Battle in Berlin

The battle in Berlin was an end phase of the Battle ofBerlin. While the Battle of Berlin encompassed the at-tack by three Soviet Army Groups to capture not onlyBerlin but the territory of Germany east of the River Elbestill under German control, the battle in Berlin details theghting and German capitulation that took place withinthe city.The outcome of the battle to capture the capital of theThird Reich was decided during the initial phases of theBattle of Berlin that took place outside the city. As theSoviets invested Berlin and the German forces placed tostop them were destroyed or forced back, the citys fatewas sealed. Nevertheless, there was much heavy ghtingwithin the city as the Red Army fought its way, street bystreet, into the centre.On 23 April 1945, the rst Soviet ground forces startedto penetrate the outer suburbs of Berlin. By 27 April,Berlin was completely cut o from the outside world. Thebattle in the city continued until 2 May 1945. On thatdate, the commander of the Berlin Defence Area, Gen-eral HelmuthWeidling, surrendered to the commander ofthe Soviet 8th Guards Army, Lieutenant-General VasilyChuikov. Chuikov was a constituent of Marshal GeorgiyZhukovs 1st Belorussian Front.

1 Prelude

1.1 Battle of the Oder-Neisse

Main article: Battle of the Oder-Neisse

The sector in which most of the ghting in the overallbattle took place was the Seelow Heights, the last majordefensive line outside Berlin. The Battle of the SeelowHeights was one of the last pitched battles of World WarII. It was fought over four days, from 16 April until 19April 1945. Close to onemillion Soviet soldiers andmorethan 20,000 tanks and artillery pieces were in action tobreak through the Gates to Berlin which was defendedby about 100,000 German soldiers and 1,200 tanks andguns.On 19 April, the fourth day, the 1st Belorussian Frontbroke through the nal line of the Seelow Heights andnothing but broken German formations lay between themand Berlin. Marshal Ivan Konevs 1st Ukrainian Fronthaving captured Forst the day before, was fanning out intoopen country. One powerful thrust was heading north-

west towards Berlin while other armies headed west to-wards a section of United States Army front line south-west of the city who were on the Elbe.By the end of 19 April the German eastern front linenorth of Frankfurt around Seelow and to the south aroundForst had ceased to exist. These breakthroughs allowedthe two Soviet fronts to envelop the German IX Armyin a large pocket east of Frankfurt. Attempts by the IXArmy to break out to the west would result in the Battleof Halbe.[4][5] The cost to the Soviet forces had been veryhigh between 1 and 19April, with over 2,807 tanks lost,[6]including at least 727 at the Seelow Heights.

1.2 Encirclement of Berlin

Main article: Battle of Berlin Encirclement of Berlin

On 20 April, Adolf Hitlers birthday, Soviet artilleryof the 79 Rie Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front rstshelled Berlin. Thereafter, Soviet artillery continued thebombardment of Berlin and did not stop until the citysurrendered. After the war, the Soviets pointed out thatthe weight of explosives delivered by their artillery dur-ing the battle was greater than the tonnage dropped bythe Western Allied bombers on the city.[7][8] The 1st Be-lorussian Front advanced towards the east and north-eastof the city.The 1st Ukrainian Front had pushed through the lastformations of the northern wing of General FerdinandSchrner's Army Group Centre and had passed north ofJuterbog, well over halfway to the American front line onthe river Elbe atMagdeburg. To the north between Stettinand Schwedt, Konstantin Rokossovsky's 2nd BelorussianFront attacked the northern ank of General GotthardHeinrici's Army Group Vistula, held by Hasso von Man-teuel's III Panzer Army.[5]

By 24 April, elements of the 1st Belorussian Front andthe 1st Ukrainian Front had completed the encirclementof the city.[9]

The next day, 25 April, the 2nd Belorussian Frontbroke through III Panzer Armys line around the bridge-head south of Stettin and crossed the Rando Swamp.They were now free to move west towards the British21st Army Group and north towards the Baltic port ofStralsund. The Soviet 58th Guards Division of Zhadovs5th Guards Armymade contact with the US 69th InfantryDivision of the First Army near Torgau, Germany, on the

1

2 3 TACTICS AND TERRAIN

Elbe River.[10] The Soviet investment of Berlin was con-solidated with leading units probing and penetrating theS-Bahn defensive ring. By the end of 25 April, there wasno prospect that the German defence of the city could doanything but temporarily delay the capture of the capi-tal by the Soviets as the decisive stages of the battle hadalready been fought and lost by the Germans ghting out-side the city.[11]

2 PreparationSee also: Order of battle for the battle in Berlin

On 20 April, Hitler ordered and theWehrmacht initiated"Clausewitz", which called for the complete evacuationof allWehrmacht and SS oces in Berlin; this essentiallyformalized Berlins status as a frontline city.[12]

The forces available to Artillery General Helmuth Wei-dling for the citys defence included several severely de-pleted Wehrmacht and Waen-SS divisions, in all about45,000 men. These formations were supplemented by thepolice force, boys in the compulsory Hitler Youth, andthe Volkssturm.[lower-alpha 3] Many of the 40,000 elderlymen of the Volkssturm had been in the army as youngmen and some were veterans of World War I. Hitler ap-pointed SS-Brigadefhrer Wilhelm Mohnke commanderof the citys central government district. Mohnkes com-mand post was in bunkers under the Reich Chancellery.The core group of his ghtingmen were the 800membersof the Leibstandarte (1st SS-Pz.Div. LSSAH) Guard Bat-talion (assigned to guard the Fhrer).[13] He had a total ofover 2,000 men under his command.[lower-alpha 4]

Weidling organised the defences into eight sectors des-ignated 'A' to 'H', each commanded by a colonel or ageneral, but most had no combat experience.[1] The XXInfantry Division was to the west of the city; the IXParachute Division to the north; the Panzer DivisionMncheberg (WernerMummert) to the north-east; the XISS Panzergrenadier DivisionNordland (Joachim Ziegler)to the south-east; and to the east of Tempelhof Air-port. The reserve, 18th Panzergrenadier Division, wasin Berlins central district.[14]

3 Tactics and terrainA Soviet combat group was a mixed arms unit of abouteighty men in assault groups of six to eight soldiers,closely supported by eld artillery. These were tacticalunits which were able to apply the tactics of house tohouse ghting that they had been forced to develop andrene at each Festungsstadt (fortress city) they had en-countered from Stalingrad.[15]

The German tactics used for urban warfare in Berlinwere dictated by three considerations: the experience

Berlin apartment blocks

that they had gained during ve years of war, the phys-ical characteristics of the city, and the methods used bythe Soviets. Most of the central districts of Berlin con-sist of city blocks with straight wide roads and containseveral waterways, parks and large railway marshallingyards. It is a predominantly at area, with some lowhills such as the Kreuzberg, which is 66 m above sealevel.[16][lower-alpha 5][lower-alpha 6][lower-alpha 7] Much of thehousing stock consisted of apartments blocks built in thesecond half of the 19th century. Most of those, thanksto housing regulations and few elevators, were ve storieshigh and built around a courtyard that could be reachedfrom the street through a corridor large enough to accom-modate a horse and cart or a small delivery truck. Inmanyplaces, these apartment blocks were built around severalcourtyards, one behind the other, each reached throughthe outer courtyards by a ground level corridor similar tothat between the rst courtyard and the road. The larger,more expensive ats faced the street while the smaller,more modest dwellings were grouped around the innercourtyards.[17][lower-alpha 8]

Just as the Soviets had learned a lot about urban war-fare, so had the Germans. The Waen-SS did not usemakeshift barricades erected close to street corners, be-cause these could be raked by artillery re from guns r-ing over open sights further along the straight streets. In-stead, they put snipers and machine guns on the upperoors and roofs because the Soviet tanks could not el-evate their guns that high, and simultaneously they putmen armed with panzerfausts in cellar windows to am-bush tanks as they moved down the streets. These tacticswere quickly adopted by the Hitler Youth and the FirstWorld War Volkssturm veterans.[18]

Initially Soviet tanks advanced down the middle of thestreets, but to counter the German tactics, they alteredtheir own and started to hug the sides of the streets (thisallowed for supporting cross-re from tanks either side ofthe wider thoroughfares).[19] The Soviets also mountedsub-machine gunners on the tanks who sprayed every

