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Who’s to blame: Populist Right-Wing and mainstream parties’ roles in adoption of welfare chauvinist policies
Please do not cite or circulate without authors’ permission
Juliana Chueri
University of Geneva, Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, [email protected]
April, 2017
Abstract
This paper aims to shed some light on PRWPs’ influence on public policies by
clarifying the mechanisms whereby these bodies influence the immigrants’ entitlement to social rights. This study tests three main hypotheses. The first is that PRWPs are able to restrict immigrants’ access to social policies by participating in the government, mechanism called direct effect. The second one is that even when PRWPs are not part of the government coalition, the increase of PRWPs participation in parliament influences the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies, the indirect effect. The third hypothesis is that welfare chauvinist policies are adopted independently of PRWPs participation in governments or parliaments. The study relies on a quantitative analysis of the legislation change from 1980 to 2014 that altered immigrants’ entitlement to social rights in 17 Western European countries. The results show that government participation is the predominant mechanism of PRWPs’ impact on immigrants’ rights. On the other hand, independently of the presence of PRWPs in politics, mainstream right-parties are likely to adopt welfare chauvinist policies.
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Introduction
Contemporary advanced welfare states have been transformed since the
1980s. Slower economic growth, aging populations, and globalization have
threatened the social commitments of the Golden Age and led several European
countries to reform their welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1996). This subject has
spurred a broad academic debate over why some countries have been more
successful than others in restructuring their welfare states. The most prominent
explanation focuses on the institutional aspects that allow public policy
retrenchment with minimal political costs (Pierson, 1994). In addition, Bonoli (2007)
argues that a retrenchment strategy generally combines expansion and
retrenchment to ensure public support, producing both winners and losers.
This background has led many academics to interpret the disproportionate
reduction of immigrants’ social rights as part of a more global process of welfare
state recalibration, which reflects governments’ aims to deal with budget constraints
and generate incentives to work. In that line, welfare state academics’ justifications
for the increasing gap between citizen and immigrant rights have generally focused
on types of welfare state (Sainsbury, 2006, 2012). Scholars argue that Liberal welfare
states are less threatened by the influx of immigrants since they do not represent a
great budgetary burden (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). On the other hand, Social
Democrat welfare states face a great dilemma between keeping the social benefits
universal and allowing an influx of immigration (Anttonen et al., 2012).
The argument of welfare generosity fails to explain the discrepancy among
cases. For example, Denmark has installed a dual welfare state system: a generous
welfare state for citizens and numerous access barriers for immigrants. On the other
hand, Sweden has implemented some minor restrictions on immigrants’ access to
social rights (Anderson, 2005; Andersen, 2007; Koning, 2013). Therefore, the
electoral success of populist right-wing party (PRWP) in Denmark must be
considered to explain completely the increasing gap between immigrants’ and
citizens’ entitlements to social rights. Although welfare chauvinism—the notion that
the welfare state should only benefit the citizens (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990)—
appears as an important component of PRWP anti-immigrant appeals (Rydgren,
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2004; de Koster, et al., 2012), literature barely explores the relationship between the
success of PRWPs and the adoption of restrictive legislation toward immigrants’
social rights (Bolin et al., 2014; Mudde, 2013).
Clarify the influence of PRWPs in the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies is
fundamental for three reasons. First, considering the governmental challenge of
ensuring inclusion of new immigrants in society, policy changes that reduce
immigrant eligibility to social rights enhance immigrants’ vulnerability to poverty and
social exclusion. Second, the deprivation of basic rights could not only harm the
integration of newcomers in the society, but also affect the integration of future
generations. Finally, integration policies are linked to solidarity towards immigration,
while restrictive integration reinforce public perception that immigrants are a threat
(Crepaz, 2008).
The few existing studies that focus on the impact of PRWPs on policies have a
broad approach, addressing, often indistinctly, immigration and integration policies
(Minkenberg, 2001; Williams, 2006; Shain, 2006; Akkerman, 2012). Exceptions are
Howard (2010), who focuses on the effect of PRWPs on immigrants’ access to
citizenship, and Koning (2013), who analyzes the impact of PRWPs on immigrants’
access to the welfare state. These works address one or few cases, with the valuable
exception of Akkerman (2012), who analyzes nine Western European countries.
The general conclusion is that the increasing presence of PRWPs in
parliaments and governments is associated with the adoption of restrictive policies.
Indeed, works that focus on party manifesto data show that the success of PRWPs
has a contagious effect on mainstream parties (Norris, 2005; van Spange, 2010; Bale
et al., 2010; Alonso and da Fonseca, 2012; Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2015).
In addition, governmental participation of PRWPs helps explain the adoption of
restrictive policies (Minkenberg, 2001; Koning, 2013).
Interestingly, rather than considering this outcome a result of the
parliamentary or ministerial activities of PRWPs’ personnel, those studies argue that
PRWPs lacked expertise and structure, and had limited bargaining power to
influence policy outcomes (Heinisch, 2003; Akkerman, 2012; Akkerman and de
Lange, 2012). Therefore, they claim that the interaction between PRWPs and
mainstream parties is the key element to explain restrictive policies towards
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immigrants (Minkenberg, 2001; Akkerman, 2012). However, the nature of this
interaction has yet to be clarified. Studies have not been clear about the different
policy responses of mainstream left and right-wing parties in light of an increasing
presence of PRWPs in politics. Also, the conditions that enable PRWPs to persuade
coalition partners to adopt an anti-immigrant agenda were not explored, and
differences in PRWPs bargaining power were far ignored.
Therefore, this study aims to shed light on the influence of PRWPs on public
policies by responding to two research questions. The first one is if PRWP had an
influence on the adoption of welfare chauvinist polices and, the second one is by
which mechanism those parties influence immigrants’ entitlement to social rights.
This paper tests three main hypotheses. The first is that PRWPs are able to restrict
immigrants’ access to social policies by participating in the government, mechanism
called direct effect. The second one is that even when PRWPs are not part of the
government coalition, the increase of PRWPs participation in parliament influences
the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies, the indirect effect. The third hypothesis is
that welfare chauvinist policies are adopted independently of PRWPs participation in
governments or parliaments.
Compared to previous studies, the scope of this study is wide. It performs a
large-N analysis with data from 17 Western European countries between 1980 and
2014. The analysis relies on a recently released database, The Determinants of
International Migration Policy data (DEMIG POLICY) Additionally, data from Support
and Opposition to Migration (SOM) and Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) are
considered for cross-validation. The study is broken into five parts. First, I discuss the
populist right-wing ideology and the role of welfare chauvinism in their agenda.
Second, I present the hypotheses of the study. Third, I outline the data and discuss
the analyses. And lastly, I discuss the next steps and conclusions.
1. Contemporary right-wing populism
The emergence of new parties on the right was one of the most important
political occurrences in contemporary advanced European democracies. In
conjunction with the Green parties, these new PRWPs ended the stability of Western
European party systems, increased polarization and party competition (Kriesi et al.,
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2006). In addition, such parties have been relatively successful in recent years,
enlarging their electoral pool, winning seats in national parliaments, and
participating in governments.
As might be expected, many scholars have studied this theme, attempting to
identify the reasons for the shift in political party systems. The literature (Betz, 1993;
Ignazi, 1992; Kitschet and McGann, 1995) explains that this transformation in the
political system was propelled by the significant changes faced by Western European
countries over the past 40 years. First, studies mention the economic crisis of the
1970s, which led to long-term unemployment and a welfare crisis. Second, there was
an increase in globalization, which led to a decrease in national governments’
authority within their own borders and an increase in competition beyond their
borders. Finally, the ‘migration crisis’ occurred, which was understood as a
significant increase in multicultural migration (Schierup et al., 2006).
This process created winners and losers, and those ‘losers of globalization’
are a core element to explain the emergence and growth of the new right (Betz,
1994). This group, composed mainly of low-skilled workers and small business
owners, could not adapt to the world’s transformation, and they perceived
modernization as a threat. They felt they had been harmed by the economic
transformations and judged that the State benefited those who did not deserve
help, while hard workers were left out (de Koster et al., 2010). From a cultural point
of view, the this group believes that national values should be celebrated, and
supports a more authoritarian attitude from the State.
From a sociological perspective of party competition, this group of
discontented created an opportunity for the emergence of populist parties on the
right. These parties were willing to address this new reality and respond to this
group’s wishes. They celebrate national identity and the superiority of the common
man, while endorsing an authoritarian solution to problems. PRWPs stress societal
issues such as violence, drug dealing, and unemployment, and attack the
mainstream parties’ inabilities to confront these challenges. In addition, they
successfully exploit anti-immigrant sentiments for electoral gain. They reinforce the
notion that immigrants are an economic and cultural danger to the nation, using
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populist arguments that are often based on false assumptions to create fear and
anxiety (Williams, 2006).
