what is a communist system?

STEPHEN WHITE

What is a Communist System?

Twenty or thirty years ago it was not difficult to identify a communist system. In principle at least, the dozen or so communist systems then in existence represented a geographical extension of the ‘Soviet model’ from which they generally claimed to have derived their inspiration and to which, in some cases, they owed their establishment. In all these states, power was concentrated in the hands of a highly centralized communist or workers’ party; and the state, economy and virtually all areas of social life were directed by the party through its ‘leading role’. This leading role was legitimated by an ideology, Marxism-Leninism, to which all the regimes claimed to adhere; and the states concerned were generally members of either the military association of communist states, the Warsaw Pact, or of the economic association of communist states, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), or of both of them. There were, to be sure, many differences among the communist systems even during the 1940s and 1950s. Some described themselves as ‘people’s democracies’ rather than as socialist states, and had retained a number of non-competitive political parties in addition to a dominant communist or workers’ party. Some-China, the GDR and Poland, for example-had retained a substantial private sector, particularly in agriculture; and Yugoslavia had already articulated a distinctive path of socialist development and adopted a non-aligned position in international affairs. Yet at the end of the 1950s there was still little reason to dispute that the USSR and its allies formed a reasonably cohesive ‘bloc’, and that they collectively represented, albeit with minor local variations, a type of political system based upon an identifiably Soviet or Marxist-Leninist model.

In the 1980s it is much more difficult to sustain these earlier and relatively straightforward assumptions. In the first place, the communist states no longer represent a cohesive bloc in international affairs. China and Albania have broken publicly with the USSR, and Albania in turn with China; Albania has also left the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, and Romania has adopted an increasingly independent role within them; and matters have several times reached the point of military hostilities between one communist state and another-between the USSR and China and between China and Vietnam, not to mention joint or individual military incursions into Czechoslovakia, Kampuchea and elsewhere. Secondly, and perhaps more important, the number of states under some form of communist or Marxist-Leninist rule has also increased greatly. At the beginning of the 1960s there were 14 generally-recognized communist systems, the USSR and its East European allies, China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba. By the beginning of the 1980s the communist universe had

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248 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

extended itself to South Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, and to a number of other regimes, mostly in Africa, whose identification with the communist state system has proved rather more contentious but which arguably represent at least a variant type of communist system, characterized as they generally are by an identification with Marxism-Leninism, a single ruling party and a substantial measure of state ownership in the economy. Defined in this manner, the number of communist systems worldwide is no longer 14 but perhaps between 25 and 30, or even more.

The increasing fragmentation and diversity of the communist world have indeed made it rather difficult to determine what a communist or Marxist-Leninist system might properly be said to be. Some have argued that the ‘Soviet model’ should be seen as an historically and culturally specific form of socialism, and that states which identify with Marxism-Leninism but which interpret that doctrine in the light of their own history and culture should be regarded as equally legitimate members of the communist universe. Others, perhaps more numerous, have pointed out the limitations of self-ascription as a basis for the classification of a political system as communist or otherwise, and have argued the importance of other, more ‘objective’ characteristics which appear to bear a more direct, less culturally refracted relationship to the essentials of Marxism-Leninism. Neither side, however, disputes that the definition of a communist system has become a more difficult and much more arbitrary exercise than it has ever been before. In the first part of this paper I propose to examine some of these classificatory frameworks more closely, before passing on to consider the extent to which political, economic and other characteristics can indeed be used to delimit a set of states which may reasonably be described as communist or Marxist-Leninist, and which share a sufficient number of distinctive characteristics to mark them out as a sub-set among the great variety of states that make up the present international state system. The purpose of the paper, however, is less to advance the claims of any particular typology and rather more to consider the ambiguities and limitations that perhaps inevitably inhere in any attempt to define a communist system in the changing world of the 1980s.

Defining Communist Systems: Some Classificatory Frameworks

The most inclusive attitude towards the definition of communist systems is taken by those who argue that communist systems, in effect, define themselves by their common adhesion to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The most substantial recent statement of this view has come from Michael Waller and Bogdan Szajkowski, both individually and in their introduction to a three-volume work on Marxist governments.’ In Marxist

Governments, Wailer and Szajkowski suggest that a ‘radically new approach be taken to the study of the politics of communism’: in particular, that self-ascription, rather than particular features of their political or economic systems, be taken as the defining characteristic of a communist or Marxist-Leninist regime. Communism, they argue, has lost what was in fact an historically contingent association with the Soviet model as it has spread to other countries and other continents whose cultural traditions are very

1. Michael Wailer and Bogdan Szajkowski, ‘The communist movement: from monolith to polymorph’, in Bogdan Szajkowski, ed., Marxxt Governments: A World Suruey, 3 ~01s. (London: Macmillan, 1981), v01 I, pp. 1-19. See also Michael Waller, ‘Problems of comparative communism’, Studier in Comparatiue Communism, vol. XII, nos. 2 and 3 (Summer-Autumn 1979), pp. 107-132; idem, ‘A movement is a movement is a movement’, Communist Affairs, vol. I, no. 1 (January 1982), pp. 40-44; and Bogdan Szajkowski, The Establishment ofMarxist Rqimer (London: Butterworths, 1982).

Mat is a Communist System? 249

different, but in which a ruling party subscribing to Marxism-Leninism nonetheless holds power. Communism, in other words, has evolved from ‘monolith’ to ‘polymorph’; what remains, and what serves to identify it, is a common commitment by the ruling elites of the countries concerned that their countries’ development should be guided economically, politically and socially by Marxism, and a common commitment to a view of the relationship between the ruling party and society that may be described as Leninist. The states that comprise this universe are variously described as ‘Marxist governments’, ‘Marxist regimes’, ‘ Marxist-Leninist regimes’ or ‘communist systems’, and some 27 of them are identified in the 1980s.

