why another war? · 2019-08-05 · 1999 unsc 1284 creates unmovic to replace unscom. iraq rejects...

After both houses of Congress granted the White House authorization fora US-led military strike to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq,George W. Bush claimed that “America has spoken with one voice” aboutthe “mortal threat” posed by Iraq’s presumed programs for weapons ofmass destruction. But much of the US public remained unconvinced that

Iraq really imperiled the world’s sole superpower. Bush has failed to prove theexistence of an urgent threat coming from Iraq. His administration’s push for warbegs for alternative explanations.

The Bush administration is liberally staffed with neo-conservatives who spent thedecade after the Gulf war criticizing President Bill Clinton’s policy on Iraq from theright. As the 1990s wore on, the US and to a lesser extent, Britain, became frustratedby the breakdown of international and regional consensus behind the comprehensivesanctions on Iraq, as well as the failure of sanctions and “containment” to toppleSaddam Hussein. Instead of regime change, the US and Britain witnessed theincreasing success of the Iraqi regime in its strategies for rehabilitating itself, and agrowing belief in international public opinion that the devastating humanitarianimpact of sanctions was too high a price to pay for containment of Hussein. The neo-conservatives argued, with considerable fervor, that Iraqi defiance warranted morerobust US military action than Clinton’s periodic missile strikes.

O C T O B E R 2 0 0 2

Why Another War?A Backgrounder on the Iraq Crisis

by Sarah Graham-Brown and Chris Toensing

Boy near open sewer on the outskirts of Basra in southern Iraq, March 1999. Karen Robinson/Panos Pictures

M I D D L E E A S T R E S E A R C H& I N F O RM AT I O N P R O J E C T

Sarah Graham-Brown is author of Sanctioning Saddam (I.B. Tauris, 1999). Chris Toensing is editor of Middle East Report,publication of the Middle East Research and Information Project.

The convergence of these factors – declining consensus, the unpopularityof sanctions, the regime’s survival and the neo-conservatives’ ideologicalcommitment – made a showdown between Saddam Hussein and the Westpredictable when Bush captured the White House in 2000. After theSeptember 11 attacks in New York and Washington, the neo-conservativesseized the opportunity for a reckoning with their béte noire in Baghdad.

A Regime RisesThe Ba‘th party, now headed by Saddam Hussein, has been in powercontinuously since 1968. Regime functionaries developed an increasinglyauthoritarian system of government based on state control of burgeoning oilrevenues and fierce repression of any and all opponents and critics –Communists, Kurdish parties and religious parties associated with themajority Shia community. Through a combination of force and inducements,the regime has sustained its narrow power base. The party apparatus has nowfaded in importance, having been eclipsed by Saddam Hussein himself, hisfamily, close allies and selected security services. Early Ba‘thist ideology waspan-Arabist, but in the 1980s, the party began to speak the language of Iraqinationalism to rally the diverse population against external enemies. IraqiBa‘thist rhetoric remained largely secular until the 1980s and 1990s, whenthe regime increasingly invoked Islam to coopt potential Islamist oppositionwithin Iraq and to exploit Islamic solidarity abroad. The words “God is great”were first emblazoned upon the Iraqi flag on January 13, 1991 – three daysbefore the US started bombing Baghdad.

Until the mid-1980s, oil wealth allowed the regime to build an impressivewelfare state, and government investment in irrigation, schools, health care andother fields contributed to steadily rising living standards for ordinary Iraqis.Iraq’s relative prosperity made the country a magnet for guest workers fromEgypt, Yemen and other poorer Arab countries until 1990. But eight years ofhighly destructive war against Iran began to undo these achievements,concentrating the country’s financial resources on expanding the size andweaponry of the Iraqi army, and subsequently on rearming and rebuilding. Anoil price collapse in 1986 further eroded the regime’s fiscal position.

Oil revenues and financial support from the Gulf states permittedSaddam Hussein’s regime to survive the war with Iran. In addition tobacking from Iraq’s long-time allies, the Soviet Union and France, moresurreptitious support came from the US, Britain and Germany, which“tilted” in favor of Iraq against Iran. After the war, Western arms andconstruction companies competed for contracts in Iraq, with thegovernments of the US, Britain, Germany, France and Russia continuing tofacilitate arms sales and business, especially by providing lines of credit.President Ronald Reagan’s administration only weakly protested Iraq’sappalling human rights record – including its use of chemical weaponsagainst Iranian troops and against Iraqi Kurds during the Anfal operationsof 1987-1988 – and blocked a Senate resolution that would have imposedsanctions. But the attitudes of Western powers, in particular the US andBritain, toward Iraq changed radically with the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Desert StormWhile Iraqi governments has staked periodic claims upon Kuwait for years,the 1990 invasion was immediately motivated by severe financial pressures

1958 Iraqi monarchy overthrown in militarycoup led by Abd al-Karim Qasim.

1959 Saddam Hussein, 22, flees Iraq afterinvolvement in attempted assassination of Qasim.

1961 Qasim claims newly independent Kuwaitas part of Iraq. Kurds begin armed revoltagainst Baghdad.

1963 Ba‘th Party overthrows Qasim, then isedged out of power by allies in coup. Iraqrenounces claim to Kuwait.

1966 Ceasefire between Kurds andgovernment forces.

1967 Iraq breaks diplomatic relations with theUS after Arab-Israeli war.

1968 BaÔthist coup makes Saddam Hussein vicepresident and deputy head of the RevolutionaryCommand Council.

1970 Baghdad and Kurdish Democratic Partysign peace agreement.

1972 Iraq Petroleum Company—a consortiumof Western companies—is nationalized.

1974 Collapse of 1970 accord with KDP. FailedKurdish rebellion produces refugee crisis.

1975 Iraq and Iran sign treaty endingborder disputes.

1979 Saddam Hussein becomes president andchairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.About 400 party members are executed.

1980 Iran shells Iraqi border towns. OnSeptember 17, Iraq abrogates 1975 treaty, andinvades Iran.

1981 Israel attacks Osirak nuclear reactor.

1982 Iranian counteroffensive reclaims muchground occupied by Iraq. Syria closes pipelineto Iraq.

1984 Iraq restores diplomatic relations withthe US.

1986 UN Secretary General reports Iraq’s useof mustard gas and nerve agents againstIranian soldiers.

1986-87 “Tanker war” between Iran and Iraqin Persian Gulf.

1988 Anfal operation results in 50,000-100,000 deaths in northern Iraq. On March 16,Iraq attacks Kurdish town of Halabja with mixof poison gas and nerve agents, killing 5,000.Ceasefire with Iran on August 20. Iraq reassertsclaim to Kuwait.

generated by the Iran-Iraq war. In need of revenue, Iraq sought forgivenessof Kuwaiti loans made during the Iran-Iraq war, disputed Kuwait’s oilproduction levels and charged Kuwait with tapping into the Rumailaoilfield that lies almost entirely inside Iraq. Saddam Hussein appears tohave misread US and broader Arab interests in launching the invasion. Hebelieved that, given its previously friendly disposition and eagerness forcontracts, the US would be amenable to negotiated solutions. ThoughHussein knew of Washington’s fears for the post-invasion security of SaudiArabian oilfields, he wrongly calculated that the Saudi royal family wouldnot allow non-Muslim soldiers to be based on Saudi Arabian soil. The factthat Iraq invaded Kuwait, a sovereign state, allowed the UN SecurityCouncil to create a wide coalition in favor of action against Iraq, includingthe key Arab states of Syria and Egypt, as well as traditional US allies SaudiArabia and Turkey.

