what do we know about drivers of radicalisation …...what do we know about drivers of...

What do we know about drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism, globally and in Niger?Aoife McCullough and Mareike Schomerus

Literature review

February 2017

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What do we know about drivers of radicalization and violent extremism? Literature review 3

1. Latest thinking on drivers of radicalisation

1.1. Framework for understanding radicalisation There is no one agreed upon framework for understanding radicalisation in the literature. This may be a good thing—a phenomenon as multi-faceted, amorphous and complex as radicalisation benefits from being viewed through multiple interpretative lenses and examined through different methods. In this literature review, we draw on the definition of radicalisation as denoting a “shift in attitudes, beliefs and practices that depart significantly from the mainstream in society”1 as our starting point.

The literature indicates that radicalisation precedes but does not necessarily lead to terrorism and violent extremism. For example, study conducted on “home-grown” terrorism in the UK, Canada, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, found that radicals are not necessarily terrorists.2 People who hold radical ideas do not necessarily engage in terrorism but that “different pathways and mechanisms operate in different ways for different people at different points in time and perhaps

in different contexts”.3 It is also inaccurate to assume that violence is by necessity a result of radicalisation. For example, in Northern Nigeria, the police are often absent in rural areas and young boys are expected to defend themselves and their families. It comes as no surprise that they often resort to violent and thus become more amenable to joining radical groups.4

As radicalisation is defined in relation to the values of mainstream society, the term is necessarily relative. What may be considered radical in one society may be considered normal in another – Radicalism is “necessarily dynamic because it depends on contexts and perspectives”.5

There are a range of theories on the drivers of radicalisation which range from psychological theories of malfunction at the individual level, to understanding radicalisation as a response to economic and political circumstances. In the next section, some of the most common theories of ‘drivers of radicalisation’ are outlined along with the evidence to support these theories.

1.2. Common theories on the drivers of radicalisation

Table 1: Examining the evidence for common theories on the drivers of radicalisation67891011121314151617181920212223242526

Common theory on drivers of radicalisation

Evidence base

There are broadly identifiable demographic or socio-economic similarities across those who are radicalising.

Broadly identifiable patterns in the socio-economic background of those who commit extremist violence do not exist.6 Identifying at-risk groups solely based on demographic factors is not possible.7

Poverty pushes people towards radical and extremist ideas.

Poverty is not identified as a clear cause for extremism.8 Though some extremist groups offer improved livelihoods, many of those joining extremist groups come from comfortable or even wealthy backgrounds.9 A comprehensive literature review finds that the evidence supporting a clear link between poverty and extremism is mixed.10

Inequality increases the likelihood those not benefitting from the status quo will be more receptive to radical messages

It is widely accepted that inequality can and does contribute to violent conflict, sparked by deep injustices and structural deficiencies that leave groups of people behind.11 Existing studies link Boko Haram’s emergence with long-standing grievances in the region, manifested in relative deprivation.12 A recent study by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) showed that inequality of opportunity can make youth vulnerable to recruitment from Boko Haram.13

Radicals or violent extremists are uneducated.

Lack of education is not an established factor.14 A study conducted on Egypt’s Islamist militant groups, for example, points out the high academic achievement of its members. Equally, studies which focused on the link between education at a madrassa and vulnerability to radicalisation failed to find a strong correlation in both Pakistan15 and northern Nigeria.16

Radicalisation is a response to illegitimate government, particularly those that feature weak institutions and repression

There is a large body of research which links illegitimate government and the rise of armed opposition groups.17 In Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Libya, a link was found between perceptions of an illegitimate or hypocritical state and the growth of radical Islamic movements.18 In Iraq, it was found that improved service provision reduced support for armed insurgent movements.19 Grievances around insufficient basic services and abuses committed by the state have also been cited as factors in the rise of Boko Haram.20

Social media drives radicalisation. The direct causality between access to information (or lack thereof) and radicalization is severely under-researched.