A similarly inclusive view is taken by Josef Wilczynski, who defines the ‘socialist countries’ as ‘countries ruled by communist or Marxist regimes under a mono-party system of government’, and identifies 25 of them in the late 1970s.2 Peter Wiles, in a volume concerned primarily with economic developments in what he describes as the ‘new communist third world’, defines it as an area encompassing those countries that have proclaimed a ‘Marxist-Leninist form of government’, or alternatively as a group of those states which are ‘ruled by a single Marxist-Leninist party’. Between 22 and 25 such systems are identified in the early 1980~.~ The Yearbook on International Communist

A&in, similarly, identifies only 16 communist parties as presently ‘in power’, but in its 1982 edition it includes for the first time a number of ruling parties in countries not formally designated as communist, namely Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Mozambique and South Yemen (Nicaragua was a previous inclusion). ‘Adherence of these regimes to Marxism-Leninism, ideological rhetoric, political and economic structures, and association with communist-ruled countries and causes’, the Yearbook

argues, ‘suggest that it would be unrealistic to exclude them from the community in which the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba are prominent members’.*

Apparently straightforward as the self-ascription criterion might appear to be, it is also not without its ambiguities. Wilczynski, for instance, includes the Seychelles among his list of 25 states with ‘ruling communist parties’, but he excludes it from his list of ‘socialist countries’ (those with a communist or Marxist regime). Afghanistan, conversely, is listed as a ‘socialist country’, but does not qualify for inclusion among the list of countries with ‘ruling communist parties’.5 Waller and Szajkowski, similarly, include Madagascar and San Marino in their list of Marxist governments, but Szajkowski, writing somewhat later, excludes Madagascar as a country with no more than a Marxist coalition government and makes no mention of the present regime in San Marino, where communists, in fact, hold no more than a minority of seats in the legislature and of positions in the government. (If Marxist coalition governments are to be excluded, indeed, then the inclusion of Poland, which has several times included non-communist and Roman Catholic deputies in its administra- tion, or Hungary, which for some time included a Bishop of the Hungarian Reformed Church as its Foreign Minister, could legitimately be questioned.6) There is consider-

2. Josef Wilczynski, An Encyclopedic Dicttonary ofMar.rzsm, Socialism and Communism (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 534.

3. Peter Wiles, ed., The New Communist Thtrd World(London: Groom Helm, 1982), pp. 13, 17. 4. Richard F. Star, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1982 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover

Institution Press, 1982), pp. xi-xii. 5. Wilczynski, op. cit. note 2, pp. 95 and 534. 6. Stephen White, John Gardner and George Schdpflin, Communist Political Systems: An Introduction

(London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 103.


able variation among the different self-ascriptionists, moreover, as to what regimes should properly be included within the list of communist or Marxist-Leninist systems. The Yearbook, for instance, inciudes Nicaragua, but Wilczynski, Wiles, and Wailer and Szajkowski do not; Waller and Szajkowski include Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, but the others do not; Szajkowski includes Grenada, but Wilczynski does not; and Wiles alone excludes Somalia (as ‘the one that got away’) and regards Guyana as a possible inclusion. Other accounts suggest the possible inclusion of states as varied as Algeria, Burma, Guinea, Iraq, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome, Syria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.7

Self-ascription as a criterion has also been attacked on other grounds. How adequately, for instance, does it apply to some of the earlier-established communist systems at certain points in their history? A formal commitment to Marxism- Leninism, for instance, was arguably superseded in practice by a commitment to Stalinism in the USSR during the 1930s and 194Os, and in China by the Thought of Mao Zedong during the 1960s.8 These, admittedly, were exceptional times; Western states have experienced these also, and we would not regard, for instance, the temporary suspension of competitive politics in these countries during wartime as sufficient reason for classifying their political systems as anything other than liberal democracies. But there are still further difficulties. Must the formal commitment, for instance, be to Marxism-Leninism as such, or to Marxism, or just to socialism? How is the commitment to be made? Is it sufficient for individual leaders to make it, or must the ruling party, and perhaps also the state constitution, subscribe to it also? Is a Marxist government the same thing as a Marxist regime, or a Marxist-Leninist political system, or a communist system, terms which Waller and Szajkowski use almost interchangeably ?Q And how helpful is a formal declaration of support for Marxism-Leninism as a basis for classification in any case, when it may be of an entirely cynical or opportunist character and represent no more than a means of maximizing foreign (and especially military) assistance. ?I0 In an interesting exercise of this kind conducted shortly after World War II, the United Nations asked all its member states how their political systems were to be described. This exercise tells us much about the appeal of political symbols but very little about the realities of politics in the countries concerned: the vast majority of states-communist, theocratic or whatever-described their political systems as ‘democratic’.” We would not, as Archie Brown has pointed out, ordinarily regard a regime’s profession of its commitment to liberal democracy as a basis for classifying its political system as such.12 Why should communist or Marxist-Leninist systems be treated differently?

Indeed, the very notion of a distinctive group of states which may be called communist or Marxist-Leninist, whether on self-ascription or other grounds, has been challenged by some scholars. John H. Kautsky, for example, has argued that

7. See for instance Yearbook, p. xi; Fred Halliday and Maxime Molyneux, The Ethiopian Reuolu~ion (London: New Left Books, 1981). p. 274; Marie Lavigne, Les economies socialisles, 3rd ed. (Paris: Cohn,

1979), p. 14. 8. Archie Brown, ‘Various shades of red’, Times Ltfcrary Supplemenf, 23 April 1982, p. 464.

9. See W&r and Szajkowskl, op. crl note I, pp. 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18 (on p. 15 the polsical practice of

these;egimes 1s also described as ‘socialist’).

10. This point is argued in Neil Harding, ‘What does it mean to call a regime Marxist?‘, in Szajkowski,

ed., Mar& Gousr~ments, vol. 1, pp. 20-33.

11, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Democracy in a World of Tenmns.- A Symposium (Paris: Unesco, 1951).

