whistleblowing in organization
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8/11/2019 Whistleblowing in Organization
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Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions,Actions, and RetaliationAuthor(s): Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam ViswesvaranSource: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Dec., 2005), pp. 277-297Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25123666.
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8/11/2019 Whistleblowing in Organization
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Journal
of
Business
Ethics
(2005)
62: 277-297
?
Springer
2005
DOI 10.1007/sl0551-005-0849-l
Whistleblowing
in
Organizations:
An
Examination
of
Correlates
of
Whistleblowing
Intentions,
Actions,
and Retaliation
Jessica
R.
Mesmer-Magnus
Chockalingam
Viswesvaran
ABSTPJVCT.
Whistleblowing
on
organizational
wrongdoing
is
becoming
increasingly
prevalent.
What
aspects
of
the
person,
the
context,
and the
transgression
relate
to
whistleblowing
intentions
and
to
actual
whis
tleblowing
on
corporate
wrongdoing?
Which
aspects
relate
to
retaliation
against
whistleblowers?
Can
we
draw
conclusions
about the
whistleblowing
process
by
assess
ing whistleblowing
intentions?
Meta-analytic
examina
tion
of 193 correlations
obtained
from
26
samples
(N
=
18,781)
reveals
differences
in
the
correlates
of
whistleblowing
intentions and
actions.
Stronger
rela
tionships
were
found between
personal,
contextual,
and
wrongdoing
characteristics
and
whistleblowing
intent
than
with actual
whistleblowing.
Retaliation
might
best
be
predicted using
contextual variables.
Implications
for
research and
practice
are
discussed.
KEY
WORDS:
retaliation,
retaliatory
acts,
organiza
tional
wrongdoing,
organizational
justice,
whistleblow
ing,
whistleblower
characteristics,
whistleblowing
intentions
Incidents
of
organizational
wrongdoing
are
increasingly making
headlines
(e.g.,
fraud,
corrup
tion,
and
other
unethical
acts
in
organizations
like
Enron, WorldCom, Anderson, and Tyco). While
once
thought
to
be
rare,
broad
coverage
of
recent
corporate
wrongdoing
has led
to
a
widely-held
belief
that scandal
may
be
uncovered
in
virtuaUy
every
business
or
organization
(Anand
et
al.,
2004).
With
greater
frequency,
reports
of
wrongdoing
are
made
by
members
close
to
the
inner
workings
of the
organization (e.g.,
by employees,
board
members
or
internal
auditors),
rather
than
by
external
auditing
agencies.
These
individuals,
often
referred
to as
whistle-blowers,
risk retaliation both
by
their
orga
nization
(e.g.,
via
job loss, demotion,
decreased
quality
of
working
conditions)
and
by
the
public
(e.g.,
character
assassinations,
accusations of
being
merely
sour
grapes ,
spies,
or
squealers )
in
their
efforts
to
expose
perceived
immoral
or
iUegal
acts
(Jubb,
1999;
Near
and
Miceli,
1985).
In
this
manuscript,
we
examine
potential
pre
dictors
and correlates
of
whistleblowing
behavior
and
of
retaliation
against
whistleblowers.
Specifi
caUy,
we
employ meta-analytic
methodology
to
examine
the
personal
and
contextual correlates
of
Chockalingam
Viswesvaran
(Ph.D. University of Iowa)
is
a
Professor of Psychology
at
Florida International
University.
His research
interests include business
ethics,
personnel
selec
tion,
and
human
resource
management.
He
has
published
in
Journal
of
Applied
Psychology,
Organizational
Behavior and
Human Decision
Processes,
and
Psychological
BuUetin.
He
has served
on
5
editorial
boards
and
as
an
Associate Editor
of
the International
Journal
of
Selection
and Assessment.
He
is
an
elected
fellow
of
the
Society
or
Industrial and
Organizational
Psychology
as
well
as
Divisions 5
(Measurement)
and
14
(Industrial-Organi
zational
Psychology) of
the
American
Psychological
Association.
Jessica
Mesmer-Magnus
(Ph.D.
2005,
Florida
International
University)
is
an
Assistant
Professor
ofManagement
with the
Cameron
School
of
Business
at
the
University
of
North
Carolina
at
Wilmington.
Her
research
interests
include
work/
family
conflict/balance, organizational
training
program
de
sign, whistleblowing/counterproductive
behavior,
and business
ethics. She has
published
in
the
Journal
of
Vocational
Behavior,
Journal
of
Business
Ethics and
Journal
of
Labor
Research. She
is
certified
as
a
Senior
Professional
in
Human Resources and has worked
as a
Human Resources
Manager for
a
US-based
national
consulting firm.
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278
Jessica
R.
Mesmer-Magnus
and
Chockalingam
Viswesvaran
whistleblowing
intentions and
behaviors,
as
weU
as
the correlates
of retaliation
against
whistleblowers
in
an
effort
to
improve
our
understanding
of the
whistleblowing
process.
Our
main
purpose
in
conducting
this
study
is
to
guide
future
research
in
efforts
to
better
predict
and understand
whistle
blowing
and
retaliation,
and
to
inform
practice
as
to
the
aspects
of the work
environment that
may
foster
the
potential
for effective
whistleblowing.
In
the
foUowing
review,
we
wiU
(1)
provide
an
overview of the
whistleblowing
construct,
(2)
re
view
potential
correlates
of
whistleblowing
and
of
retaliation
against
whistleblowers,
and
(3)
draw
a
distinction
between
an
employee's
intent
to
blow
the
whistle and
actuaUy blowing
it.
We
hope
to
inform
research
as to
the
feasibility
of
drawing
conclusions about
whistleblowing
from
data
based
on
intentions rather than
actual
behaviors.
Whistleblowing
defined
Whistleblowing
is the
disclosure
by
organization
members
(former
or
current)
of
iUegal,
immoral,
or
iUegitimate
practices
under
the
control
of their
employers,
to
persons
or
organizations
that
may
be
able
to
effect action.
(Near
and
Miceli,
1985,
p.
4).
While
whistleblowers
typicaUy
have
both
internal
and
external
reporting
channels available
to
report
organizational
transgressions,
research
suggests
that
nearly
aU
whistleblowers
initiaUy
attempt
to
report
wrongdoing
via
internal channels
before
utilizing
(or
in
lieu
of)
external
channels
(Miceli
and
Near, 1992,
2002).
Even
though whistleblowing
via
internal
channels
is
less
threatening
to
an
organization
(as
compared
with external
reporting
which
threatens
public
scrutiny
or
legal
intervention;
Miceli
et
al.,
1991a),
whistleblowing
within
an
organization
is
not
often
welcomed.
Rather,
whistleblower
reports
of
wrongdoing
are
frequently
buried
or
ignored
(Miceli
et
al.,
1991b).
In
this
scenario,
the
whistleblower
is
unsuccessful
in
stopping organizational
wrongdoing,
and
worse,
is
placed
in
a
position
to
experience
negative
consequences
to
their action.