Of significance is that there has been no work that has categorically shown violent extremists share similar psychiatric or psychologic patterns.21 There is tentative work that shows that often extremism follows a conversion from an opposite set of values—for example from petty criminality to devout religious faith.22 More recent psychological work has taken a slightly different angle, examining what specific cognitive patterns contribute to processes of identity formation that can lead to extremist views for some.23

Radicalism and extremism is cause by a psychological malfunction

There has been no work that has categorically shown violent extremists share similar psychiatric or psychologic patterns.24 There is tentative work that shows that often extremism follows a conversion from an opposite set of values—for example from petty criminality to devout religious faith.25 More recent psychological work has begun examining what specific cognitive patterns contribute to processes of identity formation that can lead to extremist views for some.26

1.3. The importance of social networks

While research on drivers of radicalisation continues to develop ever more diverse insights into causes and supporting factors, one factor stands out across all suggested explanations: Nobody radicalises on their own. If there is something resembling a consensus in the growing evidence base on what supports or pulls people back from radicalisation, it is that personal relationships matter.27 These can be individual peer and family relationships as well as group connections.28 A Mercy Corps study of ISIS foreign fighters originating in Jordan showed that social ties were a strong factor in recruitment.29 In Nigeria, research by both Mercy Corps and the Stability Reconstruction programme found that friends and other relations “play instrumental roles in the radicalization process by propagating the ‘virtues’ of the group and normalizing membership within it.”30

Relationships are influential through a wide range of mechanisms. Gaining higher social status through peer respect31 or through membership of a radicalised peer group32 have been identified as important factors in motivating people to engage in radical thinking or violent actions. The power of peer pressure is multi-faceted and can be expressed through fear of victimisation, where individuals dread repercussions if they do not join an extremist group, either by the group itself or by peer groups that might judge them.33

This peer respect can be fuelled by a shared identity, including a religious identity.34 A shared identity also highlights the importance of belonging and community, which in some older studies on terrorism has been seen as more important than the actual violence itself.35 Other studies highlight the importance of individuals who

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influence a person—almost in a mentor-like capacity—to join, for example, Boko Haram.36

This factor also includes radicalisation in opposition to existing relationships, for example as a rebellion against values held by family or friends.37 Relationships are also hugely influential in shaping trajectories away from extremism. One study finds that members of families or groups who discuss politics are more likely to see the value of participating in politics and are less likely to withdraw from politics or choose violence against a disliked political system.38 Another study in Nigeria found that migration from rural to urban areas to escape parental control or injustice is a key experience that may lead to radicalisation. A son’s angry withdrawal to the city can render him vulnerable to radical groups (NSRP, 2015:6).

The nature of influential social relationships is often portrayed in a reductive manner, depicted as manipulation of beliefs, identity, interpretations of history or choice of violent methods.39 This manipulation happens in a complex interplay of identity formation and other enabling factors, and exploitation of both by extremist groups.40

Manipulation can happen through what some refer to as ‘radicalisers’ or ‘groomers’.41

The explanation of manipulation highlights one of the great challenges in understanding violent extremism: It implicitly projects a somewhat infantilized image of extremists through the suggestion that those who radicalize are malleable, immature and infantile. The image of the teenager rebelling against authorities is regularly conjured up in debates about violent extremism—helped by the fact that those who commit violence tend to be young. This perspective implicitly suggests that individuals will outgrow their beliefs—yet this somewhat patronising response potentially contributes to strengthening beliefs, rather than weakening them.

1.3.1. Networks and beliefs Social connections determine or at the very least shape individual beliefs, values, morals or spiritual leadership or what Atran refers to as ‘sacred values.’42 If beliefs are coupled with personal relationships based on shared or developing beliefs, a greater sense of purpose can act as a factor in pushing individuals towards choosing violence.43

These can be religious or spiritual, moral, or political beliefs and can be expressed through the conviction that a group, a way of life or a political system needs to be destroyed.44 Identity often draws heavily on these beliefs.45

They are linked to an understanding of dignity, recognition and respect (not only for oneself, but also for one’s community and one’s culture). The perception that one is

being denied recognition at a collective and personal level often is considered a critical driver of violent extremism.

