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vol. XII, no. 2 cpreview.org

International: Gimme, Gimme More

Domestic: Rigging the System

Briefing: Immigration Reform

By Sarina Bhandari

By Lucas Rehaut

Bribe andPunishment

By Bruno Rigonatti Mendes

A Magazine of the Columbia Political Union

Sponsored in part by the Arts Initiative at Columbia University. This funding is made possible through a generous gift from The Gatsby Charitable Foundation

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Editor’s Note

Letting go is hard to do. So hard, in fact, that I called up Hillary earlier this week to give her the once-­in-­a-­lifetime opportunity to serve as Columbia Political Review’s next editor-­in-­chief once she ends her State Department gig. I hate to say it, but she politely declined.

Last term, our editorial board, including me, voted to amend our Constitution, changing the editorial board’s schedule from an academic to a calendar year and precluding second semester seniors from sitting on the board. As a result, this is my last issue of CPR as an editor. Despite being a “one-­semester” EIC, I consider myself extremely fortunate to have had the opportunity to serve the publication in this capacity these past few months.

In this issue, our writers tackle the question of how government should best serve the public. Sarina Bhandari takes us to East Africa, pointing to the lack of accountability in the process of “land grabbing” – transactions involving the purchase of land on a massive scale for its natural resources, usually by foreign investors. The practice, Bhandari reports, has displaced millions in the region (17). Lucas Rehaut writes that our need for another precious resource, oil, has allowed corporations to rig the system. Nevertheless, he argues that President Obama’s re-­election is evidence that the net effect of individual actions can lead to results – ones that Rehaut hopes will one day include the promotion of more sustainable practices from the fossil-­fuel industry (27).

Companies, it seems, are not the only ones that should be concerned with ef-­forts to sustain the world around them. The same can be said for countries. In its preparations for momentous international events, like the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, and its recent demonstration of due process for those accused of corruption, Brazil has demonstrated a willingness to spur and sustain long-­term development, as Bruno Rigonatti Mendes demonstrates in our cover story (13).

As 2012 draws to a close, my hope for 2013 and the distant future is that law-­

tough but fair immigration reform. At the end of the day, however, although a possible framework exists to reform immigration, it is ultimately up to our

As I move one step closer to graduation, I am happy to announce that current managing Geetika Rudra will be taking the reigns of the Political Review as

board will continue to spur and sustain the development of this publication – far better than I have. Godspeed.

Constance Boozer Editor-­in-­Chief

Editor-in-Chief

Publisher

Managing Editors

Web Editor

Senior Editors

Arts Editor

Statistician and Pollster

Copy Chief

Assistant Copy Editors

Head Layout Editor

Layout Editor

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VOLUME XII, NO. 2cpr

COVER ART BY MARISSA TJARTJALIS & ALEJANDRA OLIVA

The views and opinions expressed in this magazine belong to their authors and do not nessacar-­

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features | international4 …Bibi One More Time?

A Look Into the Likud-­Yisrael Beiteinu Coalition

By Bryan Schonfeld

10 Sanctioning Progress

The Consequnces of Misguided International Pressure on Iran

By Joshua Fattal

17 Gimme, Gimme More

Shedding Light on African Land Grab Deals

By Sarina Bhandari

24 Egypt’s Party Scene

With an Eye to the Future, a Push for Pluralism

By Nadine Mansour

cover story13 Bribe and Punishment

Legal Strides and Policy Development in Brazil

By Bruno Rigonatti Mendes

briefing 20 Crossing the Border for

Immigration Reform

By Columbia Political Review

features | domestic 7 Over Defense Taking Another Look at American Counterterrorism Spending

By Toby Pegors

27 Rigging the System Why Multinational Oil Companies Keep Getting Away With It

By Lucas Rehaut

table of contents

WINTER.2012

4

features :: international columbia political review :: winter 2012

Six months ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu’s right-­wing Li-­

kud party joined the centrist party Kadima to make a broad super-­coali-­tion that comprised 96 out of the 120 seats in Israel’s legislative body, the Knesset. The center-­right coalition fell through within seventy days. On October 25, Likud joined forces with the hyper-­nationalist Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel is Our Home) party in prepa-­ration for upcoming elections on January 22. Together, they current-­ly have 42 seats in the Knesset. N e t a n -­yahu ex-­p l a i n ed t h e m e r g e r by say-­ing “we [ m e m -­bers of the two parties] are asking the pub-­lic for a mandate to deal with the se-­curity threats, at the top of which is stopping Iran from obtaining nuclear

Given the public’s fears about the danger of a nuclear Iran, it appears increasingly likely that Netanyahu will be re-­elected. But what would this Likud-­Yisrael Beiteinu govern-­ment do with its mandate? It is pos-­sible to analyze the speeches and previous legislative actions of both parties, taking into account the nu-­anced positions of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Deputy Minister

Avigdor Lieberman, to anticipate what policies this government would promote. A Likud-­Yisrael Beiteinu coalition will likely lead to a contin-­ued impasse with Palestinian lead-­ers and a more hawkish military strategy. The potential consequenc-­es include further friction with the Obama administration and policies that may make Israel more isolated in the international community than ever before.Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu have

fundamentally different stances on

of modern Israeli political discourse regarding the issue focuses on the idea of a two-­state solution where a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza alongside Israel. Palestinians have called for Israel to cede all of the territory it conquered in the 1967 war, but Israel has been hesitant to give up this land because of Israeli settlement activity, an-­nexed territory, and concerns about the ability to defend its borders. Ul-­timately, the main issues hindering a two-­state solution are the status of Jerusalem (which both Israelis and

Palestinians claim as their capital) and a resolution of the Palestinian demand for a right of return for the

-­dants of Palestinian refugees who

-­lowing Israel’s founding. The parties have different stances

on how to approach the peace process. Yisrael Beiteinu is a hyper-­nationalist party made up largely of Russian im-­migrants. The party supports Jewish settlement of the West Bank, vows of allegiance from all citizens to the

state, and n a t i o n a l military or civil ser-­vice. One somewhat radical po-­sition of the party p la t fo rm is its call for land s w a p s

based on ethnicity. This would mean transferring certain Arab-­majority areas to Palestinian sovereignty and annexing Jewish settlements in the West Bank to Israel. Some have called this plan racist;; others have called it innovative and pragmatic. Yisrael Beiteinu’s founder, Deputy Minister Avigdor Lieberman, believes the cre-­ation of two ethnically pure states is the best way to bring about a lasting peace and minimize each nation’s internal strife. This position is based on Lieberman’s belief that Israeli Ar-­abs identify mostly with Palestinian nationalism. As a result, he has ad-­

A Look Into the Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu Coalition

…Bibi One More Time?

by Bryan Schonfeld

A Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu coalition will likely lead to a continued impasse with Palestin-ian leaders and a more hawkish military

strategy.

5

compromise, which Yisrael Be-­iteinu may be able to provide. Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu will have to make compromises on settlement expansion if a vi-­able two-­state solution is to be reached.A pressing issue of the con-­

-­estine’s successful pursuit of non-­member observer status at the United Nations. In re-­sponse to the UN bid, which Lieberman called a “diplomatic terror,” Netanyahu announced an expansion of settlements in the E1 development region, which would effectively sepa-­rate Ramallah and Bethlehem from East Jerusalem and make any kind of contiguous state virtually impossible. This is a potentially severe blow to the two-­state solution. The Obama administration condemned the move as counterproduc-­tive to the peace process, and it is unclear whether Netan-­yahu intends to use this build-­ing plan merely as a threat or if the settlement will actually be developed. It remains to be seen whether the Netanyahu-­Lieberman government will take such a drastic step away from a peace agreement. Ulti-­mately, for a two-­state solution to come into effect, E1 must not be settled.Another important foreign

policy issue for Israelis, if not the most important, is Iran. At the moment, Lieberman be-­

-­tions to prevent Iran’s attain-­ment of nuclear arms. He has said, “Based on my conversa-­tions with people who visit Iran, if you held a referendum -­ the nuclear program or quality of life -­ 70 to 80 percent would choose the second option. It’s not that they’re opposed to the nuclear program, but they are not willing to pay these crazy prices.” In addition to suggesting that the Iranian re-­gime may crumble under dip-­lomatic pressure, Lieberman

features :: internationalcolumbia political review :: winter 2012

vocated that Israeli Arabs take loyalty oaths or lose their right to vote and has suggested that Israel prosecute Israeli-­Arab congressmen that have met with the terrorist organization Hamas. The Likud platform also

supports settlement of the West Bank, which the party considers to be a realization of Zionist values through the repopulation of historically Jewish lands. Likud consid-­ers Jerusalem to be the eternal and undivided capital of Israel, making a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem very unlikely. Its platform is against the cre-­ation of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River.However, Netanyahu has

broken from the platform by supporting a two-­state solu-­tion, saying in June 2009 that he would support the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state. Earlier this year, Netan-­

letter to the Palestinian Au-­thority (PA) President Mah-­moud Abbas, expressing hope for a negotiated settlement. Nothing came of it.Lieberman has a strong

distaste for Abbas, repeat-­edly calling for his removal or resignation. His stance would make a peace agreement with the PA even more unlikely. Given that Abbas is a relatively moderate Palestinian leader (compared with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh), this is very problematic;; Lieberman’s stance may destroy any chance of progress toward a two-­state solution. On the other hand, one aspect of a Likud-­Yisrael Beiteinu government is its originality and dissimilarity to previous Israeli governments, as Lieberman’s opinions are innovative and somewhat dis-­tinct from mainstream Israeli political discourse. Ultimately, the impasse in peace negotia-­tions with the Palestinians can only be settled by innovative art by Daniela Brunner

6

“ ”

hawkish on Iran, their statements and actions imply a more measured approach. Netanyahu, nonetheless, would likely act more aggressively towards Iran in his second term be-­cause Iran is closer to nuclear capac-­ity than ever before. Still, Netanyahu and Lieberman both recognize Is-­rael’s dependency on American sup-­port, which makes a unilateral strike unlikely. Regarding the Israeli-­Pal-­

two-­state so lu t i on a p p e a r s unlikely. For prog-­ress to be made, Li-­eberman must get over his d i s t a s t e for Ab-­bas, who

is Israel’s best chance for a peace partner, and continue to craft un-­precedented proposals. Ultimately, Prime Minister Netanyahu must show a willingness to negotiate on West Bank settlements if he desires a comprehensive peace.

believes that if protests break out in Iran again, (as they did in 2009), the West must support the protest-­ers and encourage the government’s overthrow. While some portray Lieberman as

a warmonger and hawk, he believes war with Iran could prove cata-­strophic. Earlier this year, he said war would “be a nightmare,” leaving “no one...unscathed.” He added that, “the right way to prevent war is to present a solid uni-­

of the interna-­t i o n a l c o m -­munity,” and ex-­p r e s s e d s uppo r t for sanc-­tions in an interview with Yediot Aharonot, a Tel Aviv newspaper. In some ways, this represents a more apprehensive attitude toward war with Iran than that of others in Netanyahu’s ad-­ministration. Retiring defense min-­ister Ehud Barak has said, “there’s no chance…for 500,000 killed, not 5,000 or even 500 killed,” minimiz-­ing the negative consequences of a war. The Likud-­Yisrael Beiteinu joint-­government appears more hesitant about striking Iran, making unilateral Israeli military action less likely.Regardless of his defense min-­

ister’s position, Netanyahu seems to agree with Lieberman that war with Iran is a potentially disastrous

option. Despite his reputation as a war hawk, Netanyahu’s response to Iran has in reality been measured and cautious. He has been sensitive to the necessity of getting American support for a strike on Iran and using non-­military options, like sanctions, to persuade Iran to cease its nuclear program. This diplomatic approach has had some success: Several Euro-­pean nations have agreed to put sanc-­tions on Iran, causing Iran’s econ-­

omy serious harm. Netanyahu was

term, but as Iran nears bomb capa-­bility, he will be more pressed for ac-­tion. He established a literal red line in his speech at the United Nations, taking out a red marker and drawing a line on an image of a bomb. This represented Iran’s completion of the second step of nuclear enrichment, the point of no return. Clearly, for Netanyahu, a worse option than war with Iran is a nuclear Iran. Indeed, he warned that, “given this record of Iranian aggression without nuclear weapons, just imagine Iranian ag-­gression with nuclear weapons.” Despite the widespread view

that Netanyahu and Lieberman are

Bryan Schonfeld, CC ’16, is leaning

towards majoring in economics. He

is involved in restarting J Street on

campus, a Pro-­Israel group devoted

to furthering a two state solution.

