WHAT ARE RISK MANAGEMENT

PRINCIPLES

Lianne Lefsrud, PhD, PEng, E: lefsrud@ualberta.ca, T: @lefsrud

Lisa White, PhD, PEng, E: lnwhite@ualberta.ca

Engineering Safety and Risk Management

Faculty of Engineering, University of Alberta

based on course materials developed by Kathleen Baker, John Cocchio, Chris Coles, Vivian Giang,

Renato Macciotta, Gord Winkel, and Lisa White

How Are These Useful to You?

OUTLINE OF WORKSHOP

1. Case study of Hurricane Katrina

2. Introduce key concepts: hazard, hazard identification, risk assessment

3. Case study FLRA: farm/feedlot

Coffee Break 10:15-10:30

4. Uncovering hidden hazards

5. Building resilience in your risk management system

6. How can we better communicate risks?

INTRODUCTION TO

RISK MANAGEMENT:

HURRICANE KATRINA

AS YOU WATCH THE VIDEO

• What were the losses to people, environment, assets, and production?

• What were the immediate and latent causes of the flooding of New Orleans?

• What were actual and potential controls (to prevent flooding) and mitigations (to

reduce the extent of losses)

• Who knew of these controls and mitigations in advance?

• Who had the authority to implement the controls and mitigations?

• How could/should they be convinced to implement these?

KEY CONCEPTS

Losses (PEAP)

Hazards and Hazard identification

Risk Assessment and Evaluation

Risk Management Program

WHAT IS A HAZARD?

Hazard – some form of energy that is a potential source of harm

Hazard - what could go wrong?

What is the difference between occupation and process safety hazards?

What hazards did you manage in your work experiences? Were these only occupational, or did you manage some process hazards?

• Most hazards are seen as exclusively occupational safety issues.

• Do not overlook these as process safety issues.

• Workers successfully manage their exposures on a daily basis.

Fire Explosion Detonation Pressure

Corrosion Toxicity Asphyxia ** Oxygen Deficiency

Radiation Corrosive Liquids Noise Excess Pressure

Vibration Noxious Materials Electrocution Slippery Surfaces

Flammability Mechanical Failure Security Breach Elevations

WHAT ARE HAZARDS?

Tixier, A. J. P., Albert, A., & Hallowell, M. R. (2017). Proposing and Validating a New Way of Construction Hazard Recognition Training in Academia: Mixed-Method Approach. Practice Periodical

on Structural Design and Construction, 23(1), 04017027. Revised for Graham Construction

EVERY ENERGY SOURCE IS A HAZARD

Identify specific undesirable or adverse consequences

(impact on PEAP) of your operation / facility / activity

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Identify Process Hazards, Substances, and Agents that Cause Those

Consequences

Type of Incident Odour or Irritation Irreversible Effects Life Threatening

Effects

Threshold Threshold Threshold

Toxic Gas Release ERPG - 1 ERPG - 2 ERPG - 3

(1 hour exposure)

Fireball - Immediate 1st degree burns 2nd degree burns 3rd degree burns

Ignition (60 second 2 kw/m2 5 kw/m2 8 kw/m2

exposure)

Flash Fire - Delayed no low level Ignition 1/2 of lower at lower

consequence flammable limit flammable limit

Unconfined Vapour Window Breakage Partial demolition Ear drum rupture

Cloud Explosion 0.02 bar of a structure Major structural damage

0.07 bar 0.16 bar

HAZARD CONSEQUENCES (IMPACT ON PEAP)

HAZARD, IMPACT AND RISK

LINKING CAUSES AND EFFECTS WITH SIMPLE MODEL

DETAILED CAUSE & EFFECT MODEL FOR INCIDENT ANALYSIS

Detailed Cause and Effect Model:

Type Type Type Type Categories

Weaknesses in System Elements P S C

Injury / Illness Body Motion: Substandard Work Practices Engineering & Design Factors:1)       Management Leadership, Commitment

and Accountability.

First Aid Struck againstUse of Protective Defenses

(assumes in place)inadequate technical design

2)       Risk Assessment and Management of

Risks.