UN Security Council Resolution 661, passed in August 1990, imposedmandatory and comprehensive economic sanctions covering Iraq’s imports,exports and movement of funds. Sanctions were given only a few months toforce withdrawal of Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait. Meanwhile, the US,supported by Britain, began a massive troop buildup in the Gulf, includingSaudi Arabia, and pushed vigorously for military action. In November1990, US insistence secured UN Security Council Resolution 678,providing for the use of “all necessary means” to end the occupation ofKuwait. The Soviet Union, in political turmoil at the time, was persuadedto go along with the other Security Council members. China abstainedafter strong pressure from the US.

Numerous Arab, European and Soviet diplomatic efforts to avert warcame to nothing, with the US sticking to the demand that Iraq withdrawfrom Kuwait without conditions. In December 1990, the press quoted USofficials saying that a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal was a “nightmare scenario,”because then Iraq might place its disputes with Kuwait on the negotiatingtable. The US and Britain also resisted attempts to link resolution of theGulf crisis to resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including aneleventh-hour French proposal that Iraq withdraw if the US agreed toconvene an international conference on Middle East peace. The air warcommenced on January 16, 1991. Allied bombing caused major damage toIraq’s civilian infrastructure, including electricity generation, water andsanitation facilities. Despite concerns about Iraqi civilian casualties andIraq’s firing of Scud missiles at Israel, the Arab coalition held.

Operation Desert Storm, the brief ground war that followed thebombing, drove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Allied troops pursued them onlyas far as the outskirts of the southern cities of Basra and Nasriyya. PresidentGeorge Bush and other coalition leaders decided not to continue fightinginside Iraq, partly to assuage Saudi concern to forestall Iraqi Shiiteautonomy, partly to limit Iranian influence on post-war Iraq, and partly infear of getting bogged down in protracted battles.

The Day AfterThe retreat of the Iraqi army triggered an uprising against Hussein’s regimein the Shiite south, in no small part due to Bush’s urgings during the warthat the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people “take matters into their ownhands.” Fearing the influence of Iran on the rebel forces, the coalitionforces stood by while Baghdad forcibly suppressed the uprising. The

1990 Iraq invades Kuwait on August 2. UNdemands withdrawal by January 15, 1991, andimposes economic embargo. On November 29, UNauthorizes use of “all necessary means” toliberate Kuwait.

1991 Bombardment of Iraq starts OperationDesert Storm on January 17. Ground warbegins on February 24, and liberation ofKuwait occurs February 27. On March 3, Iraqaccepts ceasefire. Iraqi forces suppressrebellions in the south and north duringMarch and April, creating refugee crisis onborders with Turkey and Iran. Northern no-flyzone established in April. UNSCOM established.

1992 No-fly zone established in southern Iraq.

1993 US cruise missile attack on Iraqiintelligence headquarters in Baghdad, in responseto alleged attempt on George Bush’s life inKuwait in April.

1994 Saddam Hussein becomes prime ministerand president. Iraqi National Assembly recognizesKuwait’s borders and independence.

1994-1997 Fighting between KDP and rivalPatriotic Union of Kurdistan. Iraqi forces moveinto northern no-fly zone and help KDP defeatPUK in August 1996. Failed Iraqi NationalCongress coup attempt in 1996.

1995 UNSC 986 allows the partialresumption of Iraq’s oil exports to buy foodand medicine in April. Resolution not acceptedby Iraq until December.

1998 Inspectors withdraw from Iraq. US andBritain bomb Iraq from December 16-19 inOperation Desert Fox.

1999 UNSC 1284 creates UNMOVIC to replaceUNSCOM. Iraq rejects resolution.

2000 First domestic passenger flights in Iraqsince 1991. Commercial air links reestablishedwith Russia, Ireland and Middle East. Syriareopens pipeline.

2001 In February, US and Britain carry outmajor bombing raid. Rail link with Turkeyreopened in May for the first time since 1981.

2002 In March, Arab summit rejects militaryaction against Iraq. UNSC 1409 streamlinessanctions in May. Iraq rejects weaponsinspections in talks with UN Secretary Generalin July. UN rejects Iraqi proposal for readmittinginspectors in August.

October 2002 Both houses of Congress passresolutions authorizing George W. Bush to employforce to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime.

4 | A Backgrounder on the Iraq Crisis

ceasefire agreement signed on March 3, 1991 stoppedIraq from flying warplanes over the south but did notprevent the use of heavy armor, which became asignificant factor in regime efforts to regain control.

Iraq’s counterattack against rebels in the Kurdish-dominated north led to mass flight. At the Iranianborder, refugees were allowed to cross, but the Turkishgovernment refused to permit most of the refugeesaccess, leaving them stranded in snowbound mountains.This major humanitarian disaster prompted the Gulfwar coalition to send forces to secure a “safe haven” inthe northwest corner of Iraq. A no-fly zone was alsoestablished above the thirty-sixth parallel of latitude,initially to protect allied troops. The zone remained inplace after the coalition troops withdrew in June-July1991. In October 1991, after a series of clashes withKurdish forces, the central government withdrew all itstroops and administrative staff from the Kurdish-dominated areas of the north, halted all governmentfunding and placed an embargo on goods crossing intoKurdish-controlled areas. The internal embargo wasnot relaxed until 1997.

In April 1991, the UN passed UNSC Resolution687, which laid down the terms of the ceasefire:

elimination of Iraq’s programs for developing chemical,biological and nuclear weapons, dismantlement of itslong-range missiles, a system of inspections to verifycompliance, acceptance of a UN-demarcated Iraq-Kuwait border, payment of war compensation and thereturn of Kuwaiti property and prisoners of war.UNSC 687 has formed the basis for most subsequentUN action regarding Iraq. Resolution 688, passed afew days later, after Iraq had crushed the northernrebellion, demanded that Iraq “cease this repression,”but did not explicitly call for enforcement by militaryaction. The US and Britain, however, have consistentlyreferred to UNSC 688 to justify the continuedexistence of, and periodic bombing in, the no-fly zonesand as a further condition for the lifting of sanctions.

Inspecting IraqThe UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) establishedto verify Iraq’s compliance with the weapons provisionsof UNSC 687 first entered Iraq in 1991, andinspections by UNSCOM and the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued untilDecember 1998. Although UNSCOM succeeded in

US serviceman paints a bomb to symbolize the warplane's each bombing run during Operation Desert Fox, December 1998.

