what did the people want?: the meaning of the 1945 general ... · important turning points in...

The Historical Journal, 35, 3 (1992), pp. 623-639Printed in Great Britain

WHAT DID 'THE PEOPLE' WANT?: THEMEANING OF THE 1945 GENERAL

ELECTION*

STEVEN FIELDINGUniversity of Salford

A B S T R A C T . Labour's victory at the general election of 1945, the first in which the party won anabsolute majority in the house of commons, had fundamental implications for Britain's post-warhistory. Despite this, historians have failed to examine the popular political temper which madeLabour's term of office possible. Instead, they have largely assumed that the Second World Warradicalized the public, turning an unprecedented number into enthusiastic Labour voters. Whilst notdenying that the war had a profound impact on the politics of some sections of society this articleproposes a rather different perspective to that normally offered. Instead of promoting pro-Laboursentiment it seems that the conflict left many members of the public disengaged from the politicalprocess and cynical about the motives of all politicians. As a consequence, rather than have Labourhold office by itself the generally favoured outcome appears to have been the formation of a progressivecoalition committed to the implementation of the Beveridge report. However, in reality, electors whodid not want to see the return of a Conservative government had no choice but to vote 'straight left'.

We sat on the slope of the Head to watch the circus, and I saw a groupsitting near in very earnest conversation, with their heads together. I'dhave loved to go and butt in. I love being in an argument, and thought,' Perhaps they are talking about the atomic bomb - or the result of theElection.' I've very good hearing, and when I'd got used to the differentsounds around, I could hear what they were discussing - the new coldperm! Every woman I know is interested in it - another revolution, whencurly hair can be assured by a method so simple that it can be done athome.(Nella Last, diary entry for 11 August 1945)1

I

The general election of July 1945 is widely considered to be one of the mostimportant turning points in modern British political history, comparable withthe events of 1832 and 1906. The Labour party not only won its firstparliamentary majority, but also introduced a wide-ranging programme ofsocial and economic reform which provided the basis for a political consensus

* 1 wish to acknowledge the following for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper: SteveConstantine, Andrew Davies, James Hinton, David Howell and Tony Mason. I would especiallylike to thank Nick Tiratsoo for invaluable discussions on this and related areas.

1 Nella Last, Nella Last's war. A mother's diary, 1939-45 (London, 1971), p. 303.

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624 STEVEN FIELDING

lasting over thirty years. As a consequence, much is known about the originsof various legislative measures, the main policy differences between leaders inWestminster and the preoccupations of party activists. In contrast, the hopesof ordinary voters and the reasons why an unprecedented number votedLabour remain largely shrouded in darkness. This article is the initial part ofan attempt at a general reinterpretation of the popular basis of the post-warpolitical settlement. It will firstly survey how Labour's victory has beeninterpreted by contemporaries and historians; secondly, it will suggest that theimportance of party to the electorate has been over-emphasized whilst thesupposedly ' radical' political temper has been misinterpreted. It will concludeby suggesting that as a consequence many of the reasons behind Labour'simpressive popular vote have been left obscure.

The 1945 election is the first in which historians can evaluate popularpolitical attitudes with some hope of accuracy. This article places muchreliance on the material gathered by the British Institute of Public Opinion(B.I.P.O.) and Tom Harrisson's Mass-Observation (M.O.) both of whichaccurately predicted Labour's largely unexpected victory." B.I.P.O.'s Galluppolls are an invaluable guide to the prevailing public mood; despite doubtsabout their precise accuracy it is hard to understand why many historianshave been wary of using them.3 Although M.O. also conducted polls, theorganization concentrated on collecting qualitative rather than quantitativeevidence. This has led to the charge that much of its material, like thatproduced through oral history, is unrepresentative.4 Whilst there are potentialweaknesses, against which constant guard must be kept, M.O.'s materialprovides the historian with one of the very few means by which an acuteinsight into innumerable private worlds can be gained. To reject such sourcesout of hand would be remarkably churlish.

II

Those on the left were generally agreed about the meaning of Labour'striumph. Both the Daily Herald and Daily Worker described the 1945 result as•the People's Victory'.6 The Heral(T% editorial, entitled 'The People Win',declared that

The performance of the British people in the General Election of 1945 deserves to rankin history alongside the mightiest of their achievements... they have proclaimed theirwill and their policy with an emphasis which will hearten the lovers of freedom andsocial justice throughout the Earth, and will stand out for all time as a great act ofleadership in the building of the peace.

1 George H. Gallup, The Gallup international public opinitm polls. Gnat Britain 1937-75 (2 voU., NewYork, 1977); The Tom Harrisson Mass-Observation archive, university of Sussex. Subsequentreferences to Gallup polls are taken from volume 1.

a Tom Nossiter, 'Surveys and opinion polls', in Anthony Seldon (cd.), Contemporary history.Practice and method (Oxford, 1988), pp. 55-69-

* Henry Felling, review of The people's war, in History, LV, 184 (1970), 313; Angus Calder,preface to the second (Panther) edition, The people's war (London, 1971).

* Daily Worker and Daily Herald, 27 July 1945.



