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Is Snobbery a Formal Value? Considering Life at the End of ModernityAuthor(s): John Adams Wettergreen, Jr.Reviewed work(s):Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1973), pp. 109-129Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/446655 .

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IS SNOBBERY A FORMAL VALUE?

CONSIDERING LIFE AT THE END OF MODERNITY

JOHN ADAMSWETTERGREEN,R.CaliforniaState University,San Jose

"Yet there is also a famous danger in 'inwardness':the internal

substance cannot be seen from the outside, and so may one daytake the opportunity of vanishing, and no one will notice its ab-

sence any more than its presence before." Nietzsche, On the Use

and Abuse of Historyfor Life

ECENTLY AlexanderKojeve's Introduction a la Lecture de Hegel has been

translatedand made widely available to Americanstudentsof politics.' This

work seems especially important today in the United States because by it

Kojeve appearsas the founder of that newest,most fashionable,and - to American

liberals- strangest brand of political opinion which has come to rest among our

"young" and our intellectuals. This brand goes about with the label, "the New

Left," and with this label it has gained a certain acceptance and even respectabilityin universities and among some elected officials and public administrators (to saynothing of other "opinion leaders"). Kojeve himself (d. 1968) cannot be said to

have been a working member of the New Left. He barely appeared even in the

guise of an intellectual, but preferredto live out his life as an administrator,a mem-

ber of the "universal class." Still he seems to be the respected, if not commonlyrecognized,originatorof that combination of Marxism and existentialism that char-

acterizes the New Left when it happens to become at all thoughtful. And, we must

admit, the only seriousthinking about politicswhich cannot be reduced to studiesof

the historyof political philosophy is that which allies itself with the New Left. The

combination of Marxism and Nietzscheanism or, more precisely, of Hegel and

Heidegger is fairly obvious in the writingsof the most renowned New Left teachers.

That is, the writings of Kojeve's students, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and even of

Marcuse, are filled with themes drawn from the political sociology of Hegel-Marxand from the anthropologyof Nietzsche-Heidegger. But what makes this combina-

tion possible? What are the historical and theoretical reasons for the New Left? Ina sense, the answer is easy: the New Left position arriveswhen the left comes to sup-

pose that Historyis ended. But this simpleanswer is not enough.

Perhapsit may seem strange that the problemof the Hegelian end of historyis

dredged up to explain present-daypolitical opinions. At best, this problemis usually

'Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (NewYork & London, 1969). Hereafter cited Introduction.

In this essay, I distinguish three levels of the New Left: the New Left movement, thoseimmediately involved in day-to-day political activity and their leaders; the New Leftteachers, especially Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Marcuse; and the teachers of the New

Left teachers, Kojeve and Heidegger. This classification was based upon two considera-tions: (1) all three groups are roughly contemporary; (2) the degree of thoughtfulnessat each level is different. I make no claim of exhaustiveness here; for example, Camusand Lukacs are important in any attempt to establish precisely the beginnings of the NewLeft movement and I barely mention them. Nor do I attempt to establish the relation-ships among these levels.

109



THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLY

thought to be a matter of antiquarianinterest; it may have animated hot disputesin

the nineteenth century,but it has long sincebeen settled somehow. Indeed, the mere

fact that- sinceHegel proclaimed history's

end- historydepartments

all over

the world continue to teach courseson events since Hegel seemsto conclude that his-

tory has continued. In the history of thought or science, radical historicism or exis-

tentialism and Einsteinian physics seem to be decidely new developments. Still,before pushing this matter aside, brieflyconsiderwhy the end of historywas a matter

of hot dispute in the nineteenth century and why it became a matter of concern

for Kojeve and his followers.

Unlike any great thinker before him, Hegel's view is historical; all thinking-and all thinking is human thinking in Hegel's view - depends fundamentallyon its

time. But like the great thinkers before him, Hegel was a "rationalist." That is, in

the final analysis he was compelled to give an account of why he knew what heknew and Hegel knew or claimed to know "the whole." Thus Hegel's philosophyis

both historical and rational; the historical process is rational according to Hegel.

Leaving aside the possibilityof divine revelationas Hegel did, the historicalprocesscould only be known to be wholly rationalif it were a completed whole, i.e., if it were

at an end. If the historical process were not completed, all propositions about its

essential character necessarily would be subject to future revision. Their truth

could not be known. Thus Hegel attempted to demonstrate that the whole of historymakes sense; since thought is historical, this demonstration in Hegel's case is the

same as the demonstrationthat he knew "thewhole."

Stated simply and from a practical point of view, the whole of history consists

of work and fight: human work against nature for the sake of preservation (andcomfort) and human fight against one another for the sake of recognition (or pres-

tige). Man is constituted, individually and historically,by being against something,by negativity. The most fundamental opposition is that of masterand slave and this

opposition manifests itself or develops through time. The developing conflict -

dialectic - of master and slave as it manifests itself in each historical epoch is his-

tory. With Hegel's thinking or with the publication of the Phenomenology of the

Mind, history comes to an end: by that book men may see that in principle nature

has been mastered by modem natural science and that in principle every man nowrecognizesevery other man as equal by rights, by the universalizationof the princi-

ples of the French Revolution by Napoleon. Whatever has driven man from his be-

ginning has been accomplished. No great worksof art or science remain; there are

no great causes to fight for. Hegel'sworkis the justificationof the struggleof Robes-

pierre-Napoleon.

Hegel's proclamation that historyhad ended, that "whatever s rational is real;and whatever is real is rational" and that "the present" is the real, was greeted by

nineteenth-century ntellectualswith about the same temper as, for example, a proc-lamation by PresidentNixon that the United States is heaven on earth would be bymembers of the New Left movement. Apparently, it is not pleasant to be told

authoritatively that there is nothing left for which to work or struggle. But the

implications go still further; if man's historical work and fight is ended, then so is

humanity. Man is constituted by workand fight. To be specific, consider only the

110




example of art. According to Hegel, art is one of the forms in which the essential

content of each historicalepoch is "broughtout" or made manifest to all. But at the

end ofhistory everything

has beenbrought

out. There isnothing

internal or ob-

scure or mysterious to man. Serious art must also end. Art will become merely

formal; for example, it will become concerned with problems of "closure" (e.g.,

Pollock). There will be no real need for art: "No matter how excellent we continue

to find the Greek images of the gods, no matter how estimable and perfect we con-

tinue to find the representationsof God the Father, Christ, and Mary, it does not

help; we no longer bow our knees."

