who gets prestige, power, property, and privileged ... · who gets prestige, power, property, and...

WHO GETS PRESTIGE, POWER, PROPERTY, AND PRIVILEGED INDUSTRY LOCATION? Allocation to a Multidimensional

Structure of Inequality

David B. Grusky

CDE Working Paper 83-47 ..-



David B. Grusky Department of Sociology

University of Wisconsin-Madison

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 78th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 31 - September 4 , 1983. Computations were supported by a grant to the Center for Demography and Ecology of the University of Wisconsin-Madison from the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development (HD-5876). William Sewell and Robert Hauser generously furnished the data for this analysis. I gratefully acknowledge the productive comments of Robert Hauser, Robert Mare, and Arthur Coldberger.



ABSTRACT

This paper supplements the traditional interest in occupational attainment with a parallel inquiry into the antecedents of class and industry positions. The male attainment process is found to differ across these three stratification dimensions, implying that rules of allocation cannot be adequately inferred from the study of occupational status alone. Each dimension has a relatively independent attainment process, with a given outcome depending on the corresponding parental origin rather than the full set of ascriptive variables. Furthermore, returns to education and ability are far stronger for occupational attainment than for class or industry allocation. These results suggest a vpluralistn pattern of attainment in which the legitimation of inequality derives from the dispersion of ascriptive advantages across stratification dimensions rather than meritocratic processes within each dimension. This paper also addresses the sexual process of stratification. The main effects of sex are considerably stronger for nonoccupational outcomes, indicating that inequality is most pervasive along dimensions other than socioeconomic status. In addition, there is a consistent pattern of restricted social bac~ground effects, suggesting a "perversew meritocracy in which females net smaller returns to social origins than their male counterparts. These sex differences in multidimensional attainment contrast with the surprising similarity commonly found when occupational attainment is considered alone.

1.0 INTRODUCTION - This paper explores the process of allocation to a multidimensional

structure of inequality. Previous research focusing exclusively on

educational and occupational attainment is supplemented by examining

determinants of property ownership, workplace authority, and industry

location. The multidimensionality of the stratification system has been a

central insight of mainstream theory, evident in the tripartite distinction

between class, status, and party (Weber, 19461, in the elaboration of four

bases of inequality within the AGIL paradigm (Parsons, 1970), and in

pluralist perspectives where cross-cutting cleavages inhibit class

polarization (Coser, 1956; Lipset, 1960). More recently, neo-Marxist

analyses have also developed a multidimensional character by incorporating

workplace authority as a further criterion for class location (Wright, 1978;

Carchedi, 19751, and by recognizing industry position as an independent

dimension which divides the working class (Reich et al., 1973). Despite

these multidimensional concepts, it is only lately that empirical research

has considered the determinants of nonoccupational positions.

One of the central issues to be addressed by this analysis concerns the

relationship between class and status allocation. It has been argued that

Great Britain has two distinct stratification systems, a status system

involving education and occupation, and a class system comprising authority

and ownership (Robinson and Kelley, 1979). This dual system is

characterized by (a) moderate levels of intergenerational inheritance within

each system (class outcomes depend on class origins and status outcomes

depend on status origins), (b) limited cross-cutting effects between the two

systems (background origins in the class system have little consequence for

outcomes in the status system, and vice versa), and (c) negligible

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educational effects on class positions. Surveys from Great Britain have

provided most of the evidence to date regarding the dual system thesis

(Robinson and Kelley, 1979; Kerckhoff et al., 1982) .l The contribution of

this paper is to examine the evidence for the thesis within the United

States, to explore multidimensional allocation for both males and females, f

and to elaborate the dual system thesis into a triadic model by considering

attainment to industry as well as class and occupational positions.

Moreover, we develop a series of models more general than the dual system

thesis which explore the degree of similarity in allocation across

stratification systems.

If a dual or triadic system is confirmed for the United States, the

implications are twofold. First, a pattern of weak educational effects on

nonoccupational outcomes disputes conclusions of meritocratic allocation

derived from traditional attainment research (e.g., Blau and Duncan,

1967:401-31). Such results not only question the legitimation of inequality

through a meritocratic ideology, but also suggest inefficiencies in the

allocation of human resources. Second, the dual or triadic thesis implies a

"pluralistw pattern of attainment in which most individuals have advantaged

access to at least one system of social rewards. Since there are a

multiplicity of systems each with ascriptive processes, the dispersion of

ascriptive advantages is far greater than suggested by the conception of a

unidimensional status system. Although contrary to a meritocratic

legitimation of inequality, this broad distribution of ascriptive processes

may constitute a stabilizing force since it sustains aspirations for success

among those from a variety of backgrounds. Whereas the pluralists argue

that stability derives from the multiplicity of cross-cutting positions

(Lipset, 1960)~ we have elaborated this argument to suggest that stability

f u r t h e r d e r i v e s from a s p e c i f i c p a t t e r n o f i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l movement

between t h e s e p o s i t i o n s .

As ide from i s s u e s o f p l u r a l i s t a l l o c a t i o n , t h i s p a p e r a l s o e x p l o r e s t h e

p r o c e s s o f i n d u s t r y a t t a i n m e n t . While o w n e r s h i p , a u t h o r i t y , and s t a t u s are

t y p i c a l l y c o n c e i v e d a s s o c i a l r e w a r d s , l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l

s t r u c t u r e e n t a i l s a c o n s i d e r a b l y less s a l i e n t v e r t i c a l o r e v a l u a t i v e

h i e r a r c h y . I n d e e d , i n d u s t r y i s o f t e n e q u a t e d w i t h a h o r i z o n t a l s i t u s

d imens ion which l a c k s s t r o n g s t a t u s c o n n o t a t i o n s ( H a u s e r and Featherman,

1977; Reiss, 1961). However, much o f t h e r e c e n t d u a l economy l i t e r a t u r e

a t t r i b u t e s a v e r t i c a l d imens ion t o what was f o r m e r l y c o n c e i v e d a s p u r e l y

h o r i z o n t a l . S c a l e s o f i n d u s t r y d e s i r a b i l i t y have been deve loped ( e . g . ,

T o l b e r t e t a l . , 19801, and t h e e f f e c t s o f i n d u s t r y p o s i t i o n on income, job

s a t i s f a c t i o n , and employment t e n u r e have been amply d e m o n s t r a t e d (Beck e t

a l . , 1978; Hodson, 1980; S c h e r v i s h , 1981) . G i v e n t h i s e v i d e n c e f o r a

v e r t i c a l h i e r a r c h y , it becomes i m p o r t a n t t o c o n s i d e r t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s o f

i n d u s t r y p o s i t i o n . The s u b s e q u e n t a n a l y s i s on t h i s i s s u e c o n s i d e r s i f

c o n c l u s i o n s o f m e r i t o c r a t i c a l l o c a t i o n advanced w i t h i n o c c u p a t i o n a l r e s e a r c h

c a n be s u s t a i n e d e q u a l l y w i t h r e g a r d t o i n d u s t r y outcomes. A s no ted

e a r l i e r , w e s h a l l a l s o e x p l o r e a n e l a b o r a t e d v e r s i o n o f t h e d u a l system

t h e s i s which i n c l u d e s i n d u s t r y as t h e t h i r d d i m e n s i o n o f a t r i a d i c model.

The f i n a l i s s u e a d d r e s s e d by t h i s a n a l y s i s c o n c e r n s t h e p r o c e s s o f

s e x u a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . One o f t h e more s u r p r i s i n g f i n d i n g s from a t t a i n m e n t

r e s e a r c h i s t h e r e l a t i v e l y modest s e x d i f f e r e n c e s i n o c c u p a t i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n

(Treiman and T e r r e l l , 1975; McClendon, 1976; Fea the rman and Hauser ,

1976a) . Al though r e c e n t r e s e a r c h h a s r e v e a l e d some i m p o r t a n t s e x

i n t e r a c t i o n s i n a n expanded s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l model ( S e w e l l e t a l . ,

1 9 8 0 ) , t h e r e is merit i n t h e argument t h a t soc ioeconomic s t a t u s m e t r i c s do

n o t a d e q u a t e l y c a p t u r e s e x u a l i n e q u a l i t y i n l a b o r market outcomes (Wolf and

F l i g s t e i n , 1979a, 1979b; Acker , 1980) . We p u r s u e t h e - la t ter i n s i g h t by

e x a m i n i n g s e x d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e p r o c e s s o f a u t h o r i t y , ownership and

i n d u s t r y a t t a i n m e n t . To a n t i c i p a t e some o f t h e f i n d i n g s , we uncover a

* * p e r v e r s e w form o f m e r i t o c r a c y where females n e t s m a l l e r r e t u r n s t o s o c i a l

o r i g i n s t h a n t h e i r male c o u n t e r p a r t s .

2.0 THE SAMPLE AND VARIABLES -- T h i s a n a l y s i s is based on t h e Wiscons in S tudy o f S o c i a l and

P s y c h o l o g i c a l F a c t o r s i n Socioeconomic Achievements , a l o n g i t u d i n a l sample

o f Wisconsin h i g h s c h o o l s e n i o r s i n 1957. The r e s u l t s r e p o r t e d below

p e r t a i n t o t h e 2976 males and 2430 females who were employed i n c i v i l i a n

j o b s i n 1975 o r t h e f i v e p r e c e d i n g y e a r s , a n d who provided nonmiss ing

r e s p o n s e s on a l l twenty o f t h e i n d i c a t o r s . F i g u r e 1 lists t h e s o u r c e s and

d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e twenty i n d i c a t o r s used i n t h e a n a l y s i s . A s t h e f i g u r e

shows, many v a r i a b l e s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by m u l t i p l e i n d i c a t o r s . The more

i m p o r t a n t o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s are d i s c u s s e d below; d e t a i l s f o r o t h e r

v a r i a b l e s a r e provided i n t h e f i g u r e .