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MEANING OF I945 GENERAL ELECTION 625

Moreover, this was no simple election victory, but the climax of Labour'sineluctable rise, the end of the beginning of its magnificent journey.* FrancisWilliams merely reflected the consensus when he described the triumph as' themanifestation not simply of a transitory mood at one general election, but ofa genuine and cumulative increase over many years of popular support forSocialist policies that had been advanced with increasing precision in everyphase of the Labour Party's history'.7 Even before the result had beenannounced Peter Richards suggested that the Conservatives had been onretreat well before 1939: the war had merely accelerated those processesthrough which Labour would inevitably win power.8 Margaret Cole felt thatthe party had benefited from ' the gradual awakening of millions of ordinarypeople to the fact of their own importance, abilities and responsibilities'.* Theimpressive Labour showing amongst the young was attributed by Richards topre-war 'advances in educational standards'.10 It seemed that after so manytrials and tribulations the nation had been finally won for Labour's vision ofsocialism; the party had at last achieved a majority with which to introducethe new order. H. L. Beales was but one commentator to suggest that the 1945victory was irreversible: Labour had come to stay.11

There was a widespread assumption that, having voted for the party, thepublic had fully understood and approved Labour's programme. Fifteen yearsafter the event Herbert Morrison recalled that 'the people voted in 1945 withan honest and determined awareness of the issues at stake'.1* The Economistdeclared that 'Beyond any possibility of mistake, the country wants a LabourGovernment and a Socialist Programme'. Unusually, this opinion was sharedwith the Daily Worker which talked of Labour's 'clear mandate to go full speedahead for the programme with which it went to the country'.13 Coleconfidently asserted that 'The people who voted for it [a Labour government]voted for a real change in the direction and aims of their country, and knewthat they were doing so... If the Government wants a mandate it has got athumping one to do all that is necessary...>u

Historians are generally agreed that between the retreat from Dunkirk in1940 and the 1945 general election there was, what Henry Pelling hasdescribed as, 'a steady strengthening of left-wing feeling'.1* The main point ofdebate has been the depth of this sentiment and whether Labour can be saidto have accurately represented the new public mood or stood some way behindit. Kenneth Morgan has stated that' Labour alone seemed to understand and

• K. O. Morgan, Labour a pewtr, 1945-51 (Oxford, 1984), pp. 7-9.7 Francis Williams, Fiftyy*ars march (London, 1951), p. 358.' Peter G. Richards, 'The political temper', Political Quarterly, xvi, 1 (1945), 57-66.* Margaret Cole, TTu gaural tltction 0/1945 ""^ afttr (London, 1945), p. 17.19 Peter G. Richards, 'The Labour victory: election figures', Political QjtarUrly, xvi, 4 (1945),

11 H. L. Beales, 'Has Labour come here to stay?', Political QjtarUrly, xvm, 1 (1947), 59-60.11 Herbert Morrison, A* autobiography (London, 1960), p. 232.u Economist, 28 Aug. 1945; Daily Worktr, 27 July 1945. M Cole, 1945, p. 24." Henry Pelling, 'The 1945 general.election reconsidered', Historical Journal, xxm, (1980),

411.



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626 STEVEN FIELDING

project the new mood' whilst Paul Addison even suggested that it was 'MrAttlee's consensus' that emerged after Dunkirk." In contrast, Augus Calderand Edward Thompson have confirmed Ralph Miliband's rejection of thiscase.17 He has suggested that the war 'caused the emergence of a new popularradicalism, more widespread than at any time in the previous hundred years'.Furthermore, Miliband has stated that this radicalism had 'powerfulideological overtones' being democratic, anti-Fascist, pro-Russian and infavour of individual freedom and social equality. Although not 'for the mostpart a formed socialist ideology' this radicalism was 'eager for major, evenfundamental change in British society after the war'.18 Whilst endorsing theclaim that 'the electorate was in truth far ahead of its leaders', D. N. Pritt hasventured further than Miliband by indicating that the British people were inpossession of' at least a half-formed socialist ideology... had shaken off muchof their indifference to politics, and decided... [to] get themselves a differentkind of government'.18 James Hinton has even intimated that a 'revolutionaryspirit' emerged during the conflict.10

I l l

Whilst the emergence of an anti-Conservative consensus after 1940 isundeniable, what this new mood represented in a positive sense is by no meansclear. This is evident from the difficulties faced by historians in their attemptsto define 'popular radicalism', apparent in Miliband's characterization citedabove. Others have also been unable to resolve the puzzle. Calder noted thatthe consciousness which had emerged in the services by 1945 could bevariously described as revolutionary, radical or apathetic.11 Hinton hassuggested that the success of the Coventry Communist party in 1941-2 was theresult of support for the Soviet Union and British nationalism, as a balancebetween class struggle and class collaboration.11 However, if popular radicalismhad one distinctive characteristic, it was hostility to the 'old gang', consistingof pre-war political parties, politicians and civil servants. Calder, in a perhapsoverly romantic way, has drawn attention to the expansion of areas in whichself-activity expressed in the form of the home guard, A.R.P. and fire watchingwas encouraged by the authorities: it was in this sense 'the people's war*.Through contrasting their own strenuous efforts with the politicians' at timesfeeble and incompetent handling of events the population became disenchan-ted with the existing political order. The legend of Dunkirk contributed to this

11 Morgan, Labour in power, p. 44; Paul Addison, The road to 1945 (London, 1977), p. 278.17 CaJder, PtopWs war; Edward Thompson, 'Mr Attlee and the Gadarene swine', Guardian, 3

Mar. 1984. " Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary socialism (London, 1979), pp. 273-4." D. N. Pritt, The Labour government, 1945-51 (London, 1963), pp. 9-29.M James Hinton, Labour and socialism (Brighton, 1983), p. 165.11 Angus Calder, 'The Common Wealth party 1942-1945' (unpublished D. Phil, dissertation,

university of Sussex, 1968, 2 vols.), 1, p. 273.11 James Hinton, 'Coventry Communism: a study of factory politics in the second world war',

History Workshop Journal, x , ( A u t u m n 1980) , 112.



