which electoral reform options support women’s equality & … · ! 1!...
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A PREFERENCE FOR EqualityWhich Electoral Reform Options Support Women’s Equality & Greater Diversity?
A Gender & Diversity Analysis of Electoral Options
PEI Advisory Council on the Status of Women & PEI Coalition for Women in GovernmentSeptember 2016 A
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Between October 29 and November 7, 2016, Prince Edward Island citizens age 16 and older have the opportunity to vote in a history-‐making plebiscite on the way we vote. Voters will be asked to rank five electoral options, including the current voting system, from their most preferred to their least preferred. Some of the systems are familiar; some are new. All have positive elements that support many fundamental democratic values. Each electoral option also has potential benefits and pitfalls for electing more women to government and increasing the diversity of our elected representatives. This document provides a gender and diversity analysis of the electoral systems. Gender and diversity analysis, GDA, is an evidence-‐based process to consider how policies and laws may affect people of different genders and diverse backgrounds differently. Gender and diversity analysis begins from a recognition that people of different genders and people from diverse groups experience the world differently and unequally; under-‐represented groups may have different needs from the mainstream. Gender and diversity analysis examines ways to accommodate differences and needs to reduce disadvantages, so that there is greater potential for equitable outcomes for all. Examining the electoral options with gender and diversity in mind provides a helpful lens for citizens to weigh the options against their democratic values. Ranking the electoral options is a challenging task that is well worth undertaking for PEI voters. We have a chance collectively to provide informed opinion to government about the way we vote.
SOME FACTS AND PREMISES
• Prince Edward Island women are under-‐represented in the provincial legislature, and an increased proportion of women MLAs is a worthwhile goal. Greater gender balance will better reflect the makeup of the Island population, will increase decision-‐makers’ access to women’s experiences and perspectives, and will make democracy more representative for everyone. In terms of women in government, Canada places 64th out of 190 countries.1 PEI currently places 11th out of 13 provinces and territories.2
• Studies everywhere in the world have shown that decision-‐making has better outcomes when decisions are made by gender-‐mixed groups.3
• The percentage of women in government in PEI and Canada has hit a seeming plateau, with little opportunity for “natural” growth. Without changes to current systems, experts estimate it will take almost 90 years for women to reach gender parity.4
• In addition to women being under-‐represented, the Prince Edward Island legislature is not diverse enough, and many groups are historically and currently under-‐represented, including youth, people of colour, Aboriginal people, Francophone Acadians, newcomers to Canada, LGBTQ community members, people with disabilities, and many other groups.
• The representation of women who are also from diverse groups is particularly low. For example, women who are also people of colour face the barriers that apply to both groups. (Many diversities are intersectional.)5
• Prince Edward Island voters do not discriminate against women at the polls. Women are elected or not elected in measure with the parties they are running for: more win when their parties win, and more lose when their parties lose.6
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• The biggest barrier to women being elected in Prince Edward Island is getting the nomination to run.7
• Some parties have a better track record of nominating women than others; smaller parties have been more likely to nominate women than the two larger, more dominant parties.8
• With the notable exception of Catherine Callbeck, women have only been provincial party leaders when parties were building support or rebuilding support after a collapse.9
• There are few legislated or regulatory incentives or supports in place to reduce barriers for and to increase the number of women, diverse women, and other members of diverse communities to be elected.10
• Every electoral system, including the current one, includes some opportunities to reduce barriers and to increase supports for women, diverse women, and other members of diverse communities to be elected. However, these opportunities are not being pursued. Legislation, regulation, and voluntary actions are possible under every system. For example, every electoral option for PEI (including the current system) would allow legislation or regulations to require parties to set and meet targets for diversity.
• No electoral system is flawless. • Candidates and parties will change their campaign tactics in
both predictable and unpredictable ways when the electoral system changes.
• Voters will change their voting behaviour in both predictable and unpredictable ways when the electoral system changes.
• Some electoral systems have been shown to reduce barriers and disadvantages for women and diverse groups. This has been demonstrated in election results that show increases in diversity and greater gender balance.11
NOTES 1. Numbers courtesy of the Inter-‐Parliamentary Union. See
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-‐e/classif.htm. 2. Numbers courtesy of the PEI Coalition for Women in Government.
See http://www.womeningovernmentpei.ca/. 3. Margaret-‐Ann Armour, “Women in Leadership Today: How to Keep
Moving Forward.” (presentation at A Bold Vision Conference, Brudenell, PEI, September 25, 2014).
4. Equal Voice, “When It Comes to Gender Parity Better Is Always Possible,” available http://www.equalvoice.ca/news_article.cfm?id=1017.
5. John Crossley, “Getting Women’s Names on the Ballot: Women in Prince Edward Island Politics,” in Stalled: The Representation of Women in Canadian Government, ed. Jane Arscott et al. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 177.