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A Backgrounder on the Iraq Crisis |5

locating and destroying the majority of Iraq’s weaponsof mass destruction sites, its inspections were frequentlycontested by the Iraqis, who resisted attempts to seecertain sites and withheld documents.

From 1994, a clear rift opened among thePermanent Five members of the Security Council overthe progress of the inspections. France and Russiawanted to reward specific instances of Iraqi cooperationwith gradual amelioration of the country’s economicisolation, including a “road map” toward the lifting ofsanctions, while the US and UK refused to considersuch measures. The dispute was fueled by criticalambiguities in the conditions for lifting the embargo inUNSC 687, contained in paragraphs 21 and 22 of theresolution. Paragraph 22 appears to allow the embargoon international imports from Iraq – primarily oil – tobe removed once Iraq had complied with all clausesrelating to weapons of mass destruction. France andRussia favored a focus on this provision. Paragraph 21was much broader: international exports to Iraq couldonly resume when it was judged to have complied with“all relevant UN resolutions.” The US and Britain tookthis reference to include UNSC 688, which dealt withIraq’s treatment of the Kurds and the Shia, and stroveto keep sanctions in place as a first priority.

The rift between the US and Britain on one side,and France and Russia on the other, widened, andweapons inspections went on in an increasinglyacrimonious atmosphere. In 1997 evidence emergedthat the US, and possibly the Israelis, had been receivingintelligence gathered in the course of UNSCOMinspections. Rolf Ekeus, head of UNSCOM from 1991-1997, confirmed to Swedish radio in late July 2002 thatUS inspectors sought information outside theorganization’s mandate, such as details on the movementsof Saddam Hussein. Revelations of intelligence gatheringlent credibility to Iraq’s protests that inspections wereinfringing upon its sovereignty, and eroded internationalsupport for UNSCOM’s aggressive tactics.

Unanswered QuestionsDespite political obstacles, weapons inspections in the1990s achieved a great deal. UNSCOM inspectionsrevealed a clandestine nuclear program which, accordingto an IAEA assessment, might have produced a usableweapon by December 1992, had Iraq continued it. Thefinal reports of UNSCOM and IAEA filed after they leftIraq stated that Iraq’s nuclear stocks were gone andsuggested most of its long-range delivery systems hadbeen destroyed. Numerous outside studies, most recentlyone from the London-based International Institute forStrategic Studies, have concluded that while Iraq

retains the scientific expertise to manufacture a nuclearbomb, it lacks the necessary fissile material.

Questions remain about Iraq’s chemical and biologicalweapons capacity. In the 1990s, inspectors destroyed38,500 prohibited chemical warheads and millions ofliters of chemical agents. Iraq claims to have eliminatedover 30,000 more weapons and tons of additionalchemical agents of its own volition, but UNSCOM wasunable to verify this claim before leaving the country. InAugust 1995, Iraq admitted having produced largevolumes of weapons-grade biological materials for use inthe 1990-1991 Gulf war. UNSCOM never located thisstockpile, which Iraq also claimed to have destroyed.Some former inspectors, along with the US and Britishgovernments, refer to these chemical and biologicalmaterials as “missing” or “unaccounted for,” and believethat Iraq has successfully hidden them from scrutiny.

On the basis of IAEA reports in 1997, Russiarecommended that Iraq’s nuclear file be closed, again toestablish a “road map” toward Iraqi compliance and thelifting of sanctions, but Washington and London refused.Successive inspections crises ensued in 1998. In February,Iraq refused to allow so-called “presidential” sites to beinspected, again on grounds of sovereignty. UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan defused this crisis by brokering anagreement under which international diplomats wouldaccompany inspectors to these sites. UNSCOMcontinued to complain of Iraqi non-cooperation, andpulled out of Iraq in November, and again in December,the second time without consulting the Security Council.From December 16-19, the US and Britain heavilybombed alleged weapons sites throughout southern andcentral Iraq. This bombardment – known as OperationDesert Fox – took place without Security Councilauthorization, following a pattern established by the USand Britain over the 1990s.

Rules of EngagementThe US and Britain have regularly resorted to militaryaction to enforce Security Council resolutions on Iraqwithout express UN approval. In 1991, the US andBritain designated a part of the Kurdish-controlledregion lying above the thirty-sixth parallel as a no-flyzone for Iraqi aircraft. A second no-fly zone wasestablished in the south up to the thirty-second parallelin August 1992, and extended to the thirty-thirdparallel, close to Baghdad, in 1996. The two no-flyzones were initially policed by the US, Britain andFrance. In 1996, France withdrew from the northernzone, and in 1998 from the southern zone – in protestover Desert Fox. The US and Britain have continueddaily patrols of the no-fly zones, with periodic attacks on


Iraqi anti-aircraft emplacements and major bombingepisodes triggered by alleged major movements of Iraqiarmor in border areas or intensified anti-aircraft fire.

Following Desert Fox, the US and Britain changed therules of engagement in the no-fly zones, allowing pilots tostrike at any part of the Iraqi air defense system, not justthose that directly targeted their aircraft, by firing uponthem or by “locking on” radar detectors to the planes.The scale of action in the no-fly zones since that time hasincreased dramatically. According to British Ministry ofDefense figures quoted by the Times (London) in June2000, the average monthly release of bombs rose from0.025 tons to five tons. After a lull in early 2002, airstrikes again increased in intensity and frequency in thefall, and as of October 3, US and British planes hadbombed Iraqi targets 46 times in 2002.

A year after Desert Fox, UN Security CouncilResolution 1284 created a new arms monitoring bodycalled UNMOVIC, headed by Hans Blix, but Iraq hasnot yet permitted inspectors to return. Unless and untilinspections resume, assertions by Iraqi defectors andthe US and British governments that Iraq persists indeveloping weapons of mass destruction are impossibleto confirm or rebut. In 2001, negotiations sporadically

took place between the UN and Iraq over thereadmission of inspectors, but international diplomacyfocused almost exclusively on the various proposals forreinvigorated, “smarter” sanctions.

The Sanctions DecadeSince their introduction in 1990, comprehensiveeconomic sanctions on Iraq have raised substantialconcerns about the impact of coercive measures againstgovernments when the populations in question have nodemocratic rights. Both Security Council members andIraq frequently allowed humanitarian issues to becomebargaining chips in struggles over the fulfillment ofUNSC 687. No clear definition was agreed upon for“humanitarian goods” – those commodities to beexcluded from the embargo. The US in particularsought to limit the definition as far as possible, initiallyonly to include food and medicine. As time went on, theSecurity Council allowed the purchase of more types ofgoods, but contracts were frequently challenged becausethe sought-after items might prove to be “dual-use.”