Scholars use several combinations of words, sometimes indistinctively, to
designate those parties. Most commonly, they are called radical right-wing, far right-
wing parties, extreme right-wing parties, radical right-wing populism, right-wing
populism, and neo right-wing populism (Mudde, 2015). This variety of terms also
appears in the description of the core ideology of this party’s family: authoritarian,
nationalist, xenophobic, anti-democratic, and populist. Not surprisingly, the list of
parties that are considered part of this group diverges among scholars. To avoid this
type of confusion, it is important to acknowledge the distinction between the
various terms and adopt a precise connotation (Mudde, 2002). This work uses the
term “populist right-wing party.” However, the term “populism” also suffers from
misspecification, and it is sometimes used in such a general and catchall manner that
it becomes meaningless (Mudde, 2004; Pappas, 2012).
Cas Mudde (2004: 543) defines populism as a “thin-centered ideology that
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic
groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics
should be an expression of the volonté general (general will) of the people.” Because
populism is a thin ideology, it is usually combined with other ideologies, such as
nationalism, socialism, and liberalism. Therefore, I restrict my analysis to parties
located on the right side of the political spectrum, excluding the populist left-wing
parties, such as the Greek SYRIZA.
Many scholars adopt the term “radical” in addition to “populist right-wing” in
order to designate parties that, besides populism, have (at least) nativism and
authoritarianism in their ideologies (Mudde, 2007). This group of parties is
considered xenophobic because they believe there is homogeneous native group in
opposition to an alien minority that represents a cultural or economic threat to the
nation. In addition, they argue that crimes should be punished severely and they
defend strict law and order policies. Those parties associate foreigners with crime
and seek stricter punishment and defend extradition of immigrants involved in
crimes.
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However, this study adopts a more general definition, analyzing all populist
right wing parties, regardless of their position on immigration (radical or not). The
main reason for this decision is to avoid selection bias; by selecting parties that are
xenophobes, I may increase the chance of finding an effect on immigration policies
or overestimate the parameters of the model. As a result, I consider all populist
parties that are located in the right spectrum without restriction. This classification
excludes populist left-wing parties, extremist or anti-democratic parties, and
mainstream parties that generally accept a pluralistic view of liberal democracy
(Mudde, 2004: 545).
The parties considered in this study originate from the list proposed by
Mudde (2013, 2015) and de Lange (2008). However, since this study has a broader
classification and focuses on populist right-wing parties and not on radical, populist,
right-wing parties, I follow Norris and Inglehart’s (2016)2 study and added three
parties to that list: Finns Party/True Finn (Ps) from Finland, the Alternative
Democratic Party (ADR) from Luxembourg, and the Progress Party (FrP) from
Norway. The complete list of right-wing populist parties considered in this study is
found in the table below:
2 I considered only the parties that had parliament representation during the period of this study.
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Table1. Populist right-wing parties with parliament representation from 1980 to 2014 Country Party Name Acronym
Austria Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ
Alliance for Austria’s Future BZO
Belgium National Front Belgium FN(b)
Flemish Interest/Flemish Block VB
Denmark Danish People's Party DF
Progress Party FRP(d)
Finland Finns Party/True Finns Ps
France National Front FN
Greece Popular Orthodoxy Rally LAOS
Independent Greeks AE
Popular Association – Golden Dawn LS-CA
Italy Italian Social Movement/National Alliance MSI/AN
Northern League LN
Luxembourg Action Committee Pensions/Alternative Democratic Reform Party
AR-ADR
Netherlands Centre Party/Centre Democrats CP/CD
Pim Fortuyn List LPF
Norway Progress Party (Norway) FRP(n)
Sweden New Democracy ND
Sweden Democrats SD
Switzerland Swiss People's Party/Democratic Union of the Centre SVP/UDC
Swiss Automobile Party/Freedom Party of Switzerland FPS
Ticino League LdT
National Action for People NA
UK UK Independence Party UKIP
2. PRWPs and welfare chauvinism
Welfare chauvinism is the notion that welfare benefits should be exclusive to
citizens (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990). However, Kolbe and Capaz (forthcoming)
state that empirical evidence shows that strict welfare chauvinism, i.e., the belief
that immigrants’ access to social services should be banned, is rare among citizens;
more commonly, people believe immigrants should receive benefits after meeting
some preconditions or making some contribution. This moderate version of welfare
chauvinism is also present in PRWP agendas. They openly argue that immigrants’
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access to the welfare state should not be equal to citizens’ access, and that
restrictions to aliens’ social rights are necessary to meet fairness criteria, avoid
abuse, and ensure the sustainability of social protections. Although it was not
explored during the emergence of PRWPs, welfare chauvinism has become an
important component of PRWP rhetoric since 1990 (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990;
Rydgren, 2004; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Koster et al., 2013). The emergence of welfare
chauvinism as a central political platform coincides with the shift in those parties’
positions regarding distributive issues, from a liberal to a more pro-welfare state
rhetoric (Betz, 1994). Kitschelt and McGann (1995), analyzing the positioning of the
radical right-wing in socialist/capitalist and libertarian/authoritarian dimensions,
highlighted the authoritarian capitalist appeal as the ‘master strategy’ for those
parties. Alternatively, he predicted that those parties would lose votes if they
abandoned the master strategy and instead emphasized the authoritarian welfare
chauvinist strategy or issues such as immigration, xenophobia, and race. In fact, this
master strategy corresponds with the initial economic agenda of many PRWPs. For
example, the PRWPs in Scandinavia, similar to many other countries, such as the
Netherlands and Switzerland, defended a liberal agenda that included reducing
taxes. However, the master strategy that corresponded with the emergence of those
parties did not correspond with their expansion strategy (de Lange, 2007; Betz,
1994).
By the early 1990s, many PRWPs discovered the electoral appeal of an anti-
immigrant agenda, and gradually adopted anti-immigration as a primary issue.
Moreover, to expand the number of voters who were likely to be dependent on the
welfare state, those parties abandoned their strong defense of neoliberalism and
embraced instead a welfare state defense (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006). However,
this pro-welfare state platform is significantly different from the traditional left. The
strong anti-immigrant position of PRWPs prevents true egalitarianism; thus, they
defend distribution only for those who deserve it, i.e., the nationals who contribute to
the society’s wealth and have the right to fully enjoy social benefits. This welfare
chauvinism is supported by the view that immigrants abuse the welfare state, or
simply that natives should have preference in receiving benefits (de Koster et al.,
2013). Empirical studies have confirmed that welfare chauvinism has become a crucial
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component of anti-immigrant agendas (Rydgren, 2004; Koster et al., 2013).
Additionally, studies have shown that this rhetoric is an important variable for right-
wing populist voting (Koster et al., 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2008). Therefore, the hypotheses
of this study hold the premise that, once in power, PRWPs will be responsible to their
voters and will have the restriction of immigrants’ entitlements to social rights as their
primary policy goals.
3. Hypotheses
Many scholars have argued that political parties have a decisive impact on
policy outcomes. Focusing generally on left-to-right positioning, studies have shown a
significant relationship between right-wing parties and welfare state retrenchment
(Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Castles, 1982; Hicks, Swank, and Ambuhl, 1989). From the
perspective that parties affect policy designs, this study argues that the recent
electoral success of PRWPs in Europe is the central explanatory element for the extent
of the gap between citizens’ and immigrants’ entitlements to social rights.
This paper has three main hypotheses. The first is that PRWPs are a central
element in understanding the restrictions on immigrants’ entitlements, and that
PRWP participation in national governments is the main channel by which they
influence other parties to adopt welfare chauvinist policies. This perspective is based
on the notion that governmental participation, as a formal member of the
government or as an informal supporter of the winning coalition, leads to the
legitimization of PRWP political platforms and constitutes a channel of communication
whereby PRWPs can persuade ally parties to adopt welfare chauvinist policies.
This interpretation is supported by Akkerman and de Lange’s study (2012),
which shows that the entrance of PRWPs does not lead to moderation in issues that
are central to PRWPs. Also, this study relies on the claim that, though junior
members of the coalition, PRWPs can sway policy outcomes because the
requirement to build majorities gives them bargaining power or allows them to
blackmail the other parties of the coalition to assert their policy preferences, which
is supported by empirical results (Strom, 1990; Downs, 1957). Therefore, as welfare
chauvinism has become one important component of PRWP political platforms and
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voting (Koster et al., 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2008), it is reasonable to expect that, once in
power, PRWPs will aim to reduce immigrants’ entitlement to rights.
H1: The participation of a PRWP in the winning coalition increases the
likelihood of a reduction in immigrants’ social rights.
Due to their share of seats in a parliament, PRWPs are most frequently junior
members in the government coalition. However, in some cases, PRWPs have equitable
power with other coalition partners, for example, in Austria from 2000 to 2001, and
Switzerland from 2003. Therefore, in order to access the importance of PRWPs power
resource inside the coalition on the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies, a slightly
different model that has as PRWP participation share in coalition as dependent
variable will also be tested.