12. Brown, op. cil. note 8, p. 464.

tit is a Communist System? 251

regimes which call themselves communist or Marxist-Leninist do not in fact have any distinctive characteristics of importance, other than the fact that they call themselves communist. The features that identify these regimes, Kautsky argues, such as an official ideology, a single ruling party and a centralized system of economic management, can be found in many other developing countries as well. A single-party regime, for instance, is ‘not a specific communist phenomenon but rather a fairly general one growing quite typically out of movements of modernizers’. Kautsky prefers to classify the communist systems as either ‘mobilization regimes’-a category they share with many other non-communist regimes in the developing countries, or else in a few cases as ‘adaptation regimes’ -a category which also includes most of the developed industrial countries in the non-communist world. There are, in fact, ‘no clearly distinguishable set of phenomena, called communist, that have more in common with each other than with phenomena in some other set or sets, called non-communist’. As a myth, Kautsky argues, ‘communism’ may have retained a certain validity; but as a descriptive, analytical category it has become ‘useless’ _ l3 Others have argued similarly that as communist systems become less totalitarian, they gradually lose their unique characteristics and merge into the same category as non-communist but authoritarian regimes in the developing countries;r4 and some have joined Kautsky in calling for a move from ‘Soviet studies to comparative politics’, as Bunce and Echols put it.r5

So far, these views have not proved particularly popular among students of comparative communist politics, perhaps not least because, as Kautsky unkindly puts it, their field of study will ‘ultimately have to disappear’,r6 and most scholars appear to have adhered to the view that communist systems do retain certain distinctive characteristics, most notably in their relationship between the party and society, while at the same time arguing that these systems cannot simply be defined by the extent to which they formally identify with Marxism-Leninism. Gary Bertsch, for instance, defines a communist system as one which is ‘internationally recognized as Marxist-Leninist’ and which is also governed by ‘Communist-oriented leaders who purport to be actively engaged in the building of Communism’. This produces a list of 16 states-the USSR, the East European communist-ruled states, China, Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. ” Von Beyme, in a more elaborate set of criteria, stipulates that public ownership and planning should prevail in the sphere of production, that egalitarian policies and payment according to work should prevail in the sphere of distribution, and that Marxist-Leninist ideology should be dominant and the communist party hegemonic in the sphere of politics. This produces a similar list of regimes to that of Bertsch, less Laos and Kampuchea where communist rule had not been established at the time von Beyme’s work was first drafted.‘s White, Gardner and

13. John H. Kautsky, The Polrtrcnl Consequences of Modernizatton (New York: Wiley, 1972), pp. 247 and 250; idem, Communism and the Polifrcs of Development (New York: Wiley, 1968), p. 216. See also Kautsky’s review article, ‘Comparative communism versus comparative politics’, Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. VI, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring-Summer 1973), pp. 135-170.

14. Don E. Schulz, ‘Postscript: On the future of participation’, in Donald E. Schulz and Jan S. Adams, eds, Polifical Participation in Communist Systems (New York: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 295-296.

15. Valerie Bunce and John M. Echols, ‘From Soviet studies to comparative politics’. Souief Studies, vol. 31, no. 1 tjanuary 19791, pp~ 43-55.

16. Kautsky, op. cit. note 13, p. 136. 17. Gary K. Bertsch, Power and P&q in Communirt Systems, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1982), p. 3. 18. Klaus van Beyme, Economtcs and Politics within Socialist Systems (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 8-9

and 397. A similar listing is given in Patrice Gelard, Les sy&nes politiqua des Hats socialistes, 2 ~01s. (Paris: Cujas, 1975). pp. 659-684.


SchGpflin, in a more recent work, list the same 16 states on the basis of somewhat different criteria: a formal commitment to Marxism-Leninism, an economy largely or entirely in public ownership, and a ruling communist or workers’ party in which power is highly centralized and which plays a dominant role in the society.lg Robert Wesson, in his study of communist systems, defines them as regimes which identify themselves as such, which owe their origin directly or indirectly to the Russian revolution, and in which a communist or equivalent party plays a leading role. This produces a list of ‘ 15 or 16’ (on an earlier page ‘ 14 or 15’) states which may be defined as communist, essentially the same set of states as the generally-accepted list already quoted. Wesson nonetheless concedes that the boundaries between communist and non-communist systems remain ‘somewhat indistinct ‘,20 and, as we shall see, there are difficulties for both ‘objectivists’ as well as self-ascriptionists in attempting to specify a set of characteristics which will serve to identify a group of states which may reasonably be called communist or Marxist-Leninist and which will serve collectively to distinguish them in important respects from otherwise similar but non-communist systems.

Communist and Non-communist Systems: Some Distinguishing Criteria

1, A Formal Commitment to Marxism-Leninism

A number of scholars, as we have already noted, regard a formal commitment to Marxism-Leninism as sufficient in itself to identify a communist system; and there are few who do not regard it as a necessary if not a sufficient basis for such a classification. The longer-established and generally recognized communist systems certainly satisfy this criterion more than adequately. The Albanian Constitution, for instance, straight- forwardly declares: ‘Marxism-Leninism is the dominant ideology in the People’s Republic of Albania. The entire socialist social order evolves on the basis of its principles’ (Art. 3). *I There are similar commitments in the constitutions of Cuba (Preamble), Korea (Art. 4), Mongolia (Preamble), Vietnam (Art. 38), and China (in the Preamble to the 1982 Constitution, which refers to the ‘guidance’ of the state by ‘Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought’). The commitments to Marxism- Leninism in the constitutions of the other established communist states are generally less direct. They do, however, typically define the state as a ‘socialist’ one (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, the USSR, Romania and Yugo- slavia), and in some cases a further commitment is added to the eventual achieve- ment of communism (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Romania and the USSR). Kampuchea, in perhaps the most qualified of these commitments, nonetheless specifies in its 1981 Constitution that the state is ‘gradually advancing towards socialism’. No valid constitution is presently available for the Lao People’s Democratic Republic where a new text is currently under preparation.

19. White, Gardner and Schdpflin, op, cd. note 6, pp. 1-4.

20. Robert G. Wesson, Communtsm and Communisf Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978),

pp. 1-3 and p. ix. 21, References to constitutions in this paper are taken unless otherwise stated from the foilowing sources:

William B. Simons. ed.. The Consfitutions of the Communist World (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980); Albert P. Blaustein and Gilbert Flanz, eds, Cons&~&s of I/M Count&of the- World, 15

~01s. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1971- ); The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, in BBC Summary 0~ World Broadcasts, FE/6762/G/l-12, 30 June 1981 (I am grateful to Bogdan

Szajkowski for supplying this text); and Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, in Beijing Reuiew, vol. XXV, no. 52 (27 December 1982), pp. 10-29.