6. PEI Coalition for Women in Government, “Research Findings and Conclusions Summary,” available http://www.womeningovernmentpei.ca/sitefiles/File/research/researchfindings.pdf.
7. See both Crossley and PEI Coalition for Women in Government, “Research Findings and Conclusions Summary.”
8. Analysis from the PEI Coalition for Women in Government. 9. Kirstin Lund, PEI Coalition for Women in Government, “Reflecting on
Olive Crane’s Victory,” in the Charlottetown Guardian, November 7, 2012, available http://www.theguardian.pe.ca/Opinion/Letter-‐to-‐editor/2012-‐11-‐07/article-‐3115066/Reflecting-‐on-‐Olive-‐Crane%26rsquo%3Bs-‐victory/1.
10. In 2008 government amended the Election Act, mandating an election would be held every four years. See http://www.gov.pe.ca/law/statutes/pdf/e-‐01_1.pdf. Research shows that fixed election dates are beneficial in helping women prepare to run and helping parties recruit women candidates. In response to recommendations by the PEI Coalition for Women in Government, a legislative calendar was created to help MLA’s plan their time around days the legislature may meet, and days upon which they may not meet. See http://www.assembly.pe.ca/calendar/.
11. “Proportional Representation and Women,” Fair Vote Canada, accessed September 18, 2016, http://campaign2015.fairvote.ca/women/.
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Factors that might promote an increased number of women, diverse women, and/or representatives of diverse groups
1 Is a system of proportional representation, in which the distribution of seats matches the popular vote Why? Because electoral systems worldwide that use proportional representation on average elect 8% more women
NO NO NO YES
✔ YES
✔
2 Would increase the likelihood of more women, diverse women, or diverse candidates being elected from smaller parties Why? Because smaller parties tend to nominate more women, more diverse women, and more diverse candidates overall – except as leaders
NO NO
NO YES
✔ YES
✔
3 Would promote an increase in collaborative processes in the Legislature Why? Because some women have described combative legislatures as a barrier to running, and some systems increase the likelihood of collaboration or a coalition being needed to advance an agenda
NO NO NO YES
✔ YES
✔
4 Would promote a decrease in partisan attacks in campaigns Why? Because the electoral system reduces rewards of negative campaigning
NO NO YES
✔ YES
✔ YES
✔ 5 Would require changes to the nomination process that could increase chances of women being nominated Why? Because getting the nomination is the main barrier to women being elected
NO NO NO NO YES
✔
6 Could reduce the need to legislate or otherwise mandate gender parity or increased diversity through incentives or disincentives for parties Why? Because the electoral system is susceptible to “contagion” effect that creates positive pressure for gender balance and diversity
NO NO NO NO YES
✔
7 Would naturally increase incentives and/or supports for women, diverse women, and members of diverse groups to be able to run What? Incentives like quotas, mandated targets, financial incentives; Supports like child/elder care, financial support, accessibility supports
NO NO NO NO NO
8 Would allow for voters to express their direct support for women candidates at the polls Why? Because research has shown voters do not discriminate against women at the polls; women fail or succeed in measure with their party
YES
✔ YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔ YES
✔
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1
Is a system of proportional representation, in which the distribution of seats matches the popular vote
NO NO
NO YES ✔
YES ✔
Around the world, proportional representation electoral systems elect on average 8% more women than first-‐past-‐the-‐post systems. A study by a Canadian researcher concluded that if Canada were to switch to a proportional representation voting system, then in the very next election our percentage of women MPs would jump by at least 10%.
FPTP is not a proportional representation electoral system. Under FPTP, the distribution of seats does not match the popular vote. Because the candidate with the most votes in each constituency gets the seat, parties that come first with a plurality or majority of votes get a bonus. Parties that rank second, third, or fourth are under-‐represented relative to the number of votes they receive.
FPTP+LEADERS is not a proportional representation electoral system. It is not a necessary first step towards proportionality.
On its own, PV is not an electoral system at all; it is a tool used in an electoral system. The PV being proposed for PEI is not going to be used in a proportional representation electoral system. It would be a new tool within the current winner-‐take-‐all system. It is not a necessary first step towards proportionality.
DMP is a system of proportional representation, in which the final distribution of seats matches the popular vote. DMP distributes two MLAs to each of 13 or 14 district seats across the province, based on both local and province-‐wide voting numbers. Electoral systems worldwide that use proportional representation on average elect 8% more women.
MMP is a system of proportional representation, in which the final distribution of seats matches the popular vote. MMP is a “mixed” system, with 2/3 district seats elected the same way we elect them today and 1/3 province-‐wide seats that balance the composition of the Legislature to match the province-‐wide popular vote. Electoral systems worldwide that use proportional representation on average elect 8% more women.