Accurate assessments of the humanitarian situationhave been difficult to obtain. Most international NGOs

-200% -150% -100% -50% 0 50%

Iraq -160%

Kenya -24%

South Africa -17%

Rwanda -13%

Azerbijan -3%

Uzbekistan 0%

Chad 0%

Somalia 2%

Jordan 9%

Yemen 18%

Yugoslavia 26%

Syria 35%

Iran 39%

Turkey 42%

Egypt 54%

Portugal 64%

100%

Under-five mortality rate – Cross-country comparison

Percentage change in mortality rates among children under five, from 1990-2000. Egypt's rate was 54 percent lower in 2000 than in 1990. Iraq's rate was 160 percent higher.

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withdrew from government-controlled areas of Iraq bymid-1992, when the Iraqi government imposed stringentrestrictions on their operations. Only in 1998 wasUNICEF able to carry out a nationwide survey ofhealth and nutrition, which found, for instance, thatmortality rates among children under five in centraland southern Iraq had doubled from the previousdecade. Most independent observers would endorse theMarch 1999 conclusion of the UN Security Council’sPanel on Humanitarian Issues: “Even if not all sufferingin Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especiallysanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing suchdeprivations in the absence of the prolonged measuresimposed by the Security Council and the effects of war.”

The Security Council’s punitive approach wascompounded by the fact that Gulf war bombing hadinflicted extensive infrastructural damage,compromising the provision of clean water, sanitationand electrical power to the Iraqi population. Theresulting public health emergency, rather than hunger,has been and continues to be the primary cause of

increased mortality, especially amongchildren under five. UNICEFestimated in 2002 that 70 percent ofchild deaths result from diarrhea andacute respiratory infections.

For its part the Iraqi government,while providing a basic food ration,placed military and security concernsover civilian needs, especially whenmaking decisions on reconstruction.Poor planning and public education,and shortages of trained personnelcaused by the catastrophic decline ofreal wages in the public sector,exacerbated the humanitarian crisis.

In late 1991, under pressure fromUN agencies reporting acutehumanitarian needs in Iraq, theSecurity Council passed Resolutions706 and 712, designed to allow Iraquse the proceeds of limited oil sales topurchase “humanitarian goods”outside Iraq. After prolongednegotiations, Iraq rejected the caps onits oil sales as too stringent, and calledfor the lifting of sanctions. By 1993,the Iraqi economy under sanctionsstood at one-fifth its size in 1979, andthen took a further nose dive in 1994.Meager rations lasted only about onethird to half a month. With shrinkingincomes, Iraqis could not afford the

spiraling prices of goods on the open market. Soon Franceand Russia began to float the concept of certifying Iraqicompliance with inspections, and lifting sanctions, at theSecurity Council. The summer 1995 defection of HusseinKamil, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, who came bearingdetailed information on Iraq’s previously unacknowledgedbiological weapons program, only temporarily stalledFrench and Russian efforts to seek an exit from sanctions.

Oil for FoodTo stymie the progress of the French-Russian proposals,the US encouraged Britain to formulate UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 986 – reviving the “oil for food”idea of UNSC 706 and 712 – in early 1995. The newresolution made some concessions to Iraq’s earlierobjections, though Iraq initially held out for more. TheOil-for-Food program established by UNSC 986 finallycame into operation at the end of 1996. Under thisprogram, Iraq could sell specified amounts of oil duringevery six-month period. The proceeds, deposited in an

Women wash clothes near Basra oilfields in southern Iraq.

Karim Sahib/AFP


UN-controlled escrow account outside Iraq, would beused to fill orders for humanitarian goods from the Iraqigovernment. Until 2002, a committee of all SecurityCouncil members (known as the 661 Committee)scrutinized the operation of the Oil-for-Food program.The US, and to a lesser extent Britain, made a commonpractice of placing “holds” on large numbers of orders –over $5.3 billion worth in early 2002 – ostensiblybecause the requested items might have military uses.This practice, combined with Iraq’s bureaucratic delays,interruptions of oil sales and a prolonged dispute withthe Security Council over oil pricing, reduced thevolume of goods getting into Iraq. Holds havedisproportionately affected Iraq’s ability to rebuild itswater, sanitation and electricity infrastructure.

Modifications to the Oil-for-Food program laterraised the ceiling on oil sales and widened the scope ofgoods that could be purchased, to include some itemsneeded to refurbish Iraq’s oil industry and otherinfrastructure. In 2001, a further resolution removed thelimit on the amount of oil Iraq could sell. In 2002,Resolution 1409 reduced the role of the 661 Committee

in vetting orders and placed the job of determiningwhich items were “dual-use” in the purview ofUNMOVIC, the new weapons inspection agency, andthe IAEA. These “smart sanctions” – designed to deflectcriticism of sanctions in general and Oil-for-Food inparticular – arguably came too little, too late.

Stopgap MeasureThe US and Britain often present the Oil-for-Foodprogram as a vast humanitarian relief effort, but it wasintended as a stopgap measure to sustain economicsanctions while allowing more humanitarian goods intothe country. It was never conceived as a full-scaleprogram of economic rehabilitation. Oil-for-Food hasbrought commodities into Iraq, rather than restoringIraqis’ purchasing power or the country’s infrastructureto anything approaching pre-war levels.

In central and southern Iraq, the increase in size andcaloric value of monthly rations (to 2,472 calories perperson per day) has brought some improvement innutrition, especially among young children. Market

Kurdish children climb on sculpture atop former Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Suleimaniya in northern Iraq. Frits Meyst/Panos Pictures


prices have also been reduced from hyperinflationarylevels of the mid-1990s. Oil-for-Food, however, has alsoperpetuated dependence on rations, shoring up centralcontrol over food supplies. Meanwhile, systems of publictransportation, water, sanitation and electricity remain ina precarious state, the last two imperiled further byseveral years of drought. UNICEF figures showcontinuing high levels of mortality and morbidity fromacute respiratory infections and diarrheal diseases.

In the Kurdish-controlled areas of the north, adifferent set of factors has influenced the humanitariansituation. Because the Iraqi regime embargoed thenorth, between 1992 and 1997 the Kurdish enclavesreceived significant amounts of humanitarian assistancevia Turkey. Between 30 and 60 international NGOsworked in the north, though sporadic internal conflictand displacement between 1994 and 1997 kept thehumanitarian situation unstable. Since 1997, foodimports under the Oil-for-Food program have helpedthe Kurdish urban population, but effectivelyundermined the revival of the local economy, especiallyin the key area of agriculture. A recent survey by Savethe Children-UK found that up to 60 percent of thenorthern population has nothing to fall back on shouldOil-for-Food stop.

Oil-for-Food heightens the vulnerability of the wholeIraqi economy to disruption by political decisions andexternal factors, such as a military confrontation and thereduction or termination of oil sales. If the government ofIraq closed the de facto border with the Kurdish-controlled area, delivery of food and medical suppliespurchased for the north by the Iraqi government wouldbe interrupted. The entire ration distribution system ingovernment areas could be disrupted if there wasprolonged fighting or bombing or if large numbers ofrefugees fled elsewhere within the country or across theborders. In the north, because parts of the Kurdish regiondepend on the national grid for electricity, Baghdad isable to cut off the power supply, as it has done in the past.

