WINSTON CHURCHILL AND THE GERMAN QUESTION IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

I9I8-I922

WINSTON CHURCHILL AND THE GERMAN QUESTION IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

19 18 - 1922

by

DONALD GRAEME BOADLE

• MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1973

© I973 by Ma,tinus Nijhott, The Hague, Netherlands

All ,ights ,eserved, including the ,ight to t,anslate 0' to ,ep,oduce this book or parts thereof in any fo,m

ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1596-1 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2035-0 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2035-0

CONTENTS

A cknowledgements vii

I ntroduction ix

CHAPTER I: PEACEMAKING WITH GERMANY, I9I8-I9I9

i. The Conc1usion of an Armistice: "Effectual Guarantees" or Uncon-ditional Surrender 1

ü. Responsibilityand Retribution 9 iü. Safeguards and Security: Churchill's attitude to Allied military oc-

cupation, and his attempts to create an independent Rhineland 20 iv. Easing the Blockade: Churchill's Aldwych Club speech and his plan

to counter the spread of Bolshevism in Germany 31

v. Churchill's Critique of the Paris Peace Conference 39

CHAPTER II: THE RUSSO-GERMAN QUESTION, I9I8-I920

i. The Menace of Russo-German Conjunction 56 ii. The Case for Preventive War 66

iii. The Military Situation in Russia: Churchill's assessments and their impact upon his attitude towards Germany, ]anuary-April 1919 79

iv. The anti-Bolshevists Fail to Sustain their Offensive: Churchill sug­gests an Anglo-German modus vivendi as a complementary check against conjunction, May-December 1919 92

v. Churchill Resolves to Abandon the anti-Bolshevist Cause, ]anuary-February 1920 106

vi. "The Very Great and Imminent Danger" of Polish Collapse, ]uly­August 1920: Churchill again proposes an Anglo-German agreement to deter conjunction II6

vii. Conjunction Averted 123

VI CONTENTS

CHAPTER III: FOUNDATIONS FOR A GERMAN POLICY. I920-I922

i. Two Proposals for Securing an Agreed Anglo-French German Policy 126 ii. Churchill and Lloyd George dispute the Merits of a Coercive Ap-

proach 142

üL The Perils of Pragmatism 157 iv. The Ascendancy of British Interests 167

Conclusion 179

Bibliography 181

Index 187

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to thank Dr Ernest K. Bramsted, who first aroused my interest in this project, and encouraged my preliminary research with wise and stimulating counsel. Following Dr Bramsted's return to England, Professor J. M. Ward of the University of Sydney undertook supervision of my research, and painstakingly read and criticized successive draft manuscripts. I am also grateful to my colleagues at the University of Sydney, and subsequently at the Riverina College of Ad­vanced Education, for without their co-operation it would have been difficult to find sufficient respite from teaching commitments.

For their assistance in locating materials I should like to thank librarians at Fisher Library (University of Sydney), the Library of New South Wales, the New South Wales Parliamentary Library, the State Library of Victoria, the National Library of Australia, and the Blakemore Library (Riverina College of Advanced Education). In ad­dition, I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the staff of the British Museum Newspaper Library, in obtaining xerox copies of Churchill's articles for the press, and the University of Sydney History Depart­ment for allowing me access to microfilm copies of the British Cabinet Papers cited in the bibliography.

For permission to reproduce copyright material I am indebted to: Hon. Mark Bonharn Carter; the Earl of Derby; the trustees of the estate of Robert Gilbert Vansittart; William Collins & Son Ltd.; Victor Gollancz Ltd.; the Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd.; William Heinemann Ltd.; the Director of Publications, H. M. Stationery Office; Oxford U niversity Press; the Royal Economic Society; George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd.

Mrs. J enny Williams typed a large portion of the final manuscript with unfailing enthusiasm, and Mr. Hugh Crago gave me invaluable assistance while correcting the proofs.

