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What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power

Author(s): Jeffrey W. LegroSource: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 515-534Published by: American Political Science Association

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Articies

What China Will Want: The Future

Intentions of a Rising Power

Jeffrey Legro

China'snationalpower isgrowing apidly,utwhat China will do with its ewfound apabilities emains n issue f contentiousdebate mong scholars ndpolicymakers.t the eart f the roblem s the ifficultyfdivining uturententions.wo argumentshave dominated thedebate.One focuses n powerand likely hinese revisionism.he otherhighlights hina's growing nterdependence nd likely uture atisfaction.oth areproblematic n termsf logic nd evidence. hey offer inear rojections hatignore he ay that hina's futures ikelyobecontingent-especiallyn the nteractionfforeignolicy deas ndevents. elative

powerand interdependencere importantut their mpact smediated through hedoctrines eaders se to justifyctionandestablish uthority:hose deas reprone tochange nregular ays-and with them hina's intentions.f this rgument sright,policyprescriptionshat dvocate ontaining, ngaging,r somemix of thetwo i.e.,hedging) nrelations ithChina need tobereconfigured.

The "rising hina"problem snot just boutpower,butpurpose. hinahasconsistentlytressedhat tsdevelopmentsamajor power ill bepeacefulnd

non-obtrusive.et in theUnited States there s,as oneU.S. DeputySecretaryfState ut it, "cauldron fanxiety" verChina's future.1xpert testimonyefore he

U.S.-China Economic and Security eviewCommission, body thatmonitors nd reportsoCongress nbilateral elations,as focused eavilyn uncertaintyverChina's intentions.2n February 007, Vice PresidentCheneycautioned hat hina's recent nti-satelliteestand general ilitary uild-upwere "not onsistentithChina's tated oalofa 'peacefulise."'3 he stomachsfstrategistsre churning.

It srare hen a pressingolicy ssue onnectsodirectlyto critical ap in the cholarlyiterature.uch isthe ase

with the mpact f the rise fChina on world politics.Will growing ower lead Beijing to challenge nter

national orms, ules,nd institutions-possiblyenerating angerousonflictmongmajor powersn astAsia ifnotelsewhere?r might hina's ntegrationnthe nternational conomy,ts rowing iddle class, nd increasing articipationn nternationalnstitutionsnd xchanges

lead toenduring atisfactionn the xistingnternationalorder? Today China appears to be a "status quo" power.4

Will itremaino?Existing nswers o this uestion ack thevery hing

needed: general xplanationfcontingenthange ntheintentionsfChina.5 he problem snot simplyn issue

ofChina's ecrecyrrepressionf freexpressionince heproblem f futurententionspplies to democracies swell asdictatorships.6ven ifwe had accessto the nnerworkingsf the hinesegovernmentoday,t sunlikelythat nformationould tell sabout futureims. ven ifChina today as some ecret lan for orldhegemonyrworld harmony,hose imswill be subject o change yChina'svery rowthnd the rocess ywhich itunfolds.Ironicallyven hina'stop leaders, espite heir oncentratedolitical ower, annotknowwithcertaintyhattheirountryillwant.

Indeed, hat s hat the wo iews ominatinghe ebate

on China argue, lthough hey eedifferentnevitablefutures.he firstocusesnChina's owernd claims hatChina's desireforrevision ill growas China's relativecapabilitiesncreaseespite hatBeijingthinksoday.nthis iew ther ountries ustdo all theyan to ontainrising hina because t somepointChina willwield itsnew-found owertochallenge lobalorder.he secondview ighlightshina's rowingnterdependencend rguesthat uch onflictan be avoided y ontinuingo ngageChina,whichwill builddomesticnterestsnChina thatfavor olitical iberalizationnd accommodationo therules f the revailingnternationalystem.othanswers

tap nto eep-seated orceshaping hina,but bothareflawed ue to their inear rojection f the futuref

JejfreyLegro s rofessorndChair in theWoodrowWilson epartmentfPoliticsndCo-Directorf theGoverningmerica n GlobalAgeProgramt the illerCenter f ublic Jfairs,niversityfVirginia [email protected]).he uthor hanksobert oss, ang hip

ing,rantly omack, ndZhu Feng orhelpfulommentsandDanielAaronWeir or xcellentesearchssistance.

DOI: 10.1017/Si537592707071526 September 2007 1 ol. 5/No. 3 515

This content downloaded from 112.204.142.87 on Wed, 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions






Art'icles IWhat China WillWant

Chinesepolicy owardsnternationalrder-be it he onflictual evisionxpected ypower heoristsrthe armonious ntegrationredictedy nterdependencedvocates.7

China'sdiplomatic uture,owever,s ikelyobemorecontingenthan itherhe ower r interdependenceosi

tions llow. o highlightontingencyequireshat omething e said boutwhat the utureepends n-no smallproblem ith a country ike hina that s authoritarianand non-transparentnmany issues. hat policymakersmost need, cholarsavefound ifficulto tudy.8learlyin the ase ofChina both itsrelativeower nd its conomic nterdependenceffectts oreignolicy.he issueofcourse show thetwowilldo soovertime.9

I argue hat heirnfluenceepends n a third eshinggear-national deas bouthow toachieve oreignolicygoals.Such ideasperformhree ritical unctions:heyempower ertain omestic nterestsroups verothers,

they enerate xpectationsgainst hichperformancesassessed,nd theyither acilitater impede he ossibility or newstrategyoemerge. pecifically,henChinese expectationsboutthe enefitsf integratingntheextant nternationalrder redefied yevents ithnegativeonsequences,nopportunityxists or omestic riticsto challenge hat rthodoxy.hether change ctuallyoccurs epends, owever,n the istributionf replacement ideas hatffectshether riticsan coordinaten afeasiblelternativeorld view.

This approach ffersome twistsn familiarhinking.Contrary o the ower-centriciewofChina, themost

dangerouscenarionthe uturesnotthe rise"fChina,butrupturesn hina's conomic rowth.pposed totheeconomic interdependenceosition, conomicengagementneednot leadtoharmony.ountries hat ndertakerapid ntegrationave eneratedonsiderableystemiconflict.'0 hina itself as displayed ide variation n itsapproach,e it ooperate ith, hallenge,rseparatetselffrom nternationalociety ver thepast two centuries.The point isnot that ower reconomic iberalizationsunimportant,ut rather hat hosefactorsnteractithdominant deas nparticular ays to hape nduring atternsf national ehavior.

In terms fpolicythismeans that either containmentnor ngagementolicy s reliableonsistenthoice.Indeed,thedominant iew today mongpolicymakersaccepts his dvice y dvocating "hedging"trategyhatpursues othoptions imultaneouslyith the articularmixof strategyconflictuals.cooperative)ependentnChinesebehavior.'I

The argumentere fferssomewhatifferentndmoreproactiveiew: tsuggestshatmanaging risinghinawill dependnoton behavior er sebuton thenature fthe ominant deas. hen China espousesdeas nd ctionthat avorooperativentegration,tmakes sense odo as

much as possible o ensure hat heir nternalupportersgain positive eedbacknd "I toldyou so" leverageis-ai

vis their omestic ritics. ikewise, hen China displaysconsistent evisionistendencies,uch ideasshould bepenalized-but only hen influentialpposition roupsare promoting ore attractivelternativedeas. therwise,nomatter owloathsomeny articularpproach,f

the lternatives ven ess esirable, ramatic ressureorrapid hange sproblematic.herefore,tbehooves heinternationalommunityobe proactivenot ustreactivetobehavior) ynurturingroups nd ideas n hina thatoffermore benign replacements o the less desirablealternatives.

Naturally n all these reas,thepotential or utsideinfluencen a countryfChina'ssize nd regime ype assignificantimits.etwe knowfrom he oviet xperiencethat ven inauthoritariantates, lowpatient ffortsosupport eformersan have an impact.'2 he future fChinawillnot bedecided ythe ctions fothers,ut the

actions foutside arties ave nfluencedhina's rientation nthe ast (e.g.,Nixon and the pening fChina)andmaydo soagain nthefuture.

I approach he roblem f therise fChina from heperspectivef internationalelationsheory,ot as anareaspecialist.hus Iwill emphasize owdevelopmentsnChina relate oa general atterneen nother reat owers ntheirttemptsorevise,oin, rseparateromlobalorder. he goal is to oint ut the roblemsnthe urrentdebate, ffern alternativeiew, nd explore ts ontemporary elevance. good startingoint istodefine hatexactlyfuturententions"eansand to utline he ature

of current hinese intentions.he article hen xploreshow powerand interdependencerguments ealwithintentions,ffersn explanation or hange nd continuity,ndexploreshe mplicationsor he uturefChina'sintentions.