Hegel's proclamation, of course, had to be taken seriouslybefore it could be

rejected. For example, Kierkegaard took it seriously, but rejected it, being more

certain of the reality of his historical religious faith than he was of its rationality.

Similarly,Marx took it serously,but rejected it, being more certain of the historicaleconomic existence- misery- of the masses than he was of its rationality. In gen-eral, following Hegel there was at the level of thought a rejection of rationality for

the sake of (historical or human) reality. This sundering of reason and history or

this preference for human (historical) reality over rationality is usually called "his-

toricism."

The difficulty with Marxist historicism is well known to most contemporarystudents of politics; on the basis of Marx, how can one be sure that the final stageof communism is not subject to the historical dialectic, i.e., is not essentiallydefec-

tive? More generally, if all thought is historicallydetermined and if one does not

stand absolutelyat the end of history (as Marx claimed), then how can one know

either that all thought is historically determined or that history has some end or

even some direction? Marx would seem not to be able to account for Marx, includ-

ing his own understandingof the miseryof the masses. Something like this kind of

difficulty turned the Marxist Kojeve back to JIegel, for it was preciselyHegel whohad given an historical account of his thinking which was not contradictory.

According to Kojeve, Hegel's horizon (point of view) is still the horizon: "For

if one abstracts from the remnants of the past which Hegel knew and described

(liberalism included), and which, consequently, cannot be alleged in opposition

to him as an historical or dialectical refutation, one observes that there has beenstrictly nothing outside of Hegelianism (whether conscious or not), whether on the

plane of historical reality itself, or on that of such thought or discourseas has had

historical repercussions."3 Thus Kojeve argued intransigently that, just as Hegelhad claimed, Hegel's thought constituted the end of history. Kojeve was the first

Marxist to conclude that Hegel's thinking constituted the "end of human Time"

or that after Hegel "there will never more be anything new on earth."4 Such a con-

clusion must seem wildly implausible to the many who cannot help but be im-

pressed by the world wars and their results, to say nothing of the development of

sub-atomictechnology

andtrips

to the moon. Yet to beimpressedby

events and to

3Alexander Kojeve, "Hegel, Marx, and Christianity,"trans. Hilail Gildin, Interpretation,No. 1 (Summer 1970), p. 41. On Heidegger'sthinkingand Hegel's, see Introduction,p. 259n. Sein und Zeit is essential to the understandingof Hegel by Kojeve.

4Introduction,p. 168.

111



THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

understand them are not always the same thing. Kojeve's opinion is that these

events or their like must be understoodfrom the Hegelian point of view.

In thisessay

Iattempt

to show thatKojeve's understanding

that allthoughtsince Hegel has remainedwithin Hegel's horizon is the rational ground of the New

Left position. My claim that Kojeve's position, "that the Hegelian-Marxist end of

History is not yet to come, but is already present, here and now," is somehow pre-

supposed by the New Left or at least by its teachers must seem strange. Indeed, this

claim and its meaning are not easilypresented. Kojeve's distastefor publication and

his students'respect for that distaste (as indicated by the lack of footnotes to him in

their writings) make it impossibleto establish this claim in a manner acceptably in

accord with scholarly conventions. Moreover, unconscious presuppositions are

impossible to demonstrate. Nevertheless, we can see a coincidence of the critical

(political) and historical (theoretical) positionsof Kojeve and the New Left teach-ers. So, even if Kojeve were the only - as well as the first- member of the post-World War II left who held that the end of "human time" is here and now, his

teaching still reveals itself throughout the New Left (and is in a sense the best inter-

preter of the New Left) .5

To explain this claim, I first consider why there was a need for a new left.

That is, I consider the political situation that gave birth to the New Left. Then,

in the second part, I consider why that political situation necessarily produced a new

left. In other words, I present the historical-theoretical position that justifies the

New Left teachers' critical analysis of our times. In a digression within this sec-

tion on the historical position of the New Left teachers, I attempt to explain the

affinity of Marxism for existentialism. Having examined the political-historical

position of the New Left teachers, an interesting difficulty for my claim arises. Al-

though Kojeve's reaffirmation of history's end is shown to be fundamental to the

New Left position, his analysis of the meaning of this event for humanity is found to

be radically different from that of the New Left teachers. Since Kojeve's analysis of

our times had appeared to be the foundation of the New Left teachings, a serious

question about the contemporary left's grasp of the contemporary situation arises.

More particularly, in the third part of this essay I present Kojeve's solution to the

dilemma posed to the left by the end of history. Kojeve believed that man couldremain human at the end of history by living in accord with totally formalized

values, values devoid of any specific geographical, historical, social or political

meaning, values not specific to any particular "cause" but that of "humanity."Such values are named "snobbery." In concluding this essay, in its fourth section,

I speculate about Kojeve's belief by wondering whether snobbery is in fact a formal

value.

THE CRITICALPOSITION OF THE NEW LEFT: THE THIRD WORLD

AND ANTI-AMERICANISM

The New Left is nothing but the post-World War II left; the left attacked bySenator McCarthy was prewar. The most obvious difference between the Old and

6 For Kojeve's position as teacher of the teachers of the postwar left, see Wilfrid Desan, TheMarxism of Jean-Paul Sartre (Garden City, 1965), pp. 25, 43, 52n. See also Introduc-

tion, p. vii.

112




New Left is over foreign policy. The Old Left conceived of itself in relation to the

"country of the revolution," which could be no other than the U.S.S.R. because

priorto World War II there was no other

countrywhere a successfulMarxist revo-

lution had occurred. For this reason, the Old Left was attacked in this country not

so much for being left as for being "Communist," .e., pro-Russian. It is not unusual

then that members of the Old Left, especially those who thought that the countryof the revolution had betrayedthe revolution,aided in this attack.

