why does deuteronomy legislate cities of refuge asylum in the covenant collection (exodus 2112–14)...

7/28/2019 Why Does Deuteronomy Legislate Cities of Refuge Asylum in the Covenant Collection (Exodus 2112–14) and Deuteronomy (191–13)

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This article was published in JBL 125/1 (2006) 23–49, copyright © 2006 by the Society of Biblical Literature. To purchase

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JBL 125, no. 1 (2006): 23–49

Why Does Deuteronomy LegislateCities of Refuge? Asylum in the

Covenant Collection (Exodus 21:12–14)and Deuteronomy (19:1–13)

jeffrey stackert

[email protected]

Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02454

Although recent scholarship has renewed attention to the relationship of the

pentateuchal legal corpora, the fruits of such studies have not led to appreciableconsensus. In the case of biblical laws of asylum, a survey of current scholarship

on the development of these texts reveals the persistence of widely differing opin-ions concerning the relationship among the pentateuchal asylum laws themselves

(Exod 21:12–14; Deut 19:1–13; and Num 35:9–34) as well as continued disagree-ment on the relationship of this legislation to the narrative of its implementationin Josh 20:1–9. This disagreement extends from the broad conceptualization

of asylum to the interpretation of peculiarities in the various laws and includesdebate concerning the existence and nature of any potential literary relationships

between these texts. In forming their conclusions, scholars have asked severalimportant questions, such as, What is the nature of the refuge prescribed in the

different laws? Is asylum an actual historical institution once practiced in ancientIsrael, or is it an unpracticed, literary creation? If asylum was actually practicedin ancient Israel, do the pentateuchal laws accurately reflect historical custom?

And, whether asylum was a historical institution or not, what motivates the bibli-cal legislators’ diverse models of asylum? What is the chronology of the different

asylum laws? Is there evidence of internal development within the individual textsthat offers clues for their interpretation and/or historical import? Are the similari-

ties between the asylum laws close enough to posit a literary relationship betweenthese texts? If so, which texts serve as sources for subsequent compositions, and

how do the authors of the latter texts use and revise their sources?In the present study, I will limit my inquiry to asylum in Exod 21:12–14 and

Deut 19:1–13, leaving aside for the present the Priestly law in Num 35:9–34 and

23






the fulfillment narrative in Josh 20:1–9. I will focus specifically on the questionof the literary relationship between the texts under examination, arguing thatExod 21:12–14 serves as the main source for Deut 19:1–13. This dependence is

evidenced by several significant conceptual, lexical, and sequential ties betweenthese texts as well as by correspondences in their legal formulation. Such borrow-

ing serves the larger inner-biblical exegetical goal of the Deuteronomic author,who creatively exploits the lexical ambiguity in the use of Mwqm (“place”) in Exod

21:13 in order to legitimize his innovation of city asylum. Such an interpretationof Deut 19:1–13 establishes the literary origin of biblical city asylum and simulta-

neously rules out the possibility of Deuteronomic asylum in the central sanctuary city.

I. Exodus 21:12–14and the Question of Altar Asylum

Exodus 21:12 contains a succinct legal prescription instituting capital pun-ishment for homicide, which is then immediately followed in vv. 13–14 by condi-tions regarding the intentionality of the killer. Deuteronomy 19:1–13 likewise

addresses the issue of asylum for manslaughter, but its law omits an initial pro-hibition against homicide, even as its treatment of intent and the accompanying

requirements for accommodating the manslayer are more extensive than those of the Covenant Collection. Considered by many scholars to be the clearest example

of literary dependence among the biblical asylum laws, the genetic relationshipposited between Exod 21:12–14 and Deut 19:1–13 has recently been called intoquestion. In her book Homicide in the Biblical World , Pamela Barmash investigates

the development of what she calls “the places of refuge” (in order accurately toinclude both altar and city asylum under a single moniker) in the Hebrew Bible.1

Barmash examines the key pentateuchal texts concerning unintentionalhomicide (Exod 21:12–14; Num 35:9–34; Deut 4:41–43; 19:1–13) as well as

several other biblical texts that address similar issues (1 Kgs 1:50–53; 2:28–34;Josh 20:1–9; Neh 6:10–13; Pss 15:1; 17:8; 27:5; 57:2; 59:17–18; 61:5; 144:2), argu-

Journal of Biblical Literature 125, no. 1 (2006)24

1 Pamela Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2005), 71–93. In the following discussion, I cite Barmash’s analysis regularly for two reasons: first,

it is the most recent contribution to the discussion of biblical asylum laws. Second, it was in the

context of evaluating her work that my views on Deuteronomic asylum developed. Thus, although

I disagree significantly with Barmash’s analysis, I am indebted to her presentation of the evidence

and to her discussion of the issues.

I warmly thank David P. Wright and Marc Z. Brettler for reading and responding to an earlier

draft of this paper. Their comments were especially helpful in sharpening my arguments. Neverthe-

less, I alone am responsible for the conclusions here.






ing against the widely held view first espoused by Julius Wellhausen that the insti-

tution of asylum in ancient Israel developed from altar refuge to city refuge.2

Barmash first seeks to make a clear distinction between two fundamentally

different types of asylum: (1) the political sanctuary sought by Adonijah, Joab

(1 Kgs 1:50–53; 2:28–34), and Nehemiah (Neh 6:10–13); and (2) asylum for

homicide, which is the subject of the pentateuchal refuge legislation as well as

Josh 20:1–9.3 She also argues that refuge for homicide in Exod 21:13–14 is not

clearly altar asylum. Specifically, she notes that the word Mwqm in Exod 21:13 has

an ambiguous meaning, for Mwqm (“place”) can carry the technical sense of “sacred

site,” as is the case in Exod 20:24 and in many instances, for example, in Deuter-

onomy. Mwqm can also have the specific sense of ry(, “city, town” (Deut 21:19; Ruth

4:10).4 However, Mwqm can also retain its general sense of “place,” as evidenced

Stackert: Asylum in Exod 21:12–14 and Deut 19:1–13 25

2 Julius Wellhausen, Prolegomena to the History of Ancient Israel (trans. Allan Menzies and

J. Sutherland Black; New York: Meridian, 1957), 33, 162. In addition to the commentaries, see the

several studies devoted specifically to the pentateuchal/hexateuchal asylum laws, including N. M.

Nicolsky, “Das Asylrecht in Israel,” ZAW 48 (1930): 146–75; M. David, “Die Bestimmungen über

die Asylstädte in Josua XX,” OTS 9 (1951): 30–48; Moshe Greenberg, “The Biblical Conception of

Asylum,” JBL 78 (1959): 125–32; Henry McKeating, “The Development of the Law on Homicide in

Ancient Israel,”VT 35 (1975): 46–68; A. Graeme Auld, “Cities of Refuge in Israelite Tradition,” JSOT

10 (1978): 26–40; Michael Fishbane, “Biblical Colophons, Textual Criticism, and Legal Analogies,”

CBQ 42 (1980): 438–49; Jacob Milgrom, “Sancta Contagion and Altar/City Asylum,” in Congress

Volume: Vienna 1980 (ed. J. A. Emerton; VTSup 32; Leiden: Brill, 1981), 278–310; Alexander Rofé,

“Joshua 20: Historico-Literary Criticism Illustrated,” in Empirical Models for Biblical Criticism (ed.

Jeffrey H. Tigay; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 131–47; idem, “The History

of the Cities of Refuge in Biblical Law,” in Deuteronomy: Issues and Interpretation (London/New

York: T&T Clark, 2002), 121–47; repr. from Studies in Bible, 1986 (ed. Sara Japhet; ScrHier 31; Jeru-

salem: Magnes, 1986); Cornelius Houtman, “Der Altar als Asylstätte im alten Testament: Rechts-bestimmung (Ex. 21, 12–14) und Praxis (I Reg. 1–2),” RB 103 (1996): 343–66; Timothy M. Willis,

The Elders of the City: A Study of the Elders-Laws in Deuteronomy (SBLMS 55; Atlanta: Society of

Biblical Literature, 2001), 89–144; Ludwig Schmidt, “Leviten- und Asylstädte in Num. XXXV und

Jos. XX; XXI 1-42,”VT 52 (2002): 103–21.3 Such a distinction between asylum for political intrigue and asylum for homicide seems

hypercritical, especially in narrative texts (the stories of Joab and Adonijah), for which no particu-

lar extant legislative corpus is normative or even consistently operative. The underlying motivation

is the same in cases of both political intrigue and homicide: the perpetrator seeks refuge from a

socially legitimated form of revenge. It is certainly no accident that Adonijah and Joab each seek

asylum at the sanctuary/altar (and that Nehemiah is encouraged to do so) and not in some other

context.4 Baruch A. Levine similarly notes that the noun Mwqm can mean both “cult site” and “city”

(ry(), citing the same two verses that Barmash cites (Deut 21:19; Ruth 4:10). Contra Barmash,

however, Levine views ancient Israelite asylum as developing from altar to city refuge in response

to Deuteronomic centralization of cult. Levine also argues that these cities of asylum were chosenprecisely because, prior to centralization of worship, they had housed cultic shrines. This seems

to be the import of the parallel he draws between Mwqm and ry( ( Numbers 21–36: A New Transla-






throughout the Bible generally as well as in the Covenant Collection (Exod 23:20,5

referring to the land). Barmash claims that the sense of Mwqm in Exod 21:13 remains

unclear but that it certainly does not refer to the xbzm (“altar”) in Exod 21:14, for

if Exod 21:13 meant “altar,” it could simply have employed the term xbzm.6 She

similarly rejects the possibility that xbzm in v. 14 is a synecdochic reference to