Perceptions of cultural threats, meaning that one group holds an existential fear of domination by another group—most prominently this has been the West, or an international order that seeks to establish different norms is another belief linked with radicalisation and violent extremism. Beliefs related to culture also include more broadly perceived threats to related customs and values, including gender roles and education.46 Resisting these cultural threats is often linked to the notion of obtaining paradise47 if the cultural threat is interpreted through a religious lens.48

1.3.2. Radicalisation as linear process?Radicalisation is often a gradual process that takes time. Mere entry into a radical organization does not necessarily mean that the individual has been radicalized. A new-comer may later be radicalized via group dynamics, and this includes “shift to extreme views among like-minded individuals, extreme cohesion under isolation and threat” as well as competition for support and popularity within a radical group.49

Radicals are not necessarily violent extremists/terrorists.50 Most radicals do not engage in violence or terrorism; many terrorists do not have an ideological underpinning for their deeds.51 There is no clear and obvious trajectory of radicalisation; radicalisation is not the consequence of a long-term ‘maturation’ either in a political movement or in an Islamic environment.52

Moghaddam (2005) uses the analogy of a “staircase to terrorism” to capture the sometimes disjointed and incomplete pathway through which individuals get radicalized. On the ground floor, people perceive injustice but most of them do not do anything about it. Some will climb to the first floor in search of solutions. On the first floor, they seek solutions for their problems and some remain dissatisfied. Continued frustration pushes them to the second floor where they become receptive to being “influenced by leaders to displace their aggression onto an enemy”. A few of them would then move to the third floor where “a gradual engagement with the morality of terrorist organizations” allows them to see terrorism as a “justified strategy”.53 It is on the fourth floor that they are recruited to terrorist groups and on the fifth floor, “specific individuals are selected and trained to sidestep inhibitory mechanisms that could prevent them from injuring and killing both others and themselves and those selected are equipped and sent to carry out terrorist acts”.54

2. Focus on radicalisation in Niger/Sahel

In the literature on the drivers of radicalisation in Niger and more broadly in the Sahel, there is a tendency to focus on the political and economic factors in radicalisation, perhaps reflecting the disciplines represented in international development. In this section, we review this literature with some critical reflections on the findings of this research.

In a literature review of the drivers of extremism and radicalisation in Mali and Niger carried out for DFID in 2013, the drivers of radicalisation in this region were identified as

1. State fragility; 2. Economic distress and poor human development; 3. Historical discontent among the Touaregs;4. Transnational organised crime; and 5. Fundamentalist streams of Islam were penetrating

society in Niger.55

While the review convincingly shows that such problems exist in Niger, it does not offer any empirical evidence of how these challenges create or drive radicalisation. For example, no evidence is cited on how perceptions of state weakness motivate Nigeriens to join extremist groups. There is also no empirical data provided that shows that supporters of Niger’s Movement des Nigerien pour la Justice (MNJ) are more likely to join Islamist groups.

A more comprehensive literature review of drivers of radicalisation in North and West Africa, again for DFID and citing research from Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Nigeria and Ghana,56 stressed historical antagonisms, political climate, socio-economic factors and marginalisation of young people as important elements.