INTRODUCTION

It was in the early summer of 1906 that Violet Bonham Carter first met Winston Churchill: an encounter which left an "indelible im­pression" upon her. "I found myself," she recalled,

sitting next to this young man who seemed to me quite different from any other young man I had ever met. For a long time he remained sunk in abstraction. Then he appeared to become aware of my existence. He tumed on me a lowering gaze and asked me abruptly how old I was. I replied that I was nineteen. HAnd I," he said almost despairingly, "am thirty-two already. Younger than anyone else who counts, though," he added, as if to comfort himself. Then savagely: "Curse ruthless time! Curse our own mortality! How cruelly short is the allotted span for all we must cram into it!" And he burst forth into an eloquent diatribe on the shortness of human life, the immensity of possible human accomplishment - a theme so well exploited by the poets, prophets and philosophers of all ages that it might seem difficult to invest it with a new life and startling significance. Yet for me he did so, in a torrent of magnificent language which appeared to be both effortless and inexhaustible and ended up with the words I shall always remember: "We are all worms. But I do believe that I am a glow worm." 1

What a striking affirmation of confidence in one's own destiny! And yet, implicit in Churchill's revealing remark was a gnawing doubt of the value of his life and accomplishments, manifested in the self­abnegation of, "We are all worms." There was little comfort to be found in the signal political pre-eminence won at so early an age, or in the glittering achievements that had already marked his public life. All these were but poor compensation for his lack of self-esteem.

To a degree extraordinary for even Victorian times, Churchill was as a child, deprived of parental affection and sympathetic understand­ing. For all practical purposes he might very well have been an orphan. His parents, totally preoccupied with the sparkling society and politics of late Victorian England, took little interest in his schooling or, indeed,

1 Violet Bonham Carter, Winston Chu,chill As I Knew Him (London, Reprint Society, 1966), pp. 15-16.

x INTRODUCTION

in the boy hirnself. His father, for whom, nevertheless, he had the highest admiration, was so remote that the twelve year old Winston had no idea what school Lord Randolph had attended. 2 And instead of the affectionate affirmations of ability, and satisfaction and re­joicing in his success - which are all so important to the establishment of youthful self-esteem - Winston received consistent rebukes from his father, culminating in a most formidable letter in August 1893. Intensely disappointed by his son's failure to win an infantry (as distinct from a cavalry) place at Sandhurst, Lord Randolph denounced his performance as discreditable, and admonished hirn for writing in a "tone of exultation over your inclusion in the Sandhurst list." There was every possibility, he continued, that unless Winston was able to abandon "the idle and unprofitable life" of his schooldays, he would become "a mere social wastrel," and "degenerate into a shabby, unhappy and futile existence." "I no longer," he concluded bitterly, "attach the slightest weight to anything you may say about your own acquirements and exploits." 3 It is not difficult to imagine how cruelly this final rebuke must have struck the young ChurchilL His tutor, travelling with hirn in Switzerland, at the time when the letter was received, reported that Winston was "a good deal depressed."4 Yet only a few days later, this depression was dispelled as Churchill's at­tention began to turn toward the opportunities that Sandhurst would provide to shape his future, and indulge his ambition. 5

For a man given to speIls of such intense depression, these moments of introspective contemplation were unbearable, and had to be avoided at all costs. So like Savrola, the hero of his youthful novel, Churchill sought to combat his bouts of melancholia by rivetting his attention to the all-significant present, and pursuing the matter in hand in a burst of the most furious, aIl-engrossing activity.

"Vehment, high and daring" was the cast of his mind. The life he lived was the only one he could ever live; he must go on to the end. The end comes early to such men, whose spirits are so wrought that they know rest only in action, contentment only in danger, and in confusion find their only peace. 6

2 Randolph ChurchiIl, Winston S. Churchill (London, 1966-69). Companion Vol. I, Pt. i, pp. 143-4 (Winston Churchill to Lord Randolph Churchill, 8 October 1887). Hereafter, companion volumes are differentiated from main volumes by the addition of the prefix "C," e.g., CI/i.

3 ibid., CI/i, pp. 390-1 (9 August 1893). 4 ibid., CI/i, p. 397 (J. D. G. Little to Lord Randolph ChurchiIl, 19 August 1893). 5 ibid., CI/i, pp. 394-5 (Winston ChurchiII to Lady Randolph Churchill, 14 August 1893). 8 Winston Churchill, Savl'ola (London, Beacon Books, 1967), pp. 36-7. The novel was

written during 1897-8 in an attempt to exploit the demand for adventure stories, modelIed on the recently popularized "Ruritanian" romance, the Pl'isoner 01 Zenda (1894). Bryan

INTRODUCTION XI

The extraordinary tenacity which Churchill brought to support his

often audacious designs, the sense of urgency that underlay every

action, was a further consequence of this seemingly endless battle

with the "Black Dog."7 Convinced that he had but a short time to

make his mark upon history, he struggled relentlessly to win public

recognition and approval for hirnself and his country.8

Throughout his life, Churchill was dogged by this lingering fear of

failure. "What an awful thing it will be," he wrote to his mother in

January 1899, "if I don't come off. It will break my heart."9 In par­

ticular, he was concerned lest history judge hirn to be an unworthy

successor to a family inheritance which was synonymous with the

most notable triumphs of British military and politicalleadership.l0

Magee, "Churchill's Novel," Encounter, xxv (October 1965), pp. 45-51, has demonstrated that because Churchill's identification with his hero is so complete, the novel offers a rich source for the study of Churchill's attitudes on a whole range of issues.