Burying
or
ignoring
reports
and
retaliation
against
whistle
blowers
are
more
likely
when
whistleblowing
is
perceived
by
top management
to
represent
a
questioning
of
or
chaUenge
to
the
organization's
authority
structure
(e.g.,
Miceli and
Near,
2002).
Whistleblowing
research
Reviews
of
whistleblowing
research
have
identified
two
relatively
robust foci of
examination,
in which
researchers
have
sought
to
identify
the
conditions
under which
whistleblowing
intentions
are
formed
and action
taken,
and
retaliation
occurs
(Ellis
and
Arieli, 1999;
Miceli and
Near,
2002).
Studies
of the
antecedents,
correlates,
and
consequences
of the
decision
to
blow
the whistle
on
corporate
wrongdo
ing,
as
well
as
those focused
on
modeling
its
process,
have
typically
drawn
conceptual
distinctions
between
those variables related
to
the
whistleblower
(i.e.,
whistleblower
characteristics),
the
context in
which
the
whistleblowing
occurs
(i.e.,
contextual
variables),
and
aspects
of
the
wrongdoing
and
wrong-doer (e.g.,
King.
1997;
Miceli
et
al.,
1991a;
Miceli and
Near,
1985,1988;
Miceli
et
al.,
1991b).
Research
exploring
the role
of
these
variables
in
the
whistleblowing
pro
cess
is
typically approached
in
one
of
two
ways:
(1)
conducting
surveys
of actual
whistleblowers,
or
(2)
using
scenarios, interviews,
or
survey-based
methods
to
ascertain
when
an
observer
of
organizational
wrongdoing
will
be
likely
to
blow the whistle
or
will
report
the intention
to
make
a
claim.
Specifically,
while
some
authors have been
successful
in
gaining
access
to
actual
whistleblowers,
others have
resorted
to
drawing
conclusions
about
the
whistleblowing
process
using
reports
of
whistleblowing
intentions.
In
the first
case,
actual
whistleblowers have
observed
a
transgression,
made
the decision
to
report
it,
and then
actually
followed
through
in
making
a
claim.
Likely
or
intended
whistleblowers,
on
the other
hand,
have been
given
information
about
a
wrongdoing
(whether
real
or
fictitious)
and have
reported
either
how
likely
they
would
be
to
blow
the
whistle
or
whether
they
intended blow
the whistle
at
some
fu
ture
time.
The
obvious difference
between
these
ap
proaches
is
that intended
whistleblowers
have
not
actually
followed
through
with
blowing
the
whistle.
Researchers
have
justified
using
data
gained
from
intended rather
than actual
whistleblowers
by
(1)
citing
the
difficulty
of
carrying
out
investigations
into unethical
conduct
in
actual
organizations
(e.g.,
Chiu,
2003), (2)
suggesting
that actual
whistle
blowers
censor
the
information
they
provide
to
investigators
due
to
the
perception
that
data
gath
ered
in
actual
organizations
precludes
their
confi
dentiality
or
anonymity
(e.g.,
Sims
and
Keenan,
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Whistleblowing
and Retaliation
279
1998), (3)
iUuminating
the
difficulty
of
locating
actual whistleblowers for
questioning,
or
(4)
citing
the
inherently
flawed
nature
of
such
data
(e.g.,
self
reports
of
past
events).
While
we
believe these
concerns to
be
valid,
we
also
believe
that conclu
sions drawn based on testimonies of actual whis
tleblowers
wiU be different than those from
likely
whistleblowers.
The real
question,
however,
is how
different
wiU
these
conclusions
be.
SpecificaUy,
are
the correlates
of
actual
whistleblowing
similar
en
ough
to
those
of
likely/intended whistleblowing
to
warrant
firm
conclusions
about
the
whistleblowing
process?
Or,
given
the
nature
of
whistleblowing
as
a
behavior
(rather
than
an
attitude
or
intention),
is
the distance between
whistleblowing
intent and
actual
whistleblowing (e.g., deciding
to
blow
the
whistle, accessing the internal
or
external channel,
making
a
claim of
wrongdoing, supplying
the
necessary
evidence)
so
great
as
to
void direct
comparison?
Research
on
the
intention-behavior
relationship
suggests
only
a
weak
relationship
between
the
intention
to act
and the
actual
per
formance
of
a
behavior
(MiUer
and
Grush,
1988).
In
fact,
measures
of behavioral intentions have
ac
counted
for,
at
most,
10%
ofthe
variance
in
overt
behaviors
(e.g.,
MitcheU,
1974).
Further,
the
intention-behavior
relationship
is
thought
to
be
even
weaker
for
some
behaviors
(i.e.,
those
behaviors that
may
be
governed
more
heavily by
subjective
norms
and external
support,
like whis
tleblowing;
e.g.,
MiUer and
Grush,
1988; MitcheU,
1974).
According
to
Bagozzi's
(1992)
Volitional
Model
of
Goal
Directed
Behaviors,
behavioral
intention and
overt
action
are
separated by
extensive
psychological,
motivational,
and
imple
mentation
processes
(i.e.,
planning, monitoring
activities,
guidance
and
control,
psychological
commitment,
effort).
This
suggests
there
may
be
multiple phases
involved
in
moving
from
an
awareness
of
an
iUegitimate
practice,
to
the decision
to
blow the
whistle,
to
actuaUy
making
a
claim.
Correlates of
whistleblowing
Below
we
review
research
resulting
from
both
reports
of
whistleblowing
intent
and
whistleblowing
action.
Researchers
have
examined
the
same
sets
of
variables
in studies of intended and
actual whistleblowers
(i.e.,
relating
to
aspects
of the
whistleblower,
context,
and
wrongdoing potentially predictive
of
whistleblowing
intention/action).
A
qualitative
review
of
the whis
tleblowing
process
yields relatively
consistent
findings
resulting
from
each
approach.
However,
a
cursory
examination of their results suggests stronger rela
tionships
may
exist
between
key
variables and whis
tleblowing
intentions
than
whistleblowing
actions.
Given
that
whistleblowing
behavior
may
be
heavily
governed by subjective
norms
and
external
supports,
it
stands
to reason
that the
relationship
between inten
tion
and
action
may
be
even
lower
for
whistleblowing
than
other
actions.
Using
a
meta-analytic
approach,
we
examine
correlates
of
whistleblowing
intent and
actual
whisdeblowing separately
so as to
lend
a
greater
understanding
of
their
common
relation
to
predictors
and correlates. We hope to identify the relationship
between
whistleblowing
intent and
whistleblowing
action,
so
that
research
may
be
better informed
as to
the
applicability
of data
regarding
whistleblowing
inten
tions
to
conclusions about
whisdeblowing
actions.
Whistleblower characteristics
A
variety
of
personal
characteristics related
to
the
decision
to
engage
in
whistleblowing
have
been
examined: whistleblower demographics (i.e., age,
sex,
level
of
education,
level of
job
held,
etc.),
personality
variables
(i.e.,
locus of
control),
morality
(i.e.,
ethical
judgment),
and
other characteristics
(i.e.,
job performance, organizational
commitment,
role
responsibility, approval
of
whistleblowing;
e.g.,
Brief
and
Motowidlo,
1986;
Near
and
Miceli,
1996).