China and ContemporaryInternationalOrderIntentionsefersowhatChina plans todo. Here I focusspecificallynplansfor ealing iththenternationalrder.In general erms,tates ealwith internationalrder n

threedeal ays: ntegration,evision,ndseparation.hefirst,ntegration,eferso national trategieshat cceptthe ominantrinciples,ules,ndnorms fwhatHedleyBull called internationalociety."3 ypicallyuch tatesare een s "statusuo," "satisfied,"r "conservative"owersbasedon their esire oworkwithin the nternationalsystem. second ategoryncludes hose tates hat nalystsefero s"dissatisfied"r"revisionist,"ut themeaning s he ame: heynvolveffortsofundamentallyevisetheinternationalystem.uch revisionypicallyreedsconflict inceother ountries reprone todefend thatsameorder.14 third pproach is seen in states that

attempt oremove r separate hemselvesrom he rbitof prevailingnternationalorms nd practices, uch as

51 6 Perspectives on Politics







Figure 1China's outlook on internationalorder

DominantOrthodoxy

Qing (1800-1860) Separatist

Republican (1896-1939) Integrationist

Era Mao (1949-1976) Revisionist

Deng (1978 - ) Integrationist

TokugawaJapan ttemptedodo in thenineteenthen

tury,rMyanmarhas done inthe ontemporaryeriod.Intentionss termhat s ften ssociatedith aims r

goalsor interests.t isuseful,however, odistinguishbetweennterestsnd the deas hat tatesdoptto ttaintheirnterests.road interestshowrelativelyittleariationbothwithinand amongstates. tateshave alwayssought ecurityrom xternalhreatsndespeciallynthetwentiethentury,conomic rosperityasalsoemergedas a coreresponsibilityfgovernment.'5s Jiangemindeclaredn1997,China seeks the oalofbeing rosperousand strong"-an imshared yChinese leadersandother ations) hroughouthe ges. hina'sdesire obe a

"richnd strongountry"nd to enrich he eople" atesback to t least he ate ineteenthentury.16oday hinais ertainlyntentn increasingts comprehensiveational

power."17

If uchfundamentaloals eemrelativelyonstant verlongperiods f time, deas bout how to achieve hosegoalsarenot.Theyhave ranged rom heviolent verthrowf internationalrder o the esire o remainlooffrom t, oanurge to integrateithin it. s seeninfigure 1,China's ownhistoryver thepast two centuriesshows ariationmongthese ositions.

By this ypology,hina'scurrentntentionsremostly

integrationist.hina is oining ndworking ithintherules f the xtant ystem.hewellspringf this tatusquo approach sfoundn engXiaoping's scent o eadership n 1978. Since thattime, hina has not soughtseparationromhe ystemorhas it spired ooverturnit. nsteadthas increasinglyptedfor nvolvement.hisorientationasmanifestedtselfn ignificantncreasesninternationalnstitutionalembership swell asmoreinformalooperativeehavior ith the xistingowers.'8This integrativerientationas cautious n the arly

Deng period, ut inthe astfifteenears aspickedupconsiderable omentum. here is roomtodebate the

depthof Chinese integration hether it is shallow renmeshed-butthe rend s lear.'9 hina has left ehind

"world evolution"nd "three orlds theory" hetoricfrevisionismnd gives ess mphasis o its elf-proclaimedrole as "leader f theThirdWorld."20 Instead hinatoday howsmostof themarkers f a conservativereatpower ccepting he asicprinciplesf the xistingnter

national rder.21hina joined theWorld TradeOrganization, as cooperated ore fully ith the nitedStatessince the /11 attacks,nd regularlyarticipatesnG-8meetings.China's continuedpromotion f "theFivePrinciplesf Peaceful oexistence"r the all for "newpolitical nd economic rder that s fair nd rational"seemvague.22 hina's commitmento revising he system o benefitevelopingountrieseemsmost relevantwhen it nvolves easures elated oChina'sown growthor to oncernsfsovereigntyelatedo ts wnhistorysa targetf imperialism.23

To suggest hat hina accepts hebasic principlesf

today'snternationalrder snot tosaythat tprefersochange nworldpolitics. ertainly hina is dissatisfiedwith some spects.hree importantnes areU.S. dominance, the status fTaiwan, and external ressure odemocratize.

China favorsmultipolarization"nd "democratization" ninternationalelations-i.e., hat ll states oratleast reat owers) ave more equal say nd the nitedStates hegemonism"or ny ther redominantountry)less nfluence-especiallyn termsf theU.S. ability ouseforce o chievets oals r to ntervenenthe omestic oliticsf other ountries.24hat sentiment,owever,

ishardly nusual nd is shared ymostmajor powers,includingmerica's uropean llies. hina has a specialsensitivityn suchmatters ue to the inkbetween tscolonialpast, subsequent ndependence,nd the egitimacyofthe ommunist egimewhich ases ts uthorityinpart n successfullyestoringhina's utonomy).The second, nd related,ssue s aiwan.China favors

reunificationnd rejectsnymove that nhances aiwanese independence.ince 1979 ithas advocated eacefulreunificationver liberation"but as alsodeveloped ilitary apabilitiesuited oTaiwanas a target).hina inthis ssue,swithTibet or other isputed erritories,or

traystselfsdefenderfthe xtant ules. nification ithTaiwan inChina'sview s "domesticssue" ver hich asovereigntatemustmake its wn internalecisions. s

Mao proclaimedothe nitedStates n1970, "YouhaveoccupiedourTaiwan Island, ut I havenever ccupiedyour ong Island."25

The combinationf a desire or utonomynd reunificationith Taiwan is fuelinghat isalso anomalousfor reat owerswith he xceptionf the nitedStates)in the ontemporaryystem-a relativelyapiddefensebuildup. lthough t sdifficultofathomxact umbersand levels f spending ue toChina's secrecyn these

issues, thas bumped tsmilitary pending ome 15percent year rom 990-2005with a 17.8 percent ncrease

September 2007 1 ol. 5/No. 3 517







Articles IWhat China Will Want

announcedfor 007. The overall evel-withestimatesranging rom45-100 billion s till, owever, fractionof est.U.S. military pendingf $440 billion fy2007,excluding the $50 billion supplementfor Iraq andAfghanistan).26

China hasmade significantrogressn its apabilities(includingnballistic nd cruisemissiles, ubmarines,ircraft,ndamphibious perations) hat remostlyrelatedto regional hallenges,speciallyith regardo scenariosinvolvingaiwan.Assuming that he hinese economytriples y2025,Chinesemilitary pending s xpected oclimb o omewhereetween 185 billion o 400 billion(i.e., ess han he urrent.S. defenseudget). heChinese continue o face ignificanteopolitical hallengesfromeighborsuch s ndia, ussia, apan,nd the nitedStates, ot tomention internalhallenges nd demandsonpublic pending. iven this utlook, t sunlikely hat

the urrentcale fChina'smilitary odernizationignalsmore than desiretoprotect tsversion f autonomy,whichproblematicallyncludes aiwanand raises ssuesoverotherdisputed reas n the ast andSouthChinaSeas.27

Finally, hina may havemost of the ttributesf anormalmajor power nthe nternationalystem,ut it sdistinct rom thercontemporaryreatpowers n oneimportantay: it is the nlynon-democracy.his traitsuggestsensionsnd disagreementithemergentormsof internationalociety egardinguman and politicalrights.28n its nternationalelations,hina isquick to

makehay utofrelationsithcountries,hat y democracystandard,may be stigmatized r less desirablepartners-as seen in thestrong elationshiphina hasbeenbuilding ith Iran, orthKorea, the udan,Myanmar,andRussia.

To the xtentemocracyecomes defining eaturefinternationalociety-and countriesre forced ochoosebetween emocraciesndnon-democracies-Chinaightindeedbecomea revisionistower. ndeed, omehaveargued andChina has notdisagreed)hat hina offersdifferentodel ofdevelopment-"the eijing onsensus"that hallengeshe .S.-dominated Washingtononsen

sus."29 hat view featurestrong overnment-directedgrowth,igorousrotectionfsovereignty,nd the evelopment fasymmetricormsf defense ocombat thermore powerful ountries e.g., theUnited States). Inextremeircumstancesperhaps global conomicmeltdown),sucha visionmightbecomea rallyingointforresistanceo the ociety hat ow exists.At thepresent ime, hina'snotionofdemocracys

"the emocracyfdictatorship"ronewherepeoplearethe masterf the tate"-Kafkaesque erms hat efer osomethinghat snotdemocracys it sgenerallynderstood. nstead ower esidesnthe ands f the ommu

nistParty nd allother olitical ntities ust follow tslead or pay a blood price. Indeed even todaywhen China

aspires o greater emocratic eforms,he most mportant nd fundamentalrinciple or evelopingocialistpoliticalemocracyn hina" is he eadershipfthe ommunist arty.30nshort, olitical ompetitionsrare, opularpolitical hoice for he eadershipf the ountrys

notpermitted,he ress s tightlyanaged,the nternetsfilterednd blocked ithamazing ophistication,eligionis ontrolledy the overnment,ndhumanrightsccordsareverballycknowledgedut notfully mplemented.31

Despite this tanding,t isnotable that hina isnotadvocating hat tatesdopt imilar olitical ystemso tsown, rthat uman ightsormsre llegitimate.32nsteadBeijing mphasizes hat rinciplesuch ssovereignty,tability,nd territorialntegrityhouldtrumpuch onsiderations.33hina doesnot rule utdemocracyn ts uture,it ust nsistshatt ill followts wnpath, tylefdemocracy,nd timing. or the time eing,the nternational

normseems oemphasize emocratizationi.e.,movingina liberal irection) ot the nd state f democracy asomewhatndefinedoal).China's tatementsnd actionsfit hatrofile-asdiscussedater,t s lowlyiberalizingalbeit t a slowpace andwith reversals.verall,despitethe ensionver uman ightsnddemocratization,hina'scurrentutlook smostly ntegrationist.