7 Although many of Churchill's friends and admirers had noticed the depressive element in his makeup, its importance was not generally recognized until Lord Moran's diaries were published. See, for example, C. E. M. load, "Churchill the Philosopher," in Charles Eade (ed.), Churchill by his Contempol'aries (London, Reprint Society, 1955), pp. 327-8, 332. In­c1uded in Moran's book were some conversations with Churchill about the "Black Dog," and various notes and observations which clearly demonstrated the impact of these fits of depression on his behaviour. Charles Wilson (Lord Moran), Winston Churchill: the Struggle lor Survival, I940-I96S (London, 1966), pp. 99-101, 129 (Diary entry, 17 November 1943), 167 (Diary entry, 14 August 1944). Moran's conclusions have been endorsed by Anthony Storr, "Churchill the Man," in A. ]. P. Taylor, et. al., Churchill: Foul' Faces anti the Man (London, 1969), pp. 204-246, who has attempted - perhaps not entiIely successfully - to apply various psycho-analytical techniques to the available evidence.

Some of Churchill's war-time associates, most notably his Assistant Private Secretary, Sir lohn Colville - who has devoted a not inconsiderable section of a long essay to attacking Moran's "breach of confidence" in publishing his book - have maintained that Churchill was no more prone to depression than any other "normal" human being. It is, Colville asserts, quite erroneous to suggest that Churchill "suffered from long fits of depression." lohn Col­ville in lohn W. Wheeler-Bennett (ed.), Action This Day: Working with Churchill (London, 1968), pp. II6-7. Yet Colville has perhaps not realized that Moran's thesis, implied if not explicit, is that for most of his life, Churchill was successful in dispelling his bouts of depres­sion. It was only with growing physical and mental deterioration, which hampered attempts to fully engross his attention, that Churchill's last years were marked by increasing and deepening despair. Moran, op. cU., pp. 600, 745-6.

8 "November 30th, 1899. I am 25 today," he wrote in a postscript to his American friend Bourke Cockran, "it is terrible to think how little time remains." Randolph Churchill, Winston S. ChufChill, CI/ii, p. 1084.

9 ibid., CI/ii, pp. 1002-3 (Winston Churchill to Lady Randolph Churchill, II ]anuary 1899).

10 "If there was one thing that marked him off from comparable political figures in history", Clement Attlee wrote in Churchill's obituary, "it was his characteristic way of standing back and looking at himself - and his country - as he believed history would. He was always, in effect, asking himself, 'How will I look if I do this or that?' And 'What must Britain do now so that the verdict of history wi11 be favourable ?'" An OBSERVER Appreci­ation: ChUfChill by his Contemporaries (London, 1965), pp. 22-3.

It was Churchill's firm belief that, with passage of time, there would become available enough evidence to permit a judgment of the value of any given statesman, in both moral and political terms, and that this judgment would represent the verdict of History. Thus, in his "Armistice Dream" of what might have been, Churchill pictures President Wilson

XII INTRODUCTION

His distinguished ancestor, John Churchill, first Duke of Marlborough, had made the largest contribution by giving Britain the commanding position in European affairs which had previously belonged to France's mighty Sun King.ll Succeeding members of the Churchill family had likewise taken a worthy part in sustaining their country's fortunes, and guiding its destinies. Winston Churchill's grandfather, the seventh Duke, had been a friend of Disraeli, and a member of his Cabinet as Lord President of the Council, later becoming Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. His own father had been Chancellor of the Exchequer in Salisbury's Government, and had earlier been an especially effective opposition spokesman, when Gladstone's last ministry had been in power. This intimate connection with the most glorious phases of Britain's past explains Churchill's passionate faith in his country's greatness: a conviction whieh provided a guide for action and leader­ship, and moulded his responses to the politieal and diplomatie situ­ations of the present.

In his view, Britain's greatness had been manifested onee again in the remarkable efflorescenee of genius and energy that had marked her leadership of the grand eoalition which had won victory in the Great War.