In addition, he is a proud member

of the Undergraduate Recruiting

Committee and the Alpha Epsilon

Pi fraternity. He can be reached at

bjs2200@columbia.edu.

columbia political review :: winter 2012features :: international

Ultimately, the main issues hindering a two-state solution are the status of Jerusalem and a resolution of the Pales-tinian demand for a right of return for the approximately five million descendants of Palestinian refugees who fled during the outbreak of war following Israel’s founding.

6timeline by Alejandra Oliva

7

Taking Another Look at American Counterterrorism Spending

Over Defense by Toby Pegors

major terrorist attacks, the funding has ballooned to over three times that amount. US citizens have sacri-­

on terror, including their tax dollars and civil liberties. Some experts, like The Ohio State

University professor John Mueller, try to assure us that there is no real

on groceries last year, according to the USDA Economic Research Ser-­vice. This is a big industry, and its growth has been astonishing. With the horrifying attacks of 9/11 still prominent in the public conscious-­ness, the United States spent $22 billion on DHS in 2002. However, after more than a decade with no

Four months prior to the Sep-­tember 11 attacks, Harvard University Professor Richard

Falkenrath published an article in

Terrorism that argued for a drastic reduction of government spending on counterterrorism. He suggested that there was little evidence of any real threat to Americans’ safety and that spending on counterterrorism was a waste of resources that could be better spent on other domestic

-­tacks in 2001, however, Americans

mentality and President George W.

90 percent in the weeks subsequent to the attack. The United States com-­pletely revamped its operations, put-­ting a core focus toward increasing its counterterrorism capabilities. The FBI doubled its number of coun-­terterrorist agents and set its num-­ber one priority to “protecting the United States from terrorist attack.” The total dollar amount spent on do-­mestic counterterrorism has contin-­

year 2013, the Congressional Budget

Homeland Security (DHS) budget to be $68.9 billion, or roughly $526 per household. Thousands of politicians and cor-­

-­cent expansion of counterterrorism efforts. In the last decade, the gov-­ernment spent over $570 billion on the DHS in 2002 – not to mention the additional allocations to agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency

The $570 billion allocation alone is more money than the nation spent

columbia political review :: winter 2012 features :: domestic

As with almost every capital investment, the outlays on counterterrorism have diminishing marginal returns. That is, after a certain point, each additional dol-­lar invested in counterterrorism does not produce an equally large increase in our citizens’ safety. If terrorist attacks were the only threat facing our nation, one could easily argue that we choose a point of spending where we come close to minimizing all US casualties. But if spending becomes too large, it could be more devastating than the terrorist attacks that it prevents. We choose not to

approach and have come to accept a certain amount of crime and death.

ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT

graph and art by Mikhael Klimentov

8

roll, we could simply determine an appro-­priate risk manage-­ment level and adjust our counterterrorism efforts accordingly. However, in the ran-­domness and chaos of today’s world, it is not that simple. There needs to be a differ-­ent approach to strik-­ing the proper balance between economic burdens and national security. If terrorist attacks

were the only threat facing our nation, one could easily argue that we choose a point of spending where we come close to mini-­mizing all US casual-­ties. Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. We must take into account the burden that the spending on counter-­terrorism imposes on society. If it becomes too large, it could be more devastating than the terrorist attacks it prevents. We choose not to spend an exor-­bitant amount on po-­

rather, we rational-­ize our approach and have come to accept a certain amount of crime and death. In the same way, how-­ever, we also become angered and reactive when the level rises above what we deem a reasonable threshold. Moreover, we, as a so-­ciety, try to determine

the level at which we optimize our economic investments through taxes

When crime skyrockets, we rally in the streets and demand more pro-­tection even if it requires an increase in government revenue. In contrast, when crime is low, we complain

too little to combat it. Both of these experts rely on their analysis of cur-­rent global events and overall trends in terrorist activities. The problem, however, is that terrorist threats are organic in nature and extremely unpredictable. If the threat were calculable in the same way as a dice

threat to America. He argues that the

is the ill-­considered overreaction and fear it creates in the wake of an attack. Others, like retired U.S. Army Colonel David Hunt, counter that the next big attack is right around the corner and that we have done far

columbia political review :: winter 2012features :: domestic

9

They show that not only do we feel that more could be done to prevent terrorism, but also that we feel that what we have done so far does not make us feel safe. However, we al-­ready spend $526 per household per year on domestic counterterror-­

ism. So is it irrational to spend even more on pro-­t e c t i n g the lives U.S. citi-­zens from such an unpredict-­able and u n l i k e l y event? If we

are truly concerned with pro-­tecting the lives of

U.S. citizens, then we must reallo-­cate our resources to areas that have a greater impact on a larger number of people. For example, 2,996 lives were lost on the day of the 9/11 at-­tacks. In comparison, in that same year 559,354 died from cancer, 42,196 lives died in car accidents, and 700,142 died from heart disease. It boils down to a betting game: the likelihood of dying from any one of these more likely scenarios is far higher than from a terrorist attack. Although we should never forget 9/11, it is time, as hard is it may be, to move on and to use our money to more effectively to protect America. Since a major consideration of our elected leaders is re-­election, we must be the voice of reason that pro-­pels them to change our current poli-­cies.

ing terrorist events may lend some insight, Oxford University Professor Nassim Taleb refers to their suppo-­sitions as “epistemic arrogance,” or, arrogance despite our own limited knowledge. Furthermore, he ques-­tions, “Why on earth do we predict so much? Worse, even, and more in-­

terestingly: Why don’t we talk about our record in predicting? Why don’t we see how we (almost) always miss the big events?” So why, then, if our abilities are so limited, do we put such vast resources into trying to prevent an attack we can never pre-­dict? Columbia professors Brigitte Na-­

cos, Yaeli Bloch-­Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro conducted a study that illu-­minates some of the underlying sen-­timent responsible for this mentality. Through an analysis of public polls from September 2001 through De-­cember 2005, the professors found

-­ment’s ability to protect citizens from terror attacks spiked immediately af-­ter the attacks, but waned thereafter. By the summer of 2005, they found that “a majority of the public (56%)

-­ity to prevent terrorism in their own communities.” Additionally, they found that “a majority of Americans (54%) felt that more could be done in terms of prevention, while only 43% believed that the United States was doing all it reasonably could.” These two results help us understand why

about the tax level and are as a whole willing to cut public safety invest-­ments in return for lower taxes and a reallocation of the resources. Although many experts attempt to

manipulate our fears of another at-­tack or our anger about government over-­spending, the answer is not as c o m p l e x as they make it a p p e a r . We sim-­ply need

point at which our spending has the g r ea t e s t a m o u n t

-­cy, and, if the num-­ber of potential fatalities is reason-­ably low, set our spending accord-­ingly. According to the FBI, there have

been 318 terrorist attacks in the United States from 1980-­2005, re-­sulting in a total of 3,178 deaths. If, however, we take out the 2,996 deaths from the 9/11 attacks, which were counted as a single event, we have an average of less than one death per attack. Furthermore, the average number of attacks per year from 1980 through 2000 was 13.4, while from 2001 through 2005 it was only 7.6. Although the frequency of attacks

during the 1980s and 1990s was al-­most double that of 21st century, why were we so content at the time with an almost nonexistent counter-­terrorism policy? There were more attacks each year, although none of them mounted to the level of trag-­edy as that of 9/11, the potential was there. Just because the terror-­ists executed fewer attacks does not mean that they were not trying. Was the horror of 9/11 just a freak occur-­rence? Predicting organic events such as

the terrorist attacks of 9/11 is not a -­

Toby J. Pegors, GS ’13, is a political

science major from Minneapolis,

MN. He enjoys gasoline-­powered

outdoor adventures and is a huge

motorcycle fan. He can be reached

at tjp2131@columbia.edu.

columbia political review :: winter 2012 features :: domestic

Although many experts attempt to manipulate our fears of another attack or our anger about government over-spending, the answer is not as complex as they make it appear. We simply need to find the point at which our spending has the greatest amount of efficacy, and, if the number of potential fatalities is reasonably low, set our

spending accordingly.

“ ”

10

The Consequences of Misguided International Pressure on Iran

Sanctioning Progress by Joshua Fattal

The intense military response to the protests has been coupled by human rights violations for a huge

-­cally minorities and those who speak out against the government. Ever since the government’s crackdown in 2009, repressing civilian dissenters became the regime’s primary means of retaining power. As the climactic Arab Spring raged across the Middle East and North Africa, Iranian au-­thorities refused to allow critics of its government to engage in peace-­ful demonstrations. In Iran’s Arab-­majority Khuzestan province, secu-­rity forces allegedly shot and killed dozens of protestors. Around the country, the regime increased its use of the death penalty. Since then, the regime has continually targeted civil activists, lawyers, students, and jour-­nalists. Human Rights Watch reports that

Iranian prison authorities have exe-­cuted over 600 people since January 2012, many of them children. When a demonstration demanding gov-­ernmental accountability, reform, and an end to discrimination against ethnic minorities hit the streets, thousands were killed, beaten, and arrested by security forces. Iran has imprisoned the greatest number of journalists in the world – 42. It con-­tinues to be one of the world’s most repressive and brutal regimes. Hu-­man rights researchers are not even allowed into the country.This is the environment where a

protest movement must struggle to form. If any opposition movement is to rise up, then, it will require both international assistance and strong internal support to gain a footing ca-­

to look at the reasons for the 2009 uprising and the response of the Ira-­nian regime that led to its deteriora-­tion In the immediate wake of the

fraudulent 2009 Iranian elections, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was falsely reported to have won in a landslide, and Iranians took to the streets in protest. The opposition quickly as-­sumed the title of the Green Move-­ment, named after the Islamist campaign colors of the revolution-­ary-­turned-­reformist candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. Protestors formed a human chain around Tehran’s cen-­

-­terior Ministry building, and chanted “Down with the Dictator.” Hope for a changed Iran seemed tangible for the

Such hope, though, did not last for long once the Iranian government responded. Backed by the resilient Revolutionary Guard, the Ahmadine-­jad-­led Iranian regime killed 171 in-­nocent protestors and arrested and tortured thousands more. In all, 312 people were executed in 2010 alone. In 2011, emboldened by the suc-­cesses of the Arab Spring around the Middle East, the Green Movement began to plan a new protest. This time, the Iranian government sought to end the protest before it could even begin, and the Green Move-­ment’s leaders, Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, were placed under house arrest, where they remain today. For

-­ment began in 2009, members of the Iranian parliament publically called for the execution of Mousavi. In the Iranian parliamentary elections on March 2, 2012, the Green Movement was nowhere to be seen. It was as if 2009 had never occurred.