The Limits of Power andInterdependenceThe debate overChina isnot aboutwhat China wantstoday, utwhat itmightwant tomorrow.he rise fChina could leadto a fundamentaleorientationfChinese thinkingndperhaps challenge oworldorder,sthose ho focusnpower redict.r China could ncreasinglynmesh tselfnand support he xisting ules finternationalociety,venundergoingolitical emocratization,smostwho emphasize hina'sgrowingnterdependence oresee.oth offern importantision, utbotharehalfblind in ignoringhe ontingentature fChina's futurententions.

Power

Power theoriesxpect clear hiftna revisionistirection. sRobertGilpinonceput it, As tsrelativeowerincreases, risingtate ttemptsochange herules overning he ystem."34ohn earsheimer oncludes hatChina'sgrowingapabilitiesillmean it would ot be astatus uo power, ut an aggressivetate eterminedoachieveregional egemony."35enny Roy expects hat"China's rowthromweak,developingtate o stronger,more prosperoustate hould resultnamore assertiveforeign olicy ... bolder,more demanding, nd lessinclined ocooperate ith the thermajor powers ntheregion."36he basic thrustf these nalyses s that ising

power eads o growing eopoliticalppetitend a likelychange oward evisionism.

518 Perspectives on Politics







This view of China has twovariations, he"patienthegemon" nd the "innocent iant." In thefirst iew,China is likeGermany n theWeimar period, atientlybidingitstime ntil it isstrong nough to reconfigurean oppressiventernationalrder. ans Von Seeckt, he

headof the utlawed shadow) ermany rmy sreputedto have declared n the 1920s,"First e'll get strong,then e'll take ackwhatwe lost."37 eng supposedlyadvised, Observe almly; ecure ur position; opewithaffairsalmly; ide ourcapacities nd bide our time; egoodatmaintaining lowprofile;nd never laim eadership."38he implication,fcourse, sthat fter oweris chieved ifferentolicies ill follow.ieutenant eneralMi Zhenyu, ice Commandant f the cademy fMilitary ciences, utitmorebluntly: [Asfor he nitedStates,]for relativelyong time twill be absolutelynecessarythatwe quietly nurse our sense of ven

geance.... We must conceal ur abilitiesnd bideourtime."39A second iew fChina isas an "innocent iant" hat

may not be revisionistight ow, ut is likelyoshiftnthat irection s itgains power. hinamay genuinelybelieve tsrisewill be peaceful, ut once ithas gainedenough esources,t s ikelyowantmoreandbewillingtoconcede ess nd henceput upwith less f the tatusquo.Sometimesuch hiftsillbeprovoked,ot y hina,butbythe nsecurections f the eclining egemon,nthis ase the nitedStates.40Not only srevisionismikelyccordingopower heo

rists,ut so too s onflict.ower ransitionsre iewed saquintessentialource fwar inthe nternationalrena.41This is speciallyhe asewhen nations avehistorieshatleave hem ggrieved.hus there sconcern hat hina,like ther ountries hat eel hey avehistoricallyottenthe hort nd f the tick,re articularlyrone o ttempttorevise he nternationalystem.42Thesepower rgumentsorrectlydentifyey lements

shaping hinese foreign olicyand internationalelations. hinese leaders ay close attention opower ndgeopolitics.43ndeed,to the xtent hat hina is interested in joining nternationalociety,tshould,by the

very rinciplesf the ystem,ave n interestnbalanceofpower olitics.ndChina is ertainlyocusedn increasingits wnpower ndbalancing .S. power nAsia.44Therearealsogood reasons obelieve hat hinese aimsand influenceillgrow n omerespectssChina'spowergrows. twould be a true nomaly fsomeportion fChina'snew-foundealthwerenotdirected o increasedandmoremodernmilitary apabilities.

Likewise ower ransitionheoristsightlyointtothehigher robabilityf internationalensionshenpowertransitionsccur. t is asyto maginehatmorepowerful hinamight se ts apabilitiesnwaysthat aise ackles

of those e.g., he nitedStates) sedtocalling he hotsinAsiawithout uch onstraints.

The problem ith this rgumentowever sthat owerisnotdestiny.here are nalyticnd empiricalnomaliesthat onfound uch spare iew. e might,for xample,assume hat tates reconcerned irstnd foremostithpower, ut thattells s nothing bout how they hink

they anbestachieve ower-by challengingheworld,cooperatingith it, r ignoringt.Because internationalrelationsrecomplex nd road testingrand trategiessdifficult,tates how agged esponsestbest to externalconditions.he possibilityf effectivedjustmento nternational emands sfurthermpeded y the act hat thestate" snot a single ctor ut an aggregationf leaderswith differentonstituencies,achwithvarying erceptions ndpreferences.45ggregatinghose referencesntoa coherentollectivehoicefaces varietyfhurdles.46nshort, rand trategysfilteredhroughomestic olitics.

Empirically,tates o not always xpand their oreign

policy spower ncreasesnordo theyimit tas powerdeclines). istorical nomalies re ommon.47nthe irst

WorldWar,America merged s the ominant ower ninternationalelations,ut its nvolvementnd goalsdidnot xpand, ut contractednthe nterwareriod. hinainthe ing eradid not lter ts solationistdeastodeal

with the ncroachingnd threateninguropeanpowerseventhough hesecurityituationndicated ountingdangers.nd in termsfpower trajectories,ritain ndthe nitedStates id notgo towarwith each ther t theturn f thetwentiethentury,ven s the nitedStatessurpassedritain s the ominant nternationalower.48

Nationalstrategyanrarelyeunderstood y referenceoexternalonditions lone.

Nor have ideasfollowed he alance fpower n lockstep. hina hasbeenconsistentlyeaker than he ominantpowers f world politicssinceat least the latenineteenthentury,et ts deas avevaried etweeneparation nQing China to integrationnRepublican ndcontemporaryhina torevisionismuring ao (seefigure2). We mightviewChina'spower trajectory,otstatic osition s beingmost important,ut that rajectory as been risingwith itsnd starts)incethe ommunistsseizedcontrol f themainland.China's ideas,

however, ave made shifts etweenrevisionism ndintegration.

And contraryo the"risinghina" thesis-i.e., thatforeign olicyambitions rowwith relativeowerChinawasmost revisionisthen itwas atoneof its eakest oints ntermsfrelativeower-i.e., afterao cametopower.

Scholars ave ttemptedomodify he ower iewtotake nto onsiderationuch anomalies. ne notion isthat tatesreshaped ot just y raw ower, utalsoby"intentions."50ower ransitioncholars ave ong otedthat nationalatisfactioniththe tatusuo" is s impor

tantstransitions.nboth nstancesheseactorsre iewedasdistinct rom,ndnot reducible o, ower.hey clearly

September 2007 IVol. 5/No. 3 519







ArticIes iWhat China Will Want

Figure 2Relative power (CINC) of China, the United States, and Russia

0.45 -

0.4

~0.35

Z- 0.3

0.25-

C oo om Ajc sl cJsSa:a

020.

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0

o co0 c\J 00 o o. c\ 01t 0 CD0 C\j CO 0 (O C\j CO 't 0 (O C\J co(o (O a- oo Co 0) a) 0 0 C) C '\j CO CO ' LO cO (O (O ,- 0O 0 0)0c )0O ~O C CO o co CO C) 0') 0) 0) 0') 0) 0Y) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0Y) 0) 0) 0)

Year

| - - China CINOC 0US CINC -R ussia CINOC

imply hat e cannot nderstandnd predict hat stateswilldowithoutknowing owtheyhinkbout ppropri

ateaction.51et theyonotaddress he ey ssuefwhensuch thinkings ikelyo hange-or not.

Interdependence

A differentesponseoChinesepower omesfrom hosewho believe hat hina'smaterialmprovementnd socialevolution hroughnterdependenceith theworldgiverise odomestic olitical orceshat avorntegrationndsupport heexistingystem.his will occur throughnumber fmechanisms. irst, overnmentfficialshattake art n nternationaliplomacyndnegotiationsvertime ome todefine heirnterestsnwaysmore consistent ith the ystem.52

Second,China's increasingarticipationn theworldeconomy sexpected ogiverisetodomestic conomicand politicalnterestshat ress or ven reateriberalization.53orexample,sChinamodernizes,tsmiddle classand its resources grow (see figure3) 54-a trend that has

historicallyeena force or olitical emocratization.Finally asChina opens, the increase in travel and edu

cation broad see figure ),55the pread f free peechand ideas n the nternetseefigure),56 ndexperimentswitheven imitedoting nd choice re xpectedo nspirea taste or ibertyhat eeds emocratizingmpulseshat

willmorehappilylign hinawith nternationaltandards.