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MEANING OF 1945 GENERAL ELECTION 627

feeling: had not the little ships, representative of the British public, rescued thegovernment from a disaster largely of the latter's making?88

J. B. Priestley was the one individual most associated with this new mood,having helped propagate the Dunkirk myth and established a reputation forrepresenting the 'little man' through frequent radio broadcasts. Priestley wasalso a leading progressive who called for the creation of a ' vital democracy'to replace the interwar 'false democracy'. This belief became the underlyingprinciple behind Common Wealth's projected reconstruction of Britishsociety.*4 However, as Common Wealth was to discover, mobilizing adisillusioned population in support of a coherent programme of substantivereform was by no means easy. Priestley himself was acutely aware that thepeople were to a large degree cynical and indecisive. In 1943 he addressed thissection of the public

One moment you are crying: 'We must have changes.' The next moment you aremuttering: 'But there won't be any real changes.' Hope, doubt, despair come flashing,flickering, darkening. To-day you say: 'We must do it ourselves.' Tomorrow you maybe saying again: 'They won't do anything, and we'll have to put up with it.'"

Priestley's wartime novels expanded on his suspicion that the majority eitherdoubted the possibility of post-war reform or were completely unaware of theneed for it. As one character confided to herself in his 1943 armaments factorynovel Daylight on Saturday,

some of these girls were only half alive. How were we to create a really vital democraticsociety-out of such dim, vague people? This girl Nelly Dutton, for instance. All sheseemed to care about was not walking too far to her bus and not annoying her idioticmother. *•

Although Priestley's 1945 Three men in new suits concluded optimistically, withthe three demobbed soldiers vowing to build a better Britain, there is littledoubt left in the reader's mind that they were confronted by an ingrainedselfishness, myopia and cynicism amongst their families and friends.

A 1942 study of a Gloucestershire aircraft factory confirmed Priestley'sgloom about the public's political mood. The workforce, mainly composed ofcompulsory female personnel, was bored, alienated, resentful and mostlyuninterested in the course of the war.*7 Such feelings were not confined towomen civilians. Those who compiled G. D. H. Cole's 1942 survey of attitudestowards welfare reform castigated popular ignorance and apathy on thesubject.*8 Nicholas Monsarrat detected little enthusiasm even for the Beveridgereport amongst sailors under his command. Most seamen, he suggested,

M Calder, People's war, pp. 157-61.u J. B. Priestley, Out of the people (London, 1941), pp. 79-90.u Introduction to Richard Acland, How it will be done (London, 1943), pp. 5-6.** J. B. Priestley, Daylight on Saturday (London, 1943), pp. 37-8.17 Mass-Observation, War factory (London, 1987 edn), pp. 9, 15, 43-3, 113, 121.** Jose* Harris,' Did British workers want the welfare state? G. D. H. Cole's survey of 194a', in

Jay Winter (ed.), The working class in modern British politics (Cambridge, 1983), p. 214.



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628 STEVEN FIELDING

thought only of winning the war, all else was secondary. As he wrote 'there isno time and, in effect, no occasion for political interest'.2*

This apparent indifference can partly be explained in relation to thecharacter of the times. Historians have emphasized the radicalizing impact ofthe war to the almost complete exclusion of the possibility that it might haveprovoked a different set of responses. The Second World War was a massiveconflict which cast soldiers and war workers out of familiar surroundings intostrange and alien worlds of dislocation, isolation and possible death. Mostsoldiers, quite understandably, wanted to do their job as quickly as possibleand return to the normality of'civvy street'.80 That many appeared confusedabout the future or only dimly aware of the necessity for a radical post-warsettlement was perhaps understandable. If they did hold hopes for the futurethere was little expectation that they would be achieved. Moreover, thosedeeply affected by the exigencies of war demonstrated the greatest degree ofcynicism about their future in a post-war world. A survey of feeling amongstthe services discovered that four-fifths considered that none of the partieswould do what they wanted.31

After Labour's victory some Conservatives blamed the Army Bureau ofCurrent Affairs (A.B.C.A.) for spreading socialist propaganda. In contrast,some on the left accused the organization of being a form of ' Right-wingbromide \ M However, its impact appears to have been more modest. AlthoughAddison has suggested that A.B.C.A. might have made soldiers more criticalof the existing order he conceded that it could also have been exploited as anopportunity for a sly smoke and nap. As an officer stationed in India, Jim Priorparticipated enthusiastically in A.B.C.A. debates which he claimed were'regarded by most soldiers as no more than a welcome respite from moreserious and warlike activities'.88 Certainly A.B.C.A.'s director W. E. Williamsnever claimed that his organization was able to overcome ingrained politicalfatalism.*4

It might have been expected that as the end of the war came into sightinterest in politics would have increased. However, during the summer of 1944it was discovered that many members of the home-based forces had notregistered to vote. It seems that left to their own devices about three-quartersof soldiers would have failed to fill in the appropriate form. This was evidenceless of political apathy and more of inbred cynicism. Many distrusted theworld of politics and politicians to such an extent they felt voting would makeno difference to their lives.86 Troops stationed in Italy and India apparently

** Nicholas Monsarrat, Three corvettes (London, 1955 cdn), pp. 149-52.** Tom Harrisson, 'The British soldier: changing attitudes and ideas', British Journal of

Psychology, xxxv, 2 (1945), 35.11 Mass-Observation, The journey home (London, 1944), p. 106; Captain 'X', A soldier looks ahead

(London, 1944), pp. 81-2. '* Calder, 'Common Wealth', 1, 272.M Jim Prior, A balance of power (London, 1986), p. 11.M Addison, Road to / £ # , pp. 147-52; William Harrington and Peter Young, The / p ^ revolution

(London, 1978), pp. 180-1.•* Mass-Observation, 'Do the forces want the right to vote?', Picture Post, 19 Aug. 1944.