Workplace a u t h o r i t y i s measured by two dichotomous i n d i c a t o r s , t h e

a u t h o r i t y t o h i r e o r f i r e and t h e a u t h o r i t y t o s e t o r i n f l u e n c e t h e rate o f

2 pay. Although t h e s e i n d i c a t o r s t a p o n e s a l i e n t dimension o f power i n t h e

work s e t t i n g , t h e y f a i l t o measure l i m i t e d s u p e r v i s o r y a u t h o r i t y o r i d e n t i f y

t h o s e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r d e c i s i o n s on i s s u e s more i m p o r t a n t than r e c r u i t m e n t o r

pay. I n t h i s s e n s e t h e two measures are i m p e r f e c t i n d i c a t o r s o f a n

unobse rved , c o n t i n u o u s v a r i a b l e which i n c l u d e s t h e s e f i n e r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s . t

It might be supposed t h a t t h i s unobse rved v a r i a b l e g e n e r a t e s a r e s p o n s e o f

' 1 ' o n t h e observed b i n a r y v a r i a b l e i f t h e l e v e l o f a u t h o r i t y i s above a -

g i v e n t h r e s h o l d , and a r e s p o n s e o f '0' o t h e r w i s e . The models e s t i m a t e d

below explicitly incorporate this assumption of a continuous authority

dimension by employing tetrachoric and biserial correlations. The latter

are estimates of the product moment correlations for variables which follow

an underlying normal distribution, but are imperfectly measured as a simple

3 dichotomy.

Ownership of the means of production is measured by dichotomous d

responses to the question, "Were you self-employed in own business,

professional practice, or farm?n4 Again, we could advance a threshold

interpretation of this measure, conceptualizing it as the binary outcome of

a continuous variable indexing the utility of becoming an owner (Amemiya,

1981). In this case, however, it seems more plausible to conceive of

ownership as inherently discrete. Because a linear model for a dichotomous

outcome is rarely defensible, we specify instead a model of linear effects

on the transformed probability of becoming an owner (Mare and Winship,

1983). The latter variable is continuous, so the estimates presented below

again apply tetrachoric and biserial correlations with the current ownership

measure. In this sense the ownership measure represents an imperfect

indicator of the probability of becoming an owner, rather than an indicator

of ownership conceived as continuous itself .' Industry position is coded by the Continuous Segmentation Index

(Tolbert, et al., 1980), which was derived from a factor analysis of

indicators measuring economic concentration, economic scale and

oligopolistic behavior in product and labor markets. Since the index was E

constructed from data on labor market outcomes, there is an element of

0 circularity in subsequent attempts to predict these outcomes (Hodson and

Kaufman, 1981). However, the circularity is not of consequence for this

analysis, as the intent is to examine industry attainment rather than

i n d u s t r y e f f e c t s . I n d e e d , a n i n d e x t h a t r e s o l v e s t o i n d u s t r y d e s i r a b i l i t y

f o r m a r k e t outcomes is q u i t e a d e q u a t e f o r r e s e a r c h on who g e t s t h e mos t

p r i v i l e g e d i n d u s t r y p o s i t i o n s .

3.0 STRUCTURAL AND MEASUREMENT MODELS - B a s e l i n e models are e s t i m a t e d f o r t h e f u l l s ample , a n d f o r males and

4 f e m a l e s s e p a r a t e l y . T h e s e t h r e e m o d e l s are i d e n t i c a l , e x c e p t t h a t t h e model

f o r t h e f u l l sample i n c l u d e s s e x as a n a d d i t i o n a l exogenous v a r i a b l e . The 7

b a s e l i n e s t r u c t u r a l model f o r t h e f u l l s a m p l e i s r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e

6 f o l l o w i n g s y s t e m o f e q u a t i o n s :

The f i r s t e q u a t i o n s p e c i f i e s t h a t h i g h s c h o o l r a n k ( n 9 ) is a f u n c t i o n o f

m e n t a l a b i l i t y ( n 8 ) and a v e c t o r o f a s c r i p t i v e v a r i a b l e s (n*) i n c l u d i n g - f a t h e r ' s e d u c a t i o n ( n l ) , m o t h e r ' s e d u c a t i o n (TI*), f a t h e r ' s o c c u p a t i o n a l

s t a t u s ( n 3 ) , p a r e n t ' s income ( ~ 4 1 , f a t h e r ' s o w n e r s h i p ( n 5 ) , f a t h e r ' s

i n d u s t r y ( n 6 ) , and s e x (17,). T h e s e d e t e r m i n a n t s of h i g h s c h o o l r a n k are

exogenous v a r i a b l e s w i t h f r e e l y c o r r e l a t e d d i s t u r b a n c e s . The s e c o n d

e q u a t i o n fo rms academic p e r f o r m a n c e ( n l O ) as a l i n e a r c o m p o s i t e of h i g h

s c h o o l r a n k and men ta l a b i l i t y . S i n c e t h e r e i s no r e s i d u a l i n t h i s

PACE 7

e q u a t i o n , t h e claim is t h a t r ank and mental a b i l i t y e x h a u s t t h e concept of

academic performance. A s t o c h a s t i c component c o u l d b e i n t r o d u c e d o n l y w i t h

t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t academic performance c o m p l e t e l y a c c o u n t s f o r t h e

c o v a r i a n c e between two subsequen t v a r i a b l e s ( H a u s e r and G o l d b e r g e r , 1971).

I n t h i s case, s u c h a n assumption is less t e n a b l e t h a n t h a t o f p e r f e c t

d e t e r m i n a t i o n . It shou ld be no ted t h a t t h e n o r m a l i z i n g r e s t r i c t i o n of Bq = &

1 is imposed t o i d e n t i f y t h e v a r i a n c e o f t h e compos i te .

E q u a t i o n 3 s p e c i f i e s e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t ( r l l l l as a f u n c t i o n of

academic performance and a v e c t o r o f a s c r i p t i v e v a r i a b l e s . Mental a b i l i t y

and h i g h s c h o o l rank a r e n o t e n t e r e d i n t h i s e q u a t i o n ; t h e s e v a r i a b l e s a r e

c o n s t r a i n e d t o e x e r t t h e i r e f f e c t s th rough t h e academic performance

c o m p o s i t e . The r e s t r i c t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e of a b i l i t y

a n d r a n k on e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t and s u b s e q u e n t v a r i a b l e s is i n t h e same

p r o p o r t i o n , namely B3/B4. T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n was first i n t r o d u c e d by Hauser ,

e t a l . (19831, p a r t i a l l y t o compensate f o r t h e s i n g l e i n d i c a t o r

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a b i l i t y and rank. The n e x t f o u r e q u a t i o n s o f t h e model

p e r t a i n t o t h e c e n t r a l c o n c e r n s o f t h i s paper . They s a y t h a t a l l o c a t i o n t o

o c c u p a t i o n a l s t a t u s ( 01 workplace a u t h o r i t y ( rl1 3 1 , Ownership ( 01 4 ) , and

i n d u s t r y ( n 1 5 ) depends upon t h e same set o f d e t e r m i n a n t s : a v e c t o r of

a s c r i p t i v e v a r i a b l e s , academic performance, and e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t . The

d i s t u r b a n c e s f o r e q u a t i o n s 4 th rough 7 a r e f r e e l y c o r r e l a t e d s i n c e no c a u s a l

o r d e r is d e f i n e d between t h e f o u r s t r a t i f i c a t i o n d imens ions .

S i x o f t h e v a r i a b l e s i n c l u d e d i n t h i s model have m u l t i p l e i n d i c a t o r s :

f a t h e r ' s e d u c a t i o n , mother ' s e d u c a t i o n , f a t h e r ' s o c c u p a t i o n a l s t a t u s ,

p a r e n t a l income, e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t , and workp lace a u t h o r i t y . I n each

c a s e , a measurement s t r u c t u r e o f t h e f o l l o w i n g form is s p e c i f i e d :

Y 1 and Y 2 a r e i n d i c a t o r s o f t h e u n o b s e r v a b l e n l , and t h e

r e s i d u a l s €1 and € 2 are e r r o r s i n measurement. To i d e n t i f y t h e v a r i a n c e of

t h e u n o b s e r v a b l e , t h e n o r m a l i z i n g r e s t r i c t i o n X i = 1 is imposed. The 9

f o u r t e e n remain ing v a r i a b l e s w i t h s i n g l e i n d i c a t o r s a r e assumed t o be

measured w i t h o u t e r r o r . E

The b a s e l i n e model i n c o r p o r a t e s c o r r e l a t e d measurement e r r o r i n

a d d i t i o n t o t h e random e r r o r d e s c r i b e d above. Two t y p e s o f e r r o r

c o r r e l a t i o n a r e p l a u s i b l e . F i r s t , a n i n d i v i d u a l may respond w i t h c o n s i s t e n t

e r r o r s a c r o s s v a r i a b l e s when measured on a s i n g l e o c c a s i o n w i t h a s i n g l e

i n s t r u m e n t . T h i s b e t w e e n - v a r i a b l e , w i t h i n - o c c a s i o n c o r r e l a t e d e r r o r is

i d e n t i f i e d w i t h two i n d i c a t o r s p e r unmeasured v a r i a b l e ; s e v e n t e e n o f t h e s e

c o r r e l a t e d e r r o r s a r e i d e n t i f i e d and e n t e r e d i n t h e b a s e l i n e model. The

second t y p e o f e r r o r c o r r e l a t i o n o c c u r s between i n d i c a t o r s measur ing t h e

same v a r i a b l e b u t a s c e r t a i n e d o n d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s . T h i s w i t h i n - v a r i a b l e ,

be tween-occas ion c o r r e l a t e d error is u n d e r - i d e n t i f i e d w i t h o n l y two

i n d i c a t o r s p e r unobse rvab le . However, we were a b l e t o f i x t h e e r r o r

c o v a r i a n c e f o r bo th m a t e r n a l a n d p a t e r n a l e d u c a t i o n w i t h a n estimate o f t h e

c o r r e l a t e d e r r o r f o r f a t h e r ' s e d u c a t i o n o b t a i n e d i n t h e 1977 Wisconsin

S i b l i n g Survey (Hauser e t a l . , 1983) .