Overall, he orethathina is conomicallynd sociallyentwinedith ther ajorpowers e.g., he nitedStates)

themore itgainsfrom he verall ystemnd themore ithas to lose n changing he ystemr engagingnmajorconflict.57e might lso nticipatehat sChina participates nthe ystemtwill also change t, nconsultationand agreementith other ountries,ore to its iking.

These relatedrgumentshat upport ngagementertainly apturen importantnfluencenBeijing's hinking oday. hina has become aptivatedy the conomicgrowth hat as accruedfrom ts penness o the nternational conomy. uch interactionas generated oresignificantomestic oliticalnterestshat avor pening.

While thegrowth f theChinesemiddle class is stillnascent, heres ome videnceo uggestncreasingealthmayaffectoreignolicy pinions.58he People's epublicof China remains n authoritariantateyetChinesecitizens ill alsoattest othefact hat heir olitical ituation today isvastlymore liberal and open than itwas in

the re-reformeriod ndbecoming oreso.59 nd finallyChina realizes that itdoes have much at stake in the cur

rentystem-withncentivesobecomemoreengaged.60This explanationsefullyoints s tothefact hat orldpoliticss nacted hroughomestic oliticsndwhathappensinChina's foreignelationsanaffect hose olitics,potentiallyhanginghem ramaticallyvertime.

The problem ith these nterdependencergumentss

that hey,ike heirower-centricebating pponents,re

52 O Perspectives on Politics







Figure 3Disposable income of Chinese citydwellers

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overly eterministic.61hey assume hat nceChina hasbeenhookedup tothe nternationalystemheres ittlechance twill ever hange irections.nternationalistactions rofitingr learningromntegrationreexpectedto snowball, ushing he ountry urthern that irection. his view,however,lso runs nto nalyticalrapsandhistoricalnomalies.

Analytically,thas a difficultime ccounting or owinterestsithin societies add up" tonationalpolicychoices.62or example, hat number f internetsers

translatesnto free peech ociety hat refersemocracy? ightnow theChinese governmentsmatchingstrides owardreedomfexpressionith its wncontrolof the nternetndpress. ikewise t isdifficultodetermine how a growing iddleclass rexpansionnChina'sinternationalectors ill fit ith political iberalizationcompatible ith internationalociety.hosewho have

Figure 5Chinese Internetusers

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Figure 4Chinese students studying abroad

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benefited ost from hina'sopenness re either n,orlinked o, he ommunist arty hat ules hina andprovidesfor tabilityhat ttractsnternationalnvestment.63Indeed, tmay be that democratichina-one whererural easants nd otherdisenfranchisedroupshave asay-would bedistinctlypposedto thetypef integration owoccurring.64Democratizations precariousrocess-democratizing

states reoften ronetoconflict nderthepressuresfnew-found ationalismtoked y exaggeratedxpecta

tions nrestrainedy fledglingnstitutions.ontemporaryhinesenationalismhreatensobe the r.Hyde tothe r. Jekyllf the "reformnd opening" olicythatDeng initiated.65conomic interdependenceay be aforcehat orks gainst onflict,utit snot a failsafe-asseen nthe nterdependencef the arly 900s n uropethat nded nthe reatWar.

Figure 6Chinese economic interdependence

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September 2007 jVol. 5/No. 3 521







Articles IWhat China WillWant

Nor doesglobalization-thehrinkingf the lobe ndincreasedensity f contacts ithin nternationalocietydue to technologicaldvances-guaranteehinese integration. he potential nterdependencefChina in thesystem-in termsf the ecliningosts f transportation

and communicationnd the elativepennessf the orldtrade rder-has beenoccurring or ecades.WhetherChina took dvantagef the otential ains f interdependencewas at least npart a Chinesepolicy hoice thatneedstobeexplained.66orexample,s seen nfigure,67Chinese interdependenceasnotbeendriven imply ythemarch of technology,ut instead yChinese ideas(and those fothers) bouthowmuch China shouldbeengaged n theworld.Thus, Chinese interdependencedeclined ollowinghe ise fMao's revisionismndwhenChina beganto recalibratefter hedisastrous ulturalRevolution,nterdependenceegan orise-especiallyfter

1978.The historyfnational conomicmodernization ia

engagement ith the internationalrena is filled ithstoriesfcountriesndertakingntegrationnd then atermoving in the pposite irection. erewemight thinkofWeimarGermany'shift nderHitler orJapan's hiftfrom aish6 democracy o theShowa eraor even theretreatf the nited States n the nterwareriod. hinaitselfeversedirectionsnmovingfroming China toNationalist hina and thenreversedgainin thetransitiontoCommunist hina.

In sum,bothpower and economic nterdependence

may pushstrategynparticularirectionsut suchmoveshave lsobeenreversedven henpower nd interdependenceconditions emain airlyonstant.imilarly,ometimes tates ay stick o theirlanseven sconditions fpower nd interdependencelter ignificantly.hy?

The Meshing Gear: Collective IdeasNeitherpowernor interdependenceirectlyhaped hinese grand strategyecause such systemic actors reenacted hrough omestic olitics nd decisionmaking.There areof coursemany typesfdomestic heoriesf

politics.Here, however, want to concentraten thecentralandmisunderstood)ole fenduring oreignolicy ideas indomestic olitics nd subsequent ationalbehavior.

There isa largendvery nsightfuliteraturen howcollective deas e.g.,beliefs, orms, iscourses,ulture,etc.) "matter"nforeignolicy.68hat isusually issinginthesergumentsshow deasmatter ntheir wn transformation.he literaturesvery ood on howcollectiveideasmightkeep intentionsixed,ut less lear n howtheyffecthange. o suggesthatdeas lay role ntheirown transformationsnot to arguethat utcomes re

wholly aused y deas.t s seful o istinguishhempactof ideas romther actorse.g., trategicircumstancesr

economic ressures)nd tomake sense fhow they ightconjointlyauseoutcomes-i.e., howpower nd interdependence nteractith ideas hroughredictableechanisms ocauseoutcomes.he centralmphasisnwhatfollowss n the ole f ideas simply ecause t s the east

understood) ut the mportancefpower nd transnational ressuresill also be clear.

Foreign olicy deas and Intentions

Statestendtoformulateroadconcepts-almost perationalhilosophies-that rient heirnternationalehavior. s largeocieties,ations equiredeas hat ignifyotheir embers hat they tand or; s large rganizationsthey equire deastoguide them ntheirnteractionsnthe nternationalrena. Ideas," s Iuse the ermere, renotmentalconstructsf individuals,ut instead he ol

lectiveeliefs fsocietiesndorganizationsbouthow toact.Examples f beliefsbout "goodpolicies"from heforeignolicies fmajor powers nclude:

* "non-entanglement"nEuropeanpolitics UnitedStates, 776-1941)

* territorialxpansion n thecontinent Germany1890-1945)

* isolation romxtensiveoreignnteractionrpresence Japan 640-1868)

* integrations a normal ower Soviet nion/Russia1986-present)

They are mbedded otonly nsomehumanbrains, utmost importantlynthe ollectiveemories,ationalymbols, overnmentrocedures,ducationsystems,nd rhetoric f statecraft.69

Suchviewsmatter ecausetheyre guidetonationalactionand can shapewhat states ant toachieve vertime. aturallytateeaderstrategicallylantheirctionsbut theyften o soagainst backdrop fcertain ominantnational deas boutwhatgeneral ehaviors ppropriate. hese ideas aybecontestedy ome roups ithinsocietiesut still erve saguidefor he ollectivenation."Promoted y those ho benefitndnurturedyhabit,

they rowroots. s organizationheoristsoint ut,particularlyhengroups ave ntangibleoals uch s "security" r "wealth" tateswill focus their ffortsrounddoctrinesf actionrather han ctualgoals.Put differently,deasbecome ntentions.70n foreignffairs,uchideas arewhat ErnestMay has called "axiomatic"formulationserived rom istory hat ecome cceptedassumptionsfpolicy.71

National ideas bout nternationalrder redifficultochangefor number f reasons. irst, hey aveconstituencies hat enefit rom hem nd thus reenergizedopromote nd defend hem.econd, uchdominant deas

become ngrainednpublicrhetoricndbureaucraticrocedures hat ake them esilientike ll traditionshatre








Figure 7Collapse

Desirable Results - Continuity

Events Contradict <1Ideas on UndesirableResults * Collapse

WorldOrder (potentialhangeEventsConfirm* Continuity seeConsolidation)

institutionallyntrenched.hird,becauseof this ffectthey ecome ormalized ot ust smeans to chieve nds,but also as a standardfwhat thenation hould o, oreven hat it s i.e., dentity).

