Wis. 2d 508, 756 N.W.2d 573. "A plain duty 'must be clear and unequivocal and, under the facts, the

responsibilitytoactmustbeimperative.'"Kalal,271Wis.2d633,22(citationomitted).Theobligationofa

judge to correctly find facts and apply the law is not the type of plain legal duty contemplated by the

supervisory writ procedure, "as it would extend supervisory jurisdiction to a virtually unlimited range of

decisionsinvolvingthefindingoffactsandapplicationoflaw."Id.,24seealsosupra80.

106Consequently,forawrittoissueinthiscase,theUnnamedMovantsmustdemonstratethattheJohnDoe

judgesviolatedaplainlegalduty,eitherinacceptinganappointmentasareservejudge,inconveningaJohn


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