The leading spokesman for the New Left in this country, Herbert Marcuse,

says that it differs from the Old by being "neo-Marxistrather than Marxist in the

orthodox sense." Neo-Marxism, he claims, differs from orthodox Marxism in that

it is "strongly nfluenced by what is called Maoism" or "bythe revolutionarymove-

ments in the Third World." Now it is hardlycharacteristicof Marxismto speakof

Marxism "in the orthodox sense" as opposed to heterodox Marxism,because it goesagainst the principles of Marxism to separate the principles of Marxism from

Marxistmovements. The distinguishingcharacteristicof the New Left, therefore,is

its so-called Maoism, its concern for the fate of the Third World. The New Left cer-

tainly differs from the Old by its lack of attachment to the U.S.S.R. But the Mao-

ism of the New Left is not a simple replacement for the various and conflicting pro-Russian tendencies of the Old Left. That the left has simply switched allegianceis not the case. For this reason,the New Left is sometimes critical of Chinese policy,

e.g., if Chinese interestshappen to conflict with those of North Vietnam or Bangla-desh. The New Left differs from the Old

byits lack of attachment to

any particularnation. To use an old-fashioned commonplace, the members of the New Left are

citizens of the world. For this reason, the New Left is not attacked in this countryfor being "Communist"or "communist" or even "extreme left," but rather for

being "tooidealistic"or "intolerant"or "vague."The New Left surely understands itself to be humanitarian.7 But its humani-

tarianism is not that of the Red Cross; it takes a political form. The New Left

favors the long-range policy of revolutionarynational socialism in every nation and

opposes the "imperialism" of the U.S.A. and the "social imperialism" of the

U.S.S.R. (and sometimesof the Chinese). But because the New Left does not sup-

pose that what is humanitarianor revolutionary n the Third World is revolutionaryin the other Two Worlds, it is not so much pro-China or pro-Third World as it is

pro-warsof national liberation. Its humanitarianism s a kind of nationalism.What

were the political reasonsfor the emergenceof this position?

Immediately after World War II, Merleau-Pontymade clear the necessity for

a new critical position on the left. He sought a new left. In Humanism and Terror

(1947), this student of Kojeve sought a critical position between the policies of the

Westernor liberal powersand those of the Communistpowersor the U.S.S.R. See-

ing the horrorsof Stalinismand being himself a Marxist,Merleau-Pontyconcluded:

"It is impossible to be an anti-Communist and it is not possible to be a Commun-

6 Herbert Marcuse, Five Lectures (Boston, 1970), p. 83.

See especially The New Left: A Documentary History, ed. Massimo Teodori (New York,1969), pp. 485-90, 497-99.

113




ist."8 In the same book he wrote: "Since... [at least 1936] there is not an educated

man in the Anglo-Saxon world or in France who is not in agreementwith the goals... of Marxist revolution."9 Whatever this

mayshow about the author's

rangeof

acquaintances,his point is clear: the relevant differencesamong the dominant anti-

Communist powers and between the Communist, i.e., Sino-Soviet,10 and anti-

Communistpowers are best understoodas differences over means, not ends. As for

the "educated men" of the other western nations who are not in agreement with

these goals (in particular, Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger in Germany), it

could hardly be said in 1947 that their positionswere politically relevant. Believingthat for all practical purposes there is no position but the left in the world, believ-

ing that the left has won what was formerlythought to be its final victory, Merleau-

Pontywishesto criticize thisworld from the left.

This is not so paradoxical as it may seem. Merleau-Ponty knows all too wellthat differences over means, over what ought to be done here and now, are the most

serious differences. These differences point to the possibilityof war. Keeping this

in mind, as well as his opinion that "the right of opposition is exactly equal to the

right of those in power,"11we can see why Merleau-Pontywas not much impressed

by what he regarded as well-nigh universal agreement about "goals." Such agree-

ment, of course, does not guarantee the attainment of the goals. But, more impor-

tantly, such agreement does not guarantee a specific quality, a high quality, of

human life even when the goals are attained. The goals now appear to be emptyof

meaning;that

is,the

very agreementon

goalsallows a

questionto arise about

what man might make of himself in attaining them. Therefore, as much as Mer-

leau-Ponty believes that there is such agreement, he still insists that "everything ies

ahead." His 1947 position may be characterized as follows: the problem of the

period after the world wars is the workingout of a human way of life specific to the

universal, homogeneous ("classless") state, the goal of Marxist revolution. Even

though he seems to suppose that this goal has not been reached in any nation, this

problem still arises for Merleau-Ponty because he sees the imminence of that goal'sattainment in the U.S.A. and/or the U.S.S.R. We may restate the characterization:

as a good European who was alive during those "happy days" of the mid-1930s

when "people still knew how to read" and when "one could still think aloud,"Merleau-Ponty looks to the East and then to the West wondering whether the

American or the Russian way of life must be that specific to the universal homoge-neous state. Viewing these ways of life, he seeks a position critical of both. He seeks

a thirdworld in a timewhen thereis none.

Shortly before the publication of Humanism and Terror, Kojeve says that he

came to understand that "Hegel was right to see in this battle [sc.Jena] the end of

History properlyso called." For, "in and by this battle the vanguard of humanity

Humanism and Terror, trans. John O'Neill (Boston, 1969), p. xxi. Hereafter cited Human-

ism. Cf. the 1952 remark of Norman Mailer in Teodori, op. cit., p. 7.'Humanism, p. 126.

"'See Humanism, p. 133. The author, like Kojeve, does not distinguish much between Russianand Chinese life.

nHumanism, p. xxxvi. Cf. Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Miinchen & Leipzig,1932), p. 37.