4.1 Outer suburbs 3

A devastated street in the city centre, 3 July 1945

doorway and window, but this meant the tank could nottraverse its turret quickly. Another solution was to rely onheavy howitzers (152 mm and 203 mm) ring over opensights to blast defended buildings and to use anti-aircraftguns against the German gunners on the higher oors. So-viet combat groups started to move from house to houseinstead of directly down the streets. They moved throughthe apartments and cellars, blasting holes through thewalls of adjacent buildings (making eective use of aban-doned German panzerfausts), while others fought acrossthe rooftops and through the attics. These enlading tac-tics took the Germans lying in ambush for tanks in theanks. Flamethrowers and grenades proved to be very ef-fective, but as the Berlin civilian population had not beenevacuated, these tactics inevitably killed many.[18]

4 Battle

4.1 Outer suburbs

With the decisive stages of the battle being fought outsidethe city, Berlins fate was sealed, yet the resistance insidecontinued.[11] On 23 April, Hitler appointed German Ar-tillery General (General der Artillerie) Helmuth Weidlingcommander of the Berlin Defence Area.[20] Only a dayearlier, Hitler had ordered that Weidling be executed byring squad. This was due to a misunderstanding con-cerning a retreat order issued by Weidling as commanderof the LVI Panzer Corps. On 20 April, Weidling hadbeen appointed commander of the LVI Panzer Corps.Weidling replaced Lieutenant-Colonel (Oberstleutnant)Ernst Kaether as commander of Berlin. Only one dayearlier, Kaether had replaced Lieutenant-General (Gen-eralleutnant) Helmuth Reymann, who had held the posi-tion for only about a month.

By 23 April, some of Chuikovs rie units had crossedthe Spree and Dahme rivers south of Kpenick and by24 April were advancing towards Britz and Neuklln.Accompanying them were the leading tanks of Colonel-General Mikhail Katukovs 1st Guards Tank Army.Sometime after midnight, a corps of Colonel-GeneralNikolai Berzarins 5th Shock Army crossed the Spreeclose to Treptow Park. At dawn on 24 April the LVIPanzer Corps still under Weidlings direct command,counterattacked, but were severely mauled by the 5thShock Army, which was able to continue its advancearound mid-day.[21] Meanwhile, the rst large Sovietprobe into the city was put into operation. Katukovs 1stGuards Tank Army attacked across the Teltow Canal. At06:20 a bombardment by 3,000 guns and heavy mortarsbegan (a staggering 650 pieces of artillery per kilometerof front). At 07:00 hours the rst Soviet battalions wereacross, to be followed by tanks around 12:00, shortly af-ter the rst of the pontoon bridges were completed. Bythe evening Treptow Park was in Soviet hands and theyhad also reached the S-Bahn.[22]

While the ghting raged in the south-east of the city, be-tween 320 and 330 French volunteers commanded bySS-Brigadefhrer Gustav Krukenberg and organised asSturmbataillon (assault battalion) Charlemagne wereattached to XI SS Panzergrenadier Division Nordland.They moved from the SS training ground near Neustrelitzto the centre of Berlin through the western suburbs, whichapart from unmanned barricades across the Havel andSpree were devoid of fortications or defenders. Of allthe reinforcements ordered to Berlin that day, only thisSturmbataillon arrived.[11][23]

The location of Neuklln

On 25 April, Krukenberg was appointed commander ofDefence Sector C which included the Nordland Division,whose previous commander, Joachim Ziegler, was re-lieved of his command the same day. The arrival of theFrench SS men bolstered the Nordland Division whoseNorge andDanmark regiments had been decimated in theghting. Just midday as Krukenberg reached his com-mand, the last German bridgehead south of the Teltow

4 4 BATTLE

Canal was being abandoned. During the night Kruken-berg informed General Hans Krebs, Chief of the GeneralSta of Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) that within 24hours the Nordland would have to fall back to the centralsector Z (Z for Zentrum or Mitte).[24][lower-alpha 9]

Soviet combat groups of the 8th Guards Army and the 1stGuards Tank Army fought their way through the southernsuburbs of Neuklln towards Tempelhof Airport whichwas located just inside the S-Bahn defensive ring. De-fending Sector D was Panzer DivisionMncheberg. Thisdivision, down to its last dozen tanks and thirty armouredpersonnel carriers (APC)s, had been promised replace-ments for battle losses but only stragglers and Volkssturmwere available to ll the ranks. The Soviets advancedcautiously, using amethrowers to overcome defensivepositions. By dusk Soviet T-34 tanks had reached theaireld, only six kilometres (four miles) south of theFhrerbunker, where they were checked by sti Germanresistance. The Mncheberg Division managed to holdthe line until the afternoon of the next day, but this wasthe last time they were able to check the Soviet advancefor more than a few hours.[25][26]

On 26 April, with Neuklln heavily penetrated by So-viet combat groups, Krukenberg prepared fallback posi-tions for Sector C defenders around Hermannplatz. Hemoved his headquarters into the opera house. The twounderstrength German divisions defending the south-eastwere now facing ve Soviet armies. From east to westthey were: the 5th Shock Army, advancing from Trep-tow Park; the 8th Guards Army and the 1st GuardsTank Army moving through Neuklln north (temporar-ily checked at Tempelhof Airport), and Colonel-GeneralPavel Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army (part of Konevs1st Ukrainian Front) advancing from Mariendorf. As theNordland Division fell back towards Hermannplatz, theFrench SS and one-hundred Hitler Youth attached to theirgroup destroyed 14 Soviet tanks with panzerfausts; onemachine gun position by the Halensee bridge managedto hold up any Soviet advances in that area for 48 hours.The Nordlands remaining armour, eight Tiger tanks andseveral assault guns, were ordered to take up positionsin the Tiergarten, because although these two divisionsof Weidlings LVI Panzer Corps could slow the Sovietadvance, they could not stop it.[27] SS-OberscharfhrerSchmidt recalled, I was assigned as platoon leader of a'dwindled company' which included a squad of Hungar-ian volunteers, Volkssturm men, Hitlerjungend, as well asmembers of the Heer [army]... Daily, the Russians ad-vanced closer to the government quarter, which we wereto defend. It became more and more dicult to hold theline 'under all circumstances...[28]

Hitler summoned Field Marshal Robert Ritter von GreimfromMunich to Berlin to take over command of the Ger-man Air Force (Luftwae) fromHermann Gring. Whileying over Berlin in a Fieseler Storch, von Greim wasseriously wounded by Soviet anti-aircraft re. HannaReitsch, his mistress and a crack test pilot, landed von

Greim on an improvised air strip in the Tiergarten nearthe Brandenburg Gate.[29][30][31]

At Tempelhof Airport, the ak batteries conducted di-rect re against advancing Soviet tanks until they wereoverrun.[32] On the following day, 27 April, 2,000 Ger-man women were rounded up and ordered to help clearTempelhof Airport of debris so that the Red Army AirForce could start to use it.[33] Marshal Zhukov appointedColonel-General Berzarin to start organising the Germancivil administration in the areas that they had captured.Brgermeisters, like the directors of the Berlin utilities,were summoned to appear before Berzarins sta.