Medical Treatment Struck byUse of Tools or Equipment

(good equipment available)inadequate ergonomic design

3)       Community Awareness and Emergency

Preparedness.

Lost Time Fall to lower levelFollowing Procedures General:

(assumes sound & exist) inadequate assessment of loss exposures 4)       Management of Change.

Fatality Fall on same levelFollowing Procedures Specific:

(assumes sound & exist)

inadequate standards, specifications and/or design

criteria

5)       Incident Reporting, Investigation, Analysis

and Actions.

Caught inInattention / Lack of Awareness

(not focused)inadequate monitoring of construction

6)       Program Evaluation and Continuous

Improvement.

Environment Caught on inadequate assessment of operational readiness 7)       Design, Construction and Start-up.

spill / release <25 kg, no adverse

impactCaught between Substandard Conditions inadequate monitoring of initial operation 8)       Operations and Maintenance.

spill / release >25 kg, no adverse

impactOverexertion Hardware

inadequate evaluation and/or documentation of

change9)       Employee Competency and Training.

spill / release >25 kg, adverse

impactOverstress Condition of Safeguards Job Factors: 10)   Contractor Competency and Integration.

regulatory exceedance Process Exposure Inadequate maintenance 11)   Operations and Facilities Information and

Documentation.

off-plant adverse impact Contact with: Workspace Hazards Inadequate job procedures

Environmental Heat Error-inducing conditions

Assets Environmental Cold Organizational factors

Minor <$5,000 Hot surface Incompatible goals

Serious $5,000-$50,000 Cold surface Inadequate training

Major $50,000-$500,000 Fire Inadequate communication

Catastrophic >$500,000 Electricity

Chemical - corrosive Personal Factors:

Business Interuption * Chemical - toxicInadequate physical / physiological state / capability

to do the work.

Minor <$5,000 NoisePerceived inadequate mental / psychological state /

capability to do the work.Categories of Latent Causes:

Serious $5,000-$50,000 Pressure Physical or physiological stress. P = inadequate program

Major $50,000-$500,000 Radiation Perceived mental or psychological stress. S = inadequate standards

Catastrophic >$500,000 Improper risk taking / improper motivation C = inadequate compliance

* measured as conversion cost of lost

production plus any wasted / lost

materialsLack of knowledge / lack of skill.

This model is based on a model developed by Bird Jr., F.E. and Germain, G.L. (1992). Practical Loss Control Leadership. Loss Control Management. Det Norske Veritas Inc.

Adapted by ESRM Program at The U of Alberta, including the APEGA Model for Management System Elements.

Latent CausesLosses Incident Immediate Causes Basic Causes

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY VS. PROCESS SAFETY

OCCUPATIONAL AND PROCESS SAFETY INCIDENTS

• Risk is a combination of the likelihood of an event and its consequences, usually when there is at least a possibility of negative consequences.

• Risk assessment includes

• risk analysis (process of identifying hazards and estimating their consequences and probability),

• risk estimation (process of combining the probabilities and consequences), and

• risk evaluation (process of evaluating the risk to determine if it can be tolerated or accepted).

RISK IS …

• Risk management is systematic application of management policies, procedures, and practices to the tasks of analyzing, evaluating, controlling, and communicating risks.

• Risk management is a process that is underpinned by a set of principles. Also, it needs to be supported by a structure that is appropriate to the organisation and its external environment or context.

• A successful risk management initiative should be proportionate to the level of risk in the organisation (as related to the size, nature and complexity of the organisation), aligned with other corporate activities, comprehensive in its scope, embedded into routineactivities and dynamic by being responsive to changing circumstance

WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT?