What is a Communist System? 253

The commitment of the newer socialist-oriented states to Marxism-Leninism is generally a more limited one, although not in all cases. Only one (Somalia) IS described in its constitution as a socialist state, and only in Benin is there a specific commitment to Marxism-Leninism, although that ideology is to be applied in a ‘living, creative manner’ to the realities of the local situation (Art. 4). A few of these states describe themselves as ‘people’s republics’ (the Congo) or ‘people’s democracies’ (Mozam- bique), and the Democratic Republic of Madagascar commits itself to ‘socialist and democratic’ principles (Art. 1). For the most part, however, the commitment of these putatively communist systems to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, at least in these documents which define the bases of their political order, is ambiguous to say the least. Afghanistan, for instance, is committed by its constitution to an ‘independent and democratic government of all the toiling Muslim people’, whose aim is a ‘new, free and democratic society’ (Art. 3). Angola is defined as a ‘sovereign, independent and democratic state’, whose aim is the construction of a ‘prosperous and democratic country free from any form of exploitation of man by man’ (Art. 1); Cape Verde is defined as a ‘democratrc, secular, unitary, anti-colomalist and anti-imperialist’ republic inspired by the ‘thought of Amilcar Cabral’ (Art. 1 and Preamble); and the Constitution of the Congo simply makes no commitment to Marxism-Leninism or socialism as the guiding doctrine of the state but bases itself upon the principle of ‘government of the people, by the people, and far the people’ (Art. 6). This is some distance from Marxism-Leninism as conventionally understood!

A number of these putatively Marxist-Leninist regimes also reserve a privileged place for religion, notwithstanding the hostility towards the church as an institution and towards religion as a doctrine displayed by both Marx and Engels and by all the generally recognized communist systems today (Wiles, indeed, regards it as ‘almost a definitional part of Leninism’ that religion should be persecuted and that party activists shouId be atheists).‘2 Afghanistan, of all the states in the ‘new communist Third World’, probably goes the furthest m the opposite direction. The preamble to its constitution commits the state to ‘deep respect’ for and ‘strict observance’ of the ‘national, cultural and religious traditions of our people, with the resolute following of the principles of the sacred religion of Islam’. Article 5 specifically provides that the ‘sacred and true religion of Islam will be respected’, and Article 12 commits the state (at any rate in theory) to friendly relations with all its Muslim neighbours. The Somali Constitution, similarly, provides that ‘Islam shall be the religion of the state (Art. 3(l)), and the constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen makes an identical commitment (Art. 46). Both of these states are also members of the Arab League, and in Yemen the whole of the Politburo, for reasons which may not have been entirely devotional, is reported to have attended the mosque.23

These, admittedly, are for the most part constitutional provisions, rather than leadership declarations to which the self-ascriptianists appear to attach more importance. They have failed, however, to identify an explicit commitment by all of the leaderships concerned to Marxism-Leninism or even socialism;‘4 in some cases the commitment concerned may have been retracted or may have become somewhat outdated (Somalia may fail into this category, and the People’s Republic of Benin since

22. Wiles, op. cit. note 3, p. 19. 23. Ibid. 24. See for instance the references to Grenada, Afghanistan, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau in Szaj-

kowski, Marxist Regimes, pp. 101-104, 112-113, 124-125 and 127-129.


the conversion of its President and party leader to Islam in 1980z5); and in any case a statement of the leadership’s objectives would seem a rather slender basis on which to classify not only a government but also a political system or regime. If governmental objectives are the decisive criterion, indeed, then it becomes difficult to exclude many Western socialist parties, a number of which have formed governments whose ultimate objective is the abolition of the ‘exploitation of man by man’ and which form a group- ing and a political tradition of which the CPSU-as the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party-was formerly a part. Communism may indeed be conceived of as a ‘movement’, as Michael Wailer suggests, but why should that movement be ailowed to swallow up the whole of the socialist and labour movement from which it originally derived?

2. An Economy in which the Basic Means of Production are in State or Public Ownership

A formal commitment to Marxism-Leninism may of course be no more than that--a purely verbal and perhaps opportunistic affirmation of support for a doctrine whose ultimate objectives, if not perhaps its methods, would command wide support among liberals and Christians, not only among Marxists. For many scholars, accordingly, such a criterion must be supplemented by other, more ‘objective’ criteria, such as the state or public ownership of at least the basic means of production. Some, indeed, are prepared to define a communist or socialist system virtually on this basis alone.2” Public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange is certainly part of the normal dictionary definition of socialism, and there are good grounds for such an approach in classical Marxism, as well as in the practice of the present-day communist systems. Socialism, in the view of its founders, did after ali mean the ‘expropriation of the expropriators’, the removal of the integument of private ownership which prevented the full realization of a society’s productive potential for the benefit of all its members, rather than just a narrow and exploiting class. Typically, in the generally-recognized communist states, productive resources are not simply in public or social ownership but are also managed by the state through a national planning apparatus and directive, rather than indicative, social and economic plans- what is generaily meant by a ‘command’ or ‘administered economy’. To what extent can economic criteria of this kind serve to identify a group of systems which may be described as communist or Marxist-Leninist, and to distinguish them from others?