While results
seem
to
differ
slightly
across
studies,
whistleblowers
(as
compared
with
inactive
observ
ers)
tend
to
have
good
job
performance,
to
be
more
highly
educated,
to
hold
higher-level
or
supervisory
positions,
to
score
higher
on
tests
of
moral
reasoning,
and
to
value
whistleblowing
in
the face of unethical
behavior
(e.g.,
Brabeck, 1984;
Miceli
and
Near,
1984;
Near
and
Miceli,
1996;
Sims
and
Keenan,
1998).
Also,
it
appears
that
whistleblowers
are
more
likely
(than
inactive
observers)
to
report
a
role
related
responsibility
or
obligation
to
blow the whistle
(e.g.,
Near and
Miceli,
1996).
Age
and
organizational
tenure
as
predictors
of
whistleblowing
have
yielded
mixed results
(e.g.,
Near
and
Miceli,
1996;
Sims and
Keenan,
1998).
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280
Jessica
R.
Mesmer-Magnus
and
Chockalingam
Viswesvaran
Empirical
findings
regarding
the
personal
corre
lates of
whistleblowing
intentions and actions
are
typicaUy
interpreted
through
the lens of
social?psychological
theories of
behavior
(cf.
Casal
and
Zalkind,
1995;
EUis and
Arieli,
1999;
Miceli and
Near, 1994;
2002;
Near
and
Miceli,
1995).
For
example,
HoUander's
(1958)
idiosyncrasy
model
suggests
that
those individuals
who
are
considered
to
be the
best contributors
to
group
and
organizational
objectives
(i.e.,
have
high job
performance)
wiU be
given
greater
leeway
to
deviate
from
group
or
organizational
norms.
SpecificaUy, employees
with
good job performance
wiU
be
more
likely
to
have
accumulated
idiosyncrasy
credits
(interpersonal
bonuses)
within the
organization,
thus
providing
some
latitude
to
report
wrongdoing
without suffer
ing
retaliation,
and
more
importantly,
to
effect
the
desired
change (e.g.,
Miceli
et
al.,
1991a).
Similarly,
Pheffer
and
Salancik's
(1978)
Resource
Dependence
Theory
posits
that when
one
party
possesses
resources
upon
which
another
is
dependent,
that
party
wiU be
more
powerful.
Within
the
whistleblowing
context,
an
individual with
more
experience,
tenure,
and
better
job
performance
is
more
valuable
to
an
orga
nization,
thus
giving
them
some
leverage
to
report
misdeeds
(e.g.,
Miceli
and
Near,
2002).
Perceived
leverage
may
increase
whistleblowing
potential
and
action. Theories of
power
relationships (e.g.,
French
and
Raven,
1959) suggest
that individuals
gain
(and
exercise)
various
bases of
power
by possessing
valued
and
not
easfly replaceable
characteristics
(e.g.,
desired
or
unique
skiUs,
good job performance,
tenure
or
position
status,
credibility).
Thus,
whistleblowers
with better
job performance
and
tenure
are more
likely
to
be
successful
in
persuading
organizational
actors
to
stop
the undesirable
acts,
also
increasing
the
potential
they
wiU
report (or
intend
to
report)
a
transgression (e.g.,
Miceli
and
Near,
1994).
Organizational
employees
have three
options
to
address
an
unsatisfactory
situation
faced
within
an
organization:
(1)
to
exit the
organization,
(2)
voice
discontent
(i.e.,
blow
the
whistle),
or
(3)
remain
silent.
Employees
with
greater
tenure
are
more
in
vested
in
the
organization
and
may
prefer
voice
to
exit. This
is
also
congruent
with
predictions
from
theories
of
power
in
organizations,
where
employees
with
greater
tenure
may
have
greater
power
to
effect
change,
and
therefore
may
prefer
voice
to
exit
or
silence
(e.g.,
French
and
Raven,
1959).
In
a
similar
vein,
individuals
demonstrating higher
organizational
commitment
are more
invested
in
staying
with
the
organization,
therefore
are more
likely
to
blow
the
whistle rather
than
exit the
organization
(particularly
when the
prospect
of continued
wrongdoing
is
uncomfortable
or
unacceptable).
Thus,
theoretical
explanations
based
on
available
idiosyncrasy
credits,
power
relations,
voice-exit
choices,
and
control
theory
are
congruent
with
empirical
findings
that
older,
high performing,
more
committed
and
more
experienced employees
are more
likely
to
report
wrongdoing
in
and
by
organizations.
Contextual
variables
Compared
with the
personal
characteristics
of
whistleblowers,
contextual
variables
seem to
explain
more
variance
in
an
individual's
decision
to
blow
the
whistle
(e.g.,
Miceli
et
al.,
1991b;
Miceli and
Near,
1984;
Near and
Miceli,
1996).
Such
contextual
variables
may
include
supervisor
and
coworker
support,
organizational
climate,
threat
of
retaliation,
and size
of
organization.
Research
suggests
that
perceptions
of
supervisor
or
top
management
sup
port
are
instrumental
in
the decision
to
blow
the
whistle,
and
in
the determination
of
which
reporting
channel
wiU
be
employed
(i.e.,
internal
vs.
external
to
the
organization;
e.g.,
Keenan,
2000;
Sims
and
Keenan,
1998).
For
instance,
predictions
from Social
Exchange
Theory
(Thibaut
and
Kelley,
1959)
would
suggest
that
when
there
is
a
high
level
of
supervisor
and co-worker
support,
norms
of
reciprocity
will
develop
that channel
an
individual
to
use
internal
means to
effect
behavior
change
(before
making
the
charges public).
Other
contextual variables
are
also
worth
pursu
ing.
For
example,
whistleblowing
seems
to
be
greater
in
organizations
that
value
whistleblowing
and
in those
in which the
whistleblower
perceives
a
high
congruence
between
personal
and
organiza
tional values
(Berry,
2004;
Near
and
Miceli,
1996).
This is in
accordance
with
Enz's
(1988)
theory
of
value
congruence.
Similarly, potential
whistleblow
ers
who
perceive
a
threat
of retaliation
(by
the
organization,
immediate
supervisors,
or
co-workers)
are
much less
likely
to
blow
the whistle
than
those
who do
not
perceive
a
retaliatory
climate
(Keenan,
1995;
King,
1999;
Near
and
Miceli,
1996).
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Whistleblowing
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Retaliation
281
Characteristics
of wrong-doing
Evidence
suggests
that characteristics of
the
wrong
doing
(i.e.,
perceived
severity
of
the
wrongdoing,
evidence
of
wrongdoing)
and/or characteristics
of
the wrong-doer (i.e., likeability of or closeness to the
wrongdoer)
may
have
significant
implications
in
the
decision
to
blow the whistle.
Wrongdoing
type
and
perceived severity
has
been found
to
be
moderately
positively
related
to
whistleblowing
(Miceli
and
Near, 1985;
Near
and
Miceli,
1996).
