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Sand Casting ConferenceOctober 22, 2014 – Indianapolis, IN USA

OSHA’S SILICA RULEMAKING,

WHAT FOUNDRIES NEED TO

KNOW

Thomas Slavin

Slavin OSH Group, LLC.


Presentation Overview

• Background on Silica Rulemaking

• Key Issues for Foundries

– Health risk

– Technological feasibility

– Economic feasibility

– Standard provisions

• What happens next

• Q&A


Respirable Crystalline Silica

• Respirable:

4 micron

• Thoracic:

10 micron

• Inhalable:

100 micron

1 4 7 10 30 100

Size (diameter) in microns

INHALABLE

THORACIC

RESPIRABLE

3



(SiO2)• Crystalline

forms:– quartz– cristobalite– tridymite

• Amorphous forms: – glass, – diatomaceous

earth

• Vitreous forms– Fused silica



• Current PEL formula is for total respirable dust containing silica (quartz)

• New PEL is for quartz only100 µg/m3 of quartz

• Lake sand is ̴ 95% quartz

• Respirable foundry dust is ̴15% quartz

5

Dust PEL = 10 mg/m3

(%Quartz + 2)

PEL = Permissible Exposure Limit

µg/m3 = micrograms per cubic meter


• Lowers quartz PEL by 50% from 100 to

50µg/m3

– Cristobalite PEL already at 50µg/m3

– Construction PEL at 250µg/m3

• Contains several ancillary provisions

– Air monitoring, medical tests, training

– Regulated area

• Prohibits sweeping and compressed air

• Dismisses rotation and respirators as

suitable control methods

Proposal Highlights


• Health risk-

– Is there a need for a standard?

– Will a standard lower risk?

• Technological feasibility

– Is compliance possible?

– Is measurement accurate?

• Economic feasibility

– Will business impact be acceptable?

Key Regulatory Issues –

What OSHA Needs to Show


Silicosis Deaths and Death Rates

1968-2007

This is a Great

Public Health

Success Story

8


OSHA Risk Estimates • Uses other silicosis plus other diseases (lung

cancer, renal disease) to establish risk

• OSHA analysis faulted for

– Study selection bias (omits many foundry studies)

– Data selection bias

– Model selection bias

– Model uncertainty bias

– Model over-fitting bias

– Confirmation bias

– Investigator bias

– Specification errors

– Threshold smoothing and shifting bias

– Uses models that cannot detect threshold

Every

Bias

in the

Book?


Vermont Granite Shed Studies

Attfield and Costello (2004)

• 5414 workers

• 201 lung cancer cases

• Through 1994

• Excluded highest exposure

group

• Incomplete worker status

follow up

• Inaccurate exposure

assessments

• Inaccurate worker categories

• Lung cancer risk

• OSHA relies on

Vacek (2011)

• 7052 workers

• 356 cases

• Through 2004

• Included all exposure

groups

• 162 workers assumed alive

in 1994 were actually dead

• 5204 more exposure

measurements

• Job assumptions corrected

• No lung cancer risk

• OSHA rejects10


Bottom Line on Health Risk

• Dramatic reduction in silicosis cases

• No evidence of lung cancer or other diseases

without silicosis

• Evidence of threshold above 100 mg/m3 for all effects

• Improved compliance could eliminate residual risk

• BUT… OSHA has considerable discretion in

interpreting health risk data

• Comforting to us…

...But NOT compelling to Court


Key Foundry Issue:

Technological Feasibility• One gram of silica sand (same as artificial

sweetener packet) would generate

exposure level above proposed PEL in

space the size of football field 13 feet high


• Definition of compliance - What does

meeting the proposed PEL mean?

1. All employers all of the time

• (OSHA enforcement)

2. Most employers most of the time

• (OSHA proposal)

3. Any employer ever

• (OSHA feasibility analysis)

• Many foundries use definition #2

• Measure of confidence needed

Key Foundry Issue:

Technological Feasibility


Compliance in OSHA PEA vs.