In the case of the longer-established communist-ruled states the position again seems reasonably clear. Albania, for example, describes its economy in its constitution as a ‘socialist’ one based upon the ‘socialist ownership of the means of production’. Private ownership and the exploitation of man by man are deciared to have been abolished and prohibited (Art. 16), and all economic and social life is regulated by a single state plan (Art. 25). The Bulgarian Constitution similarly states that the country’s economic system is a ‘socialist’ one based upon the ‘public ownership of the means of production’ and regulated by a state social and economic plan (Arts. 13 and 22). Analogous provisions are contained in the constitution of Cuba (Arts. 14 and IS), China (Arts. 6, 7 and 15), Czechoslovakia (Arts. 7(l) and (2)), the GDR (Arts. 9(l) and (3)), Hungary (Arts. 6(l) and 7), Korea (Arts. 18, 19 and 3I), Mongolia (Arts. 10 and IS), Vietnam (Arts. 18, 19 and 33), and Yugoslavia (Arts. 10, 12, 67-77 and 257, a rather more

25. Wiles, op. cif. note 3, pp. 205-206 and 293. 26. Lavigne, op. cit. note 7, p. 12 and elsewhere.

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Table 1: Share of the socialist sector in communist economies, 1980

Country

Percentage of national income

Percentage of industry

Percentage of

agriculture

AgriEulfure and

forestry a5 70 of

national income

Bulgaria

Hungary

GDR Mongolia Poland

Romania USSR

Czechoslovakia Cuba

99.9 99.8 99.9 16.7

97.6 99.3 98.9 15.8’

96.4 97.9 95.5 8.5 100 100 99.9 15.0

84.4 98.0 22.7 15.3 95.5 99.7 85.6 15.2

100 100 100 15.2 99.5 100 97.6 7.3 n.a. 100 77.6 n.a.

Source: Sfatisticheskii ezhqodnik strawchlenou Soueta Ekonomicheskoi Vzaimopomoschchi 1981 (M. 1981), pp. 39-40 and 44. l Agriculture only.

Table 2: Nationalization ratios* for major economic sectors in communist and non-communist

systems, 1950s and 1960s (percentages)

Country Year

Mining,

manu-

Total f&wing

Transport, A.&x&we,

communica- forestry,

Commerce Construction lions fishing

Bulgaria 1956 37 85 96 96 100 6

GDR 1964 71 84 55 67 96 17

Poland 1960 48 83 53 90 96 8

USSR 1959 59 93 92 100 100 14

Yugoslavia 1953 30 72 79 100 100 3

For comparison

France

United

Kingdom

United States

Sweden

West Germany

1954 17 8 5 1 69 n.a.

1962 25 9 n.a. 8 70

1960 15 1 1 12 18

1960 20 4 5 12 53

1950 9 1 0 0 74

Source: Frederic L. Pryor, Property and Industrial Organizabon m Communrst and Capitalist Nations (Bloom- ington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 46-47. l Ratio of economically active population in publicly owned enterprises and units to the total economically active population in the corresponding branch or sector.

of wealth, may be protected by law and widely practised in real life. In Angola, for

instance, the basis of economic and social development is stated by the constitution to

be ‘socialist ownership, both state and cooperative’, but the private property, even of

foreigners, is ‘recognized and guaranteed, so long as it is regarded as of benefit to the

country and in the interests of the Angolan people’ (Art. 10). Most large companies

abandoned by their former Portuguese owners have been nationalized, but non-


Portuguese firms appear to have been largely unaffected, and in 1979 a law was adopted specifically to encourage foreign investment. Oil interests, in particular, have normally been operated in copartnership with major Western interests. Agriculture, which accounted for 48 per cent of GDP and 59 per cent of employment in 1980, is not collectivized.31 In Benin, similarly, all natural resources are in the hands of the state and the economy is notionally a planned one, but private property in land is constitu- tionally guaranteed and the economy is still in practice dominated by a number of major French firms.32

In most other putatively Marxist-Leninist regimes a similar pattern is evident. In Afghanistan, for instance, banking, insurance, heavy industry and communications are reserved by the constitution for state ownership (Art. 17); but private ownership of land is guaranteed, retail and wholesale trade is unrestricted, the security of private investment is guaranteed, and a formal commitment is given that the state will support the participation of ‘national capitalists’ in the development of industry, transport services and external trade (Art. 21). In the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen natural resources have similarly been nationalized, but the rights of private property and even the private accumulation of wealth are guaranteed by the constitution. A number of the socialist-oriented states have admittedly proceeded further. Ethiopia, for instance, declared itself a socialist state in December 1974 and opted, among other things, for complete state control of the economy. There has been extensive nationalization, and rural and urban land has been declared the property of the whole people. The manufacturing sector-accounting admittedly for a small proportion of GNP-is overwhelmingly state-owned, and restrictions have been placed upon the activities of private firms in other sectors of the economy. 33 Rather more typical, however, is the situation in the Congo, where the principal means of production are stated to be in the hands of the people and where a form of planning exists at least in principle, but where private property is guaranteed, foreign investment is encouraged and is dominant in the most profitable (extractive) sectors of the economy, and land is publicly owned but overwhelmingly in private use.34

Shortages of reliable data, differences between ownership, control and possession, and variations between formal provisions and on-the-ground realities make it difficult to categorize the economic systems we have been considering. Indeed, the value of attempting to identify a communist or Marxist-Leninist system on the basis of public ownership and control of its economy becomes increasingly doubtful the more closely it is examined. It is evidently a feature by no means necessarily confined to regimes which describe themselves as communist or Marxist-Leninist; it is rather difficult to implement in a developing country, whatever the wishes of its leadership, because of various objective constraints; and in many of the generally-recognized communist systems the private sector still played an important role for several years after their respective revolutions without leading anyone to doubt that their regimes were communist or Marxist-Leninist. In the USSR, for instance, the state and cooperative sectors accounted for no more than 35 per cent of national income by 1924;ss and in China the constitution of 1954 went so far as to extend its specific protection

31. Wiles, op. cd. note 3, pp. 67-73; Africa South oftheSahara 1982-1983 (London: Europa, 1982), p. 154. 32. Szajkowski, ed., Marxist Governments, vol. I, pp. 93 and 102-106. 33. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 299-305; Wiles, op. cit. note 3, pp. 91-97. 34. Szajkowski, ed., Marxist Governments, vol. 1, pp. 214 and 226-228; Wiles, op. cit. note 3, p. 238. 35. TsSU SSSR, Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR za 6Olet (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), p. 9.


to the ‘ownership by capitalists of the means of production and other capital’ within a general framework by state planning. Private ownership has also played some part in the economies of many other communist states, particularly in their earlier post-revolutionary years. 36 It appears nonetheless to be the case that the state is the dominant force in the economies of all the more generally-recognized communist systems that are presently in existence, and that its role is rather more peripheral in most if not all of the less generally-recognized systems, despite extensive state ownership of industry, natural resources, banking and other sectors in many of these countries.