4.2 Inner suburbs

As the Soviet armies of the 1st Belorussian Front andthe 1st Ukrainian Front converged on the centre of thecity there weremany accidental 'friendly re' incidents in-volving artillery shellings because the spotter planes andthe artillery of the dierent Soviet Fronts were not co-ordinated and frequently mistook assault groups in otherarmies as enemy troops. Indeed, the rivalry between theSoviet armies to capture the city centre was becoming in-tense. A corps commander of the 1st Ukrainian Frontjoked with laconic humour, Now we should be scarednot of the enemy, but of our neighbour... Theres nothingmore depressing in Berlin than learning about the suc-cesses of your neighbour. Beevor has suggested that therivalry went further than just jokes and says that Chuikovdeliberately ordered the left ank of the 8th Guards Army(of 1st Belorussian Front) across the front of the 3rdGuards Tank Army (of the 1st Ukrainian Front), block-ing its direct path to the Reichstag. As Chuikov did notinform Rybalko, commander of the 3rd Guards TankArmy, that the 8th was doing this, the troops ordered tocarry out this manoeuvre suered disproportionate casu-alties from friendly re.[34]

Humboldthain Flak Tower in 2004

In the south-west, Rybalkos 3rdGuards TankArmy, sup-ported by Lieutenant-General Luchinskys 28th Army,were advancing through the wooded park and suburbs

4.2 Inner suburbs 5

of the Grunewald, attacking what remained of the XVIIIPanzergrenadierDivision on their eastern ank and enter-ing Charlottenburg. In the south, Chuikovs 8th GuardsArmy and Katukovs 1st Guards Tank Army crossed theLandwehr Canal on 27 April, the last major obstacle be-tween them and theFhrerbunker next to the ReichChan-cellery less than two kilometres away (a little over a mile).In the south-east, Berzarins 5th Shock Army had by-passed the Friedrichshain ak tower and was now be-tween Frankfurter Allee and the south bank of the Spree,where its IX Corps was ghting.[14][35]

By 27 April the Soviet Armies had penetrated the Ger-mans S-Bahn outer defensive ring from all directions.The Germans had been forced back into a pocket abouttwenty-ve kilometres (fteen miles) long from west toeast and about three kiliometres (one and a half miles)wide at its narrowest, just west of the old city centre, nearthe Tiergarten. In the north-west, Lieutenant-GeneralF.I. Perkohorovitchs 47th Army was now approachingSpandau, and was also heavily involved in a battle to cap-ture Gatow aireld, which was defended by Volkssturmand Luftwae cadets using the feared 88mm anti-aircraftguns in their anti-tank role. In the north, Colonel-General Semyon Bogdanovs 2nd Guards Tank Armywas bogged down just south of Siemensstadt. Colonel-General Vasily Kuznetsovs 3rd Shock Army had by-passed the Humboldthain ak tower (leaving it to follow-up forces), and had reached the north of the Tiergartenand Prenzlauerberg.[14][35]

On the morning of 27 April, the Soviets continued theassault with a heavy bombardment of the inner city. The8th Guards Army and the 1st Guards TankArmywere or-dered to take Belle-Alliance-Platz (Belle-Alliance beingan alternative name for the Battle of Waterloo) that in atwist of history was defended by French SS soldiers of theNordland Division. That night Weidling gave a battle sit-uation report to Hitler, and presented him with a detailedbreakout plan which would be spearheaded with just un-der forty tanks (all the combat-ready German tanks avail-able in Berlin). Hitler rejected the plan, saying he wouldstay in the bunker and that Weidling would carry on withthe defence.[36]

In sector Z (centre) Krukenberg Nordland divisionalheadquarters was now a carriage in the Stadtmitte U-Bahnstation. The Nordlands armour was reduced to four cap-tured Soviet APCs and two half-tracks, so Krunebergsmens chief weapon was now the panzerfaust which wereused for close quarters battle against both Soviet armourand in house to house ghting against Soviet combatgroups.[37]

At dawn on 28 April, the youth divisions Clausewitz,Scharnhorst and Theodor Krner, attacked from thesouth-west in the direction of Berlin. They were partof Wencks XX Corps and were made up of men fromthe ocer training schools, making them some of thebest units the Germans had left. They covered a distance

of about 24 km (15 mi), before being halted at the tipof Lake Schwielow south-west of Potsdam and still 32km (20 mi) from Berlin.[38] In the evening of 28 April,the BBC broadcast a Reuters news report about HeinrichHimmler's attempted negotiations with the western Alliesthrough Count Folke Bernadotte in Luebeck. Upon beinginformed, Hitler ew into a rage and told those who werestill with him in the bunker complex that Himmlers actwas the worst treachery he had ever known.[39] Hitler or-dered von Greim and Reitsch to y to Karl Dnitz's head-quarters at Ploen and arrest the traitor Himmler.[29]

By 28 April, the Mncheberg Division had been drivenback to the Anhalter railway station less than 1 km (1,100yd) south of the Fhrerbunker. To slow the advancingSoviets, allegedly on Hitlers orders, the bulkheads un-der the Landwehr Canal were blown up. It caused panicin the U-Bahn tunnels under the Anhalter railway stationin which some were trampled to death. But the waterlevel only suddenly rose by about a metre (yard) and af-ter that much more slowly. Initially it was thought thatmany thousands had drowned, but when the tunnels werepumped out in October 1945 it was found that most ofthe bodies were of people who had died of their wounds,not from drowning.[40][lower-alpha 10] In any event, the So-viets continued their advance with three T-34s, making itas far asWilhelmstrasseU-Bahn station before being am-bushed and destroyed by the Frenchmen of the NordlandDivision.[41]

During 27 and 28 April, most of the formations ofKonevs 1st Ukrainian Front that were engaged in the Bat-tle in Berlin were ordered to disengage and proceed southto take part in the Prague Oensive (the last great oen-sive of the European theatre). This did not mitigate theirresentment at being denied the honour of capturing thecentre of Berlin, but left the 1st Belorussian Front un-der Marshal Zhukov to claim that honour for themselvesalone.[42]

By 28 April, the Germans were now reduced to a stripless than 5 km (3.1 mi) wide and 15 kilometres (9.3mi) in length, from Alexanderplatz in the east to Char-lottenburg and the area around the Olympic Stadium(Reichssportfeld) in the west. Generally, the Sovietsavoided ghting their way into tunnels and bunkers (ofwhich there were about 1,000 in the Berlin area); instead,they sealed them o and continued the advance. How-ever, just over 1 km (0.62mi) to the north of theReichstagthe 3rd Shock Army did use heavy guns at point blankrange to blast a hole in the walls of Moabit prison; aftera breach was made and the prison stormed, the garrisonthere quickly surrendered. The 3rd Shock Army were insight of the Victory Column in the Tiergarten and duringthe afternoon advanced towards the Moltke bridge overthe Spree, just north of the Ministry of the Interior anda mere 600 m (660 yd) from the Reichstag.[43] Germandemolition charges damaged the Moltke bridge but left itstill passable to infantry. As dusk fell and under heavyartillery bombardment, the rst Soviet troops crossed the

6 4 BATTLE

bridge. By midnight, the Soviet 150th and 171st rie di-visions had secured the bridgehead against any counter-attack the Germans could muster.[44]

4.3 CentreOn 28 April, Krebs made his last telephone call from theFhrerbunker. He called Field Marshal Wilhelm KeitelChief of OKW (German Armed Forces High Command)in Frstenberg. Krebs told Keitel that, if relief did not ar-rive within 48 hours, all would be lost. Keitel promisedto exert the utmost pressure on Generals Walther Wenck,commander of XII Army, and Theodor Busse, comman-der of the IX Army. Meanwhile, Martin Bormann wiredto German Admiral Dnitz: [the] Reich Chancellery(Reichskanzlei) [is] a heap of rubble.[29] He went on tosay that the foreign press was reporting fresh acts of trea-son and that without exception Schrner, Wenck and theothers must give evidence of their loyalty by the quickestrelief of the Fhrer.[38] Bormann was the head of theNazi Party Chancellery (Parteikanzlei) and Hitlers pri-vate secretary.During the evening, von Greim and Reitsch ew out fromBerlin in an Arado Ar 96 trainer. Von Greim was or-dered to get the Luftwae to attack the Soviet forces thathad just reached Potsdamerplatz and to make sure thatHimmler was punished.[lower-alpha 11] Fearing that Hitlerwas escaping in the plane, troops of the Soviet 3rd ShockArmy, which was ghting its way through the Tiergartenfrom the north, tried to shoot the Arado down. The So-viet troops failed in their eorts and the plane took osuccessfully.[40][45]

During the night of 28 April, Wenck reported to Keitelthat his XII Army had been forced back along the en-tire front. This was particularly true of XX Corps thathad been able to establish temporary contact with thePotsdam garrison. According to Wenck, no relief forBerlin by his army was now possible. This was evenmore so as support from the IX Army could no longerbe expected.[46] Keitel gave Wenck permission to breako his attempt to relieve Berlin.[38]