Mwqm in the previous verse. Instead, the use of different terminology in vv. 13 and

14 suggests to Barmash that the two locations should be distinguished from each

other. Barmash concludes that Exod 21:14 confirms only that an intentional killer

can be arrested anywhere, even at an altar, a ritual area normally restricted to all

but authorized cultic personnel, and cannot be equated with the Mwqm in v. 13. She

goes on to suggest later that Exod 21:13–14 could even envision either sanctuary


tion with Introduction and Commentary [AB 4A; New York: Doubleday, 2000], 566–68). But cf. his

(potentially contradictory) statement concerning the cities of asylum in Deut 4:41–43: “It is some-what ironic that the towns selected under the Deuteronomic policy, echoed by the Deuteronomist,

may have had a history as legitimate cult sites at an earlier time. In fact, they may have continued

to operate, but cultic references are consistently avoided in Deuteronomy precisely in order to deny

them legitimacy. In summary, it can be stated that the right of asylum is cultic in origin, and that

changes in the allocation of sacred space created the need to adapt the asylum system, affording

new venues of access” (p. 568). Thus, for Levine, it appears that Deuteronomic cities of refuge are

paradoxically both sacred and secular: the Deuteronomic author was constrained to choose cities

of refuge based on their previous sacred character, even as he asserted their secular character. For my

own views on these issues, see below.5 The parameters of the Covenant Collection are debated, and some scholars view Exod

23:20 as outside the strict boundaries of the Covenant Collection proper. For a discussion of the

boundaries of the Covenant Collection and especially the place of Exod 23:20–33, see, e.g., Frank

Crüsemann, The Torah: Theology and Social History of Old Testament Law (trans. Allan W. Mahnke;

Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 112–15, 178–81, 195–200.

6 On this point, Barmash follows Greenberg, “Biblical Conception of Asylum,” 125. See alsoMenahem Haran, Temples and Temple Service in Ancient Israel: An Inquiry into the Character of Cult

Phenomena and the Historical Setting of the Priestly School (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977; repr., Winona

Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1985), 121–22 n. 15. Haran’s conclusions are similar to those of Barmash: he

suggests that city asylum and altar asylum coexisted in ancient Israel and that Exod 21:13 refers to

city asylum. He states, “The characteristic, quasi-technical expressionslo µ < s \a µda µh, < ašer ya µnûs ša µmma µh,

which emerge both in v. 13 and in the P and D sections dealing with the cities of refuge (cf. Num

35:11, 15, 20, 22, 25–26; Deut 19:3–4; Josh 20:3, 6, 9), as well as additional considerations, give good

reason for believing that only a city of refuge is meant in this verse” (Temples and Temple Service,

121 n. 15). He also suggests that Exod 21:13–14 represents an ascending order of asylum power: the

altar (v. 14) is a more powerful refuge than the city (v. 13), translating in v. 14, “You shall take him

from my very altar.” Haran’s arguments are unconvincing: in the first case, it is hardly clear that the

“characteristic, quasi-technical expressions” in Exod 21:13 that accord with other pentateuchal asy-

lum legislation require this verse to refer to city asylum. Moreover, Haran leaves undefined what the

“additional considerations” are that suggest city asylum in this verse. In the second case, the syntax

of v. 14 and the logic of vv. 12–14 do not necessitate a translation of yxbzm in v. 14 as “my very altar.”Neither is an adverb such as Mg or P), which would substantiate such a translation, attested. Even if

such a translation is accepted, it does not justify understanding vv. 13–14 as legislating city and altar

asylum, let alone a hierarchical relationship between these disparate places of refuge.






asylum or city asylum, for other biblical legislation concerning homicide refuge

does not present its city asylum as fundamentally innovative.7

These issues all relate to the interpretation of asylum in the Covenant Col-

lection alone and should be addressed on their own terms before turning to the

Deuteronomic asylum law. Barmash’s discussion of the word Mwqm in Exod 21:13

does not adequately consider all of the available evidence, and thus her conclusion

for its meaning is at one point overly conservative and at another harmonistic.

Her complete separation of Exod 21:13 from Exod 21:14 is equally unwarranted.

With regard to Mwqm in v. 13, it is important to note that the homicide law in

Exod 21:12–14 is integrally related to the altar law in Exod 20:24–26. Though she

does not address it at length, Barmash considers and rejects such a connection,

for she critiques Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger’s contention that, in light of

Exod 20:24–26, the Mwqm in v. 13 and the xbzm in v. 14 refer to the same place. For

Schwienhorst-Schönberger, the distinction is that the Mwqm is chosen by the deity while the xbzm is constructed by humans.8 Several scholars, however, including

David P. Wright, have demonstrated that the homicide law in the Covenant Col-

lection is related to and borrows from the altar law that precedes it. Such a con-

nection is evidenced by the strong lexical correspondences between these laws, the

partial second person formulation of the laws, and the first person speech of the

deity in both the altar law and the homicide law. Such second person formulation

and first person speech are otherwise unattested in the central casuistic section of

this legal collection but find their natural analogue in the apodictic formulation

of Exod 20:24–26.9 The following display highlights the correspondence between

Exod 20:24 and Exod 21:13–14:


7 Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World , 76–80.8 Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger, Das Bundesbuch (Ex 20,22–23,33): Studie zu seiner

Entstehung und Theologie (BZAW 188; Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1990), 40–41. Moshe Weinfeld

similarly argues that Exod 21:13–14 refers to the same cultic location: “Mwqm in this context, like the

Arabic maqâm, refers to a holy place and a temple, and thus the reference is to a temple that affords

refuge” (Social Justice in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East [2nd ed.; Jerusalem: Magnes;

Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000], 123).9 David P. Wright, “The Laws of Hammurabi as a Source for the Covenant Collection (Exodus

20:23–23:19),” Maarav 10 (2003): 11–87. Several scholars have argued that the participial laws in

Exod 21:12, 15–17 (and for some, 22:17–19) were originally independent of the casuistic laws that

characterize Exod 21:2–22:16 (see, e.g. Crüsemann, Torah, 144–51) and that Exod 21:13–14, which

introduces the issues of inadvertent killing and asylum, is a later, even post-Deuteronomic/post-

Priestly, addition to the Covenant Collection (see, e.g. Moshé Anbar, “L’influence deutéronomique

sur le Code de l’Alliance: le cas d’Exode 21:12-17,” ZABR 5 [1999]: 165–66). Admitting the relation

between Exod 21:13–14 and Exod 20:24–26, one can then argue that the altar law is also a later

addition to the Covenant Collection. If this is the case, then the direction of dependence arguedin this study—Deuteronomy depends on Exodus—would have to be reversed. However, Wright’s

study of the Covenant Collection in relation to the Laws of Hammurabi (cited previously in this

note) effectively quells this issue: Wright argues that the Covenant Collection employs the Laws of







Exod 20:2410 t) Kyml# t)w Kytl( t) wyl( txbzw yl h#(t hmd) xbzmKyl) )wb) ym# t) rykz) r#) Mwqmh lkb ̂Krqb t)w K)nc

Kytkrbw

You shall make an earthen altar for me, and you shall

sacrifice upon it your burnt offerings and your well-beingofferings, your sheep and your cattle. In every place in

which I declare my name I will come to you and bless

you.11

Exod 21:13–14 swny r#) Mwqm Kl ytm#w wdyl hn) Myhl)hw hdc )l r#)wwnxqt yxbzm M(m hmr(b wgrhl wh(r l( #y) dzy ykw hm#

twml

But he who did not lie in wait, but rather it was an act of

God, I will establish for you a place to which he may flee.

But if a man plots against his neighbor to kill him treach-

erously, you shall take him from my altar to die.

For her part, Barmash recognizes that Mwqm in Exod 20:24 is obviously cultic in

nature,12 but she does not consider this verse important for understanding Mwqmin 21:13. In view of the connection between the altar and homicide laws, however,

Hammurabi (LH) as a source and controlling template for its composition, following the sequence

of laws in LH in its arrangement of both material it culls from LH and material it derives from other

sources. Thus, the fact that LH 206–7 concern inadvertent homicide suggests that Exod 21:13–14,

while likely modifying a participial law that the Covenant Collection author derives from another,

perhaps native source, does not arise from a different compositional event from the one in which

LH serves as the template for the author of the Covenant Collection (Wright, “Laws of Hammurabias a Source,” 17–18). Likewise, because of the clear correspondence between Exod 21:13–14 and

Exod 20:24–26, it is unnecessary to presume that the altar law is a late addition (cf. David P. Wright,

“The Compositional Logic of the Goring Ox and Negligence Laws in the Covenant Collection [Ex

21:28–36],” ZABR 10 [2004]: 93–142, esp. 111 n. 42; 49 n. 141; Bernard M. Levinson, Deuteronomy

and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation [Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], 11–52;

idem, “Is the Covenant Code an Exilic Composition? A Response to John Van Seters,” in In Search

of Pre-exilic Israel: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar [ed. John Day; JSOTSup 406;

London: T&T Clark, 2004], 272–325, esp. 297–315]). For discussion of the relation of the altar law

to the LH, see Wright, “Laws of Hammurabi,” 43–44; idem, “Compositional Logic,” 2–3 n. 3. I thank