Extensive state ownership and control of such sectors is of course a common feature of the economic system of the developing countries in general, and if some of the countries we have considered were to be defined as Marxist-Leninist upon this basis it would be difficult to exclude many others. Why, for instance, should Benin and the Congo be included, but not, for instance, Guinea, a planned economy with some 86 per cent of industry in the state sector, or Burma, another planned economy with 41 per cent of its economy in the state or cooperative sectors, or Iraq, another planned economy with some 75 per cent of national income in the state sector, or Algeria, where the state sector accounts for some 88 per cent of industrial and about 30 per cent of agricultural production ?37 Some of these are considerably more ‘socialist’ in economic terms than a number of the putatively Marxist-Leninist regimes we have considered, and in fact it is difficult to think of a developing country which does not display to some degree the defining characteristics of central planning and extensive public ownership of at least the basic means of production. If the basic criterion is taken to be state spending as a percentage of GNP, indeed, then some of the major and more welfarist capitalist countries emerge as at least as ‘socialist’ as many of the systems under unequivocally communist rule.38

3. A VanguardMarxist-Leninist Par9 Exercising a Leading Role in the Society

Given the ambiguities of a classification based upon purely economic criteria a third possible defining characteristic of a communist system, the existence of a Marxist- Leninist or vanguard party exercising a ‘leading role’ in the society, has widely been regarded as having more decisive significance. This, indeed, appears to be the crucial criterion so far as the Soviet authorities themselves are concerned, as they have tolerated a variety of forms of economic management in the countries under their influence but have never permitted a successful challenge to the leading role of the party as they understand it. It appears also to be the basis for the identification of states such as Laos or Kampuchea as communist (or socialist) in such authoritative sources as, for instance, the General Secretary’s reports to successive CPSU congresses, while states such as Afghanistan and Angola remain at the more junior level of states of ‘socialist orientation’.3g There is every warrant for such an approach in Lenin, if less

36. Theodore H. E. Chen, ed., The Chinese Commumst Regime (London: Pall Mall, 1967), p. 78, Article

10; van Beyme, op. czt. note 18, p. 30. 37. These data are taken from the Ezhegodnik Bol’shoi Souetskoi Entsiklopedii 1982 (Moscow: Sovetskaya

entsiklopediya, 1982), pp. ZOO, 215, 244 and 268. 38. See Gabriel A. Almond and G. gingham Powell, Jr., Comparafiue Poltttcr: System, Process and Policy, 2nd

ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), p, 291.

39. See Ma&$ XXVI s”ezda KPSS (M oscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1981), pp. 5 and 10,

where 14 countries are listed as socialist; Kampuchea and Albania were included in this section of the

Central Committee report in 1976 and 1971 respectively

W?kzt is a Communist System? 259

obviously so in Marx, for it was of course Lenin who formulated the doctrine of the vanguard party in his What is to be Done? (1902), who broke with the Mensheviks on this issue, and who later required that all parties which wished to affiliate to the Communist International subscribe to the ‘21 points’. These bound the parties concerned, among other things, to make a ‘complete and absolute break with reformism’, to direct the work of their representatives in parliamentary, trade union and other bodies, and to base their organization upon the principle of democratic centralism, under which the party was to be ‘as centralized as possible’ and its leadership equipped with the ‘most comprehensive powers’ .40

Perhaps not surprisingly, these requirements are more than adequately fulfilled within the USSR itself. As Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution states, the ‘leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organizations and public organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’. The party, which adheres to the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, is supposed to impart a ‘theoretically substantiated character’ to the Soviet people’s struggle for the victory of communism; and both the party and the state itself are based upon the principle of democratic centralism. Analogous provisions appear in the constitutions of Vietnam (Art. 4), Romania (Art. 3), China (Preamble), Poland (Art. 3(l)), Mongolia (Preamble), Korea (Art. 4), Kampuchea (Art. 4), Hungary (Art. 3), the GDR (Art. l), Czechoslovakia (Art. 4), Cuba (Art. 5), Bulgaria (Art. 2), and Albania (Art. 3). Laos lacks a written constitution, but the leading role of the Lao People’s Revolu- tionary Party in that country is not in doubt; and the same is true of Yugoslavia, where the constitutional provisions relating to the League of Communists are worded somewhat less directly than elsewhere: the party is described in the preamble to the constitution as the ‘leading organized ideological and political force of the working people and of all working people in the creation of socialism and the realization of solidarity among working people, and of brotherhood and unity among the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia’.

A rather different situation obtains in most of the other putatively Marxist-Leninist regimes. A leading or vanguard party is indeed provided for in the constitutions of a number of these states, although it is generally not called a communist party as such. In Afghanistan, for instance, the People’s Democratic Party is described as the ‘leading and guiding force of the society and state’ (Art. 4). In Angola the MPLA-Workers’ Party is described as a “Marxist-Leninist party’ which is responsible for the ‘political, economic and social leadership of the state in the effort to construct socialist society’ (Art. 2). In Benin, the People’s Revolutionary Party is entrusted by the constitution with the organization of ‘all national life’ (Art. 4). In the Congo, the Congolese Workers’ Party is described as the ‘supreme form of political and social organization of our people’ and the ‘dominant force of the state and of society’s activities’ (Arts. 2 and 36). In Mozambique, similarly, the state is supposed to be guided by the political line laid down by Frelimo, the ‘leading force of the state and society’ (Art. 3); and in Somalia, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party is the only legal party and is entrusted with a leading role of comparable scope (Art. 7). Several of these states also base themselves upon the principle of democratic centralism (Somalia, Benin and Angola, for instance), and have party structures modelled closely on that of the CPSU

40. Jane Degras, ed., The Communist Inkmational 1919-1943, vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 168-172.


and its allied parties, with a central committee and Politburo, auxiliary organizations, party schools and so forth.