Finally, literature generally treats indistinctly the informal participation of
PRWPs in government, i.e., the support of a PRWP to the winning coalition without
receiving a portfolio, and its formal participation in the government (Akkerman, 2012;
Akkerman and de Lange, 2012; Afonso, 2015). However, recent studies have linked
informal participation to a strategy to prioritize voters over offices (Akkerman, de
Lange and Rooduijn, 2016).
Studies have shown that participation in office has given PRWPs significant
electoral backlash (Akkerman and de Lange, 2012). The lack of skilled human capital
to occupy key chairs in government and the necessity to compromise with other
parties on core issues precluded PRWPs from delivering their campaign promises.
Therefore, learning from their first experiences in government led PRWPs to
occasionally abdicate portfolios and opt to support the winning coalition from the
outside. Scholars suggest that this type of agreement reduces the setbacks of
government participation, as it enables PRWPs’ influence on their priority issues,
such as immigration and integration (Christianse and Pedersen, 2014; Thesen, 2016).
Therefore, this paper investigates if informal governmental participation of a PRWP
increases the likelihood of a reduction in immigrants’ social rights versus formal
participation.
The second hypothesis is that PRWPs influence policy outcomes indirectly.
Literature has called significant attention to the contagious effect of PRWPs in
mainstream parties (Norris, 2005; Shain, 2006; Bale, van Spange, 2010; Alonso and
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da Fonseca, 2012). Studies have posited that the electoral success of PRWPs has led
mainstream parties to adopt PRWP positions in issues such as immigration and
integration. This approach assumes that parties are maximizing agents that adapt
their policies to obtain electoral gains (Downs, 1957). Consequently, the electoral
successes of PRWPs signify to other parties, especially right-wing parties, that
immigration issues have gained significant political visibility. This may nudge
mainstream right-wing parties toward policy convergence to prevent PRWPs from
gaining ownership of the immigration issue, i.e., being considered by the electorate
as the most competent party to deal with the issue (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Meguid,
2005). Therefore, the presence of a PRWP has an indirect impact on the restriction
of immigrants’ entitlement to social rights. Mainstream right-wing parties perceive
the electoral success of PRWPs as a threat, which leads those parties to adopt PRWP
policies regarding immigration and integration (Norris, 2005; van Spange, 2010,
Meguid, 2005; Bale et al., 2010).
H2: The presence of PRWPs in a parliament increases the likelihood that
right-wing governments will adopt restrictions to immigrants’ entitlement to rights.
The mainstream left has a much more complicated choice. On one hand, those
parties casts votes from the working class, a group that has become a supporter of
PRWPs in recent years. Those voters feel particularly threatened by immigration and
wronged by the social welfare state (Koster et al., 2010). Therefore, they are generally
inclined to approve restrictions toward immigrants’ access to rights. On the other
hand, mainstream left parties attract highly educated voters and those with liberal
social-cultural values, which favor social egalitarianism policies and a broader concept
of solidarity.
Additionally, left parties are less likely to change their political positions in
response to changes in other parties’ positions in the political spectrum. Studies
attribute this behavior to left wing parties’ decentralized structure of decision, which
gives substantial power of influence to party activists (Kitschelt, 1994; Adams et al.,
2009). Therefore, left wing parties are less likely to abandon their ideological
commitments to tolerance on immigration and integration.
Empirical studies also present inconclusive results. Alonso and da Fonseca
(2012) show that the mainstream left tend to increase the salience of the immigration
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issue, and adopt a tough discourse on immigration in response to the threat of PRWP.
On the other hand, Bale and his colleagues (2001) found that the social democratic
response to the rise of the populist radical right, and to the rise of immigration and
integration issues’ salience, is not uniform. However, it rarely involves adoption of
PRWP positions. Therefore, in contrast to the mainstream right, I expect that if PRWPs
gain ground in national politics, the mainstream left will not restrict immigrants’
access to rights.
H2a: Left-wing governments are not likely to restrict immigrants’ entitlement
to social rights in response to increased PRWP parliament participation.
The third hypothesis assumes that PRWP is not a necessary element for a
restriction of immigrant social rights. This perspective assumes that mainstream
parties can access citizen sentiments regardless the electoral success of those parties.
Thus, if anti-immigrant sentiments become a salient issue in society, mainstream
parties will adapt their policies towards the medium average voter in order to
maximize their electoral results (Downs, 1957). This last hypothesis is in line with
Mudde’s perspective (2007) that the impact of PRWPs have been exaggerated by
scholars, and the fact that restrictive policies have been enacted by mainstream
governments and by governments that have faced no significant populist right
competitor.
H3: Independently of PRWPs electoral success or government participation, if
anti-immigrant sentiment became relevant, mainstreams right-wing governments will
reduce immigrants’ entitlement to social rights.
As the hypothesis 2, this study also assumes that left wing government are
unlikely to adopt restrictions on immigrants’ entitlements to social rights.
H3a: Mainstreams left-wing governments are not likely to reduce immigrants’
entitlement to social rights.
4. Data and research design
Data will be collected from the following 17 countries: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. The data is annual, and covers the period from 1980 to 2014. Those years
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correspond to the rise of PRWPs and growth of PRWPs for most of the
aforementioned countries. The empirical analysis involves a statistics study.
For each country, the following eight social policies will be considered:
minimum income, social pension, guaranteed income for the elderly, children’s
allowances, housing allowances, healthcare aid, compulsory education, and non-
compulsory education. These are all non-contributory policies, which means they are
generally financed by taxes and that the benefits received do not depend on
previous contributions.
The choice of non-contributory policies stems from three factors. First, they
represent a greater fiscal burden to the state because they are not linked to
contributions. Second, immigrants have a higher exposure to social risks, such as
poverty and unemployment, so they are relatively more dependent on these types
of benefits than the general population (Boeri, 2010). Therefore, such policies are
likely targets of restrictions. Finally, the literature reports that, generally, immigrant
access to contributory policies has no restrictions (Fix and Laglagaron, 2002).
The entitlements of six categories of immigrants (EU citizens, permanent
residents, temporary residents, asylum seekers, refugees, and non-documented
immigrants) will be examined separately. This distinction is fundamental because
social rights entitlements are linked to statuses of entrance, and legislation
specifically addresses the entitlements of each immigrant category. The statistical
study conducted is based on a random effect logistic regression (Logit), with an
ordinal dependent variable. I chose to apply the random effect model because I have
time-independent explanatory variables. The estimator is the method of maximum
likelihood.3
3 The ordinal logistic regression is based on the parallel-lines assumption, which is often violated. The test for parallel-lines assumption, “Brand test,” is not available in Stata for random effects ordinal logistic models. If the parallel-lines assumption is violated, the common solution is to treat the outcomes as nominals and apply the generalized order logistic regression. However, this last model, which frees all variables of the parallel-line constraint, often estimates far more parameters than necessary. For these reasons, I opted to apply a random ordinal logistic regression, regardless the parallel assumption verification, in order to simplify the interpretation of the results.
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The dependent variable of the model is the change (increase, maintenance,
or decrease) of immigrants’ rights. Note that I consider citizens’ entitlement as the
baseline, so an increase in immigrants’ entitlement is a change that equates or
approximates immigrants’ rights to citizens’ rights. Similarly, a decrease in
immigrants’ social rights represents a change that increases the gap between
immigrants’ and citizens’ entitlement to social rights. Therefore, changes in
legislation that target both immigrants’ and citizens’ rights are not considered. The
magnitude of the change is also considered. To analyze the comprehensiveness of
the change, I considered the number of immigrant groups and policies affected, as
well as the severity of the restriction.
4.1 Dependent variable
Data on immigrants’ entitlement to rights comes from three databases. First,
the DEMIG POLICY data from Oxford University a qualitative database that provides
information about legislation changes that affect immigrants’ entitlement to social
rights. Then, the explanation tables of MIPEX and SOM databases were also
consulted to crosscheck information and include missing data. In this last step, four
new legislation changes were incorporated in the study (see Appendix I).
The choice of prioritizing the DEMIG POLICY database rather than other
databases (Niessen et al., 2007; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008; Oxford Analytica,
2008; Klugman and Pereira, 2009; Ruhs, 2011) is four-fold. First, DEMIG covers the
countries and years examined in the current study. Second, it appropriately
differentiates the diverse policy areas of immigration (immigration, integration, and
citizenship policies) and their subcategories. Third, the DEMIG POLICY database
makes a clear distinction between outputs and outcomes, and it catalogues only
legislation changes, i.e., policy outputs. Some databases mix information about
policy outputs, legislation, and norms with outcomes.4 Evidently, no superiority a
priori exists among these perspectives; they are merely different approaches, and
they answer different questions. The present study will assess the effect PRWP
participation in parliament and government has on policies. Finally, the DEMIG
4 Refer to Helbling (2013) for a full discussion about the topic.
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POLICY database provides the direction of the changes in terms of immigrants’
entitlement to social rights (more restrictive or less restrictive). This feature allows
the present study to make inferences about both movements.