4.0 RESULTS - A series o f models were e s t i m a t e d by maximum l i k e l i h o o d w i t h t h e

assumpt ion o f m u l t i v a r i a t e n o r m a l i t y ; t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s and goodness of " f i t s t a t i s t i c s a r e p rov ided i n T a b l e s 1 t h r u 4 . A s is common f o r samples o f

- t h i s s i z e , none o f t h e t h r e e b a s e l i n e models f i t by c o n v e n t i o n a l

s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , w e f o c u s o u r d i s c u s s i o n on t h e r a t i o o f

c h i - s q u a r e s t a t i s t i c s t o t h e i r d e g r e e s o f freedom. Another c r i t e r i o n f o r

model e v a l u a t i o n i n l a r g e samples is p r o v i d e d by a n u l l model e s t i m a t e d by

c o n s t r a i n i n g a l l c o v a r i a n c e s t o be z e r o , e x c e p t t h o s e between exogenous

v a r i a b l e s ( B e n t l e r and B o n e t t , 1980). The r a t i o of c h i - s q u a r e s ta t i s t ics

be tween t h e b a s e l i n e and n u l l models r e v e a l s t h a t a t l e a s t 97 p e r c e n t of t h e

" a s s o c i a t i o n n i n t h e d a t a is e x p l a i n e d by e a c h o f t h e t h r e e b a s e l i n e models.

It is a l s o i n s t r u c t i v e t o compare t h e s e b a s e l i n e models t o a random e r r o r

model which r e s t r i c t s a l l measurement e r r o r c o v a r i a n c e s t o z e r o . For a l l

2 t h r e e s a m p l e s , t h e L /df r a t i o s f o r t h e c o n t r a s t s are c o n s i d e r a b l y l a r g e r

t h a n t h e r a t i o s f o r t h e b a s e l i n e models. T h i s marked d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n f i t

i n d i c a t e s t h e s t r e n g t h o f c o r r e l a t e d r e s p o n s e e r r o r ; s u c h e r r o r w i l l be

f r e e l y a l lowed i n a l l subsequen t models.

4 . 1 The Dual System T h e s i s --- T a b l e s 5 t h r u 7 p r e s e n t t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r t h e b a s e l i n e

models i n t h e t h r e e samples.8 I n s p e c t i o n o f T a b l e 6 r e v e a l s s u b s t a n t i a l

s u p p o r t f o r t h e d u a l system t h e s i s w i t h i n t h e male sample. The t h r e e

background v a r i a b l e s o f t h e s t a t u s sys tem ( f a t h e r ' s e d u c a t i o n , m o t h e r ' s

e d u c a t i o n , and f a t h e r ' s o c c u p a t i o n ) have no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t s on t h e two

class outcomes ( a u t h o r i t y and o w n e r s h i p ) , w h i l e t h e e f f e c t s o f c l a s s

background ( f a t h e r ' s ownership) o n t h e two s t a t u s outcomes ( e d u c a t i o n and )L fj o c c u p a t i o n ) a r e e i t h e r i n s i g n i f i c a n t o r negat ive . ' I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e s e p - X. n e g l i g i b l e cross-system e f f e c t s , t h e r e is e v i d e n c e o f moderate a s c r i p t i v e p e

: p r o c e s s e s w i t h i n each system. The c o e f f i c i e n t f o r i n h e r i t a n c e o f ownership

i s p a r t i c u l a r l y l a r g e , w h i l e a s c r i p t i v e p r o c e s s e s f o r a u t h o r i t y a r e a l s o - .'

s i g n i f i c a n t bu t less prominent ; t h i s d i f f e r e n c e may d e r i v e p a r t i a l l y from

t h e o m i t t e d measure o f p a t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y . The d u a l sys tem t h e s i s r e c e i v e s

f u r t h e r s u p p o r t on t h e i s s u e o f r n e r i t o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s i n t h e class system.

Whereas o c c u p a t i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n d e p e n d s s t r o n g l y upon e d u c a t i o n a l

a t t a i n m e n t , r e t u r n s t o s c h o o l i n g f o r c lass ou tcomes a re i n s i g n i f i c a n t o r

n e g a t i v e . The effect o f academic p e r f o r m a n c e on o w n e r s h i p is a l s o

i n s i g n i f i c a n t , b u t t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g e f fec t o n a u t h o r i t y is q u i t e s t r o n g .

The l a t t e r f i n d i n g i n d i c a t e s t h a t m e r i t o c r a t i c e f f e c t s are n o t e n t i r e l y *

a b s e n t f rom t h e class s y s t e m , a l t h o u g h i t is e q u a l l y e v i d e n t t h e y a re n o t o f

o v e r r i d i n g i m p o r t a n c e . I t s h o u l d a l s o b e n o t e d t h a t p a r e n t a l i ncome , wh ich - c a n n o t be c l e a r l y p l a c e d i n e i t h e r t h e c lass o r s t a t u s s y s t e m , h a s

s i g n i f i c a n t e f fec ts o n ou tcomes i n b o t h s y s t e m s . D e s p i t e t h e s e c a v e a t s ,

t h e r e is s t r i k i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d u a l s y s t e m t h e s i s advanced by Rob inson

and K e l l e y (1979) f o r Great B r i t a i n a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .

A s c r i p t i v e r e s o u r c e s f a c i l i t a t e a t t a i n m e n t w i t h i n t h e s y s t e m o f o r i g i n , b u t

c a n n o t b e c o n v e r t e d f o r c r o s s - s y s t e m a c h i e v e m e n t . Moreover , e d u c a t i o n a l

c r e d e n t i a l s a n d academic p e r f o r m a n c e are t h e p r i n c i p a l b a s i s o f s e l e c t i o n

w i t h i n t h e s t a t u s s y s t e m , b u t are o f l i t t l e c o n s e q u e n c e f o r ou tcomes w i t h i n

t h e c lass s y s t e m .

However, t h e female p a t t e r n o f c lass and s t a t u s a l l o c a t i o n s u g g e s t s a

c o n s i d e r a b l y d i f f e r e n t s t o r y . A l t h o u g h m e r i t o c r a t i c e f f e c t s on c l a s s

outcomes are e q u a l l y weak, t h e r e are m o d e r a t e l y s t r o n g c r o s s - s y s t e m ef fec ts

be tween e d u c a t i o n a l a n d o w n e r s h i p v a r i a b l e s . I n a d d i t i o n , a s c r i p t i v e

p r o c e s s e s w i t h i n t h e c l a s s and s t a t u s s y s t e m s a r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y weake r f o r

female a t t a i n m e n t . We s h a l l d i s c u s s t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n o f s o c i a l background

e f f e c t s i n more d e t a i l l a te r ; a t t h i s p o i n t , s u f f i c e i t t o s a y t h e d u a l

s y s t e m model l e n d s l i t t l e i n s i g h t i n t o female s t r a t i f i c a t i o n .

4.2 I n d u s t r y A t t a i n m e n t and t h e T r i a d i c Sys t em - --

A s y e t , we h a v e n o t c o n s i d e r e d t h e p r o c e s s o f i n d u s t r y a t t a i n m e n t o r

i t s r e l a t i o n t o c l a s s and s t a t u s a l l o c a t i o n . T a b l e 6 s u g g e s t s t h a t males

1

e x p e r i e n c e a p a t t e r n o f a l l o c a t i o n t o i n d u s t r y p o s i t i o n s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t

f r o m t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f o c c u p a t i o n s . While m e r i t o c r a t i c e f f e c t s are t h e

m o s t prominent a s p e c t o f o c c u p a t i o n a l r e c r u i t m e n t , i n d u s t r y r e t u r n s t o

s c h o o l i n g and academic pe r fo rmance are n e g a t i v e and i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,

r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h i s p r o v i d e s l i t t l e s u p p o r t f o r t h o s e who i n t e r p r e t i n d u s t r y

e f f e c t s on income a s r e t u r n s t o human c a p i t a l med ia ted by i n d u s t r y p o s i t i o n

( ~ a l a c h e k and R a i n e s , 1976). I n f a c t , o u r r e s u l t s s u g g e s t t h a t s u c h

m e d i a t e d r e t u r n s t o e d u c a t i o n are a c t u a l l y n e g a t i v e , c o n t r a r y t o human

c a p i t a l s u p p o s i t i o n s . Al though m e r i t o c r a t i c e f f e c t s are q u i t e weak, i t is

u n w a r r a n t e d t o conc lude t h a t p u r e l y a s c r i p t i v e p r o c e s s e s g o v e r n t h e

a l l o c a t i o n t o i n d u s t r y p o s i t i o n s . I n d e e d , t h e s t a n d a r d i z e d c o e f f i c i e n t f o r

i n d u s t r y i n h e r i t a n c e i s somewhat smaller t h a n t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o e f f i c i e n t

f o r o c c u p a t i o n . T h i s combina t ion o f weak a s c r i p t i v e and m e r i t o c r a t i c

p r o c e s s e s r e n d e r s i n d u s t r y a l l o c a t i o n l a r g e l y unde te rmined , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t

J e n c k s t t h e o r y o f l u c k may p e r t a i n more t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f i n d u s t r y t h a n

o c c u p a t i o n ( J e n c k s e t a l . , 1972).