The research reviewed which shows a link between historical antagonisms, political climate and radicalisation was from Tunisia,57 Algeria,58 Nigeria,59 Morocco and Libya.60 These studies show a link between perceptions of an illegitimate or hypocritical state and the growth of radical Islamic movements. Pargeter (2009) argues that radicalisation should be understood in the broad context of political and cultural resistance to a delegitimised and stagnated central authority.61 He highlights that those areas that have a history of rebellion and resistance against colonialization are particularly receptive to Islamic radicalisation. Many of the populations in these areas have

also problematized the concept of a secular state. In more recent work, scholars on Boko Haram describe how Boko Haram claims that its violence is a response to a decades long history of persecution against Muslims in northern Nigeria.62

In the DFID literature review, research from Morocco,63

Libya,64 Nigeria65 and Ghana,66 showed that radical Islam is likely to resonate with populations in areas with economic and social inequalities. Drawing from empirical research in Mauritania, Boukhars (2012) finds that lack of access to education disproportionately affects those that are already poor and marginalised, and can exacerbate feelings of anger towards a central authority.67

In the literature review, the marginalisation of youth is understood partly as a product of unemployment. Low levels of employment have been noted as a contributory factor to radicalisation among both young and old in research in Tunisia,68 Morocco and Libya.69 However in more recent research in Mali, the link between unemployment and radicalisation was not so clear: Here those who joined radical groups were as likely to join to earn an income as to protect their current income.70

Aside from these broad political and social drivers of radicalisation within countries, the DFID review also identified international events such as the war in Iraq or Israel’s actions in Palestine as political factors that resonate with those who are inspired by radical movements. The integration of these events into the ideology of radical movements shifts the inspiration for these movements beyond the problems experienced at the national level.

The decline of traditional Islamic organisations is a driver included in the review but the evidence for this is limited. The idea of ‘traditional Islam’ in West Africa will be interrogated in the next section.

A recent analysis of the causes and processes of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria by Sani Umar and Raufu Mustapha71 stresses that radicalisation has multiple causes.72 The report included case studies of students of Koranic schools (almajirai) and women. Almajirai were not found to be more likely to be radicalised—and the majority interviewed expressed views that contradicted the basic tenets of Boko Haram ideology. This finding is in line with research in other countries where those educated in madrassas were not found to be more likely to join the Taliban in Pakistan.73

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Women’s radicalisation was found to be directly connected to the wider context of gender roles in Nigeria. Social expectations of women to be dependent on men for their livelihood compelled women to join Boko Haram once their husbands had done so. Some women chose to be active participants in Boko Haram; they shared the group’s ideology and became involved in its operations. They served as logisticians, recruiters and even operational leaders. Many other women were forced to join by circumstances and/or family members. Abduction is a common pathway of coercing women into Boko Haram. Unlike the active participants, coerced women undertake roles under duress without necessarily becoming radicalised.

Research carried out by Mercy Corps broadly supports this analysis. Mercy Corps found that Boko Haram members do not share one demographic profile. Former members interviewed came from diverse backgrounds; some had jobs and others did not. Some had attended secular school; some had been to Islamic school while others had dropped out. In his detailed analysis of the rise of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, Andrew Walker describes how the sect initially attracted a mix of people from different socio-economic backgrounds including successful Kanouri traders, disaffected (and often wealthy) youth and the urban poor.74

In the Mercy Corps study, it was found that broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance of Boko Haram. Boko Haram took advantage of deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses to gain a foothold in communities. About half of former members said their communities at some time generally supported the group, hoping it would bring a change in government. That support later waned as Boko Haram’s tactics became more brutal.

Both the Mercy Corps study and Walkers analysis found that social relationships were key to understanding the spread of Boko Haram. Influence from social and business networks was found to be a key factor in recruitment. In the Mercy Corps study, it was that found that almost all former members cited a friend, family member, or business colleague as a factor for joining Boko Haram. One influential person seems to have greater weight in guiding this decision than whether or not a large number of people in a youth’s network joined. Many youths described either accepting loans prior to joining or joining with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses.

Research carried out by International Alert (2016)75 found that a lack of trust in state and security forces, plus injustice, self-protection and economic hardship are the primary drivers of people’s readiness to take up arms. In interviews conducted with community members who describe others who support violent extremist groups, there is a sense of impatience; ‘In street discussions, I hear that

other young craftsmen will take up arms if their conditions don’t improve’ (pg4).