A s democracy becomes a life-­less dream for Iranians and the

memory of a brave but futile attempt for change, there seems to be reason, backed up by the recent behavior of the international community, to look at Iran as a monolithic nuclear threat. It is one thing, though, for the Iranian nuclear threat to dominate the world’s headlines;; it is quite an-­other for this threat to eradicate or render obsolete the world’s efforts to help the Iranian people transform their political system. Forgetting the Iranian people’s

-­ous as it is strategically shortsighted. The best hope for preventing a nu-­clear Iran is promoting the develop-­ment of an Iranian government that attains its authority through the people, not through nuclear power. As Tom Malinowski, Director of the Human Rights Watch in Washing-­ton, D.C., explains, “So long as an authoritarian government rules Iran against the wishes of much of its people, it will have an incentive to provoke confrontations with the out-­side world, in hopes of distracting its people from domestic problems, and to justify domestic repression.” For the United States and the

international community to play a critical part in fostering the rise of a democratic Iran, it must promote Iranian human rights and the growth of Iranian civil society. To do this, the world must turn its focus to the oppressive nature of this Iranian re-­gime, stop sanctioning the Iranian middle class, and foster an environ-­ment that promotes human rights. In advocating for the rise of a civil

society capable of promoting demo-­cratic reform in Iran, it is important

features :: international columbia political review :: winter 2012

11

human rights activists…want us to speak out on their behalf, to expose and condemn the government’s hu-­man rights abuses, and to sponsor resolutions in U.N. bodies challeng-­ing their government to stop its re-­pression. ” The history of the Hel-­sinki accord should serve as a guide for policymakers seeking to do more to hasten the day when Iran begins to respect its people. As much as the Gorbachev-­led

Soviet Union was in a perhaps more open position toward accepting change than Khomenei-­led Iran is today, the Helsinki model does of-­fer some striking and useful paral-­lels. Daniel Thomas explains in The Helsinki Effect that the economic pressures on the Soviets in the mid-­1980s were not enough to democrati-­cally reform the regime as Gorbachev eventually did, rightly pointing to China’s Tiananmen Square Massa-­cre as an example where economic reform did not entail political liber-­alization. The international adoption and promotion of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 created an international environment in which normalizing relations with the West depended on the strength of a country’s human rights record. Quite like Khomenei, Gorbachev

harming the opposition, but they also have minimal effect on their intend-­ed targets: autocratic countries. In-­deed, ultimately, the Iranian regime will not comply with international demands even if its people are suffer-­ing. The only sanctions that are nec-­essary are those that apply pressure directly on the Iranian government. By sanctioning over forty Iranian ter-­rorist and nuclear-­material related entities as well as state-­owned banks since 2006, the US Department of the Treasury has begun to do this, but these types of sanctions need to be broadened and strengthened. There is also a stronger course of

action that the international commu-­nity can and should take to better the chances for a renewed democratic movement. In the late 20th century, the American and Western European community adopted the Helsinki Ac-­cords, effectuating an international environment that valued respect for human rights to the extent that the Eastern Bloc found itself forced to reform its policies. Today, an inter-­national consensus stands opposed to the Iranian nuclear program, and it stands to reason that this interna-­tional consensus should be further utilized to demand the end of the Khomenei government’s oppression. As Malinowski points out, “Iran’s

recent months the opposition move-­ment has faced a new hardship: the economic side effects of the interna-­tional community’s actions to thwart Iran’s nuclear program. Before the international community can begin to take smart, strategic, and concert-­ed action to force the Iranian regime to rectify its record on human rights,

that are harming the very middle class that should be encouraged to lead the next wave of the protest movement. Recent reports have emphasized

that the sanctions are primarily hurting an innocent Iranian popula-­

middle class. “Sanctions are affect-­ing the entire country, but it is the people that bear the brunt and have the least ability to protect themselves from this pressure,” as Trita Parsi, the president of the National Iranian American Council, told The Guard-­ian this summer. Those middle class women who historically are the voice for change within Iran are increas-­ingly unemployed and forced to re-­treat from volunteer work. The sanc-­tions, which are precipitating the demise of public enterprise, will in-­evitably force people to depend more on the state, spelling the end of civil activism. Not only are these sanctions

features :: internationalcolumbia political review :: winter 2012

art by Justin Walker

12

weakened, surrounded position and offer it a way out. By ceasing to point-­lessly sanction the Iranian people and offering to stop all economic censures on the Iranian regime in return for a new respect for human rights, the United States and the international community can provide a democratic movement the chance to reform Iran from the inside and offer the Islamic

Republic the road to le-­git imacy that it so craves. The short term goal of halt-­ing Iran’s n u c l e a r program can and should be

coupled with the long-­term goal of fostering a more democratic, open Iran, if only because the sanctions that target those worth targeting and a diplomacy that offers Iran a path to legitimacy are ultimately the solu-­tions to both these issues. “An action that extends Iran’s nuclear clock by a couple of years, but its democracy clock by ten years, will undermine the long term goal of denying Iran nuclear weapons,” said Malinowski. America cannot turn a blind eye to the best solution to the Iran problem, which requires the rise of a newly energized protest movement. The nuclear centrifuges are continuing to spin, faster than ever, in Tehran to-­day. The long-­term analysis dictates a radical revision of today’s current international strategy. If Iran’s fu-­ture is to change, the international community’s approach must change

will calculate the instrumental value of compliance with international norms. If the international community

losing power at home is deemed pref-­erable to massive repression, as was achieved with the Soviet Union, the calculus of the Iranian regime can and will change.

In Hidden Iran, Ray Takeyh pro-­vides historical background to the success of diplomatic pressure and economic incentives. He discusses how long-­standing militant Iranian practices, such as the assassination of dissidents living abroad, were cur-­tailed following the European Union’s threat to cut off diplomatic relations and German threats to impose trade restrictions in 1997. In 2011, when Iran announced that it was apply-­ing for a seat on the United Nations Human Rights Council, the interna-­tional outcry that ensued, with hu-­man rights organizations loudly op-­posing its candidacy, led the regime to withdraw its bid. Indeed, the cre-­ation of this normative environment has already begun, perhaps most no-­ticeably through Senator Mark Kirk’s Iranian Dissident Awareness Pro-­gram, which aims to turn courageous dissidents into household names. The imposition of such a norma-­

tive framework can also offer pro-­test movements an internationally legitimate model to construct trans-­national networks for mobilization. Even partial compliance expands op-­portunities for domestic mobilization and increases the likelihood that the regime will be persuaded to reform. It is evidently time for a new Helsin-­ki process today. The international community should use Iran’s current

was well aware that his country faced international isolation, and sought to rectify this environment, leaving him little choice but to accept the need to improve his country’s human rights record. The international commu-­nity issued widespread criticism of the regime in the international press.

than the former Secretary of State G e o r g e S h u l t z , s t r e s s ed the pre-­eminence of human rights in America’s dea l ings with the w o r l d . D u r i n g r o u t i n e meetings with senior Soviet foreign policy ad-­visors, the co-­chair of Congress’ Hel-­sinki Commission listed the names of

be released. The constant push by Western

governments to the Soviets to release political pressures convinced the So-­viets to release dissidents who quick-­ly resumed their political activities against the state. The social mobiliza-­tion that can result from such oppor-­tunities erodes a repressive regime’s control of information and public discourse. Such constant and relent-­less focus on human rights abuses ultimately left the government with little choice but to reform. If Iranian political prisoners were to be freed, a re-­energized dissident movement could continue to do what the inter-­national community might not have

“The Iranian government can-­not survive with tanks and prisons alone – it needs at least some de-­gree of political legitimacy at home and abroad,” said Malinowski. “We should do everything we can to deny it that legitimacy.” The key to the success of this kind of international action is the formation of an environ-­ment where there are no other op-­tions – a process the United States must lead today. States that iden-­tify weakly with international society

Joshua Fattal, CC ’15, is studying

intellectual history and philosophy.

He is interested in politics, foreign

policy, and human rights. He is a

Contributing Editor of The Current, Assistant Executive Editor of the Co-­lumbia Undergraduate Law Review, and a Senior Editor and Columnist

for the Columbia Political Review. He can be reached at jrf2126@co-­

lumbia.edu.

When a demonstration demanding governmental acountability, reform, and an end to discrimination against ethnic minorities hit the streets, thousands were killed, beaten, and arrested by security forces.“ ”

columbia political review :: winter 2012features :: international

13

columbia political review :: winter 2012 cover story

Legal Strides and Policy Development in Brazil

Bribe and Punishment by Bruno Rigonatti Mendes

ments in 2007. Designed to analyze all individual cases together, the trial began in August and led to the con-­viction of 25 of the defendants in late October. However, the trial is ongo-­ing, and the STF’s justices have yet

each convict. Nevertheless, the trial’s repercus-­

sions have transcended the capital, Brasília, and have struck a chord with the Brazilian public, popping up in day-­to-­day conversations. Born and raised in poverty, Justice

to become a STF justice, has found clamorous popular support – from trending hashtags on Twitter to dop-­pelgänger masks worn during street protests and currently being mass

produced for the Febru-­ary’s Carnival festivities.To many Brazilians,

the mensalão trial rep-­resents a shift in the im-­punity paradigm that has

political abuse in Brazil throughout its history. Denise Moura, a historian at São Paulo State Uni-­versity, traces corruption in the country back to the

16th century, when the Portuguese Royal Court encouraged government bureaucrats to settle and work in Brazil by turning a blind eye to any instances of power abuse or graft. The Court was particularly permis-­sive in Brazil’s rural frontier terri-­tories, which had little contact with government outposts and were left largely to the iron hand of local land-­holding bureaucrats. This practice of localized despotism was accentuated by the continuous isolation of large

generally refers to a large monthly stipend. Its executors were only brought to trial after several years of press investigations and peripheral scandals that progressively uncov-­ered their complex political arrange-­ments.After the scandal gained atten-­

tion at the national level and more evidence became available, an ava-­lanche of accusations between in-­volved parties began to shed more light on the individuals behind the

-­ney General has been able to iden-­tify the recipients of $16 million in bribes, but many remain unclear –

amount of transferred money adds up to over $70 million. Those indict-­

ed range from business and banking moguls to high-­level government of-­

José Dirceu, a founding member of the Workers’ Party and former gov-­ernment minister, and José Genoi-­no, who was president of the party when the bribes took place. The judicial process examining the

mensalão began only after a compre-­hensive series of investigations called on by the Brazilian Chamber of Dep-­uties that led the STF to issue indict-­

“The problem is that in Brazil you don’t convict. I’ve been in court for seven years, yet

this is the second time we attempt to reach conviction. This course of ac-­tion is still very novel to me and to other judges.” Judge Joaquim Bar-­bosa is unhappy with his court’s con-­viction rate. He is closer to the rule than to the exception in a region that has suffered from a tainted judicial system since the establishment of

-­ever, isn’t merely a small-­town pub-­

patrimonial political relations that plague Latin America. In reality, he is a justice and rapporteur at the Su-­premo Tribunal Federal, the Brazil-­ian equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court. Colloquially ab-­breviated as STF, the country’s highest court is currently conduct-­ing its most important trial in its two hundred years of existence, a process whose novelty, unprecedented size, and potential impact have intrigued justices and common citizens alike.Justice Barbosa is referring to a

gargantuan trial where 37 people have been indicted with up to sev-­en different constitutional types of criminal offenses. All of the indicted were involved in a political bribery scheme at the federal level organized between 2003 and 2004 by the Par-­tido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) to maintain congressional support for their incumbent govern-­ment. The scheme became popularly known as “mensalão,” a word that

The mensalão scandal is just another instance of this form of corruption that reaches into the Brasília’s highest cir-cles, yet it is the first major scheme at the federal level to result in thorough

investigation and punishment.