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2
Would increase the likelihood of more women, diverse women, or diverse candidates being elected from smaller parties
NO NO NO YES ✔
YES ✔
Due to a variety of factors, smaller parties in PEI have tended to nominate more women than the two main parties that have held power. Smaller parties have also nominated more diverse women and more diverse candidates overall – except as leaders.
FPTP reliably delivers seats to the two parties that have traditionally held power. Only one NDP MLA and one Green MLA have ever been elected.
FPTP+LEADERS may result in more frequent representation of smaller parties. However, political parties large and small have rarely had women as leaders, except in building phases (Sharon Labchuk, Green Party) and rebuilding phases (Pat Mella and Olive Crane, PC Party). Only Catherine Callbeck (Liberal Party) has been leader in a time of strength and been the only woman Premier.
PV sometimes has surprising results. The candidate will often be from a traditionally dominant party that can attract support from a wide base of people, but may be from one of the smaller parties.
Because DMP is proportional, it would increase the likelihood of more candidates from smaller parties being elected. Smaller parties tend to nominate more women, more diverse women, and more diverse candidates overall.
Because MMP is proportional, it would increase the likelihood of more candidates from smaller parties being elected. Smaller parties tend to nominate more women, more diverse women, and more diverse candidates overall.
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3
Would promote an increase in collaborative processes in the Legislature
NO NO NO YES ✔
YES ✔
In local research, some candidates and potential candidates identified the combative and competitive nature of politics as a barrier to them getting involved in politics – and many expressed a preference for getting things done collaboratively. Competitive and combative processes adversely affect women and diverse groups who have traditionally had less power.
FPTP is designed to produce majority governments more often than not, especially in a place such as PEI where two parties are dominant. Parties that have a majority government don’t need to collaborate with other parties to advance their political agenda.
Because all seats except the leaders’ seats are under the current FPTP system, FPTP+ LEADERS is likely to produce majority governments more often than not. Majority governments don’t need to collaborate with other parties to advance their political agenda.
As a winner-‐take-‐all system PV is likely to produce majority governments more often than not. Majority governments don’t need to collaborate with other parties to advance their political agenda.
DMP would produce a majority government only when a majority of voters chose the same party. As a proportional representation system, DMP is most likely to produce a coalition government, which would necessitate more collaboration in the legislature – because coalitions require collaboration to advance an agenda.
MMP would produce a majority government only when a majority of voters chose the same party. As a proportional representation system, MMP is most likely to produce a coalition government, which would necessitate more collaboration in the legislature – because coalitions require collaboration to advance an agenda.
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4
Would promote a decrease in partisan attacks in campaigns
NO NO YES ✔
YES ✔
YES ✔
In local research, women candidates and potential candidates often cited discomfort with negative campaigning as a reason not to run for election. Due to continued sexism, racism, ableism, and other forms of discrimination, women, diverse women, and members of diverse groups may face unequal exposure to personal attacks during campaigns.
Under FPTP, the winner takes all; as a result, there is little disadvantage to running down opponents and there is no reward for campaigning supportively and collaboratively.
Under FPTP+LEADERS, the winner still takes all. Smaller parties would be expected to run leader-‐focused campaigns, which would make some of the campaigning very personal.
Under PV, the winner still takes all, but the winner needs to be ranked high by a majority to win. A candidate can’t win with a plurality of the vote. This promotes a campaign focused on winning broad-‐based support. There is decreased incentive to run down opponents, because even if the voter ranks an opponent first, a candidate will want to be ranked second.
Because DMP is more likely to produce a coalition government, the system would promote a decrease in partisan attacks in campaigns and would reduce rewards of negative campaigning. This effect would be particularly strong under DMP because in each dual-‐member district, candidates elected would likely have to work collaboratively at the district level with a member from another party.
Because MMP is more likely to produce a coalition government, the system would promote a decrease in partisan attacks in campaigns and would reduce rewards of negative campaigning.
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5
Would require changes to the nomination process that could increase chances of women being nominated
NO NO NO NO YES ✔
Local research has shown that the biggest challenge for women is not getting support at the polls – it’s getting their name on the ballot in the first place. Some electoral systems would make it necessary to revisit and change nomination processes.
Under FPTP, changes to nomination processes that present barriers to women would have to be legislated or regulated by the government in power or enacted voluntarily by individual parties at their discretion.
Under FPTP+ LEADERS, changes to nomination processes that present barriers to women would have to be legislated or regulated by the government in power or enacted voluntarily by individual parties at their discretion. Changes to processes to select leaders would also be at the discretion of individual parties.
Under FPTP, changes to nomination processes that present barriers to women would have to be legislated or regulated by the government in power or enacted voluntarily by individual parties at their discretion.