2.1. History of Islamic reform movements in the SahelThe debate over the ‘right form’ of Islam has a long history in the Sahel. This debate existed before colonialism but the huge social changes, movement of people and adjustment in the hierarchies of power that colonialism brought intensified the debate over how Islam should be practiced.76

The French were influential in promoting secular states in both Niger and Mali. Yet by the early 20th century they had developed a ‘Muslim policy’ that involved the promotion of certain Muslim leaders and the detention or deportation into exile of other Muslim leaders who were considered dissidents.77 In the early 20th century, the Taniya Sufi brotherhood was considered a threat and the French even resorted to deporting the Tijaniyya leader at the time, Sheikh Ahmad Hamallah.78 The Tijaniyya are now considered a moderate and tolerant form of Islam with which international agencies often seek to engage. The changing fate of the Tijaniyya movement highlights the vagaries of what is considered acceptable or not in Islam by international powers.

In Northern Nigeria, the Sufist Qadiriyya tradition became dominant in the early 1800s, with the establishment of Dan Fodio’s caliphate. The Sufist Taniya movement contested the dominance of Qadiriyya throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. As in Mali, the Taniya influence was a source of concern for colonial authorities in Northern Nigeria, who worried about the influence of the ‘modern’ Tijaniyya missionaries in their provinces.79 Although linked to power in different ways, both the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods challenged Hausa rulers at different times and promoted reform in the practice of Islam.80 Famous Sufist reformist include the Tijaniyya jihad leader al-Hajj Umar Taal (d. 1864), and the Qadiriyya leader Usman dan Fodio (d.1817). Dan Fodio was active in critiquing innovation or bidaa.

By the 1930s, Salafist reformist movements had already appeared in different locations across the Sahel. French colonial administrators reported that Muslim activists in Timbuktu and Gao were challenging Sufi prayer styles.81 Some Muslims returning home from pilgrimage or study in Egypt strengthened the ranks of reformists in the 1940s and 1950s.82 In the 1950s, Bamako and Sikasso witnessed violent clashes between reformists and Sufists, because the reformists refused to attend congregational prayers led by Sufists.83 The issues that divided reformists and Sufists in this period—how to pray, how and when to celebrate, or how to define Islamic doctrines—remain the very issues that are contested today.

In the 1970s, Nigerian Salafis started to publically question the orthodoxy of Sufism.84 In Niger, there was limited political and civil space for Salafis to open debate

about the practice of Islam during the 70s and 80s but with the advent of multi-party democracy in 1992, that space opened up for a much wider debate on how Islam should be practiced in Niger and indeed how Niger should be governed. Salafists were especially active in these debates. Inspired by ideas of reform and models that they have either experienced or imagined, they strove to promote change in the practice of Islam and in the moral social order in Niger.85

What is clear from the literature is that to understand Sufist movements as ‘traditional’ to the Sahel is to overlook the evolving and contested nature of Islam. It is true that the majority of traditional leaders in Niger adhere to a Sufi form of Islam but the reformist movement represented by Salafists is not new. It is presented as foreign and ‘wrong’ by traditional leaders as it threatens the power that they gain from the Sufi tradition being the dominant form of Islam practiced in Niger.

There is also an important geo-political angle to the different Islamic movements which seek to promote religious reform in the practice of Islam in northern Nigeria and Niger. During the 1980s, the Qadiriyya in Northern Nigeria and Niger were linked with Qaddafi who provided resources and funding to the movement.86 As the Qadiriyya were active in opposing the Salafist Izala movement who were funded and supported by Saudi Arabia, this alliance also benefitted Qaddafi. Meanwhile one part of the Tijaniyya movement in northern Nigeria established links with Iran and another part fostered links with Morocco.87