Professor Wright for generously sharing with me an advance copy of this manuscript.10 All translations of biblical texts are my own. Second person forms are underscored with

a single line. First person forms are underscored with a double line. Lexical correspondences are

marked with underdots and wavy lines.11 For a grammatical discussion of the phrase Mwqmh lkb and a justification for its rendering

as “in every place,” see Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics, 32 n. 18.12 The cultic nature of the Mwqm in Exod 20:24 is indicated both by the presence of an altar and

the sacrifices performed and by the deity’s coming (*)wb) there and blessing (*Krb) the people, all

activities integrally connected to a sanctuary and not to a city.







considerable light is shed on the meaning of Mwqm here: the most natural readingof Mwqm in Exod 21:13 is as a cultic site at which there would be an altar.13

The suggestion that the background for the legislation in Exod 21:13–14

could be either sanctuary asylum or city asylum can likewise be refuted. While she

rightly recognizes that Mwqm can carry the precise meaning of ry(, “city, town,” the

only examples of Mwqm as “city, town” that Barmash adduces are very far removed

from the verse under examination.14 In fact, it is likely that one would never even

consider rendering Mwqm in Exod 21:13 as “city, town” if not for the influence of the asylum legislation in Num 35:9–34 and Deut 4:41–43; 19:1–13. Indeed, the

connotation of Mwqm as “city, town” is otherwise unattested in the Covenant Col-

lection and even in the rest of the Sinai narrative in which it is embedded. The

possibility that Exod 21:13–14 could envision city asylum originates from just

such a conflationary interpretation of Mwqm and should therefore be rejected.15

II. Exodus 21:12–14, Deuteronomy 19:1–13,

and the Origin of City Asylum

Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, one should not completely dis-

regard such a harmonistic interpretation of Mwqm in Exod 21:13, for it points to

problems in the prevailing view that altar asylum preceded and gave way to city

asylum in ancient Israel. Like the scholars with whom she disagrees, Barmash is

concerned with the historical development of the places of refuge in ancient Israel,

and she addresses this development from altar asylum in Exod 21:12–14 to city

asylum in Deut 19:1–13 by rejecting the argument that Exod 21:12–14 refers toaltar asylum at all. Curiously, though she claims that these texts share the concep-

tion of the city as a place of refuge and admits to extensive Deuteronomic borrow-ing from elsewhere in the Covenant Collection (e.g., slave laws in Exod 21:2–11

and Deut 15:12–18), Barmash contends that there is no genetic relationship at all

between Exod 21:12–14 and Deut 19:1–13.16 As will be demonstrated below, this

view is untenable. Nevertheless, the underlying issue remains. Even if Barmash’s

13 So also, e.g., Eckart Otto, Das Deuteronomium: Politische Theologie und Rechtsreform in

Judah und Assyrien (BZAW 284; Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1999), 254.14 As noted above, Barmash cites Deut 21:19 and Ruth 4:10. Additionally, Mwqm unambigu-

ously carries the specific meaning of ry( in Gen 18:24, 26; 19:12, 14; 28:19; Jer 19:12; and Amos 4:6.15 M. David approaches this issue differently, arguing that extended altar asylum itself is un-

realistic and that a larger geographical space is necessary for the one who flees to find refuge. Thus,

the Covenant Collection and Deuteronomic asylum laws can be viewed as complementary (“Die

Bestimmungen über die Asylstädte,” 38). Greenberg takes a similar view: to his mind, Num 35:9–34

predates Deut 19:1–13, and thus the Priestly law complements Exod 21:13–14. The altar provides

temporary asylum, while the city provides more permanent protection (“Biblical Conception of

Asylum,” 130). See below for a critique of these views.16 Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World, 79–80.







argument is rejected in favor of the view that Exod 21:12–14 establishes the altar

as a place of refuge, the question of how one moves from altar asylum to city asy-

lum persists. In other words, why does Deuteronomy innovate with regard to the

place of refuge for the unintentional killer?

Several mutually exclusive responses have been offered to this question.

Some scholars, such as John Van Seters, offer the radical and implausible solution

that Deuteronomic city asylum predates and serves as a source for asylum in the

Covenant Collection.17 Others, such as Moshe Greenberg, assert that Deuter-

onomy borrows its cities of refuge from Num 35:9–34.18 The majority of biblical

critics, as noted above, see Deuteronomy’s city asylum as a development from

altar asylum in the Covenant Collection in light of the former’s larger program of

cultic centralization. They argue that because a multiplicity of altars is explicitly

outlawed in Deuteronomy 12, legislation that has significant and far-reaching

influence in the Deuteronomic legal corpus,19 altar asylum is no longer a viableoption for refuge from Mdh l)g (“the blood avenger”), for the central sanctuary

could potentially be too far for the manslayer to reach, leaving him too vulnerable

to the revenge of Mdh l)g. Deuteronomy 19:6 is particularly concerned about this

latter possibility:

17 See John Van Seters, A Law Book for the Diaspora: Revision in the Study of the Covenant Code

(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 106–8. Van Seters understands Exod 21:12–14

to rely on the altar law in Exod 20:24–26; however, he views each text as referring to a single sanctu-

ary in its use of the term Mwqm. Moreover, for Van Seters, the Covenant Collection’s conception of

cultic centralization is directly borrowed from and thus subsequent to Deuteronomy. For critique

of Van Seters, see Levinson, “Is the Covenant Code an Exilic Composition?” passim; Eckart Otto,

review of A Law Book for the Diaspora: Rev ision in the Study of the Covenant Code , RBL 7 (2004)(www.bookreviews.org/pdf/39293801.pdf); and David P. Wright, review of A Law Book for the Dias-

pora: Revision in the Study of the Covenant Code, JAOS124 (2004): 129–31.18 Greenberg, “Biblical Conception of Asylum,” 131–32. For a critique of this view, see Rofé,

“History of the Cities of Refuge.” Briefly, the assumption that Num 35:9–34 serves as a source for

(all of) Deut 19:1–13 does not adequately explain why the Priestly law is more developed concep-

tually than the Deuteronomic law. Nor does it explain why Num 35:9–34 answers questions that

logically arise from Deut 19:1–13: for example, How long must the manslayer remain in the city

of refuge? And what are these cities called? Without further explanation, it is implausible that the

Deuteronomic legislator would have left out these details from his own composition if he were rely-

ing on one that included such elements. Moreover, as demonstrated below, Deut 19:1–13 invents

the concept of asylum cities based on its interpretation of Exod 21:12–14. No such invention can be

demonstrated for Num 35:9–34.19 Centralization is an important factor in Deuteronomy’s (re)formulation of several laws,

including its legislation on tithes, slaves, festivals, the judiciary, and Levites. Among the many treat-

ments of such issues, see Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford:Clarendon, 1972; repr.,Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1992), 191–243; Levinson, Deuteronomy and

the Hermeneutics, 23–143.







Deut 19:6 Krdh hbry yk wgy#hw wbbl Mxy yk xcrh yrx) Mdh l)g Pdry NpMw#l# lwmtm wl )wh )n# )l yk twm +p#m Ny) wlw #pn whkhw

Lest the blood avenger pursue the manslayer in his rage and

overtake him and kill him—because the way is great—even

though it was not a capital case, for the manslayer had not

hated him previously.

Therefore, Deuteronomy establishes multiple cities of asylum so that uninten-

tional killers may be afforded protection similar to that established by Exod

21:12–14. Barmash critiques this explanation of Deut 19:1–13 on the grounds

that the Deuteronomic text does not exhibit enough marked verbal correspon-

dences to Exod 21:12–14 to demonstrate that it depends on this text and because

the formula that the Deuteronomic legislator regularly employs to refer to cultic

centralization20 is unattested in Deuteronomy 19, as is any other polemic toindicate that Deut 19:1–13 is a legal innovation.21 Before turning to these issues

directly, it is worth adding one further objection to this standard explanation of

the development of refuge from altar asylum to city asylum as a response to cultic

centralization. Even if it is determined that cultic centralization did motivate the

shift from altar to city asylum, the question remains: Why city asylum at all? In

other words, Deuteronomic centralization precludes the possibility of altar asy-

lum, but it hardly requires that its replacement be city asylum. What motivates the

innovation of city asylum?

Weinfeld demonstrates that city asylum is widely attested in the ancient Near

East and Mediterranean world generally, citing examples from Mesopotamia,

Anatolia, Egypt, Syro-Palestine, and Greece. He thus sees a natural legal tradition

in the ancient Near East concerning asylum that is incorporated into the penta-teuchal asylum laws.22 But certainly there are other viable methods of providing

asylum than the two biblical options, altar refuge and city refuge. For example,

there is evidence that several nations in the eastern Mediterranean employed the

island of Alashia/Cyprus as a place of asylum/exile during the second millennium

20 With some variation, this formula is M# wm# Mw#l/Nk#l hwhy rxby r#) Mwqmh, “the place in

which the Lord shall choose to place his name.” See Deut 12:5, 11, 14, 18, 21, 26; 14:23, 24, 25; 15:20;

16:2, 6, 7, 11, 15, 16; 17:8, 10; 18:6; 26:2; 31:11.21 Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World , 79.22 Weinfeld, Social Justice, 97–132, esp. 120–32. As will become apparent in the following

discussion, it is important to note that all the extrabiblical examples of asylum that Weinfeld cites

transparently associate city asylum with a temple located within the refuge city. Moreover, because

cultic asylum extended to different boundaries—from altar to temple to temple city—Weinfeld

argues that one need not recognize a development in the Bible from altar asylum to city asylum.Instead, as noted above, Weinfeld argues that the “altar” in Exod 21:14 is housed within the “place”

in Exod 21:13 (Social Justice, 123–24). See below for my response to this view.







b.c.e.23 Thus “island asylum” and/or “foreign nation asylum” could be added to

the list of possible places of refuge.24 Limiting considerations to the ideologi-

cal world of Deuteronomy, the author could have retained the asylum function

of the former sanctuary sites throughout the land while abolishing their cultic

function.25 Such modification would be comparable to the redefinition of animal

slaughter in one’s local town from sacred to secular in nature (Deut 12:15, 21).26

The Deuteronomic legislator, however, does not offer such a redefinition in the

case of asylum. The question thus remains: Why did Deuteronomy choose city

asylum?