ONE

Commit toProcess Safety

• Process Safety Culture

• Compliance with Standards

• Process Safety Competency

• Workforce Involvement

• Stakeholder Outreach

TWO

Understand Hazards and Risk

• Process Knowledge Management

• Hazard Identification & Risk Analysis

THREE

Manage Risk

• Operating Procedures

• Safe Work Practices

• Asset Integrity & Reliability

• Contractor Management

• Training & Performance Assurance

• Management of Change

• Operational Readiness

• Conduct of Operations

• Emergency Management

FOUR

Learn from Experience

• Incident Investigation

• Measurement & Metrics

• Auditing

• Management Review & Continuous Improvement

The Center for Chemical Process Safety established the

Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety in 2007

THE 4 PILLARS & 20 ELEMENTS

OF RISK-BASED PROCESS SAFETY

RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

NO

NO

YES

YES

MLL

HML

HHM

MLL

HML

HHM

(9) Continue to

Monitor & Manage

Residual Risks

(7)

Reduce the Risks

(2)

Identify Hazards

(3)

Analyze for Risks

(1)

Do Planned Reviews

(6)

Can the Risk

be Reduced?

(4)

Evaluate Risks.

Are the Risks Acceptable?

(5)

Manage the Residual Risk

(8)

Discontinue

the Activity

9 SEQUENTIAL STEPS

New or existing projects

Step 3: L and C

Step 4: The risk matrix!

Step 5: Ongoing process

Step 6: Management Direction

(Adapted from APEGA Guidelines for

Management of Risk in Professional

Practice, version 1.0 – September 2006

• The control of risks is improved by

identifying and minimizing the

associated probability and severity of

consequences.

• The explicit consideration of risk

improves return on investment and

allocation of resources by helping the

professional practice to avoid harm,

minimize losses, and save time.

• The use of a comprehensive,

documented, transparent approach to

risk management demonstrates due

diligence.

BENEFITS OF RISK MANAGEMENT

Control of

risks is

improved

Demonstrates

due diligence

Avoids

harm,

minimizes

losses, and

saves time

• Risk management may help to uncover

hidden risks in situations that appear

straightforward at first glance.

• Risk management and communication

promotes of two-way dialogue with

stakeholders regarding new operations,

products, policies, or decisions; allowing

them to understand and be part of the

process.

• Investors, lenders, insurers, clients, and

customers are increasingly drawn to

professional practices that are able to

manage risks effectively.

BENEFITS OF RISK MANAGEMENT

Uncover

hidden

and

unknown

risks

Provides for

safe business

investment

Promotes

dialogue with

and

involvement of

stakeholders

Prevent incidents

Better inform strategic decisions

Help manage change

Increase operational efficiency

Reduce costs, increase competitiveness

Improve perception of the organization

Ensure compliance with government requirements

THE INTENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT IS:

• Strategic, operational and business planning

• Asset management and resource planning

• Design and product liability

• Environmental and public health issues

• Public risk and general liability

• Compliance

• Occupational health and safety

• Operations and maintenance systems

• Project management

• Purchasing and contract management

WHO USES RISK MANAGEMENT?

WHAT TOOLS DO

WE HAVE AVAILABLE?

Qualitative Methods

• Hazard identification

• Field Level Risk/Hazard Assessments (FLRA/FLHA)

• Checklists

• ‘What If?’ analysis

Semi-Quantitative Methods

• Bow-Tie Analysis

Quantitative Risk Analysis

• Event trees / Fault trees for consequence and probability analysis

• HAZOPS

• FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis)

• Layers of Protection Analysis

• Inherently Safer Design …

RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS

There are three key purposes of the FLRA/FLHA:

1. It is for workers to assess hazards and to eliminate or control those hazards before starting to work (the job at hand).

2. It is used to share and communicate the nature of the job and the hazards associated with that job when working on a crew/team.

3. It is used to ensure understanding of the control measures to eliminate or mitigate the hazards when working on a crew/team.

In some uses, likelihood is a factor; however the underlying assumption is that if there is a hazard, then there is a high likelihood an incident will occur, so action must be taken to address the hazard.

FIELD LEVEL RISK/HAZARD ASSESSMENT

12ESMR ENGG404/406

Module 2-05: What is an Acceptable Level of Risk?

Risk Criteria: An Example of Putting Theory into Practice:

➢ Risk Criteria Table:

Ratings Impact on PEAP Probability

High

High P Disabling injury, loss of body part or

fatality. E Reportable violation, toxic release. A High repair cost (Typically > $100k). Pr Loss of function of facility for extended

period, with business consequences, major quality deviation.