Sanctions CrumbleAfter the passage of UNSC 986, Baghdad used tradeto woo international support for modifying or liftingsanctions. From 1997-2001, companies representingthe Security Council members most sympathetic toIraq’s position – France, Russia and China – garnered$5.48 billion of the $18.29 billion in contractsapproved by the UN. Firms based in Egypt and theUnited Arab Emirates, whose governments also movedcloser to Baghdad at the close of the decade, wereawarded 30 percent of Iraq’s import contracts underthe Oil-for-Food program in 2000.

By 2001, sanctions were crumbling around the edges.Most of Iraq’s neighbors, including its adversary Syria,and countries friendly to the West like Turkey, Jordanand some Gulf states, were involved in sanctions-bustingtrade with Baghdad. In comparison with the large-scaleevasion of comprehensive UN sanctions on Rhodesia andSerbia, there has been little illegal transfer of goods inand out of Iraq, but the resulting revenues weresufficient to keep the Iraqi regime well-financed despitesanctions. Illicit trade – especially oil smuggling – alsoforged economic ties of mutual advantage which madeIraq’s neighbors resistant to US and British schemes for“enhanced containment.”

Since 1997, illicit revenues amounting to roughly $2billion per year have accrued to the regime in Baghdad.A recent report from the Coalition for InternationalJustice, which advocates the trial of Iraqi leaders forcrimes against humanity, states that 90 percent of thesemonies come from oil smuggling. The most remunerativesmuggling route runs through Syria’s pipeline to oilfieldsin northern Iraq, reopened on November 6, 2000 afterbeing closed since 1982, when Hafiz al-Asad’s regimebacked Tehran in the Iran-Iraq war. As many as150,000 barrels of discounted Iraqi crude per day passthrough the pipeline, enabling Syria to export more ofits own oil. Another third of Iraq’s contraband oil findsits way to Iranian ports, where it is reportedly mixedwith outgoing Iranian oil products to conserve Tehran’sdomestic reserves.

The Kurdish enclave bordering Turkey hasbenefited handsomely from imposing exit taxes ondiesel and crude smuggled into Turkey, though Turkeytook steps to curtail this trade beginning in March2002, perhaps because smuggling revenue was findingits way to Iraq-based militia units of the Workers’Party of Kurdistan (PKK), which fought a separatistwar against Turkey in the 1990s. Officially, Iraqexports 110,000 barrels per day of oil to Jordan, withthe tacit approval of the Security Council, in returnfor preferential prices on Jordanian consumer goods.Jordan is particularly dependent on the Iraqi market.

End of ConsensusThree times since the winter of 1999, the regime hashalted oil exports, calculating that the resulting pricespike would pressure the UN into concessions in reviewsof the sanctions. Each time the maneuver failed,because Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have filled the gapin supply to prevent the price from rising too high. Iraqhas twice stopped its exports during major Israelioffensives in the Palestinian territories, rathertransparently to pose as the champion of the


Palestinian cause in the Arab world, also to negligibleeffect on the oil markets.

Smuggling and illegal surcharges on sales approvedthrough the Oil-for-Food program have proven moreeffective for Iraq than direct use of the “oil weapon.”Although the benefits of smuggling and sanctions-busting trade to Baghdad are well-known inWashington and London, the US has been unable (orunwilling) to cut off these sources of revenue, revealingthe complexity of its relations with front-line states.Turkey and Jordan have been allowed to breaksanctions with impunity, arguing that their fragileeconomies could not afford to lose Iraqi trade, thoughIran has received harsh criticism. Syria has rebuffedUS demands that it close down its pipeline to Iraq, andeven offers of UN compensation for lost oil revenue,without apparent penalty. The US has backed downfrom calls to debate Syrian smuggling in the SecurityCouncil, because France has insisted on debatingTurkish smuggling as well.

The general non-cooperation of Arab governmentswith US-UK attempts to plug holes in the embargo alsosignaled their displeasure with Washington’sincreasingly unequivocal support of Israel in itscampaign to defeat the Palestinian uprising by force ofarms. Arab governments, anxious about their ownstability in the event of war, maintained vocal publicopposition to military intervention in Iraq as theintention of the Bush administration to topple SaddamHussein by force became clear.

Vice President Dick Cheney returned from aMiddle East tour in mid-March 2002 withoutinducing any government to change its public lineagainst forcible “regime change” in Iraq. The surpriserapprochement between Iraq and Kuwait at theMarch 2002 Arab summit – which also produced anunprecedented agreement among all Arab countries(including Iraq) to recognize the state of Israel insideits pre-1967 borders – marked the formal end of theArab consensus behind the sanctions and containmentpolicies of the previous decade. Iraq recognizedKuwaiti sovereignty for the first time, and the twocountries issued a pledge (so far unfulfilled) to resolveKuwaiti missing persons and stolen property claimsfrom the Gulf war. The summit concluded with aunified call to lift the UN sanctions. Arab diplomatsworked to persuade the Iraqi regime to accept thereturn of weapons inspectors.

Meanwhile, the logic of inspections and sanctions –that they would be lifted once Iraq complied withUNSC 687 – has been undermined by US and Britishstatements that “regime change” is their preferredpolicy toward Iraq.

From Rogue State to Regime ChangeSince 1991, there has been a constant tension in officialUS thinking between regime change and efforts to secureIraqi compliance with UN resolutions. At the time of theGulf war, Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, persuaded theUS that a military coup in Iraq was preferable to anallied drive on Baghdad. The Saudis and other coalitionmembers regarded the post-war uprisings in the Shiitesouth with fear because of Iran’s influence on the rebels,and possible repercussions among their own Shiitepopulations. In the north, Turkey, embroiled in war withthe PKK until 1998, expressed loud concerns thatautonomy for the Iraqi Kurds would encourage TurkishKurds in their aspirations to independence. Until the lastyear of the first Bush administration, Washington heldout hope that Saddam Hussein could not survive theimpact of war and punitive sanctions. Yet despite anumber of attempts since 1991, no coup has succeeded,with or without outside help.

By 1993, lack of progress in any direction led theClinton administration to espouse the notion of “dualcontainment” of Iraq and Iran, defined henceforth as“rogue states.” The primary aim of dual containmentwas to protect US friends in the region – Israel,Turkey and Saudi Arabia – while keeping SaddamHussein “in a box.” According to this argument,Saddam Hussein’s regime could not and would notcomply with the requirements for lifting sanctions,so sanctions would remain in place indefinitely, oruntil the regime collapsed. In a major speech onMarch 27, 1997, Secretary of State MadeleineAlbright said the US would back sanctions “as longas it takes” to usher in a “successor regime” thatwould comply with UN resolutions.

But attempts to promote regime change during bothterms of Bill Clinton’s presidency were only sporadic.Clinton’s advisers were profoundly reluctant to commitground troops after the disastrous Somalian operationand the difficulties over Bosnia. Support for theexternal Iraqi opposition was lukewarm, and theadministration was often divided on how far toencourage it. Successive administrations distrusted theIraqi National Congress (INC), the ostensible umbrellaorganization based in Britain and the US, though theUS has done much to foster its claim to berepresentative. The INC’s shifting membership hasproven difficult to pin down to specific policies beyondregime change, while doubts persist whether (asidefrom the Kurds) INC-affiliated groups can muster anysignificant social support inside Iraq.