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shared a similar type of disenchantment.** One officer reporting on a series ofA.B.C.A. discussions during 1944 stated that

The general line that is always taken is the We and They line. Here is a typical sort ofargument: 'What can I do about it all? I may elect a Labour MP, but as soon as hegets into Parliament he does nothing about the things he says he is going to do. Theyhold all the power and They always will. We can't get it away from them. They haveall the money and newspapers and everything. It always has been like that and italways will.'37

For whatever reason as many as forty per cent of service personnel abstainedin the 1945 general election.*8 A Gallup poll held in the late summer of 1944suggested that such feelings were not confined to those in the armed forces:only thirty-six per cent of its civilian sample felt politicians acted on behalf ofthe country's interests, thirty-five per cent thought they looked out forthemselves and twenty-two per cent suggested they were only concerned withparty advantage.

IV

Given the level of disenchantment with Conservative-dominated interwar andwartime governments it is perhaps not surprising that Gallup polk takenbetween June 1943 and April 1945 showed that the Labour party wasconsistently supported by between thirty-seven and forty-two per cent of thoseinterviewed. In contrast, support for the Conservatives varied betweentwenty-three and thirty-one per cent. Although this was the answer to thequestion 'If there was a general election tomorrow, how would you vote?' itis dear that a substantial minority favoured the continuation of the coalitiongovernment after the war's end.39 In August 1944 forty-four per cent wantedsome form of coalition under either Eden or Churchill whereas only twenty-six per cent sought an exclusively Labour government. Even as late as March1945 forty-three per cent favoured some kind of a Conservative-Labour-Liberal combination. It is possible that Churchill and Eden were the favouredcandidates for prime minister simply because they enjoyed the most publicityas leader and foreign secretary of the coalition. In January 1945 whilst thirty-one per cent wanted Eden to lead a post-war government and twenty per centChurchill, Cripps, Attlee and Morrison were chosen by only six, four andthree per cent respectively.40 The suggestion that wartime office had madeLabour politicians more prominent and thereby contributed to theirelectability thus appears unconvincing.41 However, this preference for aConservative leader did not mean that the public wanted a post-war coalitiondominated by his party. A March 1945 poll revealed that fifty-five per cent ofthose asked were willing to vote for an anti-Conservative popular front.

M Mass-Observation, PuuUd ptopU (London, 1947), pp. 149-51." Mass-Observation, Jowrtuy howu, p. 107.M R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman, The Britisk general tUctum of 1945 (Oxford, 1947), p

30. ** McCallum and Readman, 1945, p. 16.** Frank V. CantwcU, 'The meaning of the British election*, Political Opvam Qparterfy, a.

(Summer 1945), 150. " Pelling, '1945 reconsidered', p. 41a.



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63O STEVEN FIELDING

Labour was not in existence to pander to this popular taste for coalition: theparty's left was especially hostile to any form of bi-partisanship.4* A numberof delegates at the 1944 annual conference even accused the coalition ofdrifting towards fascism: continued cooperation was therefore impossible.48

Thus, the 1945 conference passed a resolution committing Labour to theformation of an administration which 'shall stand or fall by its socialistprogramme, even to the extent of again going to the country for a mandatefor socialism, after having been defeated on the floor of the House'. The eventssurrounding the creation of the 1931 national government obviously remainedin the forefront of delegates' minds, with Attlee cast as a potential MacDonald.From the platform Harold Laski reassured members that the coming conflictwould indeed be a 'straight fight'.

It is a fight between private enterprise now expressed as monopoly capitalism, fightingthrough the Conservative Party, and socialism that realises that the new age is bornand that only through the establishment of a Socialist Commonwealth can we realisethe purposes for which we have been fighting the war.

As the only vehicle of socialist advance it was the party's clear moral duty towin a majority and govern alone.44

That a majority of electors did not share Laski's partisanship wasappreciated by a number of activists. Labour's London women's organizerdirected attention to the existence of a large body of electors under thirty whohad no experience of what she called 'normal political activity' and remained'sceptical about the old parties and... think that "they are all the same whenthey got into power'".46 The candidate for Canterbury calculated that thisgroup of about eight million voters, many of whom had been 'cut off frompolitical life' by active service, would decide the result. Although he felt thattheir predominant political disposition was left-wing they remained un-attached to any specific party. Labour's task was to 'stress the hard,inescapable fact that the choice is between Labour or Conservative and thatall other alternatives are illusory'.46 In the view of the party's nationalexecutive committee young voters in particular would only be confused by thealleged ' complexity' of multi-party arrangements: Labour on its own offeredthem 'clarity'.47

If the anti-Conservative vote went to Labour rather than the dividedLiberals it was perhaps due more to a disbelief in the latter's ability to win orthe absence of a candidate - the party contested less than half the availableseats - rather than any strong feeling that Labour was preferable.48 M.O.noted a 'general goodwill' towards the Liberals during the campaign but

41 Roger Eatwcll, The 1945-1951 Labour governments (London, 1979), pp. 30-1.41 Labour party annual conference report 1944, p 114.44 Labour party annual conference report 1945, pp. '42-4.44 Joan Bourne, 'Revitalising local Labour parties', Socialist Commentary, Oct. 1944, p. 336.41 Denis Bell, 'The young electors', Socialist Commentary, June 1945, pp. 114-16.47 Election and organisation sub-committees *, joint memo, 5 July 1944, NEC.4* Harrisson archive, file report 2257.