2.1.1. The Rise of the Izala Movement in Niger In Niger, the most influential Salafist movement is arguably the Izala movement. The founder of the Izala movement was Abubakar Gumi (1924-1992), a senior Muslim judge who was educated in an Arabic language British colonial school in Northern Nigeria. The movement spread to Niger in the 1980s but only started to become prominent in the 1990s. Its first major representative in Niger was Malam Shu’aibu Ladan, a student of Abubakar Gumi who started to build the movement in Maradi. Shu’aibu Ladan and his followers found a major group of supporters among the “alhazai”, the wealthy, mostly Hausa, merchants of Niger’s bigger towns, who became the major donors of the movement, financing its activities.88 Artisans, functionaries, university and high school graduates, and some malaman (religious teachers) linked with the Sufi orders joined the movement and helped to spread it to other towns in Niger.89

In Niger, the movement positions itself against Sufism and its activism has provoked bitter debates between Sufis and Salafis, with Sufis seeking to marginalize and constrain the Izalas. Izalas in Niger critique the Sufist traditions on three fronts; their use of bidaa or innovation (e.g. integration of syncretism into Islam), the monetization of Islamic rituals and their support of a political order that

does support the Sunna.90 Their criticism of the Sufi orders led to conflicts with Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya followers, conflict that often turned violent, especially in the early years of Izala activism.91

Although different sects within the Izala movement have different emphasis, the Izala movement in Niger tends to be more politically radical than in Nigeria. The Izala in Niger openly critique the political establishment. According to the leader of Kitab wa Sunna, one of the major Izala movements in Niger, the current political order has failed to liberate Muslims because it remains structurally European (‘Milkin Nasaru’ - lit: the rule of the White men).92 In his view, ‘the people are Muslim, but the state is only half-Islamic’.93 To resolve this gap, Kitab wa Sunna undertakes social transformation initiatives94, not necessarily in attempting to capture the state apparatus, but rather in promoting Islamic learning. However, they also believe that only those who “know Islam” can be good and moral leaders. Izala members do not think that the current political establishment “know Islam”.

The Izala movement appeals to Nigeriens for many reasons. They promote modern education (using desks and blackboards) in Arabic so that people can read the Koran themselves. Through emphasizing education for all, the Izala encroached on the space of the Sufist imams, whose source of power emanated from being able to interpret the Koran for people.95 The Izala also revolutionised communication techniques, using preachers at grassroots levels to hold sermons, and using radio and TV to preach to a wider audience.96 This contributed to a democratization of religious debate. They critique flamboyant spending, particularly on weddings, funerals and naming ceremonies.97 For many poor people in Niger, this new source of morality which eased the burden of debt incurred from increasingly expensive rituals is hugely attractive. The Izala encourage criticism of authority, including of one’s parents. Loimeier notes that in some towns in Northern Nigeria, the Izala movement had a socially liberating effect as many youths and women were enabled to voice protest against their fathers or demand emancipation from their husbands based on religious arguments.98 Finally, the Izala movement managed to transcend ethnicity and social hierarchy to create a new form of community based on religious piety.

While the Izala receive funding from private donors in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, much of the cost of their social activities is financed by wealthy merchants and traders, but also by the contributions of their own members.99 Apart from the costs of the preaching campaigns and other activities, these funds allowed the ‘Yan Izala to provide members with some degree of financial and social support, a factor that explains the success of the ‘Yan Izala as a social and religious reform movement.

The Izala world view features a certain degree of intolerance of other world views. They believe that bidaa and Sunna (those who follow and promote the

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tradition of the Prophet Mohammed) cannot coexist as bidaa exposes the Sunna to ‘the risk of being diluted and eventually destroyed’.100 However, the Izala movement is not homogenous in its beliefs and its practice and ideology is constantly being contested resulting in numerous sub-groups and splinter associations. Some members are more radical in their position, others are more conciliatory. A particularly interesting development is the emergence of the ‘Sunnance’, a group of mostly young Nigeriens who identify with the Izala rationalist and modernist approach but who do not problematize the secular state.101

Current Izala leaders in Nigeria vehemently oppose Boko Haram. Thurston (2016) argues that Boko Haram is a result of fierce intra-Salafi competition for audiences.102

Notes

1 (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, 2015)