There
is
also
a
tradition of research
in
whistleblowing
that addresses
whether
the
wrongdoing
is
sufficiently
costly
to
warrant
pursuit.
Thus,
it has been
suggested
that
potential
whistleblowers look for
materiality
(as
auditors
do)
before
embarking
on
any
actions.
Similarly, organization members seem to be more
likely
to
blow the
whistle
on
organization
wrong
doing
when
they
have
convincing
evidence of
the
wrongdoing,
and
when the
transgression
personaUy
affects them
(Miceli
and
Near,
1985).
The latter
finding parallels
the research
on
the
bystander
effect
in
explaining prosocial
behavior: due
to
a
diffusion of
responsibility,
individuals
are
less
likely
to
help
when
several others
are
present
(Latane
and
Darley,
1970).
On the
other
hand,
to
the
extent
strong
norms
of
reciprocity
develop
and
social
sup
port is high between organizational members,
wrongdoing
that
harms
the
organization
and/or
co-workers
is
more
likely
to
be
reported (especially
using
internal
channels).
Interestingly,
in
organiza
tions that
depend
upon
the
continuation of the
wrongdoing,
whistleblowers
are more
likely
to
select
external
reporting
channels rather than
attempt
to
make
an
internal claim
(Miceli
and
Near,
1985).
This
relationship
appears
to
be
especially
strong
when
the
whistleblower
is
fearful
of
retaliation
by
the
organization,
supervisors,
or
coworkers
(Miceli
and
Near, 1985).
Retaliation
against
whistleblowers
Once
an
organization
member has blown the whistle
on
an
organizational
wrongdoing,
management
may
make
two
types
of
decisions:
(1)
whether
to
disre
gard
the claim
or
take
appropriate
action,
and
(2)
whether
to
reward
or
retaliate
against
the
whistle
blower
(Near
and
Miceli,
1986).
It
is assumed
that
a
whistleblower's
experiences
(perceived
or
actual,
reward
or
retaliation)
foUowing
a
whistleblowing
event
wiU
have
strong
effects
on
others'
wiUingness
and likelihood
to
blow
the
whistle
in the
future
(Casal and Zalkind, 1995; Miceli and Near, 1992).
LogicaUy,
organizational
response
to
whistleblower
action
depends
in
part upon
whether
management
agrees
with
the merit of the
claim
and
with the
whistleblower's
obligation
to
take
action
(Parmer
lee
et
al.,
1982).
Under
circumstances where
an
organization
is
dependent
upon
the continuation of
the
wrongdoing
or
when
they
are
not
dependent
upon
the whistleblower
(e.g.,
Resource
Depen
dence
Theory;
Pheffer
and
Salancik,
1978),
the
organization
is
more
likely
to
retaliate
against
the
whistleblower and continue the wrongdoing (Near
and
Miceli,
1986).
Retaliation
may
take
many
forms,
ranging
from
attempted
coercion of
the
whistleblower
to
with
draw
accusations of
wrongdoing
to
the
outright
exclusion
of
the
whistleblower
from
the
organiza
tion
(e.g.,
Parmerlee
et
al.,
1982).
Other
retaliatory
acts
may
include
organizational
steps
taken
to
undermine the
complaint
process,
isolation of
the
whistleblower,
character
defamation,
imposition
of
hardship
or
disgrace
upon
the
whistleblower,
exclusion from meetings, elimination of perquisites,
and other forms
of discrimination
or
harassment
(e.g.,
Parmerlee
et
al.,
1982).
RetaUatory
acts
may
be
motivated
by
the
organization's
desire
to
(1)
sUence
the
whisdeblower
completely,
(2) prevent
a
full
pubUc
knowledge
ofthe
complaint,
(3)
discredit
the
whistleblower,
and/or
(4)
discourage
other
potential
whistleblowers
from
taking
action
(MiceU
and
Near,
1994;
Parmerlee
et
al.,
1982).
Retaliation is
not
always
initiated
by
organiza
tional
top
management.
Rather,
isolated
acts
of
retaliation may be initiated by the whistleblower's
supervisor
or
coworkers
with
or
without
(formal
or
informal)
sanctioning
by
top
management.
Super
visors
may
be motivated
to
retaliate
against
whis
tleblowers
for
a
variety
of
reasons,
but
they
frequently
do
so
out
of
fear
that
a
whistleblowing
claim
signals
their
inability
to
maintain
order and
compliance
within
their
departments,
or
the fear that
valid
complaints
wiU
result in
the restriction
or
cessation
of
their
own
operations
or
influence
(O'Day,
1972;
Parmerlee
et
al.,
1982).
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282
Jessica
R.
Mesmer-Magnus
and
Chockalingam
Viswesvaran
Correlates of retaliation
against
whistleblowers
Predictors
or
correlates
of retaliation
against
whis
tleblowers
fall
into
one
of four broad
categories:
(1)
characteristics of the whistleblower, (2) actions taken
by
the
whistleblower
in
reporting
organizational
wrongdoing,
(3)
situational
or
environmental
vari
ables
related
to
the
organization,
and
(4)
character
istics
of
the
wrongdoing
or
wrongdoer.
Characteristics
of
the whistleblower
Characteristics of the
whistleblower examined
in
relation
to
retaliation include whistleblower
age,
education
level,
job
level,
role
responsibility,
and
value
congruence
with
the
organization.
While
demographic
characteristics
of
whistleblowers
are
thought
to
be less
predictive
of retaliation than
are
contextual
variables
(Miceli
and
Near,
2002),
research
suggests
that individuals who blow the whistle be
cause
it
is their
job
to
do
so
(e.g.,
audit
or
role
responsibility)
are
less
likely
to
be
retaliated
against
and
are more
likely
to
be
successful
in
stopping
the
transgression (e.g.,
Casal
and
Zalkind, 1995;
Miceli
and
Near,
2002).
Further,
Parmerlee
and
coUeagues
(1982)
found
preliminary
evidence that
older
whistleblowers
are more
likely
to
be retaliated
against
than
are
younger
whistleblowers.
Interestingly,
their
results also
suggest
that whistleblowers that
are
valuable
to
their
organization
(e.g.,
due
to
age,
experience,
education,
job
level)
are
more
likely
to
be
retaliated
against
as
compared
to
less valuable whistleblowers.
Perhaps,
for
older
individuals
and those
at
higher
job
levels and with
more
experience,
greater
organiza
tional
loyalty
is
expected.
When
such
individuals
blow the
whistle,
other
organizational
members
may
feel
a
greater
sense
of
betrayal,
thus
paving
the
way
for
more
retaliatory
behaviors.
This is
especially
true
when
external channels
are
employed
to
report
vio
lations.
Norms of
reciprocity
and
notions of
perceived
justice
violations
(however
misguided)
appear
to
predict
retaliation.
Theories of
power
also
suggest
that
whisdeblowers
at
higher job
levels,
who
are
expected
to
enforce the
power
structure,
upon
violating
this
mandate
are more
likely
to
suffer retaliation. On the
other
hand,
individuals
at
lower
levels of
the
organiza
tional
structure
may
have
lesser
power,
thus
being
easy
targets
for
retaliation.