The r e s u l t s o f T a b l e 6 a l s o s u g g e s t s u b s t a n t i a l s u p p o r t f o r a t r i a d i c

s y s t e m t h e s i s . F i r s t , t h e c r o s s - s y s t e m e f f e c t s o f c l a s s and s t a t u s o r i g i n s

o n c u r r e n t i n d u s t r y a r e e i t h e r i n s i g n i f i c a n t o r n e g a t i v e . Second, a

p r i v i l e g e d i n d u s t r y background c o n f e r s no a d v a n t a g e f o r a t t a i n m e n t i n o t h e r

s y s t e m s ; i n f a c t , a n i n d i v i d u a l from a p r i v i l e g e d i n d u s t r y s u f f e r s a n e t

l o s s i n b o t h e d u c a t i o n a l and c l a s s outcomes. T h i r d , w e have no ted a l r e a d y

t h a t i n d u s t r y a t t a i n m e n t is d i s t i n g u i s h e d by modera te i n h e r i t a n c e and weak

r n e r i t o c r a t i c e f f e c t s . These f i n d i n g s imply a t r i a d i c t h e s i s where a n

i n d i v i d u a l from any o f t h e t h r e e s y s t e m s e n j o y s a s c r i p t i v e a d v a n t a g e s f o r

a t t a i n m e n t i n h i s sys tem o f o r i g i n , b u t is u n a b l e t o c o n v e r t t h e s e

a s c r i p t i v e r e s o u r c e s f o r c r o s s - s y s t e m ach ievement . Moreover, t h e p o s s e s s i o n

o f e d u c a t i o n a l c r e d e n t i a l s o r academic s k i l l s are o f major c o n s e q u e n c e o n l y

w i t h i n t h e s t a t u s sys t em.

T u r n i n g t o T a b l e 7 , we c o n s i d e r t h e female p r o c e s s o f i n d u s t r y

a l l o c a t i o n . We n o t e t h a t t h e e f fec ts o f a c a d e m i c p e r f o r m a n c e and e d u c a t i o n

are b o t h p o s i t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t , i m p l y i n g somewhat s t r o n g e r meritocratic

p r o c e s s e s f o r females. I n a d d i t i o n , i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l i n h e r i t a n c e w i t h i n -

t h e i n d u s t r y s y s t e m is s i g n i f i c a n t l y weake r f o r females; t h i s p a r a l l e l s

p r e v i o u s f i n d i n g s o f r e s t r i c t e d a s c r i p t i v e e f f e c t s i n t h e c l a s s and s t a t u s

s y s t e m s . Thus a t r i a d i c t h e s i s i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e female p r o c e s s o f

a l l o c a t i o n , s i n c e w i t h i n - s y s t e m i n h e r i t a n c e i s h a r d l y s t r o n g e r t h a n

c r o s s - s y s t e m a s c r i p t i o n . I t s h o u l d a l s o be n o t e d t h a t t h e s t r e n g t h o f

m e r i t o c r a t i c e f f ec t s r e n d e r s female i n d u s t r y a l l o c a t i o n s u b s t a n t i a l l y

similar t o t h e i r o c c u p a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t . I n d e e d , i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n

we w i l l b e u n a b l e t o re jec t a model o f homogeneous a l l o c a t i o n .

4.3 Models o f P r o p o r t i o n a l A l l o c a t i o n - T h i s s e c t i o n c o n s i d e r s a series o f models which f o r m a l l y test t h e

h y p o t h e s i s o f h e t e r o g e n e o u s a l l o c a t i o n . The d e g r e e o f s i m i l a r i t y i n

a t t a i n m e n t p r o c e s s e s c a n n o t b e a s s e s s e d by i m p o s i n g e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s

a c r o s s e q u a t i o n s on t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e r e g r e s s o r s , s i n c e t h i s would confound

t h e s t r e n g t h of e f f e c t s w i t h d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e metrics o f t h e

s t r a t i f i c a t i o n outcomes.1° R a t h e r , we c o n c e p t u a l i z e a l l o c a t i v e s i m i l a r i t y

t o imp ly t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e s i z e o f t h e p a r a m e t e r s is t h e same f o r e a c h

outcome. I n t h i s s e n s e , t h e p r o c e s s o f a l l o c a t i o n i s p e r f e c t l y homogeneous

when t h e r a t i o o f e f f e c t s f o r any two r e g r e s s o r s is t h e same c o n s t a n t f o r

e a c h o f t h e f o u r outcomes . T h i s set o f p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y r e s t r i c t i o n s i s

imposed by c o n s t r a i n i n g t h e e f fec ts o f t h e r e g r e s s o r s t o be e n t i r e l y

m e d i a t e d by a n u n o b s e r v a b l e w i t h t h e f o u r ou tcomes as i ts i n d i c a t o r s . We

r e t a i n a l l p o s s i b l e c o r r e l a t i o n s between t h e d i s t u r b a n c e s o f t h e f o u r

outcomes; t h e s e are i d e n t i f i e d b e c a u s e t h e u n o b s e r v a b l e is comple te ly

d e t e r m i n e d by t h e r e g r e s s o r s (Hauser and G o l d b e r g e r , 197 1 ) .ll i n s h o r t ,

p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s are imposed by embedding M I M I C r e s t r i c t i o n s

w i t h i n t h e b a s e l i n e model ( J o r e s k o g and G o l d b e r g e r , 1975). I

T a b l e 2 r e v e a l s t h a t t h i s model o f p r o p o r t i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n (Model D) is

i 2 p a t e n t l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e male d a t a , a s t h e L /df r a t i o i s n e a r l y e i g h t

times l a r g e r f o r t h e c o n t r a s t t h a n t h e b a s e l i n e . Model E r e l a x e s t h e

r e s t r i c t i o n s of Model D by a l l o w i n g o c c u p a t i o n a l s t a t u s t o be de te rmined

d i r e c t l y by t h e r e g r e s s o r s . T h i s is a d u a l sys tem model p o s i t i n g two

p r o c e s s e s o f a t t a i n m e n t : one f o r o c c u p a t i o n , a n d a n o t h e r which s u b j e c t s t h e

n o n o c c u p a t i o n a l outcomes t o p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s . The c o n s i d e r a b l e

improvement i n t h e t e s t s t a t i s t i c s u g g e s t s t h a t much o f t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y i n

a t t a i n m e n t is l o c a t e d a l o n g an occupational-nonoccupational dimension, b u t

t h e c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e b a s e l i n e a l s o s u g g e s t s s t r o n g d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n t h e

n o n o c c u p a t i o n a l system. We a t t e m p t t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e l a t t e r w i t h a t r i a d i c

model which f r e e s both o c c u p a t i o n a l and i n d u s t r y a l l o c a t i o n from

p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s ; s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s a r e now imposed upon t h e

a u t h o r i t y and ownership outcomes a l o n e . However, t h i s model is a l s o

r e j e c t e d , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e assumpt ion o f a u n i t a r y c l a s s sys tem d i s g u i s e s

d i f f e r e n t p r o c e s s e s o f a l l o c a t i o n t o t h e a u t h o r i t y and ownership components.

We c o n c l u d e from t h e s e series o f models t h a t a t t a i n m e n t p r o c e s s e s are

q u i t e he te rogeneous . Only t h e b a s e l i n e model which a l l o w s d i s t i n c t

p r o c e s s e s a c r o s s t h e f o u r outcomes is a c c e p t a b l e . Although a t r i a d i c model

was s u p p o r t e d e a r l i e r by a c r i t e r i o n o f c r o s s - c u t t i n g e f f e c t s , t h i s model is

o v e r l y r e s t r i c t i v e i f a l s o i n t e r p r e t e d t o imply t h a t a l l o c a t i o n t o ownership

and a u t h o r i t y a r e p r o p o r t i o n a l . The r e m a i n d e r o f t h e models i n Tab le 2

f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between o c c u p a t i o n a l and n o n o c c u p a t i o n a l

a l l o c a t i o n . We s u c c e s s i v e l y impose p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s between t h e

a t t a i n m e n t o f o c c u p a t i o n and e a c h o f t h e o t h e r t h r e e outcomes; i n a l l c a s e s

t h e ~ * / d f r a t i o f o r t h e c o n t r a s t is l a r g e r t h a n t h e b a s e l i n e r a t i o . 1 2 These

f i n d i n g s emphasize t h a t t h e p r o c e s s of a t t a i n m e n t c a n n o t be s i m p l y i n f e r r e d

f rom t h e s t u d y o f o c c u p a t i o n a l outcomes a l o n e . To d o so s e r i o u s l y - m i s r e p r e s e n t s t h e complex n a t u r e o f t h e s t r a t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s .