The Kurds – the part of the INC with forces and abase within Iraq – were engaged in internecine warfare


from the end of 1993 until 1997. A CIA-backed effortto use northern Iraq as a base for an assault on theregime in 1995-1996 ended in catastrophe whenWashington aborted an INC challenge to Iraqi forcesalong the de facto border and a planned coup inBaghdad failed. At the invitation of one Kurdishfaction, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Iraqi armymoved into Erbil within the no-fly zone soonthereafter, killing many INC cadres and militarydefectors, and helping the KDP to defeat its rivals, thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan. This episode reinforcedthe message of the 1991 uprisings, which still resonatesamong those seeking to overthrow Saddam Hussein’sregime, that the US is not a reliable ally.

Pressure from the INC’s Republican allies in Congresspushed Clinton to sign the Iraq Liberation Act in late1998, which appeared to signal more active support forthe opposition and made regime change official USpolicy. But the State Department continued to havelittle trust in the effectiveness of the INC, and only $8million of the $97 million allotted by the bill wasdisbursed by the time Clinton left office. Since 2000, theopposition has energetically burnished its image, but the

question of what sort ofgovernment would replace theclique around Saddam Husseinhas not been answered, at leastin the public domain. How tobring about the regime’soverthrow? Options ranged fromall-out invasion to Special Forcesaction with the opposition in Iraqto support for a coup staged bythe INC and other oppositionforces, on the model of US tacticsin Afghanistan.

The Bush DoctrineBeginning early in George W.Bush’s tenure in the WhiteHouse, Republicans with strongviews on Iraq, led by VicePresident Dick Cheney andSecretary of Defense DonaldRumsfeld, promoted a newforeign policy strategy focusingon preemptive and, if necessary,unilateral action capitalizing onthe “overwhelming” militarypower of the US to preserveWashington’s superpower statusindefinitely. Drafts of this

strategy had been prepared before the collapse of theSoviet Union, but only after the attacks of September11, 2001 did a doctrine of preemption become thestated policy of the Bush administration. In September2002 Bush sent a national security strategy toCongress, which read: “As a matter of common senseand self-defense, America will act against suchemerging threats [posed by dangerous technologies]before they are fully formed. We cannot defendAmerica and our friends by hoping for the best.” Thefirst target of this policy is Iraq.

The second Bush administration, like the previoustwo administrations, has focused on the person ofSaddam Hussein, rather than the system he presidesover, and it remains unclear who would be acceptableas a leader of Iraq if he were toppled, and how far theUS would insist that structures of power built overseveral decades be dismantled. Yet leading hawks, suchas Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, havesucceeded in pushing regime change in Iraq to the topof the US foreign policy agenda. To prepare Americanpublic opinion, Bush revived his predecessor’s conceptof rogue states, embellishing the rhetoric by labeling

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz with George W. Bush.

Paul Richards/AFP


Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “an axis of evil.” Themore moderate views of the State Department havebeen sidelined over the past year.

Although the core of the US case against Iraqconcerns the weapons of mass destruction proscribed bythe Security Council, the radicals in the Bushadministration at first wanted to sideline the UNentirely, rather than seeking to work though it andmanipulate it, as did the first Bush administration andthen the Clinton administration. The more outspokenmembers of the Bush team, especially Rumsfeld, haveopenly disparaged the utility of restarting weaponsinspections. But the need to retain at least some allies,especially Britain, and Iraq’s expressed willingness toaccept the weapons inspectors back finally createdpressure to go to the Security Council.

Bush’s speech to the UN on September 12, 2002challenged the UN to endorse new, tougher measuresto enforce Iraq’s compliance with UNSC 687,promising unilateral US action if the UN failed to doso. The subsequent flurry of Arab and internationaldiplomacy persuaded the Iraqi regime to announcefour days later its willingness to readmit inspectors“without conditions.” Following several expressions ofskepticism from US and British officials, and formerinspectors, that renewed inspections could disarm Iraq,Baghdad stipulated that it would only acceptinspections under the terms of its February 1998agreement with Kofi Annan, meaning that“presidential” sites could only be inspected with priorwarning and with diplomats present. The US and UK

continued to lobby for a new resolution enabling moreaggressive inspections and making war the penalty fornon-cooperation, setting the stage for a standoff. In aspeech in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, Bushpointedly did not set aside the option of going to warunilaterally, if matters did not go his way at the UN.

War and International LawIn its draft resolution seeking Congressionalauthorization of force against Iraq, the Bushadministration invoked “the inherent right [of the US],as acknowledged in the UN Charter, to use force inorder to defend itself.” Article 51 of the UN Charterdoes authorize the use of military force in self-defense,but only if a country has been attacked by another, oris under imminent threat of attack. The charter goeson to specify that the right of self-defense only obtainsuntil the Security Council has taken measures torestore peace and security. After World War II, theinternational community set the bar very high formember states seeking to justify military action, toprevent a repeat of the expansionist aggression of theAxis powers. After making the political decision toremove Saddam Hussein’s regime by force, the Bushadministration pursued a two-track strategy to addressthe standard set by the UN Charter – one track which(nominally) would meet the standard and anotherwhich seeks radically to redefine it.

Given that Iraq has not attacked the US, the USmust demonstrate an imminent threat of Iraqi attack.

Hence the Bush war powersresolution also cited “the highrisk that Iraq will employ [itsweapons of mass destruction] tolaunch a surprise attack againstthe US or its armed forces orprovide them to internationalterrorists,” and topadministration officials spokeominously of the “mortal threat”posed by Iraq.

Since inspectors have not beenin Iraq since 1998, it wasimpossible for the White Houseto proffer solid evidence that Iraqpossessed weapons of massdestruction that could target USinterests. Instead, the Bushadministration, buttressed by themedia interviews of formerinspectors, posited thatUNSCOM’s inability to confirmUNSCOM members return from inspection of destroyed warehouse at the Muhammadiyat storage site.

H. Arvidsson/United Nations


the eradication of Iraq’s entire weapons stockpile in 1998meant that the regime probably retained some of itsarsenal. A dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destructionreleased by the British government on September 24,2002 repeated the conclusions of publicly availablereports on Iraqi weapons capacity. Evidence in thedossier that Iraq continued to build illicit weapons after1998 – such as the country’s retention of many scientistswho had worked on the secret nuclear program before1991 – was circumstantial and not new. A CIA reportpublished in October reached similar and hardlyalarming conclusions.