“ ”

14

columbia political review :: winter 2012cover story

where clientelism is at its strongest. Moreover, the trial does not di-­

rectly address the incentives that engender the politics of patronage

local and the federal levels. Indeed, just punishment does not necessar-­ily impede these forms of corruption from reappearing in Brazilian poli-­tics. Paulo Uebel, Columbia SIPA’13, who is currently writing his thesis

on Brazilian cor-­ruption, points to the source of the problem: “The Brazilian govern-­ment has a series of legal, adminis-­

-­ments at its dis-­posal to pick win-­ners and losers, all of which gen-­erate incentives

-­ernments at the federal, state, and municipal levels in Brazil often lack restraint in choosing the recipients

-­tition gives way to bribery, lobbying, and personal connections. Rather than addressing these incentives di-­rectly, the mensalão trial merely ex-­

-­quences.Nevertheless, the international

community has been primarily op-­timistic while observing the trial’s development. The results were par-­ticularly praised in neighboring countries like Argentina and Ecua-­dor, where increasingly authoritar-­ian governments seem to be headed in an opposite direction, cracking down on free press and showing little sign of tackling internal corruption and impunity. Clarín, Argentina’s largest newspaper, said that the con-­victions harmonize with a series of measures undertaken by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff to increase government transparency and to dis-­courage graft, such as publishing the salaries of all federal employees on-­line. La Nación, another major Ar-­gentine newspaper, highlighted for-­mer Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s positive outlook on the process, seeing it as a sign of in-­

there is widespread expectation that the STF will continue to indict and

in future corruption schemes. As Cy-­nara Menezes describes in Brazil’s Carta Capital magazine, any future demonstration of leniency or lack of rigor in Brazil’s highest court will risk perpetuating the mensalão case as an exception rather than a game

changer in Brazil’s justice system. While the novelty, size, and ex-­

ecution of the trial are all laudable, it is also important to note its short-­comings and the extent of its imme-­diate impact. The meticulousness of the investigation process might have been crucial to providing enough in-­formation for the conviction of sev-­

news of the scandal and the sentenc-­ing of involved parties is nothing new

-­

system that was not addressed by the trial. Moreover, it stands alongside other shortcomings that delayed the process and continuously enabled those who are guilty to game the system to their favor. The outcomes of the mensalão trial ultimately re-­sulted in many convictions in spite

be resolved by structural reforms reducing the judicial privileges en-­

reforms include the foro privile-­giado, a constitutional arrangement that overloads higher courts with all indictments of corruption in the public sector, as well as undermin-­ing attempts to corrupt or maneuver the judicial system, particularly in the least developed areas of Brazil,

swaths of the country and eventually evolved into various forms of clien-­telism. The mensalão scandal is just an-­

other instance of this form of cor-­ruption that reaches into the Brasí-­

major scheme at the federal level to result in thorough investigation and punishment. Previous attempts were not as successful: One of the latest was the trial of Fernando Collor de Melo, Brazil’s

-­cally elected – and impeached – president after a twenty-­year pe-­riod of military dictatorship that ended in 1984. Publicly accused by his own broth-­er of sanctioning

scheme run by his campaign trea-­surer, Collor was absolved by the Supremo Tribunal Federal for lack of evidence of his involvement. The verdict was met at the time with unanimous outrage by the public and has remained a constant refer-­ence for the STF’s previous failings throughout the mensalão trial, ex-­erting pressure on the court to meet popular expectations this time.Indeed, the thorough and fair con-­

the government is an unprecedented and welcome fact in a country that in 2011 scored 3.8 on Transparency In-­ternational’s Corruption Perception Index on a scale that ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly un-­corrupt). The convictions have also attracted international attention. While foreign analysts differ in their assessments of the trial’s practical impact on Brazilian law, it has gen-­erally been interpreted as a signal of change in a continent where many countries still struggle to bring cor-­rupt politicians and corporate lead-­ers of the past and present to court.

yet been delivered, Brazil’s STF has proven its ability to tackle corrup-­tion, setting a strong deterrent to any future attempts by government

While foreign analysts differ in their assess-ments of the trial’s practical impact on Brazilian law, it has generally been interpreted as a signal of change in a continent where many countries still struggle to bring corrupt politicians and cor-porate leaders of the past and present to court.

“

”

15

columbia political review :: winter 2012 cover story

which connects large empty areas to each other throughout the Amazon rainforest, hardly knew their coun-­try would win bids to host both the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics. Brazil is also a pioneer in offshore oil drilling, and the recent discovery of massive deep-­water reserves along its coast has sparked the interest of investors and politicians alike.The government has also spe-­

technical experience of science and engineering students by implement-­ing the “Ciência sem Fronteiras” (Science without Borders) fellow-­ship, which covers tuition and living costs for a semester or year abroad at top universities across the world. The program avoids brain drain by guaranteeing that students return to Brazil for the last year of their stud-­ies. At the same time, it provides stu-­dents with the top-­notch education

growing national demand for high skilled labor. There have also been advance-­

-­tion. The STF ruled in April of this year that racial quotas in universi-­ties are constitutionally valid. In Au-­

term in the 1990s and furthered by Workers’ Party President Lula and incumbent Dilma Rousseff, major advances have been made in three particular areas in which Brazil has struggled in the past: infrastructure, education, and inequality.Notorious for their large-­scale,

poorly planned projects, Brazil’s main transport and energy net-­works have historically been built and maintained by federal and state governments, often costing too much to compensate for embezzled money and taking too long to be completed. Brazil’s latest leaders have begun to privatize parts of both networks, which have often led to safer, even environmentally friendly, projects, such as São Paulo state’s Rodoanel and scenic Imigrantes highways. Hoping to attract greater invest-­ments to interior areas, President Rousseff has also recently an-­nounced a series of measures to sig-­

among them an up to 28 percent cut in electricity bills. The increasing in-­

to halt within the next few years. The

Rodovia Transamazônica highway,

creased institutional strength rather than a threat to his party and politi-­cal legacy. An op-­ed from Ecuador’s La República similarly praises the STF’s “enviable” neutrality and in-­tegrity. News of the convictions reso-­nated all the way north to Mexico, the region’s second largest economy, where El País stressed the trial’s un-­usually severe sentences and praised the STF’s decision to prevent inter-­

passport of every defendant, albeit criticizing the STF’s slow pace in set-­ting up the trial. The mensalão trial might be the

most remarkable event in Brazil-­ian legal affairs today, but it is not the only contemporary government stride toward a more developed so-­ciety in Brazil. As it embarks on its third decade of democracy, Brazil

economic stability it needs to ad-­dress latent institutional problems that have hindered its development for decades, or even centuries. In-­deed, Brazil strives to become a leading world presence worthy of its immense area, population, and resources. Begun during Presi-­dent Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s

art by Marissa Tjartjalis

16

columbia political review :: winter 2012cover story

program, but long-­overdue reform of Brazil’s pensions system has been pushed back on the senate’s agenda several times and there is no short-­term implementation in sight, partly because of the political cost of reduc-­

senior citizens.The mensalão trial is not an isolat-­

ed phenomenon, but part of a mul-­tidimensional struggle to overcome developmental problems, which for a long time have characterized Brazil’s political, economic, and social or-­ganization. Many of these attempts

of the problems, and the successful implementation of a few is laud-­able not only at the national level, but also in Lat-­in America as a whole, where oth-­er countries still languish without much hope for transformation.

However, as skeptics of the trial’s outcome have correctly highlighted, reform will only come from the con-­tinuous generation of progressive results, and any faltering can be in-­terpreted as a step backwards in the

-­ciency, educational imbalances, and inequality of opportunity. It is, then, necessary for both the government and civil society to actively monitor and evaluate the results of structural reform and developmental policies – recognizing progress and scruti-­nizing failure in order to spur and sustain long-­term development in Brazil.

ensure a fairer educational access and skill-­building experiences. However, it is important to note

that progress has not occurred at an optimal pace, and that many govern-­ment initiatives have faltered or out-­right failed because of weak political support, implementation problems, social resistance, and corruption. In

-­ture, local governments are strug-­gling to complete the infrastructure projects necessary to accommodate the World Cup and the Olympics on time, in a paradoxical scenario where delayed bureaucratic checks have fostered urgency contracts that are

more vulnerable to embezzlement. The federal government is also strug-­gling to receive competitive bids for the completion of a high-­speed rail system between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and there has been sig-­

-­tal groups to halt the construction of large-­scale hydroelectric projects in the Amazon rainforest. Large-­scale

-­cult to implement. The transposition of the São Francisco River in Bra-­zil’s northeast, for example, aimed at combatting regular droughts, has been delayed for more than a decade among complaints of embezzlement, environmental disregard, and ques-­tionable functionality. Environmen-­tal concerns have also arisen after a minor oil leak in one of Brazil’s newer offshore oil drilling platforms, and fears of a “resource curse” have increased since the Brazilian Depu-­ties Chamber failed to pass a bill pipelining all future federal royalties to educational funding from the ex-­ploration of deep water oil reserves.Concerning inequality, there has

been remarkable progress with con-­ditional cash transfers such as Bolsa Família, a titanic poverty-­reduction

gust, President Rousseff sanctioned a law that reserves 50 percent of all spots in federal universities to public high school students, who are often at a disadvantage when competing against wealthier private school stu-­dents in taking standardized tests for admissions to the country’s best public institutions, which also hap-­pen to be free of charge.Educational reform further

caused an uproar among the white upper-­middle class, whose privately educated younger generations will face tougher competition because

-­cies in public universities. Criticism abounds, ranging from veiled rac-­ism and classism to more construc-­tive arguments questioning the generality of the 50 percent public high school quo-­ta, which might lead to imbalanc-­es in regions where most students are privately educated. Some also question the functionality of racial quotas in a country where over 40

as a mix of European, African, and indigenous ancestry. One of the most acute problems

endured by Brazil is its high degree of income inequality. The World Bank’s latest measure in 2009 re-­vealed Brazil has the 12th highest

-­sure of a state’s economic inequal-­ity) in the world, surpassed only by smaller economies in Latin America and Sub-­Saharan Africa. Fortunate-­ly, it is an active topic of discussion in the government’s agenda, and there have been signs of steady im-­provement. A comprehensive World Bank study published in 2004 point-­ed to inequitable access to educa-­tion, regressive public transfers in the pensions system, and high wage differentials as the main source of Brazil’s unusually high economic

-­cant attempts by the governments of Presidents Fernando Cardoso and Lula to counter these problems. The aforementioned education policies

Bruno Rigonatti Mendes, CC ‘14, is

an economics and political science

major born and raised in São Pau-­

lo, Brazil. He has an avid interest

in development economics in Latin

America and Sub-­Saharan Africa,

and strives to climb the interna-­

tional development ladder to World

Bank presidency one unpaid intern-­

ship at a time. Bruno can be reached

at brm2126@columbia.edu.