9

The same s e t o f models was e s t i m a t e d f o r t h e f u l l sample and f o r

f e m a l e s a l o n e . Al though t h e r e s u l t s f o r t h e f u l l sample d e m o n s t r a t e s t r o n g

d i f f e r e n c e s i n a t t a i n m e n t p r o c e s s e s , t h e female sample s u g g e s t s a

c o n s i d e r a b l y d i f f e r e n t s t o r y . I n Tab le 3 , t h e model o f p r o p o r t i o n a l

a l l o c a t i o n t o a l l f o u r outcomes h a s a n ~ * / d f r a t i o f o r t h e c o n t r a s t which is

s m a l l e r t h a n t h a t o f t h e b a s e l i n e . Indeed , none o f t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l

a l l o c a t i o n models f o r t h e female sample g e n e r a t e s a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e ~ * / d f

r a t i o . These r e s u l t s c o n t r a s t s h a r p l y w i t h t h o s e p r e s e n t e d f o r men; we

e x p l o r e t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e o f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n .

4 . 4 The P r o c e s s o f S e x u a l S t r a t i f i c a t i o n -- -

One o f t h e a rguments a d d r e s s e d by t h i s a n a l y s i s s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e

s t r u c t u r e o f s e x u a l i n e q u a l i t y i s b e s t e x p l o r e d w i t h i n a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l

framework. The e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d t h u s f a r s u p p o r t s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n , a s a

number o f i m p o r t a n t s e x d i f f e r e n c e s i n m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t have

a l r e a d y been r e p o r t e d . T h i s s e c t i o n p u r s u e s t h e i s s u e o f s e x i n t e r a c t i o n s

i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l .

Research t o d a t e h a s uncovered s u r p r i s i n g l y l i t t l e e v i d e n c e f o r s e x u a l 5

i n e q u a l i t y i n o c c u p a t i o n a l s t a t u s . T h i s f i n d i n g i s r e p l i c a t e d i n T a b l e 5 ,

which i n d i c a t e s o n l y a modera te s e x e f f e c t on c u r r e n t occupa t ion . The n e t B

e f f e c t s o f s e x a r e c o n s i d e r a b l y l a r g e r f o r t h e o t h e r s t r a t i f i c a t i o n

outcomes, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t l a b o r marke t i n e q u a l i t y i s most p e r v a s i v e a l o n g

d i m e n s i o n s o t h e r t h a n socioeconomic s t a t u s . C o n t r o l l i n g f o r t h e i r o r i g i n s

and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , women e x p e r i e n c e s u b s t a n t i a l d e f i c i t s i n workp lace

a u t h o r i t y , i n d u s t r y rewards , and t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f ownership. These

f i n d i n g s s u p p o r t t h e r e s u l t s o f Wolf and F l i g s t e i n (1979a) f o r a u t h o r i t y

a l l o c a t i o n , and ex tend t h e i r a n a l y s i s t o t h e added dimensions o f ownersh ip

and i n d u s t r y .

I n a d d i t i o n t o main e f f e c t s , i t is a l s o o f i n t e r e s t t o e x p l o r e

i n t e r a c t i o n s i n t h e r e t u r n s t o s o c i a l o r i g i n s and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . Model J

i n T a b l e 4 a l l o w s a l l p o s s i b l e s e x i n t e r a c t i o n s i n t h e measurement and

s t r u c t u r a l pa ramete rs by e s t i m a t i n g t h e b a s e l i n e models f o r t h e two s e x e s

s e p a r a t e l y . The f o l l o w i n g model imposes e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s a c r o s s s e x e s

on t h e l a t e n t v a r i a b l e l o a d i n g s ; s e x d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e s t r u c t u r a l

c o e f f i c i e n t s are i n t e r p r e t a b l e o n l y when t h e measurement model is r e s t r i c t e d

i n t h i s manner. The r e l e v a n t c o n t r a s t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e l o a d i n g s a r e

i n d e e d comparable , s o a l l s u b s e q u e n t models r e t a i n t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s . The

h y p o t h e s i s o f s e x u a l e q u a l i t y i n a t t a i n m e n t i s impl ied by Model L , which

c o n s t r a i n s b o t h t h e measurement and s t r u c t u r a l models t o be t h e same f o r

L m a l e s a n d females . T h i s h y p o t h e s i s c a n n o t be s u s t a i n e d , s i n c e t h e L / d f

r a t i o f o r t h e c o n t r a s t is n e a r l y twice as large a s t h e r a t i o f o r t h e

b a s e l i n e Model K . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h we d i s c u s s t h e p a t t e r n o f s e x

i n t e r a c t i o n s r e v e a l e d i n t h e b a s e l i n e e s t i m a t e s . I n t h e f i n a l f o u r models ,

. .c e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s a r e s u c c e s s i v e l y imposed on t h e a t t a i n m e n t p r o c e s s f o r

e a c h s i n g l e outcome, w h i l e t h e p r o c e s s e s f o r t h e remaining t h r e e outcomes 0

are a l l o w e d t o va ry between s e x e s . We n o t e c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s between

outcomes i n t h e degree o f s e x u a l s i m i l a r i t y i n a l l o c a t i o n , w i t h t h e

s t r o n g e s t d i s s i m i l a r i t y e v i d e n t i n t h e p r o c e s s o f ownership a t t a i n m e n t . The

PACE 16

l a t t e r r e s u l t a g a i n s u g g e s t s t h a t s e x u a l i n e q u a l i t y is most p e r v a s i v e a l o n g

n o n o c c u p a t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n s .

O f t h e f o r t y - s e v e n p o s s i b l e i n t e r a c t i o n s between male and female

s t r u c t u r a l c o e f f i c i e n t s i n Model K , t h i r t e e n are s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e .05

l e v e l . We d i s c u s s t h o s e p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f t h e f o u r 4.

s t r a t i f i c a t i o n d i m e n s i o n s ; s e x d i f f e r e n c e s i n o t h e r p a r t s o f a n e l a b o r a t e d

model a r e c o n s i d e r e d i n S e w e l l e t a l . (1980) . The m a j o r i t y o f t h e .s - i n t e r a c t i o n s s u g g e s t a p e r v e r s e form o f m e r i t o c r a c y where females e n j o y

s i g n i f i c a n t l y less a s c r i p t i v e b e n e f i t s t h a n t h e i r male c o u n t e r p a r t s . 1 3 T h i s

p a t t e r n is e v i d e n t f o r a l l f o u r s t r a t i f i c a t i o n outcomes: f emales show

s i g n i f i c a n t l y s m a l l e r d i r e c t e f f e c t s o f background o c c u p a t i o n on c u r r e n t

o c c u p a t i o n , background ownersh ip on c u r r e n t a u t h o r i t y , background income and

ownership on c u r r e n t o w n e r s h i p , and background i n d u s t r y on c u r r e n t i n d u s t r y .

There is a s t r i k i n g p a r a l l e l between t h i s form o f s e x u a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and

t h e p r o c e s s o f racial s t r a t i f i c a t i o n r e p o r t e d by Featherman and Hauser

(1976b) . Al though d i f f e r e n t i a l s have d i m i n i s h e d o v e r time, b l a c k s a r e a l s o

unab le t o c o n v e r t s o c i a l o r i g i n a d v a n t a g e s i n t o l a b o r market achievements .

I n t h e s t r u g g l e between c o n f l i c t i n g a s c r i p t i v e e f fects , t h e n e g a t i v e

consequences o f b l a c k s k i n and female gender a p p a r e n t l y overcome any

a d v a n t a g e s t h a t might a c c r u e from s o c i a l o r i g i n s . 14

5.0 CONCLUSIONS - Recent s t r a t i f i c a t i o n r e s e a r c h h a s e x p l o r e d p o s i t i o n a l s o u r c e s o f

i n e q u a l i t y o u t s i d e t h e t e c h n i c a l d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r . C o n t r a r y t o t h e

assumpt ion t h a t o c c u p a t i o n a l r o l e s form t h e s t r u c t u r a l b a s i s of advanced

c a p i t a l i s m , it h a s been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t c l a s s and i n d u s t r y p o s i t i o n s have

i m p o r t a n t e f f e c t s on economic and noneconomic r e w a r d s (Wr igh t , 1979;

K a l l e b e r g and G r i f f i n , 1980; K a l l e b e r g e t a l . , 1981) . T h i s r e s e a r c h h a s

t y p i c a l l y eschewed c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a l l o c a t i v e p r o c e s s e s i n t o class and

i n d u s t r y p o s i t i o n s , on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r

c o n s e q u e n c e s is l o g i c a l l y p r i o r . However, t h e c u m u l a t i o n o f r e s u l t s on

p o s i t i o n a l consequences s u g g e s t s a r e t u r n t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e r n s of

a t t a i n m e n t r e s e a r c h , y e t w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l s t r u c t u r e

o f i n e q u a l i t y .