Barmash’s observations concerning Deut 19:1–13 are often quite astute;

however, the data can be interpreted differently, the result of which is a more plau-

sible solution to the problems associated with biblical asylum in the Covenant

Collection and Deuteronomy. I shall begin by reexamining the lexical correspon-

dences between Exod 21:12–14 and Deut 19:1–13, which prove both more subtleand more complex and integral to the Deuteronomic revision overall than in

some other examples of legal innovation. Even so, there are several simple, exact

verbal correspondences. First, Exod 21:13 employs the clause hm# swny r#), “to

which he may flee,” which is paralleled exactly in Deut 19:4. Additionally, varia-

tions of this phrase appear several times in Deut 19:1–13:

Deut 19:3 xcr lk hm# swnl hyhwIt shall be for any killer to flee there

Deut 19:5 hl)h Myr(h tx) l) swny )whHe shall flee to one of these cities

Deut 19:11 l)h Myr(h tx) l) snwHe shall flee to one of these cities

Moreover, the root *ykn (C stem) appears in Exod 21:12, Deut 19:4, Deut

19:6, and Deut 19:11:27

23 Michael Heltzer, “Asylum on Alashia (Cyprus),” ZABR 7 (2001): 368–73.24 In his discussion of Num 35:9–34, Greenberg rejects the possibility of foreign nation asy-

lum for ancient Israel because of the religious separation that it would cause the manslayer (“Bibli-

cal Conception of Asylum,” 128).25 This is essentially the argument of Weinfeld, except that the number of asylum cities is lim-

ited by Deuteronomy: asylum cities predate Deut 19:1–13 in ancient Israel and originate as temple

cities (Social Justice, 125, 131). See below for a critique of this view.26 Note the secular redefinition of the verb *xbz (“to sacrifice”) in these verses. See Jacob

Milgrom, “Profane Slaughter and a Formulaic Key to the Composition of Deuteronomy,” HUCA 47

(1976): 1–17; for critique of Milgrom, see Levinson,Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics, 38, 41–43.27 While *ykn is certainly a common verbal root, it is noteworthy that it is not necessary in

this context. A root such as *grh could be substituted for *ykn in several of these examples without

changing the meaning of the text.







Exod 21:12 tmwy twm tmw #y) hk' %maOne who strikes a man, who then dies, shall surely

be put to death

Deut 19:4 t(d ylbb wh(r t) hke % ,yA r#)

who strikes his neighbor unintentionally

Deut 19:6 twm +p#m Ny) wlw #pn w%hkf %hiw:and he strikes him fatally, but he had not commit-

ted a capital crime

Deut 19:11 tmw #pn w%hk% fhiw:and he strikes him fatally, and he thus dies

Verbal forms from the roots *twm and *xql as well as the noun (Ar0 " plus the third

masculine singular possessive pronominal suffix also appear in equivalent con-texts in both pericopae:

*twmExod 21:12 tmwy twm tmw #y) hkm

One who strikes a man, who then dies, shall surely

be put to death

Exod 21:14 twml wnxqtYou shall take him to die

Deut 19:5 tmw wh(r t) )cmw C(h Nm lzrbh l#nwand the iron slips from the wood and finds his

neighbor, who then dies

Deut 19:6 twm +p#m Ny) wlw #pn whkhwand he strikes him fatally, but it was not a capital

crime

Deut 19:11 tmw #pn whkhwand he strikes him fatally, and he thus dies

Deut 19:12 tmw Mdh l)g dyb wt) wntnwthey shall give him into the hand of the avenger,

and he shall die

*xqlExod 21:14 twml wnxqt

You shall take him to die

Deut 19:12 M#m wt) wxqlwThey shall take him from there







wh(r28

Exod 21:14 wgrhl wh(r l( #y) dzy ykwBut if a man plots against his neighbor to kill him

Deut 19:4 t(d ylbb wh(r t) hky r#)who strikes his neighbor unintentionally

Deut 19:5 tmw wh(r t) )cmw C(h Nm lzrbh l#nwand the iron slips from the wood and finds his

neighbor, who then dies

Deut 19:11 wh(rl )n# #y) hyhy ykwBut if a man hates his neighbor

The Covenant Collection and Deuteronomy also express intentionality in

a similar manner. In the case of inadvertency, each text focuses on both a lack of premeditation and the involuntary nature of the blow inflicted. For intentional

cases, premeditation is the major indicator for judging culpable murder:

Unintentional homicide:

Exod 21:13 wdyl hn) Myhl)hw hdc )l r#)wBut he who did not lie in wait, but rather God

moved his hand

Deut 19:4 M#l# lmtm wl )n# )l )whw t(d ylbb wh(r t) hky r#)(the one) who strikes his neighbor without knowl-

edge, for he did not hate him previously

Deut 19:6 Mw#l# lwmtm wl )wh )n# )l ykfor he did not hate him previously

Intentional homicide:

Exod 21:14 hmr(b wgrhl wh(r l( #y) dzy ykwBut if a man plots against his neighbor to kill him

craftily

Deut 19:11 #pn whkhw wyl( Mqw wl br)w wh(rl )n# #y) hyhy ykwBut if a man hates his neighbor and lies in wait for

him and rises up against him and strikes him fatally

28 As David Wright has suggested to me, the appearance of the noun (r (“friend, neighbor”)

in the Covenant Collection homicide/asylum law likely originates in its author’s translation of the

clause šumma aw È µlum aw È µlam/ana aw È µlim + verb in the laws of Hammurabi, which is rendered

(with variation) in the Covenant Collection as yk(w) + imperfect verb + #y) (+ preposition) + wh(r

(see Wright, “Laws of Hammurabi,” 17–35). The appearance of this construction in Deuteronomic

laws certainly reflects the Covenant Collection author’s translation of LH.







Finally, the casuistic formulation of primary and secondary laws in Deut19:1–13 corresponds closely with that in Exod 21:13-14. On this point, EckartOtto observes,

The unusual order of ykw with the following r#$) in 19.4b, 5, 11 hints at a direct

literary dependence of Deut. 19.2–13* upon Exod. 21.12–14. In the BC [Book of

the Covenant] the general rule of the case of killing in Exod. 21.12 was followed by

Exod. 21.13–14, which differentiated between fatal bodily injury and murder. Deut.

19.2–13* reversed the order and placed the asylum regulations at the fore because

they were relevant with regard to the hermeneutical key of cult-centralization.29

Otto’s description of the casuistic formulation in Deut 19:1–13 is imprecise:

there is no ykw in Deut 19:4b (v. 4b begins with r#$)), and v. 5 begins with r#$)w.Verse 11 begins with ykw but is not followed by r#$). Moreover, his description of

a Deuteronomic reversal of the Covenant Collection’s legal sequence is erroneous:

it is true that Exod 21:12–14 begins with a general murder law and then moves tounintentional and intentional cases. However, Deut 19:1–13 does not reverse theorder of murder—manslaughter that Otto observes in the Covenant Collection;rather, the Deuteronomic legislator assumes the normative status of blood revenge

and with it the murder law of Exod 21:12, even though he does not rehearse thislaw in his own asylum legislation. Consideration of intentionality, by contrast, is

found in both Exod 21:13–14 and Deut 19:1–13, and each text follows the samesequence: unintentional (Exod 21:13; Deut 19:4–6, 10)–intentional (Exod 21:14;

Deut 19:11–13).30

Notwithstanding these issues, Otto’s observations are helpful, for they high-light further similarities between these laws. Note the correspondences between

the casuistic formulation of Exod 21:13–14 and Deut 19:1–13:

Exod 21:13 r#) Mwqm Kl ytm#w wdyl hn) Myhl)hw hdc )l r#)w hm# swny

But he who did not lie in wait, but rather Godmoved his hand, I will establish for you a place to

which he may flee.

Deut 19:5 trkl Nzrgb wdy hxdnw Myc( b+xl r(yb wh(r t) )by r#)wtx) l) swny )wh tmw wh(r t) )cmw C(h Nm lzrbh l#nw C(h

yxw hl)h Myr(h

29 Eckart Otto, “Aspects of Legal Reforms and Reformulations,” in Theory and Method in

Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development (ed. B. M. Levinson; JSOTSup

181; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 160–96, here 195). Otto views 19:1, 2b, 7–9 as

Deuteronomistic additions to an original, preexilic asylum text in Deut 19:2a, 3–6, 10–13.30 Something is amiss in Otto’s statement, for, as demonstrated here, the situation is actually

the reverse of what the paragraph cited says. Such basic errors suggest that there may have been a

mistake in the translation of Otto’s work. Nevertheless, once corrected, the thrust of Otto’s observa-

tions remains and is helpful.







And the one who goes with his neighbor into the forest to chop wood andhis hand swings the ax head to cut the wood, but the ax head slips from thewood and finds his neighbor, who then dies, he may flee to one of these

cities and live.