Compliance in Real World

Number

of

Samples

Proposed PEL

Compliance OSHA PEA Feasibility

AB

Exposure Levels

OSHA PEA considers control to be feasible if case study (A) was ever able to achieve proposed PEL; Compliance requires assurance that PEL is met

with some level of confidence (B).

14


GM Defiance Foundry

Proposed

PEL

Current

PEL


Does this show feasibility?

Proposed

PEL


GM Saginaw Data

• 622 samples (1998-2013)

• Geometric mean = 22 µg/m3

• 25% exceeded proposed PEL (50 µg/m3)

• 13% exceeded current PEL (100 µg/m3)

• 5% exceeded 200 µg/m3

• What mean level must be achieved to be

in compliance?


Foundry Exposure Data

Mean is 46 mg/m3 but 16% of samples exceed 115 mg/m3

From study by R.C. Scholz, 2014

18


OSHA Feasibility Analysis Uses

Wrong Target

• OSHA issues citations if any exposures exceed

PEL, even if mean is below PEL

• To be confident that proposed 50 mg/m3 PEL is met

84% of time, mean exposure must be below 20

mg/m3. (much lower to reach 95% level)

• Engineering control target must be 20 mg/m3 or

less.

• OSHA feasibility conclusion based on wrong

target.

19


Control Capability – ISO 9 Clean Room

Could Exceed Proposed PEL

20

Silica Mass

>=0.1 µm >=0.2 µm >=0.3 µm >=0.5 µm >=1 µm >=5 µm µg/m3

ISO 1 10 2

ISO 2 100 24 10 4

ISO 3 1,000 237 102 35 8

ISO 4 10,000 2,370 1,020 352 83

ISO 5 100,000 23,700 10,200 3,520 832 29

ISO 6 1,000,000 237,000 102,000 35,200 8,320 293 0.07

ISO 7 352,000 83,200 2,930 0.66

ISO 8 3,520,000 832,000 29,300 6.63

ISO 9 35,200,000 8,320,000 293,000 66.29

ISO 14644-1 Cleanroom Standards

Class

maximum particles/m3

Exceeds Proposed PEL


Control Capability Overstated

• OSHA assumes that engineering controls will produce

same reduction in all operations

• OSHA treats controls like recipes in a cookbook that

have never been tried before

– Foundries have extensive experience with virtually every

control discussed: ventilation, enclosure, vacuuming, non-

silica sand, etc.

– None have magic powers to reduce silica below proposed PEL

throughout the industry

– Some listed controls (e.g. pneumatic sand transfer systems)

cause more problems than they solve

– Some controls (e.g. sand substitution) cannot be used in all

operations

21


Adding Control Capability

• Cleaning and finishing example (IV-170)

– 69% reduction in one foundry with downdraft ventilation

• No evidence of continued performance

• Assumes same reduction for all exposed operators

• Many foundries already use downdraft

• Controls chosen for optimum applicability in one situation

– 67% reduction for precleaning

• Silica due to burned in sand, not dirty castings

• Most foundries already preclean

• Additive approach (90% total reduction) not warranted

– Subtracts additional 38 µg/m3 for reduced background

• Fully effective additive assumption is not appropriate


OSHA Uses 18 Case Studies to

Demonstrate Technological Feasibility

• Isolated data points taken out of context

• Case studies actually show:

– Controls often unsuccessful ( for current PEL)

– Control are more difficult (several iterations)

– Implementation often takes several years

• “It is reasonable to expect that on any particular day an overexposure to silica could occur.” – OSHA area director referring to sample result used by OSHA to show feasibility of compliance with proposed PEL


Technological Feasibility

Bottom Line1. Despite extensive, expensive and sincere

efforts, many foundries find it difficult to reliably meet the current PEL for certain operations and will not likely be able to meet the proposed lower PEL.