The table below shows the number of legislation passed regarding
immigrants’ entitlement to social rights.5
Table 2. Number of approved legislation that increased or decreased immigrants’
entitlement to social rights from 1980 to 2014
Country Increases Decreases
Austria 3 2
Belgium 0 6
Denmark 3 5
Finland 0 1
France 2 2
Germany 2 2
Greece 4 2
Ireland 1 2
Italy 2 1
Luxembourg 1 1
Netherlands 1 2
Norway 2 0
Portugal 4 0
Spain 1 1
Sweden 0 2
Switzerland 0 3
UK 0 6
Total 26 38
Table 2 shows that, instead of a constant restriction of immigrants’
entitlement to rights, most of the countries combine expansive and restrictive
changes in legislation. The United Kingdom is one of the notable exceptions; it was
the most restrictive nation and approved five bills that reduced immigrants’
entitlement to rights. These restrictions affected different groups of immigrants;
asylum seekers had their social rights reduced in 1993, 1996, and 1999, and refugees
saw their entitlement restricted in 2004. In addition, the Borders Citizenship and
5 To maintain coherence with the hypotheses developed previously, I excluded changes in legislation that address economic rights (access to the labor market), target exclusively the rights of immigrants from the diaspora, and legislation adopted due to judicial decision.
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Immigration Act of 2009 restricted access to public services and benefits for all
immigrants during the first five years in the country.
Denmark also approved five restrictive legislations on immigrants’ social
rights, but it combined those restrictions with three expansions over the thirty-five-
year period. Interestingly, Denmark backpedaled on some of its imposed restrictions.
In 2000, it reversed the 1999 legislation that restricted refugees’ entitlement to
social benefits, and in 2012, the country approved a legislation nulling the 2002
restriction that reduced the welfare benefit for new migrants.
In order to transform the qualitative information present in DEMIG POLICY
database in a numerical variable that considers not only the direction of change but
also its magnitude, the following dimensions were considered (see Appendix 1 for a
detailed description of the database and coding):
1. The change in policy coverage, which corresponds to a comparison
between the initial degree of coverage and the policy coverage after
the legislation change. Three levels of change are considered: minor
change, mid-level change, and major change. Those categories are
respectively coded as 1, 2, and 3 if the change corresponds to an
extension of coverage, or -1, -2, and -3 if the change corresponds to a
restriction of coverage.6
2. The number of immigrant groups affected (EU members, permanent
immigrants, temporary immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and
non-documented immigrants).
3. The number of policies affected (compulsory education, non-
compulsory education, family allowances and childcare benefits, old
6 Policy coverage corresponds to rules regarding who can receive social rights and under what conditions. Policy reforms may or may not introduce fundamental changes in the criterion of social policy distribution. Introduction or removal of bureaucratic requirements to receive benefits is considered a minor change in coverage. On the other hand, exclusion or inclusion of an immigrant group from receiving the benefits and the introduction or removal of long waiting periods are considered major changes. The increase or decrease of waiting periods up to one year and exclusion or inclusion of only part of an immigrant group are considered mid- level changes.
18
age assistance, minimal income and long-term unemployment, social
housing, and public health or subsidies for insurance fees).
The dependent variable is calculated in a two-step process. First, I multiply
the values of criterion 1, 2 and 3 aforementioned. For example, if the change
corresponds to a mid-level restriction of rights, two immigrants’ groups are affected,
and the bill affects one social policy, this legislation change receives the value -4. As
a result, I have an ordinal variable with values form from -36 to 36. Second, I collapse
the outcome of the first step into an ordinal scale from -3 to 3.7 Legislations that
score less (more) than -5 (5) were considered major restrictions (expansions) and
received the code -3 (3). Legislation changes scored between -3 and -4 (3 and 4)
were considered mid-level restrictions (expansions) and were coded -2 (2).
Legislation changes scored between -1 and -2 (1 and 2) were considered minor
restrictions (expansions) and were therefore scored -1 (1).
As a result, negative values correspond to decreases in entitlement, positive
values correspond to increases in entitlement, and zeroes correspond to the absence
of change. Absolute values of 3 correspond to major changes in terms of polices and
immigrants’ groups affected, as well as the degree of change in immigrants’
entitlement to rights. Likewise, absolute values of 2 correspond to mid-level
changes, and absolute values of 1 correspond to minor modifications.
4.2 Independent variables
This study uses nine explanatory variables. The first independent variable is
the share of seats occupied by PRWPs in parliament, 8 which was taken from the
Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov). 9 The breakdown of PRWP
participation in national parliaments is shown in the table below:
7 In proportional odds models, it is common practice to collapse adjacent categories. For a detailed discussion about the pros and cons of this method, refer to Murad, Fleischman, Sadetzki, Geyer, and Freedman (2003). 8 If there is more than one PRWP in the parliament, this variable represents the share of the sum of all seats occupied by PRWPs. 9 For electoral years, I considered preponderant data, i.e., information that lasts more than six months.
19
Table 4. Share of PRWPs participation in national parliaments from 1980 to 2014.
Country Best result Last election 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2014
Austria 30,1% 21,9% 7,4% 19,4% 21,8%
Belgium 12,5% 2% 0,6% 6,6% 11,3%
Demark 13,4% 12,3% 7,2% 7,3% 12,6%
France 6,3% 0,3% 1,3% 0,1% 0,1%
Finland 19,5% 19,5% 0% 0,1% 6,4%
Germany 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Greece 12,7% 12,2% 0% 0% 3,5%
Ireland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Italy 35,9% 4,4% 5,6% 19,1% 14,5%
Luxembourg 11,7% 5% 0% 8,0% 8,5%
Netherlands 17,3% 10% 0,1% 1,3% 8,3%
Norway 24,4% 17,2% 1,6% 10,8% 19,9%
Portugal 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Spain 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Sweden 7,2% 5,7% 0% 2,2% 1,5%
Switzerland 31,5% 28% 13,5% 17,2% 27,7% UK 0,2% 0,2% 0% 0% 0%
Source: Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov)
The table above shows the power of PRWPs in national parliaments and their
presence across decades. In five cases (those of Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain,
and the United Kingdom), PRWPs have neither parliament participation or a minor
participation. It also illustrates that in Greece and Finland, right-wing populism is a
recent phenomenon. However, in the other 10 nations studied herein, PWRPs
appear as a steady growing force in national parliaments over the last 35 years.
Therefore, these data contradict the idea that PRWPs are forcibly temporary. Even if
a PRWP loses seats and disappears from the national parliament, it is generally
replaced by another from the same party family.
The second variable of interest is PRWP government participation. This
variable is a dummy that assumes value 1 if PRWP participates at government
(formally or informally), and assumes value 0 otherwise. A slightly different version
of the second variable is the PRWP government participation type that considers the
following three situations: PRWP formal participation in the government, PRWP
informal support of the winning coalition, and no PRWP government participation.
20
The table below shows the years of formal and informal participation of PRWPs in
governments for the countries and period considered in this study:
Table 5. PRWP formal and informal participation in governments from 1980 to
2014.
Country Formal Informal
Austria 1985-1986
2000-2006
Denmark 2002-2011
Greece 2011
Italy 1994
2001-2005
2008-2011
Netherlands 2002-2003 2010-2011
Norway 2014- 2002-2005
Switzerland 1985-2007
2009-2014
Table 5 shows 13 examples of PRWPs participating in governments, three of
which were informal. The Netherlands and, recently, Norway had combined
experiences of formal and informal participation.
The third explanatory variable is government orientation. This variable is
equal to the sum of the product of party position in the left-right scale and its share
in cabinets for all parties in government.
Governmet orientation = ∑ party positioni
n
party=1
X government participationi
For minority governments, this study takes two approaches. The first
approach is to look for informal supporters. If the minority government had one or
more supporter parties that were not formal members of the coalition, such parties
are considered in the calculation because they were members of the coalition. If the
minority government had no informal supporters and looked for ad hoc allies to pass
bills, the calculation of this variable considers the entire parliament position in left-
right scale multiplied by its participation in the coalition, which is the additional
share necessary to build a simple majority of 50%. For example, if the government
has 35% of the parliament seats and its position is 3,5, the position of the entire
21
parliament, excluding the government parties, is 6,0. This variable will assume the
value of 4,25: ((0,35 0,50)⁄ *3,5)+((0,15 0,50)⁄ ) * 6,0.
I also considered the following four other rival explanations: welfare state
type, welfare state expenditure, public debt, and immigrant influx. For the first
variable, I classified welfare state type according to Esping-Andersen’s typology
(1990). For the second, I used The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) data on the ratio of public welfare expenditure to the gross
domestic product (GDP). For the third variable, I considered OECD data on the ratio
of total central government debt to the GDP. For the last variable, I considered the
OCDE data on the ration of immigrant influx to the total population. The
independent variables are summarized in the table below.