FinaUy,
evidence
suggests
that
whistleblowers
whose values
regarding
right
and
wrong
are
not
congruent
with
those
of
the
organization,
are
more
likely
to
be retaliated
against
(Miceli
and
Near,
1994),
presumably
because
organization
top
man
agement does not deem the wrongdoing to be as
severe as
is
perceived
by
the
whistleblower,
thus
casting
doubt
on
the
merit
ofthe whistleblower's
complaint.
Actions
taken
by
the
whistleblower
Some
researchers have examined
whether
specific
actions
taken
by
a
whistleblower influence the de
gree
to
which
they
are
retaliated
against (e.g.,
whether
the whistleblower used
an
internal
or
external channel
to
report
wrongdoing,
whether the
whistleblower
attempted
to
remain
anonymous
during
the
whistleblowing
process,
how successful
the
whistleblower
was
in
ultimately curbing
the
organizational
wrongdoing,
and
even
whether
others
in
the
organization
ignored
wrongdoing).
Indeed,
research
suggests
that
when
whistleblowers
report
wrongdoing
via external
channels,
they
are
more
likely
to
receive
retaliation,
and such retalia
tion
is
likely
to
be
more severe
than when internal
channels
are
utilized
(Near
and
Miceli,
1986).
Starting
with Weber
(1947)
and Barnard
(1938),
organizations
have relied
on
the
concept
of
legiti
mate
authority.
Thus,
the
use
of external channels
is
more
likely
to
elicit
retaliatory
behaviors,
as
it
violates the
power
and
authority
structure
present
within
the
organization. Similarly,
whistleblowers
who
unsuccessfuUy attempted
to
remain
anonymous
during
the
whistleblowing
process
were more
likely
to
be
retaliated
against
(Miceli
and
Near,
1994).
Inconsistent results have
been
reported
regarding
the
effectiveness
of
the
whistleblower
in
curbing
wrongdoing
and
experience
of retaliation.
Specifi
caUy,
Miceli
and
Near
(2002)
report
that effective
whistleblowers
are
less
likely
to
experience
retaUation
unless the
supervisor
or
top management
simul
taneously
curbed
the
wrongdoing
and
retaliated
simply
for
blowing
the whistle. This
suggests
that
even
when the
transgression
is
agreed
to
be
harmful
and is
subsequently stopped,
some
organizations
are
particularly
sensitive
to
violations
of
the
authority
structure
via
whistleblowing.
This
seems
to
be
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Whistleblowing
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Retaliation
283
especiaUy likely
when
whistleblowers
have utilized
external channels.
Contextual variables
Context variables
examined
in
relation
to
retaliation
include
top management,
supervisor,
and coworker
support,
as
well
as
organizational
climate for whis
tleblowing.
While
lack
of
support
from
supervisors
and
top
management
is
likely
predictive
of
retalia
tion
against
whistleblowers,
coworker
support
does
not
appear
to
be related
to
perceived
or
experienced
retaliation
(Near
and
Miceli,
1986).
This
finding
is
likely
due
to
the low
occurrence
of
retaliation
ini
tiated
by
coworkers
(e.g.,
Miceli
and
Near,
1994).
However, this
finding
may be indicative of
organi
zational
norms
for
treatment
of whistleblowers.
SpecificaUy,
in
organizations
where
whistleblowing
is
not
sanctioned,
coworkers
are
likely
less
willing
to
offer
support
or
protection
from retaliation
to
a
whistleblower.
Characteristics
of
the
wrongdoing
Lastly,
in
addition
to
the
other
predictors
of retali
ation, researchers have examined
aspects
of the
wrongdoing
that
may
influence
retaliation
(e.g.,
frequency, severity,
and evidence of
wrongdoing).
Logic
suggests
that
when
wrongdoing
in
an
orga
nization is
widespread
or
when
the
organization
is
dependent
upon
the continuation of
wrongdoing,
the
organization's
top
management
would be
more
likely
to
lash
out
at
individuals who blow
the
whistle
(Casal
and
Zalkind,
1995).
However,
Near
and
Miceli
(1986)
found that
a
whistleblower's
report
of
(a)
multiple
incidents
of
wrongdoing,
(b)
multiple
individuals involved in the wrongdoing, or (c)
multiple
sources
of
evidence,
appear
unrelated
to
retaliation. This
could be
explained
in
terms
of
the
effort
needed
to
retaliate
against
a
whistleblower
with
strong
evidence of
wrongdoing,
particularly
when the
wrongdoing
is
widespread
and
impacts
multiple
individuals
(Parmerlee
et
al.,
1982).
In
sum,
our
first
purpose
in
conducting
this
re
search
was
to
investigate
the
antecedents
and
cor
relates of
whistleblowing,
and
to
determine
whether
these
were
different
for
whistleblowing
intent
versus
actual
behavior.
Our
second
purpose
in
conducting
the
present
study
was
to
examine
likely
antecedents
and
correlates
of
retaliation
against
whistleblowers,
and
to
determine
the
relative
importance
of each
variable
in
predicting
retaliation.
To
address these
questions,
meta-analytic
cumulation of the extant
literature
was
employed
to
summarize and
integrate
findings
from
individual studies.
Method
Database
One hundred and
ninety-three
correlations
from
26
samples
reported
in
21
articles
(total
N
=
18,781)
examining
whistleblowing (including
intent to blow
the
whistle,
likelihood of
blowing
the
whistle,
and
actual
whistleblowing,
both
via
internal and external
channels)
and
retaliation
against
whistleblowers
were
included
in
this
meta-analysis.
To
ensure a com
prehensive
search,
these studies
were
located
using
the
foUowing
strategies:
(1)
conducting
a
comput
erized
search
ofthe
Psyclnfo
(1887
to
present)
and
ABI
Inform
(1971
to
present)
databases,
using
appropriate
keywords
and
phrases
(e.g.,
whistleblow
ing,
blowing
the
whistle,
organizational
wrongdoing,
retaliation, dissent,
counterproductive
behavior,
corruption),
(2)
conducting
a
manual search
of
references cited
in
studies
included
in
this
meta-analysis
and cited
in
this
manuscript,
(3)
snowbaUing
references
cited
in
recently
published
reviews of
the
whistleblowing
literature
(e.g.,
Gundlach
et
al., 2003;
Miceli
et
al.,
1991b;
Near and
Miceli,
1995,
1996),
and
(4)
soliciting
relevant,
but
as
yet
unpublished,
research
from authors
at
the
2004 and 2005
meetings
of the
Society
of Industrial
Organizational
Psychology.
These
methods
yielded
an
initial
67
journal
articles, dissertations, and theses with the potential to
provide
usable
data.
An
attempt
was
made
to
obtain
aU
studies
identified.
When
a
manuscript
was
not
available
via
interlibrary
loan,
a
request
for
a
copy
was
sent
directly
to
the
study's primary
author.