The outcomes of the mensalão trial ultimately resulted in many convictions in spite of such difficulties, which would only be resolved by structural reforms reducing the judicial privileg-

es enjoyed by government officials.“

”

17

Shedding Light on African Land Grab Deals

Gimme, Gimme More by Sarina Bhandari

usually call for environmentally un-­friendly practices and the forcible re-­location of its residents. The displaced

all while dealing with increasingly limited access to food and water. Current guidelines for foreign land

purchases do not effectively ensure that investors handle the land and the people living on it fairly and respon-­sibly. Financial institutions have the power to regulate the terms of trade, but they enable, rather than restrict, the rampant deals.Land grabbing was an established

p r a c t i c e even be-­fore the 2008 food c r i s i s . Droughts and a hike in oil pric-­es in 2006 led to dra-­matic in-­creases in the price

of food in developing nations, but within the past few years, the number of foreign land acquisition deals has exploded. Research by Columbia so-­ciology professor Saskia Sassen shows that land grab deals between 2006 and 2011 exceeded a total of 200 million hectares. According to public reports, 134 million hectares of land in Africa now belong to foreign investors. This

the African continent is entangled in a land grab. Additionally, the prolif-­eration of legal-­yet-­clandestine land acquisition deals means that the true quantity of foreign-­owned land in Af-­rica is likely even greater. While the sheer size of African

land acquisition can be shocking, the

could be used for the production and extraction of resources. The practice of acquiring land on a

massive scale in the name of resource security has a name: land grabbing.

what is not land grabbing, the process typically involves the sale of a plot of land that is larger than 10,000 hect-­ares. Today’s land grab deals often in-­volve even larger plots of land — many are larger than 200,000 hectares, and some purchases exceed one mil-­lion hectares. The buyers are usually wealthy governments and private in-­

vestors purchasing tracts of land from developing nations. Most of the land sold to foreign investors in this way is in eastern Sub-­Saharan Africa. The

-­tries: Ethiopia, Tanzania, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Madagascar, according to a 2012 re-­port from Oxfam International. The intended uses of the acquired land are diverse, but biofuel extraction and food crop production are usually the primary objectives.

both buyers and sellers, but the prac-­tice comes with consequences for which no one is currently taking re-­sponsibility. After a deal has taken place, investors’ plans for the land

By 2013, more than 1.5 million Ethiopians will be displaced from their homes by the or-­

ders of their own government. Some will have to relocate to areas that lack stable access to food and water, and

land of these local residents no longer belongs to them because the Ethio-­pian government has sold much of it without their consent. Between 2008 and 2011, Ethiopia leased 3.6 million hectares of land to foreign investors, and more than two million hectares remain avail-­able for lease or purchase. What is

h a p p e n -­ing to these 1.5 million Ethiopians is not an a n o m a l y within Af-­rica. In fact, it is an increasingly common occur-­rence, given the quantity of land that foreign investors have purchased on the continent following a spike in food prices in 2008. As governments and

solutions to rising food prices, inves-­tors also knew to act quickly. The ag-­ricultural crisis was a telltale sign of a new era in which demand for staple crops and natural resources would soar as supply decreased. Acknowl-­edging the unsustainability of global

then swiftly secured food and other resources. To be prepared for the next major resource shortage, investors be-­gan acquiring large tracts of land that

columbia political review :: winter 2012 features :: international

After a deal has taken place, investors’ plans for the land usually call for environmentally un-friendly practices and the forcible relocation of

its residents.“ ”

18

features :: international columbia political review :: winter 2012

political leaders endorsed by interna-­tional organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, even if these leaders do not have the support of local resi-­dents. Unfortunately for the displaced and their land, the IMF and World Bank generally back leaders who show promise to prioritize their countries’

related to international debt. A lead-­

organizations would be predisposed to accept lucrative land-­grab agree-­ments, especially considering that large foreign investors are relatively reliable with payments. However, these leaders are often unmoved by the fact that the terms of most deals threaten the rights of Africans and the long-­term health of the land. Given that the power to accept or reject the sale of land lies with these leaders, those who would oppose the deals are usually powerless to stop them.

African leaders agree to land grab deals because they

-­ceived from foreign investors. However, the leaders ignore the negative (and often per-­manent) impacts of the deal, such as displacement, unem-­ployment, and environmental degradation. Investors seem to understand that the local and long-­term problems caused by their land-­use practices will be issues they can ignore – it is only the people on the land that will have to face the conse-­quences. The deals are rapidly taking place, despite the fact that the consequences devas-­tate vast amounts of land and millions of people, especially small farmers. As the deals take place today, neither the buyers nor the sellers are watching out for the consequences, especial-­ly the long-­term ones, that East Africa will have to endure. No single organization,

government, or other group of individuals is entirely respon-­sible for ensuring that human rights and long-­term environ-­

mental concerns are taken into con-­sideration when these deals are made. Current organizations can offer guide-­lines that the deals should follow, but

origins of the issue. In the 1980s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported re-­structuring programs that introduced African land to the global market. In-­vestors who had previously consid-­ered African property law too compli-­cated to purchase now reconsidered,

-­stitutions would support their deci-­sion to invest in African territory. In fact, within the past decade, the World Bank has loaned over $8 billion to in-­vestors for land grab deals. Before Western institutions could

complete the process of integrat-­ing Africa into the global market, the problem of political instability needed

Africans – let alone foreign investors – to determine who is in charge of the land. For foreign investors looking to purchase hundreds of thousands of

hectares, it is impractical to communi-­cate with individuals or local leaders. To make their deals secure, investors instead negotiate with national-­level

treatment of the land is even more frightening. Twenty years of sustained heavy mining or industrial planta-­tion procedures will strip land of its resources. As Sassen notes, a twenty-­year land grab lease can leave land barren. Speculators have realized that foreign investors’ use of land-­grabbed territories is unsustainable and could cause massive food and water crises in Africa. Some, including Henk Hob-­belink, a coordinator of GRAIN, an or-­ganization supporting small farmers, have even called the problem of wa-­ter abuse in land-­grabbed territories “hydrological suicide” for the African continent. If foreign investors were to use green procedures, sustainable farming techniques, or other methods to protect the longevity of the land, perhaps the land could be returned to Africans in a manageable state. But when investors are only looking out for their own interests and lack exter-­nal pressure from national and international regulators, they will not question the ethics of their practices.

-­tent property rights, most Af-­ricans in heavily land-­grabbed territories do not have any le-­gal claim to their land. Another concern is that, despite playing

agreements, local residents face forcible displacement and

land is transferred to foreign investors. The deals incite re-­sistance among some affected Africans, but most are at a loss as to how, exactly, to resist the deals. When a Saudi investor purchased 700,000 hectares for the rice production, lo-­cal farmers in Mali responded with court action. Unfortu-­nately, locals who protest land

their grievances within the very governments that sold the land

to appeal, locals often suffer the consequences of land grabs without any attention or help from their own governments.When looking for solutions to the

problems associated with land grab

art by Desislava Petkova

19

columbia political review :: winter 2012 features :: international

displaced, use sustainable farming or extraction methods instead of cheaper but more harmful ones, and leave the land arable at the end of their lease,

they would have to spend more money. Simply put, when in-­vestors opt for expensive, al-­beit socially responsible plans in place of cheaper yet damag-­ing ones, they do not receive as

-­tutions look at the long term, they should understand the need to demand fair and sus-­tainable land grab deals – even if it means taking a short-­term hit. The resource crisis that inspired land grabbing will only worsen in twenty years if abusive farming and resource-­extraction dry out over 200 million hectares of land. Sus-­tainable practices need to be enforced, but buyers and sell-­ers without regulation are agreeing to non-­sustainable terms of trade. Land grab deals cannot be

halted, but they can be handled responsibly. Many continue to believe that governments and policy institutions should be in charge of enforcing social responsibility in investments, but these organizations are too

weak to intervene in the deregulated,

-­tor. The protection of human rights and the environment is possible if de-­manded by the World Bank and other

the utmost importance for the future of the African continent and its peo-­ple.

Historically, governments and in-­ternational policymaking institutions have been expected to regulate inter-­national terms of trade. They still do,

but deregulation has allowed for high-­-­

tions to take place with less oversight than in the past. The power of regu-­lation has shifted from the hands of governments and political institutions

Whether a transaction will occur de-­

on any given set of policy aims. This

land grab deals serve as the last and sometimes only checkpoints before a deal can go through – but most are not exercising their power responsibly.

regulating institutions have the most power to enforce social responsibility in investments, they often lack incen-­tives to do so. Socially responsible in-­vesting often correlates with weaker returns on investment. For example, if land grab investors were required to provide housing and work for the

these bodies lack the power to enforce any of their suggested rules. On an in-­ternational level, the United Nations has developed global guidelines that call for transparency in land grab deals and consultations with locals, but these guide-­lines are not enforceable. Afri-­can-­led programs currently in place for small farmers, such as the Comprehensive Africa Agri-­culture Development Program (CAADP), outline basic protec-­tions that all African countries should honor, but when land grab deals deny these basic pro-­tections, they lack the regula-­tory and enforcement power to insist that small farmers’ rights be respected by the terms of the trade. If buyers or sellers do not want to follow international or national guidelines, no one says they have to. Dangerous deals continue to

happen because the current po-­litical institutions are too weak to intervene. Because buyers and sellers do not pay enough attention to long-­term environ-­mental or human rights con-­cerns in their agreements, land grab deals need to be checked by an external party that en-­sures important interests are not neglected. Given that cur-­rent policy-­based organizations lack the power to enforce healthier terms of trade, it is up to organizations with real power over land grab deals to de-­mand better terms. Land grab deals require the sup-­

because foreign investors usually need to withdraw major loans to purchase extensive tracts of land. By contrast, land grab deals do not require the sup-­port of policymaking organizations, such as the UN or CAADP. Because in-­

grabs ultimately determine whether or not a deal can take place, they have the most leverage to demand that land grab take environmental interests, human rights, and other long-­term concerns into consideration. By com-­parison, policy institutions, which do not determine whether the deals will take place, do not have leverage over the deals.