2. Cases used to show feasibility, show opposite

3. Real world compliance target (continuous control) is much more difficult than the test used in OSHA’s feasibility determination (occasional control)

4. Traditional control methods may not be capable of clean room level dust control

24


Economic Feasibility

25


OSHA URS/

Environomics

Annualized Cost

(incremental)

$44 million $2,200 million

Annual Cost as

percent of

revenue

0.2% 9.9%

Annual Cost as

percent of profit

4.8% 276%

Widely Different Cost

Estimates

26


Economic Feasibility –

How Can Estimates Be So Different?

1. Marginal cost error

– Assumes no greater cost to achieve 50 than 100µg/m3

– Industry estimate is 5 times more to get to 50µg/m3

– Room cooling analogy

2. First Time Success Error

– Assumes control works perfectly the first time

– Cases show lengthy multi-step process

3. Under 50 error

– No costs counted to reduce exposures below 50µg/m3

– May need to reduce exposures to 15 or 20µg/m3

27


Economic Feasibility –

How Can Estimates Be So Different?4. Discounted cost

– No cost for 2/3 workers exposed above current PEL

– Assumes no additional cost to go from 100 to 50

– Assumes no costs under 50

5. Per worker calculation

– Divided costs of controls by number of workers (typically 4) assuming each control would protect 4 workers

– Employees may operate multiple machines

– No cost for automated operations

6. Understated costs

– Ventilation at $5/cfm

– Industry experts estimate $20 plus $7 make up

– EPA estimates $5 to $40 (2 million cfm to 5000 cfm)

28


Economic Analysis

Unit Costs & Quantity Understated

HEPA Vacuum

OSHA Assumption:

15 gallon HEPA Vacuum

$3,495 initial cost

$1,009 annual cost

Foundry: 2 cubic yard 40 HP

system with HEPA filter ($45,000

initial cost plus $15,000 hoses and

attachments)

29

http://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&docid=W3wN99GHQIjGhM&tbnid=mcJq0Ac-HrfrmM:&ved=0CAUQjRw&url=http://www.durovac.com/industrialvacuums/portable-vacuum/powerlift-ultra.htm&ei=U0U9UuaCEOOH2gWtjYHYCQ&bvm=bv.52434380,d.b2I&psig=AFQjCNGB-K53mF2fGYmq14Gcz64dqWCWfg&ust=1379833489567232


Abrasive Blasting Case Study

• Several steps documented in case history

– Replaced shot blast machine and ventilation ($107,000

for used machine)

– Covered and ventilated conveyor from shakeout

– Added skip buckets to load shot blast

– Covered conveyor next to shot blast

– Added enclosure and ventilation to shakeout exit

– Added ventilation to skip bucket enclosure

• OSHA cost estimate for abrasive blast operator

– $1,349 per worker for improved maintenance (based on

$8,000 Norton blast cabinet)


7. Controls Listed but Not Costed

(Only 24 of 46 controls costed)

• Substitution of Non-Silica Sand ($2 billion)

– 3 million tons of silica sand/yr times extra $700/ton

• Pneumatic Sand Transport System ($150 million)

– If used by 25% of foundries

• Production downtime to clean before beginning maintenance ($300 million)

• Professional cleaning ($1 per sq. ft. plus $400 million downtime)

• Automated Knock-Off

• Isolate Pouring & Shakeout in Separate Room

• Precast Refractories

• Didion drum to clean scrap for furnace operators

• Non-silica core coatings

• Low silica refractory

• Automated abrasive blast to pre-clean castings before finishing

• Wet methods31


7. Omitted Costs • Many costs and controls are omitted entirely

• Discussed in technological section but omitted from economic section

– E.g. Precleaning castings

– $1349 for maintenance* but nothing for blast unit

– *based on $8000 blast unit

• Missing operations

– Cut off saws

– Torch cutting

– Arc Air operations

• Ductwork, engineering design, and installation

• EPA modeling and permitting

• Upgrading baghouses to BACT if required

32


8. Other Errors

• 10 year replacement cost assumption lowers annual capital cost (replacement needed more often in abrasive environment)

• Profit calculation used inflated profit number

– 2000-2006 years used (pre-recession)

– Industry profit based on firms reporting profit; did not include those reporting loss