At 0400 hours on 29 April, in the Fhrerbunker, GeneralWilhelm Burgdorf, Goebbels, Krebs, and Bormann wit-nessed and signed the last will and testament of AdolfHitler. Hitler dictated the document to Traudl Junge,shortly after he had married Eva Braun.[47][lower-alpha 12]

After Rokossovskys 2nd Belorussian Front had brokenout of their bridgehead, General Gotthard Heinrici dis-obeyed Hitlers direct orders and allowed von Manteuf-fels request for a general withdrawal of the III PanzerArmy. By 29 April, Army Group Vistula Headquar-ters sta could no longer contact the IX Army, so therewas little in the way of coordination that Heinricis stacould still to do. As Heinrici had disobeyed a direct or-der from Hitler (in allowing von Manteuel to retreat),he was relieved of his command. However, von Man-

The Moltke bridge around 1900

teuel refused Keitels request that he take over, and al-though ordered to report toOberkommando der Wehrma-cht (OKW's or Armed Forces HighCommand) headquar-ters, Heinrici dallied and never arrived.[48] Keitel laterrecalled the incident in his memoirs and said that com-mand passed to the senior army commander of the XXIArmy, General Kurt von Tippelskirch.[49] Other sourcesclaim that von Tippelskirchs appointment was temporaryand only until the arrival of General Kurt Student,[50][51]but that Student was captured by the British and neverarrived.[29] Whether von Tippelskirch or Student or bothtook command, the rapidly deteriorating situation that theGermans faced, meant that ArmyGroup Vistulas coordi-nation of the armies under its nominal command duringthe last few days of the war were of little signicance.In the early hours of 29 April, the 150th and 171st Riedivisions started to fan out from the Moltke bridgeheadinto the surrounding streets and buildings. Initially theSoviets were unable to bring forward artillery, as the com-bat engineers had not had time to strengthen the bridgeor build an alternative. The only form of heavy weaponryavailable to the assault troops were individual 'Katyusha'rockets lashed to short sections of railway lines. Major-General V. M. Shatilov's 150th Rie Division had a par-ticularly hard ght, capturing the heavily fortied Min-istry of the Interior building. Lacking artillery, the menhad to clear it room by room with grenades and sub-machine guns.[52]

In the south-east at dawn on 29 April, Colonel Antonovs301st Rie Division pressed on with its assault. Aftervery heavy ghting, the formation managed to capturethe Gestapo headquarters on Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, buta Waen SS counter-attack forced the regiments of thedivision to withdraw from the structure. Still conned tothe building, seven inmates who had been spared in themassacre of other prisoners on 23 April.[41] To the south-west Chuikovs 8th Guards Army attacked north acrossthe Landwehr canal into the Tiergarten.[53]

The Nordland Division was now under Mohnkes cen-tral command. All the men were exhausted from days

4.3 Centre 7

and nights of continuous ghting. The Frenchmen ofthe Nordland had proved particularly good at destroy-ing tanks, of the 108 Soviet tanks knocked out in thecentral district, they had accounted for about half ofthem. That afternoon the last two Knights Crosses ofthe Third Reich were awarded; one went to FrenchmanEugne Vault, who had personally destroyed eight tanks,the other was awarded to SS-Sturmbannfhrer FriedrichHerzig, the commander of the 503 SS Heavy Panzer Bat-talion. Two other men received less prestigious awardsfor only knocking out ve tanks each.[54]

During the evening of 29 April, at Weidlings headquar-ters in the Bendlerblock, now within metres of the frontline, Weidling discussed with his divisional commanders,the possibility of breaking out to the south-west to linkup with the XII Army, whose spearhead had reachedthe village of Ferch in Brandenburg on the banks of theSchwielowsee near Potsdam. The breakout was plannedto start the next night at 22:00.[54] Late in the evening,Krebs contacted General Alfred Jodl (Supreme ArmyCommand) by radio: Request immediate report. Firstlyof the whereabouts of Wencks spearheads. Secondlyof time intended to attack. Thirdly of the location ofthe IX Army. Fourthly of the precise place in whichthe IX Army will break through. Fifthly of the where-abouts of General Rudolf Holste's spearhead.[46] In theearly morning of 30 April, Jodl replied to Krebs: Firstly,Wencks spearhead bogged down south of SchwielowLake. Secondly, XII Army therefore unable to continueattack on Berlin. Thirdly, bulk of IX Army surrounded.Fourthly, Holstes Corps on the defensive.[46][55][56][57]

By this time, several smaller Polish units had alreadytaken part in the battle in Berlin (such as the 1stPolish Motorized Mortar Brigade, the 6th Polish Mo-torised Pontoon Battalion, and the 2nd Polish HowitzerBrigade)[58][59] Soviet forces were lacking infantry sup-port, and armored units, without infantry support, weretaking heavy casualties.[60][61] As of 30 April, the So-viet forces were joined by the Polish 1st Tadeusz Ko-ciuszko Infantry Division after a request from the Sovietcommand for infantry reinforcements.[62][63] Originally,one infantry regiment was to support the 1st MechanisedCorps, and two, the 12th Guards Tank Corps; contraryto the original plan, two regiments (1st and 2nd) endedup supporting the 1st Corps, and only one (3rd) the 12thCorps.[64][65] The 3rd Polish Infantry Regiment was op-erating with the 66th Guards Tank Brigade of the 12thGuards Tank Corps.[60] The 1st Polish Infantry Regimentwas split up into combat teams supporting the 19thand 35th Mechanized Brigades, with the 2nd Polish In-fantry Regiment supporting the 219th Tank Brigade; allunits of the Soviet 1st Mechanized Corps.[60] Upon ar-rival, the Polish forces found that the Soviet units had suf-fered tremendous losses; the 19th and 35th MechanizedBrigades sustained over 90% casualties, and thus the Pol-ish 1st Infantry Regiment originally assigned to supportthem had to, in eect, take over their tasks.[60][66][67] The

Battle for the Reichstag

66th Guards Tank Brigade of the 12th Corps that re-ceived the 3rd Polish Infantry Regiment for support hadsimilarly taken heavy losses, having already lost 82 tanksdue to insucient infantry cover.[60][61]

4.3.1 Battle for the Reichstag

At 06:00 on 30 April the 150th Rie Division had stillnot captured the upper oors of the Ministry of the Inte-rior, but while the ghting was still going on, the 150thlaunched an attack from there across the 400 metres ofKnigsplatz towards the Reichstag. For the Soviets, theReichstag was the symbol of the Third Reich (ironically,it was never restored by the Nazis after the re); but it wasof such signicant value that the Soviets wanted to cap-ture it before theMayDay parade inMoscow. The assaultwas not an easy one. The Germans had dug a complicatednetwork of trenches around the building and a collapsedtunnel had lled with water from the Spree forming amoat across Knigsplatz. The initial infantry assault wasdecimated by cross re from the Reichstag and the KrollOpera House on the western side of Knigsplatz. By nowthe Spree had been bridged and the Soviets were ableto bring up tanks and artillery to support fresh assaultsby the infantry, some of which were tasked with out-anking the Opera House and attacking it from the north-west. By 10:00 the soldiers of the 150th had reached themoat, but accurate re from 12.8 cm guns, two kilome-tres away on the Berlin Zoo ak tower, prevented any

8 4 BATTLE

further successful advance across the moat during day-light. Throughout the rest of the day, as ninety artillerypieces, some as large as the 203 mm howitzer, as wellas Katyusha rocket launchers, bombarded the Reichstagand its defensive trenches. Colonel Negodas 171st RieDivision, on the left ank of the 150th, continued to cap-ture the buildings of the diplomatic quarter to the northof Knigsplatz.[68][69]

As the perimeter shrank and the surviving defenders fellback on the centre, they became concentrated. By now,there were about 10,000 soldiers in the city centre, whowere being assaulted from all sides. One of the othermainthrusts was along Wilhelmstrasse on which the Air Min-istry, whichwas built of reinforced concrete, was situated.It was pounded by large concentrations of Soviet artillery.The remaining German Tiger tanks of the Hermann vonSalza battalion took up positions in the east of the Tier-garten to defend the centre against the 3rd Shock Army(which, although heavily engaged around the Reichstag,was also anking the area by advancing through the north-ern Tiergarten) and the 8th Guards Army advancingthrough the south of the Tiergarten. These Soviet forceshad eectively cut the sausage-shaped area held by theGermans in half and made an escape to the west for thoseGerman troops in the centre much more dicult.[70]