We have found c o n s i d e r a b l e h e t e r o g e n e i t y i n t h e male p r o c e s s of

a t t a i n m e n t . A formal model o f p r o p o r t i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n t o a l l f o u r outcomes

was s t r o n g l y r e j e c t e d , a s were s u c c e s s i v e models p o s i t i n g p r o p o r t i o n a l

a l l o c a t i o n between o c c u p a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n s and e a c h o f t h e c l a s s and i n d u s t r y

outcomes. Not o n l y a r e e d u c a t i o n a l e f f e c t s o n n o n o c c u p a t i o n a l outcomes weak

o r i n s i g n i f i c a n t , b u t a s c r i p t i v e p r o c e s s e s f o r t h e s e outcomes rest on a se t

o f background v a r i a b l e s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e r e l e v a n t f o r o c c u p a t i o n a l

a t t a i n m e n t . I n t h i s s e n s e , h e t e r o g e n e i t y i s l o c a t e d i n bo th t h e a s c r i b e d

and a c h i e v e d components o f t h e a t t a i n m e n t p r o c e s s , a l t h o u g h p r e v i o u s

r e s e a r c h h a s emphasized d i f f e r e n c e s i n a c h i e v e d e f f e c t s a l o n e ( G r i f f i n and

K a l l e b e r g , 1981). T h i s h e t e r o g e n e i t y i m p l i e s t h a t p r o c e s s e s o f a l l o c a t i o n

c a n n o t be s imply i n f e r r e d from s t u d i e s o f o c c u p a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n s . Moreover ,

t h e p a t t e r n o f weak e d u c a t i o n a l e f f e c t s on n o n o c c u p a t i o n a l outcomes s u g g e s t s

t h a t a m e r i t o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n o f i n e q u a l i t y may n o t be t e n a b l e . R a t h e r ,

t h e s t a b i l i t y o f t h e s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s y s t e m may d e r i v e from t h e d i s p e r s i o n of

a s c r i p t i v e p r o c e s s e s ; t h i s is d i s c u s s e d i n some d e t a i l la ter i n t h e

c o n c l u s i o n .

Informed by a paradigm of economic s e g m e n t a t i o n , t h i s p a p e r h a s a l s o

e x p l o r e d t h e p r o c e s s o f i n d u s t r y a t t a i n m e n t . Our i n t e r e s t i n t h i s i s s u e was

twofold . F i r s t , i t becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t t o d e t e r m i n e who g e t s t h e

p r i v i l e g e d i n d u s t r y p o s i t i o n s g i v e n t h e emerg ing consensus on t h e s a l i e n c e

o f i n d u s t r y l o c a t i o n for economic r ewards . S e c o n d , w e s o u g h t t o e l a b o r a t e

t h e d u a l s y s t e m t h e s i s i n t o a t r i a d i c model by i n c l u d i n g i n d u s t r y outcomes

a s a t h i r d d i m e n s i o n . With r e g a r d t o t h e first i s s u e , we n o t e t h a t b o t h

a s c r i b e d a n d a c h i e v e d v a r i a b l e s e x e r t r a t h e r weak ef fects on i n d u s t r y

15 outcomes . The i m p l i c a t i o n is t h a t i n d i v i d u a l p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n t h e

,. i n d u s t r y h i e r a r c h y r e m a i n l a r g e l y u n e x p l a i n e d . T h i s may i m p l y t h a t t h e

p r o c e s s of a l l o c a t i o n is s o complex t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t d e t e r m i n a n t s a r e q u i t e ?r

d i f f e r e n t f rom t h o s e t y p i c a l l y employed i n a t t a i n m e n t r e s e a r c h .

A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i n d u s t r y a l l o c a t i o n migh t e n t a i l a s t r o n g random component

which r e w a r d s t h e w o r k e r l u c k y enough t o p r o b e t h e labor m a r k e t when a

d e s i r a b l e i n d u s t r y i s h i r i n g . I n t h i s r e g a r d , w e h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h a t

J e n c k s ' t h e o r y o f l u c k may p e r t a i n more t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f i n d u s t r y t h a n

o c c u p a t i o n ( J e n c k s e t a l . , 1972). 16

Al though some m i g h t b e more impres sed by t h e r e s i d u a l s , a c o n s i s t e n t

p a t t e r n o f a l l o c a t i o n n o n e t h e l e s s c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l

s t r u c t u r e o f a t t a i n m e n t . We h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d t h e r e s u l t s a s e v i d e n c e f o r a

t r i a d i c s y s t e m w i t h t h r e e i n d e p e n d e n t a t t a i n m e n t p r o c e s s e s . T h e r e is

modera t e i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l a s c r i p t i o n w i t h i n e a c h s y s t e m , c o u p l e d w i t h

n e g a t i v e o r i n s i g n i f i c a n t c r o s s - s y s t e m e f f e c t s . It s h o u l d be emphasized

t h a t no s i n g l e s y s t e m m o n o p o l i z e s a s c r i p t i v e r e s o u r c e s , a n d t h a t no s i n g l e

s y s t e m p o s s e s s e s a s c r i p t i v e r e s o u r c e s p o w e r f u l enough t h a t t h e y c a n be

c o n v e r t e d f o r a c h i e v e m e n t i n a n o t h e r sys tem. I t is a p l u r a l i s t p a t t e r n of

a t t a i n m e n t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t a s c r i p t i v e a d v a n t a g e s a re s h a r e d by a

m u l t i p l i c i t y o f s o c i a l g r o u p s -- a f u l l 83 p e r c e n t o f t h e sample h a s a

f a t h e r who is a n owner , o r who is i n t h e t o p t h i r d o f t h e o c c u p a t i o n a l o r

i n d u s t r y h i e r a r c h i e s . ' ' T h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a d v a n t a g e s may be a

s t a b i l i z i n g f o r c e s i n c e i n d i v i d u a l s from a v a r i e t y o f backgrounds c a n a s p i r e

t o success i n a t least one system. I n d e e d , t h i s p l u r a l i s t p a t t e r n of

a t t a i n m e n t s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n o f i n e q u a l i t y may proceed on a

b a s i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t commonly supposed . R a t h e r t h a n a

m e r i t o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n , t h e s t a b i l i t y o f t h e s t r a t i f i c a t i o n system may

ar ise from a wide d i s p e r s i o n o f a s c r i p t i v e r e s o u r c e s a c r o s s s o c i a l g roups .

The son o f t h e shopkeeper o r u n i o n worker p a r t i c i p a t e s w i t h i n t h e sys tem

because he c a n a s p i r e t o a p o s i t i o n similar t o h i s f a t h e r ' s , n o t because h e

b e l i e v e s t h a t such outcomes a c c r u e t o t h o s e who a r e b e s t q u a l i f i e d o r most 18

e d u c a t e d .

However, t h i s p a t t e r n o f d i s p e r s e d a s c r i p t i o n does n o t a p p l y t o t h e

female p r o c e s s o f a l l o c a t i o n . R a t h e r , w e h a v e found a c o n s i s t e n t

r e s t r i c t i o n o f s o c i a l background effects f o r a l l f o u r outcomes. A s c r i p t i v e

. p r o c e s s e s o p e r a t e p r i m a r i l y i n r e g a r d t o t h e main e f f e c t s o f s e x , and we

n o t e t h a t t h e l a t t e r a r e c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r o n g e r f o r nonoccupa t iona l outcomes.

These main e f f e c t s p r o v i d e a n o b j e c t i v e b a s i s t o t h e c u r r e n t " c r i s i s f 1 of

l e g i t i m a t i o n o v e r female a l l o c a t i o n , c o n t r a r y t o p r i o r r e s e a r c h which h a s

found l i t t l e e v i d e n c e o f s e x d i f f e r e n c e s i n a t t a i n m e n t p r o c e s s e s .

We conc lude w i t h t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t new i n s i g h t s i n t o r e l a t e d i s s u e s

might be g a i n e d from a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e . The c u r r e n t r e s u l t s on

s t r a t i f i c a t i o n t r e n d s , racial d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n a t t a i n m e n t , and s o c i a l

p s y c h o l o g i c a l models may need r e v i s i o n i f nonoccupa t iona l measures a r e

c o n s i d e r e d .

FOOTNOTES

1. Robinson and K e l l e y (1979) a n a l y z e NORC d a t a f rom t h e Uni ted

S t a t e s , b u t t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n s are l i m i t e d s i n c e m e a s u r e s o f class background

are n o t a v a i l a b l e . G r i f f i n and K a l l e b e r g (1981) a l s o c o n s i d e r d a t a from t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s , b u t t h e y f o c u s on t h e s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n o f m e r i t o c r a t i c P

a l l o c a t i o n t o c l a s s p o s i t i o n s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e d u a l s y s t e m t h e s i s .

2. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e s e measures a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e p a r e n t s o f 5

t h e r e s p o n d e n t s .

3 . T h i s n o r m a l i t y a ssumpt ion seems a n a d e q u a t e a p p r o x i m a t i o n , a l t h o u g h

a t r u n c a t e d normal might b e t t e r r e f l e c t t h e p r e v a l e n c e o f r e s p o n d e n t s wi th

no a u t h o r i t y a t a l l .

4 . S i n c e i t might b e supposed t h a t farm ownersh ip e n t a i l s a d i s t i n c t

p r o c e s s o f a l l o c a t i o n , t h e b a s e l i n e models were e s t i m a t e d f o r t h e nonfarm

p o p u l a t i o n as well a s t h e t o t a l sample. However, p a r a m e t e r e s t i m a t e s f o r

nonfa rmers were q u i t e similar t o t h o s e r e p o r t e d below f o r t h e f u l l sample.

5. The r a t i o n a l e p r e s e n t e d h e r e f o r t e t r a c h o r i c and b i s e r i a l

c o r r e l a t i o n s i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e m o t i v a t i o n f o r p r o b i t o r l o g i t a n a l y s i s .

We have e s t i m a t e d p r o b i t models f o r t h e a u t h o r i t y and ownersh ip outcomes,

w i t h r e s u l t s similar t o t h o s e p r e s e n t e d below. We have a l s o e s t i m a t e d

models w i t h p r o d u c t moment c o r r e l a t i o n s , and a g a i n t h e s u b s t a n t i v e

c o n c l u s i o n s remain unchanged.