Table 6. Independent variables of the study
Variable name Type of variable Explanation
Government orientation Continuous Weighted average of left-right orientation of the cabinet.
PRWP share of seats in parliament
Continuous Participation of PRWP in parliament.
PRWP share in coalition Continuous Ratio of PRWP share of seats in parliament/ share of seats of the entire coalition.
PRWP government participation
Dummy PRWP government participation (formally or informally). No participation is the baseline
PRWP government participation type
Dummy
PRWP formal member of coalition, and PRWP informal member of coalition and PRWP. No participation in the government is the baseline.
Welfare state Dummy Liberal, Social Democrat and South European welfare state types .Continental is the baseline.
Public debt Continuous Ratio debt government/GDP.
Welfare state expenditure Continuous Ratio public welfare state expenditure per
capita/GDP.
Immigrant influx Continuous Immigrant influx/total population.
4.2 Statistical analysis
22
As shown in Table 7, four models were tested. Model 1 tested the influence
of PRWP government participation on the adoption of restrictive or expansive
policies towards immigrants’ access to rights, controlled by PRWP parliament
participation, PRWP government participation, government orientation, welfare
state type, immigrant influx, government social expending, and government debt.
Model 2 tested the influence of PRWP share of participation in coalition. Model 3
includes two dummy variables for PRWP government participation, informal and
formal. Model 4 considers the interaction between PRWP parliament participation
and government orientation.
One of the downsides of the ordinal logistic regression model is that the
interpretation of the coefficients of the model is not straightforward because the
coefficients represent the log odds. Therefore, Table 7 shows the coefficients (log
odds) in the first line, and the odds ratio, i.e., the exponential transformation, in the
second line. The odds ratio represents the odds of obtaining greater values of the
dependent variable for a unit of change in the predictable variable. Therefore, if the
odds ratio is less than 1, a marginal increase in the dependent variable will increase
the odds of obtaining lower values of the dependent variable.
23
Table 7. Model result coefficients and odds ratio (N=595, 1980–2014, 17 countries). Coefficients and log-odds in parenthesis.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PRWP parliament participation 0,019 (1,019)
0,027 (1,027)
0,018 (1,018)
0,193*** (1,212)
PRWP government participation
-1,306*** (0,291)
-0,491 (0,612)
PRWP government participation type (baseline non-participation)
Informal participation -1,708** (0,181)
Formal participation -1,114* (0,328)
Government orientation -0,239 ** (0,787)
-0,188 * (0,829)
-0,216* (0,806)
-0,063 (0,939)
PRWP coalition participation -0,05*** (0,951)
Interaction between PRWP parliament participation and government orientation
-0,036*** (0,965)
Welfare state type (baseline continental)
Liberal -0,479 (0,619)
-0,683 (0,595)
-0,538 (0,584)
-0,899 * (0,406)
Social Democrat 0,01 (1,010) -0,085 (0,918
0,075 (1,077)
-0,043 (0,958)
South European 0,921 * (2,511)
0,857* (2,909)
0,908 * (2,479)
0,814 (2,256)
Debt/GDP -0,003 (0,997)
-0,001 (0,999)
-0,003 (0,997)
0,001 (0,999)
Public social expenditure/GDP -0,02 (0,980)
-0,018 (0,982)
-0,019 (0,981)
-0,018 (0,982)
Immigrant influx/ population 0,004 (1,004)
0,004 (1,004)
0,003 (1,003)
0,002 (1,002)
Prob > chi2 0,0021 0,0004 0,0024 0,0001
Wald chi2 25,96 30,29 27,17 35,18
(*) significant at the 0.1 level, (**) significant at the 0.05 level, and (***) significant at the 0.01 level.
Model 1 supports Hypothesis 1, which states that PRWPs’ government
participation has a negative influence on immigrants’ entitlement to rights. The
model shows that PRWP government participation increases the odds of getting
lower values of the dependent variable (reduction in immigrants’ entitlement to
24
rights) in 3,4410 times. Additionally, the study indicates that government orientation
explains changes in immigrants’ access to rights. All variables held constant, marginal
increase in government orientation (toward the right) increases the odds of a
reduction in immigrants’ social rights by 1,27 times.
Model 2 considers the “PRWP coalition participation” variable. This
coefficient shows that a marginal increase in PRWPs’ participation share in the
coalition increases the odds of a decrease in immigrants’ entitlement to rights by
1,05 times. Additionally, the coefficient of the “government orientation” variable is
negative and significant. All variables held constant, a marginal increase in
government orientation (toward the right) increases the odds of reduction in
immigrants’ social rights by 1,21 times.
Model 3 tests different types of government participation. Both types of
participation, formal and informal, have negative and significant coefficients, which
mean that they increase the chance of a restriction in immigrants’ entitlement to
social rights. However, informal participation has a greater negative effect. Holding
all variables constant, the informal participation of PRWPs in the government
increases the chance of obtaining lower values in the dependent variable (reduction
of immigrants’ entitlement to rights) over higher values by 5,52 times, in comparison
to non-participation. On the other hand, formal participation increases this chance
by 3,03 times compared to non-participation. Similar to previous models, the
government orientation is negative and significant.
Model 4 includes the interaction between the participation of PRWPs in
parliament and government orientation, which slightly changes the interpretation of
the coefficients. The coefficient “PRWP parliament participation” corresponds to the
effect of the variable when government orientation is zero. This coefficient shows
that a marginal increase in PRWP parliament participation increases the odds of an
increase in immigrants’ entitlement to rights by 1,21 times when government
orientation is zero. The variable “government orientation” is not significant in this
model.
10 The calculation 1/odd gives the odds of obtaining lower values of the dependent variable given a marginal rise in the independent variable.
25
The interaction variable represents the effect of PRWPs parliament
participation mediated by the government’s position on the left/right scale. The
interpretation of an interaction between two constant variables is not
straightforward, since its coefficient may have different signs for different values of
covariates. Therefore, the graph below shows the linear marginal effect of an
increase in PRWPs participation in parliament on the dependent variable, for both
different fixed values of government orientation and no government participation.
For a simplified interpretation, the margins are based on a simplified version of the
model that excludes economic and demographic controls.
Graph 1. Linear marginal effect of the participation of PRWPs in parliament on the dependent variable for different levels of government orientation, when PRWPs do not participate in government, with 90% confidence interval.
As displayed in the above graph, the effect of PRWPs parliament participation
in immigrants’ entitlement to social rights is dependent on government orientation.
The marginal effect is positive for governments that score 5 and below in the
left/right party position dimension and negative for governments that score above 5.
-.3
-.2
-.1
0.1
.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Government Orientation
26
Therefore, a marginal increase in PRWP participation in parliament enhances the
chance of a restriction on immigrants’ social rights when a right-wing government is
in power. On the other hand, this increase enhances the chance of expansion of
immigrants’ social rights when a center or left-wing coalition is in power. However,
those results are only significant, with a confidence level of 90%, for right-wing
governments that score below 4 in the left/right political, and for left-wing
governments that score above 8. 20% of the database falls within the first criteria,
and there is not a single case in the last criteria.
Additionally, in all models, the variables “public welfare expenditure,” “public
debt,” and “immigrant influx” are not statistically different from zero. For models 1,
2, and 3, the dummy for South European welfare states have positive and significant
coefficients. Therefore, compared to the Continental welfare states, the presence of
this South European welfare state increases the chance of an expansion of
immigrants’ access to rights. Model 4 shows that, compared to Continental welfare-
states, the presence of a Liberal welfare state increases the chances of a decrease in
immigrants’ entitlement to rights in 2,5. Finally, the Prob > chi2 test has the null
hypothesis that all coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. The small values of
the p-value lead to the conclusion that at least one coefficient is different from zero
and the rejection of the null hypothesis.
5. Conclusions
This paper sought to clarify PRWPs’ influence on immigrants’ entitlement to
social rights and the effect of the interaction between PRWPs and mainstream
parties on the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies. In line with previous studies, it
confirmed that PRWP participation in governments increases the odds of a reduction
in immigrants’ entitlement to welfare benefits. An additional finding is that the share
of PRWP participation in the coalition increases the likelihood of changes in
immigrants’ entitlement to rights. This last point shows that simple participation of
PRWPs in governments only partially explains the restriction of social rights; their
bargaining power also explains the influence of those parties on the adoption of
welfare chauvinist policies.
27
The statistical study showed that the effect of direct and indirect PRWP
government participation on immigrants’ entitlement to social rights differs in terms
of magnitude, with the negative impact being greater when a PRWP informally
participates in a coalition. A possible explanation for this result is that PRWPs trade
offices for policy outcomes. One important limitation of this outcome, though, is
that it is mainly the result of the Danish case; therefore, it cannot be generalized for
other parties. Nevertheless, a case study is needed to identify and clarify how this
trade mechanism works to verify that hypothesis.