During the morning, Mohnke informed Hitler the cen-tre would be able to hold for less than two days. Laterthat morning, Weidling informed Hitler in person that thedefenders would probably exhaust their ammunition thatnight and again asked Hitler permission to break out. Atabout 13:00, Weidling, who was back in his headquartersin the Bendlerblock, nally received Hitlers permissionto attempt a breakout.[71] During the afternoon, Hitlershot himself and Braun took cyanide.[72][73] In accor-dance with Hitlers instructions, the bodies were burnedin the garden of the Reich Chancellery.[74] In accordancewith Hitlers last will and testament, Joseph Goebbels,the Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda,became the new "Head of Government" and Chancellorof Germany (Reichskanzler). At 3:15 am, ReichskanzlerGoebbels and Bormann sent a radio message to AdmiralKarl Dnitz informing him of Hitlers death. Per Hitlerslast wishes, Dnitz was appointed as the new Presidentof Germany (Reichsprsident).Starting from 16:00 on 30 April, the 1st Battalion ofthe Polish 1st Regiment (assigned to the region of 35thMechanized Brigade) begun an assault on a barricade onPestalozzistrasse, a major obstacle which made previoustank attacks in that direction suicidal.[75] The Polish 2ndand 3rd Regiments cleared the path through the barri-cades on Goethestrasse and Schillerstrasse for the tanksof the Soviet 19th Brigade.[76]

Because of the smoke, dusk came early to the centre ofBerlin. At 18:00 hours, whileWeidling and his sta nal-ized their breakout plans in the Bendlerblock, three regi-ments of the Soviet 150th Rie Division, under cover of

a heavy artillery barrage and closely supported by tanks,assaulted theReichstag. All the windows were bricked up,but the soldiers managed to force the main doors and en-tered the main hall. The German garrison, of about 1,000defenders (a mixture of sailors, SS and Hitler Youth) reddown on the Soviets from above, turning the main hallinto a medieval style killing eld. Suering many casu-alties, the Soviets got beyond the main hall and startedto work their way up through the building. The re andsubsequent wartime damage had turned the buildings in-terior into a maze of rubble and debris amongst whichthe German defenders were strongly dug in.[77] The So-viet infantry were forced to clear them out. Fierce room-to-room ghting ensued.[78] As May Day approached So-viet troops reached the roof, but ghting continued in-side. Moscow claimed that they hoisted the Red Flag onthe top of the Reichstag at 22:50, however Beevor pointsout that this may have been an exaggeration as Sovietpropaganda was xated with the idea of the Reichstagbeing captured by 1 May.[77] Whatever the truth, theghting continued as there was still a large contingentof German soldiers down in the basement. The Ger-mans were well stocked with food and ammunition andlaunched counter-attacks against the Red Army, leadingto close ghting in and around the Reichstag.[78] Closecombat raged throughout the night and the coming dayof 1 May, until the evening when some German troopspulled out of the building and crossed the FriedrichstraeS-Bahn Station, where they moved into the ruins hoursbefore the main breakout across the Spree.[79] About 300of the last German combatants surrendered.[77] A further200 defenders were dead and another 500 were alreadyhors de combat, lying wounded in the basement, manybefore the nal assault had started.[77]

4.4 Capture of Charlottenburg

The barricade at Pestalozzistrasse was taken on the morn-ing of 1 May, allowing Soviet tanks of the 34th Brigadeto advance and to reestablish contact with the 19th Mech-anized Brigade supported by the 2nd and 3rd Battalion ofthe 1st Regiment, which pushed through the barricadesat Goethestrasse and Schillerstrasse.[75] Further, heav-ily fortied German positions in and around the churchat the Karl August-Platz were taken, allowing the Pol-ish and Soviet units to advance along the Goethestrasseand Schillerstrasse.[76] In the meantime, the Polish 2ndRegiment, with its own artillery support, took the heav-ily fortied Berlin Institute of Technology that was sit-uated in the triangle between Charlottenburgerstrasse,Hardenbergstrasse and Jebenstrasse.[80][81] With supportby the Polish 3rd Infantry Regiment, the Soviet 66thGuards Tank Brigade (which had only 15 tanks) brokethrough Franklinstrasse and advanced towards the Berlin-Tiergarten station.[82] The stronghold of the Tiergarten(S-Bahn) station was then secured by the 3rd InfantryRegiment.[83] Thereafter, Polish and Soviet units took

4.5 End of the battle 9

control of the Zoologischer Garten station and the railwayline between them. By these actions, the Red Army hadbroken through the central Berlin west line of defence.[84]

4.5 End of the battle

At about 04:00 on 1 May, Krebs talked to Chuikov, com-mander of the Soviet 8th Guards Army.[85] Krebs re-turned empty-handed after refusing to agree to an uncon-ditional surrender. Only ReichskanzlerGoebbels now hadthe authority to agree to an unconditional surrender. Inthe late afternoon, Goebbels had his children poisoned.At about 20:00, Goebbels and his wife, Magda, left thebunker and close to the entrance bit on a cyanide ampoule,and either shot themselves at the same time or were givena coup de grce immediately afterwards by the SS guarddetailed to dispose of their bodies.[86] As promised by theSoviets, at 10:45 on 1 May they unleashed a hurricaneof re on the German pocket in the centre to force theGermans to surrender unconditionally.[70]

For a brief period after Hitlers suicide, Goebbels wasGermanys Reichskanzler. On 1 May, after Goebbelsown suicide, for an equally brief period, ReichsprsidentAdmiral Karl Dnitz appointed Ludwig von Krosigk asReichskanzler. The headquarters of the Dnitz govern-ment were located around Flensburg, along with Mrwik,near the Danish border. Accordingly, the Dnitz admin-istration was referred to as the Flensburg government.The commanders of two formidable Berlin fortressesagreed to surrender to the Soviets, so sparing both sidesthe losses involved in further bombardment and assault.The commander of the Zoo ak tower (that had provedimpervious to direct hits from 203 mm howitzer shells)was asked to surrender on 30 April; after a long delay amessage was sent back to the Soviets on 1 May inform-ing them that the garrison would surrender to the Sovi-ets at midnight that night. The reason for the delay wasbecause the garrison intended to join in the attempt ata breakout. The other fortress was the Spandau Citadelof Trace italienne design which although several hundredyears old presented a dicult structure to storm. Af-ter negotiations, the citadels commander surrendered toLieutenant-General F. I. Perkhorovitch's 47th Army justafter 15:00 on 1 May.[87]

4.5.1 Breakout

Weidling had given the order for the survivors to breakout to the north-west starting at around 21:00 hours on1 May.[88] The breakout started later than planned ataround 23:00 hours. The rst group from the ReichChancellery was led by Mohnke. Bormann, WernerNaumann, and remaining Fhrerbunker personnel fol-lowed. Burgdorf, who played a key role in the death ofErwin Rommel, along with Krebs, committed suicide.[46]Mohnkes group avoided the Weidendammer Bridge

Weidendammer bridge in 2006

(over which the mass breakout took place) and crossedby a footbridge, but his group became split. A Tigertank that spearheaded the rst attempt to storm the Wei-dendammer Bridge was destroyed.[89][90] There followedtwo more attempts and on the third attempt, made around1:00, Martin Bormann and SS doctor Ludwig Stumpfeg-ger in another group from the Reich Chancellery man-aged to cross the Spree. They were reported to havedied a short distance from the bridge, their bodies seenand identied by Arthur Axmann who followed the sameroute.[91][92]

Charlotten bridge. Rebuilt in 1926, it survived World War II.