A ruling and explicitly Marxist-Leninist party is however less than universally encountered in the other putatively communist or Marxist-Leninist regimes. The PAICV in Cape Verde, for instance, describes itself as a ‘liberation movement in power’ and makes no mention of Marxism-Leninism or even socialism in the proclamation of its founding congress which was held in 1981.41 In Madagascar the ruling party, the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (Arema), appears not to have committed itself explicitly to Marxism-Leninism and is a member of a coalition government. In Ethiopia no communist party is in existence, nor indeed any party of any kind, although the military government in that country intends ultimately to establish one. In Grenada, a communist system according to most of the self-ascriptionists, the ruling party (the New Jewel Movement) appears to be committed to no more than the goal of the ultimate establishment of a socialist system along Tanzanian lines.42 The acceptance of Marxism-Leninism by the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, up to the coup in November 1980, appears also to have been rather equivocal.43 Again, if the formal commitment of a ruling party to a Marxist form of socialism were to be regarded as sufficient to define a system as communist or Marxist-Leninist, many other regimes could be included: for instance Algeria, which is ruled by a vanguard party whose objective is the ‘triumph of socialism’; or Guinea, whose ruling party aims officially at the establishment of a new society without exploitation and is organized on democratic centralist lines; or Syria, whose governing coalition includes communist participation; or Tanzania or Zimbabwe, whose ruling parties are committed to the socialist transformation of their respective societies. 44 No fewer than 36 ruling parties of this kind affirmed their solidarity with Marxist-Leninist party rule in this sense by attending the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981 .45

This, however, is to accord purely formal or declaratory indicators more value than they are properly due; for a ruling communist party exercising a genuinely leading role must evidently have an organizational structure and a level of mass membership sufficient to allow it to exercise a dominant influence at all levels of society and not only within the national government. In this respect the communist parties of Laos and Kampuchea, with memberships of 0.4 per cent or less of their respective populations, must find it rather difficult to qualify. 46 What, however, is one to make of ruling parties with memberships that are even smaller than this-the Congolese Party of Labour, for instance, with a membership of 1600 at the most (0.1 per cent of the total population),47 or the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, with a membership of perhaps lo-20 000 (no more than 0.16 per cent of the total population), not to mention several other parties whose total membership is presently unknown and may well be even smaller? Soviet sources have generally welcomed the proliferation of such ‘revolutionary-democratic’ parties in the developing countries, but several important

41. Communz~~A&trs, vol. I, no. 1 (January 1982), pp. 52-55. 42. Alan J. Day and Henry W. Degenhardt, camps., Polztzcal Par&~ of the World (London: Longman,

1980), p. 142. The New Jewel Movement was removed from power in October 1983.

43. SzaJkowski, ed., Marxist Governments, vol. II, p. 372; idem, Marx&t Rgimes, pp. 103-104. 44. See the Algerian Constitution, Arts. 95 and 97; Day and Degenhardt, camps., Pdikd Partws,

pp. 144, 326-327 and 389; and Ezhegodnik BSE, p. 348. 45. Yu. V. Irkhin, ‘Avangardnye revoluyutsionnye partii trudyashchikhsya v osvobodivshikhsya

stranakh’, Voprosy istorii, 1982, no. 4, pp. 55-67, at p. 56. 46. Membership statistics are taken from the Yearbook unless otherwise stated.

47. Szajkowskl, ed., Afar& Governments. vol. I, p. 218.


differences are said to distinguish them from Marxist-Leninist parties in the proper sense. In the first place, it is suggested, their members have not fully absorbed and do not fully apply scientific communism; their primary party organizations are also insufficiently strong and active, particularly in the industrial and military spheres; and in some areas of social and economic life a party presence is altogether absent. The experience of Ghana, Mali, Egypt and some other countries, it is argued, demonstrate the dangers of attempting to complete the national-democratic revolution and maintain political stability without a ruling party of properly Marxist-Leninist character .48

4. A Foreign Policy Association with Other Marxist-Leninist Regimes

Some authorities have suggested, finally, that to qualify as Marxist a regime must demonstrate an association with other communist forces internationally.4g It is certainly true that proletarian solidarity has been a central element in classical Marxism and at least on a declaratory basis in the political practice of most of the established communist-ruled countries. In most cases an affirmation of solidarity with other socialist countries and with progressive forces in general is also incorporated in the constitutions of these states. The Soviet provision to this effect is reasonably representative. Under Article 30 of its Constitution, the USSR is a ‘component part of the world system of socialism and the socialist commonwealth’, and it ‘develops and strengthens friendship, cooperation, and mutual comradely assistance with the countries of socialism on the principle of socialist internationalism’. There are analogous provisions in the constitutions of Albania (Art. 15), Bulgaria (Art. 12), Cuba (Arts. 11 and 12, an unusually comprehensive formulation), Czechoslovakia (Art. l(3)), the GDR (Art. 6(2)), Hungary (Art. 5(2)), Kampuchea (Art. lo), Korea (Art. IS), Mongolia (Preamble), Poland (Art. 6(2), a rather restrained version), Romania (Art. 14), and Vietnam (Art. 14). Even the Yugoslav Constitution in its preamble speaks of ‘socialist internationalism’ as one of the principles on which the foreign policy of the state is based. These formal commitments are supplemented by the membership of seven of the states involved in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and of ten of them in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, in which Yugoslavia also holds associate status.