High

• Repetitive event.

• At least once per year

• Several times in the life cycle of a project.

• Has happened frequently in similar circumstances.

• Greater than 50% chance of occurring.

Medium

Medium P Medical Aid injury. E Non-reportable spill, non toxic release. A Moderate repair cost (typically > $10k). Pr Short duration loss of function, serious

quality deviation, medium business impact.

Medium

• Infrequent event.

• May only happen occasionally (less than once per year).

• Has been observed in similar circumstances.

• 10 to 50% chance of occurring.

Low

Low P First aid injury. E Minor lead, non toxic fugitive emission. A Low repair cost (typically <$10k). Pr Brief interruption or minor quality

deviation.

Low

• Unlikely event.

• Never happened to date.

• May happen less than once in 10 years.

• Has never been observed but is still felt to be a possibility

• Less than 10% chance of occurring.

M H H

L M H

L L M

Co

ns

eq

ue

nc

e:

Inc

rea

sin

g S

eve

rity

of

the

Ha

za

rd

Increasing Probability

Simple Risk Matrix:

M H H

L M H

L L M

Co

ns

eq

ue

nc

e:

Inc

rea

sin

g S

eve

rity

of

the

Ha

za

rd

Increasing Probability

Simple Risk Matrix:

M H H

L M H

L L M

Co

ns

eq

ue

nc

e:

Inc

rea

sin

g S

eve

rity

of

the

Ha

za

rd

Increasing Probability

Simple Risk Matrix:

8ESMR ENGG404/406

Module 2-05: What is an Acceptable Level of Risk?

Simple Risk Matrix:

M H H

L M H

L L M

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

: In

cre

asin

g S

eve

rity

of

the

Ha

zard

Increasing Probability

Simple Risk Matrix:

M H H

L M H

L L M

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

: In

cre

asin

g S

eve

rity

of

the

Ha

zard

Increasing Probability

Simple Risk Matrix:

M H H

L M H

L L M

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

: In

cre

asin

g S

eve

rity

of

the

Ha

zard

Increasing Probability

Simple Risk Matrix:

L M H

H

M

L

HIGH LOW

CONDUCTING A FIELD LEVEL RISK ASSESSMENT

What is a Checklist:

• A basic inspection tool for a planned inspection.

• Provides a way to manage how persons look into the activity or

operation to identify specific hazards.

• Developed by experts – acceptable parameters / conditions are

satisfied to maintain / reduce risks to acceptable levels.

• Two broad groups:

• prior to and during the execution of work

• to check for compliance (see 5-11: Planned Inspections)

CHECKLISTS FOR EXECUTING WORK

What are the Hazards: something that can

do harm

What are the Consequences: what was

harmed and how badly

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

What are the Likelihoods: probability of

occurrence of various outcomes

What are the Risks: Σ Consequences *

Likelihoods

This is subjective and will change depending on the company!

Risk Criteria: L, M, H Likelihood and Consequence

WHAT IS AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RISK?

Simple Risk Matrix

Terms Used: Likelihood = Probability = Frequency

Term

s U

sed:

Consequence =

Im

pact

= S

everity

WHAT IS AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RISK?

MLL

HML

HHM

MLL

HML

HHMIn

cre

as

ing

Co

ns

eq

ue

nc

e

Increasing Likelihood

Risk Matrices: Categorizing the Level of Risk

WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF RISK?

MLL

HML

HHM

MLL

HML

HHMIn

cre

as

ing

Co

ns

eq

ue

nc

e

Increasing Likelihood

Risk = Consequence x Likelihood

Simple Risk Matrix demonstrates the relationship

Risk Matrices: Management Direction

WHAT DOES MANAGEMENT

DIRECTION MEAN?

MLL

HML

HHM

MLL

HML

HHM

Inc

rea

sin

g C

on

se

qu

en

ce

Increasing Likelihood

Risk = Consequence x Likelihood

Simple Risk Matrix demonstrates the relationship

LL LOW = Proceed with caution

MMMEDIUM = Do not proceed until

further protective features are

included

HH HIGH = Do not proceed

If deemed too high,

management direction will

dictate how to reduce risks

(likelihood and consequence)

from a given activity

FARM FEEDLOT

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

GROUP ACTIVITY

• Using a field level risk assessment form, what hazards are present in your case study?