The sequence of elements in these two verses is analogous: (1) The law is intro-duced with pronominal r#$) (preceded by wa µw ).31 (2) An example of uninten-

31 The corresponding usage of pronominal r#$) in Exod 21:13 and Deut 19:4–5 underscores

the literary relationship between these verses, for, as several scholars have noted, the formulation

of Exod 21:13–14 is anomalous in the Covenant Collection but is nevertheless influential in Deut

19:4–5. Incidentally, the origin of this unconventional formulation, as David Wright has pointed

out to me, is the introduction of participial law in Exod 21:12. Because the participle cannot be

negated, the author employs pronominal r#$) + )l + finite verb in v. 13. Deuteronomy 27:24 vis-à-vis 27:26 is a parallel example:

Deut 27:24 Nm) M(h lk rm)w rtsb wh(r hkm rwr)“Cursed is the one who strikes his neighbor in secret,” and all

the people said, “Amen!”

Deut 27:26 rm)w Mtw) tw#(l t)zh hrwth yrbd t) Myqy )l r#) rwr) Nm) M(h lk

“Cursed is he who does not uphold the words of this teaching

to do them,” and all the people said, “Amen!”

In this list of curses, the participle is employed in the positive construction. In the negative con-

struction, the author employs the pronoun r#$) + )l + finite verb. Exodus 9:20–21 provides an

analogous case in a narrative context.

This explanation of r#$)w in Exod 21:13 mitigates somewhat the problem of the introduction

of a subordinate case in v. 14 with the preposition yk. yk otherwise introduces only primary cases in

the Covenant Collection, while M) is normally employed to introduce subordinate cases. Only yk

is used in Exod 21:12–14, however, and then for a secondary case rather than a primary case. Thesolution to this problem is that the author, by employing the participial construction in v. 12 and

the corresponding negative construction with r#$) in v. 13, creates a unique compositional circum-

stance: v. 14 is a subordinate law and thus, if it is to be introduced by a preposition, that preposition

should be M). However, yk has not yet been employed in this subset of laws. He thus follows the rule

that yk comes first in a casuistic law (i.e., before M)), even though v. 14 is a subordinate law.

Related is the use of the participle xcr in Deut 19:4–5: as in Exod 21:13, where the antecedent

for r#$) is the participle hkm in Exod 21:12, the antecendent for r#$) in both Deut 19:4b and 5a is

the participle xcr in v. 4a (thus v. 5 is a direct continuation of v. 4). This scenario suggests that the

author of Deut 19:1–13 may have chosen the participle xcr to describe the killer in his asylum law

not only because the root *xcr could apply to either an intentional or unintentional killer but also

because, even as he desired to give greater specificity to hkm in Exod 21:12, he also sought to pre-

serve the participial form of his source text’s moniker.

Gershon Brin offers a different explanation for the legal formulation in Exod 21:12–14: he

suggests that the combination of two sources—one participial (Exod 21:12) and the other casuistic

(Exod 21:13-14)—necessitated the reversal of vv. 13-14. To his mind, v. 14 should precede v. 13, but

the author of the Covenant Collection reversed this sequence because when placed immediately

after v. 12, v. 14 appears redundant (Studies in Biblical Law: From the Hebrew Bible to the Dead Sea

Scrolls [JSOTSup 176; trans. Jonathan Chipman; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994], 33).







tional killing is offered. (3) Permission is granted to the killer to flee for asylum.

In Exod 21:13, the actual establishment of the place of asylum appears (anacolu-

thically: K̂l ytm#ow) between elements 2 and 3. In Deut 19:1–13, by contrast, the

asylum cities and their purpose are introduced (topicalized, as it were) prior to

v. 5 (19:2–4). Similar correspondences can be observed in the case of intentional

killing:

Exod 21:14 yxbzm M(m hmr(b wgrhl wh(r l( #y) dzy ykwtwml wnxqt

But if a man plots against his neighbor to kill him

craftily, you shall take him from my altar to die.

Deut 19:11–12 #pn whkhw wyl( Mqw wl br)w wh(rl )n# #y) hyhy ykwwxqlw wry( ynqz wxl#w 12 l)h Myr(h tx) l) snw tmw

tmw Mdh l)g dyb wt) wntnw M#m wt)But if a man hates his neighbor and lies in wait for

him and rises up against him and strikes him mor-

tally, and he dies, and he then flees to one of these

cities, the elders of his city shall send and take him

from there and give him into the hand of the blood

avenger, and he shall die.

As in the previous example, these verses share a common sequence: (1) The law

is introduced by ykw. (2) An example of intentional killing is offered. (3) The killer

flees to the asylum place (assumed in Exod 21:14; stated overtly in Deut 19:11).

(4) The killer is denied refuge and is sentenced to death.

While the examples from Deut 19:1–13 cited above certainly differ at points

from those found in Exod 21:12–14, the similarities are quite extensive and doindeed point to direct, genetic dependence of Deut 19:1–13 on Exod 21:12–14.

Moreover, it is possible at points to reconstruct the compositional logic of the

Deuteronomic author and his method of reusing texts. First, Deuteronomy

updates the language of its source, replacing the verbs *ydc and *yn), which are

very rare in the Hebrew Bible generally and do not appear at all elsewhere in the

book of Deuteronomy.32 Second, in comparison with Exod 21:13, the author

While such an explanation is potentially attractive, there are no other examples of laws beginning

with yk followed by subordinate laws introduced by r#$)w in biblical casuistic legislation. Thus,

Brin’s solution is as exceptional as the present form of Exod 21:12-14.32 The verb *ydc appears only twice in the Hebrew Bible: Exod 21:13; 1 Sam 24:12. The verb

*yn) appears four times in the Hebrew Bible: Exod 21:13; 2 Kgs 5:7; Ps 91:10; Prov 12:22. Michael

Fishbane describes the scribal practice of lexical substitution, best evidenced in texts that borrow

extensively from other biblical texts (e.g., between Chronicles and Samuel/Kings) (Biblical Interpre-

tation in Ancient Israel [Oxford: Clarendon, 1985], 55–57). In the book of Deuteronomy, one can

observe this phenomenon both in legal texts, as noted here, and in narrative texts. For examples of







of Deut 19:6 reverses the sequence of criteria for judging a homicide uninten-

tional:33

Exod 21:13 wdyl hn) Myhl)hw hdc )l r#)w

Deut 19:4 M#l# lmtm wl )n# )l )whw t(d ylbb wh(r t) hky r#)

-l; )n"#o becomes Deuteronomy’s preferred description of intention throughout

the rest of its pericope. This explains the recurrence of this phrase in Deuterono-

my’s description of intentional homicide (Deut 19:11), where it replaces the verb

*dyz (Exod 21:14). Even in this revision, however, Deut 19:11 borrows the term

wh(r from Exod 21:14 and integrates it into its description of intentional homi-

cide with -l; )n"#o:

#pn whkhw wyl( Mqw wl br)w wh(rl )n#o #y) hyhy ykw

Moreover, Deut 19:11 complements its -l; )n"#o clause with the verb *br), a more

frequently attested synonym to the verb *ydc,34 which the author already replaced

in Deut 19:6 with the -l; )n"#o clause. Finally, Deut 19:11 omits the adverbial phrase

hmfr:(fb; in Exod 21:14 presumably for two reasons: (1) hmfr:(f is an unusual biblical

word35 and is unattested elsewhere in Deuteronomy; and (2) the author deemed

hmfr:(fb; unnecessary, for its function in Exod 21:14 parallels the -l; )n"#o clause in

Deut 19:11.

Analysis of the compositional logic of Deut 19:1–13 can be extended further

by comparing the portions of the law that correspond directly to Exod 21:12–14

with the portions of the law that find no direct literary parallel in the CovenantCollection law. Deuteronomy 19:3b–6, 11–12 exhibit lexical correspondence to

Exod 21:12–14, as demonstrated already. By contrast, Deut 19:1–3a, 7–10, 13 con-

tain no direct lexical parallels with Exod 21:12–14. Interestingly, the formulation

of Deuteronomy’s asylum legislation can be divided according to grammatical

the latter, see the chapter entitled “Deuteronomy as Interpretation” in Marc Z. Brettler, The Creation

of History in Ancient Israel (London: Routledge, 1995), 62–78.33 This may be an interpretive variation of the inverted quotation technique commonly

called Zeidel’s law, after its discoverer. See Moshe Zeidel, “Parallels between Isaiah and Psalms” (in

Hebrew), Sinai 38 (1955–56): 149–72, 229–40, 272–80, 335–55; Pancratius C. Beentjes, “Inverted

Quotations in the Bible: A Neglected Stylistic Pattern,” Bib 63 (1982): 506–23; idem, “Discover-

ing a New Path of Intertextuality: Inverted Quotations and Their Dynamics,” in Literary Structure

and Rhetorical Strategies in the Hebrew Bible (ed. L. J. de Regt et al.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns,

1996), 31–50.34 See Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World , 23 n. 6.35 hmfr:(f appears five times in the Hebrew Bible, twice with a negative connotation: “craftiness”

(Exod 21:14; Josh 9:4), “prudence” (Prov 1:4; 8:5, 12).







person in the same way: Deut 19:3b–6, 11–12 exhibit third person, casuistic for-

mulation, while Deut 19:1–3a, 7–10, 13 exhibit second person formulation that is

a combination of casuistic and apodictic style. In other words, the content that the

Deuteronomic legislator takes over without significant alteration is expressed in

the language of his textual patrimony and in third person casuistic formulation.

