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Why did PSOE lose in the general elections in Spain in 2011? An analysis of electoral behaviour Tomáš Došek Instituto de Iberoamérica Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration University of Salamanca https://sites.google.com/site/tomasdoseklatam/ [email protected] 2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference “Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis”, November 28-29, 2013, European University Institute, Florence, Italy

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Why did PSOE lose in the generalelections in Spain in 2011?

An analysis of electoral behaviour

Tomáš DošekInstituto de IberoaméricaDept. of Political Science and Public AdministrationUniversity of Salamancahttps://sites.google.com/site/tomasdoseklatam/[email protected]

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference “Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis”,November 28-29, 2013, European University Institute, Florence, Italy

Stucture of the Presentation

Context Research Design Theoretical framework and

hypothesis Data, method and variables Results Conclusions

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 1/13

ContextGeneral elections in Spain (November 2011)PSOE electorally punished – one of the last

elections in Europe and one of the harshest lostFatigue (8 years in government), economic crisis,

unemployment, bad communication93.3% of the people considered that the economic

situation in the last 4 year worsened (a lot)More of a defeat of PSOE than victory of PP

– PSOE lost more than 4m votes (2008)– PP improved only moderately

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 2/13

Context: electoral results

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 3/13

Votes % valid Votes % validPP 10,866,566 44.63 10,278,010 39.94PSOE 7,003,511 28.76 11,289,335 43.87IU 1,686,040 6.92 969,946 3.77Other parties 4,459,308 19.69 2,911,393 12.42Total valid 24,348,886 25,734,863

Abstention 11,113,050 (31.06%) 9,172,740 (26.15%)

2011 2008

Research Design “Restricted variance” problem

Fraile & Lewis-Beck (2013)- Exogenize economic perceptions

(agreggate economic measures)- Pooled cross-sectional design- Economy matters

Martín & Urquizu-Sancho (2012)Kennedy (2012), Chari (2013)- More qualitative studies

Different research question=> What factors led the socialist

voters from 2008 to abandonelectorally PSOE in 2011?

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 4/13

Theoretical framework and hypothesis

Traditional voting behaviour literature, recent studies on elections in thetime of crisis, qualitative studies of the last elections

Test of rival models for the explantation of voting behaviour of PSOEvoters (2008)

Crisis responsibility Who is to blame? (Anderson & Hecht 2010; Karyotis & Rüdig 2013; Tillman 2011; Bartels 2011)

Evaluation of PSOE performance Retrospective voting (Fioirina 1981; Bartels 2011; Dalton & Anderson 2011)

PP more capable to handle unemployment Valence issues (Clarke & Whitten 2013; Clarke et al. 2011; Martín and Urquizu-Sancho 2012)

New Primer Minister Personalization of politics (Rico 2009 and 2010; Rohrschneider & Schmitt-Beck 2010)

15-M movement Social movilization & Discontent with politics (Chari 2013)

Few analysis of the last elections (Fraile & Lewis-Beck 2013; Martín &Urquizu-Sancho 2012; Kennedy 2012; Chari 2013)

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 5/13

Data, method and variables Panel survey n° 7711 (Centro de Investigaciones

Sociológicas, October 2011-January 2012) Limited sample: voters of PSOE from 2008 who voted for

PP, IU, other party, did not vote or remained loyal to PSOE=> Dependent variable (Nominal, 2+ categories) Independent variables:

– Pre-electoral: evaluation of the PSOE government (3C),preference for the future Prime Minister (3C), capacity to handlethe most important problem (3C)

– Post-electoral: responsibility for the economic crisis (4C), opinionabout the 15-M movement (int.)

Control variables:– proximity to PSOE (dummy), functioning of democracy (int.),

ideology (int.), sex (dummy), age (int.), educational level (3C)Multinomial logistic regression

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 6/13

ResultsAll parties: Proximity to PSOE PP: Next Prime Minister, Retrospective evaluation of PSOE, Capacity on

unemployment, Approval of 15-M activities (negatively)

IU: Retrospective evaluation of PSOE, Approval of 15-M movement

(positive)

Other parties Retrospective evaluation of PSOE, Capacity on unemployment, Next

Prime Minister (to a lesser extent)

Abstention Next Prime Minister, Capacity on unemployment, Responsibility for

the crisis

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 7/13

bOddsratio

bOddsratio

bOddsratio

bOddsratio

Sex (RC: Man)Woman -0.048 0.953 0.085 1.088 0.069 1.072 0.101 1.106

(-0.219) (0.234) (0.202) (0.295)Age -0.022** 0.978 0.002 1.002 -0.01 0.99 -0.041*** 0.96

(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012)Educational level (RC: None or primary)

Secondary 0.01 1.01 0.870** 1.372 0.326 1.386 0.378 1.459(0.256) (0.295) (0.257) (0.335)