TokugawaJapan ame to be defined y itspolicy f

excluding oreignersnd its eaders ppealedto that radition o ustain heirosition.imilarly,he nited tateswas distinguishedy ts efusalo get ntangled"ith thesuspect raditionalowersfEuropeinthe irst50 yearsof its xistencend presidentsaidhomage o that orm(e.g., arding n the 920s) in rder obolster heiropularity.72hina in thenineteenthenturyntheface fforeignncursionsttemptedohew to traditionaling

Middle Kingdommentality espite ts aning authority.It isthereforeotsurprisinghat ontinuitys the orm

inforeignolicy deas. hosewhowant tochallenge raditionface ignificanturdles.t is ften ardforndivid

uals toknow f thers esire hange nd ifthey o,howmuch they ill risk cting n suchpreferences.ackingsuch nformation,heyannot e sure f heir wndesireand effortsor hange should they xist)will haveanyeffect.heymustmount a casefor hythe ld ideas eredefunct,hich an nvolveonsiderableffort,ndbecauseit threatensradition,nvitesocial nd political riticism.

Likewise he ormationnd institutionalizationfnewideas reeds trifend uncertaintyecause articularrientations ffer ifferingosts nd benefits odomesticgroups hat an stalemateverwhich, f ny, ewdirection smore desirable. ontinuity,herefore,sa potent

force. et asMay points ut,entrenched oreign olicyconceptsrenonethelessulnerable o transformationashistoryrows"nd countriessee he ast n new ight."73The interestinguestionsrewhen and how?

VWhenrthodoxyisintegrates

Implicitnthe bovediscussions thefact hat hange snot a single henomenon ut involves wostages hatmust be explained:ollapse f the ld ideas ndconsolidationof thenew.Both stages, argue, reaffectedypre-existingdeas.

In the ollapsetage, re-existingdeas ffectow lead

ers ustifyolicy nd set baseline f social xpectationsofwhat should result. olitical pponents ithincoun

tries hen se those aselines o assess-and support rcritique-existing olicies, epending n events. henevents ontradictollective xpectationsnd the onsequences re tarklyndesirable,hange smorelikely.uchsituationsacilitatehange y giving mmunition o the

opponents f thecurrentrthodoxy,llowing hem orally upport o their idewhile supportersf the urrentorthodoxyre uton the efensive.orexample,he eparatistpproachf the ing Empirewas finallyisruptedby the1895 Japanese ictorynthe ino-Japanesear.That event et ff race mong utsiders o ontrol hinaand encouraged orces ithinChina tochallenge radition, ncludingnforeignolicy.74

Inmost other ircumstances,ontinuitys likely. orexample,ontinuityanbeexpectedhendeviations romexistingdeas ead o ndesiredutcomes. hen the nitedStates ntervenednWorldWar I it iolated ts ongstand

ingtaboo gainst ntanglementnEurope's olitics. heresults fWorldWar I brought idespread isillusionment in the nitedStates nd the mericans mbracedanewtheir raditionf "no-entanglement"nEurope. nsuch ituations,efendersf the ld ideas as the merican isolationistsid)will be able tomake political ayby claiming toldyou so,we shouldnever avestrayedfromur tried nd true radition."nterventionnWorld

War I, they rgued, adbeen a disastrous istake.Likewiseontinuitys ven ikelyhendominant deas

are gnored et esirable esultsccur. t ishard togathermomentum o hange ollectivedeas hen outcomes re

agreeable. onsider, or xample, he earth f investigations f largetockmarket ncreaseshat o one expectedversus he pecial ommissionshat lways eem to formto examineunexpected tockmarket crashes.Whenoutcomes redesirable,t sdifficultogenerate omentum to reorient ureaucraciesnd alter traditions.hedelegitimationfan extantrthodoxyequiresvents hatboth contradict ts logicand have undesiredconsequences. n such ircumstances,ndividualsill bemoremotivated ndmore likelyo hallengehosedeas, elieveothers reof a likemind,andhence the ossibilitiesorchange remore significant.

Figure depicts he ranchingogic fcollapse nvolvingthis nteractionf ideas ndconsequences.

September 2007 iVol. 5/No. 3 523








Figure 8Consolidation

None orMany -* Continuityof ld deas)Replacement

Ideas UndesirableFeedback -*Continuity

OneDesirable Feedback * Consolidation

(change)

Conditions fNew Orthodoxy

Evenwhen dominant deas aredelegitimated,owever,change isnot automatic. onsolidation, ikecollapse,faces urdles hat eed nertia.ndividuals ay agree hatthe ld viewhas togo butmay notbe able toagree r

coordinate nwhat neworthodoxyhouldbe the uide.Such a dynamic asbeen chartednthe tudyf revolution,but it also exists n foreign olicydisputes nddebates.75 he consolidation f a new foreign olicyapproach ependsnot onlyon thecollapse f theoldideas, ut also on thedistributionf replacementdeas,especially he xistencefa prominentlternative.henthere reno developed lternativesrwhen there re

many equally trong lternatives,heresult ouldbe areturn othe ld thinkingue todefault nthefirstaseand deadlock mong factionsn the econd.For example, inQing China in thenineteenthentury,inocen

triceparationromhe ncroachingnternationalocietywas so dominant hat here erevirtuallyo groups fany import ithdevelopedreplacementdeastoguideChina's foreignolicy.76

The sustainabilityf a neworthodoxywhen prominentreplacementoes exist) ver longer eriodoftenhinges n somedemonstrationf its fficacy.deasthatendure o so becausethey ppeartogenerate esirableresults.hen those otions onot,revanchistsften indfertileround o rguefor returnothe ld ideas. hiswas the ase nWeimarGermany hen the esultsfVersailles nderminedhe iberalnternationalolicy f the

fledglingocialDemocraticgovernment.ersailles lsospawned he ay Fourth ovement n hina that elpeddiscreditledglingiberal emocracyotions.77

Figure depicts he ay that he istributionfreplacement ideasnd their emonstratedfficacyosterr inhibitchange.

This argumenteaturesdeas s ameshing ear-onethat nteractsithotherfactorsnd indoingso has itsown influence.ationalstrategieshereforere productofmulti-causal nfluence.rior deasplaya rolebutofcoursedo not unilaterallyetermine ll aspects fneworthodoxies.onsider, orxample,he ole f the elative

power factors, hichoften hapes egativendpositivefeedbacko revailingdeas. ominant onceptshatgnore

relativeower an leadtodisappointingesults hat ontribute o their elegitimation.onsider thedecline fthe ing-eratributeystemnd sinocentrismnder the

weightof superioruropeanand Japanese apabilitiesthat xposed heir ragilitynthe ate ineteenthentury.

Likewise, he umbernd nature f replacementdeas ocentral oconsolidations haped y the olitical ctivityand resourcesf interestroups nd individualshat romote them.conomic nterdependencend the romisesofgrowthnherentn it can indeed trengthenhose nfavorf such ideas.78 ong-term ffortshat ncourageinternationalxchange an facilitateherise f replace

ment ideas nparticularocieties.79hus the uccess fideas an alsobeshaped ythe egree countrys nvolvedinthe nternationalconomy.Overall, hen, he ccount fforeignolicy hange and

continuity)fferedere scontingent.tdepends n the

interactionf the ominant oreignolicy deas f stateswith the esultsncountered,swell as the istributionfreplacementdeas n a particularociety nd theirnitialsuccess,f ny. o stressontingencysnot toforgo xplanation.80 e can posit that uturententionsilldependon the egree owhich the xpectationsfparticularominant deas redefied y events, egative onsequencesresult,nd some ocially iablereplacementdea xists.

Thisgeneralogic eems ohavewideapplicationnthehistoryfgreat owers, nd though here redifferences,coversoth emocraticndauthoritarianegimes.8'hatfollowss a brief llustrationfhow someof the entral

dynamics aptured y the logicmightplayout in thefuturefChina's currentreformndopening" iewoninternationalrder escribedbove.

The Contingent Path ofChina'sFuture IntentionsThe argumentbovehighlights articular ignpostssimportantor nderstandinghatChinamightdowithits rowing ower nthefuture.ost centrally,he ongevityfChina's ntegrationistrthodoxyilldepend nthe xpectationst eneratesnthe omesticrena nd theresults hat reexperiencedcollapse onsiderations),s

well ason the ature f the deas hat ight replacentegrationconsolidationactors).address ach inturn.








justificationsndExpectations

Contemporaryhinese leaders ustifynd promote hedominantntegrationdea-i.e., "reformndopening"intwo ifferentays.The first,ndmost important,ustificationf current

policy s thatntegrationithin the xistingnternationalorder rovideshe estmeans for ational conomic evelopment.82hina remains governmentun y communistparty.et the egitimacyndpopular upportf thegovernmentoesnot rest n socialistdeology,ut nsteadon economic erformance.Well-offociety"ot "Workers nite" is the ational antra. resident iangemin's2002 address o the16thParty ongress ut this laimstarkly:

It is ssential or he arty o give toppriorityodevelopment ngoverningnd rejuvenatinghe ountry nd open up newprospectsfor hemodernization rive . . . theprogressivenessf theParty s oncrete nd historical, nd itmust be judgedbywhetherthe arty romotes he evelopment f the dvancedproductiveforces.83

The Fifth lenary f the 16th Party ongressof theCPC inOctober 2005 calleddevelopmentthe verriding rinciplend the ey to resolvingllproblems acingChina."84 he dominance f the ntegrationrientationincontemporaryhineseforeign olicy s largely asedon economic considerations.ntegrationccording othe reformndopening rthodoxyerveshina's rapiddevelopment.