DMP would require changes to the nomination process. It is unclear that this would increase the number of women nominated. Under DMP, with half the number of current districts, there would be half the opportunities for women to lead the ballot. While each party could put forward 2 candidates in a district, which could promote gender parity, the candidates would be ranked and the second candidate would rarely be elected.
MMP would nominate district candidates in the usual way, district by district, but it would require changes to the nomination process in that there would also be a province-‐wide list of candidates for each party, nominated in a province-‐wide process. It is easier to mandate gender parity or increased diversity on a list than in district-‐by-‐district contests. Voluntary measures to increase equity would still be at the discretion of parties.
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6
Could reduce the need to legislate or otherwise mandate gender parity or increased diversity through incentives or disincentives for parties
NO NO NO NO YES ✔
Experience in other parts of the world with different electoral systems suggests some systems are susceptible to a “contagion” effect, where positive pressure to increase gender balance and diversity can spread from party to party. This “contagion” can only spread effectively when the party can shape a list, rather than create a slate of candidates nomination by nomination.
FPTP creates no natural incentives for parties to nominate women. The optics are poor when running a slate of candidates with few women and little diversity; however, under FPTP, each district acts independently in nominating and electing candidates, so voluntary system-‐wide targets for greater equity have not been effective.
FPTP+LEADERS creates no natural incentives for parties to nominate women. The optics are poor when running a slate of candidates with few women and little diversity; however, under FPTP+ LEADERS, each district acts independently in nominating and electing candidates, so voluntary system-‐wide targets for greater equity would likely not be more effective than those in place now.
PV creates no natural incentives for parties to nominate women. The optics are poor when running a slate of candidates with few women and little diversity; however, under PV, each district acts independently in nominating and electing candidates, so voluntary system-‐wide targets for greater equity would likely not be more effective than those in place now.
Because DMP’s nomination process is still done district by district, there are no natural incentives built into the system to create greater gender parity or greater diversity across a slate of candidates. However, there is evidence women do better in districts with greater magnitude, and DMP would double the voters per district. This could help women post-‐nomination.
MMP’s nomination process includes a list, which has been shown in other places to increase opportunities for gender balance and increased diversity across the slate of candidates. This is due to a “contagion” effect. Voters expect a list that reflects province-‐wide values and diversity, and parties can easily compare lists, so pressure is “contagious.” District-‐by-‐district nominations are not as susceptible to this “contagion.”
10
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Would naturally increase incentives and/or supports for women, diverse women, and members of diverse groups to be able to run
NO NO NO NO NO
Local research has identified numerous barriers that prevent some women, diverse women, and members of diverse groups from running. Incentives and supports would reduce those barriers.
No matter which electoral system Islanders choose, incentives and disincentives for parties to increase diversity (such as legislated quotas, mandated targets for diversity, requirements to comply with targets or explain missed targets, or financial incentives or penalties for meeting targets) and supports for women, diverse women, and members of diverse groups to run (such as child care, elder care, financial support, or other accessibility supports) would need to be legislated or regulated by government or adopted voluntarily by individual parties. Neither incentives nor supports are embedded within any electoral system on offer.
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8
Would allow for voters to express their direct support for women candidates at the polls
YES ✔
YES ✔
YES ✔
YES ✔
YES ✔
Research has shown that PEI voters don’t discriminate against women at the polls, so it is really important for an electoral system to allow voters to express direct support for women candidates. During the 2015 PEI provincial election, voters in 74% of Island districts had the option to vote for a female candidate. Local research on the diversity of candidates is not available.
Under FPTP, voters mark an X by the name of the candidate they choose. This allows voters to express their support for women through their vote, as long as there is a woman nominated to run in a voter’s district.
Under FPTP+LEADERS, voters do not have the opportunity to vote directly for party leaders, only parties and only through support of a local candidate. In their districts, they may mark an X by the name of the candidate they choose. This allows voters to express their support for women through their vote, as long as there is a woman nominated to run in a voter’s district.
Under PV, voters rank the names of the candidate they choose. This allows voters to express their support for women through their top vote or their ranking, as long as there is a woman nominated to run in a voter’s district.
Under DMP, voters mark an X by the name of the candidate and party they choose. This allows voters to express their support for women through their vote, as long as there is a woman nominated to run in a voter’s district. Because one vote on the ballot gets you two local candidates, there is a greater chance of being represented locally by a female MLA.
Under MMP, voters get 2 ballots. On the first, they mark an X by the name of the district candidate as under FPTP. This allows voters to express their support for women, as long as there is a woman nominated to run in a voter’s district. They then vote for a party by marking an X for a chosen candidate of their preferred party. This is a second opportunity to express support for a woman candidate and/or for a party that has strong representation of women on its slate of candidates.