114




virtually attained the limit and the aim, that is, the end, of Man's historical evolu-

tion. What has happened since then was but an extension in space of the universal

revolutionaryforce actualized in France

by Robespierre-Napoleon." Kojeveis

precise: since the Battle of Jena all that has happened has happened only "inspace"or has not required historical time (or dialectic) for its accomplishment. That is,all was "inevitable,"not only from our point of view - "lookingbackward" but

preciselyfrom Hegel's - "lookingforward." Still, what happened was "an"exten-

sion: other not essentiallydifferent extensionsmay have been possible. Kojeve con-

tinues: "Man no longer acts in the full sense of the term - that is ... he no longer

negates, no longer transformsthe natural and social given through bloody Fightingand creative Work." Or, to put this in words heard quite often today, there is no

longer any reasonfor wars,bloodyrevolutions,or slavery (forced labor) except acci-

dental ones ("senselessness"). At the very time that his student sought a new nega-tive stance, Kojeve preparedto announce the impossibilityof such a project.

This same difficulty reveals itself in the writings of Marcuse. Twenty yearsafter Kojeve, this professorconcluded: "Through [the]totalitarian-democraticcon-

quest of man and of nature, the subjective and objective space for the realm of

freedom has... been conquered."12 Now intellectuals like Marcuse, and unlike

Kojeve, cannot be expected to rest content in any realm of freedom if in fact wars

and work, however irrational, still persist. Their sense of moral indignation is too

great. Therefore, whole booksmust be written detailing the "irrationality" nternal

to the already existing "space for the realm of freedom." But precisely because

within that "space" t is already admitted that wars and work (forced labor) are in

principle irrational, such books cannot be received as authentic negations of the

existing order. Books such as One-Dimensional Man are barely objects deservingof criticism; they are requiredreading in state schools. At best, they are criticizedas

"vague"or "too idealistic." Therefore, it becomes necessaryto speak of "repressivetolerance,"a phrasewhich criesout, "Please take us seriouslyfor we speakof serious

matters "

To repeat, this difficultyarisesbecause thoughtful members of the left believed

that there was agreement on goals among the dominant world powers. But this

difficulty seems to go deeper than the left's inability to confess that it has won andthat it is a failure. After World War II, the belief that there is a well-nigh univer-sal agreement on highest social values caused a twofold reaction. On the one hand,there is nausea caused by the realization that contemporaryman is epigonic. On the

other hand, there is the resolutionthat man must not be epigonic becausebeing so is

dehumanizing. To use Kojeve's words again, the realizationthat the United States

(ca. 1958) may indeed have "alreadyattained the final stage of Marxist 'commun-

ism,' seeing that, practically, all the members of a 'classlesssociety' can from nowon appropriatefor themselveseverything that seems good to them, without thereby

working any more than their heart dictates" engenders resolute nausea in the New

Left or its teachers. This nausea is caused by the realization that "the American

way of life" may be the wave of the future. Thus, the resolution that it must notbe. "The American way of life is not the life-style proper to the final State because

12Negations (Boston,1968), p. xvii.

115




it is too vulgar." 13 Such snobbery, as will be seen, is not without theoretical ground.As for the Chinese and Russian ways of life, is not Kojeve correct in proclaimingthat "the Russians and the Chinese are

onlyAmericans who are still

poorbut are

rapidly proceeding to get richer" ?14

The postwar left intellectuals thus come to experience what Nietzsche's Zara-

thustra came to know when the mob demanded, "Give us this Last Man, O Zara-

thustra " Is this not a description of the American, Russian, and Chinese wayof life?

One still worketh,for work is a pastime. But one is careful lest the pastime shouldhurt one. One no longerbecomethpooror rich; both are too burdensome.

No shepherd,and one herd Everyonewanteth the same; everyoneis equal: he whohath other sentimentsgoeth voluntarily nto the madhouse.

"Formerlyall the world was insane" say the subtlestof them, and blinkthereby.

But there is a difference between Nietzsche's situation and that of the New Left

teachers: whereas the Last Man appeared to Nietzsche to be the ideal of his genera-

tion, he appears to be the reality of this generation to the New Left intellectuals of

the West. How charming, how exciting, how meaningful then is the Third World,

where at the least the Last Man still may appear as an ideal and, therefore, where

man still appears to have some purpose beyond entertainment and/or comfortable

self-preservation.

Seeing the tendencies of the American and Sino-Soviet superpowers, the intel-

lectual leftbegan

to seek a new criticalposition immediately

after the war. This

position has become the New Left. Feeling resolute nausea at the prospects for the

future, the New Left cannot help but also feel a kinship with Nietzsche.

ON THE HISTORICAL POSITION OF THE NEW LEFT TEACHERS

"Nietzsche is the first thinker who, in view of a world-history emerging for the

first time, asks the decisive question . . . [because he] recognizes the historical mo-

ment in which man prepares to assume dominion over the whole earth." 15 So saysMartin Heidegger, whose followers should not be underestimated. Heidegger

creatively transforms Nietzsche's question: "The question is: is man, as man in his

nature till now, prepared to assume dominion over the whole earth?" Man's do-

minion over the whole "earth" is his rule of himself and of everything else without

taking his bearings from anything but himself. That is, this dominion is man's rule

unchecked by man's awareness of anything higher or lower than himself, i.e., un-

checked by anything but what the ruler understands to be of his own creation. This

is the human realm of human freedom for which man has seemed to work and strug-

gle throughout human time. This dominion is imminent, according to Nietzsche

according to Heidegger. But has man's "nature till now" fitted him for his reign?

3In the light of this and what follows, consider Raymond Aron's question: "Would a life sub-

jected to a rational and purposeless organization still be human?" This is asked at theend of a book entitled Progress and Disillusion: The Dialectics of Modern Society (NewYork, 1969), p. 275. Cf. Mario Savio's famous speech in Teodori, op. cit., pp. 160-61.

" Introduction, p. 161.

15"Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" trans. Bernard Magnus, Review of Metaphysics, 20(March 1967), 415.