The impact of PRWPs’ parliamentary participation on the adoption of welfare
chauvinist policies is mediated by government orientation. Left-wing governments
respond to an increase in PRWPs in parliament by expanding immigrants’ access to
social rights. In contrast, right-wing mainstream governments respond to the
increase of PRWPs in parliament by reducing immigrants’ entitlement to rights;
however, this effect is only significant for extreme values of government
orientations, not observed in the sample.
Another finding is that mainstream parties affect immigrants’ entitlement to
social rights. All variables held constant, a marginal shift in government orientation
towards the right increases the odds of restrictions to immigrants’ rights. On the
other hand, a marginal shift to the left raises the chances of an increase in
immigrants’ entitlement to rights. This result suggests that mainstream right-wing
parties adopt welfare chauvinist measures regardless of the electoral success of
PRWPs and level of PRWPs’ government participation. This finding supports Mudde’s
observation (2007) that governments that do not face competition with a PRWP or
have a PRWP in their coalition still adopt restrictive policies towards immigrants.
It is important to note that the present research relies on a small database
made up of 17 cases studied over 35 years. It reduces the power of the statistical
tests, which increases the probability of rejecting a true hypothesis (type II error).
However, this feature does not alter the reliability of the significant results (type I
error). Therefore, the associations found in the study are likely to be true.
Additionally, due to the size of the dataset, the results are sensitive to changes in my
database. In that scenario, the accuracy of the data is even more determinative to
obtain reliable results.
28
Therefore, this study illustrates that the role of PRWPs in the adoption of
welfare chauvinist polices cannot be ignored. The analysis supports the claim that
the participation of a PRWP in the coalition is the predominant mechanism of
PRWPs’ impact on immigrants’ rights. Additionally, unlike previous studies, which
highlighted the technical incapacity of PRWPs to obtain policy results, this work
suggests that PRWPs use their bargaining power inside coalitions to implement
strategies to influence policies. Finally, traditional left and right dimensions also
explain changes to immigrants’ entitlement to rights. Controlled by the presence of
PRWPs in politics, the higher a government scores on the left-right scale, the more
likely they are to adopt welfare chauvinist policies.
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36
Appendix 1
Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
Austria 1989 Increase
The access to emergency benefits (Notstandshilfe) has been granted to refugees and holders of a permanent work permit for a maximum of one year The emergency benefits are the prolongation of the unemployment benefits in Austria.
Minimal income
Refugees and permanent immigrants
Major change
Right acquisition with no restriction
DEMIG
Austria 1991 Increase
Law on Federal Care for Asylum Seekers (Bundesbetreuung) stipulated that the federal government is responsible for health, nutritional and accommodation of asylum seekers. However, there is no legal entitlement to these benefits.
Heath, minimum income and housing
Asylum seekers
Mid-level change
Benefits, but no legal right
DEMIG
Austria 1997 Increase
Revision of the Law on Unemployment assurance - made all third country nationals eligible for emergency benefits (after unemployment benefits) but enshrined the priority of people born in Austria. > This amendment is a reaction to a judgement of the ECHR, which considered the exclusion of third country nationals from emergency benefits not conform with human rights. Before, only refugees and those with permanent residence permit were eligible.
Minimal income
Temporary immigrants
Mid-level change
Right, but priority to nationals
DEMIG
Austria 2002 Decrease
Internal order of the Ministry of Interior - restricted access to state benefits to asylum seekers from certain countries which were likely to be rejected (a list of safe third countries was created) Background: In 2002, a record number of 36,990 asylum applications were lodged, exceeding the already high figures for 2001 by almost 7,000 (not counting the 16,150 applications submitted to the Austrian embassy in Islamabad in late 2001).
Minimal income
Asylum seekers
Mid-level change
Part of a immigrant group out of the benefit
DEMIG
Austria 2004 Decrease Seasonal workers are no longer eligible for unemployment benefits.
Minimal income
Temporary immigrants
Mid-level change
Part of a immigrant group out of the benefit
DEMIG
Belgium 1984 Decrease
Modification to the Law of Foreigners (Dec 1980) comes into force on 16 August 1984 - restricts access to benefits for unregistered foreigners, those who did not comply with a deportation order, admitted persons for a maximum of three months and asylum seekers whose case has not been determined yet
Minimal income
Asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants
Mid-level change
Part of a immigrant group out of the benefit and bureaucratic obstacles
DEMIG
Belgium 2000 Decrease
Two measures have been introduced in 2000 in the field of asylum - replacing the granting of financial assistance to asylum seekers by a material assistance distributed in open reception centers created for this purpose
Minimal income
Asylum seekers
Mid-level change
Material benefit instead of cash benefits
DEMIG
37
Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
Belgium 2007 Decrease
Reception Law of 12 January 2007 (entered into force on 7 May 2007) - introduced material support during the entire asylum procedure (replacing, as was the case in the past, the situation where asylum seekers could apply for financial support from social welfare centers)
Minimal income
Asylum seekers
Minor change
Fine tuning in relation to previous measure
DEMIG
Belgium 2010 Decrease
Reaction to the reception crisis the right of reception and/or material aid for certain categories of asylum seekers and other foreigners > 1) Fedasil may exclude asylum seekers, who applied for asylum the third or further times 2) the end terms of material aid for asylum seekers and certain other categories of foreigners is specified: if an asylum claim is henceforth concluded with a negative decision of the appeal instance or the Court of Cassation, the material aid is ending after a term of five days after the issue date of the decision (with some exceptions). 3) in exceptional circumstances it is allowed to assign asylum seekers to a local Public Centre for Social Welfare (OCMW/CPAS) for inscription.
Minimal income
Asylum seekers
Minor change
Fine tuning in relation to previous measure. Bureaucratic impediments
DEMIG
Belgium 2011 Decrease
Bill of October 27, 2011 - stipulated that asylum seekers introducing a subsequent asylum application can no longer benefit form material assistance, unless their asylum claim is deemed admissible by the Immigration office.
Minimal income
Asylum seekers
Minor change
Bureaucratic impediments
DEMIG
Belgium 2012 Decrease
The Belgian Public Centre for Social Welfare (CPAS/OCMW) has restricted its support to EU citizens and their family members since 27 February 2012 - All EU citizens and their family members are excluded from entitlement to CPAS/OCMW social services, (urgent) medical assistance and employment provisions during the first 3 months of their stay in Belgium. - After the first 3 months, EU citizens and their family members are entitled to CPAS/OCMW social services, medical assistance and employment provisions, provided that they are not job seekers. Irregularly staying individuals are only entitled to urgent medical assistance. - Once they obtain an E or F card, all EU citizens and their family members qualify for social integration (income support and employment provisions) if they meet the conditions regarding the Right to Social Integration provided by Belgian Law.
Minimal income and heath assistance
EU Minor change
Waiting time of 3 months
DEMIG
Denmark 1989 Increase
Circular of 1 May 1989 - granting foreigners the right to financial support to attend high schools and other institutions of learning
High education
EU, temporary immigrants, permanent immigrants, asylum seekers
Minor change
Bureaucratic facilitation
DEMIG
38
Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
Denmark 1999 Decrease
On 26 June 1998 the Danish Parliament passed its first Integration Act, which entered into effect on 1 January 1999 - created the Start Help, a very low level of social benefits for newly arrived refugees, so that their benefits were much lower than the benefits for Danish citizens. > This was a drawback from the general entitlement to social benefits enacted in 1976. The official argument was that the level of benefits should function as a positive incentive to integrate refugees into the labor market.
Minimal income
Refugees and asylum seeker
Mid-level change
Reduced level of the benefit for the entire group
DEMIG
Denmark 2000 Increase
The start help for newly arrived refugees was abolished in January 2000 only 13 months after its introduction. > The official argument was that it was not possible to demonstrate that the lower rates had given work to more refugees and that the rules might be contravening the 1951 refugee convention .
Minimal income
Refugees and asylum seeker
Mid-level change
Contrary as above
DEMIG
Denmark 2002 Decrease
Amendment to the Integration Act in 2002 - reduces the amount of assistance granted to newly-arrived immigrants in order to encourage them to look for a job more rapidly.
Minimal income and housing
Temporary immigrant, asylum seeker and refugees
Mid-level change
Reduced level of the benefit for the entire group
DEMIG
Denmark 2003 Decrease
In July 2003, a new law regarding asylum seekers and refugees came into effect - creating a contract that needs to be fulfilled by an applicant in order to receive basic cash allowances from the state.
Minimal income
Asylum seekers and refugees
Minor change
Bureaucratic requirements
DEMIG
Denmark 2009 Decrease
Act No. 982 of 2 October 2009 Section 2: old age pension requires 10 years of legal residence in Denmark OR (convention or quota refugees). The size of the pension depends of the length of stay. Full pension is possible after 40 years of legal residence.