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FURTHER ANALYSIS: Factors that might promote other democratic values Values that tend to support familiarity and continuity in the electoral system for PEI
1 Provides some continuity with the past YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔ YES
✔ 2 Tends to elect majority governments that make it easy for a government to advance its agenda
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔
NO NO
3 Has a simple, familiar one-‐step ballot
YES
✔
YES
✔
NO YES
✔ NO
4 Is likely to provide most reward to parties and leaders that are strongest on district issues
YES
✔
NO YES
✔ YES
✔ NO
5 Is used in other parts of Canada or the world
YES
✔
NO YES
✔
NO YES
✔
6 Ensures every MLA faces the voter with their name on the ballot
YES
✔
NO
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔ 7 Rewards political parties that address multiple issues and appeal to a wide population
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔ 8 Usually elects governments that are stable for a full term
YES
✔ YES
✔ YES
✔ YES
✔ YES
✔ 9 Could function without increasing the number of MLAs
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔ 10 Allows independent candidates to run and be elected
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔
YES
✔
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Values that tend to support some modification or change in the electoral system for PEI
11. Represents some degree of modification or change in the electoral system for PEI
NO YES
✔ YES
✔ YES
✔ YES
✔ 12. Is a system specifically designed to address some of the needs and interests PEI voters raised in consultations
NO YES
✔ YES
✔ YES
✔ YES
✔ 13. Is likely to result in some representation from 3rd and 4th parties as well as the traditionally dominant parties
NO YES
✔ NO YES
✔ YES
✔ 14. Reduces the role of political parties in the electoral system
NO NO NO NO NO Values that tend to support change in the electoral system towards proportional representation
15. Is a system of proportional representation, where seats are distributed according to the popular vote
NO NO NO YES
✔ YES
✔ 16. Prevents a party being elected to government with a “false majority” (a majority of seats but less than a majority of votes)
NO NO NO YES
✔ YES
✔ 17. Tends to elect coalition governments that make it necessary for parties to work together to advance an agenda
NO NO NO YES
✔ YES
✔ 18. Could break the cycle of two major parties swapping power with lopsided majorities
NO NO NO YES
✔ YES
✔ 19. Ensures your vote contributes directly to electing someone (is not “wasted” or ineffective – EVERY VOTE COUNTS)
NO NO NO YES
✔
YES
✔
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Values that might help you discern how you will rank the five systems 20. Creates more opportunity than the current system for voters to express their views through their ballots
NO NO YES
✔
NO YES
✔ 21. Gives an advantage to leaders of parties, compared to others who run
NO YES
✔
NO NO NO
22. May lead to creation of more political parties, including single-‐issue parties, that could be elected
NO NO NO YES
✔ YES
✔ 23. Has province-‐wide candidates and may reward parties that focus on provincewide issues
NO YES
✔
NO NO YES
✔ 24. Creates MLAs with apparently different roles/constituencies from one another
NO YES
✔
NO NO YES
✔
25. Makes it possible to vote for a candidate and party separately
NO NO NO NO YES
✔ 26. Would eliminate tied votes and decisions by coin toss for district candidates
NO NO YES
✔
NO NO
27. Includes party “lists” as part of a slate of candidates NO NO NO NO YES
✔ 28. Is susceptible to the “contagion” effect to increase diversity across a slate of candidates
NO NO NO NO YES
✔
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Values that tend to support familiarity and continuity in the electoral system for PEI
1. Provides some continuity with the past FPTP has been used in Prince Edward Island for a long time. FPTP, FPTP+LEADERS, and PV are all district-‐focused, winner-‐take-‐all electoral systems that provide continuity with past PEI traditions. DMP is a district-‐focused proportional representation system. DMP also provides continuity with the past in a different way: it would return us to dual-‐member ridings, a feature of PEI’s legislature until 1994. MMP maintains 2/3 district seats that would be elected in the same way they always have been but adds in province-‐wide seats and proportionality.
2. Tends to elect majority governments FPTP, FPTP+LEADERS, and PV tend to elect majority governments, but if third and fourth parties gain seats, minority governments are possible. Coalitions under these winner-‐take-‐all systems tend to be unstable, because returning to the polls at the right moment could result in a party with a minority gaining a majority government.
3. Has a simple, familiar one-‐step ballot FPTP, FPTP+LEADERS, and DMP maintain a simple and familiar ballot. PV would change to a ranked ballot, where voters would rank their preferences. MMP would have a two-‐part ballot. Voters would vote once for district candidates and once for the parties they want to see make up the legislature, by choosing a party’s candidate from a province-‐wide list. DMP is the only proportional option that has a one-‐X ballot. One vote gives you two district MLAs – and the proportional makeup of the legislature is based on that one vote.