The conclusion of the Great War raised England to the highest position she has yet attained. For the fourth time in four successive centuries she had headed and sustained the resistance of Europe to a military tyranny; and for the fourth time the war had ended leaving the group of smaIl states of the Low Countries, for whose protection England had declared war, in fuIl independence. Spain, the French monarchy, the French Empire and the German Empire had all overrun and sought to dominate these regions. During 400 years England had withstood them all by war and policy, and all had been defeated and driven out. To that list of mighty sovereigns and supreme Military Lords which already included Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon, there could now be added the name of William II of Germany. These four great series of events, directed unswervingly to the same end through so many generations and all crowned with success, constitute arecord of persistency and achievement without parallel in the history of ancient or modern times.12

asking "himself what his position would be in history if he pledged the faith of his country without warrant ... " And again, of Lloyd George: "'History will judge my record and will not find it unworthy.''' Winston Churchill, The WOl'ld Cl'isis, V: The Aftel'math (London, 1929), pp. 22-3. In his biography of the first Duke of Marlborough, Churchill makes judg­ments of the hero's military and personal conduct in terms of an external standard of his own, and clearly regards these as definitive. To this extent, he appears as a firm adherent to the Whig dicta of Lord Acton, although in the Marlborough book, family piety seems to have softened the severity of his judgment. See Winston Churchill, Mal'lborough, His Life and Times (London, 1947), Book I, Chps 2-3; Maurice Ashley, Chul'chill as Histol'ian (London, 1968), p. 19·

11 Winston Churchill, Mal'Zborough, Book I, pp. 5 IO-II ; Book H, p. 491. 12 Winston Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 17.

INTRODUCTION XIII

In seeking to restore liberty to these small states, in liberating Europe from the threat of domination by a single power, Churchill believed Britain was fulfilling her natural destinies, and sustaining the Whig tradition he so highly prized.

Naturally enough, Churchill conceived Britain's role in the post­Versailles world in terms commensurate with this image of British power and position. Succeeding chapters will reveal how his attempts to influence and control foreign policy derived from his concern to maintain Britain's world position. Because this was in large measure founded upon her continued prosperity, his efforts were directed to­wards the stabilization of the European political situation, and the reconstruction of the German economy. At the same time, the mainte­nance of Britain's pre-eminence involved the exercise of her peculiar responsibility to exert her influence in shaping the European settle­ment. Comparatively isolated, and with a might that was unbuttressed by entangling alliances, Britain seemed perfectly equipped to mediate between France and Germany. Indeed, since only Britain enjoyed such confidence and respect, Churchill believed that she alone would be able to strike a new balance in Europe, by giving France security and Germany reassurance.

In order to translate these conceptions into policy, Churchill needed a strong political base in the Cabinet and the Commons. Yet in a fashion reminiscent of the first Duke of Marlborough, he was fairly oblivious to party loyalties, and inclined to regard hirnself as a "National Minister, secure of support from all men of goodwill." 13

Such behaviour provoked resentment among both Conservatives and Liberals, and reinforced their existing conviction that he would not scruple to sacrifice principle and allegiance to his insatiable ambition. Like so many others, the leader of the Conservatives, Andrew Bonar Law, regarded hirn with a bitterness verging on contempt, and never did justice to his ability to hold resolutely to his fundamental princi­ples.14 The Times likewise reflected this hostility when it charged, in

13 William Maxwell Aitken (Baron Beaverbrook), Politicians and the Wal' (London, 1960), pp. 26, 125, 234.

14 In September 1917, the right·wing Conservative periodical, Blackwood's Magazine, recalled a speech that Bonar Law had made a few years earlier, in which he savagely observed that Churchill "has had a comparitively short career, but it has been varied, and perhaps you think it is impossible that he can have any surprise in store for us. You are mistaken. There is still a surprise that he might give uso It would stagger humanity. I really thought it was coming. The thunderbolt will come when the First Lord of the Admiralty shows that he is ready on any question to sacrifice his ambition to his convictions." (pp. 402-3.)