Studies
were
included
only
if
they
reported
a
cor
relation
(or
an
effect
size
which
could
be converted
to
a
correlation
using
appropriate
conversion
for
mulas)
between
one
of
the
several
predictors
and
whistleblowing
(intent/likelihood
or
behavior)
or
instances of retaliation.
Studies
that
examined
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8/11/2019 Whistleblowing in Organization
9/22
284
fessica
R.
Mesmer-Magnus
and
Chockalingam
Viswesvaran
constructs
different
from
those
of interest
(e.g.,
perceptions
of
or
reactions
to
unethical
behaviors/
incidences other than those
of actual
or
intended
whistleblowing)
or
those that
reported
only
anec
dotal
data,
regression
coefficients,
or
other
effect
sizes not representative of a clean relationship
between
whistleblowing
intent/action
and
a
relevant
correlate,
were
not
code-able. When authors
reported
separate
correlations
for different
subgroups
(e.g.,
males and
females),
samples,
administrations
(as
in
a
longitudinal
study),
or measures
of the
same
construct,
those
correlations
were
examined
sepa
rately.
The studies included
in
this
meta-analysis
are
listed
in the references
prefixed
with
an
asterisk.
The
studies
included
in this
meta-analysis,
for the
most
part,
utilized
largely
male
samples
of
working
adults
(average ages between mid-1920's and late-1940's)
who
have
(or
could
have)
witnessed
and
reported
(or
considered
reporting)
organizational
wrongdoing
(i.e.,
internal
auditors,
military
and
government
employees,
accountants).
Experimental,
scenario
based,
and
survey-based
designs
were
utilized.
Coding procedure
The
first author
made
an
initial
independent
effort
to
code the 21 articles selected for inclusion in this
study.
A
random
subset
of
these
articles
was
coded
by
the
second author
in
an
effort
to
determine
coder
reliability.
Inter-coder
agreement
was
very
high,
likely
due
to
the
objective
nature
of the data coded.
In
reference
to
whistleblowing
intentions and
actions,
the
variables
coded included those related
to
(1)
the characteristics
of
a
whistleblower
(e.g.,
demographics,
like
age,
sex,
education,
tenure,
and
job
level,
and other
characteristics,
like ethical
judgment,
job
satisfaction,
job performance,
role
responsibility to blow the whistle, and approval of
whistleblowing),
(2)
the
context
in
which
whistle
blowing
takes
place
(e.g., organizational
climate for
whistleblowing,
fear
or
threat
of retaliation
against
whistleblowers,
organizational
size,
and
supervisor
and
co-worker
support),
and
(3)
the characteristics
of
the
wrongdoing
or
the
wrong-doer
(e.g.,
the
seri
ousness
of
the
wrongdoing,
the
amount
of evidence
of the
wrongdoing
possessed
by
the
whistleblower,
whether
the
whistleblower
was
effective
in
stopping
the
wrongdoing,
and the
degree
to
which
the
whistleblower works
near
or
closely
with
the
wrong-doer).
These correlates
were
coded
with
re
spect
to
whether
the
data
was
coUected
from in
tended
or
likely
whistleblowers
or
from
actual
whistleblowers.
Further,
the data
were
coded
with
respect to whether the whistleblower used (or in
tended
to
use)
an
internal
or
external
reporting
channel.
If
the
reporting
channel
was
not
specified
or was
mixed,
this
was
coded
separately.
Wrnle
we
had
hoped
to
be able
to
examine
correlations
be
tween
whistleblowing
correlates and
whistleblowing
intentions
and
behaviors
by
the
type
of
reporting
channel
employed
(intended),
there
was
an
insuffi
cient number of
studies
available
to
facilitate
this
specificity.
We chose instead
to
examine
the
rela
tionships
of
whistleblowing
correlates with
either
intentions or actions, regardless of reporting channel.
In
reference
to
correlates
of retaliation
against
whistleblowers,
the variables coded included those
related
to
the
(1)
characteristics of
a
whistleblower
(e.g.,
like
age,
education,
job
level,
role
responsi
bility
to
blow
the
whistle,
perceived
alternative
job
opportunities,
and
degree
to
which the whistle
blower
perceived
value
congruence
with the
orga
nization), (2)
actions taken
by
the whistleblower
in
reporting
an
organizational
wrongdoing
(e.g.,
utilizing
an
external
channel,
attempting
to
remain
anonymous during the whistleblowing process, and
success
in
stopping
the
wrongdoing),
(3)
contextual
variables
(e.g.,
supervisor
and co-worker
support),
and
(4)
characteristics
of
the
transgression (e.g.,
frequency
of
wrongdoing
in the
organization,
the
severity
of the
transgression,
and the
amount
of
evidence about the
wrongdoing possessed
by
the
whistleblower).
Analysis
The
meta-analytic
methods
outUned
by
Hunter
and
Schmidt
(2004)
were
employed
to
analyze
this data.
The
three
outcomes
investigated
are
(1)
intent
to
blow the
whistle,
(2)
whistle-blowing
behavior,
and
(3)
retaliation
experienced.
Each
set
of
bivariate
correlations
(between
a
predictor
and
outcome)
were
analyzed separately.
The
sample-size weighted
mean
observed
correlation and
the
sample-size
weighted
standard deviation
of
the
observed
corre
lations
were
computed.
These
two
estimated
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10/22
Whistleblowing
and Retaliation
285
parameters
provide
a
distribution
of the observed
effect
sizes.
Unfortunately,
insufficient
information
was
available
to
correct
for
unreliability
in
the
measures.
This
concern
is
mitigated
to
some
extent
by
the
objective
nature
of
some
ofthe
predictors
included (e.g., gender, tenure). To the extent sta
tistical artifacts
like
unreliability
and
range
restriction
in the
measures
affect the
results,
our
reported
findings
underestimate
the
true
magnitude
ofthe
correlations and overestimate the true
variability
across
studies.
Note,
however,
that
our
analyses
are
conservative
in
that
true
correlations
wiU
actuaUy
be
higher
and
we are more
likely
to
consider
potential
moderators
(even
when their
effects
are
weak).
The
sampling
error
variance
associated with
the
mean
observed
correlation
was
computed
(Hunter
and Schmidt, 2004) and subtracted from the
observed
variance.
The
resulting
residual variance
was
used
to
compute
the confidence
intervals
around the observed
mean.
The
percent
of observed
variance
attributable
to
sampling
error
was
also
computed. UsuaUy,
if
60%
or more
of the observed
variance is
attributable
to
sampling
error,
one
can
assume
that
variance
across
studies
due
to
uncor
rected artifacts
like
unreliability
and
range
restriction
in
the
measures
correlated
can
explain
the
remaining
variability.
Such
a
finding
suggests
that the
rela
tionship generalizes
or
transports
across
contexts.
Thus,
our
analyses
could be construed
to
be
a
bare
bones
meta-analysis
(Hunter
and
Schmidt,
2004).