116




If man's historical nature is essentially "liver of the American way of life" -- as

Heidegger'6 and Kojeve seem to believe - then can his unqualified rule of himself

begreeted

with warm enthusiasm? If one thinks that all men arecapable

at least

of philosophizing in the evening rather than watching color television, if one has cut

one's teeth on Marx rather than John Locke or Mark Twain, then the answer must

be, "No , man is not prepared." But is there any reason to hope that man might

prepare himself? From this point of view, is there any aspect of man's nature "till

now" that can be developed so as to prepare him? Will life at the end of history be

human life?

Before turning to this question, we should ask why the left might admit that

human time, history, is at an end since the completion of the Phenomenology ofthe Mind. Surely there has been no lack of wars and bloody revolutions since then.

From the Hegelian-Marxist point of view, these are easily comprehended: "Fromthe authentically historical point of view, the two world wars and their retinue of

large and small revolutions had only the effect of bringing the backward civilization

of the peripheral provinces into line with the most advanced (real or virtual) Euro-

pean historical positions." Indeed, as Kojeve continues, "the democratization of

imperial Germany (by way of Hitlerism)," the sovietization of Russia and the com-

munization of China, the coming to independence of Togoland, the Papuans' self-

determination and a whole series of other events which would be unthinkable on the

basis of pre-Napoleonic or pre-Hegelian Europe are now taken for granted and

praised. They occurred, so to speak, "by rights."'7 Only the administrative struc-

ture, a merely technical development, seems lacking to actualize the universal

homogeneous state across the whole face of the earth.'8

Of course, many members of the New Left movement are of the opinion that

the full development of the end of history, one homogeneous state in the world, is

not a realistic possibility. Such a state appears to be utopian. Or, as Marcuse so

nicely put it, such a development appears to be "what is today called a utopia." We

cite only one example. One hard-headed New Left critic of Marcuse, Martin Jay,

writes: "Nationalism ... is likely to frustrate hopes for a reconciliation of particular

and universal interests in the future ... [because] at the center of the national ques-

tion is the irreducible fact of linguistic differences. This is a reality which Marcuse sutopianism fails to acknowledge. . . ."19

Although the full scope of Marcuse's

"utopianism" is difficult to judge, it is not bold to suggest that it takes into account

Heidegger's On the Way to Language:

16See the "MemorialAddress" in Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E.Hans Freund (New York, 1966), p. 52, and "Dialogueon Language...," in On theWayto Language,trans. PeterD. Hertz (New York, 1971 , p. 17.

7 Cf. C. W. Cassinelli,"TheNationalCommunity,"Polity, 2 (Fall 1969), 26-29."sRevel's popularbook does nothing but argue this at a ratherlow level. The "secondworld

revolution,"which Revel claims will result in the world state, must begin in Americabecause of our technically advanced position. Things are much further "workedout"

here. Without Revel (or the Americanintelligentsia) knowing it, this is no more thanKojeve, Heideggeret al. have been sayingfor at least twenty years.The difference s thatthe New Left teachersdo not regardthis "Americanization" f the world as revolution-ary. See WithoutMarx or Jesus, the New AmericanRevolution Has Begun, trans.J. F.Bernard (New York, 1971).

19"How Utopian is Marcuse?"in The Revival of American Socialism, ed. George Fischer(New York, 1971), p. 256. Cf. Cassinelli,op. cit., pp. 30-31.

117




Of late, the scientific and philosophic investigation of languages is aiming ever more reso-

lutely at the production of what is called "metalanguage." Analytical philosophy, which isset on producing this super-language, is thus quite consistent when it considers itself metalin-

guistics. That sounds like metaphysics--not only sounds like it, it is metaphysics. Meta-linguistics is the metaphysics of the thoroughgoing technicalization of all languages into thesole operative instrument of interplanetary information. Metalanguage and sputnik, meta-

linguistics and rocketry are the Same.20

Marcuse, who preaches for a biological technology that can reduce the well-known

differences of interest between the lion and the lamb, is not likely to worry much

about reducing linguistic differences. He has this in common with Heidegger: he

is not prone to underestimate the power of technology, of technical thinking.Indeed, to put the capstone on this matter, Heidegger has no trouble asserting that

the problem of nuclear annihilation is capable of a wholly technical solution and

that it will be solved in the foreseeable future.21Indeed, the most thoughtful teachers of the New Left movement seem to re-

gard the problems which preoccupy that movement on a day-to-day basis - world

war, world racism, world poverty- as merely technical problems. The New Left

movement, unlike its teachers and its teachers' teachers, overestimates the technical

difficulties of the present era and underestimates the moral or human difficulties.

But Kojeve and Heidegger, and to some extent Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and even

Marcuse, consider more the human difficulties facing man as he prepares for his

dominion. One might say that the teachers have a more fully developed historical

sense than their movement does. That is, these teachers have become convinced

that there can no longer be any practical deliberation about whether the above

mentioned world problems ought to be solved. The only question is, "How?" If

this is the case, history would seem to be at an end.22

But to return to the historical position of the New Left teachers. Kojeve alone

among the New Left teachers comes to grips with Nietzsche's question - as restated

by Heidegger - in a rational way; he alone wonders what are the rational possi-

bilities open to man positioned at the end of history. The other New Left teachers,

as we shall see, separate the demands of reason from those of history and so do

not feel compelled to yield to reason. With regard to Heidegger, this is the case.

He questions reason radically; to question rationally is to predetermine the kind ofanswer acceptable and, therefore, not to question authentically at all: "Das Wesen

der Endlichheit des Daseins enthiillt sich aber in der Transzendenz als der Freiheit

zum Grunde."23 Thinking's way, he teaches, must proceed by means of a decidedly

historical hermeneutic,24 because no other way is open in these times. This way is

neither rational nor irrational, neither theoretical nor practical, but is more "origin-

ary" than the distinction between the rational and the irrational, the theoretical

20On the Way to Language, p. 58.

21Discourse on Thinking, p. 51.

2This is not an exaggeration for effect. Consider the New Left's fascination with planningdown to the last and most vulgar detail what they will do and with what consequences:Teodori, op. cit., pp. 163-82, 218-39, 297-309, 318-23, 352-61, 362-75, 396-98. Tech-nique is more important than results.