When Deuteronomy innovates, however, the author regularly reverts to his pre-

ferred second person, apodictic style. Analogous is the Deuteronomic revision of

the kidnapping law of Exod 21:16: Deut 24:7 converts the Covenant Collection’s

participial law into third person casuistic form and strictly follows this legal style

until introducing its own characteristically second person apodictic rationale

clause (Kbrqm (rh tr(bw, “and you shall purge the evil from your midst”). The

changes in grammatical person and legal style mark the shift from dependence on

source material to original composition.36

With respect to legal formulation, however, there is a middle road for theDeuteronomic legislator. Specifically, Deuteronomy need not follow its source

text slavishly even when it borrows lemmas directly from it. With regard to

asylum laws, the verb *xql in Exod 21:14 is in the second person form ( w%n%xeq% ft% i).

By contrast, Deut 19:12 attests a third person form of the same verb (w%xq;lfw:),

undoubtedly due to the added context in the Deuteronomic law (i.e., the intro-

duction of the elders). This change in context allows the author of Deut 19:12 to

simultaneously borrow and innovate, preferring the diction of his source even

as he smoothes its legal formulation to conform to his larger composition. The

result is consistent use of third person casuistic formulation in instances in which

the author of Deut 19:1–13 borrows from the Covenant Collection asylum law,

even though the latter is not characterized by such consistency. On this point, too,

Deut 24:7 provides an analogy. The legal patrimony for this text—the participial

law in Exod 21:16—is converted into a third person casuistic law. This revision is

particularly striking because the asylum law in Exod 21:13–14 is introduced by

and depends on the participial homicide law in Exod 21:12, which suggests that

Deuteronomy may employ a similar methodology for revising various participial

laws and those subordinate to them.

The shift from second person wnxqt in Exod 21:14 to third person wxqlw in

Deut 19:12 may also indicate a substantive shift in the Deuteronomic law. In light

of the connection between the Covenant Collection altar and asylum laws, it is

likely that the imagined referents of the second person form in Exod 21:14 are

the same as those to whom the altar laws are directed in Exod 20:24–26.37 In the

latter case, the recipient of the law is explicitly the nation of Israel as a whole (cf.

36 To my knowledge, scholars have not previously recognized that the Deuteronomic asylum

law’s dependence on Exod 21:12–14 is recognizable in the variation between the third person casu-

istic and second person apodictic legal formulation of this unit.37 I thank David Wright for calling my attention to this point.







Exod 20:22). Thus, in the Covenant Collection law, the adjudication of the asylum

seeker’s case (implied in Exod 21:13–14) and the execution of the penalty in v. 14

are the responsibility of the national administrative body. By contrast, Deut 19:12

clearly assigns to the city elders jurisdiction over both the trial and punishment

phases of the asylum seeker’s case. By employing the form wxql, then, the Deu-

teronomic author modifies the second person verbal form of his source text and

in this way marks his own composition as a revision. But by making this revision,

he also subverts the legal process his source text prescribes, introducing instead

a new adjudication procedure for the case of the asylum seeker. Such nuanced

revision—integrating and even subsuming significant content alterations within

a grammatical pattern that marks textual reuse—exemplifies the Deuteronomic

author’s keen understanding of his legal patrimony as well as his skillful method

of literary revision. The introduction of the city elders also betrays the Deu-

teronomic author’s strong orientation toward application of this legislation in theland of Israel (cf. Deut 19:1).38

The preceding discussion demonstrates the intricacy of the Deuteronomic

author’s creative utilization and modification of his source text and highlights

three different compositional techniques employed in Deut 19:1–13 for such revi-

sion:

1. Direct borrowing without revision of legal formulation

2. Direct borrowing of content with revised legal formulation

3. Creative revision of content and interpolations in the preferred style of

the author

Distinguishing clearly between portions of the Deuteronomic asylum law that

have been influenced by the Covenant Collection and those parts that have not

been so influenced may at first suggest the combination of two originally inde-pendent sources, one of which contained third-person casuistic law while the

other contained second-person apodictic and/or casuistic law. Further investiga-

tion, however, demonstrates that positing multiple, originally independent legal

sources in the case of Deuteronomic asylum is not warranted, for those sections

of Deut 19:1–13 without parallel in the Covenant Collection (i.e., Deut 19:1–3a,

7–10, 13) are infused with characteristically Deuteronomic language.39

38 One is tempted to conclude that the Deuteronomic author may find further substantiation

for introducing the city elders here in light of their role at Sinai in Exodus 19 and 24 (19:7; 24:1, 9,

14). That is, Exod 20:22 clearly states that Moses is to speak to the children of Israel, but the elders

play an especially prominent and representational role in Exodus 19 and 24, which suggests that

they should represent the people in the fulfillment of Moses’ command in Exod 21:14.39 See Weinfeld’s helpful compilation of Deuteronomic phraseology (Deuteronomy and the

Deuteronomic School , 320–65).







III. The Reconceptualization of Mwqmin Deuteronomy 19:1–13

The foregoing reconstruction of the compositional logic of the Deutero-

nomic asylum law adds further weight to the lexical and sequential ties adduced

between Exod 21:12–14 and Deut 19:1–13. The most compelling piece of evidence

recommending a direct, literary relationship between these asylum laws, however,

concerns the issue of the Mwqm in Exod 21:13 and its reflex in Deut 19:1–13. The

suggestion that Mwqm in Exod 21:13 may refer to a city and not to a cultic site

presents a possibility for understanding the relationship between asylum laws in

the Covenant Collection and Deuteronomy. Although a modern, historical-criti-

cal reading of Mwqm in Exod 21:13 precludes the meaning of “city, town” (ry(), as

shown above, Barmash likely (unknowingly) stumbled upon the logic of the Deu-teronomic legislator in his revision of the homicide and asylum laws in the Cov-

enant Collection. The question is, Is it possible that the author of Deut 19:1-13

exploited the biblical semantic parallel between Mwqm and ry( in order to reorient

the Covenant Collection law? Did he recognize that a claim for city asylum rather

than altar asylum can indeed be found in the ambiguous use of Mwqm in Exod

21:13? Barmash certainly does: as noted already, she goes even further, suggesting

that Mwqm in Exod 21:13 actually does mean ry(. Her conclusion, however, recog-

nizes no literary relationship between these two laws:

No evidence exists for the dependence of Deut 19:1–13 on Exod 21:12–14. It

appears, then, that Deut 19:1–13 assumes that the cities of refuge were an insti-

tution of long standing, not an innovation. . . . There are no texts that depict

cities of refuge as a radical discontinuity. The cities of refuge are presented ashaving continuity with past practice.40

A different conclusion is more plausible: with regard to city asylum, the Deu-

teronomic legislator need not innovate, for he finds just such a long-standing

institution in (his interpretation of ) his source text. In other words, Deut 19:1–13

does not assume that asylum cities were a well-established institution; it asserts

this claim from documented fact. Moreover, Deuteronomy’s asylum law need not

polemicize strongly against its source in order to present its innovation, for it can

simply declare that Mwqm in Exod 21:13 always meant ry(.41 This is the reason that

40 Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World, 80. Milgrom similarly argues that Deuteronomic

asylum is unrelated to centralization and does not innovate but rather presumes a long-standing

tradition of city asylum (“Sancta Contagion and Altar/City Asylum,” 302–3; see also Jacob Milgrom,

Numbers rbdmb [JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia/New York: Jewish Publication Society,

1990], 506).41 In some ways, although he views the chronology of the relationship between the penta-

teuchal asylum laws differently, Greenberg comes closest to this interpretation in his conclusions







the role of the city elders in its law (vv. 19-20) in a manner analogous to that in the

asylum law (Deut 19:12).45 Second, as noted already, Deut 21:19 explicitly places

Mwqm and ry( in parallel:

Deut 21:19 wmqm r(# l)w wry( ynqz l) wt) w)ycwhw wm)w wyb) wb w#ptwHis mother and father shall seize him and take him out to

the elders of his city and to the gate of his place.

This verse is especially important for understanding the development of city

asylum in Deut 19:1-13 because it demonstrates that the Deuteronomic author

recognizes the parallel between Mwqm and ry( and does so in a judicial context

comparable to that of the refuge law.

In light of such evidence, it is likely that the Deuteronomic legislator inten-

tionally omits the word Mwqm from his discussion of cities of refuge in order to

contrast his vision of city asylum with the altar asylum found in his source text.

This also explains why explicit reference to cult centralization, including the

centralization formula found in several Deuteronomic laws, is absent from Deut

19:1–13: because the author is reinterpreting the term Mwqm to mean ry(, he avoids

making any reference to Mwqm as cultic site—its precise meaning in the centraliza-

tion formula. Moreover, it is important to recognize that, with respect to its spe-

cifically cultic character,46 Mwqm is fundamentally singular for the Deuteronomic

legislation such as Deut 19:1-13 in their work if their aim were to supplant completely the local

judiciary in the precise cases that the asylum law addresses.45 There are several Deuteronomic laws that elucidate the judicial function of the city elders.

Particularly comparable to Deut 19:1–13 is the hpwr( hlg( (broken-neck heifer) rite in Deut 21:1–9,

the concerns, procedures, and players of which are analogous to the Deuteronomic asylum law

(many scholars assign these two texts to the same layer within the compositional history of Deu-

teronomy; see Rofé, “History of the Cities of Refuge,” 126–27). As in the asylum text (esp. 19:10,

13), the interest of Deut 21:1–9 is the shedding of innocent blood ( yqn Md Kp#$) and its potential

effects (Deut 21:7–9, 13). Moreover, the city elders play a fundamental role both in assessing the

guilt or innocence of the killer in Deut 19:12 and in determining which town must participate in the

elimination rite in Deut 21:1–9 and in facilitating that rite (Deut 21:2–3). Each text commands the

measurement of the land between cities (Deut 19:3; 21:2). Additionally, both the asylum text and

the hpwr( hlg( rite employ the same verb to describe the killing, *xcr (Deut 19:4, 6, 11; Deut 21:1).