• What are the associated risks (consequences, likelihood)?

UNCOVERING HIDDEN HAZARDS

UNCOVERING HIDDEN HAZARDS

“Seen” Hazards: hazards that are identified and controlled using engineered, administrative controls or personal protective equipment to

bring the risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable

“Normalized” Hazards: common hazards in one's work environment that are tolerated by workers independent of the risk

associated with them

“Unseen or Overlooked” Hazards: hazards that are unidentified by workers, are not detected by monitoring systems, engineered or

administrative controls

DEFINITIONS

• Cognition

• Emotional

• Organizational

WHY HAZARDS BECOME NORMALIZED

• Workers depend on sensory cues to identify hazards 1

• Mental shortcuts can either help or hinder the workers ability to identify of hazards 2, 3

1. Pocock DC. Sight and knowledge. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers.1981 Jan 1:385-93.

2. Kasperson RE, Renn O, Slovic P, Brown HS, Emel J, Goble R, Kasperson JX, Ratick S. The social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework. Risk analysis. 1988

Jun 1;8(2):177-87.

3. Finucane ML, Alhakami A, Slovic P, Johnson SM. The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of behavioral decision making. 2000 Jan 1;13(1):1.

Sensory

Cues

COGNITION

• Technical risk level of a hazard can be very different from the perceived risk 4

• Risk = Hazard + Outrage 4

• Angry drivers experience lapses in concentration, minor losses of vehicle control, close calls, aggressive driving and risky behaviour 5

• Frustration causes neural transmitters to go into survival mode instead of allowing us to reason 6

4. Sandman PM. Responding to community outrage: Strategies for effective risk communication. AIHA; 1993.

5. Dahlen. E.R., Martin. R.C., Ragan. K., and Kuhlman. M.M. 2004. Driving anger, sensation seeking, impulsiveness, and boredom proneness in the prediction of unsafe driving.

Accident Analysis and Prevention. 37 (2005). 341-348

6. Sylvestre. C. 2017. The neuroscience of personal safety. AusIMM Bulletin. https://www.ausimmbulletin.com/feature/neuroscience-personal-safety/

(after Sylvestre)

EMOTIONAL

• Voluntariness (right to refuse)

• Controllability (your job)

• Familiarity (normalization of risks)

• Benefits (livelihood)

• Understanding (over confident)

• Trust (company will take care of you)

• Incident history (memory of past event)

• Anger (distracted from tasks)

FACTORS AFFECTING RISK TOLERANCE

• “Safety Culture”- How things are done around here

• Reward or penalty motivational factors

• Over worked or under worked

• Supervisors and co-workers

• Internal communication

• Time constraints

• Peer pressure

6. Aksorn T, Hadikusumo BH. The unsafe acts and the decision-to-err factors of Thai construction workers. Journal of Construction in Developing Countries. 2007 Jan 1;12(1):1-25.

ORGANIZATIONAL

• Within the Worker’s Control

• Within the Organization’s Control

WHY ARE HAZARDS UNSEEN?

Within the Worker’s Control:

• Unfamiliarity with tools and equipment

• Hazard that are unassociated with the primary task

• Perceived low levels of risk

• Stopping hazard recognition prematurely

• Selective attention or inattention

• Task unfamiliarity

Jeelani, I., Albert, A., and Gambatese, J, A., 2017. Why do construction hazard remain unrecognized at the work interface? Journal of Construction Engineering and

Management. 143 (5).

CAUSES OF UNSEEN HAZARDS

Within the Organization’s Control:

• Latent or stored energy hazards

• Visually unperceivable/ obscure hazards

• Infrequent or unexpected hazards

• Unknown potential hazards

• Hazard source detection failure

• Multiple hazards associated with a single source or task

• Hazards without immediate outcome

Jeelani, I., Albert, A., and Gambatese, J, A., 2017. Why do construction hazard remain unrecognized at the work interface? Journal of Construction Engineering and

Management. 143 (5).