23The Essence of Reasons/Vom Wesen des Grundes, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston, 1969),p. 130. Original italics.

24On the Way to Language, pp. 28-29.

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and the practical.25 But Kojeve holds that coherent discourse about history, i.e.,about human things, is rational; that is, he argues that history is a (completed)whole. If the human or rational

possibilitiesare finite and can be actualized in

time,then historymust be finite and alreadycompleted if there is to be rational discourse

about it. As we shall now see, the other New Left teachers take an historical posi-tion closerto Heidegger'sthan to Kojeve's (or Hegel's).

Perhaps Merleau-Ponty seems to seek a non-historicalground for human his-

tory. Therefore, his historicalposition appearscloser to Kojeve's than to the radical

historicismof Heidegger. Still, this non- or a-historicalground- "flesh"or "sensed

thickness" is essentiallyhuman. Certainly, it is not superhuman. However, this

may be, Merleau-Ponty never abandoned the historical view of Humanism and

Terror. He consistentlymaintains that the times demand that the times be criticized

from the point of view of the times. That is, he maintains that Marxism demandsthat Marxism be criticized from a Marxist point of view.26 Marxist historicismis

only radicalized.

Sartre'sposition is not markedlydifferent. WhereasKojeve returned to Hegelbecause he was dissatisfiedwith Marx's anthropology and metaphysics,27Sartre is

a Marxist for reasons of historical necessity, for the sake of the times. He himself

confesses this: "As soon as there will exist for everyone a margin of real freedom

beyond the production of life, Marxism will have lived out its span; a philosophyof freedom will take its place. But we have no means, no intellectual instrument,no concrete

experiencewhich allows us to conceive of this freedom or of this

philosophy.'"28Sartre is certain that Marxism is not the best or final horizon; it is

only his horizon. It will, he assuresus, be replaced by a fundamentally different

and superior view, a "philosophy"as superior to Marxism as the realm of "real

freedom" is to the realm of "the production of life." For the present (and, there-

fore, the past) but only for the present, Sartre is a Marxist. When "everyone"has

"realfreedom,"he certainlywill not be. The problemis only freedom's "extension"'to "everyone." Obviously, Sartre'scertainty about the philosophy of the future is

not possible on the basis of his Marxism. Why then is he so confident about the

realm beyond the realm of the production of life? How can he know, for example,

that from the point of view of the "philosophyof freedom" the realm of the produc-tion of life will appear as something worthy of going "beyond"? The answer is, as

he admits, that this simply cannot be known. Nevertheless,Sartre has his hopes.

DIGRESSION: ON THE AFFINITY OF MARXISM FOR EXISTENTIALISM

As the single passage makes clear and as we all know, Sartre's position is exis-

tentialist. More precisely, his view is that of radical historicism. This view amounts

2Cf. Heidegger, "Uber den 'Humanismus'," in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit (2nd ed.;Bern, 1954), p. 106.

23See his Themes from Lectures, trans. John O'Neill (Evanston, 1970), pp. 29 and especially37-38. The problem of or contradiction in Camus's historical position is much the same;see The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York, 1956), pp. 4, 20-22. Of course, theintended a-historical element in Camus is different from that in Merleau-Ponty.

'7"Hegel, Marx . . ," p. 34. See Bloom's introduction to Introduction, p. viii.

28

Critique de la raison dialectique (Paris, 1960), p. 32. My italics.

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to what Rosen calls "nihilism": "Nihilismis fundamentallyan attempt to overcome

or repudiate the past on behalf of an unknown and unknowable yet hoped-forfuture."29

Kojevecharacterizesthis view: "the

Conceptis

temporal."He makes

the meaning of this view clearer: ". . .this is no longer a philosophical possibility,for this (sceptical) type of thought makes all philosophy impossible by denying the

very idea of truth: being temporal, the concept essentially changes; that is to saythat there is no definitive knowledge, hence no true knowledge in the proper sense

of the word."30 This radicallyhistoricist or nihilistic view unites Marxistsand exis-

tentialists in their analysisor criticism of our times. It makespossiblethe New Left.

To explain this unity, this digression s necessary.Radical historicism or nihilism is often recognized as characteristic of Nietz-

sche's view. But, as Heidegger shows, it is also characteristicof the view of Marx:

"With the reversal of metaphysics, already accomplished with Karl Marx, it is themost extreme possibilityof philosophy that is reached. Philosophyhas entered into

its terminal state. Every attempt at philosophic thought can today only issue in a

varied play of epigonic renaissances."31For purposes of this essay, the reversalto

which Heidegger refersmay best be understood as Marx's open insistence that phi-

losophy (or metaphysics) exists to change, and certainly not to understand, the

world. No previous thinker had been so bold as to simplymaintain what today is a

commonplace: "Theory is (only) a guide to practice." Marx thus appears to

Heidegger as the first to make explicit what Heidegger thinks hasbeen lurkingin the

background of Westernthinking

since Plato, the technical intent. Inreading

this

passage,we must not forget Heidegger's position that Nietzsche also was still within

the historic tradition of Westernthinking that beginswith Plato. That is, we should

remember that Heidegger'spath began with Nietzsche or with the crisisof thinkingeffected by Nietzsche.

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche's final doctrine of the eternal recurrenceof

the same is still a metaphysicalor philosophicdoctrine. This doctrine is still inspiredsomehow by the desire for revenge: all teachings involving eternities of any kind

are attempts to "get back at" the essential temporality of human existence. The

doctrine of eternal recurrence is, moreover, the comprehensive technical thought.