The secondmajor justificationor ntegrationithinthe existing nternational rder is that it enhancessovereignty-understoodn termsf independencendterritorialntegrity.hat is, integrationhouldpreventthetype f colonialsubordinationf thepastand theinfringementf China by outsidepowers.A definingpoint fhistoryor he ommunist arty CPC) leadership sthe centuryfhumiliation"hina endured nderthe nfluencef imperialistowers e.g., he est, Japan).One of theCPC's main claims to authoritys that tliberatedhina from hat utsideinfluence.85ntegrationfacilitatesuch goal byprovidingccessto institu

tionalfora hereglobalpolitics redecidedthatmightaffecthina'sautonomy.uch integrationlsoprovidesthe mprintfmajor power tatus,onfirminghat hecountry s no longer implyn objectmanipulated ymorepowerfulestern ountriesrJapan, utan important ctor tself.The most concrete arker f sovereigntyor hina

today sTaiwan.China expects hat tsparticipationnthe xtant nstitutionsnd conventionsfworldpoliticswill help to fulfill desire seeminglyidespread crossthe oliticalpectrum)ounite hemainland ndTaiwan.Suchparticipationllows hina tostymieffortsyTai

wan to laim overeignnternationaltandingnd tobuilditS wn internationalupport.

These two themes,conomicmodernizationnd sovereignty,ay look closely inked o therealist ocus npower nd autonomy.he key ifference,owever,sthatChinese eadersustifyhem otbased n increasinghina'ssecurity,uton betteringhe iving tandardfChinese

citizens.ikewise,hina's bsession ith aiwan ndotherterritoriesshard tounderstandrom trictlypower erspective.ithout knowinghina'shistory nd the entralityfTaiwanto PC legitimacyains, t s mpossibletounderstandherole his ssue anplay nChinesepolitics nd securityecision-making.Economicdevelopmentnd sovereigntyanofcourse

alsobe intensionithone another, fact hat oesmuchtoexplain he omplexityfcontemporaryhinesepolicies.86 ntegrationan lead to deep inroadsn issues fsovereignty.orexample, embershipnthe orld TradeOrganization rings ith it numberfsignificantmpli

cations or he hinese social nd political rder, ot theleast fwhich ismajor turmoiln themassiveChineseagriculturalector ndgrowingnequalityithin hinesesociety.87

Anticipating ventsthat avor Change

The durabilityfChina's ntegrationistoreignolicy, herefore,illdepend n howresultsatch social xpectationsrelated o conomic rowthnd sovereignty.vents elatedtoChina's integrationhat epresentignificantetbacksto ither f those ssues ould beoccasions or hina to

rethinkntegration.The firstituationhere the ntegrationistrthodoxywould be vulnerable nvolves roublesnChina's economicmodernization.rom this iewpointand incontrast otherise fChina debate)themost likelycenarioinwhichChina will alter ts ntegrationistindset snot

with thegrowthfChinesepowerbut, instead, ajorrupturesn that rajectoryhat ould put thedominant"openness"iew n a slipperyefensive. reasonableasecan bemade that levelingfChineseeconomic rowthis as likelynthefutures isChina's rise osupremacy.88Especiallyis-'a-visurrenthinese xpectations,his ould

be a deeplydisillusioningxperiencefChina'sgovernment is somehowmplicated.hat is, n the bsence fdownturnshat ffectll countriesr unforeseenrises,criticsf the urrentrthodoxyill have ncentiveousefalteringhinese economicprospects o rally oliticalauthorityround new pproach o the nternationalystem. hemotivatingource n uch scenario ill be thecombinationf surprisingconomic etbacks ontrastedwithoptimisticxpectationsenerated y leaderseekinglegitimacy.

The decline f economic rowthould encourage reviouslyilentroups hatppose ntegration.hina'srapid

development as led todaunting apsbetween ich ndpoor.89 ocial protests nd disturbancesppear to have








Articles IWhat ChinaWillWant

risen teadily n recent ears, ncreasingrom ,700 in1993 to87,000 in2005.90 Involvementn theWorldTradeOrganization W1TO) isputting ignificantressures npoor farmersnd peasants ho cannot ompete.As long s the conomy sbooming, ome f these eople

can transferoother ypes f jobsor the overnmentanprovide omeform f subsidy.91et if rowth altersn away thatmakes the overnmenteem omplicit,his ystem ooks rittle.

Second, ventsupportedythe nternationalommunitythat hina sees sneo-colonial rwhichmove Taiwan towards ndependenceould help toundermineChina'scurrentntegrationrthodoxy.or example, he1999bombing f the hineseembassynBelgrade uelednationalismnd strengthenedpponents f opening.92Much, of course, ill dependon theparticularircumstances ndwhether hey akeBeijinggovernmenteem

complicit.aiwanese ffortso establish ormalndependence ausedeepconcernn hina-indeed the ype hatcansetthe tage orhina to take ggressiveffortsn anissue eenas priority ven by "reformist"overnments.Taiwanese ndependenceffortsn2004-2005weremetbya strong andself-defeating)eaction romu JintaoandNationalPeople's ongress assingnti-secessionegislationhichauthorizedhina touse forcegainst ai

wan if t ontinued opushfor ndependence.93

Replacements or "Reformnd Opening"

Ifreformndopening oes falter,hat then?resumablysome sort f alternativeath.Anticipatinguch a newapproach, owever, epends n a keyfactorhat sespecially lusiventhe hinese case: the ature nddistribution freplacementdeasbout nternationalocietyithinChina.94 he outlines f three eplacementsrediscernable inanadmittedlypaqueview.95

The first as identifiedy Jiangemin as a challengeto his own "reformndopening" mphasis n theyearsfollowing he1989 TiananmenSquare fiasco.96 ianglabeled his hethreatrom he Right." or thegovernment,the anger rom he ight nvolveshose howould

attemptopursue conomic ndpolitical iberalizationtan evenmore rapid ace at the xpense f the artyndsocial tability.nrecentears he PC hasbeen speciallyfocusedn this hallengend hasgone togreat ffortolure uccessfulusinessmenntothe arty ndwelcomethereturnfChinese frombroadwhomightotherwisebe a voiceformore forcefulolitical hange. hinkhereof those ho havebenefitedost from apid ntegrationbutwho arenowchafingnder PC constraintsrbelieveChinamust take eformsothe ext evel e.g.rule f law,education)t a fasterace-e.g., the ewprivateusinessmen or state-ownednterprisexecutives,rtists r intel

lectuals,oastal ity regionsnd their fficials,r evenparts f the ureaucracyhat ave n interestn ntegration.

Jianglso dentifiedsecond roup ith lternativereferences or hina'sforeignolicy. e called t those ithleftistendencies"distinctrom he ldMarxistvariety)

who critique eform-and nternationalnvolvementas contributingo social njusticend inequality.n the

currentontext,his ight nclude armers,uralitizens,inlandities,ndparts fthe ilitaryrCommunist arty

who havenotsharedqually nChina'sdevelopmentndcouldrightlylamereformndopening rparticipationnthe lobal rder thinkTO) as the ause. nforeignolicy uch endenciesranslatento ocial upport or altingand reversinghina's integrationnthe urrentrder.fthe ommuniqueromhe ifthlenaryession fthe 6thParty ongress n ctober2005 is n indicator,he hallenge rom he eft-and the nequalityfgrowth-is ofparticularoncern othe eadershipfHu Jintaoho hasemphasized hemoreegalitarianoal f"harmoniousoci

ety"n ontrast oJiang'santra f"well-offociety."97A third osition ould comefromhose ho are ritical

ofglobalizationndwestern alues, ut arenotnecessarilyisolationistr anti-capitalist.hese peoplemight advocate nationalistealpolitikolicy hat avorsmore confrontationaltrategyith theWest, stabilitynd centralauthoritythome,whilepursuing soft ine nd integration nAsia.Thinkofthis erhaps,s the latform or heresurgencef amodern ay Middle ingdom" ole hereChinawould exercisencreasingegemony ithinAsiawhileperhaps istancingtselfrom verall nternationalorder.98

Absentbetternformation,twould appear that hosewhowould emphasize ithdrawal-either henew Leftorrealpolitikers-wouldccupy he hetoricaligh roundshouldfuturevents efy he opening" ustificationsfthe hinesegovernmentithclear isappointingesults.Both offergreaterifferenceithcurrentominantntegration deas Rightistsant evenmore integration)ndwould likelye ina better ositiontodrawoff he anguage fnationalismomake theirase.99 hinesestrategywill of coursealwaysbe amix of thesedifferentapproaches;he ssue sthe irectionfshiftnd the egreetowhichoneorientationominates.