2 (Bartlett, Bridwell and King 2010)

3 (Borum, 2011: 8)

4 (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, 2015: 6)


6 (Bodea & Elbadawi. 2007; Goldstone, Jack, et al. 2010)

7 (Pargeter 2009) (Marks 2013) (Boubaker 2011) (Alao 2013)

8 (Berman, Eli, et al. 2011; Mercy Corps. 2015a)

9 (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014)

10 (Ranstorp 2016)

11 (Ranstorp 2016)

12 (Allan et al. 2015: 2)

13 (Ranstorp 2016)

14 (Ranstorp 2016)

15 (Allan et al. 2015: 2)

16 (Ranstorp 2016)

17 (Mercy Corps 2016)

18 (Allan et al. 2015: 7)

19 (R. Hassan, 2009)

20 (Allan et al. 2015: 4)

21 (Cramer, 2003)

22 (Agbiboa, 2014; 2013)

23 (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme. 2015)

24 (Allan et al. 2015: 5; Hassan 2012; Botha and Abdile 2014; Ibrahim 1980)

25 (Winthrop and Graff, 2010)

26 (Mercy Corps, 2016)

27 (USAID 2009) (Sheikh, Ginges, and Atran 2013) (Atran 2010)

28 (Hassan 2012; Ranstorp 2016) (Atran, 2010)

29 (Mercy Corps. 2015b)

30 (Mercy Corps, 2016)

31 (USAID 2011)

32 (Ranstorp 2016)

33 (Hassan 2012)

34 (Botha and Abdile 2014)

35 Horgan cited in (Borum 2004; Crenshaw 1998)

36 (Mercy Corps 2016)

37 (Ranstorp 2016)


39 (Hassan 2012)

40 (Allan et al. 2015: 4)

41 (Ranstorp 2016; Hassan 2012)

42 (Atran 2010)

43 (Taylor and Louis 2004)

44 (USAID 2009; Atran and Axelrod 2008)


46 (USAID 2011)

47 (Hassan 2012; Botha and Abdile 2014)



50 (Bartlett, Bridwell, and King 2010)

51 See (Borum 2011: 8)

52 (Ranstorp 2016)

53 (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, 2015:5)

54 (Ibid)

55 (Jillani 2013)

56 (Hinds 2013)

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57 (Pargeter 2009) (Marks 2013)

58 (Boubaker 2011)

59 (Alao 2013)

60 (Pargeter 2009)

61 (Pargeter 2009)

62 (Thurston 2016)

63 (Alonso and Gracia-Ray 2007)

64 (Pargeter 2009)

65 (Alao 2013)

66 (Aning and Abdallah 2013)

67 (Boukhars 2012)

68 (Merone and Cavatorta 2012; Marks 2013)

69 (Pargeter 2009)

70 (Institute for Security Studies 2016)

71(Mercy Corps 2016)

72 (Sani Umar 2015)

73 (Fair, 2007)

74 (Walker, 2016)

75 (International Alert, 2016)

76 (Launay and Soares 1999)

77 (Soares 2005)

78 (Thurston 2013)

79 (Hill 2013)

80 (Loimeier, 2016)

81 (Thurston 2013)

82 (Thurston 2013)

83 (Kaba 1974)

84 (Loimeier, 2016)

85 (Sounaye, 2015)

86 (Loimeier, 2016)

87 (Ibid.)

88 (Gregoire, 1991)

89 (Maikorema, 2007)

90 (Maikorema, 2007) (Sounaye, 2015; 2012)

91 (Loimeier, 2016) (Masquelier, 2009)

92 (Sounaye, 2012)

93 (Ibid: 431)

94 (Sounaye 2009) (Meunier 1998)

95 (Loimeier, 2016)

96 (Ibid.)

97 (Ibid.)

98 (Ibid.)

99 (Maikorema, 2007)

100 (Sounaye 2012: 437)

101 (Sounaye, 2015)

102 (Thurston 2016)

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