Even as the machine comes into being in order to transform what is in nonhumanor natural time for the relief of man's material estate, this doctrine comes into beingto transform all (including the machine) for the relief of what is truly human

("highest") in man as he has been up to the present. Thus is Nietzsche's "most

abysmal thought" conceived with the same intent as Marx's doctrine of historical

materialism,to "changethe world."32

Nietzsche only radicalized Marxist historicism. Seeing more clearly than Marx

what philosophy must be if it exists to change the world and interpreting nobly

2 Stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay (Boston: 1969), p. 140.

0 Introduction, p. 102.s1"La fin de la philosophie et la tache de la pensee," in Kierkegaard vivant (Paris, 1966), p.

178. The "with Marx," rather than "by Marx," indicates that Heidegger does not con-sider Marx to be a great thinker.

32 The difference is that Nietzsche seems to think that man is at his best when he acts from(his own) necessity.

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IS SNOBBERYA FORMALVALUE?

philosophy's recognition of its essential worldliness, Nietzsche attempted a self-

conscious revaluation of the very world that modem philosophy exists to change.The historical

positionof Marx as radicalized

byNietzsche is the

beginning pointof Heidegger's thinking. Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger are all historical think-

ers; they all understandtheir positionsas possibleor necessaryonly by virtue of "the

times."

But considerHeidegger'sbeginning point as he himself records it: "[Nietzsche]was still compelled to think metaphysically,and only metaphysically,but [this]does

not preclude that [his]most abysmal thought conceals something unthought, which

also is impenetrable to metaphysical thinking."33 Heidegger's non-metaphysical

thinking, his creative transformation of all prior thinking, begins with the eternal

recurrenceteaching, which teaching is rejected for the sake of the times. That is, I

believe, the well-known politically nihilistic consequences of Nietzsche's thoughtseem to have suggested the Heideggerian teaching that what is truly human in man

cannot be brought out by any kind of technical or traditionallymetaphysicalthink-

ing. Rather, Heidegger "lets go" of techniques. Such "letting-go" (Gelassenheit)must not be done with technical intent. It is not willful because it does not go

against technology. "Letting-go" goes with technology, grants it its realm, while

seeking its limits. Heidegger has indeed taught many that they must find a way to

leave an inner life untouched by technical progress, even though human life can

no longerdo without technical progress.34As much as their historicism, what united Marxism with existentialism is a

concern with technique or, more specifically, with the human problem caused by

technology. This is especiallyworth noting: the leftist concern with technologyis in

essential harmony with technology in the same way that Heidegger's thinking is.

That is, the radical historicismof the left fundamentally agreeswith what must be

called the nihilism of modern (technological) science. Moder science, like mod-

ern philosophyand politics, rejects its past for its unknown future; it proudlyclaims

that every one of its "discoveries" s necessarilysubject to radical revision- rejec-tion - in the future. So do the New Left teachershope to create a "significantand

undetermined future"for man by rejecting- criticizing- the present. According

to most New Left teachers,there is this difference between the human world and thetechnical world: man is constantly faced - when he is authentic - by his end or

limit. Therefore, the technical world, the world of the infinite transformationof

matter/energy, is not authenticallyman'sworld. No technique can secure man from

his end; it can only make him forget it. At the moment we say, "Peace and

Security," all this may pass away: into nothingness. Man is essentially limited byhis (individual) death, but the world which technique presupposesand creates is

one of infinite regression. The danger is that technical thinking will overcome the

authentically human and therebymake man only an integral part of the technical

world.

Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty all conceive of their task as the seekingof man's authentic limit, the horizon of his freedom, in the "age of the planetary

3 "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" p. 431.34See, e.g., the New Yorker (June 1971), p. 27.

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liberation of atomic energy," the "epoch summoned to disclose Nature as the total

reservoirof the fund of transformableenergy."35 Again, the danger of this age is

that man will be inauthentic. He will make himselfnothing

but a "fund of human

energy, committed to the universe as indefinite field of commutation, where needs

are always and everywhere less and less satisfied, a field unfolded by movement

without finality,a Will to Will."36 The modernhuman problem,the problemof the

relief of man's material estate, will be solved in the way that Hitler solved the Ger-

man-Jewish problem. For the sake of himself, man reduces himself to a fund of

transformableenergy, to something less than human. At the end of all man's his-

toric work and struggle occurs the "definitiveannihilation" of the type Man. Thus

the resolute nausea at the prospect that man can now reduce himself to somethingsub-human by making his dominion nothing but a system of energetic stimulation

and energetic responsecauses the concern with technique. At the level of politics,this concern manifests itself as resolutecontempt for or hatred of the United States,the most technically advanced nation. But Heidegger shows us that this concernwas always at the heart of Marxism, albeit unconsciously. It remained only for

Nietzsche and then Heidegger to radicalize- make self-conscious this concern.

The hope for a change in the technological world's relation to man, the hope that

the American way of life is not the wave of the future, unites Marxism with

Heidegger'sradical historicism (existentialism) for the very reason that the Marxist

goals have been reached in the United States, if only in a formal sense. But let usreturnto the explanation of the historicalpositions.

Marcuse'shistorical position, his analysisof the present epoch, at firstappearsdifferent from that of the other New Left teachers. He is, he says, "quiteromantic."

Nietzsche might say that he is not yet thoughtful. However this may be, Marcuse's

historical position is difficult to establish because he has spoken of a "natural law"

which guarantees the right of "resistance"by some men against other men.37 This

raises a difficulty because Marcuse has often maintained that man's relation to

nature has been radically transformedand that it will be again so transformed. If

man's relation to nature can be essentially altered, then it seems foolish to speak of

anything natural guaranteeing a human right. If man's relation can be so trans-

formed (and not by any act of nature, but by human action), how can there benaturally right or naturally lawful human actions at any particular time? PerhapsMarcuse means something like this: historical man's relation to nature up to the

present has necessitated "resistance";therefore, nature being up to now the realm

of necessity, there exists presently a natural law which guarantees the right of

resistance. If so, then Marcuse's insistence that in the truly free future a radical

transformationof historical or human relationsand of nature itself and nature in its

relation to man will occur seems consistent with his "natural law" teaching. Man

3.A. F. Lingis, "On the Essence of Technique," in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed.

Manfred S. Frings (Chicago, 1968), p. 128.

6Ibid., p. 127.

.7The context makes it clear that Marcuse does not use the term rhetorically. About tacticsfor resistance he says, ". . . we should say that we are sacrificing lower-level laws in orderto defend constitutional law." But about "natural law" he says, "I believe that it doesexist." Five Lectures, p. 105.