To bolster the urgency of its case, the British dossieradded the contention – based on unnamed intelligencesources – that “as part of Iraq’s military planning,Saddam is willing to use” chemical and biologicalweapons. Along with similar claims advanced by USofficials, also based on classified intelligence, as ofOctober 2002 this contention was the only attempt toprove that the Iraqi regime constituted a “mortalthreat.” The lack of fresh evidence in the Britishdossier suggested that the goal of US-UK policy was notto prove the existence of, and eliminate, weapons ofmass destruction in Iraq, but rather to provide a casusbelli. But most of the Security Council appeared toagree with the Canadian foreign minister, who saidthat “[the dossier] shows why…inspectors have to getinto Iraq and get in there quickly. I do not read this asa suggestion that Mr. Blair is advocating that weattack Iraq immediately.”

The second track of the Bush team’s strategy, muchmore in keeping with its unilateralist philosophy,focused on the possibility that Iraqi weapons of massdestruction might in the future target the West –meaning that the West should strike first to obviate thethreat. Asked to supply material evidence of the Iraqithreat, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Ricecommented that “we don’t want the smoking gun to bea mushroom cloud.” Rice’s argument, restated by otheradministration officials, relied on emotional appealgenerated by the September 11 attacks: wouldn’t anyreasonable person have supported a preemptive striketo stop the hijackers from carrying out their plot?Although the Bush administration has yet to presentthis case in a sustained fashion, Rice seemed to becontending that, after September 11, 2001, thestringent requirements of the UN Charter should bereplaced with the far more flexible Bush doctrine of thepreemptive strike. Along with Bush’s vow to attack Iraqunilaterally if the Security Council refused to authorizeit, the administration’s strategy revealed its estimationthat international law was an obstacle to be overcomerather than a guidepost for US policy.

Human RightsThe US and British dossiers calling for regime changealso rely on raising the Iraqi regime’s dismal humanrights record, despite a decade of virtual Westernindifference to these concerns in the 1980s. After the UScited Amnesty International’s reports on Iraq in itsbackground briefing accompanying Bush’s September14 speech to the UN General Assembly, Amnestyobserved that “once again, the human rights record of acountry is used selectively to legitimize military actions.”In the 1990s, the US and other outside powers havedone very little to promote human rights protections inIraq – there is no Security Council resolutionmandating, for instance, that Iraq cooperate with UNhuman rights monitors – not to mention the disregard ofthe US and other governments for the very severehumanitarian consequences of economic sanctions.

Iraq’s human rights record is, without question, amongthe very worst in the world. The current government,since it came to power in 1968, has relentlessly suppressedbasic civil and political rights in the country, and sharesresponsibility with the UN Security Council for thehumanitarian disaster caused by more than a decade ofsanctions. Arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances,mass killings, assassinations of political critics and routinetorture have left the country devastated.

The wars caused by Iraqi aggression, the UN-imposed sanctions and the government’s relentlesspolitical repression against virtually all sectors of thepopulation have caused massive suffering anddislocation. As many as five million Iraqis – over 20percent of the country’s population – now live abroad.A recent report by the Norwegian Refugee Councilestimated there are 700,000 to 1 million internallydisplaced persons in Iraq.

Exile was not, for many, a matter of choice.Hundreds of thousands of Shiite families – Arabs andKurds – were forcibly exiled to Iran in the 1980s,typically with only the clothes on their backs. Thousandsof villages were systematically razed in the counter-insurgency campaign against Iraq’s Kurds in the northand the marshlands south of Baghdad. Conservativeestimates place the number of Iraqi Kurds systematicallyput to death in 1988 alone at more than 100,000.

“Protecting” the North and SouthThe US and Britain have claimed that the no-fly zonein the north has helped to protect the lives of KurdishIraqis. In practice, such protection as has beenprovided has applied only to shelter from Iraqiaircraft, not the Turkish or Iranian air forces. The


Turks, pursuing their war with the PKK, used both airand ground troops on a regular basis, often causingcivilian deaths, injuries and destruction of property.The US has never challenged Turkey’s incursions –though the EU and UN periodically made ineffectualprotests. Iraq has claimed substantial civilian casualtiesfrom the increasingly regular US-British bombingraids after Desert Fox. Fact-finders working for UNSpecial Observer Hans von Sponeck verified that 144people were killed in the no-fly zones in 1999.

Further, the northern no-fly zone does not coincideexactly with the “de facto” line to which Iraqi troopswithdrew in 1991. The no-fly zone therefore includesMosul, still under government control, but excludesSuleimaniya, the largest city of the Kurdish-controlledregion now ruled by two party-based administrations,along with the southern part of that governorate. Alsooutside the zone is the city of Kirkuk, a center of theIraqi oil industry that remains under governmentcontrol. In the Kirkuk region, Kurds are at most directrisk from the Iraqi regime, which has pursued a policyof “Arabization” of the city and the surrounding region.By the conservative estimate of the US Committee forRefugees, in the past ten years nearly 100,000 Kurdshave been expelled from their homes in Kirkuk, in favorof Iraqi Arabs resettled by the regime.

In the south, low-level armed resistance continuedafter 1991, mainly in the marshland areas between theTigris and Euphrates, but a southern US-enforced no-fly zone provided precious little by way of protection.The government’s counter-insurgency campaignincluded systematic drainage of the marshes – the utter

destruction in less than a decade ofthe largest wetland ecosystem inthe Middle East. What the UNEnvironmental Program termed“one of the world’s greatestenvironmental disasters” led to thenearly complete displacement ofhundreds of thousands of residents.

Dangers AheadEach year sees credible reportsfrom the Iraqi Communist Partyand other dissident groups ofhundreds – sometimes thousands –of killings and executions. Thegovernment has imposedmandatory death sentences fornon-violent political “crimes” suchas recruiting a current or formerBa‘th Party member into any

other political organization, or publicly insulting thepresident or the party. Since 1998, when a directivefrom the Office of the President authorized thecreation of “supervisory committees” to “clean up Iraqiprisons,” the government has conducted massexecutions of political detainees.

Many of these reports have been verified byinterviews with witnesses and family members whohave fled the government-controlled areas to the northor to other countries. The government has refusedentry to independent human rights monitors and to thelong-time UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, Max vander Stoel, whose one visit occurred in 1992. Thegovernment never permitted him to return. A newrapporteur, Andreas Mavrommatis, appointed by theUN Commission on Human Rights in 2000, made abrief, four-day visit in February 2002, as “a first step indialogue,” but conducted no fact-finding.

The human rights and humanitarian consequencesof any coming war will likely be significant, however.From one side will be potential civilian casualties froma US-led air war and ground invasion. From the Iraqigovernment side, one real danger is the practice of“human shielding” – placing troops and high-valuemilitary targets amidst civilian populations. There isalso a great danger from any chemical and/or biologicalweapons that the government of Iraq may possess –either from a government decision to deploy thoseweapons or from a US decision to target such sites fordestruction. Finally, but not least, a war is likely toproduce a vast refugee crisis and internaldisplacement, and neighboring countries, especially

Ceyhan

Banias

Oil pipelines

Projected pipeline

Export terminal

Oil field

Gas field

Refinery

10

Oil fields

1 West Qurna2 Rumaila3 Ratawi4 Bin Umar5 Majnoon6 Halfaya7 Nasiriya8 Al-Ahdab9 Kirkuk10 Suba

Gas fields

10 Chemchemal11 Mansuriya

To Red Sea(closed)

Iraq’s oil infrastructure

Petroleum Argus

Iraqi oilfields and pipelines. The Syrian pipeline is now open.