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accurately predicted that it would not be reflected in the final result.** A JuneGallup poll showed the Liberals standing at fifteen per cent, but in theelection a few weeks later the party received only nine per cent: they had beensqueezed. Labour, it seems, benefited from its claim that to vote other than'straight left' would keep the Conservatives in office. As one Liberal-inclinedLabour voter confessed prior to the poll,' I am at heart a Liberal, I never havebeen a true Tory. As things are I realise that the only chance to throw ourweight in is on the side of Labour as this will be a definite fight between Toryand Labour.' Therefore, Labour won the conditional support of anunquantifiable number of tactical voters. The intention of this group was tolimit the impact of what even most Labour politicians assumed would be aConservative triumph. One M.O. respondent reported that a 'Liberalminded' Reigate business man of his acquaintance, ' told me he had votedLabour as "he knew they had no chance to get in, and thought it would begood for the Conservative to have a smaller majority"!' In another normallysafe Conservative seat, however, one teacher's similar ambitions wentsomewhat awry: ' I voted Labour in Norwich with the intention to lessen theTory majority. I wouldn't have minded Tories in at present with a muchsmaller majority, so that opposition could be effective... I think Labour needspolitical experience and may make a bit of a mess of finance.' After Labourhad won the seat he confessed to feeling apprehensive. Others also seemed toregret their decision to vote Labour. One M.O. informant reported that

quite a few people who had voted Labour seemed definitely rather shocked by theirsuccess, even a little scared. I had the impression... that they had done so in a spirit ofdefiance against the old order of things, and were now rather wondering what wasgoing to happen next.50

In the weeks that followed, the general election was considered to have beena 'bad thing1 by fifty-eight per cent of those polled.61 This was partly due tothe feeling that, with the war in the Pacific unresolved, it had been improperto return so hastily to ' normal' politics. More fundamentally, this resentmentwas the result of the already noted widespread distaste for politicalpartisanship. 'They're like a lot of old fish wives', one M.O. respondent notedof party leaders. Others were equally damning: politics was 'dishonourable';the election campaign was 'dirty... I don't like this mud-slinging'. Politicianswere mistrusted and felt to be 'all the same'." Despite Labour's best effortsmany remained wedded to the idea of coalition because they doubted that theparties on their own would live up to their promises.

Hostility to blatant partisanship explains the response to Churchill'sinfamous first radio speech of the campaign in which he suggested that aLabour government would be forced to rely on 'some sort of Gestapo'. The

** Harrisson archive, file report 2259. ** Harrisson archive, file report 2270A.11 Harrisson archive, file report 2260.** Mass-Observation Bulletin, 1 (March-April 1946), pp. 9-10; Harrisson archive, file reporu

2376, 2260-1.



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632 STEVEN FIELDING

Conservative leader was seen as reviving his party's pre-war smears.43 Anumber of candidates echoed their leader's rhetoric with approval, whilstcentral office grimly warned the public to 'Remember Belsen'.64 However, bycompletely miscalculating the public mood Churchill was, literally overnight,transformed from a national figurehead into a squalid party hack. Previouslya man elevated above politics he henceforward appeared to be the dirtiestmember of a filthy profession." Sixty-nine per cent of those asked by Gallupfelt the Gestapo speech to have been 'bad'.6* Even the Times criticized theConservative leader for 'emphasizing the narrow animosities of the partyfight'.'7

Despite their lack of enthusiasm for Labour, the public voted for the partyin unprecedented numbers: it won 478 per cent of votes cast, or 36*1 per centof the total electorate. This was an impressive, but by no means unprecedentedachievement: since 1918 six parties have won an even greater share of the vote.Moreover, voting Labour did not indicate that the people had overcome theirearlier doubts. The most cynical electors were under thirty years of age whowere nevertheless more inclined towards Labour than any other group.58 Thiswas clear evidence of the 'unfocused left vote': although the war hadproduced a dissatisfaction with the Conservatives it had not provided Labourwith a large body of positive support. As early as 1943 Richard Adand hadclaimed that the party was merely the beneficiary of a' negative enthusiasm \ M

Even in 1945, according to Roger Eatwell, Labour simply represented a'rejecting consensus*.*°

Perhaps this was why the 1945 general election campaign was observed bya 'dispirited electorate' considering its options under a 'cloak of apathy'.*1

Compared with pre-war elections, far fewer windows displayed party colourswhilst numbers at party meetings were by no means impressive.** As theLiberal agent at Ilford suggested, many of those who went to hear candidatesspeak might have done so less out of a concern for politics and more as 'a treatto go to an evening meeting after all these years'.*' Such was theirdisengagement from the democratic process that during the three week hiatusbetween polling and the declaration of the result most people didn't discusspolitics at all.*4 What politicians such as Morrison had taken to be a soberelectorate quietly weighing up the alternatives was, it appears, more aquestion of voters glumly confronting Hobson's Choice.

M Mark Abrams, 'The Labour vote in the general election', Pilot Papers, 1, 1 (1946), 16-17.Harrington and Young, 1945, pp. '64-5.Harriston archive, file report 2260; Pelling, ' 1945 reconsidered', p. 400.Harrisson archive, file report 3253.Quoted in Pelling, ' 1945 reconsidered', pp. 410-11.Harrisson archive, file reports 2261, 2257. ** Adand, How it will be dtmt, p. 181.Eatwell, Labour governments, p. 44. ( 1 Harrisson archive, file report 2270A.

** Geoffrey Mander, "The general election', Contemporary Review, cutvm (Sept. 1945), 138;Alastair Forbes, "The nation considers its verdict1, Picture Post, 7 July 1945.