CAUSES OF UNSEEN HAZARDS

GROUP ACTIVITY

• Brainstorm a list of unseen or overlooked hazards in your case study. Add these to

your Field Level Risk Assessment

• Pick 1-2 examples to share with the larger group

Within the Organization’s Control:

• Latent or stored energy hazards

• Visually unperceivable/ obscure hazards

• Infrequent or unexpected hazards

• Unknown potential hazards

• Hazard source detection failure

• Multiple hazards associated with a single source or task

• Hazards without immediate outcome

Jeelani, I., Albert, A., and Gambatese, J, A., 2017. Why do construction hazard remain unrecognized at the work interface? Journal of Construction Engineering and

Management. 143 (5).

CAUSES OF UNSEEN HAZARDS

Within the Worker’s Control:

• Unfamiliarity with tools and equipment

• Hazard that are unassociated with the primary task

• Perceived low levels of risk

• Stopping hazard recognition prematurely

• Selective attention or inattention

• Task unfamiliarity

Revised form Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D., & Leveson, N. (2007). Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROCESSES BUILD RESILIENCE

• Resilience engineering looks at how the organisation or system functions as an

interdependent whole:

• Respond. Knowing what to do, or being able to respond to regular and

irregular changes, disturbances, and opportunities by activating prepared

actions or by adjusting current mode of functioning.

• Monitor. Knowing what to look for, or being able to monitor that which is or

could seriously affect the system’s performance in the near term – positively

or negatively. The monitoring must cover the system’s own performance as

well as what happens in the environment.

• Learn. Knowing what has happened, or being able to learn from experience,

in particular to learn the right lessons from the right experience.

• Anticipate. Knowing what to expect, or being able to anticipate

developments further into the future, such as possible disruptions, novel

demands or constraints, new opportunities, or changing operating

conditions.

Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D., & Leveson, N. (2007). Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

BUILDING RESILIENCE

Tailoring intervention tools to your organizations’ maturity level would best drive engagement and improvement

Knowing what has happened

• Awareness – simple knowledge of a ‘better’ alternative to current state

• Creation of need – active personal desire to achieve the new state

• Making the outcome believable – believing that the new state is sensible for those involved

• Making the outcome achievable – making the process of achieving the new state credible for those involved

• Personal vision – definition by those involved of what they expect the new situation to be

• Information about successes – provision of information about others who have succeeded

Hudson, P., 2007. Implementing a safety culture in a major multi-national. Safety Science, 45(6), pp.697-722.

Sharp, J.V., Strutt, J.E., Busby, J. and Terry, E., 2002, January. Measurement of organisational maturity in designing safe offshore installations. In ASME 2002 21st International Conference on Offshore

Mechanics and Arctic Engineering (pp. 383-390). American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

TAILOR INTERVENTIONS TO DRIVE ENGAGEMENT AND IMPROVEMENT

Hudson, P., 2007. Implementing a safety culture in a major multi-national. Safety Science, 45(6), pp.697-722.

Sharp, J.V., Strutt, J.E., Busby, J. and Terry, E., 2002, January. Measurement of organisational maturity in designing safe offshore installations. In ASME 2002 21st International Conference on Offshore

Mechanics and Arctic Engineering (pp. 383-390). American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

Knowing what to do

• Plan construction/operation – creation by those involved of their own action plan

• Measurement points – definition of indicators of success in process

• Commitment – signing-up to the plan of al involved

Knowing what to look for

• Do – start implementing action plan

• Review – review progress with concentration upon successful outcomes

• Correct – reworking of plan where necessary

Knowing what to expect

• Review – management review of process at regular (and defined in advance)

intervals

• Outcome – checks on internalisation of values and beliefs in outcome state

TAILOR INTERVENTIONS TO DRIVE ENGAGEMENT AND IMPROVEMENT

GROUP ACTIVITY

Given the:

1) list of hazards/risks that you identified in your Field Level Risk Assessment and

2) potentially unseen or overlooked hazards in your case study

What controls would you put in place to reduce the consequences and/or likelihood of

these risks?

What resiliency elements would better equip your organization to more effectively

understand and manage your risks?