Krukenberg and many of the survivors of the remnants ofthe Nordland Division crossed the Spree shortly beforedawn but could not break through and were forced backinto the centre. There they split up, some discarded theiruniforms and tried to pass themselves o as civilians, butmost were either killed or, like Krukenberg, captured.[93]An attempt to break out northward along the SchnhauserAllee by German troops on the north-eastern side of thecentral defence area failed because the Soviets were nowaware that breakout attempts were being made and werehurriedly putting cordons in place to stop them. The rem-nants of the Mnchenberg Division (ve tanks, four ar-tillery pieces, and a handful of troops[94]) and the rem-nants of the 18th Panzer Grenadier and 9th Parachute

10 7 NOTES

divisions broke out of the centre westward through theTiergarten. They were followed by thousands of strag-glers and civilians.[95] Spandau was still in the hands ofa Hitler Youth detachment, so an attempt was made toforce a passage across the Charlottenbrcke (Charlottenbridge) over the Havel. Despite heavy shelling whichkilled many, German weight of numbers meant that theywere able to drive the Soviet infantry back and manythousands crossed into Spandau. The armoured vehiclesthat crossed the bridge made for Staaken.[96]

Mohnke (and what was left of his group) could not breakthrough the Soviet rings. Most were taken prisoner andsome committed suicide. General Mohnke and the oth-ers who had been in the Fhrerbunker were interrogatedby SMERSH.[97] Only a handful of survivors reached theElbe and surrendered to the Western Allies. The ma-jority were killed or captured by the Soviets. The num-ber of German soldiers and civilians killed attempting thebreakout is unknown.[98]

4.5.2 Capitulation

On the morning of 2 May, the Soviets stormed the Re-ich Chancellery. In the ocial Soviet version, the battlewas similar to that of the battle for the Reichstag. Therewas an assault over Wilhelmplatz and into the buildingwith a howitzer to blast open the front doors and severalbattles within the building. Major Anna Nikulina, a po-litical ocer with Lieutenant-General I. P. Rossly's 9thRie Corps of the 5th Shock Army carried and unfurledthe red ag on the roof. However, Beevor suggests thatthe ocial Soviet description is probably an exaggera-tion, as most of the German combat troops had left in thebreakouts the night before, resistance must have been farless than that inside the Reichstag.[99]

At 01:00 hours, the Soviets picked up radio message fromthe German LVI Corps requesting a cease-re and statingthat emissaries would come under a white ag to Pots-damer bridge. General Weidling surrendered with hissta at 06:00 hours. He was taken to see Lieutenant-General Chuikov at 8:23 am. Chuikov, who had com-manded the successful defence of Stalingrad, asked:You are the commander of the Berlin garrison?" Wei-dling replied: Yes, I am the commander of the LVIPanzer Corps. Chuikov then asked: Where is Krebs?What did he say?" Weidling replied: I saw him yester-day in the Reich Chancellery. Weidling then added: Ithought he would commit suicide.[46] In the discussionsthat followed, Weidling agreed to an unconditional sur-render of the city of Berlin. He agreed to order the citysdefenders to surrender to the Soviets. Under the directionof Chuikov and Soviet General Vasily Sokolovsky (Chiefof sta of the 1st Ukrainian Front), Weidling put his or-der to surrender in writing.[46][100]

The 350-strong garrison of the Zoo ak tower nally leftthe building. There was sporadic ghting in a few isolated

buildings where some SS still refused to surrender. TheSoviets simply blasted any such building to rubble. MostGermans, soldiers and civilians, were grateful to receivefood issued at Red Army soup kitchens. The Soviets wenthouse to house and rounded up anyone in a uniform in-cluding remen and railwaymen, a total of 180,000 andmarched them eastwards as prisoners of war.[101]

5 AftermathMain article: Battle of Berlin Aftermath

The Red Army made a major eort to feed the resi-dents of the city which began on Colonel-General NikolaiBerzarin's orders.[102] However, in many areas, vengefulSoviet troops (usually rear echelon units) looted, raped(an estimated 100,000) and murdered civilians for sev-eral weeks.[103]

6 See also End of World War II in Europe German Instrument of Surrender Race to Berlin

7 Notes[1] Weidling replaced Oberstleutnant Ernst Kaether as com-

mander of Berlin who only held the post for one day hav-ing taken command from Reymann.

[2] For the 45,000 soldiers and 40,000 Volkssturm. A largenumber of the 45,000 were troops of the LVI PanzerCorps that were at the start of the battle part of the Ger-man IX Army on the Seelow Heights (Beevor 2002, p.287).

[3] By 23 April when the Soviets rst entered the city, Wei-dlings LVI Panzer Corps made up the majority of theWaen-SS andWehrmacht forces in Berlin

[4] The Soviets later estimated the number as 180,000, butthis gure was calculated from the number of prisonersthat they took and included many unarmed men in uni-form, such as railway ocials and members of the ReichLabour Service (Beevor 2002, p. 287).

[5] A Prussian law of 1875, enacted to cover the streets ofBerlin, prescribed that the main avenues should be 95 feetor more in width, secondary thoroughfares from 65 to 95feet and the local streets from 40 to 65 feet. (McDonnald1951, p. 720)

[6] The Berlin streets are for the most part very broad andstraight. They are surprisingly even; there is not a hill wor-thy of the name in the whole of the city (Siepen 2011, p.7).

11

[7] The highest hill in the ridge was the Kreuzberg, whichstood at 217 feet (66 m). It became the site of a Schinkel-designed monument erected in 1821 and gave its name tothe most famous of Berlins districts (Urban Land Insti-tute 2006, p. 88).

[8] The poorer tenement blocks were known as "Rent-barracks" (Mietskasernen)

[9] Beevor states the centre sector was known as Z for Zen-trum (Beevor 2002, p. 304); while Fischer and Tiemann,quotingGeneralMohnke directly refers to the smaller cen-tre government quarter/district in this area and under hiscommand as Z-Zitadelle ("Citadel") (Fischer 2008, pp.4243, and Tiemann 1998, p. 336).

[10] Antony Beevor writes that the incident is contentious andthat the number of dead and the day of the incident vary.He states that orders were given by Krukenberg to a groupof Nordland sappers on 1 May (after Hitlers death) andthat the charge probably did not go o until the earlyhours of 2 May (Beevor 2002, p. 371). Stephan Hamiltonnds it more likely that the tunnel system ooded due toseveral broken locks caused by the thousands of tons ofheavy Soviet artillery and rocket re. He points out thatit would not make any sense for the SS to ood the tun-nels when The U-Bahn tunnel system in Berlins centreserved key functions for the defenders like command-and-control centers, makeshift hospitals and supply points. Inaddition, the Germans eectively used the system to movequickly around the city to attack the Russians. Even theSS maintained several combat HQs along theU-Bahn linethat ran north-south from the Stadtmitte U-Bahn station(Hamilton 2008, p. 214).

[11] The Luftwae order diers in dierent sources. Beevorstates it was to attack Potsdamerplatz (Beevor 2002, p.342), but Ziemke asserts it was to support Wencks XIIArmy attack (Ziemke 1969, p. 118). Both agree that hewas also ordered to make sure Himmler was punished.

[12] On the MI5 website, using sources available to HughTrevor-Roper (a Second World War MI5 agent and histo-rian/author of The Last Days of Hitler), records the mar-riage as taking place after Hitler had dictated his last willand testament (MI5 sta 2012, Hitlers will and mar-riage).

[1] Beevor 2002, p. 287.

[2] Antill 2005, p. 85.

[3] Kiederling 1987, pp. 3840.

[4] Beevor 2002, pp. 217233.

[5] Ziemke 1969, p. 84.

[6] World War II Axis Military History Day-by-Day: April20 April 1945

[7] Beevor 2002, pp. 255256, 262.

[8] Antony Beevor, speaking as himself in a televisiondocumentary:Revealed Hitlers Secret Bunkers, di-rected by George Pagliero (2008)

[9] Ziemke 1969, pp. 9294.

[10] Ziemke 1969, p. 94.

[11] Ziemke 1969, p. 111.

[12] Fischer 2008, p. 42.

[13] Fischer 2008, pp. 4243.

[14] Map of the Battle of Berlin 2628 April 1945 This map iscopied from Ziemke 1969, p. 93, Battle For Berlin: EndOf The Third Reich

[15] Beevor 2002, p. 317.

[16] Prakash & Kruse 2008, pp. 4446.