We
report
for each
meta-analysis,
the
number
of
correlations
included
(k),
the
total
sample
size
across
all
estimates
(N),
the
sample-size weighted
mean
observed
correlation
(r),
the
sample-size weighted
standard deviation
(SDr),
the
sampling
error
standard
deviation,
the residual standard
deviation
(resSD),
the
percent
of
observed
variance attributable
to
sampling
error,
and
the
95%
confidence interval
around the
sample-size weighted
mean
observed
correlation.
For
studies with
a
mean
observed
cor
relation
of
greater
than
0.05,
we
conducted
a
file
drawer
analysis
(Hunter
and
Schmidt,
2004),
and
provide
a
file
drawer
fe ,
which
represents
the
number
of
missing
studies
averaging
nuU
results
required
to
reduce
our
reported sample-size
weighted
mean
observed
correlation
to
0.05.
For
the
most
part,
we
conducted
meta-analyses
only
when
a
minimum
of three
studies
reporting
a
relationship
between
whistleblowing
intent/action
and
a
relevant
correlate
were
available.
However,
given
that
one
of the
purposes
of this
study
was
to
compare
conclusions drawn from
reports
of whis
tleblowing
intentions with those
drawn
from
reports
of
whistleblowing
actions,
in
cases
where fewer
than
three studies were available examining a compari
son
relationship
of
interest
(i.e.,
a
sufficient number
of
studies
were
available
to
meta-analyze
the rela
tionship
between
a
correlate
and
either whistle
blowing
intention
or
whistleblowing
action,
and
less
than three
were
available for the other
relevant
meta
analysis),
we
report
the results
of the other
relation
ship
for
purposes
of
description
and
comparison.
Results
The
results of
the
meta-analysis
of
correlations
between whistleblower
characteristics and whistle
blowing
intentions
(Intent
WB)
and
actions
(Actual
WB)
are
presented
in
Table
I.
Results indicate that
older
employees
are more
likely
to
intend
to
blow the
whistle
than
are
younger
employees
(r
=
0.19).
Unfortunately,
no
studies
examining
age
and actual
whistleblowing
were
located,
so we
cannot
be
sure
whether
this
relationship
translates
to
actual
whistle
blowers.
Sex and
tenure
appear
to
be related
to
actual
whistleblowing (r
=
0.13 and 0.10, respectively), but
not to
whistleblowing
intent.
Specifically,
females
and
more
tenured
employees
appear
to
be
slightly
more
likely
to
actually
blow the whistle.
Job
level
appears
to
have
a
similar
relationship
with whistle
blowing
intentions
(r
=
0.10)
as
with
actual
whistle
blowing.
These
results
support
the
contention
that
older
employees
with
greater
tenure
and
at
higher
levels
are
more
likely
to
have
the
commitment and
power
to
employ
voice rather than
exit
mechanisms.
More
interesting
than the
demographic
charac
teristics of whistleblowers
were
the results related
to
other
whistleblower
characteristics
and
intent
or
actual
whistleblowing.
Specifically,
ethical
judgment,
while
moderately
related
to
the
intent
to
blow the
whistle
(r
?
0.45),
is
not
related
to
actual whistle
blowing
(r
=
-0.08).
Similarly,
while role
responsi
bility,
approval
of
whistleblowing,
and
perceptions
that
blowing
the
whistle
would
be in one's
best
interests,
appear
to
be
predictive
of
the
intent
to
blow
the
whistle
(r
=
0.15, 0.44,
and
0.31,
respec
tively), they
do
not
appear
to
be related
to
actual
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8/11/2019 Whistleblowing in Organization
11/22
286
Jessica
R.
Mesmer-Magnus
and
Chockalingam
Viswesvaran
TABLE I
Correlations
between
Whistleblower Characteristics
and
Whistleblowing
Intentions and
Actions
Meta-analysis
k
N
r
SDr
SESD
resSD
%SEV
95%CI
File
drawer k
Whistleblower Action
demographics
Age
Intent WB 3 1279
0.19 0.1902 0.0457
0.1847
5.77 -0.17/0.55
9
Actual
WB
------
--
Sex
Intent
WB
2
1131
-0.05 0.0866
0.0414 0.0760
22.93
-0.20/0.09
-
Actual
WB 4
1707 0.13 0.0368 0.0460
0
100
0.13/0.13
7
Education
Intent WB
3
1667 0.02
0.0867
0.0418 0.0759
23.32 -0.13/0.17
-
Actual
WB 6 7851 0.02 0.0619
0.0275
0.0555
19.76 -0.09/0.12
-
Tenure
Intent WB
3
1563 0.02 0.0651
0.0436 0.0483
44.93
-0.07/0.12
-
Actual
WB
2
1383
0.10 0.0100 0.0376 0
100 0.10/0.10
2
Job
level
Intent WB
4
1938
0.10 0.1164 0.0439 0.1078 14.22
-0.11/0.31 4
Actual
WB
8
9200 0.08 0.0320
0.0293 0.0130 83.56 0.05/0.10 5
Other characteristics Action
Ethical
judgment
Intent WB 4 1147 0.45 0.0707
0.0472
0.0527
44.49
0.35/0.56
32
Actual
WB
2
320
-0.08 0.1669
0.0695 0.1518
17.32 -0.38/0.22
2
Job
satisfaction
Intent WB
2
838
-0.01 0.0503
0.0487
0.0128 93.58
-0.03/0.02
-
Actual
WB
2 1164 0.19 0.0300
0.0399
0
100
0.19/0.19
6
Organizational
Intent
WB 8
2170 0.03 0.0637
0.0603 0.0202 89.89
-0.01/0.07
-
commitment Actual
WB
------
__
_
Job performance
Intent WB
2
1315
0.05 0
0.0389
0
-
0.05/0.05
Actual
WB
2
1401
0.11 0.0156 0.0373
0 100 0.11/0.11
3
Role
responsibility
Intent
WB
4
1494
0.15
0.1556
0.0474 0.1482
9.28
-0.14/0.44
8
Actual
WB 6 7762
0.06 0.1048 0.0274 0.1011 6.85
-0.14/0.26
2
Approve
of
Intent WB 6 2143 0.44 0.1406 0.0394
0.1349 7.86 0.18/0.71
47
whistleblowing Actual WB 2 5514 0.06 0.0200 0.0190 0.0064 89.92 0.05/0.07 1
Notes: k
=
number of studies included
in
the
meta-analysis;
N
=
total number of
participants
across
studies included
in
the
meta-analysis;
r
=
sample-size
weighted
mean
observed
correlation;
SDr
=
tandard
deviation of
sample-size weighted
mean
observed
correlation;
SESD
=
standard
error
of
the
standard
deviation;
resSD
=
residual standard
deviation;
%SEV
=
percent
variance due
to
sampling
error;
95%
CI
=
95%
confidence interval
formed around the
sample-size
weighted
mean
observed correlation
(the
number
before the slash indicates the lower bound
and the number after
the
slash indicates the
upper bound);
File drawer
k
indicates the
number of
missing
studies
averaging
nuU results
required
to
reduce the
mean
observed correlation
to
0.05.