For further discussion of the judicial function of the elders, see Jacob Milgrom, “The Ideological

and Historical Importance of the Office of Judge in Deuteronomy,” in Isac Leo Seeligmann Volume:

Essays on the Bible and the Ancient World (ed. A. Rofé and Y. Zakovitch; 3 vols.; Jerusalem: E. Ruben-

stein, 1983), 3:129–39.46 Deuteronomy 23:17 employs the term Mwqm in the singular in the context of a slave choosing

a place to live and the Israelites’ obligation to not return him to his master. In this verse, Mwqm does

not have a cultic connotation. It is interesting to note, however, that the slave’s choice of a “place”

to dwell among the Israelites is described in terms that parallel the centralization formula almost

exactly. See Hamilton, Social Justice, 117–21. Further, Deuteronomy rarely uses Mwqm in reference to

the land of Israel as a whole (e.g., Deut 26:9). Thomas C. Römer suggests that such texts are exilic







legislator. In fact, the only attestation of twmwqm (“places”) in the book of Deuter-onomy is the proverbial exception that proves this rule. Deut 12:2 states:

Deut 12:2 Mywgh M# wdb( r#) twmqmh lk t) Nwdb)t db)Mymrh Myrhh l( Mhyhl) t) Mt) My#ry Mt) r#)

Nn(r C( lk txtw tw(bgh l(wYou shall destroy all of the places in which the

nations that you are possessing worshipped theirgods—those upon the high mountains and uponthe hills and under every leafy tree.

This single example of Mwqm in the plural, found at the beginning of Deuteron-

omy’s centralization law, appears in the context of prohibited worship. For the

Deuteronomic legislator, the proper locale for worship is essentially singular, andhe underscores such cultic ideology by contrasting the singular “place that theLord your God shall choose” with the plural “places” in which the Canaanites

worshiped their gods. Thus, twmwqm in Deut 12:2 serve as a foil for the ensuingdetails of cult centralization. In light of this fundamental tie between cultic con-notation and singularity, the word Mwqm is effectively eliminated from eligibil-

ity in the Deuteronomic author’s discussion of asylum: to speak of multiple,noncultic “places” undercuts too severely the driving ideological principle that

stands behind the Deuteronomic legal corpus.47 The author of the Deuteronomicasylum law is thus forced to reinterpret his source text’s use of what has become to

him a vital and technical term—Mwqm.48

in origin and therefore link temple and land together, for the restoration of the former requires

the restoration of the latter (“Cult Centralization in Deuteronomy 12: Between DeuteronomisticHistory and Pentateuch,” in Das Deuteronomium zwischen Pentateuch und Deuteronomistischem

Geschichtswerk [ed. E. Otto and R. Achenbach; FRLANT 206; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,

2004], 168–80, here 172–73). Römer’s suggestion that Mwqm in Deut 12:11 may mean “land,” how-

ever, is dubious and may even cast doubt on his larger historical reconstruction.47 An analogous example of “reserving” a particular word/verbal root for a specific, technical

usage (and refusing to use it otherwise) is the attestation of the verb *#$dq in P/H. In contrast to

other biblical authors, pentateuchal Priestly writers never employ this verb for simple cleaning/

washing. Instead, P/H reserves *#$dq for specialized use within its ideological framework of cult and

morality (see Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary

[AB 3A; New York: Doubleday, 1991], 967).48 The import and flexibility of the term Mwqm in asylum legislation are further exemplified

by its attestation in Josh 20:4. This verse states, “He shall flee to one of these cities and stand at the

opening of the gate and speak his words into the ears of the elders of that city. They shall gather

him to themselves into the city and they shall provide a place (Mwqm) for him, and he shall dwell

with them/under their protection.” Meir Malul argues that in this verse Mwqm is not simply a physi-

cal place but rather takes on a spacially nuanced sense of social status (“> A µqe µb ‘Heel’ and > A µqab ‘To

Supplant’ and the Concept of Succession in the Jacob-Esau Narratives,” VT 46 [1996]: 190–212, here

210).







The foregoing arguments make it possible to contrast Deuteronomy’s cen-tralization law with its asylum law as follows: the author of Deuteronomy 12 takesover the basic meaning of Mwqm in his legal patrimony of Exod 20:24 without

change. In both cases, it is a cultic site. The only difference is plurality versus sin-gularity.49 In Deut 19:1–13, by contrast, the author must revise his source, secu-

larizing50 what is explicitly cultic in Exod 21:12–14. Rather than meaning “cultplace,” as it does in Exod 21:13 (in the context of v. 14 and the association of these

verses with Exod 20:24–26), the author of Deut 19:1–13 reinterprets Mwqm so thatit might mean ry(. Such secularization, however, allows the Deuteronomic authorto retain the potential plurality of Mwqm in Exod 21:13, for as “city” instead of “cult

place,” there is no longer any fundamental ideological restriction with regard tomultiple “places.” Through such creative inner-biblical exegesis, Deuteronomy

borrows the prestige and authority of its source text, presenting its legal innova-

tion as continuous and harmonious with Exod 21:12–14.51

49 Just as modern scholars have struggled with the difficult phrase Mwqmh lkb in Exod 20:24

and have treated it as a crux interpretum, it is possible that the author(s) of the Deuteronomic cen-

tralization law exploited this “pregnant construction” to his own ends. That is, though this phrase

should be rendered “in every place,” as noted above, it is possible that the Deuteronomic author

found a textual basis for a singular Mwqm in this phrase, choosing to understand r#) Mwqmh lkb

ym# t) rykz) as “in the entirety of the (singular) place in which I will declare my name.” In light of

Deuteronomy’s penchant for legitimating its innovations through inner-biblical exegesis, it is likely

that the Deuteronomic author does creatively interpret Mwqmh lkb in Exod 20:24 as a singular cultic

site. I thank David Wright for this suggestion.50 Weinfeld also argues that Deuteronomy secularizes in the case of asylum; however, he

presumes that Num 35:9–34 is historically antecedent to Deut 19:1–13 and serves as a source for

the latter. Thus, Deuteronomy’s secularization, evidenced by its use of the verb lydbh (Deut 19:2,

7) rather than the Priestly hrqh (Num 35:11) and #$dqh (Josh 20:7) (but cf. Rofé’s rebuttal of such

argument [“History of the Cities of Refuge,” 133]), is a move away from the cultic consideration of asylum in the Priestly law and not from altar asylum in the Covenant Collection (Deuteronomy and

the Deuteronomic School , 236–37). In addition to viewing the chronology of the sources differently,

Weinfeld leaves the question of the origin of the concept of city asylum unexplained. For secular-

ization in Deuteronomy, see also Moshe Weinfeld, “On ‘Demythologization and Secularization’ in

Deuteronomy,” IEJ 23 (1973): 230–33; Jacob Milgrom, “The Alleged ‘Demythologization and Secu-

larization’ in Deuteronomy,”IEJ 23 (1973): 156–61.51 The method of inner-biblical exegesis that I observe here builds on that explained by Fish-

bane (Biblical Interpretation, 231–77) and by Levinson (Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics, pas-

sim). In the latter case, Levinson concentrates especially on examples in which the Deuteronomic

legislator uses the exact words or phrases (in his and Fishbane’s terminology, lemmas) of the Cov-

enant Collection in order to subvert their meaning in their original context (cf. Deuteronomy 12’s

reinterpretation of the altar law in Exod 20:24 [Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics, 23–52]). In the

case of Mwqm in Exod 21:13, however, the Deuteronomic author does not actually use the exact term

from his source text but rather only interprets it, thereby leaving less evidence of his literary depen-

dence. Nevertheless, as is the case in Levinson’s examples, Deuteronomy here borrows the authority

of the Covenant Collection while altering its message. This seems similar to what Fishbane calls the

“‘bound’ variety” of “implied lemmatic exegesis” (Biblical Interpretation, 267).

In a more recent article (“You Must Not Add Anything to What I Command You: Paradoxes







Finally, the other innovations introduced in the Deuteronomic asylum law

flow smoothly from this reconceptualization of Mwqm as ry(. For example, Deu-

teronomy clarifies the adjudication of the asylum seeker’s case by introducing

the city elders, for whom the city (gate) is the natural judicial context.52 Similarly,

while Exod 21:13–14 leaves the fate of the unintentional killer undefined, the

asylum city in Deut 19:1–13 provides a potentially permanent safehaven for the

manslayer.53

Even without the preceding explanation of Deuteronomy’s interpretation

of asylum in the Covenant Collection, Barmash’s contention that Deut 19:1–13

contains no polemic vis-à-vis Exod 21:12–14 cannot withstand closer evaluation.

As noted already, the Deuteronomic author offers a compelling rationale for his

asylum city legislation in v. 6: such cities must be established so that, if the dis-

tance be too far, the blood avenger cannot overtake the manslayer on his way to

of Canon and Authorship in Ancient Israel,” Numen 50 [2003]: 1–51), Levinson discusses further

the nature of biblical legal innovation and offers particularly pertinent insights for the present

study. For example, he states, “The biblical authors developed what may best be described as a

‘rhetoric of concealment,’ one that served to camouflage the actual literary history of the laws” (p.