[17] Ladd 1998, pp. 99102.

[18] Beevor 2002, pp. 316319.

[19] Beevor 2012, p. 565.

[20] Beevor 2002, p. 286, states the appointment was 23 April;Hamilton 2008, p. 160, states ocially it was the nextmorning of 24 April; Dollinger 1997, p. 228, gives 26April for Weidlings appointment.

[21] Beevor 2002, pp. 259, 297.

[22] Beevor 2002, p. 297.

[23] Beevor 2002, pp. 291292.

[24] Beevor 2002, pp. 291292, 302304.

[25] Beevor 2002, p. 303.

[26] Ziemke 1969, pp. 114115.

[27] Beevor 2002, pp. 303304, 319.

[28] Tiemann 1998, pp. 339, 340.

[29] Dollinger 1997, p. 228.

[30] Beevor 2002, p. 322.

[31] Ziemke 1969, p. 98.

[32] Tiemann 1998, p. 339.

[33] Beevor 2002, p. 321.

[34] Beevor 2002, pp. 318320.

[35] Beevor 2002, pp. 323324, 17, 318.

[36] Beevor 2002, pp. 319320.

[37] Beevor 2002, p. 323.

[38] Ziemke 1969, p. 119.

[39] Kershaw 2008, pp. 943947.

[40] Ziemke 1969, p. 118.

[41] Beevor 2002, p. 351.

[42] Beevor 2002, p. 340.

12 8 REFERENCES

[43] Map of the Battle for Reichstag 29 April 2 May 1945.This map is copied from Ziemke 1969, p. 121, Battle ForBerlin: End Of The Third Reich

[44] Beevor 2002, pp. 340, 347349.

[45] Beevor 2002, p. 342.

[46] Dollinger 1997, p. 239.

[47] Beevor 2002, p. 343.

[48] Beevor 2002, p. 338.

[49] Exton, Brett. Some of the prisoners held at Special Camp11: Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici

[50] Exton, Brett, andMurphy, Richard. Some of the prisonersheld at Special Camp 11: General der Infanterie Kurt vonTippelskirch

[51] Ziemke 1969, p. 128.

[52] Beevor 2002, p. 349.

[53] Beevor 2002, pp. 352353.

[54] Beevor 2002, p. 352.

[55] Ziemke 1969, p. 120.

[56] Beevor 2002, p. 357 last paragraph

[57] Dollinger 1997, p. 239, says Jodl replied, but Ziemke1969, p. 120, and Beevor 2002, p. 537, say it was Keitel

[58] Le Tissier 2010, p. 29.

[59] Komornicki 1967, p. 146.

[60] Le Tissier 2010, p. 173.

[61] Komornicki 1967, pp. 220221.

[62] Komornicki 1967, p. 151.

[63] Zbiniewicz 1988, p. 272.

[64] Komornicki 1967, p. 170.

[65] Komornicki 1967, p. 174.

[66] Komornicki 1967, p. 178.

[67] Komornicki 1967, p. 181.

[68] Beevor 2002, pp. 354355.

[69] Mende et al. 2001, p. 651, for the size of the AAA

[70] Beevor 2002, pp. 356357.

[71] Beevor 2002, p. 358.

[72] Joachimsthaler 1999, pp. 160182.

[73] Kershaw 2008, p. 955.

[74] Kershaw 2008, p. 954.

[75] Komornicki 1967, pp. 182184.

[76] Komornicki 1967, pp. 190197.

[77] Beevor 2002, pp. 365367, 372.

[78] Hamilton 2008, p. 311.

[79] Hamilton 2008, p. 312.

[80] Komornicki 1967, pp. 200209.

[81] Hamilton 2008, pp. 312313.

[82] Komornicki 1967, pp. 212219.

[83] Komornicki 1967, pp. 224229.

[84] Komornicki 1967, p. 232.

[85] Dollinger 1997, p. 239, states 3am, and Beevor 2002, p.367, 4am, for Krebs meeting with Chuikov

[86] Beevor 2002, pp. 380381.

[87] Beevor 2002, pp. 372375.

[88] Ziemke 1969, p. 126, says that Weidling gave no ordersfor a breakout.

[89] Beevor 2002, p. 382.

[90] Weidendammer Brcke de.wikipedia.org

[91] Beevor 2002, pp. 383, 389.

[92] Le Tissier 2010, p. 188.

[93] Beevor 2002, p. 383.

[94] Ziemke 1969, p. 125.

[95] Beevor 2002, p. 384.

[96] Beevor 2002, pp. 384, 385.

[97] Beevor 2002, pp. 388389.

[98] Beevor 2002, pp. 384, 385, 388.

[99] Beevor 2002, p. 388.

[100] Beevor 2002, p. 386.

[101] Beevor 2002, pp. 287, 388393.

[102] Beevor 2002, p. 409.

[103] Beevor, Antony; They raped every German female fromeight to 80 1 May, The Guardian, 2002

8 References Antill, Peter (2005). Berlin 1945: End of the Thou-

sand Year Reich. Campaign Series 159 (illustrateded.). Oxford: Osprey Publishing. p. 85. ISBN 978-1-84176-915-8.

Beevor, Antony (2002). Berlin: The Downfall 1945.London; New York: Viking-Penguin Books. ISBN978-0-670-03041-5.

13

Beevor, Antony (2012). The Second WorldWar (illustrated ed.). UK: Hachette. ISBN9780297860709.

Dollinger, Hans (1997). The Decline and Fall ofNazi Germany and Imperial Japan (reprint ed.).New York: Crown Publishers. ISBN 978-0-7537-0009-9.

Fischer, Thomas (2008). Soldiers of the Leibstan-darte. Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing. ISBN978-0-921991-91-5.

Hamilton, Stephan (2008). Bloody Streets: The So-viet Assault on Berlin, April 1945. Solihull: Helion& Co. ISBN 978-1-906033-12-5.

Joachimsthaler, Anton (1999) [1995]. The LastDays of Hitler: The Legends, The Evidence, TheTruth. London: Brockhampton Press. ISBN 978-1-86019-902-8.

Kershaw, Ian (2008). Hitler: A Biography. W.W. Norton & Company Publishing. ISBN 0-393-06757-2.

Kiederling, Gerhard (1987). Berlin 19451986.Geschichte der Hauptstadt der DDR. Berlin: DietzVerlag. ISBN 978-3-320-00774-4.

Komornicki, Stanisaw (1967). Poles in the Battle ofBerlin. Ministry of National Defense Pub. OCLC5297730.

Ladd, Brian (1998). The Ghosts of Berlin: Con-fronting GermanHistory in the Urban Landscape (il-lustrated ed.). University of Chicago Press. p. 99102. ISBN 978-0-226-46762-7.

Le Tissier, Tony (2010) [1999]. Race for the Re-ichstag: The 1945 Battle for Berlin. Pen and Sword.ISBN 978-1-84884-230-4.

McDonnald, Alexander Hopkins, ed. (1951). TheEncyclopedia Americana 6. Americana Corpora-tionn. p. 720.

Mende, Hans-Jrgen; Wernicke, Kurt; Chod,Kathrin; Schwenk, Herbert; Weipug, Hainer(2001). Berlin Mitte: Das Lexikon. Berlin: Stapp.ISBN 978-3-87776-111-3.

MI5 sta (8 June 2012). Hitlers last days: Hitlerswill and marriage"". Retrieved May 2013.

Prakash, Gyan; Kruse, Kevin Michael (2008). Thespaces of the modern city: imaginaries, politics, andeveryday life (illustrated ed.). Princeton UniversityPress,. pp. 4446. ISBN 978-0-691-13343-0.

Siepen, Edith (2011). Peeps at Great Cities Berlin.BoD Books on Demand. p. 7. ISBN 978-3-86403-134-2.

Tiemann, Ralf (1998). The Leibstandarte IV/2.Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing. ISBN 978-0-921991-40-3.

Urban Land Institute (2006). Urban land 65 (912).Urban Land Institute. p. 88.

Ziemke, Earl F. (1969). Battle For Berlin: End OfThe Third Reich. London: Macdonald & Co. ISBN978-0-356-02960-3.