To the xtent hat factionalccount fChinesepolitics is overdrawn e.g.,because thedecisionmakingdynamic s one of consensus, ot groupsfightingvercontrol) hen nychange nforeignolicythinkingilldemand specially egative esultsndcould take onsiderable ime, ust s itdid inQing China.'00 If there s acontinuedhared iew that isolation sthemajor factorexplaininghina's decline" nd "opening ueled hina'srise," hen hiftingignificantlywayfrom eformndopeningwould nothappenquickly.101lthoughnot sodominant s the eparatistentalityfQingChina, integrationtoday njoys privilegedtatus gainstwhich

replacementdeaproponents ay havea hard timemakingheadway.








Influencing IntentionsUnderstandinguturententionssa significantnd critical hallenge or oth scholars nd policymakers.haveargued hat neway (bynomeans the nlyway) tothinkaboutthe volutionfintentionss s aproductfchange

and continuityndominant deas bout foreign olicy.Situationsnvolvinghe ombinationfunmet xpectations nd undesiredonsequencesre likely ofacilitatecollapsewhile thosewhereconceptual xpectationsrefulfilledr desired onsequencesccurfavorhe ontinuity f orthodoxy.onsolidation f a new foreignolicyapproach-andhence set f intentions-is nhanced ythe xistencefa prominent eplacementdea that lignswithdesirable esults.

If this rguments right,t mplies hat nderstandingthe uturef a "risinghina"means looking eyond, utnotover, ower nd interdependence.he effectsfpower

and interdependencerecertainlymportantor nderstandinghina's ttitude owardsnternationalrder. elative ower asshaped hina'spast thinkingowards hedominant ules ndnorms f the nternationalystem.hepenetratingeopoliticaleachfWestern ower admuchtodowithwhy ingChinahad the ncentiveo hange tslong nduring ributaryystemnd sinocentrism.ikewise,the nterdependencepproach ightlyighlightsowthe pennessfChina andgrowthf internationalradeand contacts ashelped evelop onstituenciesnd liberalforcesn hina that therwise ightnotexist. ut thesetwo onstanttructuralorcesannot ccount or he ari

ation ver imen hinese deasbout owtorelateo nternational ociety.o do that emust lsoheedthe ontingentwaysthat oreignolicy deas elate o vents,swell as thereplacementdeas hat orm ithin hina.

In termsfpolicy, his rgumentautions gainst hechoice that xistsmongthe three ain alternativesnthe urrent .S. policy ebate: ngaging,ontaining,rhedging gainst herise fChina.Anymightbe appropriate ependingnwhatparticularolicy hina ispursuing ndhow that elates o the hinesegovernment'srationale or ts ctions. o the xtent eijing eadersreattemptingobuild theiruthoritynd legitimateheir

rulebasedon actions hat hallengenternationalrder,other tates hould bjecttoorpenalize uch ctions. orexample, .S. policiestoward heSovietUnion-e.g.,theCarterandReagan defense uildup,theresponseto theSovietdeploymentf new SS-20 Euromissiles,and the aid to theMuhjahadeen in thewake of theSoviet nvasionfAfghanistan-helped oundercut heBrezhnev correlationfforces"hinkinghatrgued hatthe xercisefSoviet ower erved he SSR's interests.The dynamic as not just balancing fpowerbut anunderminingf ideas.Likewise, houldChina pursueaggressive olicies thatundermine nternationalrder,

other ountries nd organizationshould sanction nddelegitimizehem.

The pointhere isnot to pursue hat hascome to betheperceived isdom indealing ithChina'sunknownfuturententions-i.e., hedging trategy.uch an approach ounsels hat he ther ountries repare hemselves orny ventualitynd respondnkind.However,

doing o suffersrom wo roblems.t is verlyassive nitsdependence n simply eactingowhat happens nChina.Andmost importantt s verly ocusednChina'sbehavior ndnot attentivenoughto the deasbehindaction and how they elate o thedomestic olitics fauthoritynChina.A simpleresponse o behaviormayunnecessarilytrengthenevisionistorcesnBeijing.

Ifthe oal sto ncorporatehina into he nternationalsystemn way that akes the ystemperaten fashionacceptableo ll,however,t s mportantoreinforcehoseChinese eadersndmovementshat ave taked heiregitimacyn the ositivespects f ntegration.modern-day

repeat f the nderminingf pro-liberalizationdvocatesbyWestern ction-as occurred hen the ersaillesreatyproduced heMay Fourth ovement and a reactionaryChina-would be adisaster.hismaymeanmakingnextraefforto ssureayoffso hina forarticularlyoldmovesintermsf integration-or n termsfrestraintis-a-visTaiwan. he point snotsimply o mpede ardlinersndhelp softliners.ndeed, oing ither ightbedesirabledependingn the deas nd xpectationsheyre romoting.

There is f course risk nsupportinghinese development hroughntegration.tmay lead-throughnforeseen vents,rmiscalculation,r inadequateupport-to

aChina that trengthensnough obedangerous,uthasnotyet hanged nough nternallyobe satisfiedith thenorms f the ystem.'02nsuch ircumstances,here ntegrationistdeas reundermined,hinamaywell looktoanother ndmuch less esirable et f ideas toguide itsforeignolicy.

To dealwith this cenario,tmakessense, hen, o beproactive-topayattentiono the otential eplacementideas irculatingnChina and their ackers-ones thatmaysomedayeconceptualings.or xample,t s mportant hat ong-termffortsemade tostrengthenhoseChinesegroups nd individuals ho would support,n

the vent f significantetbacks o reformndopening,replacementdeas hat remore desirable han n aggressive,eparatistationalistpproach oforeignolicy.herearehistoricalrecedentsor uch transformativenfluence. ffortsakenvermanyyears yavarietyfgroupsin the nitedStates and inBritain) fter orldWar Ihadmuch todowithwhy internationalisma fusingfgeopoliticsndWilsonianism)was a coherent eplacement for solationismnAmerican trategyfter orldWar II.103 ikewise uring he oldWar,U.S. andEuropean nteractionith neven ore uthoritarianndclosedSoviet nion helped new hinking"andnotsome ther

thinking)ake hape sa viablereplacementhen the ldSovietforeignolicy ogmadisintegrated.'04








Articles IWhat China WillWant

Of course, he imitsfoutside nfluencen a countryofChina's size ndcomplexity,specially iven he opular hinesedesire orutonomyndnon-interferenceromforeigners,resignificant.oreover, hina'sauthoritariangovernmentnd lack f transparencyimit he bility

to losely ollownd shape nternalevelopments.hina'sfuturenthe orldwill be largelyf its wnmaking. etas seen nhistory,utside nfluenceas sometimeslayeda role in theevolution f China's approachto internationalociety-fromhepiumWars tothe ay FourthMovement to the arly old War periodto the urrentintegration.entral to this istory-and hina'sfuturearenot just the erils fpower r the romisesf interdependence,ut alsohow they elate o thewayChinathinksboutthe orld.

Notes1Zoellick2005.2 See, for example thehearings held from the summer

of 2006 up to now. http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/

hearingarchive.php3 Vice President sRemarks to theAustralian-American

Leadership Dialogue, Shangri-La Hotel Sydney,Australia, February 27, 2007. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070223.html

4 Johnston 2003.

5 Friedberg 2005 offersa typology and contingent

analysis of future relations that lacks a general explanation to telluswhether eventswill move in one

direction or another.

6 Copeland 2000a.

7 Friedberg 2005 documents that there is some varia

tion in this dichotomy?some who focus on power

do not see inevitable conflict and some liberals are

morepessimistic.

8 For a study that explores the linkbetween uncer

tainty about intentions and cooperativeor conflic

tual strategies, see Edelstein 2000.

9 The classic synthesisof power and interdependence

(without ideas) isKeohane andNye, 1977.10 See Snyder 1991 and Solingen 1998.

11 TheNational SecurityStrategy of theUnited States ofAmerica (March 2006) "seeks to encourage China to

make the right strategic choices for itspeople, whilewe hedge against other possibilities." http://www.

whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/. See also Carter and

Perry 2007, 16-22; Council on Foreign Relations,U.S.-China Relations: An AffirmativeAgenda, A

Responsible Course, Independent Task Force Report59 (April007).

12 Thomas 2001; Evangelista 1999.

13 SeeBull 1995.14 SeeMorgenthau 1966, 38ff;Wolters 1962, 81-102.

15 Rosecrance 1986.

16 JiangZemins Report at the 15* National Congress oftheCommunist Party ofChina, September 12, 1997.

http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.htm; Hao andWang 1978, 171.

17 Pillsbury 2000.18 See Kent 2002; Johnston 2003, 2004a.

19 Cf.Wang 2000 and Johnston 2001.

20 Such themes are common in speeches from the

1970s. See for example, thekeynote speeches at the

10th 1973) and 11th 1978)Party ongresses.n

Jiang's address to the 16thNational Congress of the

Chinese Communist Party inNovember 2002, therewas virtually no mention of this traditional role.Hu

Jintao's leadership has placed somewhat more em

phasis on it.