Sarina Bhandari, CC ’14, is major-­

ing in sociology and concentrat-­

ing in business. She has worked in

cartoons at The New Yorker and communications at Doctors With-­

out Borders. Currently, she is the

outreach director and an editor for

Columbia’s undergraduate literary

magazine, Quarto. Her interests in-­clude new age philosophy, human

biology, and humor. Sarina can be

reached at sb2122@columbia.edu

20

generation Americans voted in favor of Democratic candidates over Republican ones, bringing the issue of immigration re-­form to the forefront of governance. With 71 percent of Latinos voting for President Barack Obama, many Republican politi-­cians, including Marco Rubio and Jeb Bush, both from Flor-­ida, have voiced concerns that their party needs to change its stance on immigration policy to account for a rapidly changing American demographic. In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act legal-­

ized the status of many undocumented residents in the United States, but the hiring of workers without proper work authori-­zations remained illegal. While a subsequent Immigration Act that passed four years later increased and established a more

United States, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 led to massive federally-­imposed deportations by requiring those who had unlawfully immigrat-­ed to the United States to leave the country until they could acquire a pardon. In 2001, senators Dick Durbin (D-­IL) and Orrin Hatch (R-­

UT) introduced the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, which provides for conditional

allow the children of undocumented residents to pursue post-­secondary education. Despite subsequent attempts to pass the DREAM Act in Congress, most recently by Harry Reid (D-­NV), the bill has never become law. President Barack Obama’s exec-­utive order in 2012, nonetheless, directed his U.S. Department of Justice to stop the deportation of immigrants who fall under the provisions originally proposed in the DREAM Act. Apart from the DREAM Act, other Congressional attempts

toward immigration reform have included the bipartisan pro-­posals of senators Charles E. Schumer (D-­NY) and Lindsay Graham (R-­SC). In 2010, they introduced a legislative blue-­

only documented citizens are hired for jobs. They also brought forward a proposal to improve border security to prevent un-­lawful crossing of the American-­Mexican border while simul-­taneously constructing a means to admit temporary workers into the United States and give those already in the country an opportunity to become citizens. Despite the fact that their

-­term elections placed immigration reform on the backburner, Schumer and Graham announced after the 2012 elections that they are planning to revive their proposals. In December 2012, it became evident that the Obama ad-­

ministration had already begun gearing up to launch a com-­

Crossing the Border for Immigration Reform

columbia political review :: winter 2012briefing

A Future Framework for Fixing a Fractured Immigration System

20

21

allow the children of undocumented residents to pursue post-­secondary education. Despite subsequent attempts to pass the DREAM Act in Congress, most recently by Harry Reid (D-­NV), the bill has never become law. President Barack Obama’s exec-­utive order in 2012, nonetheless, directed his U.S. Department of Justice to stop the deportation of immigrants who fall under the provisions originally proposed in the DREAM Act. Apart from the DREAM Act, other Congressional attempts

toward immigration reform have included the bipartisan pro-­posals of senators Charles E. Schumer (D-­NY) and Lindsay Graham (R-­SC). In 2010, they introduced a legislative blue-­

only documented citizens are hired for jobs. They also brought forward a proposal to improve border security to prevent un-­lawful crossing of the American-­Mexican border while simul-­taneously constructing a means to admit temporary workers into the United States and give those already in the country an opportunity to become citizens. Despite the fact that their

-­term elections placed immigration reform on the backburner, Schumer and Graham announced after the 2012 elections that they are planning to revive their proposals. In December 2012, it became evident that the Obama ad-­

ministration had already begun gearing up to launch a com-­

munications strategy to promote immigration reform after its

Obama administration told the Los Angeles Times, President Obama intends to start working with Congress on a compre-­hensive bill that would not only create a path to citizenship for the large number of undocumented workers already residing in the United States, but would also create disincentives for future unlawful immigration by improving border security, punishing employers for hiring illegal immigrants, and encouraging the immigration of high-­skilled workers through legal means. It is uncertain at this moment whether the Obama administration will work closely with Senators Schumer and Graham to ad-­vance their proposed measures that includes a tough but fair approach toward amnesty, or will instead focus predominantly on provisions that are more popular with conservatives, such as visas to assist entrepreneurs and high-­tech workers. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold

some of the provisions in Arizona’s SB 1070, it is inevitable that the path toward immigration reform will involve a deli-­cate dance between local and federal government. What can be changed, however, is whether members of both political par-­ties work to creating substantive immigration reform.

The Startup Visa Act of 2011

Introduced by Senators John Kerry (D-MA), Richard Lugar (R-IN), and Tom Udall (D-NM), this bi-partisan ini-tiative creates a new provision in current immigration law that would create a new type of visa for foreigner entrepreneurs who want to move to the United States.

This new visa can be given to three types of foreign entrepreneurs:

1. Entrepreneurs who have an American investor who has agreed to invest $100,000 in the venture. In two years the venture must have created five new American jobs and generated at least $500,000 in financing or early income.

2. Foreigners already living in the United States and who have graduated from an American universi-ty with a degree in the sciences, including math or engineering. They must have an income of at least $30,000 and a US investor who can com-mit $20,000 to their venture. After two years, the startup must have created three new American jobs and generated at least $300,000 in financ-ing or yearly income.

3. Foreign entrepreneurs who already have busi-nesses that generate at least $100,000 in sales from the United States. After two years, the startup must have created three new American jobs and generated at least $100,000 in financing or yearly income.

The Startup Visa is only a temporary visa, but people who initially move with the visa can later apply for a green card that would give them permanent residency.

Current immigration law has capped the number of im-migrants who can come to the United States based on country of origin. This bill, introduced by Representative Jason Chaffetz of Utah, which has passed in the House of Representatives but is stalled in the Senate. It would eliminate these quotas for immigrants who come to the United States with an employment visa, that is visas that have been sponsored by an American employer. This bill would also increase the country quotas for family-based immigrants, meaning immigrants who already have fam-ily in the United States.

The Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act of 2009

columbia political review :: winter 2012 briefing

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columbia political review :: winter 2012briefing

As part of his presidential campaign, on June 15, 2012, President Obama issued a directive to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that it use “prosecutorial discre-­tion” to allow unauthorized immigrants between the ages of 15 and 30 who entered the United States before the age of 16;; who continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007;; and who are currently in school, graduated from high school, obtained a GED/in the process of getting a GED, graduated with an associates or bachelor’s degree;; or are honorably discharged from the Coast Guard or Armed Forces to remain in the country for two years. Although the directive includes many of the policies contained in the DREAM Act, it does not create a path to permanent legal residency or citizenship. Moreover, unlike the DREAM Act that promises permanent reforms, the directive will remain in effect only through 2016 or until Congress enacts new im-­migration policy prior to the end of that year. The directive offers temporary relief to the most innocent

and deserving of the undocumented, that is, those who were brought to the United States as children and who have either

or have prepared themselves to make such contributions.As the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda demands,

permanent reforms require two components. First, they must institutionalize the rights of these groups and extend them to all undocumented immigrants who demonstrate that through their labor and behavior they too are contrib-­uting to the nation’s wellbeing. Second, the Department of Justice must develop policies designed to curtail anti-­immi-­grant policies at state and local levels. But even such major changes will not provide a viable long-­term solution to the immigration dilemma.

The root of the problem is in the continuous reproduc-­tion of households that include undocumented immigrant children. This pattern means that the current problem re-­garding how to deal with large numbers of relatively young

nation, or who are poised to do so in the future, will continu-­ously recur and create demands for new DREAM Acts.There are three obvious humane responses to this conun-­

-­tion unrestricted;; this is politically untenable. The second is to mandate the use of reliable and enforceable employer sanction regime. This is increasingly technically feasible. Employers who hire immigrants and activists who defend all immigrants, strongly oppose such a regime because of doubts regarding its reliability. Such opposition, given the

the enemy of the good. Third is to enact legislation countermanding Plyler v. Doe

that would greatly reduce the educational rights of undocu-­mented children. Absent Plyler, foreign nationals would be much more likely to demand improved educational oppor-­tunities for their children in their countries of origin. This legislation, thus, is not intended and should not deprive children of education. Rather, it would create strong incen-­tives for parents to demand that their home governments provide the services that citizens demand. Unless the Obama administration commits itself to ad-­

dressing the roots of our nation’s immigration problem by

-­

improve the immigration problems we now confront.

22

Rodolfo de la GarzaProfessor of Political ScienceSIPA

Scott MinkoffAssistant Professor of Political ScienceBarnard

23

columbia political review :: winter 2012 briefing

23

While the Supreme Court has made it clear that the na-­tional government is the enforcer of US citizenship, public policies in our federal system suggest murkier waters. One example of this is the federal 278(g) program that allows state and local police to partner with federal authorities in order to collectively enforce immigration laws (including raids on businesses employing illegal immigrants). But the fact remains that without the help of the federal government, there is little that sub-­national governments can do to actu-­ally remove people from the state or country.

-­ity to independently engage with policies that impact non-­citizens. The fallout from Arizona’s “Support Our Law En-­forcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” is a good example. In U.S. v. Arizona (2012), the Court pre-­empted the most of the enforcement-­oriented aspects of Arizona’s tough immi-­gration law but left intact the law’s requirement that police check the immigration status of anybody who has been ar-­rested if there is suspicion that the person is in the country illegally. What remains of these state level efforts is not only consistent with historical Constitutional standards but also

-­eralism. Indeed, the immigration policies being formulated and enacted by state and local governments are not trivial but they are also – by rule and intention – fundamentally different than uniformly federal efforts. Whereas federal im-­

and social bounds of community. These social and economic bounds can be contracted with

exclusionary policies or expanded with inclusionary policies. Large-­scale exclusionary policy efforts (like Arizona’s) have received the majority of attention but narrower exclusionary

administered by the Social Security Administration and the Department of Homeland Security that allows sub-­national governments and private businesses to check the immigra-­tion status of their employees (within a non-­trivial margin

illegal immigration by Mitt Romney during the campaign. Throughout his 2010 Florida gubernatorial campaign, Rick Scott strongly supported an E-­Verify mandate for public and

politics of immigration reform were more complicated than he anticipated. The Florida citrus industry pushed back and

-­lic contractors and subcontractors. Whether or not E-­Verify is an effective tool for reducing the desirability of places as destinations for illegal immigrants remains an open ques-­tion. What is clear is that E-­Verify is a way for communities to say: “You are not welcome here… even if we cannot force you to leave.” Local governments have implemented exclusionary poli-­

cies, too. Illegal Immigration Relief Acts (IIRAs) are local ordinances that seek to regulate employment and housing. These measures have been considered in cities in over 30 states. A 2006 IIRA passed in Hazleton, Pennsylvania made it illegal for landlords to rent to illegal immigrants and for employers to hire them. The Act was pre-­empted by a U.S. District Court, but still sent a clear signal to the illegal im-­migrants in the community. Prince William County, Virginia passed a similarly restrictive ordinance that prevents immi-­grants access to certain social services and creates a partner-­ship between local law enforcement and U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Other ordinances estab-­

Not all policy efforts are exclusionary. State-­level DREAM Acts are an example of inclusive efforts by states to broaden the economic and social community. These laws, which have been enacted by California, Texas, Illinois, New Mexico, and Maryland, allow undocumented students to pay the in-­state tuition rates at public colleges and universities and in many

inclusionary policies are just as much about shaping the bounds of community as exclusionary policies. But just as exclusionary policies are not enforcement policies, inclu-­sionary policies – like state DREAM Act programs – are not paths to citizenship. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that whatever action governments have to deal with the il-­legal immigration problem is not being uniformly used to make the community more hostile to illegal immigrants. It remains to be seen if federal action will change the dy-­

namics of state and local immigration policy. Our suspicion is that because these policies appear to be driven by expecta-­tions of community, anything short of a draconian national law is unlikely to curb local exclusionary policies.

Scott MinkoffAssistant Professor of Political ScienceBarnard

24

With an Eye to the Future, A Push for Pluralism

Egypt’s Party Scene by Nadine Mansour

Egypt. Egyptians should eliminate

move away from an era of thinking between Mubarak cronies and the long-­banned Muslim Brotherhood, and to make way for cooperation that transcends this binary.