24). Likewise, in the context of his discussion of Ezekiel’s transformation of intergenerational pun-

ishment, Levinson notes, “The new teaching is presented as consistent with the very doctrine that it

rejects: as an authoritatively taught ‘re-citation’ of the original theologoumenon” (p. 39). Such is the

case in Deuteronomy’s transformation of Exod 21:13’s Mwqm.52 See Willis, Elders of the City , 89–144.53 In contrast to Num 35:25, 28, Deut 19:1–13 does not explicitly state how long the uninten-

tional killer must remain in the asylum city. For this reason, scholars have offered several different

suggestions for understanding the nature and length of the manslayer’s residence in the asylum city.

For example, Weinfeld argues that the manslayer would remain in the asylum city until the blood

avenger’s anger diminished (Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School , 237). Rofé suggests, on

the evidence of Num 35:32, that the manslayer would pay a ransom to the victim’s family, thereby

resolving the issue of blood feud for the blood avenger (“History of the Cities of Refuge,” 144).

Raymond Westbrook holds that compensation may be paid to the victim’s family in the case of both

intentional and unintentional killing (Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law [CahRB 26; Paris: Gab-

alda, 1988], 79). The implication in the text, however, is that the unintentional killer must remain in

the asylum city permanently in order safely to avoid reprisal at the hand of the blood avenger (see

Willis’s discussion of this issue, in which he argues that requiring the exile of the unintentional killer

“equalizes” the loss of the victim’s family [Elders of the City , 135]).

One major issue in Deut 19:1–13 that is left unexplained by the Deuteronomic reconceptual-

ization of Mwqm as ry( is the introduction of the blood avenger as agent of revenge. It is possible that

the idea of blood revenge, which is common in kinship-based societies (see Barmash, Homicide in

Ancient Israel , 20–70; Willis, Elders of the City , 90–111), was assumed by the Deuteronomic author

in his understanding of Exod 21:12–14 and simply made explicit in Deut 19:1–13 (so Westbrook,

Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law , 79). Certainly Exod 21:13–14 assumes that the unintentional

killer is in potential danger, especially in light of the homicide law in Exod 21:12 and the talion pre-

scriptions in Exod 21:23b–25. However, there is no direct evidence for determining how the blood

avenger was introduced into the pentateuchal asylum laws.







the place of asylum. The question that must be addressed here is, Why would thedistance to the place of asylum be too far? What is the author’s assumption thatstands behind his rationale in v. 6? Deuteronomy 19:6 betrays both its assumption

of cult centralization and its dependence on a source that advocates altar asy-lum.54 Specifically, this verse presumes that the immediately preceding command

that three cities of asylum be established will combat any potential problem thatfewer places of refuge could create. Is this possibility to which the author responds

a hypothetical one, or is Deuteronomy here responding to an actual, if only liter-ary, issue? The most plausible answer is that the Deuteronomic legislator is herereacting to the promulgation of altar asylum in Exod 21:12–14, which, if taken

over wholesale in Deuteronomy, would mean that asylum would be limited to thesingle, centralized sanctuary.55 In such a circumstance, the distance to the altar

could indeed be so far that the manslayer could be unduly exposed to the blood

avenger’s wrath. Thus, Deut 19:6 serves precisely as a polemic against the altarasylum that Exod 21:12–14 advocates and does so in response to Deuteronomy’slarger program of cult centralization.

The recognition that Deuteronomy reinterprets Mwqm in Exod 21:13 as ry( and thus avoids the word Mwqm altogether also provides further evidence forevaluating the suggestion of scholars such as Rofé and Otto that, in addition to

the asylum cities that it legislates, Deuteronomy imagines the central sanctuary as a place of refuge.56 Such a scenario is unlikely for several reasons. First, Deuter-

onomy nowhere refers to the central sanctuary (city) as an asylum city.57 Second,the description of the establishment of the asylum cities in Deut 19:2–3, which

includes instructions for dividing the land, takes no account of an additional ref-uge at the central sanctuary. Neither does the rest of the passage take into accountan additional place of asylum:

Deut 19:5 yxw hl)h Myr(h tx) l) swny )whHe may flee to one of these cities and live.

Deut 19:9 hl)h #l#h l( Myr( #l# dw( Kl tpsywYou shall add for yourself another three cities on

top of these three.

Finally, Deuteronomy’s redefinition of the term Mwqm from sanctuary to city, itsdisciplined avoidance of centralization language in its asylum law, and its specific

54 Rofé similarly recognizes that Deut 19:6 responds to the issue of cult centralization (“His-

tory of the Cities of Refuge,” 127–28).55 Among the many scholars who recognize the shift from altar asylum to city asylum as a

response to Deuteronomic centralization, see recently Otto, Das Deuteronomium, 253–56; and Rofé,

“History of the Cities of Refuge,” 127–28, 133, 137.56 Rofé, “History of the Cities of Refuge,” 128–30; Otto, Das Deuteronomium, 264–65.57 See Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World , 88 n. 61.







polemic against sanctuary asylum (Deut 19:6) eliminate the central sanctuary

from consideration as a place of refuge. Thus, the continuity between Exod 21:12–

14 and Deut 19:1–13 is but a guise, masking the considerable innovation of the

Deuteronomic author. By claiming that Deuteronomy preserves Jerusalem as an

asylum city, Rofé and Otto fail to recognize that the legislator here completely

secularizes asylum and thus rejects the Covenant Collection’s altar asylum.58

Rofé argues based on historical data that Jerusalem remained an asylum

city even into the postbiblical period;59 however, such evidence can only dem-

onstrate that the Deuteronomic legislator was either not completely successful

in his attempt to replace altar asylum with city asylum or that the city of Jerusa-

lem was indeed considered an asylum city by persons and/or sources unrelated

to Deut 19:1–13. If the issue is indeed the incomplete accomplishment of the

Deuteronomic reform of asylum, such failure of application is certainly attested

with regard to other laws in Deuteronomy. One of the most well-known examplesof the historical breakdown of Deuteronomic law is in the case of the release of

slaves: Jer 34:8–22 records the prophet’s indictment of the Judeans for failing to

enact the release of slaves and does so by citing (a variation of) the law concerning

slaves in Deut 15:12–18.60 Similarly, letters from the Jewish colony at Elephantine

reveal that diasporic Jews in the postexilic period were custodians of a YHWHistic

temple in their Egyptian locale and that their temple was sanctioned by Jewish

officials in Jerusalem,61 a flagrant violation of the centralization law in Deuter-

onomy 12. In the case of asylum, the literary evidence precludes the possibility

58 Rofé argues that the Deuteronomic asylum law was only “intended to modify and comple-

ment the customary law,” as expressed in Exod 21:12–14 (“History of the Cities of Refuge,” 128).

Otto differentiates between the sanctuary city and the land cities, arguing that Exod 21:13–14

applies to the central sanctuary while Deut 19:2–13 applies to the rest of the land (Das Deuterono-

mium, 264–65).59 Rofé cites an ambiguous letter from Arad; Jer 7:4, 9–14; several psalms; Neh 6:10–13;

1 Macc 10:31, 43; and Hellenistic custom in support of understanding Jerusalem as a refuge in the

post-Deuteronomic period (“History of the Cities of Refuge,” 128–30).60 See M. David, “The Manumission of Slaves under Zedekiah (A Contribution to the Laws

about Hebrew Slaves),” OTS 5 (1948): 63–79; Nahum Sarna, “Zedekiah’s Emancipation of Slaves

and the Sabbatical Year,” in Orient and Occident: Essays Presented to Cyrus H. Gordon on the Occasion

of his Sixty-fifth Birthday (ed. H. A. Hoffner; AOAT 22; Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker; Neukirchen-

Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1973), 143–49.61 See texts 30–33 in Arthur E. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford: Clar-

endon, 1923). See also the newer edition of these texts (identified as A4.7–A4.10) in Bezalel Porten

and Ada Yardeni, Textbook of Aramaic Documents from Ancient Egypt (3 vols.; Jerusalem: Hebrew

University Department of the History of the Jewish People, 1986) and their English translation with

commentary (texts B19–B22) in Bezalel Porten, The Elephantine Papyri in English: Three Millennia

of Cross-Cultural Continuity and Change (Documenta et Monumenta Orientis Antiqui 22; Leiden:

Brill, 1996).







that the author of Deut 19:1–13 intended the central sanctuary to serve as a placeof refuge.

A final word: the historical development from altar asylum to city asylum

that is posited here exists on the literary level, for my interest in this study is theliterary development of a concept within competing ideological frameworks. The

“history” that is recovered in this analysis is both the real compositional inter-action between actual ancient texts and the story imagined and narrated within

them. Deuteronomy 19:1–13 invents the concept of refuge cities on interpre-tive grounds in its creative engagement with its textual legal patrimony, Exod21:12–14.62 The actual history of asylum in ancient Israel remains unaddressed

in this scenario. This is important to note because the concern of many scholarswho have analyzed the pentateuchal asylum laws previously has been the real, his-

torical development of asylum practice in ancient Israel. I challenge such theories

only insofar as their substantiation lies primarily in biblical texts. The real history of ancient Israel may actually agree with one reconstruction or another, althoughfurther extrabiblical evidence would be necessary to demonstrate this.

62 An interpretive invention of asylum cities accords better with the Deuteronomic method

of introducing reform than does any posited reaction to historical circumstance. For example, in

Deuteronomy 12, it is not historical circumstances but interpretive interaction with Exod 20:24 that

forms the basis for D’s centralization law. So also here: interpretation of Exod 21:12–14 provides the

basis for the invention of asylum cities, not the preexistence of such refuge towns in Israel/Judah.