Jordan, have indicated they plan to use armed force ifnecessary to prevent any large influx of Iraqi refugees.

Oil and WarThe Iraqi Ministry of Oil estimated in the mid-1990sthat Iraq could produce six million barrels per daywithin seven years of ending the UN embargo, with$30 billion in foreign investment. But throughout the1990s, sanctions prevented major energy conglomeratesfrom exploiting Iraq’s 115 billion barrels of provenpetroleum reserves – second only to those of SaudiArabia – despite the willingness of the Iraqi regimeafter mid-1991 to relax its control of the rigidlynationalized oil industry. Since no geological survey hasbeen conducted in Iraq since the 1970s, experts believethat the proven reserves underestimate the country’sactual oil wealth, which could be as large as 250 billionbarrels. Three decades of political instability and warhave kept Iraq from developing 55 of its 70 provenoilfields. Eight of these fields could harbor more than abillion barrels each of “easy oil” which is close to thesurface and inexpensive to extract.

Sanctions and US law barred American firmscompletely from exploring Iraqi fields, but beginningin 1994 international companies signed lucrativecontracts with Baghdad in anticipation of the lifting ofsanctions. Paris-based companies negotiated an(unsigned) agreement to develop the 18 billion-barrelMajnoon field, as well as the smaller Nahr bin Umarfield, while a Russian consortium inked a deal todevelop the West Qurna field, containing an estimated15 billion barrels. Baghdad also signed contracts withChinese firms. Frustrated that none of its partnerswould begin work while sanctions remained in place,the Ba‘thist regime first threatened to revoke theagreements and to downgrade their attractive terms.Nevertheless, the prospect that oil exploration mightstart gave Baghdad a lifeline of sorts to the UN SecurityCouncil. In June 2001, France and Russia proposedremoving restrictions on foreign investment in the Iraqioil industry during Security Council deliberations over“smart sanctions.” These attempts to reconstitute Iraq’soil revenue – and refill the government’s coffers – raninto staunch opposition from Washington and London.Due to deteriorating infrastructure and a pricingdispute with the Security Council, in September 2002Iraq was pumping at less than half its capacity, itslegitimate oil sales tightly regulated under the Oil-for-Food program.

In the thinking of the neo-conservatives whodominate Middle East policy in the Bush WhiteHouse, the primary benefit of regime change is to

enshrine the Bush doctrine, but Iraq’s oil reserves offeran important secondary benefit. In concert with otherproducers, a US-allied Iraqi government might in thefuture export enough oil to displace Saudi Arabia asprimary arbiter of world oil prices, reducing whatinfluence the Saudis can exert on US policy toward theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict and giving the US morefreedom of maneuver in the Gulf.

It is uncertain that a post-war Iraq would be willingor able to assume that role, but the possibility,combined with the sheer size of Iraqi reserves, has ledmany observers to conclude that oil motivates the USpolicy of regime change. Ahmed Chalabi, leader of theopposition Iraqi National Congress, fueled thesetheories when he told the Washington Post in September2002 that “American companies will have a big shot atIraqi oil.” Under Oil-for-Food, the US has been theleading consumer of Iraqi oil, and the long-standingUS interest in free access to Persian Gulf oil willdoubtless continue to be a pillar of Middle East policy.Cheney’s national energy policy report, released in May2001, projects that US demand for oil will climb 32percent by 2020, while domestic production remainssteady. Two thirds of global petroleum reserves arefound in the Persian Gulf, and the US military presencein the Gulf certainly aims to secure the westward flowof oil in the future.

But the dogged intensification of sanctions,containment and regime change rhetoric by the US andBritain, when Iraq was prepared to open its oilindustry to Western investment, suggests that oil hasplayed a more complicated part in the 12-yearconfrontation between Washington, London andBaghdad. The Iraqi regime has tried to use oilexploration contracts to undermine internationalsupport for the sanctions, while using illicit exports torebuild ties with its neighbors. Determined to stop therehabilitation of the regime, but unable to foil itseconomic survival strategies completely throughdiplomacy, the US and Britain gradually hardenedtheir resolve – encouraged by the neo-conservatives –that Saddam Hussein had to be removed by force.

Toward the DenouementThe Bush team’s determination to topple SaddamHussein both builds on, and radically departs from,international policy on Iraq since 1991, whichessentially has been made by the five permanentmembers of the Security Council. On the issue ofIraq, Washington retained a dominant positionamong the Permanent Five until the impasse thatfollowed the withdrawal of weapons inspectors in


1998. The US also engaged in the kind of bargainingand arm-twisting in the Council that is only availableto a global power. On October 7, 2002, Bushrepeated his warnings to the UN to endorse the use offorce or “prove irrelevant to the problems of ourtime.” Days later, Secretary of State Colin Powellconvinced UNMOVIC head Hans Blix to delay newinspections until a new resolution could be accepted.Meanwhile, apparent Pentagon preparations for wareven as the UN deliberated signaled that the USwould attempt to form a coerced internationalconsensus behind military action.

The international atmosphere is not conducive tothe rapid coalition building that was possible before the1991 war. Middle Eastern states in particular are upsetby Bush’s failure to intervene positively in the escalatedIsraeli-Palestinian conflict, by seemingly clumsyattempts to link Iraq to al-Qaeda and by the possibleregional implications of a new war. Regional concernsover an attack on Iraq have been rejected by the Bushadministration as mere public show. Internationalopinion increasingly asks why Security Councildemands upon Iraq should be enforced by militaryaction, when that body’s numerous demands uponIsrael, India, Pakistan, Turkey and Morocco remain

conspicuously unmet. Reports that the US would installa military administration to govern post-war Iraqprompted nervous comparisons to British and Frenchcolonialism in the Middle East.

A military assault to remove Saddam Hussein canonly deepen the problems that any new Iraqigovernment will face after two decades of war andsanctions. Civilian infrastructure remains severelydegraded. The once vibrant Iraqi professional classeshave been cut off from advances in knowledge andtechnology since 1990, the work force is deskilled,and the school system is in grave disrepair. Theregime’s survival strategies – encouraging tribal andpersonal loyalties – have widened existing riftsbetween Iraq’s ethnic, religious and tribal groups thatmay erupt into communal strife.

Still, in October 2002 back-door diplomacy focusingon post-war access to Iraqi oilfields appeared to besoftening Russian and French objections to the US-British draft resolution making war the penalty forIraqi non-cooperation with a toughened inspectionsprocess. The 2002 crisis in the Gulf seemed to benearing the denouement desired by hard-linepolicymakers in the White House: a test of the Bushdoctrine of the preemptive strike. �

Available online at www.merip.org or from the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington DC, 20005 USA

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