-­

– while not as polar as a choice be-­

Ismail and Mubarak’s Vice President Omar Suleiman, would have left Egyptians with a bittersweet taste of democracy. It is only hoped that Egypt will not go down a road where citizens’ interests are seen as binary. It is ironic that as much as this system seems to pit two extremes against

Mubarak regime versus the Brother-­hood – the parties are actually iden-­

tical in their ability to address Egypt’s employ-­ment, education, and healthcare crises. An expansion of the politi-­cal space through an in-­stitutional change in the electoral system would move the country for-­ward. To begin this, the most important change is a reform of the politi-­cal attitude into one that does not lead into this political polarization. In the current Egyp-­tian political climate, citizens think in either a pro-­Morsi or anti-­Morsi mindset. Violent clashes occur on the ground be-­tween those who deem Morsi democratically elected and thus worthy of obeisance, and those

however, many citizens are under the false impression that they must choose between only two candidates. This system traps us in the mindset that there can only be two possible winners. When presidential elections began in Egypt, 14 candidates ran,

candidates were functionally whittled down to two by the High Commission for Elections’ decision to establish a

candidate with the most votes in the election wins, even without a major-­ity of votes. The system left two vi-­able candidates: Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and Ahmed

running as an independent.

will ensure a two-­party system in

“The success of our efforts to devise a thoroughly Egyp-­tian model for reform will

depend to a large extent on the abil-­ity of our political parties to mould themselves into dynamic grassroots forces, thereby stimulating broader public participation in the political

columnist for the Al-­Ahram weekly

multi-­candidate elections in 2005. But this comment could not be more relevant to Egypt’s political climate today. Now that Hosni Mubarak has been removed from power and Mohamed Morsi has been elected through a fair and free election, Egypt seems to be on its way to democracy. In the United States, the two-­party system has emerged as the accepted paradigm. As a result of this model,

features :: international columbia political review :: winter 2012

all art by Nadine Mansour and Chloe Blanchard

25

-­ing for a retrial of Mubarak, two acts that, unfortunately, have gained him popular support. The defeat of this with-­or-­against-­me notion will not only take time, but will require continuous efforts toward establishing a new discourse. For decades, the Muslim Brother-­hood was banned from political ac-­

tivity;; only in March 2011 did it estab-­lish its own party, the Freedom and Justice Party. Over the sev-­enty years of their politi-­cal exclusion, the Islamists had stepped in to help the poor when the government was unable to provide services, and thus with a broad appeal, it was able to more easily mobilize sup-­port during the elections. While liberal and secular parties would not as easily appeal to the uneduca ted masses, they

alternative to boycotting so as to include themselves in

the political process, even with its

Currently, there is evidence of progress. But the impasse in approv-­

than just the Islamist interests of the populace, the struggle for Morsi to ef-­fect change without feeling the need to reopen unhealed wounds, and Morsi’s expansion of his unchecked use of political powers, will pass as soon as the country’s institutions are

mindset that has placed Egyptians into a hole that can only be escaped through gradual trust in elected poli-­ticians. This polarized mindset was pres-­ent even before Egyptians had the

fair elections in May 2012. In discus-­sion with Western allies, Mubarak would strengthen his autocratic po-­

sition by presenting his Islamist op-­ponents as destabilizing. If anything, there are more similarities than dif-­ferences between rule under the NDP’s Mubarak and the FJP’s Morsi in terms of power consolidation, use of emergency laws, and calling oppo-­

interests. This Mubarak-­versus-­Brotherhood mindset continues to divide the country, as Morsi focuses

-­

-­tive of the political climate during the

where voting for Morsi was consid-­ered tantamount to voting for a pup-­pet of the Brotherhood, and those

as felool, or Mubarak supporters. Perhaps it is because Egyptians have never had a free election between multiple par-­ties under Mubarak, Sa-­dat, and Nass-­er, that they are currently s t r u g g l i n g with the con-­cept of politi-­cal difference and plural-­ism. The Egyp-­tian Republic under Gamal Abdul Nasser started with a one-­party system. In 1978, Anwar Sadat formed the National Democ ra t i c Party (NDP) and ended the one-­party ide-­ology. Despite this reform, the electoral system con-­tinued to be d om i n a t e d by the NDP, which would “win” each election with a sweeping majority. Per the 1971 constitution, the president would be re-­elected every six years, functionally serving for life in a one-­

party elections occurred, but they proved to be a farce. Ayman Nour of the al-­Ghad (Tomorrow) Party won only 8.8 percent of the vote, and was immediately accused of signature rigging. As a result, Mubarak held the presidency, and Nour was impris-­oned. It is this with-­us-­or-­against-­us

features :: internationalcolumbia political review :: winter 2012

26

Egyptian elections are seen as be-­ing between corruption and sup-­posed purity, or between religion and pragmatism, the emerging debates will only drive the nation backward to the choice that Mubarak had al-­ways evoked between an authoritar-­ian leader or chaos. A new system is needed to elect a new, truly repre-­

in the democratic system are paving the way for a tyranny of the major-­ity rather than exhibiting the kind of pluralism that the Freedom and Justice Party platform is supposed to ensure.

inely democratic election of presi-­dents will become the norm in Egypt. To maintain legitimacy, they will need to prove they are abiding by their party’s platform. As the Free-­dom and Justice Party’s platform states, “We also stress the need that the Egyptian people should be the ones who draft the Egyptian Con-­

identity and will of the nation.” The current climate, however, in which liberals and secularists withdrew from the constitutional committee, left the constitution to be drafted in a way that does not respect plural-­ism. As Morsi claims, his power grab is temporary until Egyptians approve the new constitution.At present, the Egyptian political

scene sees the negotiations over its constitution as its primary struggle for the future. The political climate, nonetheless, that will emerge is not bound by new laws: It is an ethos that will characterize how the coun-­try expresses its pluralistic interests for years to come. If the choices in

put in place. Overcoming the two-­party system mindset, however, is not a change that will come with the new institutions. Rather, a new sys-­tem must be put in place that can al-­low for a wider variety of opinions in future elections. While no electoral system can

completely avoid political polariza-­tion, there is still a way to have a two-­party system whereby voters rank their candidates in a preferential voting system. Had candidates been

either Abol Fotoh or Hamdeen Sa-­

contenders, as they were the most commonly favored candidates across a large span of voters according to polls from the Egypt Independent. Australia, for example, has preferen-­tial voting, a ranking system in which candidates favorable to a large base are successful. As voters pick their second and third choice candidates, a common consensus can be reached, and a shift from the duopoly can be achieved. This electoral system al-­lows for more space for third parties in that the winner does not need a majority of the vote in order to win. In this way, third parties have a bet-­ter chance, and voters will learn to think in terms of their personal pref-­

-­dividual candidate.Keeping Egypt’s plurality system

provides a low-­risk model for future political movement, but the revolu-­tion was not started to achieve low-­risk results. In order for Egypt to avoid establishing this problematic precedent, an institutional change accompanied by a more important societal shift from the two-­party paradigm is necessary. This means efforts should be made to effect in-­stitutional change. Given the frustra-­tion and impatience surrounding the unchecked powers of the “democrati-­cally” elected president, this may not be easy. Since the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces-­appointed High Commission of Elections, not the president, put this electoral system into place, there remains room for innovation. Unlike prior presidents, Morsi’s

mandate is derived from his legiti-­mate election. With time, the genu-­

Nadine Mansour, BC ‘14, is a politi-­

cal science major with an interest in

international relations and a love for

languages. An Egyptian-­American,

her research focus is to examine the

changing socio-­political dynamic of

the Middle East within the greater

context of a universal human strug-­

gle for justice. She can be reached at

nmm2150@barnard.edu.

columbia political review :: winter 2012features :: international

27

Why Multinational Oil Companies Keep Getting Away With It

Rigging the System by Lucas Rehaut

To this point, those who follow in-­ternational affairs might object that such abuses of human rights and in-­ternational law are typical of power-­ful states: Consider the United States’ reliance on torture of captives at Guantanamo Bay or on drone strikes in unstable countries. “Might makes right,” the saying goes, and that’s just the way it goes. Such objections would be valid,

were it not for the fact that Chevron is not a state. Rather, it is a multina-­tional oil corporation and acts in a fundamentally different way. Inso-­far as today’s multinational oil cor-­porations play a key role in shaping American energy policy both at home and abroad, it is important to take these distinct characteristics into ac-­count when analyzing and attempt-­ing to regulate their behavior, rather

-­ing them like other political actors. Moreover, unless the United States

change the incentive structure of how multinational oil companies operate, it risks allowing critical aspects of the country’s energy policy to be dictated

-­tions that cannot be effectively held accountable by the American people.The primary difference between

the behavior of multinational corpo-­rations and states relates to this idea of democratic accountability. Sim-­ply put, modern democratic states provide concrete mechanisms – like elections – by which citizens can hold state governments accountable

or weak, they force policymakers to “self-­regulate” and take public opin-­ion into account when determining state policy. Corporations gener-­ally lack such direct mechanisms, as

mate reasons to question the govern-­ment’s objectivity – some evidence suggests it turned a blind eye to Chev-­ron’s activities and is hoping to let the company take all the blame – but the broader implication is clear nonethe-­less: Despite overwhelming evidence that Chevron is at fault for the harm done to the local environment and its residents, Chevron is getting away with it. The unfortunate reality of the situ-­

ation, moreover, is that it makes per-­fect economic sense for Chevron to carry on with the tactic it has been using successfully for the past two de-­cades – avoiding formally acknowl-­edging any wrongdoing by spending millions of dollars to stall court pro-­ceedings into oblivion and disabling opponents from continuing their cas-­es. Whereas admitting defeat would set an important precedent and could inspire innumerable other groups with grievances against Big Oil to launch similar cases, Chevron’s opt-­ing instead to invest a couple million dollars a year to pay legal fees and keep the case from closing is rational;; the company makes billions in prof-­its every year and, ultimately, is con-­

-­ers. For the people of Ecuador and their independent legal team, how-­

support for the continuing court pro-­ceedings has become an all-­consum-­ing struggle, a weakness Chevron is actively exploiting by drawing them out as long as possible. But even if Chevron’s strategy is logical and tech-­

-­cal. Indeed, the Ecuador case illus-­trates the fact that Chevron can often avoid the constraints of justice and international law simply by mobiliz-­

The numbers alone are striking. In 2011, the World Bank esti-­mated the gross domestic prod-­

uct (GDP) of the state of Ecuador at approximately $67 billion. Chevron Corporation, by contrast, reported sales of $236.3 billion for 2011, with

In the same year, a local Ecuador-­ian court ruling against Chevron in an $18 billion case over the company’s widespread pollution in the Ecua-­dorian rainforest marked an unprec-­

hold multinational corporations re-­sponsible for their actions. Between 1964 and 1990, Chevron illegally dumped tons of contaminated waste-­water directly into the forest, causing the land and water supply to become dangerously toxic. In the case, which started in 1993, thousands of poor Ecuadorians sued Chevron in New York federal court for the damage to their local environment, demanding the company pay for a proper clean-­up as well as for the health care of those affected by illnesses caused by the pollution. After Chevron man-­aged to have the case moved to Ecua-­dor in 2003, the company continued to stall the court’s progress with brute force and dubious legal maneuvers – threatening laboratories that released unfavorable environmental assess-­ments and harassing the resident’s lawyers with unfounded racketeering charges. The judgment in 2011, how-­

the underdog Ecuadorians had over-­come the goliath Chevron. As of December 2012, Chevron has

still not paid. The company has ap-­pealed the court’s decision, insisting that interference by the Ecuadorian government invalidates the judg-­ment. To be fair, there may be legiti-­

columbia political review :: winter 2012 features :: domestic

28

sumers are much less likely to seek intervention in the operations of the companies that provide their state with oil. In addition, because oil prices tend to have a direct effect on the prices of many goods throughout the economy, many people fear that heavy-­handed government attempts to regulate oil companies may impose substantial personal costs and pre-­fer to conveniently ignore the messy world of oil production altogether.Still, even after wrongdoings as

serious as Chevron’s abuses in Ecua-­dor have come to light, how is it that virtually all Americans remain con-­sumers of products that can be linked to Chevron oil? If it were true that self-­interested concern about higher prices always trumps ethical convic-­

the popularity of “sweatshop-­free” or “fair trade” products. Rather, when it comes to oil products, the structure of the industry is such that consumers simply have no choice but to continue supporting companies whose policies they condemn.