A number of the socialist-oriented states in Africa and Asia make similar commitments in their constitutions. Afghanistan, for instance, is committed to a policy of friendship with the USSR and other members of the ‘socialist alliance’ (Art. 11); it has a friendship treaty with the USSR and has been represented on an invited basis at CMEA sessions. Mozambique also has a constitutional provision relating to support for the ‘socialist countries’ (Art. 22), and has a friendship treaty with the USSR and has been invited to attend CMEA sessions. For the most part, however, commitments in the area of foreign policy in these states are rather more ambiguous and lukewarm. The Congo, for instance, is committed to the principles of ‘national independence, peace, non-alignment, solidarity, friendshi; and cooperation with all peace and justice- loving peoples and governments’ (Art. 37), although it has also concluded a friendship treaty with the USSR. Angola, similarly, declares its solidarity with ‘all democratic and progressive forces in the world’ (Art. 15), and although like the Congo it has also

48. Irkhin, op. cit. note 45, pp. 57-58 and 59. 49. Brown, op. cit. note 8, p. 464.

262

concluded a friendship treaty with the USSR. Benin, on the other hand, is committed to nothing more than the unobjectionable principles of ‘non-alignment, equality, mutual respect for sovereignty, reciprocal advantages, and national dignity’ (Art. 11). Ethiopia lacks a written constitution and can thus make no formal commitment at this level to socialist internationalism, although it has a friendship treaty with the USSR and has participated by invitation in CMEA sessions. Madagascar has a friendship treaty with the USSR but makes no formal constitutional commitment to solidarity with the socialist countries, while Somalia abrogated its friendship treaty with the USSR in 1978 and has also no constitutional commitment to socialist internationalism.

Foreign policy commitments, in fact, emerge as a rather imperfect guide to the classification of a political system as communist or otherwise. China, for instance, undoubtedly a communist system, makes no reference in its current constitution to fraternal relations with other socialist countries; China, Albania, North Korea and Kampuchea play no part in the Warsaw Treaty Organization or in CMEA; and some of these generally-recognized communist states have been engaged in military hostilities with each other, as already noted. Many putatively communist systems, including some generally-recognized ones, are also members of international associa- tions of a clearly non-communist character, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the French Community. Conversely, a number of non- communist states, such as Finland and India, have friendship treaties or close ties of other kinds with the USSR and its allies. A formal commitment to proletarian solidarity does to some degree serve to distinguish the older-established communist systems from some of the states in the ‘new communist Third World’, whose commitments are generally much less clear and specific. The clear failure of such commitments to accord with the international behavior of the states concerned, however, together with the existence of numerous ‘anomalies’ on either side, suggest that this is a criterion of very limited value for identifying a communist system; or at least, that communist systems identified in this way cannot be thought of as constituting a cohesive ‘camp’ in international politics as they clearly did in the 1940s and 1950s.

Some Conclusions

There are of course no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ criteria for defining a political system as Marxist-Leninist or otherwise. It is perfectly possible, for instance, to define a communist system as one in which alienation, money, the division of labour, inequality and the state have all disappeared, and to conclude that in terms of this by no means unreasonable definition, no communist systems are presently in existence, have ever existed in the past, nor, perhaps are ever likely to exist in the future (a theological question which we must leave aside). This paper has avoided such an a priori

approach; its concern, rather, has been to attempt to establish whether the states generally recognized as communist or Marxist-Leninist, such as the USSR, Eastern Europe and China, possess a sufficient number of important characteristics in common to distinguish them, as a group, from other comparable but non-communist systems. More particularly, the paper has sought to establish whether any such characteristics might meaningfully be applied to a wider group of states than those conventionally classified as communist, such as those identified by some as communist on the basis of their commitment to Marxism-Leninism, and if so, whether a large number of other states not generally classified as Marxist-Leninist can properly be excluded.

263

On the whole, it was found that the three criteria of a formal commitment to Marxism-Leninism, an economy largely or wholly in public ownership, and the presence of a vanguard party exercising a leading role in the society did, taken together, serve to distinguish the earlier-established communist systems from those with which they have been implicitly equated in the ‘new communist Third World’, although there is a certain amount of obscurity and overlap at the margins, not least because of the political instability in and paucity of data about many of the countries concerned. The overlapping and obscurity at the margins, however, in turn suggest the importance of regarding the communist-non-communist distinction as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, with many socialist-oriented states sharing some (though not normally all) of the characteristics of fully communist systems such as an unambiguous commitment to Marxism-Leninism, a vanguard communist or workers’ party and extensive public ownership and control in their economies. If self-ascription alone is taken as the criterion, these important distinctions disappear from sight; it also becomes difficult to justify the exclusion of a large number of other states, particularly in the developing countries, which have dedicated themselves to some form of socialism and copied many of the institutional features of the completely communist systems. Up to 50 states could be classified in this way in the early 198Os, a very high proportion of all the states in the world which are not developed capitalist countries or right-wing dictatorships. It can scarcely represent an advance in the precision and discrimination of our vocabulary to define all these as ‘Marxist-Leninist’ or ‘communist systems’.

Finally, are the political and economic criteria which have been suggested for defining a communist system an unimportant or random group of characteristics? Both comparative politics and Marxism itself suggest otherwise. They suggest, rather, that characteristics such as a single ruling party and a largely publicly-owned economy form an identifiable ‘cluster’ of attributes, and that the absence of any one of them is likely to prove temporary and disequilibrating. Karl Deutsch and his associates, for instance, have shown that there are no centrally planned countries with pluralistic political systems, although democratic socialists have aspired for more than a hundred years to combine them.50 The private ownership of at least a substantial section of the productive resources of a society is likely to prove to be one of the most effective means by which the powers of government can be constrained, and no such state of affairs is likely in the long run to be compatible with a system of party rule of a genuinely Leninist character. In terms of orthodox Marxism, equally, the private ownership of productive wealth stands in the way of the realization of the full potential of a society for the benefit of all its members, a goal to which a Marxist-Leninist or communist party must necessarily subscribe. None of the characteristics that we have suggested appears to be unique to the generally-accepted communist systems; in no other system, however, do all three occur in this distinctive and apparently by no means accidental combination. If classifications of this kind are necessary, and the experience of political scientists over many years suggests that they are, then it surely makes better sense to reserve the label ‘communist’ for systems characterized by this distinctive cluster of attributes than to place them within a single and undifferentiated category together with a variety of radical nationalist regimes.

50. Karl W. Deutsch, Jorge I. Dominguez and Hugh He&, Comparattue Gouernment. Politics ojIndustrial- trednndDeuelopin~Nations(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p. 6.

what is a communist system?

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