• ISO/CEN sampling change lowers PEL by 20-30%

33


OSHA Proposed Standard

Specific Provisions

• Regulated Area

• Contaminated Clothing

• Prohibit Sweeping & Compressed Air

• Methods of Compliance

• Monitoring

• Compliance Dates



Regulated Area

• Demarcate areas where overexposures exist and

require respirators for anyone inside

• Unmanageable - Based on TWA exposure of employees

who may move around vs. concentration in an area

(e.g. maintenance worker who spends part of time on

office)

• Unnecessary – Adds no protection

• Costly - Increases number of people in respirator

program (engineers, quality, material handlers,

maintenance)



Contaminated Clothing

• “Grossly Contaminated” is not defined

• Refers to visible dust NOT respirable

• Study (Exponent) shows no appreciable

exposure from dirty clothing

• When entering or leaving regulated area:

– Clothing change

– Vacuuming clothing (8 minutes)

– Blow off booth (30 sec cycle) - $11,000 (cost not

included)



No Sweeping or Compressed Air

• “if Contribute to Overexposure”

– Not defined; but referred to as prohibition in question 66

• Restriction on air wands for cleaning floor, rafter blow

down may be reasonable

• Cleaning molds, patterns and core machines may be

difficult and hazardous (put worker in danger zone)

• Automated processes (e.g. molding machines) may not

be able to function

• Wet methods not suitable and may be dangerous

(rust, molten metal hazard)



Methods of Compliance

• Must use engineering controls, even if NOT

effective

• Employee rotation prohibited as control

(may be used for other reasons)

• Respirators are NOT allowed as a control,

but required until controls are effective

• Removed exemption for respirator as

control for exposures less than 30 days



Exposure Monitoring

• New monitoring requirements

– Quarterly monitoring for every employee above PEL

– Semi-annual monitoring for every employee above action level

(25mg/m3)

– Full shift samples

• If no new information is to be learned, the

requirement is unproductive & punitive

– Other sampling options (e.g. real time monitoring, area mapping)

may provide information on sources and controls

– Waste of resources that could help with controls



Compliance Dates

• Effective 60 days after final rule

announced

• Only 1 Year to install engineering controls

– Ignores potential permitting issues

– Ignores time to design & implement controls

– Ignores fact that accurate air sampling not

available; labs have 2 years to meet accuracy

requirements


WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

41


Background on Silica Rulemaking

– OSHA spent years developing proposal

– 2012 SBREFA panel

– 2013

• September- Published proposal (Only 152 Days to analyze

proposal and comment)

– 2014

• March - Hearings

• June - Post hearing comments (OSHA Data dump to

docket early June)

• August 18 - Post hearing briefs (docket now closed)

– Entering dark period

– OMB must review final standard

– Dr. Michaels expects final rule by 2016


Foundry Industry Response

• Strongest industry response, according to

OSHA

• Foundry members provided valuable data,

and resources

• AFS made detailed review of OSHA

assessments and analysis of costs

• AFS economic and technological

arguments remain largely uncontradicted

in record


End Game Options?

1. OSHA listens

– Maintains current PEL with ancillary provisions

– Foundries still have challenge to meet current PEL (especially with change in size criteria)

– Option: redefine PEL as being mean exposure

2. OSHA ignores

– Tries to meet political target

– OMB approval hurdle

– Court challenge (overturn or force revision)

3. Compromise

– 50 µg/m3 PEL but allow respirators below 100

– More time to come into compliance

44


• Budget – drop funding

• Pressure to conduct updated

SBREFA review

• Ask National Academy of Sciences to

study measurement and health risk

issues

• Oversight of flawed process

Is There Room for

Congressional Action?


Getting Ready in the

Meantime• Exposure assessment

– Variability and confidence

– Source evaluation

• Operational review – size up the

impact and need for court challenge

– Compressed air

– Sweeping

– Regulated area


Questions ??

Thomas Slavin

Slavin OSH Group, LLC

312-863-2350

708-937-3244

[email protected]

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