Intent WB indicates
participants
indicated
they
intended
or were
likely
to
blow
the
whistle
on
a
wrongdoing;
Actual
WB indicates
participants actuaUy
blew the
whistle
on a
wrongdoing.
whistleblowing behavior (r
=
0.06, 0.06, and 0.04).
Conversely,
while
job
satisfaction and
job perfor
mance
relate
to
actual
whistleblowing
(r
?
0.19
and
0.11,
respectively),
they
are
unrelated
to
whistle
blowing
intentions
(r
=
?0.01 and
0.05,
respec
tively).
Finally, organizational
commitment
does
not
appear
to
be
related
to
either
whistleblowing
inten
tions
or
actual
whistleblowing.
It
should be
noted,
that
while
our
analysis
suggests
that
role
responsibility
is
unrelated
to
actual
whistleblowing
behavior,
it
is
possible
that
this
relationship
may
be
moderated
by
the whistleblowing channel used. Specifically,
the
data
included
in
our
analysis
suggest
a
small,
but
positive
correlation
may
exist between role
respon
sibility
and
the
use
of
an
internal
reporting
channel,
while
no
(or
a
negative) relationship
may
exist
with
the
use
of
an
external
channel.
The
results
of the
meta-analytic
examination
of
correlations
between contextual
aspects
of the
whistleblowing
situation and
whistleblowing
inten
tions
(Intent WB)
and
actions
(Actual
WB)
are
presented
in
Table
II.
Organizational
climate for
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8/11/2019 Whistleblowing in Organization
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Whistleblowing
and
Retaliation 287
TABLE II
Correlations between contextual variables
and
whistleblowing
intentions
and
actions
Meta-analysis
k
N
r
SDr
SESD
resSD
%SEV
95%CI
File drawer
k
Contextual
variables
Action
Organizational
climate
Intent
WB
8
2947
0.28 0.1738 0.0457
0.1677 6.92 -0.05/0.61 37
for
whistleblowing
Actual WB
5 6960
0.10
0.0375
0.0263 0.0266
49.45
0.05/0.15
5
Threat
of
retaliation
Intent WB 7
2849
-0.27 0.1292
0.0459
0.1208 12.61
-0.51/-0.03
31
Actual
WB
8
11974 0.04 0.0907 0.0251 0.0872
7.65 -0.13/0.21
Supervisor
support
Intent WB 4 1443 0.28 0.0530 0.0484 0.0216 83.41
0.23/0.32
19
Actual WB
2
789 -0.12
0.0088
0.0495 0 100 -0.12/-0.12 3
Organizational
size Intent
WB
1
725
-0.10
-
- -
- -
1
Actual
WB 5
5803
0.09
0.0783 0.0286 0.0729
13.34
-0.05/0.23
4
See
Note
to
Table
I.
TABLE
III
Correlations
between characteristics of the
wrongdoing/wrongdoer
and
whistleblowing
intentions
and
actions
Meta-analysis
k
N
r
SDr
SESD
resSD
%SEV 95% CI File drawer k
Wrongdoing/wrongdoer
Action
Seriousness of
Intent WB 7
3207
0.16
0.2642
0.0413 0.2609
2.44 -0.35/0.67 16
wrongdoing
Actual
WB 6 6460
0.13
0.0348
0.0299 0.0180
73.41 0.10/0.17 10
Evidence
of Intent WB
1
636 -0.06
- -
1
wrongdoing
Actual
WB 3 4759 0.06
0.0079
0.0250
0 100
0.06/0.06
1
Closeness
to
Intent WB 4
965
0.45
0.1768 0.0527 0.1687 8.88 0.12/0.78 32
wrongdoer
Actual WB
------ -- -
Effective
in
stopping
Intent
WB
------
-- -
wrongdoing
Actual
WB
3 1714 -0.07 0.0741 0.0410 0.0617 30.65
-0.19/0.05
2
See Note
to
Table
I.
whistleblowing
is
more
strongly
related
to
whistle
blowing
intentions
than
actual
whistleblowing,
but
the
direction of
the
relationship
is
consistent
(r
=
0.28 and
0.10,
respectively).
Of
greater
interest
is
that threat of
retaliation is
negatively
related
to
the
intent
to
blow the
whistle,
but
appears
to
be
unre
lated
to
actual
whistleblowing
behaviors
(r
=
?0.27
and
0.04,
respectively).
Also
intriguing
is
the
finding
that
supervisor
support
is
positively
related
to
whistleblowing
intent
(r
=
0.28),
but
negatively
related
to
actual
whistleblowing
(r
?
?0.12),
sug
gesting
that
supervisor
support
may
facilitate
one's
decision
to
blow the
whistle,
but
work
to
inhibit
behaviors
required
to
actuaUy
blow
it.
The
results of
the
meta-analysis
of correlations
between
characteristics
of
the
wrongdoing
and of
the
wrong-doer
and
whistleblowing
intentions
(Intent WB)
and
actions
(Actual
WB)
are
presented
in
Table III.
We
found
similar smaU
relationships
between
seriousness of
the
wrongdoing
and whis
tleblowing
intentions
and
actions
(r
=
0.16 and
0.13,
respectively). Importantly,
the
observed correlations
used
to
compute
the
relationship
between
severity
of
the
transgression
and
whistleblowing
intent
varied
widely
in
magnitude, potentially signaling
the
pres
ence
of
a
moderator.
Of
interest
is the
moderate
effect size found for the
relationship
between
closeness
to
the
wrong-doer
and
intent
to
blow
the
whistle
(r
=
0.45);
this
finding
suggests
that the
closer the
potential
whistle-blower
is
to
the
wrong
doer
(whether
interpersonally
or
with
respect
to
organizational
structure),
the
greater
their
intention
to
blow
the whistle
on
the
transgression.
Unfortu
nately,
similar
data
was
not
available
for actual
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8/11/2019 Whistleblowing in Organization
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288
Jessica
R.
Mesmer-Magnus
and
Chockalingam
Viswesvaran
whistleblowing,
so we
do
not
know
if
this rela
tionship
wiU
generalize.
Also
noteworthy
is
the
smaU
negative
correlation
found
between actual
whistle
blowing
and
the
whistleblower's
success
in
stopping
the
wrongdoing
(r
=
?0.07).
This
finding
suggests
that whistleblowers are not frequently successful in
their efforts
to
curb
organizational
wrongdoing.
It
is
worth
noting,
however,
that
aU
correlations included
in
this
computation
reflect the
success
of
whistle
blowers
who
utilized
an
external
reporting
channel.
Lastly,
displayed
in Table
IV
are
the results of the
meta-analysis
of
correlates of
retaliation
against
whistleblowers. Information
is
arranged
according
to
the four
types
of
correlates
examined
(1)
character
istics of the
whistleblower,
(2)
actions
taken
by
the
whistleblower,
(3)
contextual
variables,
and
(4)
characteristics of the wrongdoing. Education, job
level,
and the
role-prescribed responsibility
to
blow
the whistle
appear
to
be
relatively
unrelated
to
retaliation
against
whistleblowers
(r
=
0.04, ?0.07,
and
?0.07,
respectively).
While
smaU
relationships,
it
is
import