To some extent, Bonar Law's attacks on Churchill were intended to discredit the Govern· ments in which he served. See, for example, speech at the Albert Hall, 26 ]anuary 19IZ,

XIV INTRODUCTION

September I9I6, that Churchill had left other parliamentarians to bear the burden of rendering "unobtrusive service" in the trenches, while he rushed back and forth to England, drawn by the lure of opportunity and advantage. Those "who aspire to lead the people," the leader contended, "should be absolutely free from all suspicion of caring for their own future. That is a suspicion of which Mr. Churchill has never been able to rid hirnself." 15

By itself, Churchill's defection to the Liberals would probably have been excused in time,16 had it not been for his relentless ambition, his youthful self-assertion, and aseries of reverses which led his colleagues to question his abilities. In particular, his abortive excursions into policy making meant that he was not just hated and distrusted, but also greatly feared, as a man with a powerful yet unbalanced mind, who would bring disaster to hirnself and any govemment in which

quoted in Robert Blake, The Unknown P,ime Minister: the Life and Times 01 And,ew Bona, Law I8S8-I9Z3 (London, 1955), pp. 94-5. But the vituperation which he heaped on the head of his opponent was not simply a product of political expediency, but rather the consequence of a genuine feeling that Churchill was totaIly wicked. For Bonar Law, the critical demon­stration of Churchill's unscrupulous conduct had been the incident at the Curragh in March 1914, which he interpreted as a "plot" or "pogrom," master-minded by Churchill, in order to coerce Ulster into accepting the Home Rule Bill. Since he was descended from a long line of Ulster protestants, Bonar Law approached this question with aIl the fervour of a participant. Theevidenceon which he based his claim was little more substantial than the fact that passages dealingwith Ireland in Churchill's Bradford speech (14 March) had revealed what The Times de­scribed as a "change of tone." The Times, 16 March 1914. Leader: "Mr Churchill's Change of Tone." The leading advocate of conciliation for Ulster, Churchill had sought a compromise with exceptional zeal. "My personal view had always been that I would never coerce Ulster to make her come under a Dublin Parliament, but I would do aIl that was necessary to prevent her stopping the rest of Ireland from having the Government they desired. I still believe," he asserted in the Wo,Zd C,isis, "that this was sound and right, and in support of it I was prepared to maintain the authority of the Crown and Parliament under the Consti­tution by whatever means were necessary. I spoke in this sense at Bradford." Winston Churchill, The Warld C,isis (London, Odhams, n.d., [1950]), v. I, p. 146. But, alas, he chose his words with less caution than the situation demanded, and his warning, which was under­taken with the fuIl consent of his coIleagues, seemed most ominous. The Times was according­Iy quick to insinuate that Churchill had taken this action of his own accord, and pointed to his increasing interest in lrish affairs. Bonar Law similarly drew attention to the involvement of Churchill, when he told the House of Commons of his belief in the existence of a plot (23 March). It is not easy to see what evidence led them to draw such conclusions, but their suspicions were greatly heightened by Geoffrey Dawson's discovery that Churchill had ordered the 3rd Battle Squadron to Lamlash. John Evelyn Wrench, Geol/,ey Dawson and Ou, Times (London, 1955), p. 99. In a leader on 25 March, Dawson predicted that he would hardly be surprised "if it is not established that naval as weIl as military preparations formed part of the enterprise." The Times, 25 March 1914. Leader: "The Plot that Failed." Dawson further charged that the Prime Miuister and his "more responsible coIleagues" were clearly not involved, and attributed leadership of the "plot" to Churchill alone. For his own part, Bonar Law was genuinely convinced of Churchill's responsibility for the "plot" and, as his biographer has shown, was not simply paying lip-service to the idea in order to attack Asquith's administration. Blake, ap. eil., p. 205.

U The Times, 13 September 1916. Leader: "Service Members." 18 Churchill had left the Unionist Party on the issue of Free Trade, in 1904.

INTRODUCTION xv

he served.17 Because of his single-minded pursuit of some chosen objective - his total preoccupation with the success of the matter in hand - Churehill's sense of proportion was severely disturbed. In consequenee, he failed frequently to gauge the relative importanee of the problems laid before him, and failed to see their inter-relations and ultimate consequences. In laying plans for a military operation, his consideration ot many crucial problems was apt to be somewhat fragmentary, sinee his whole attention was direeted towards the speedy realization of his complete proposal. In planning the assault on the Dardanelles, he did not encourage his colleagues to assess the viability of his strategie coneeptions in view of existing resourees or ultimate national objectives. Fired from the beginning by the First Lord's untramelled enthusiasm, Asquith's War Couneil allowed itself to drift into an extensive eommitment without any attempt at far-reaehing analysis or assessment. Since no effort was made to test the soundness of Churehill's claim that an amphibious landing of troops might be aeeomplished at Gallipoli with ease, no measures were taken to eurtail the hazards that were involved.18 In some degree, the conduet of the entire operation condemns the method by which war was waged under Asquith's administration, with its inadequate system of strategie eontrol and direetion, whieh gave too great a seope for strong person­alities to earve up responsibility in both planning and eommand.19