BESIDES TECHNICAL RISK …

• Risk = consequences X likelihood

• Located in technical/management systems

• Common in engineering, epidemiology, toxicology

www.dappolonia.com/pdfs/pprofile148.pdf

AND TECHNICAL RISK

MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

APEGA. (2006). Guideline for Management of Risk in Professional Practice. Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta.

RISK IS ALSO

SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL

• Risk is a function of interpretation X response

• Located in cognition, communication

• Common in psych, behavioral economics, public opinion studies, etc

DECISION MAKING IS

RATIONAL AND EMOTIONAL

insights.unimelb.edu.au/vol4/15_harris.html

RISK EVALUATION IS

PRIMARILY EMOTIONAL

Peters, E.M., Burraston, B. and Mertz, C.K., 2004. An emotion‐based model of risk perception and stigma susceptibility: Cognitive appraisals of emotion, affective reactivity, worldviews, and risk perceptions in the generation of technological stigma. Risk Analysis, 24(5): 1349-1367.

Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236(4799), 280-285.

RISK PERCEPTIONS CAN LEAD TO FEAR OR ACCEPTANCE ≠ PHYSICAL RISK

• Typically external from an organization to the public

• Growing need for communication of risks from an organization to employees

and contractors

• External communication tools can be applied to internal risk communication

TAILINGS DISCHARGE AREA

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RISK COMMUNICATION

“Risk communications is defined as any exchange of information

concerning the existence, nature, form, severity or acceptability of

health or environmental risks.”

Enlightenment: making people able to understand risks and become ‘risk

literate’

Behavioural changes: making people aware of potential risks and help them

to take protective actions

Trust building: assisting risk management agencies to generate and sustain

trust

Conflict resolution: assisting risk managers to involve major stakeholders

and affected parties to take part in the risk management process

Health Canada (https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/reports-publications/2007/strategic-risk-communications-framework-within-context-health-canada-phac-s-integrated-risk-

management.html)

Renn., O. (2019). Risk Governance Framework. https://irgc.epfl.ch/risk-governance/page-139715-en-html/

PURPOSE OF RISK COMMUNICATION

WHO IS A ‘STAKEHOLDER’?

Stakeholder* - any

person or

organization that

can effect or be

affected by a

decision or activity.

Including those who

believe that a decision

or an activity can affect

them

May be internal or

external

*According to ISO 31000

ISO, (2009). 31000 Risk management–Principles and guidelines. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland.

COMMUNICATION REQUIRED AT EACH STEP OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Renn., O. (2019). Risk Governance Framework. https://irgc.epfl.ch/risk-governance/page-139715-en-html/

WHY COMMUNICATE AND CONSULT?

BROADER SOCIAL VALUES DETERMINE

PROJECT ACCEPTABILITYProject acceptability depends on economic, legal AND social license to operate

GROUP ACTIVITY

In groups, list the stakeholder groups (internal and external) for your case study?

How could they affect or be affected by the operation of

your operation?

When and why would you communicate with each?

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

▪ Health and Safety on Alberta Farms and Ranches:

https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/be8c66aa-c176-433f-a7d3-

6a56abff43c4/resource/c4069eaf-326d-4ec1-8f5d-

6ffa57717b98/download/ohs-farm-ranch-flipbook.pdf

▪ Farm and Ranch OH&S: https://www.alberta.ca/farm-and-ranch-ohs.aspx

▪ Farm Safety for Feedlots, Alberta Cattle Feeders Association:

https://www.cattlefeeders.ca/new-program-customizes-farm-safety-for-

feedlots/

▪ Confined Feeding Operations, NRCB: https://cfo.nrcb.ca/

THANK YOU

QUESTIONS? COMMENTS?

Lianne Lefsrud, PhD, PEng Lisa White, PhD, PEngAssistant Professor Industrial Professor

M: 780.951.3455, E: lefsrud@ualberta.ca M: 780.982.6441, E: lnwhite@ualberta.ca

Engineering Safety and Risk ManagementDonadeo Innovation Centre for Engineering

9211 116 St, University of Alberta Edmonton, Canada T6G 1H9