21 Ross 1997.

22 The fiveprinciples, which have been included in theChinese constitution, are 1) respect for sovereignty2) non-aggression 3) non-interference 4) equal and

mutual benefit 5) peaceful co-existence.

23 JiangZemins Report to the 16th ational Congress

of theChinese Communist Party,November 8,2002. http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm. Chinas recent "reassurance diplomacy"in South East Asia suggests amode of cooperative

leadership not easily equated with domination or

balancing behavior, but isnonetheless compatiblewith extant norms. SeeMedeiros and Fravel 2003;

Shambaugh 2005.24 Wen, 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/

2007-03/03/content_818952.htm

25 As quoted inWestad et al. 1998, 135.

26 Yardley and Lague 2007 and Office of the SecretaryofDefense, 2006.

27 Crane et al. 2005 andAnnual Report toCongress: The

Military Power of thePeoples Republic ofChina 2006.

28 See Foot 2000; Barkin 1998; Payne and Samhat

2004.

29 Ramos 2004.

30 "Building of Political Democracy inChina," Infor

mation Office of the State Council of the People'sRepublic ofChina, October 2005, Beijing, http://

news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/content_3645750.htm. and Kahn 2007.

31 Foot 2000, 3.

32 Chinas respect forhuman rightssaw a downturn in

2006 as China cracked down on dissent likely in

anticipation of the 2008 Olympics. See Human

RightsWatch, World Report 2007. http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11 /chinai4867.htm.Small advances are also sometimes made. For exam

ple, theHuman RightsWatch report in 2005 noted

thatChina amending its constitution inMarch2004 to include guarantees on private property and








human rights "signals a growing acknowledgment of

human rights."Human RightsWatch, "Human

Rights Overview: China," inWorld Report 2005.

http://hrw.Org/english/docs/2005/01/13/china9809.htm.

33 Zhang 1998, 177-193; Wen 2007.34 Gilpin 1981, 187. See also Zakaria 1992.

35 Mearsheimer 2001, 402.

36 Roy 1994, 149-168, 159-160.

37 Geyer 1981, 107.

38 Hong Kong Jingbao, No. 172 (5November 1991),

84-86, inFBIS-CHI, 6November 1991, 28-30 as

cited inWhiting 1995.

39 Quoted inMosher 2001, ch. 1.

40 See Copeland 2000b.

41 E.g., seeOrganski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981;Kim andMorrow 1992; Copeland 2000b. For dif

ferent strategiesofmanaging such a situation, seeSchweller 1999.

42 Waldron 1995.

43 For an argument thatChina has a long strategictradition of realpolitik thought, see Johnston 1995.

44 Pillsbury000;Qin 2001.45 In theChinese case see,Dittmer 1995, 1-39.

46 Gilbert1987,185-20447 For a variety of examples, seeWalt 1987; Snyder

1991; Stein and Rosecrance 1993; Kupchan 1994.

48 Most power transitions occur without conflict. See

De Soysa, Oneal, and Park 1997.

49 Relative power isgiven as a composite of the relativeshare of absolute total global data on six categories:

energy consumption, iron& steel production, mili

taryexpenditure, military personnel, total population, and urban population. See National Material

Capabilities Study (v3.01) http://www.correlatesof

war.org and Singer et al. 1972, Singer 1987.

50Walt 1987;Schweller006.51 Lemke 2002. Ruggie 1982 speaks to theneed to

consider purpose as well aspower.

52 Johnston 2001.

53 Frieden and Rogowski, 1996.

54 The index number of 100 for real disposable incomein 1978 was equal to 343.4 RMB. See http://

chinadataonline.org/member/yearbook/default.

asp?StartYear= 1984&EndYear=2006.

55 www.chinadataonline.org. For data prior to 1985,seeChina Statistical Yearbook, 633.

56 StatisticalReports on theDevelopment ofChinese

Internet, available athttp://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/

index/index.htm

57 Rosecrance 1986; Russett and Oneal 2000.

58 Johnston 2004b, 603-628.

59 Zhao 2000, 11-12; Johnson 2003, 551-554.

60 Building on arguments offeredby scholars,Chinasleaders such asGeneral SecretaryHu Jintao and

PremierWen Jaibao have argued thatChinas mod

ernization depends on peace and thatChina's "rise"

would not lead to policies thatpose threatsor come

at the expense of other countries. See Suettinger2004. (http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/

20044/rs.pdfandZheng2005.61 For a synthesisof the two thatovercomes some of

these problems, seeCopeland 2003.

62 See Garrett and Lang 1996. It also applies to social

ization arguments about China aswell.

63 For an argument thatChina isunlikely to liberalize

in any foreseeable time frame seeMann 2007.

64 Waldron 2004.

65 Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000. Gries

2004.

66 The Western powers of course had a sayon this

outcome as well. U.S.policy after Mao came to

power was largelyaimed at isolatingChina.67 Trade data is the total currentvalue of imports and

exports over the total currentGDP. See http://

chinadataonline.org/member/macroy/.68 Berman 2001; Adler 2002.

69 See Anderson 1983; Halbwachs 1992; Kertzer 1988.

70 E.g., themission statement for theUnited States

Department of State is "Create a more secure, demo

cratic,and prosperousworldfor thebenefitof the

American people and the international community'?see

http://www.state.gov/rn/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm. On the general organizational dynamic

see Selznick, 1949, 69-70, 250-259; Selznick 1957,16;Wilson 1989.

71 May 1962.

72 SeeToby 1997,323-364;Adler 1957.73 May 1962, 667.

74 Gong 1984; Zhang 1991.

75 On consolidation in the literatureon revolutions,see e.g.,Goldstone 1991.

76 As the future revolutionary Sun Yatsen wrote to

an official in 1893, "the reasonwhy we have not

achieved much (relative to other countries thathad

opened up); public opinion and entrenched ideas

simplywill not allow it."Mitter 2004, 32.77 See Hunt 1996, 77ff.

78 This is the thrustof Frieden and Rogowski 1996

and ties inwell with Copeland 2003.

79 See Keck and Sikkink 1998; Thomas 2001.

80 Friedberg 2005 rightlypoints out the difficultyof

predicting the futurewhen itdepends on events that

we cannot foresee.Nonetheless, it ispossible to

explicate the conditions andmechanisms throughwhich eventswill produce differentfutures.

81 See Legro 2005.

82 Downs and Saunders 1998/99 argue thatChina has

valued economic development ahead of nationalistgoals.









83 JiangZemins Report to the 16th ational Congress oftheChinese Communist Party-, ewsmith 2003, 3.

See too recent speeches byHu Jintao, successor to

Jiang, that offer similar themes, e.g. "PresidentHu

Outlines Work Agenda for2005," http://www.

chinaembassy.org.il/eng/xwdt/tl78046.htm.84 Communique of the 15thCPC Central Commit

tee Plenum, October 9-11, 2005. http://www.

china.org.cn/english/features/45280.htm.85 Lampton 2001, 25Iff.; Zhao 2004. For an example

of thisview of history seeChinas October 2005

white paper "Building Political Democracy in

China," especially Section I, "AChoice Suited to

Chinas Conditions."

86 Wu2001.

87 Riskin and Khan 2000; Lardy 2002; Eckholm

2002, 1;Kahn 2004a, 2004b.

88 Goldstein and Lardy 2004. Dollar 2005, 48-58.89 Wang et al. 2007. www.l32.203.59.36:81/Group/

papers/papers/PMMA-2007-07.pdf.90 Data based on figures released byChinas Public

Security Bureau, www.zonaeuropa.com/

20061115_l.htm. See also Tanner 2004, 137-156.

91 Lin2007.92 See Zhen 2000; Gries 2004.

93 Cody 2005.94 Seasoned China specialists

note thedifficultyas

sessing thenature and strengthof competing coali

tions, e.g., Christensen 2003, 4-6.

95 On differentfactions, see Swaine and Tellis 2000,83-86; Johnston 2003; Yan 2001, 35; Deng and

Gray 2001, 5-16. In general, seeDittmer 1995,

1-39; Nathan 1973, 33-66.

96 JiangZemins Report at the 14* National Congress oftheCommunist Party ofChina, 1992.

97 "Chinese Communist Party Fifth Plenary Session

Communiqu??Text," Xinhua News Agency Do

mestic Service, Beijing, October 11, 2005; Kahn

2005; Li 2005a, 2006.

98 Kang 2004, 165-81; Khoo and Smith 2005,

196-205.

99 E.g., the appeal to in-group/out-group biases?seeGries 2004.

100 Heer 2000, Li 2005a.

101 Yan 2001, 35.

102 Christensen 2006, 81-126.

103Divine 1967;Cull 1990.104 In the Soviet case, see Lynch 1987; Checkel 1997;

Evangelista 1999; Richmond 2003.

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