** Harrington and Young, 1945, pp- <57~B- M Harrisson archive, file report 2270A.



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MEANING OF IQ45 GENERAL ELECTION 633

Despite some uncertainty whether Labour was competent to govern on itsown, there were few doubts in the minds of most electors that any post-wargovernment would have to introduce extensive reforms. The war hadproduced a 'vague and nebulous' desire for a better Britain.68 In April 1943fifty-seven per cent of those questioned expressed a desire to see 'greatchanges' after the end of the conflict; in July 1945 fifty-six per cent felt thatLabour's election indicated a desire for 'sweeping changes'. The newJerusalem envisaged by some could be shamelessly whimsical: the Labourcandidate for East Grinstead told the 1945 party conference

two yean ago, when I was in Africa, we fell to talking one day about what we hopedto see in the post-war world, and the fellow who put the point best was the one whosaid that he wanted to settle down with his wife in a cottage, with the kiddies, and toenjoy chocolates and looking after the chickens.**

By no means all shared this cosy vbion: support for very practical reforms wasevident even prior to the Beveridge report's publication in December 1942. AGallup poll conducted in April the previous year revealed that fifty-five percent of those surveyed supported the idea of a state-run health service free atthe point of delivery. The public had also anticipated Beveridge's proposals forpensions." If the report only echoed many pre-existing popular concerns it didraise hopes that they might be taken seriously by government. The initiallyenthusiastic response of certain ministerial spokesmen encouraged suchexpectations. However, when the commons debated Beveridge in February1943 the public's optimism was quickly transformed into deep cynicism. Themealy-mouthed attitude of Sir Kingsley Wood and Sir John Anderson'brought a profound sense of disillusion' and convinced many that thegovernment was' not sincere in its aims for post-war social change '.** A monthafter the debate forty-seven per cent of the public declared themselvesunhappy with the government's response against twenty-nine per cent whowere satisfied.

It can be said, with not much exaggeration, that the 1945 general electionhad been won two years before it took place. Whereas the Conservative-dominated coalition quibbled about the report's details a majority of Labourback-benchers had enthusiastically endorsed it and even taken the un-precedented step of forcing a division in protest at the government'shesitation.** If the Conservatives had previously won votes by wrappingthemselves in the flag, after December 1942 Labour covered itself with the

** Mass-Observation, 'Social security and parliament', Political QyarUrly, xrv, 2 (1943), 245.M Labour party annual conference report 1945, p. 94.*' Mass-Observation, 'Social security', p. 247.** Mass-Observation, 'Social security', pp. 350-4.** Henry Pelling, 'The impact or the war on the Labour party', in H. L. Smith (ed.), War and

social change. British socuty in the stcond world war (Manchester, 1986), pp. 135-6; Addison, 1945, pp.216-35; Mass-Observation, 'Social security', p. 250.

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Table 1. Percentage approval/disapproval of Labour's nationalization proposals

Approve Disapprove

Coal minesRailwaysLandBank of England

60

545'39

1626

302 0

pages of the Beveridge report. Henceforward politicians were classified on thebasis of their response to Beveridge. Labour's most popular proposals duringits early period in office were those associated with social security and thenational health service. In February 1946 seventy-one per cent approved of itsplans for the former whilst in the same month two years later sixty-one percent endorsed the party's scheme for the latter. In October 1948 when askedto name the government's most impressive achievement the two most popularremained the establishment of the health service and the increase in pensions.Many of the priorities given credence, if not actually established, duringwartime were still seen to be important after 1945: Labour's role in furtheringthese objectives contributed to its own popularity.

In contrast to social security, the electorate did not appear to take muchinterest in Labour's nationalization proposals. However, this did not preventa majority expressing support for them, as shown in Gallup polls summarizedin Table 1, taken between March 1944 and May 1945.

The general case for nationalization seems to have been widely — if passively- accepted. When asked by Gallup in December 1945, fifty-nine per cent saidthey approved of the government's plans to nationalize coal, transport,electricity 'and so on'. As even the Economist put it, state control of industry'Once a maxim for revolutionaries only...has now acquired an almostmiddle-class respectability'.70

The Conservatives tried to turn the general election into an explicitlyideological contest. As early as February 1945 the party chairman had warnedagainst 'nationalization and encroaching bureaucracy', a theme Churchillwas later infamously to elaborate.71 It was the Conservative party, notLabour, that talked of' socialism' as the key election issue.7' Yet, although therole of the state - either in the guise of planning or nationalization - was thekeenest point of difference between the two parties the issue failed to arousemuch public concern. Perhaps this was because Labour and Conservativesobscured even this point of dissension: the former declared that interventionwould only be undertaken on the basis of 'efficiency' whilst the lattersuggested that governmental aid would be applied if it appeared 'necessary'.7*

7# Economist, 24 Mar. 1945. " McCallum and Readman, 1945, p. 11.71 Miliband, ParlumunUuy socialism, pp. 384-5.71 McCallum and Readman, 7945, pp. 53-7.



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More importantly, state intervention was rarely popularly conceived as adistinct issue; it was widely considered a means rather than an ends. Thefundamental test was: would nationalization hasten or impede the moregeneral objectives of social security and social justice?74 Labour's carefuldefence of state control as necessary and efficient therefore met with approval.As Morrison warned the 1945 Labour party conference

In our electorial arguments it is no good saying that we are going to socialise electricity,fuel and power because it is in accordance with Labour Party principles so to do... youmust spend substantial time in arguing the case for the socialisation of these industrieson the merits of their specific cases. This is how the British mind works. It does not workin a vacuum or in abstract theories.78

In a similar vein Arthur Greenwood had earlier assured first-time voters thatLabour proposed 'to face the future with bold minds, but with a saneoutlook'.7*

The Conservatives did themselves few favours by turning the campaign intoa question of fundamental principles because the public was, if anything,hostile to their notion of 'free enterprise'. Undiluted market forces werethought to have led to interwar mass unemployment, a spectre which cast along shadow over the whole campaign, especially as many assumed that thepost-war economy would quickly return to its earlier torpor.77 In this context,it was more than unfortunate for the Conservatives that in the midst of thecampaign a Manchester cinema displayed a message imploring 'Give MrChurchill Your Support' during a programme that contained the film versionof'Love on the Dole'.78