Higher -0.289 0.749 1.013** 1.564 0.746** 2.108 -0.497 0.608(0.274) (0.295) (0.267) (0.412)

Ideology 0.318*** 1.374 -0.087 0.917 0.005 1.005 0.071 1.074(0.085) (0.093) (0.083) (0.104)

Proximity to PSOE (RC: No)Yes -0.773** 0.462 -1.576*** 0.207 -1.807*** 0.164 -1.177*** 0.308

(0.234) (0.276) (0.225) (0.329)Responsibility for crisis (RC: Other factor)

Government 0.617 1.853 0.402 1.495 0.36 1.433 1.112** 3.04(0.324) (0.413) (0.341) (0.397)

International economic situation -0.732* 0.481 -0.415 0.66 -0.27 0.763 -0.66 0.517(0.302) (0.351) (0.311) (0.435)

Banks -0.151 0.86 0.166 1.181 0.362 1.437 -0.4 0.67(0.29) (0.338) (0.274) (0.413)

Next prime minister (RC: Rubalcaba)Rajoy 2.604*** 13.514 0.02 1.02 0.668 1.951 1.524** 4.592

(0.318) (0.559) (0.376) (0.442)Other person 1.26*** 3.524 0.576 1.778 0.712* 2.037 0.926 2.524

(0.32) (0.386) (0.305) (0.394)Evaluation of PSOE (RC: Good)

Regular 0.521 1.685 1.180* 3.254 0.973* 2.646 -0.252 0.777(0.55) (0.542) (0.478) (0.642)

Bad 1.392* 4.021 1.156** 4.776 1.529** 4.614 0.58 1.786(0.544) (0.578) (0.496) (0.676)

Capacity on unemployment (RC: PSOE)Partido Popular 0.988** 2.685 0.19 1.21 0.908** 2.478 1.274* 3.573

(0.33) (0.384) (0.345) (0.624)Other party 0.228 1.256 -0.316 0.729 0.786** 2.194 1.641** 2.524

(0.308) (0.282) (0.269) (0.555)Functioning of democracy 0.068 1.071 -0.066 0.936 0.015 1.015 -0.079 0.924

(0.049) (0.055) (0.045) (0.073)Approval of 15-M -0.127** 0.88 0.234*** 1.263 0.036 1.037 -0.043 0.958

(0.042) (0.06) (0.043) (0.055)Constant -2.545 -3.678 -2.424 -1.112

(0.894) (1.032) (0.906) (1.066)Nagelkerke R2

McFadden R2

N

0.536

Reference category (RC) for the dependent variable is PSOE and for independent variables are indicated in parentheses andbold

PP IU Other political party Abstention

0.2731399

Robust standard erros in paretheses*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Results: Proximity to PSOE0

.1.2

.3.4

.5.6

.7.8

.91

Pro

babi

lity

of v

ote

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE0

.2.4

.6.3

1.8

.9.7

.1.5

Pro

babi

lity

of v

ote

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 9/13

Results: Responsibility0

.1.2

.3.4

.5.6

.7.8

.91

Prob

abilit

y of v

ote

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE

Responsability: Government

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1Pr

obab

ily of

vote

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE

Responsibility: International Economic Situation

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1Pr

obab

ility o

f vote

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE

Responsibility: Banks

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1Pr

obab

ililty

of vo

te

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE

Responsibility: Other

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 10/13

Results:Evaluation of PSOE & Capacity on unemployment

.1.2

.3.4

.5.6

.7.8

.91

Pro

babi

lity

of v

ote

Good BadRegularEvalutation of PSOE in Government

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE0

.1.2

.3.4

.5.6

.7.8

.91

Pro

babi

lity

of v

ote

PP OtherPSOECapacity on Labour Politics

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 11/13

Results:Next PM & Approval of 15-M

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1P

roba

bilit

y of

vot

e0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Approval of 15M

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE

.1.2

.3.4

.5.6

.7.8

.91

Pro

babi

lity

of v

ote

Rubalcaba Rajoy OtherNext Prime Minister

PP IU Other Abs. PSOE

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 12/13

Conclusions• Different alternatives – different reasons – bilateral

opossition• Combination of short and long-term factors• Responsibility for the crisis rather limited

explanatory power• Justification of multinomial logistic regression in

multiparty/multi-option context• Other case studies of incumbent parties punished

in Hungary, Bulgary, Ireland (LeDuc & Pammett)

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013 13/13

Why did PSOE lose in the generalelections in Spain in 2011?

An analysis of electoral behaviour

Tomáš DošekInstituto de IberoaméricaDept. of Political Science and Public AdministrationUniversity of Salamancahttps://sites.google.com/site/tomasdoseklatam/[email protected]

2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference “Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis”,November 28-29, 2013, European University Institute, Florence, Italy