4. Is likely to provide most reward to parties and leaders that are strongest on district issues The options that focus most on district representation are FPTP, PV, and DMP. They elect all their members on a district-‐by-‐district basis. FPTP+LEADERS takes party leaders out of districts. Under MMP, 2/3 of seats are district seats and the remaining 1/3 are province-‐wide.
5. Is used in other parts of Canada or the world FPTP is the current system used in PEI and federally in Canada. No new democracies or democracies that democracies that have changed their electoral systems have chosen FPTP as their electoral system. FPTP+LEADERS is not used elsewhere. PV is commonly used in Canada for nominating candidates and choosing party leaders. DMP is a new electoral system model designed with Canada in mind and would be unique to PEI. MMP is used in places such as Scotland, Germany, and New Zealand and was a model suggested for Canada by the Law Commission of Canada and for PEI by the Carruthers Commission.
6. Ensures every MLA faces the voter with their name on the ballot Under FPTP, PV, DMP, and MMP, every MLA elected to the legislature would have their name on a ballot to be selected or not selected by voters. Under FPTP+LEADERS, leaders would be selected by members of their party and would not face voters directly on the ballot.
7. Rewards political parties that address multiple issues and appeal to a wide population All the proposed electoral systems reward political parties that appeal to the widest support. The proportional systems, DMP and MMP, would give single-‐issue parties a greater chance of being represented in the Legislature – but because the popular vote determines the makeup of
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the Legislature, it is a given that the party with the most support will have the most seats.
8. Usually elects governments that are stable for a full term All the electoral options are systems that tend to elect stable, full-‐term (four-‐year) governments. Electoral systems based on proportional representation are sometimes thought to be unstable; this is a myth. Coalitions, as noted below, tend to be stable. (See #17.) Countries that use proportional representation do not have more frequent elections. Fair Vote Canada reports that “a study of countries over 50 years showed the average number of elections in countries using winner-‐take-‐all voting systems was 16.7 and in proportional systems it was 16.”
9. Could function without increasing the number of MLAs None of the proposed systems require adding more than the current 27 MLAs to the PEI Legislature. Two options could increase the number. FPTP+LEADERS would require a fluctuating number of MLAs: it would be impossible before an election to know how many parties would win 10% of the popular support and have the right to place their leader in the Legislature. DMP would require an even number of MLAs but could work with 26 MLAs (one MLA less than the current number) or with 28 MLAs (one MLA more than the current number).
10. Allows independent candidates to run and be elected All proposed electoral systems allow independent candidates to run. Independents could only run as district candidates (not provincewide candidates) under MMP or as district candidates (not leaders) under FTPT+LEADERS. Because DMP is a dual-‐member system, independents would have perhaps a greater chance to be elected, since if they placed either first OR second in their district, they would fill one of the two district seats.
Values that tend to support some modification or change in the electoral system for PEI
11. Represents some degree of modification or change in the
electoral system for PEI FPTP is the current electoral system in PEI. All other systems represent modifications or changes.
12. Is a system specifically designed to address some of the needs and interests PEI voters raised in consultations FPTP is the current electoral system in PEI, and proponents of the status quo think it addresses adequate needs. In consultations with the Special Committee on Democratic Renewal, many Islanders expressed needs and interests that are not adequately met by FPTP. Each of the other electoral options (FPTP+LEADERS, PV, DMP, MMP) addresses some of those needs and interests. There is no perfect electoral system that meets all needs.
13. Is likely to result in some representation from 3rd and 4th parties as well as the traditionally dominant parties Historically, FPTP has not resulted in much representation from 3rd and 4th parties – just 1 NDP MLA and 1 Green MLA. FPTP+LEADERS could result in the leader of 3rd and 4th parties sitting in the Legislature. In the 2015 provincial election, all four parties earned 10% or more of the vote, which would place their leaders in the Legislature under FPTP + LEADERS. PV can lead to surprise results, since people’s rankings matter, so the results for 3rd and 4th parties would be hard to predict, but results might not increase the number of candidates elected from smaller parties. The PR systems DMP and MMP would result in parties having seats in the legislature proportional to their share of the popular vote, so DMP and MMP would be very likely to result in representation for 3rd and 4th parties.
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14. Reduces the role of political parties in the electoral system None of the proposed electoral systems reduces the central role of political parties in our democracy. Nor does any system reduce parties’ responsibility, at party level, to improve women’s equality and increase the diversity of membership, candidates, and leaders.
Values that tend to support change in the electoral system towards proportional representation
15. Is a system of proportional representation, where seats are distributed according to the popular vote Only DMP and MMP are systems of proportional representation.