6. R e f e r t o F i g u r e 1 f o r t h e names and d e s c r i p t i o n s o f v a r i a b l e s .

S i n c e t h e v a r i a n c e s o f t h e t r ans fo rmed ownersh ip and a u t h o r i t y v a r i a b l e s a r e

n o t i d e n t i f i e d , t h e y a r e a r b i t r a r i l y f i x e d a t u n i t y i n t h i s model and a l l rl

s u c c e e d i n g ones . C

7 . S i n c e t h e models a r e e s t i m a t e d w i t h b i s e r i a l and t e t r a c h o r i c

moments f o r t h e a u t h o r i t y and ownership outcomes, s t a n d a r d e r r o r s and

PACE 21

chi-square statistics should be regarded as only approximate (Joreskog and

Sorbom, 1981).

8. The models presented in Tables 6 and 7 were estimated with equality

constraints across sexes on the measurement model; this allows meaningful

comparisons between the male and female structural coefficients.

Differences between the models presented here and the unconstrained versions

are entirely trivial, as evidenced by the chi-square contrast between Models

J and K in Table 4.

9. References to significance in the text are based on an .05 level,

two-tailed.

10. The regressors include father's education, mother's education,

father's occupational status, parents1 income, father's ownership, father's

industry, academic performance, and educational attainment. For models

estimated in the full sample, sex is also included.

11. In this sense, the unobservable is a simple linear composite of

the regressors.

12. The contrast with Model I suggests a considerable degree of

homogeneity between occupational and industry allocation. However, the

loading of the industry variable on the unobservable is negative, implying

that regressors with positive consequences for occupational achievement have

negative effects for industry attainment. This supports the triadic model

of allocation, since advantages for within-system attainment are

simultaneously disadvantages for cross-system mobility.

13. Of course, the main effects of sex imply strongly nonmeritocratic

processes. The label of perverse meritocracy applies only in regard to

attainment processes within the female subsample.

PACE 22

14. These findings of restricted background effects should be

interpreted with caution, since it is possible that female ascriptive

processes operate through the mother's characteristics. However, the

available evidence suggests that such effects are limited. In the subsample

of Wisconsin women with working mothers (N=911), we included mother's

occupation, ownership, and industry in the set of regressors for the

stratification outcomes. Only three of the fifteen least squares P

coefficients were significant: the effect of mother's industry on the power

to set pay (beta = -.O8O), the effect of mother's industry on current

industry (beta = . 099 ) , and the effect of mother's ownership on current i .

ownership (beta = .073).

15. It should be noted, however, that sex effects on industry location

were quite strong, and the role of racial ascription was not examined.

16. Similar conclusions might equally be applied to the attainment of

authority and ownership. However, inferences regarding comparative levels

of determination should be avoided, as there is no legitimate contrast of

2 R s between dependent variables.

17. At the same time, the triadic system is contrary to the pluralist

image of cross-cutting cleavages, since intergenerational movement tends to

be restricted to a single system of stratification.

18. However, it is unclear if ascriptive processes are strong enough

to sustain this form of legitimation. An alternative explanation suggests

that stability may derive from a subjective belief in purely random

allocation, so that failure is neither a sign of overt discrimination nor a $

reflection on individual ability. The negligible size of the R~ statistic

for nonoccupational outcomes might suggest this alternative. t

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F i g u r e 1

Sources and Desc r i p t i ons o f Var iab les

V a r i a b l e I n d i c a t o r Source Desc r i p t i on

F a t h e r ' s EDFA57 1957 survey Compl e ted years o f school ing , Educat ion (n, t r unca ted a t 17 -

EDFA75 1975 survey Completed years o f scnool ing, I,

t r u n c a t e d a t 17 T

Mother ' s ED1105 7 1957 survey Cornpl e t ed years o f s c5oo 1 i ng , Educat ion (n,) - t r unca ted a t 17

ECMO 7 5 1975 survey Ccspl e ted years o f school i ng, t r unca ted a t 17

Fa the r ' s Occupat ional Status ( q 3 )

Parent ' s Income (n4)

OCFATA Wisconsin Duncan S E I f o r d e t a i l e d census t a x records occapat ion i n 1957 o r c l o s e s t

yea r a v a i l a b l e

OCFA75 1975 survey Duncan SEI f o r d e t a i l e d occupat ion i n 1357

IFlPAl 'rliscons i n Pa ren t ' s incorre i n 1357 o r f i r s t t a x records y e a r a v a i l a b l e , t runca ted a t

$1,000 and S30,000 and t r m s - f c r r e d by l o g a r i t h i c f u n c t i o n

3?A2 'riiscons i n Pa ren t ' s income i n years t a x records f o l lowing t h e f i r s t a v a i l a b l e

(1957-1960), t r u n c a t d a t $1 ,GCO and $30,030 and trznsformed by l o g a r i t h m i c f u n c t i o n

Fa the r ' s C'rlN F A 1975 survey Dichotonous response (Owner = 1, Ownership (q5) Nono1tiner = 0 )

Fa the r ' s INDFA 1975 survey Continuous I n d u s t r y S e v e n t a t i o n I n d u s t r y (n6) Index ( T o l b e r t , Horan, and Beck

1980)

Sex (q7) SEX Wisconsin Dichotomous response (Male = 1 , school records Female = 0 )

Mental A b i l i t y 1 Q Wisconsin IQ based on Henmon-Nelson t e s t ("8) T e s t i n g Serv ice g iven i n grade 11

Figure 1

(cont inued)

Var iable

" High School Z

Rank ( l g ) -

Educational A t ta innent

1 )

Occupational Status (q12)

I n S i c a t o r Source Descr 2 t i o n

RAN K Wisconsin Average grades i n h igh school, school records ranked and norna! i zed

€064 1964 survey Completed years o f school ing, t runcated a t 1 7

ED75 . 1975 survey Conipl eted years of schooling, t runcated a t 17

OCC 1975 survey Duncan SEI f o r d e t a i l e d census occupat ion h e l d a t survey date o r o f l a s t occupat ion he ld w i t h i n t h e preceding f i v e years

Xorkpl ace AUTH?AY 1975 sursfey Au tho r i t y (n, j)

AUTHHIRE 1975 survey

Owners h i p (ql 3 ) Ci;?4 1975 surv3y

Industry (nI5) I:ID 1975 survey

Dichotomous res;cnse (Power t o se t pay = 1 , No Pcwer t o se t pay = 0 )

Dichotomous response ( b w e r t o h i r e = 1, ?lo Power t o h i r e = 0)

Dichotonous respcnse ('3wner = 1 , Nonowner = 0 )

Continuous Indus t r y S q r e n t a t i o n Index (To1 b e r t , Horan , and Beck igeo)

Tab le 1

Models o f t h e S t r a t i f i c a t i o n Process, Wiscons in Yales and Fenales

Model s o r C o n t r a s t L2 df L2 / d f 3

B a s e l i n e

N u l l Yodel

Random E r r o r

P r o p o r t i o n a l A l l o c a t i o n , S i n g l e System

P r o p o r t i o n a l A l l o c a t i o n , Dual Systen

P r o p o r t i o n a l A l l o c a t i o n , T r i a d i c System

P r o p o r t i o n a l A1 l o c a t i o n t o Occupat ion and A u t h o r i t y

P r o p o r t i o n a l A l l o c a t i o n t o Occupat ion and Ownership

P r o p o r t i o n a l A1 1 o c a t i o n t o Occupat ion and I n d u s t r y

C vs. A 424.1 17 24.95

D vs. A 2055.0 24 55.63

E vs. A 784.3 16 49.02

F vs. A 428.2 8 53.53

G vs. A 866.6 8 108.33

H vs. A 450.7 8 56.34

I vs. A 574.9 8 71.86

Table 2

Models o f t h e S t r a t i f i c a t i o n Process , Wisconsin Males

u Models o r Con t r a s t L~ df L~ / df -

A. Basel ine

B. Null Model

C. Random Error 755.4 85 8.89

3. Proport ional A l loca t ion , S i n g l e System 14G2.4 89 15.76

E. Proport ional A1 l o c a t i o n , Dual System 682.3 82 8.32

F. P r o ~ o r t i o n a l A 1 l o c a t i o n , T r i a d i c System 654.4 75 8 .73

G. Proport ional A1 l o c a t i o n t o Occupation and Authori ty 574.3 75 7.66

H. Progort ional A l loca t ion t o Occupation and Ownership 781.8 75 10.42

I . Propcrt ional A1 1 oca t ion t o Occupation and Indus t ry 484.0 75 6.45

C vs . A

D v s . A

E vs. A

F vs. A

G vs. A

H vs. A

I vs. A 59.8 7 8.54

Table 3

Models of t he S t r a t i f i c a t i o n Process, Wisconsin Females

Model s o r Con t ras t L~ df L~ / d f .+r. &-

A. Base l i ne

B. F4ull Model

C. Randcm E r r o r

D. P r o p o r t i o n a l A l l o c a t i o n , S i n ~ l e System 369.6 89 4.15

E. P r o p o r t i o n a l A1 l o c a t i o n , Dual System 354.1 82 4.32

F. P r o p o r t i o n a l A1 l o c a t i o n , T r i a d i c Systen 334.0 75 4.45

G . P r o p o r t i o n a l A1 l o c a t i o n t o Occupation and A u t h o r i t y 325.7 75 4.34

H. P r o p o r t i o n a l A l l o c a t i o n t o Occupation and Ownership 337.3 75 4.50

I. P r o p o r t i o n a l A1 1 oca t i o n t o Occupation and I n d u s t r y 310.8 ' 75 4.14

C vs. A

D vs. A

E vs. A 46.7 14 3.34

F vs. A 26.6 7 3.80

G vs. A 18.3 7 2.61

H vs. A 29.9 7 4.27

I vs. A 3.4 7 0.49

Table 4

Model s of Sex Differences in the Stratification Process

-- Nodels or Contrast L df L~ / df - ,-

* J. No Constraints Bstween Sexes

K. Equal Measurement Model s

L. Global Equal i ty of Structural Models

M. Equal Occucational A1 location

N. Equal Authority Allocation

0. Equal Ownership A1 location

P. Equal Industry A1 location

K vs. 3

L vs. K

M vs. K

N vs. K

0 vs. K

P vs. K

Tal~ le 5

Structural Cocf f ic lents o f Basclinc Hudel. Wisconsin Males and rentales*

ow!~d_entJ?r!I,!e-- -- ---- - - - - - -.------- --------- Ili31 SCIKIOI Acad~mic Educational Occupational Workplace

Predetermined Variable ---------- Ha11 k P e r l o n ~ ~ a ~ ~ c e At ta i n ~ ~ t c ~ r t Stalus Autl~ority_ @$f?fip lndu_sry~ ---- - -..---- - - -.