Unemployment assistance
EU member, permanent immigrant, temporary, refugees and asylum seeker
Mid-level change
Waiting period plus proportional reduction of the benefit
MIPEX/SOM
Denmark 2010 Decrease
Law no.1609 (L79): adopted: December 12th 2010 & January 1st 2011: Introduced an earnings-principle, which was used to discriminate in the payment of child- and youth benefits to families in Denmark, effectively barring newly arrived immigrant families from receiving child- and youth benefits equivalent to that of ethnically Danish families until they had held residence in Denmark for 2 years. Newly arrived families thereby only had the right to 25% of the benefits after 6 months, 50% of the benefits after 12 months, 75% of benefits after 18 months and 100% after 2 years. Law 1382 (L31)
Family Assistance
EU member, temporary immigrants
Mid-level change
Waiting time and proportional reduction
MIPEX/SOM
Denmark 2012 Increase
From January 2012, cash allowances for newly arrived refugees and immigrants, as well as the starter allowances for persons having resided in Denmark for less than seven of the preceding eight years will be eliminated - instead, new immigrants will be entitled to social assistance from the moment they arrive in Denmark.
Minimal income
Temporary immigrant, asylum seeker and refugees
Mid-level change
Same as above
DEMIG
39
Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
Finland 2010 Decrease
Amended Decree entered into force on 2 February 2010 on living allowance paid in cash to asylum seekers - reducing the cash portion of basic living allowance paid to an asylum seeker by 30% compared to other residents of Finland. > For instance, living allowance for an adult asylum seeker living alone will be EUR 292.22 per month (compared to EUR 375.11 previously).
Minimal income
Asylum seekers Mid-level change
Reduced level of the benefit for the entire group
DEMIG
France 1986 Decrease Barzach Law of 29 December 1968 - conditions access to social housing and family benefits to the regularity of the stay
Housing and family assistance
Undocumented immigrants
Major change
Exclusion of the benefit
DEMIG
France 1989 Decrease Law establishing the guaranteed minimum income (RMI) . Included certain groups of immigrants, but excluded others
Minimal income
Temporary, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented
Minor change
Right was not conceded before
DEMIG
France 1998 Increase Law 98-349 of 11 May 1998 relative to the conditions of entry and stay of foreigners (Loi Chevènement) - extends social benefits to irregular migrants.
Housing and family assistance
Undocumented immigrants
Major change
Inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
France 2010 Increase Law Arête. Foringners are elegible for housing Housing
Permanent immigrants, temporary, asylum seekers and refugees
Mid-level change
Inclusion in the benefit
MIPEX/SOM
Germany 1982 Decrease
Asylum Procedure Act of August 1982 (Asylverfahrensgesetz or 2. Beschleunigungsgesetz) - transforms the social benefits from cash into non-cash form (Sachleistungsprinzip)
Minimal income
Asylum seekers Mid-level change
Cash benefit to in kind benefit
DEMIG
Germany 1993 Decrease
1993 law on financial support of asylum seekers (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz) - creates a specific allowance for asylum seekers which is lower than the mainstream social benefits
Minimal income
Asylum seekers Minor change
Fine tuning in relation to previous measure
DEMIG
Germany 1993 Increase
1993 law on financial support of asylum seekers (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz) - grants illegally resident migrants entitlement to medical care. In particular, medical services are granted in cases of acute sickness and pain, pregnancy and childbirth.
Health assistance
Non documented immigrants
Mid-level change
Right conceded for some medical circumstances
DEMIG
Germany 2014 Increase
In November 2014, over two years after the Constitutional Court ruling, both houses of the German Parliament finally passed revisions to the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act. According to the amendment, from March 2015 onwards allowances for asylum seekers will be similar to the ones provided under the transitional arrangement.
Minimal income
Asylum seekers Mid-level change
Similar benefits
DEMIG
Greece 1991 Decrease
Act No 1975/1991 regulating the admission of aliens Stipulates that the local administration authorities, public utilities venture and social security fund organizations are obliged to refrain from offering their services to irregular immigrants. This obligation is also extended to hospitals, sanatoriums and clinics, unless there is an emergency or children need medical care.
Health assistance and family benefits
Undocumented immigrants
Major change
Inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
40
Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
Greece 1996 Increase
Law 2452/1996 - defined the requirements and the procedure for granting assistance, both to recognized refugees and to those who have submitted a request for refugee status.
Minimal income
Asylum seekers and refugees
Major change
Inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
Greece 1999 Increase Presidential Decree 266/1999 - covered issues like social protection of the recognized refugees and asylum seekers.
Minimal income
Asylum seekers Major change
inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
Greece 2001 Increase
Act 2910/2001 on the entry, residence and naturalization of immigrants in Greece, Guarantees equal access to the courts, social services and health care to legal migrants, as well as access to education for undocumented children. Since 2001, immigrants who work and pay taxes in Greece have the same rights as Greek workers. For example, they can benefit from the housing program of the Organization of Labor Housing (OEK) as long as they fulfill certain requirements that also apply to Greek workers. This housing program is supervised by the Ministry of Employment and Social Protection and it gives immigrants the opportunity to either receive a monthly rent subsidy or reside in public (labor) housing.
Housing and basic education
Undocumented immigrants, Temporary immigrants, permanent
Major change
inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
Greece 2005 Decrease
In February 2005, the Minister of Health issued a ministerial circular to state hospitals stating that free routine healthcare to immigrants who are not legal residents is against the law.
Health assistance
Undocumented immigrants
Major change
Exclusion of the benefit
DEMIG
Greece 2006 Increase
Act 3386/2005 on the entry, residence and integration of immigrants (voted in May 2005 and to be implemented in 2006) - made legally resident immigrants eligible for social security insurance and benefiting of the same social, labor and security rights as Greek workers.
Family assistance and social pension
Temporary and permanent immigrants
Minor change
Law of 2001 had already given legal immigrants rights
DEMIG
Ireland 2004 Decrease
The Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 - restrict access to social assistance and Child Benefit payments by introducing a ‘Habitual Residence Condition’. Migrants have to demonstrate two years of ‘habitual’ residency in Ireland and the intention to stay in the country in order to be eligible for benefits. As in the UK, Accession State nationals face restrictions on access to Ireland’s social welfare system. Ireland proposed the restrictions in February 2004 after the UK had done so. The test applies to all persons but was introduced to protect the Irish welfare system.
Minimal income, housing allowances, child benefits, pension assistance
EU member, temporary, asylum seeker
Major change
Long waiting periods
DEMIG
41
Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
Ireland 2006 Increase
2006 Amendments to the Habitual Residence Condition - eased the requirement of the habitual residence condition to access social benefits nearly completely for EEA and to a certain extent for non-EEA residents. > The amendment granted all EEA workers who have work history in the State access to the Supplementary Welfare Allowance (includes a basic allowance, rent allowance, emergency payments and medical cards). Non EEA nationals must still satisfy the HRC. Also, al EEA nationals working in the State will be able to apply for One-parent Family Payment if necessary as it is considered a family payment along with child benefit under European Law. Finally, all workers, both EEA and non-EEA will be able to access Child Benefit. EEA workers will be able to draw the payment even if their children are not resident in the State. Non-EEA nationals will have to be resident in the State with their children to get payments. Child Benefit is considered a family payment under European Law and is not therefore subject to the HRC for EEA nationals. The Irish Government has made child benefit available to all non-EEA nationals working in the State, however, all non-EEA nationals must satisfy the HRC unless they have resided and worked in another EEA country (Free Legal Advice Centers, 2006). Asylum seekers will continue to have no entitlement to Child Benefit.
Minimal income, housing allowances, child benefit and social pension
EU members Major change
in line with the previous one
DEMIG
Ireland 2009 Decrease Since December 2009, asylum seekers no longer have access to the Irish welfare system.
Minimal income, housing allowance, child benefits and social pension
Asylum seekers Major change
Exclusion of the benefit
DEMIG
Italy 1986 Increase
First law on immigration (Act 943) passed on December 30st - declared total parity of treatment between Italian and foreign workers (it guarantees rights to social and health services, access to housing, maintaining cultural identity in school)
Family allowance, pension assistance, healthcare and housing
permanent immigrants, temporary and EU members
Major change
Inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
Italy 1999 Increase
“Turco-Napolitano” law (Act 40) of 6 March 1998 entered into force on 3 November 1999 - granted access to education and the national health system for all immigrants regardless of their legal status, including irregular migrants, but in this case limited to urgent and/or essential treatment.
healthcare and education
Undocumented immigrants
Mid-level change
Only some kind of treatments
DEMIG
42
Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
Italy 2002 Decrease
(Law no. 189 called Bossi-Fini). TCNs need a two years temporary permit for an equal access to housing The claim of a permit at least two years was introduced in 2002
Housing
Temporary immigrants and EU members
Major change
Long waiting period
DEMIG
Luxembourg 2002 Increase Grand Ducal Regulation of 4 July 2002 - defines the modalities and conditions of social aid for asylum seekers
Housing and minimal income
Asylum seekers Major change
Inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
Luxembourg 2012 Decrease
Grand-Ducal Regulation of 8 June 2012 on social aid for international protection applicants - significantly reduced the financial allocation they receive every month.