The issues considered by voters to be the most important were those thatbore directly upon their everyday lives: they were immediate and practical.Perhaps surprisingly foreign policy never generated much interest: theidentity of the 'guilty men' was never much of an issue.7* In the wake ofintensive German bombing, housing was, by a very long way, the dominantpopular concern until early 1947.80 This was also another problem Labourwas thought to possess a greater willingness to solve. In June 1945 forty-twoper cent of those questioned felt the party best qualified to overcome thehousing crisis as opposed to twenty per cent who believed in the Conservatives.Significantly, housing was one of the issues least discussed by politicians duringthe 1945 campaign: it was also the Labour government's most abject failure.81

74 G. D. H. Cole, A history of the Labour party from 1914 (London, 1948), pp. 465-6.'* Labour party annual conference report 1945, p. 90." Picture Post, 6 Jan, 1945.77 McCallum and Rcadman, 1945, p. 44; Mass-Observation, Jowrtuy Horn*, p. 43.7 i Daily Herald, 2 July 1945.7* McCallum and Rcadman, 7945, pp, 49-50.M Harrisson archive, file report 228a.a> David Howell, British social democracy (London, 1976), p. 130.

22-2



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636 STEVEN FIELDING

VIThe most impressive feature of voting patterns was the extent to which theyremained stuck into pre-war grooves.81 Some interwar Conservative voterswere so loyal to their party that they gave credence to Churchill's most absurdscares. Housewife Nella Last declared: ' heaven save any Nosey Parkers whointruded into my domestic life with any Gestapo methods. '88 Others wereafraid that after a Labour victory their savings would be confiscated.84 InScotland nationalism was an important issue during wartime by-electionswhilst sectarianism continued to influence party choice.85 It is certainly hardto deny Eatwell's suggestion that the most significant factor in Labour'svictory was the party's increased share of the working class vote. For the firsttime the party had a virtual monopoly of the industrial regions, especiallylarge towns and cities. Most famously Birmingham, that bastion of workingclass Conservatism, finally went Labour.8* Forty-three per cent of Laboursupporters stated they voted for the party because it best represented workingclass interests.87

For contemporaries, however, the most remarkable feature of the electionwas the extent to which Labour made inroads into the middle class vote, mostconspicuously in London's suburbia.88 According to John Bonham abouttwenty-two per cent of the middle class voted Labour.8* As G. D. H. Colepointed out Labour did well only in certain parts of the suburbs, those hedescribed as 'working-class-cum-black-coat areas', such as North Croydonand Dagenham rather than solidly bourgeois constituencies like Hornsey andChurchill's own Woodford. Moreover, outside the capital, apart from thespecial case of Great Yarmouth, spa towns and coastal resorts also eluded theparty.10 This was primarily a white collared, lower middle class vote: menialoffice workers, small business owners, managers and lower professionals.*1

The key to Labour's lower middle class support appears to have been theBeveridge report. The promise of the welfare state appealed to this group asmuch, if not more, than those lower down the social scale.98 Althoughaccuracy is a vain hope, the lower middle class would have comprised most ofB.I.P.O.'s occupational group B, forty-eight per cent of whom felt in a 1943survey that they would gain if the report was implemented. Whereas eighty-eight per cent of the predominantly working class group C favoured a freehealth service, ninety per cent in B approved of it. The same proportions inboth categories felt that government should implement the report. Fur-

w Howell, Social democracy, pp. 131-4. M Last, Nella Lasts war, p. 288.M Harrisson archive, file report 2270A.** Christopher Harvie, 'Labour in Scotland during the second world war', Historical Journal,

xxvi, 4 (1983), 934-7; Tom Gallagher, Glasgow: the tauasy peace: religious tension in modem Scotland(Manchester, 1987), p. 255. ** Eatwell, Labour governments, pp, 37-8, 42-3.

" Harhsson archive, file report 2265. ** Cole, 1945, p. 8.** John Bonham, The middle class vote (London, 1954), derived from tables 10 and 11, pp.

129-30. •• Cole, Labour party, pp. 435-6." Bonham, Middle class, derived from table 10, p. 129.n Bonham, Middle class, pp. 69, 182.



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thermore, while sixty-three per cent in B wanted government to nationalize alllife insurance companies, only fifty-five per cent in C were so inclined.*3

Too much has probably been made of the scale by which the middle classfell to Labour: even among sections of the middle classes where Labour didbest, more than twice as many still voted Conservative. Perhaps the mostsignificant increase in middle class influence was found not in the constituenciesbut in the party's parliamentary leadership. However, although in simplenumbers the middle class made only a marginal contribution to the totalLabour vote, it gave the party the edge over the Conservatives in a host ofMetroland constituencies. Similarly, whilst the defection of middle class votersin 1950 and 1951 made little impact on the size of Labour's vote-whichactually increased - it managed to deny the party vital suburban seats.

The key group for Labour was the young of whichever class: the swing fromConservative to Labour amongst those old enough to vote in 1935 was slight.M.O. estimated that sixty-six per cent of those under thirty-five voted Labourin East Fulham, as opposed to fifty per cent of those over thirty-five.** Thislatter age group had most to gain from Beveridge; they had also borne themain burden of winning the war; they also held the most extreme hopes-and fears - for the post-war world. For some middle class first time voters,Labour seemed to have been the fashionable political choice - in spite ofcertain social reservations. One female student 'said that she was votingLabour, and so were all her friends, because it was the only progressive partythat stood a chance of getting in, but she hated the Labour party, they wereso uncouth and didn't know how to behave'.*6 Although not by any stretchof the imagination representative, this comment suggests that Labour's holdon even some young voters was tenuous.