16. Prevents a party being elected to government with a “false majority” (a majority of seats but less than a majority of votes) It is not uncommon under FPTP for a government to gain all the power after earning less than 50% of the votes. The current PEI governing Liberals earned 40.8% of the vote in 2015 and still gained a majority government. Under FPTP systems, the winner is determined by who gets most votes in each district (who is first past the post). The winner often has a plurality (the most votes) without a majority (50% of the votes). The party with the most district wins forms the government. This compounds the advantage FPTP gives to winners. By contrast, PV would require district-‐level winners to be ranked high by a true majority of voters, but PV would not eliminate the chance of a party forming government without getting 50% of the popular support across the province. Both DMP and MMP are proportional systems, which means that the only way
to gain a majority government would be by garnering the majority of popular support.
17. Tends to elect coalition governments Systems of proportional representation distribute seats proportionally to the popular vote and so in three-‐ or four-‐party systems tend to elect coalition governments. Coalitions tend to be stable, because it is unlikely that returning to the polls will shift voters’ preferences or bring about a majority government. However, if the majority of voters select one party, that party will still get a majority government.
18. Could break the cycle of two major parties swapping power with lopsided majorities PEI has seen a long-‐time cycle of the Progressive Conservative Party and Liberal Party swapping power, often with dramatic swings in MLA numbers in the shift from one party to the next. Twice, we have seen the Official Opposition party reduced to one member after one of these swings in support. Lopsided majorities have been frequent. Some argue that these dramatic shifts back and forth between two parties create a long-‐term instability for policy, planning, and economic development. Proportional representation systems would disrupt the boom-‐and-‐bust cycle because the swings in support are not as dramatic as the swings in representation: winner-‐takes-‐all systems exaggerate majorities. Voters sometimes get more dramatic change than they voted for.
19. Ensures your vote contributes directly to electing someone In proportional systems DMP and MMP, every vote contributes to the makeup of the legislature. Under FPTP and other winner-‐take-‐all systems, if you vote for a local candidate who is not elected, your vote does not count
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towards anything. It is not “effective.” Fair Vote PEI says that the percentage of effective ballots can vary from election to election, but the percentage of wasted votes can be as low as 3%. As long as you rank the candidates, preferential voting (PV) makes it more likely your vote will contribute to electing someone. If you only choose one candidate and they are eliminated, your ballot is eliminated too.
Values that might help you discern how you will rank the five systems
20. Creates more opportunity than the current system for voters to express their views through their ballots FPTP, FPTP+LEADERS, and DMP are all one-‐X ballot systems. PV allows you to rank candidates according to your preference. MMP is a two-‐part ballot, for district candidate and provincial party. The slightly more complex ballots for PV and for MMP both allow voters to say more about what they want than a one-‐X ballot does. Both systems then use that additional information to determine representation: it is not wasted effort.
21. Gives an advantage to leaders of parties, compared to others who run The FPTP+LEADERS model puts leaders in a special category. They would not face the voter in a district: they would be elected based on popular support for their party across all districts. If their party received enough support, they would sit in the Legislature. The number of seats reserved for leaders would vary based on the success of parties. Leaders would be selected as leader by their party members province-‐wide. Parties could still change leaders between elections.
22. May lead to creation of more political parties, including single-‐issue parties FPTP, FPTP+LEADERS, and PV would not tend to reward single-‐issue parties. It is hard for single-‐issue candidates to get the nomination, and it is hard for single-‐issue parties to get enough support to elect a candidate in a district. Systems that reward parties with seats when they reach a certain threshold of the popular vote may lead to creation of more parties, including more single-‐issue parties. DMP and MMP would have a lower threshold for giving a party a seat.
23. Has province-‐wide candidates and may reward parties that focus on province-‐wide issues FPTP+LEADERS releases party leaders from local campaigning and allows them a focus on province-‐wide issues, while all other candidates from their party could focus on local/regional issues. MMP’s slate of candidates includes an open list of province-‐wide candidates. Under MMP 1/3 of candidates would be province-‐wide representatives.
24. Creates MLAs with apparently different roles from one another Under FPTP+LEADERS, leaders would be released from a constituency role and would have a province-‐wide responsibilities. Under MMP, the MLAs elected in the districts would have constituency responsibilities and the MLAs elected from the list would have province-‐wide responsibilities. In either case, any citizen who did not feel well served by a district MLA could approach a province-‐wide MLA. Functionally, all five electoral systems result in MLAs with different roles from one another as soon as the Premier appoints a Cabinet following an election. All Cabinet ministers have province-‐wide responsibilities.
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25. Makes it possible to vote for a candidate and party separately Only MMP allows you to vote for one party for your local candidate and another party for the makeup of the legislature, if you want to do this. You don’t have to worry that voting for the best person as your local representative will result in a party you don’t support holding all the power.