Zbiniewicz, Fryderyk (1988). Armia Radziecka wwojnie z hitlerowskimi Niemcami 19411945. War-saw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony. ISBN978-83-11-07489-7.

9 Further reading Antill, P, Battle for Berlin: April May 1945 (web-

site): Appendix 1: Appendix 1: Soviet Order of Battlefor the Battle for Berlin (Le Tissier, pp. 196 207)and Appendix 2: German Order of Battle for Op-eration Berlin (Le Tissier, pp. 208 214) cites LeTissier, T (1988), The Battle of Berlin 1945, Lon-don: Jonathan Cape

Hastings, Max (2004), Armageddon: The Battlefor Germany, 19441945, Macmillan, ISBN 978-0-333-90836-5

Hillers, Marta; Bell, Anthes (translator), A Womanin Berlin: Six Weeks in the Conquered City, ISBN978-0-8050-7540-3

Krivosheev, G. F. (1997), Soviet Casualties andCombat Losses in the Twentieth Century, London:Greenhill Books, ISBN 978-1-85367-280-4

Le Tissier, Tony (2010), Charlemagne The 33rdWaen-SS Grenadier Division of the SS, Pen &Sword, ISBN 978-1-84884-231-1

Naimark, Norman M. (1995), The Russians in Ger-many: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupa-tion, 19451949, Cambridge: Belknap, ISBN 978-0-674-78405-5

Read, Anthony (1993), The Fall of Berlin, London:Pimlico, ISBN 978-0-7126-0695-0

Remme, Tilman, The Battle for Berlin in World WarTwo, BBC

Ryan, Cornelius, The Last Battle, ISBN 978-0-684-80329-6

Sanders, Ian J., Photos of World War 2 Berlin Loca-tions today

Shepardson, Donald E. (1998), The Fall of Berlinand the Rise of a Myth, The Journal of MilitaryHistory 62 (1): 135153, doi:10.2307/120398

14 9 FURTHER READING

White, Osmar, By the eyes of a war correspondentAlternative account of crimes against civilians

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10 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses10.1 Text

Battle in Berlin Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_in_Berlin?oldid=673329430 Contributors: PBS, Altenmann, Carnildo,Wwoods, Kpalion, Piotrus, Irpen, Klemen Kocjancic, Rich Farmbrough, Xezbeth, JustPhil, Maxl, Alansohn, Anthony Appleyard,Woohookitty, Tabletop, Rjwilmsi, Kmorozov, Quentin X, RussBot, Gaius Cornelius, Ryubread, Stijndon, Otto ter Haar, Groyolo, Mhard-castle, Crystallina, SmackBot, Deathlibrarian, Tchernobog, Mauls, Yopie, Gilliam, Hmains, Rcbutcher, Mike hayes, Valenciano, Niremetal,LanternLight, Ohconfucius, RASAM, Andrwsc, Dl2000, FairuseBot, Valoem, CmdrObot, Denis jaimes, Nick Number, BokicaK,DagosNavy, HanzoHattori, Joshua, Magioladitis, Dodo19~enwiki, Buckshot06, The Anomebot2, KConWiki, Martynas Patasius, Cara-norn, Kevinsam, Rettetast, CommonsDelinker, DrFrench, Mrg3105, DadaNeem, Christopher Kraus, MisterBee1966, Jaimeastorga2000,KaizenIT, Jackfork, Mkpumphrey, Natg 19, Robert1947, Julian BH, Tomaxer, Eurocopter, Sealman, Jack Merridew, Lucasbfrbot, Cyfal,ImageRemovalBot, De728631, Mild Bill Hiccup, Polaco77, Niceguyedc, Sleeming88, Alexbot, Iohannes Animosus, Berean Hunter, Van-ished user uih38riiw4hjlsd, Brock2097, Jim Sweeney, Addbot, Brumski, CanadianLinuxUser, Buster7, Fireaxe888, Lightbot, Luckas-bot,Reenem, Magog the Ogre, Starbois, AnomieBOT, Metalhead94, DirlBot, Jerey Mall, Ulf Heinsohn, Kithira, Backpackadam, SchekinovAlexey Victorovich, FrescoBot, Kierzek, Remotelysensed, DrilBot, Chumchum7, Abuttlmao, DocYako, King Ref, Diannaa, MyMoloboac-count, RjwilmsiBot, EmausBot, John of Reading, GoingBatty, Sundostund, Bcaulf, Bahavd Gita, Brigade Piron, Whoop whoop pull up,ClueBot NG, Gareth Grith-Jones, Frietjes, Helpful Pixie Bot, Gob Lofa, 2001:db8, FJS15, Corpusfury, Wikih101, Hamish59, Chris-Gualtieri, Dissident93, Br'er Rabbit, Lemnaminor, B14709, Filedelinkerbot, TheRealSingapore, Gabbeman1 and Anonymous: 82

10.2 Images File:Battle_for_Reichstag_1945_map-eng.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c3/Battle_for_Reichstag_

1945_map-eng.png License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Ivengo(RUS) File:Berlin_Lehrter_Bahnhof_um_1900.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8f/Berlin_Lehrter_

Bahnhof_um_1900.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ? File:Berlin_neukoelln.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1a/Berlin_neukoelln.png License: CC BY-SA

2.5 Contributors: ? Original artist: ? File:Charlottenbrcke_1_Havel_Berlin.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/Charlottenbr%C3%

BCcke_1_Havel_Berlin.JPG License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Lienhard Schulz File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Original

artist: ? File:Destruction_in_a_Berlin_street.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/af/Destruction_in_a_Berlin_

street.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This is photograph BU 8604 from the collections of the Imperial War Museums (collectionno. 4700-30) Original artist: No 5 Army Film & Photographic Unit, Wilkes A (Sergeant)

File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(19351945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax

File:Flag_of_Poland.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/1/12/Flag_of_Poland.svg License: Public domain Contrib-utors: ? Original artist: ?

File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag ofthe Soviet Union.svg.

File:Humboldthain.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/dd/Humboldthain.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0Contributors: Transfered from German WP to Commons by PSIplus Original artist: de:User:Richardfabi, de:User:Montauk, de:User:Raymond, en:User:Ian Dunster

File:Plattenbau-Berlin-Friedrich.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/18/Plattenbau-Berlin-Friedrich.jpgLicense: CC BY-SA 2.0 de Contributors: de.wikipedia.org: 22:14, 20. Apr 2006 . . Bettenburg (Diskussion) . . 1306 x 979 (108626 Byte)Original artist: Bettenburg

File:Prenzlauer_Allee,_Berlin_1900_(2).jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ea/Prenzlauer_Allee%2C_Berlin_1900_%282%29.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Scanned from Janos Frecot & Helmut Geisert: Berlin in frhen Pho-tographien 18571913. Schirmer/Mosel, Munich 1984. ISBN 3-88814-984-3. Original artist: Unknown amateur

File:Reichstag_after_the_allied_bombing_of_Berlin.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3a/Reichstag_after_the_allied_bombing_of_Berlin.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This is photograph BU 8573 from the collections of theImperial War Museums. Original artist:

Post-Work: User:W.wolny File:Wikibooks-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Wikibooks-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0

Contributors: Own work Original artist: User:Bastique, User:Ramac et al. File:Wikinews-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/24/Wikinews-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0

Contributors: This is a cropped version of Image:Wikinews-logo-en.png. Original artist: Vectorized by Simon 01:05, 2 August 2006 (UTC)Updated by Time3000 17 April 2007 to use ocial Wikinews colours and appear correctly on dark backgrounds. Originally uploaded bySimon.

File:Wikiquote-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Wikiquote-logo.svg License: Public domainContributors: ? Original artist: ?

File:Wikisource-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors: Rei-artur Original artist: Nicholas Moreau

File:Wiktionary-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ec/Wiktionary-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

16 10 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

10.3 Content license Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0

Prelude Battle of the Oder-Neisse Encirclement of Berlin

Preparation Tactics and terrain BattleOuter suburbs Inner suburbsCentre Battle for the Reichstag

Capture of Charlottenburg End of the battle Breakout Capitulation

Aftermath See also Notes References Further reading Text and image sources, contributors, and licensesTextImagesContent license