Yet at the same time, Churchill eannot be absolved from a eonsiderable load of responsibility. Not only did he urge eolleagues into hasty and ill-eonsidered decisions, but he hampered attempts to consider problems whieh he - as the principal advocate of the proposal- should have given his attention.zo The Times, on 16 November 1915, was not unfair in pointing to the very large part played by Mr Churchill's impetuous personality in all these transactions. We see a minister able, courageous, daring, with his eyes fixed on the end to be achieved, and eager to attempt what he himself calls a "gamble," and we see also a number of sailors, perhaps a little overbome by his eagemess, willing to think the attempt might succeed and most unwilling to thwart an enthusiastic minister. 21

17 See, for example, the attacks by Lord Charles Beresford and Lord Robert Cecil, in the course of their speeches at a Unionist rally at Hyde Park, 4 April 1914. Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Chu,chill, Ir, quoted p. 501.

18 Robert Rhodes ]ames, ChurchiU: a Study in Failure, I90o-I939 (London, 1970), pp. 75-6; Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill (London, 1971- ), Vol. III, I9I4-I9I6, pp. 262-5, 294-6, 3II•

19 lohn Ehrman, Cabinet Government and War, I89Q-I940 (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 59-61. 80 Sources cited in n. 18 (above); Trumbull Higgins, Winston Chu,chiU and the Da,danelles

(London, 1963). pp. 91-4. 11 The Times, 16 November 1915. Leader: uMr Churchill's Statement."

XVI INTRODUCTION

Five months earlier, Churchill had written to Sir Maurice Hankey, defending his part in the conduct of the Dardanelles operation. "No one knows better than you the difficulties of carrying through a posi­tive enterprise with only partial control. If I have erred," he observed with rare insight, "it has been in seeking to attempt an initiative without being sure that all the means and powers to make it successful were at my disposal." 22 In this last sentence, Churchill pinpointed the shortcoming that repeatedly frustrated his seemingly endless attempts to carry a host of plans and proposals into reality. Because of his undoubted versatility, he was able to readily (if somewhat superficially) master much of the specialized detail of whatever portfolio was given into his charge; an endowment that also enabled hirn to extend his interest to matters like foreign affairs, which he found especially congenial and quite accessible, through the memoranda and dis­patches which the Foreign Office circulated to Cabinet members. These efforts to shape policy in an area beyond the competence of his own department were particularly resented, so that his initiatives were frequently undertaken in the face of overt opposition from the re­sponsible minister, and colleagues who were less miscellaneously gifted.23 Blackwood' s Magazine captured these feelings nicely in its September I9I7 article, which assailed Churchill as a "mere politician," lacking in specialist abilities: a "jack of all trades and master of none," who would "wriggle by the methods familiar to hirn and to us, into the narrow circle of the War Cabinet."24

In spite of these rather formidable handicaps, Churchill was able, in the years between the conclusion of the Armistice and the fall of the Coalition, to assurne a leading - though informal - role in the foreign policy making process. Often his counsel was ignored, and frequently it was decisively rejected, but tor all this, he emerged as the foremost exponent of an alternative German policy to that pursued by the Prime Minister. And while events would demonstrate that this policy could never offer a feasible substitute for Lloyd George's rather ineffectual attempts at European reconstruction, Churchill's largely

22 Gilbert, Winston S. ChurchiZl, Companion Vol. III, Pt. ii, pp. 984-5 (Winston Churchill to Maurice Hankey, 2 June 1915).

23 C. P. Snow, Variety 01 Men (London, 1967), p. 123; Compton Mackenzie, My Lile and Times, Octave 5: I9I5-I9z3 (London, 1966), p. ISO; Randolph Churchill, Lord Derby: King 01 Lancashi,e (New York, 1960), quoted pp. 281-2, 283-5 (Lord Derby to Sir Philip Sassoon, marked "not sent", 22 ]uly 1917; "Record by Lord Derby of what has passed in the last few days in regard to Mr Winston Churchill", 18 August 1917).

24 "Mr Winston Churchill", Blackwood's Magazine, September 1917, p. 407.

INTRODUCTION XVII

abortive efforts to secure its adoption significantly altered the shape of British policy.

The central concern of the chapters which follow is to examine this intervention, and elucidate the principles and assumptions that under­lay Churchill's attempts to achieve a settlement of the German question, during the years immediately following the conclusion of the Great War. At the same time, these pages seek to shed some light on Churchill's methods of approaching policy making and administration in general.