.0169 . 0 705 - .0254 - .0022 .00 32 - .Oi l5 rather 's Education (.0105) ( .0145) (.0181) ( .0089) (.0166)

[.0319] [. I1611 [- .O N O ] - .006\] 1:%3 [-.0\69]

.0215 .064 7 .0002 .0156 .02W .0041 Mother's Education ( .0092) (.0127) ( .0l511) (.0077) (.00H1) (.0145)

[ .0352] [.0832] [.0002] [.0371] [.0535] [.0053]

- .0257 .I306 .I037 .0202 -.0190 -.0139 Fatlrer's Occupational Status

(.0135\ ( .OiRU) (.0233) (.0118) (.0119) (.0212)

[ - .0369 [. 14731. [.0927] 1.0420) [-.03UJ3] [-.0156]

- .0228 .2774 .O 798 .I036 .I102 - .OW6 Parent's Inconte (.0333) ( .0452) (.0570) (.0272) ( .0293) ( .0524)

[-.0093] [ .OW ] [.0204] 1.06161 [.0644] [-.ON21

.I362 .0578 -. 2835 .19AG . I 148 -. 1627 Father's Ownership (.0370) ( .0500) ( .0630) (.0299) (.0323) (.0579)

[ .0460] [.0154] [-.059R] 1.0975) f.22901 [-.0431]

.00%6 - . 03N .(I025 - .0234 -.0141 .0504 Father's Industry ( .0096) ( . o l a ) (.0164) ( .0078) I.OOU4) ( .0151)

[.0034) [-.0337] [.0020] [-.04411 [-.0261] [.0511]

- .I096 .U451 .3965 .a168 . N 9 1 1.1954 Sex (.0301) ( .0428) (.0552) (.0283) (.0506)

[- .2475] [.2311)] r .OU63] ( ' 0 2 6 2 ~ r.4137 [ . I54 I ] I.32641

.5731 .5 320 Henlal A b i l i t y (.0110) ( .0552)

r.57991 [ .3ntl41

1 .0000 I l i c ~ 1 1 Scllool Rank --

[ .7215]

.4211 ,1565 .0574 .0017 .0139 Acade~ttic Perfornmltce (.0116) (.0169) (.001Y) ( .00112) (.0140)

[.459?] [. 13541 [.I 1'351 [ .0093] ( . 0 3 6 ~ ]

.5749 .OM1 - .037R .0133 fducat ional A t t a i n ~ ~ e r ~ t ( .0206 ) ( .009U) (.0104) (.01a6)

[ . IS!IU] [.0566] [-.0185] [.0132] Coeff icient o f Oetennination .4083 1.0 .4314 .3516 .21(16 ,081 2 .I104 - . - - - - . - - _ - - - - - - . - - - - _ - _ _ _ - I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ ~ - _ _ . _ _ . _ ..

Cd .. - - - P,

9 Entries are s t r ~ ~ c t u r a l cor f f i c ie t l t . (standdrtl e r ro r ) , [standarctircd coef f lc ic t r t ] . l l ~ e s,r~~~ple s ize I s 5106. l istwise presort. . 10

l l l e scales o f t l le occupat iundl stat l l \ , 111t.ttta1 d b i l l t y , l t ly l l sct~ool r.ar~lr, acnclr~ttic pe~.for~tta~lce. a l~d i r~dus l ry variable5 Itdve w been divided by ten fo r cot~venience ill ~)resc.~r lat ion. ru

ldble 6

Structurdl Cuefl lc ients o f Odsel lne Hudel , WIscoll>in Hdlcsh

- - - -. .- - - - I kyenda~ t Vartdbl e - . - . . - -- - . - . - - - - - ..-- HI 911 S d ~ o o l Acdde1111c Educdt londl 0ccul)at ional Wurkplace

Predetem~ined V a r l a b k - Rdnk ---- Perforaunce Attatnmeni -- Stdtus Aut l~or i ty h ~ e r s t ~ l p I n d u s t r l

.0054 .0704 - .(I366 - .MI59 - .MY9 .0037 Fictt~cr's Educat ton (.0195) ( .014U) (.0124) (.0219

[. 1021 ] [-.a4141 [-.0167] [-.0276 ('0119\ [.0059]

.0065 .OM5 - .0033 .0207 .0138 -.0079 Mother's Education ( .0133) ( .Ol8l) ( .0231) (.0114) (.0111) (.0204)

[.0108] [.0704] [-.0031] [.04W] [.0317] [- .0104]

-.0149 .I370 .I707 .0285 -.0155 -.0325 fat l ter 's Occupdi lonal Status (.OlaO) (.02M1)

[-.0225 ('0J19{ 1.1457 [ .0607] [!:::::{ [- .0389)

- . O O l Y .2702 .0675 .I848 - .01 UI Parent's Incone ( .0454) ( .0787) (.0379) (.0698)

[-.0o08] [.0163] [ . Ot133 r. 10951 [--00441

.I221 -.(I523 -.4436 .2619 .6619 -. 2546 Fat l~er 's Uwnershlp (.0510) ( .0685 ) (.0423) (.0781)

[.0424] [-,01321 [-.0872

- -0002 -.0394 -.0111 - .0394 -. 0320 .0821 f a t l ~ e r ' s Industry (.0134) (.0179) (.0231) (.0114) (.0111) (.0205)

[- .OOOZ] [- .0379] [- .0084] [- .0740] [- .0589] [.0863]

.5432 .5523 Mental A b l l i t y ( .O lU) ( .0628)

[ .50ZO] [.4118]

1 .0000 I l igl l School Hdnk --

[ .TO361

.5082 . I ZUII .0 708 .0134 ,029 1 ACCI~CIII~C Perfon~unce (.0233) ( .0240) (.0119) (.0113) (.0209)

1.52333 [. 10361 I . 14241 1.02643 [.0320]

.6213 .0252 - .0369 -.0561 Cducational Attainwent (.0139) (.d247) : \ l.04931 [!:t:o]:j [-.0614]

Coeff ic ient o f Detenni~tation .3373 1.0 .4 687 .3911 .0838 ,1204 .0217 ---- ----- -

l f a t r i e s are s t ruc tura l coef f ic ient . ( s t a n d ~ r d e r ro r ) . [standardized c o e f f i c t e ~ ~ t ) . Ttle sdsple s lze i s 2976, I l s twtse present. Tlle scales of the occ~lbdtionihl status, l lel l tal dbi 1 i t y , high school rank, dcadullic perfolr~~dnce, d ~ ~ d lndustry varidbles have bccn divided by ten fo r coc~veniu~ce i n ~)resentdt io~r.

Table 7

Structural Coeff icients o f Baseline b d e l , Wisconsin ferulesf

f dther's Educat ton

.0371 h t l r e r ' s Education ( .0125)

C.06411

- .0359 Father's Occupdt lonal Status ( .0200)

[-.0521]

Fdlher's Industry

Mentdl A b i l i t y

Hi911 School Hank

[ducat io r~d l Attairur~ent

Coef f ici'ent o f Oeternrirrat ion

h!pg~dent Var id111 g - .- ------ --- Aca dun i c fducdt iondl U~cupdt ional

Status P c ~ f o s g Attainrrurrt-- ---------

.0914 -. 0064 (.0210) ( .0260) [. 14031 [- .OOM3 ]

.07& .0074 (.0169) ( .0210) [.I1621 [.0007]

.I146 .0139 (.0275) ( .0335) [. 14231 [.0137]

.26 36 .\OR2 ( .0654) (.OuI5) [.0949] [.031 I]

-.0771

[. 0629

Workplace Aulhorlty. - .0009 ( .0158)

[- .0024]

.0146 (.0213) 1.02963

.055 1 ( .0466) 1.03231

.I101

.----. .

Industry ---. ---

- .0202

.0073 ( .a202 ) [.0103]

.0027 ( .0320) 1.oa321

.0329 (.07a4) r .0112]

- .077!, (.0052)

1-.0221]

* Lntr ies dre s t ruc turd l coef f ic ier l t . (stdrlddt.d ert.ot.), [stdnddrdized c o e f f i c i ~ r ~ t ] . The sdr~role size i s 2430. l i s t w i ~ c pit!irrtt. Itre 5cdlt.s o f tlrc o c c u ~ d t i o r~d l s t'rtus. rlrcrrtd 1 db t l i t y . trigtt scllool rdrtk. dcddernlc perfonnirrlce. and itrdustry vdridbles Irdve bee11 divided by ten fo r cor~venicnce i r ~ i~resentirt ion.

who gets prestige, power, property, and privileged ... · who gets prestige, power, property, and...

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