consciousness, are seen as “good” ends that can justify occasional “bad” means, such as drone strikes or tor-­ture. When a corporation commits some major impropriety, however, their purpose is inherently tied to

-­lic opinion can excuse drone strikes when they promote national security, but few Americans consider it accept-­able for multinational corporations to abuse human rights in order to fur-­ther enrich their shareholders. But why, then, has Chevron man-­

aged to get away with just that for so long? The answer has to do with the unique features of the oil industry and of oil (and other hydrocarbons) as products. Oil is a resource of nearly unpar-­

alleled economic and political value. States around the world desperately compete for access to oil reserves in those countries that have them, and a secure oil supply is essential to the healthy functioning of nearly all modern industrialized economies. For that reason, politicians and con-­

they are only directly accountable to their shareholders, though to some extent consumers can hold corpora-­tions accountable by “voting with their wallets,” choosing to selectively buy products from companies whose policies they support. If a particular clothing manufacturer mistreats its foreign workers, consumers can ex-­press their disapproval by buying from a different company. Second, breaches of international

law and abuses of human rights by powerful states are often publicly perceived as more acceptable than those of multinational corporations because of differences in the way each organization explains its actions. For example, when the United States launches drone strikes against ter-­rorist operatives in the Middle East,

national security, something even the most human rights-­conscious Americans tend to support. Goals like national security or promoting de-­mocracy, which are associated with ethicality in the collective American

columbia political review :: winter 2012features :: domestic

art by Wehui Lu

29

a famously brutal military and con-­doning the violent suppression of an Acehnese nationalist movement does not seem to be in line with the broad-­er American foreign policy agenda, it is clear that ExxonMobil’s risky com-­mitment to gas production in Aceh, rather than any well-­reasoned analy-­sis by policymakers, ultimately deter-­mined the direction and tenor of US policy in the region.Similarly, over the past two years,

both ExxonMobil and Chevron have made oil exploration deals with the autonomous government of Kurd-­istan in northern Iraq, a move that

-­cials in Baghdad, who maintain that the companies are legally obligated to get their approval for any deal in-­volving territory in the region. Both companies have actively ignored Iraq’s claims, implicitly contribut-­ing a great deal to the credibility and authority of the beleaguered Kurdish government. Furthermore, without legal control over Kurdistan’s oil in-­dustry, Iraq can no longer exert the

-­tan as before, and the multinational oil corporations are largely to blame. Indeed, Steve LeVine, a commentator on energy and geopolitics for Foreign Policy, suggests that the companies

column in Kurdistan’s march toward economic autonomy.”Of course, opinions diverge on

whether this enhancement of Kurd-­ish authority is a good thing, but the most notable aspect of the situation is the conspicuous absence of any other state actors, especially that of the United States. Just a year after pulling its troops from the country, and despite impassioned requests by Iraqi leaders for President Obama to pressure ExxonMobil and Chev-­ron into stopping their exploratory efforts, the United States has not played an active role in negotiating

its inaction, the United States is en-­abling the multinational oil corpora-­tions to shape the future path of the Kurdish and Iraqi nations. Whereas US foreign policymakers might have

geostrategic reasons for supporting one side or the other, the companies’

uncomfortable for Americans who like to believe that the United States and its corporate representatives abroad act in accordance with the inspired ideals of democracy, justice, and the rule of law. Furthermore, while we expect that the government, which is elected by the people, should deter-­mine the path of the country’s foreign energy policy and that American mul-­tinational corporations should follow behind, historical instances of corpo-­rate direction of government policy illustrate that it sometimes works the other way around.In 2001, for example, when sepa-­

ratist violence encroached on Exx-­onMobil’s facilities in the Arun gas

state of Aceh, Indonesia, the com-­pany threatened to suspend opera-­tions unless the Indonesian govern-­ment could create conditions under which its employees felt safe. Robert Gelbard, the US ambassador to Indo-­nesia, reported concern that the loss of federal tax revenues from such a suspension could further weaken the already struggling new Indone-­sian government. Gelbard used that argument to help push the United States into an arrangement with the Indonesian government where the Indonesian military, which had an

-­man rights abuses, would protect ExxonMobil’s property and person-­nel in Aceh. In addition, he made it clear to the leaders of the GAM, the militant separatist group, that the United States would designate the GAM as a terrorist organization un-­less the attacks against ExxonMobil were stopped immediately. Gelbard claimed later that his de-­

cisions at the time had nothing to do with preserving ExxonMobil’s busi-­ness interests in the region, yet the extent to which ExxonMobil was in-­volved in diplomatic negotiations about the US response to the Aceh cri-­sis suggests that these business inter-­ests likely did play an important role. Regardless of Gelbard’s true inten-­tions, moreover, this case illustrates the tendency of the US government to

-­national oil corporations in their op-­erations abroad without considering the consequences. Since supporting

Since the beginnings of the inter-­national oil industry, the number of major production companies has al-­ways been small, but if there was a tendency toward cartel-­like behav-­ior in the early years, today’s multi-­national oil corporations compose a model oligopoly. As oil-­producing states around the world began na-­tionalizing their own oil industries, the multinational oil corporations were forced to turn to a smaller num-­

oil reserves, and the greater risks and costs associated with tapping these reserves led to a need for larger econ-­omies of scale and expanded access to capital. As a result, today we have the so-­called “supermajors” which emerged in the late 1990s: Exxon-­Mobil (originally Exxon and Mobil), Chevron (which absorbed Texaco), ConocoPhillips, BP, and Royal Dutch Shell.

-­vide around one-­third of all US oil, so each has such a large market share that consumer efforts to avoid prod-­ucts connected to any of these compa-­nies’ oil are largely unrealistic. Since

products, like gasoline, and consumer goods produced with energy from oil, rather than raw crude oil itself, their attempts to refrain from supporting a particular company are frustrated by complex domestic networks of oil

may process crude originally pumped by any number of companies. Fur-­thermore, because the incestuous co-­operation of the supermajors ensures that each can enjoy stable access to the US market, none have a meaning-­ful incentive to consider public opin-­ion or government policies in their own policymaking. In this sense, they can all be understood as having a role in collectively protecting each other from the pressures of democratic ac-­countability.In sum, the United States has ef-­

fectively ceded control over a major portion of its energy resources to a

-­-­

out regard for ethical norms or public opinion and that both politicians and consumers are unwilling or unable to regulate. This recognition should be

columbia political review :: winter 2012 features :: domestic

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Responsibility, standards that should apply even to corporate activity out-­side of the United States. In terms of

American government should em-­brace the widely-­endorsed concept of a tax on carbon, which would allow market forces to help promote more sustainable behavior throughout the economy by forcing fossil-­fuel com-­panies to revalue their assets in a way

that ac-­counts for the costs of climate change. Lastly, but per-­haps most i m p o r -­t a n t l y , campaign f i n a n c e laws must

be reformed to limit the ability of corporations to determine the direc-­tion of American politics. In October, Chevron proudly made a $2.5 mil-­lion donation to a Republican Super PAC, and the Center for Responsive Politics estimates that Mitt Romney received nearly $5 million in dona-­tions from the oil and gas industry. It is unacceptable that corporations, as McKibben puts it, “have far more free will than the rest of us,” and campaign

this dangerous inequality. However, despite the efforts of the fossil-­fuel companies and other major corpo-­rations, Barack Obama’s successful reelection once again demonstrated the irrepressible power of collective action by motivated individuals. Cor-­porations may be rigging the system, but they will never be invincible.

reserves of fossil-­fuel companies around the world, if released, would far exceed the upper limit of the range of emissions designated by main-­

-­nancial health of these companies, he argues, has therefore become directly dependent on energy policies that will eventually wreck the planet. The companies then have powerful incen-­tives to use their resources to prevent

adoption of stricter climate change policies by lobbying and support-­ing political candidates who eschew such policies. Though McKibben is excessive in his blanket characteriza-­tion of fossil-­fuel companies as “en-­emies” of the planet, he is insightful in his emphasis on the importance of restructuring these companies’ cor-­porate incentives such that they are more consistent with efforts to limit climate change. So we are left with a vivid under-­standing: Multinational oil corpo-­rations cannot be properly held ac-­countable, and, if left unchecked, they

United States foreign policy and poli-­cies on energy and climate change in ways that are inconsistent with gov-­ernment’s ultimate goal of promot-­ing the well-­being of the American

necessary for fostering more account-­able multinational oil corporations are less obvious, but the basic con-­tours are clear. In general, increased government regulation and oversight of corporate activities is crucial, es-­pecially for industries (like the oil in-­dustry) whose products are integral to the country’s economic health. Ad-­ditionally, the United States should codify and legally mandate corporate adherence to basic ethical standards along the lines of Corporate Social

support of Kurdistan is based purely on economic interests. Frustrated with the greater regulatory demands of the Iraqi government, the compa-­nies decided to throw their weight behind the Kurdish government, which promised them more generous

deals. While the cases of Aceh and Kurd-­

-­ence multi-­national oil corporations have over US foreign policy in re-­gions where fossil fuels are involved, their foreign policy in-­v o l v emen t has steadily decreased over the past few decades as the world’s oil reserves have been nationalized. In contrast to the mid-­dle of the twentieth century, when the multinational oil corporations were the sole producers extracting from

-­proximately 80 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves are controlled by companies that are either wholly or partially owned by the states in which they operate. This trend has forced multinational oil corporations to op-­erate on a more contractual basis,

new state-­owned companies lack the technical capabilities to exploit, but it has also, to some extent, pushed them out of international affairs. However, it would be a mistake to suggest that their era has ended. Multinational oil corporations are in fact continuing to direct US policy on what may be the most pressing global issue of this gen-­eration: climate change. In a Rolling Stone piece published earlier this year, famed environmen-­talist-­journalist Bill McKibben makes the case that the fossil-­fuel industry should be considered “Public Enemy Number One” and that we should re-­gard it as “a rogue industry, reckless like no other force on Earth.” McK-­ibben notes the fact that the amount of carbon contained in the proven

Lucas Rehaut, CC ‘14, is studying

political science and business. He

is interested in the ways both states

and businesses are responding to

the threats and opportunities asso-­

ciated with global climate change.

Despite occasional cynicism, he has

faith in human ingenuity and be-­

lieves that progress has momentum.

He also really likes dogs, traveling,

and photography. Lucas can be

reached at lnr2115@columbia.edu.

columbia political review :: winter 2012features :: domestic

“ ”Unless the United States enacts specific policies designed to change the incentive structure of how multinational oil companies operate, it risks allowing critical aspects of the country’s energy policy to be dictated by the finan-cial interests of corporations that cannot be effectively

held accountable by the American people.

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