26. Would eliminate tied votes and decisions by coin toss for district candidates In the 2015 PEI provincial election, there was a tie between the leading two candidates in one district, and the election was decided by coin toss. Only PV eliminates the potential for tied votes: a candidate can only with a true majority of support based on rankings. However, it would be possible under any of the other electoral systems to change legislation and regulations about how ties should be handled. Eliminating the coin toss as the decision-‐making mechanism could be decided by a government under any of the electoral systems.
27. Includes party “lists” as part of a slate of candidates: FPTP, PV, and DMP all would nominate candidates at the local level without significant changes to the nomination processes being required. In essence, parties create a list of candidates district by district under these models. FPTP+LEADERS would create their list of candidates by district, except leaders would be determined party by party. Each party has its own rules to choose a leader. MMP chooses district candidates the same way as other systems but each party would also nominate a list of province-‐wide candidates. The MMP system proposed for PEI calls for an open list. This means voters would select their preferred candidate from a list. Choices would not be ranked by the party. All our electoral systems have a
“list” of some kind: you have to choose between predetermined options, and the options are usually decided by parties. We don’t have an electoral system where you can write anyone’s name in on a ballot.
28. Is susceptible to the “contagion” effect to increase diversity across a slate of candidates “Contagion theory,” based on evidence from democracies around the world, holds that when political parties have to compete on the basis of lists of candidates that are compared against other parties’ lists, they are more likely to put forward more women candidates and/or more diverse candidates to meet the needs and expectations of voters. Sometimes this translates directly into quotas (for women or for rural candidates or for candidates of colour, and so on). District-‐by-‐district nomination processes suppress contagion, and current nomination processes are allergic to quotas. Only MMP includes a list-‐making process where contagion could easily spread.
SOURCES Armour, Margaret-‐Ann. 2014. “Women in Leadership Today: How to Keep
Moving Forward.” (presentation at A Bold Vision Conference, Brudenell, PEI, September 25, 2014).
Arscott, Jan, Manon Tramblay, and Linda Trimble, eds. 2013. Still Counting: Women in Politics Across Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Crossley, John. 2014. “Getting Women’s Names on the Ballot: Women in Prince Edward Island Politics,” in Stalled: The Representation of Women in Canadian Government, edited by Jane Arscott, et al. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 172–183.
Elections PEI. 2015. 2015 General Election Results: Province-‐Wide Summary http://www.electionspei.ca/provincial/historical/results/2015/
Equal Voice. 2016. Women’s Political Representation and Electoral Systems. September 2016.
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https://www.equalvoice.ca/assets/file/EV_Electoral%20Reform%20-‐%20FINAL%20-‐%20SEPT%2012.pdf
Fair Vote Canada. 2015. Proportional Representation and Women. October 17, 2015. http://campaign2015.fairvote.ca/women/
Government of Prince Edward Island. 2015. White Paper on Democratic Renewal. http://www.gov.pe.ca/photos/original/democraticrenew.pdf
Inter-‐Parliamentary Union. Women in National Parliaments: World and Regional Averages. 2016.. http://www.ipu.org/wmn-‐e/classif.htm
Peckford, Nancy, and Lore, Grace. 2015. “When It Comes to Gender Parity Better Is Always Possible.” Ottawa Citizen. October 25, 2015. http://www.equalvoice.ca/news_article.cfm?id=1017
PEI Advisory Council on the Status of Women. 2005. “Policy Guide: Women and Electoral Reform.” http://www.gov.pe.ca/photos/original/acsw_elec_full.pdf
-‐-‐-‐. 2005. “What’s in PEI’s Electoral Future for Women?: Plebiscite Guide 2005.” http://www.gov.pe.ca/photos/original/acsw_reform1.pdf
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PEI Coalition for Proportional Representation. 2016. “MMP -‐ Mixed Member Proportional” and “DMP -‐ Dual Member Proportional. https://peipr.ca/dmp-‐mmp/
PEI Coalition for Women in Government. 2005. Getting Women Elected: Innovative Practices from Around the World, available http://www.womeningovernmentpei.ca/content/page/resources_innovativepractices
-‐-‐-‐. 2013. Research Findings and Conclusions Summary. http://www.womeningovernmentpei.ca/sitefiles/File/research/researchfindings.pdf
-‐-‐-‐. 2015. Election 2015: A Gender Based Analysis of PEI’s 2015 Provincial Election. May 2015. http://www.womeningovernmentpei.ca/sitefiles/File/research/provincial-‐election_gender-‐analysis_15.pdf
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Weeks, Blair, Susan Connolly, and Natalie Munn. 2001. Minding the House: A Biographical Guide to Prince Edward Island MLAs, 1873–1993. Charlottetown: Acorn Press.
Report prepared for the workshop A Preference for Equality: Which Electoral Reform Options Support Women’s Equality & Greater Diversity? September 20, 2016, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, with many thanks to participants.