VII

For Labour party activists July 1945 was a moment of triumph whichvindicated over fifty years of struggle. It was a time to look back in wonder.After the party's newly-elected M.P.s left their first meeting one was heardasking 'What would Keir Hardie think of this?', another speculated 'Whatwould William Morris say?'** It is unlikely that many Labour voters weretouched by such emotions. Doubtful that any politician was worthy of theirtrust, the electorate turned to Labour as part of a reaction against theConservatives. As the party's general secretary conceded, 'There was a tidalwave of popular distrust which submerged the Tories. '*' Idealism on a massscale was prominent by its absence. If Labour won on just one issue it was thatraised by Arthur Greenwood in the house of commons the day before thepublication of the Beveridge report. 'There are', he said, 'two words graven

** British Institute of Public Opinion, The Beoaiigt rtpert and tkt public (London, 1943), pp.13-14. ** Harrisson archive, file report 228a.

•* Harrisson archive, file report a2 70A. H Daily Htrald, 30 July 1945.w 'Party development', paper presented to the campaign sub-committee, 26 Oct. 1945, NEC.



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638 STEVEN FIELDING

on the hearts of the overwhelming mass of men and women, "Neveragain ".. . never again will they submit to the social and economic evils of thepast.' Despite the absence of firm promises and minimal coverage of domesticreform, the party printed this speech in pamphlet form with a cover consistingof newspaper cuttings announcing unemployment figures.98 This negativeemphasis exploited the public mood which, by the war's end, was dominatedby the idea that the future would merely repeat the bitter failures of the past:depression would be followed by war.*9 In this sense it could be argued thatLabour was the party of the pessimists: it was the fear of the dark satanic millrather than the hope of a new Jerusalem which cast a shadow over the ballotbox.

The Labour vote in 1945 was socially more disparate than it had previouslybeen. The party's predominantly working class support was supplemented byan enhanced middle class element, a social coalition united by a sharedadherence to the promise of security contained within the Beveridge report.Progressives gave this common self-interest a spurious moral grandeur bydescribing Labour voters as 'the people', Labour was not slow to take up thispoint: a 1944 pamphlet claimed that' Labour Politics are the People's Politics'and ' In a very real sense, the Labour Party is the Party of the people'.100 'Thepeople' was a specifically wartime idea, although it had obvious roots innineteenth century popular radicalism. Priestley declared that' We are ail thepeople, so long as we are willing to consider ourselves the people'. 'Thepeople' were those who ' mucked in' whatever their background: the war hadseemingly made class differences irrelevant - a German bomb did notdifferentiate between social groups.101 Those on the right were less convinced,as Colm Brogan complained 'The notion of The People...is deplorablyvague'.10* Both semantically and socially 'the people' was an ambiguousconstruct, but necessarily so if Labour was to win power. It-was the linguisticcounterpart of the Beveridge report, something which bridged the gapbetween the working and lower middle classes. Before the war theConservatives had successfully kept Labour out of the suburbs by presentingit as a party which threatened both the interests of the nation as a whole andthe hard-earned savings of the middle class in particular. Labour's support forBeveridge committed it to providing each and every individual with aneconomically secure future whilst allowing the party also to employ thelanguage of patriotism against opponents.103 According to Williams, Labourhad become a classless party, 'a coming together of men and women ofgoodwill among all classes': in 1945 Labour, not the Conservatives,

'* Arthur Greenwood, 'Never again' (London, 1943), p. 4.H H. D. Willcock, 'Twenty-five year cycle', JXew Statesman, 7 July 1945.>M Labour party, 'Build your own future. A citizen's guide to effective politics' (London,

'944). PP- 2 -3- 1W Priestley, Out 0/the people, pp. 13-17.1 0 Colm Brogan, Who are the people? (London, 1943), p. 3.IM Tom Jeffrey 'The suburban nation. Politics and class in Lewisham', in David Feldman and

Gareth Stedman Jones (eds.) Metropolis. London. Histories and representations since 1800 (London,1989), pp. 205-8.



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represented the nation.104 However, once the Labour government had done itsjob and established the welfare state, maintained full employment andimproved standards of living ' the people' lost its cohesion. This was especiallyso after the Conservatives had accepted the broad parameters of Beveridgiansocial policy: the anti-Conservative impulse was less urgent.

Labour's victory was, more than anything else, a consequence of thepeculiar nature of the British electoral system. During the twentieth centurythis has, with few exceptions, delivered commanding majorities in thecommons to parties whose share of the popular vote was, in contrast, far fromimpressive.106 Despite this, historians still tend to see a reflection of the popularmood in the number of constituencies won by the competing parties. In 1945Labour won just over one-third of the votes of those eligible to exercise thefranchise. Yet, the impression is that the party was swept to power on a tidalwave of left-wing fervour. Perhaps more damning to this dramatic, if spurious,view is the strong impression that many first-time Labour voters gave theparty their support despite multifarious misgivings. Simply put, an as yetunspecified number of Labour voters did not want the return of a Conservativegovernment - at least with its 1935 majority intact - because of the party'shostility to the Beveridge report. In such a context - with the Liberals,Common Wealth and Communists not serious contenders for power - Labourwas the only possible choice. In many ways, therefore, 1945 was by no meansuntypical of other general elections which also forced an unconvinced publicto decide between two parties. As a consequence, instead of popularpartisanship and expectant idealism the election, like others before and since,generated widespread disengagement and pre-emptive cynicism. Perhaps the1945 contest was unusual only in that the victorious party actually lived up topromises made during the campaign. For this, Labour was rewarded with anincreased share of the popular vote in 1951, yet denied a further term in officeby the very electoral system that had granted it power six years earlier.

1#l Williams, Fifty years march, pp. 358-9.1M For a contemporary demand for the abolition of the first-past-the-poM system in favour of

some form of proportional representation see R. W. G. MacKay, Coupon orfru? Being a study oftUctoral reform aid representative government (1943). Interestingly, the author, at the time ofpublication a leading member of Common Wealth, became a Labour M.P. in 1945.



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