Housing and minimal income
Asylum seekers Mid-level change
Reduced level of the benefit for the entire group
DEMIG
Netherlands 1983 Increase
Resettlement Program - Holders of a temporary residence permit for asylum in the Netherlands have the same access to health care, social security as Dutch citizens.
Health assistance
Asylum seekers Mid-level change
Enlargement of the right
DEMIG
Netherlands 1996 Decrease
Linking Act. Law passed in November 1996 and went into effect on July 1, 1998. Since then, undocumented migrants are barred from all social benefits and provisions with the exception of education for under-aged children, legal counselling, and emergency medical care.
Non-compulsory education, healthcare, housing and minimal income
Undocumented immigrants
Major change
Exclusion of the benefit
MIPEX/SOM
Netherlands 2000 Decrease
Aliens Act of April 2000 (replacing the 1965 Act and its 1994 amendment). Introduced the same social benefits for all asylum seekers and disentitled asylum seekers to social assistance Koning (2013).
Minimal income and housing
Asylum seeker Mid-level change
Equal benefits for the entire group.
DEMIG
Norway 1997 Increase
1997 policy on refugees - granted those under collective protection the same rights as those granted refugee status, including the right to receive education and social security payments.
Housing, family allowances, minimal income and non-compulsory education
Asylum seeker Major change
Inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
Norway 2008 Increase
New Immigration Act of 15 May 2008 entered into force on 1 January 2010 - grants all asylum applicants who are entitled to protection refugee status. > Pursuant to the Act, persons who were previously granted asylum in accordance with the Geneva Convention and persons who are protected from deportation according to other conventions will be given the same status as refugees, entitling the former to the same rights as the latter.
Housing, family allowances, minimal income and non-compulsory education
Asylum seeker Minor change
Fine tuning in relation to previous measure
DEMIG
43
Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
Portugal 2001 Increase
Law establishing a framework on health (Despacho 25360/2001, December 12) - stipulates that any foreign citizen living legally in Portugal has access to health care and services of the National Health Service (NHS), like all nationals. > Those staying irregularly may have access to NHS by presenting a residence certificate (that can be obtained in the local councils) at the health service located in their area of residence, proving that they had been in Portugal for at least 90 days. Many of the irregular immigrants are not aware of their rights and are afraid of being denounced to the authorities. The residence certificate may not be also so easy to obtain because of bureaucratic procedures or the refusal of local authorities.
Health assistance
Non documented immigrants
Minor change
Limited right for undocumented
DEMIG
Portugal 2006 Increase
Decree Law 41/2006 of 21 February - extended the attribution of family social allowance to foreign children and youngsters who hold a legal title of permanence, to refugees, and to holders of temporary protection titles. > Thereby, the mentioned Decree Law puts on the same level resident foreigners, the holders of permanence permit, the refugees, and the holders of temporary protection title for attribution of family social allowance to children and youngsters. Such social benefits were formerly only granted to foreigners holding residence permits.
Family Assistance
Permanent immigrants, temporary and refugees
Major change
Inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
Portugal 2009 Increase
Decree-Law 204/2009 of 31 August - allows foreign students who hold a permanent residence permit or benefit from the status of long-term resident to access social action benefits in the field of higher education.
Non-compulsory education
Permanent immigrants
Mid-level change
Inclusion in the benefit for part of a group
DEMIG
Portugal 2010 Increase
Circular 11258/2010 of 7 June approved the Regulations for Advanced Training and the Qualification of Human Resources 2010 - facilitating the conditions for the applications of foreign students to Portuguese education resources
Non-compulsory education
Temporary immigrants
Minor change
Bureaucratic facilitation
DEMIG
Spain 2000 Increase
Law 4/2000 on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Integration (LOEX)- widened most socio-economic rights to aliens in an irregular situation, such as the right to education in the same conditions as Spanish people; the right of all aliens, whatever their legal situation might be, to emergency public health care, and the right to public health care for all aliens who are minors and for pregnant women before and after the birth; the right to assistance as regards housing for aliens registered in the municipal census; and the right to basic social services and facilities (although such basic facilities were not clarified) > Only the right to work and to receive facilities and services of the Social Security under the same conditions as Spanish nationals and the right to family reunion were restricted to aliens who were residents in regular situations.
healthcare, housing, compulsory education
Undocumented immigrants
Major change
Inclusion in the benefit
DEMIG
44
Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
Spain 2001 Decrease
Law 8/2000 amending Law 4/2000 (came into force in January 2001) - makes the Immigration Law more restrictive by removing nearly all socio-economic rights that had been granted to irregular migrants under the January 2000 Law, except the right to health care and access to education for minors > The most important exception is the right to public health care which remains unaltered by the modification, so, Spanish legislation on aliens in force still recognizes the right of irregular aliens to public health care on condition that it is an emergency situation, the aliens are minors or women requiring pregnancy, obstetric or post-natal care and all aliens in irregular situations if they are registered in the Municipal Population Register.
Housing, and non-emergency healthcare
Undocumented immigrants
Major change
Inverse as above
DEMIG
Sweden 2003 Decrease
Bill “Measures to clarify the identity of asylum seekers, etc” entered into force on 1 July 2004 - allowed to partially reduce or entirely remove the daily allowance and housing allowance of an alien over the age of 18 under the Act on the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Others Act (1994) if she or he hinders the investigation of a case concerning a residence permit by not assisting in clarifying his or her identity.
Housing and minimal income
Asylum seeker Mid-level change
Remove benefit for part of the group
DEMIG
Sweden 2009 Decrease
In late 2009, the government in Stockholm announced that students from abroad will have to pay for university studies in Sweden from the winter semester 2011 onwards.
Non-compulsory education
Temporary and permanent immigrants
Mid-level change
Introduction of fees
DEMIG
Switzerland 2004 Decrease
Asylum seekers with a decision to dismiss an application without entering into the substance of the case (DAWES) have been excluded from social assistance since 2004. They are only eligible to emergency assistance and in some cantons they only get access to the public health system in case of emergency.
Healthcare, minimum income and housing
Asylum seeker Mid-level change
Part of an immigrant group excluded from the benefit
DEMIG
Switzerland 2007 Decrease
New Asylum Act approved in a referendum in September 2006 (phased in between 2007-2008) - excludes individuals with a legally binding rejected decision on asylum from social assistance. They are only eligible for emergency assistance (Nothilfe) and have limited access to health care
Healthcare and minimum income
Asylum seeker Minor change
Only a legal adjustment of the previous law
DEMIG
Switzerland 2010 Decrease
In February 2010, the Federal Council approved a number of measures aimed at limiting potential abuses in the framework of the freedom of movement - including restrictions of access to the welfare system of persons from the EU/EEA.
family allowances and minimal income
EU members Minor change
Bureaucratic requirements
DEMIG
45
Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected
Immigrant group(s)
Magnitude Explanation Source
UK 1993 Decrease Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 - reduced the benefit entitlements of persons who claim asylum in the UK, as well as their dependents
Minimal income
Asylum seeker Minor change
Reduction for part of a group and bureaucratic requirement
DEMIG
UK 1996 Decrease
Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 - withdraw eligibility to non-contributory benefits from asylum seekers who did not lodge their application at the port of entry or who are appealing on a negative decision on their claim. > This resulted in a High Court judgement in October 1996 which established that local authorities have a duty under the National Assistance Act to provide services to asylum seekers with no other means of support.
Minimal income
Asylum seeker Mid-level change
Exclusion of the benefit for part of a group
DEMIG
UK 1999 Decrease
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 - introduces the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) to co-ordinate the arrangements for supporting asylum seekers and dispersing them to different areas of the UK. > The act replaces welfare benefits for asylum seekers with vouchers worth £35 a week for an adult and provides accommodation on a no-choice basis around the United Kingdom.
Housing and minimum income
Asylum seeker Minor change
Equalization of the benefit and restriction of choice for accommodation
DEMIG
UK 2004 Decrease
2004 EU enlargement - workers from the new EU countries only become eligible for benefits such as Jobseeker's Allowance and income support after working continuously in the UK for at least a year.
Minimal income
EU member Mid-level change
Waiting period for benefits for part of the group
DEMIG
UK 2004 Decrease
Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 - Limits eligibility for refugee support. > Failed asylum seekers with children can be refused support if they are not "cooperating with the removals process".
Minimal income
Asylum seeker Minor change
Bureaucratic DEMIG
UK 2009 Decrease Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 - restricts the access to public services and benefits during Probationary Citizenship
Housing, old age assistance, minimum income and family allowances
EU members and temporary immigrants
Mid-level change
Waiting period
DEMIG
Source: DEMIG (2015) and author