122




will become truly free in the future. He will not even have the choice of opposinghimself to the historical (societal) or natural given. Nature will also be within the

realm offreedom;

the lionmay

lie down with the lamb. Were this not thecase,Marcuse could not hope for a world of "playful experimentation," i.e., of experi-

mentation by men on men and on nature free of fearful consequences for man

and/or nature.

Marcuse's historical position, his conception of man's present place in human

time, does not differ substantially rom that of Merleau-Ponty,Heidegger, or Sartre.

lHe takes the nihilistic stance, rejecting the past in favor of an unknown and un-

knowable future. Against this it may be objected that Marcuse'sutopianism pre-

supposes the knowabilityof the future. However, the preface to the Essay on Lib-

eration shows that Marcuse's utopianism is rhetorical. It arises to meet the most

public objection to the New Left, the objection that it is merelycritical and does notresist for the sake of any positive ideal. (By the way, this objection is wholly valid

even from the point of view of the New Left.) Throughout the Essay Marcuse

affirms that his utopian projection is not necessarilythe form of the future. The

realm of freedom cannot be circumscribed. Moreover,Marcuse does not even claim

that the "forcesof liberation"will prevail; they may go down to a crushingdefeat.38

Marcuse, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty all seek a critical position opposed to the

American and Sino-Soviet way of life. From this negative stance, they call forth a

radicallydifferent future, a future so different that it is almostmorally reprehensibleto delimit it. On the contrary, their historical position demands that the future be

defined by radical actions: radical historicism is epimethian. Heidegger, the "later

Heidegger" at least, has foresaken even this much looking to the future. Heideggerclaims that his way is to seek a way which is prior to the very distinction between

theory and practice and so his later writings seem not to issue in any call to action.

Yet no one can read his "Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an In-

quirer,"which is an inquiry into the essential limits to the "danger"to East Asian

thought and to Westernnon-metaphysical (Heideggerian) thinking posed by West-

ern metaphysical (technical) thinking, without seeing that Heidegger has some

intention which can only be fulfilled in the future and which the future cannot

vouchsafe.39Unlike these teachers of the New Left movement, Kojeve seems to have

avoided nihilism or radical historicism. He could not reject reason for the sake of

the times. This is not to imply that Kojeve failed to grasp the nihilistic dilemma in

which contemporary Western civilization- nay, Kojeve's own teachings- may

place men. This forced Kojeve to attempt to describe contemporaryman and the

dilemma or danger facing him in a manner somewhat different from the other

teachersof the New Left. That is, Kojeve maintained that the post-historicalsitua-

tion as well as history (human time) can be understoodrationally. Like the others,

Kojeve sees that the end of historymay necessitate the "re-animalization"of man,

his return to the "funds of energy"from whence he came. After all, if there is no

3s An Essayon Liberation(Boston,1969), p. viii.

9See On the Way to Language, pp. 3, 4, 199 for Heidegger'slongstandingconcern with thisdanger. Cf. Discourse on Thinking,pp. 43-57.

123




longer any reason for bloody struggles of man against man or for forced labors of

man against nature, then "man properly so-called" disappears by historical neces-

sity."Hence it must be admitted that after the end of

History,men would con-

struct their edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their

webs, would perform musical concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas, and

would play like young animals, and would indulge in love like adult beasts."40

Kojeve does not let it rest at this: "The definitive annihilation of Man properlyso-called also means the definitive disappearance of human Discourse (Logos) in

the strict sense. Animals of the species Homo sapiens would react by conditioned

reflexes to the vocal signals or sign 'language' and thus their so-called 'discourses'

would be like what is supposed to be the 'language' of bees."41 Kojeve faced man's

historical annihilation of himself calmly.

One must admit, Kojeve says, that this post-historical human situation will notmake men "happy." Instead, one must confess that "post-historical animals of the

species Homo sapiens (which will live amidst abundance and complete security)will be content..." inasmuch as by their own definition they will be contented.

For what more could these animals reasonably wish? Kojeve in his wisdom tried to

reconcile himself to this outcome: "And if history is certainly the history of human

errors, man himself is perhaps only an error of nature that 'by chance' (freedom?)

was not immediately eliminated."

RATIONAL LIFE AT THE END OF HISTORY?

But if Kojeve, the member of the universal class, could learn from Hegel that

he must "accept the necessary abandonment of Individuality" and consequently the

abandonment of humanity, he could not be happy with his acceptance. Imaginethen his state of mind when in 1959 he traveled to Japan

- "a Society that is one of

a kind, because it alone has for almost three centuries experienced life at the 'end

of History' "- and discovered there a type of human life that was "anything but

animal." That is, he claimed to discover there a way of life "diametrically opposed"to the American and Sino-Soviet way. Such a discovery ought to be of great interest

to the New Left.

Kojeve claimed that the middle-class emperor Hideyoshi's destruction of the

feudal system (an action which had immediate consequences very much like the

long-range consequences of the policies of Henry VII and Henry VIII in England)

together with the subsequent isolation of Japan by the noble emperor Yiyeasusecured a way of life among the upper class such that there was no need for them

to risk their lives even for prestige. Japan was free from civil and foreign war for

centuries. Nor was there any reason for them to work. Yet these Japanese remained

human. There was in Japan no religion, no politics, no morals, and - we may add

- no art "in the 'European' or 'historical' sense of these words." In short, there was

by European standards nothing for which these Japanese could live (or die). Thesame was "in principle" true of the members of the lower class; indeed, no Japanese

4 Introduction, p. 159. Cf. On the Way to Language, p .16: ". . . the Europeanization of manand of the Earth attacks at the source everything that is of an essential character."

41 Introduction, p. 160. Does he describe the ideal or the reality of contemporary social science?

124




attempted the negation of the post-historical Japanese civilization. But strangely,"in the extreme, every Japanese is in principle capable of committing .. .a perfectly

'gratuitous'suicide."

Apparently they

die forsomething.

But, the suicideappearsto be "gratuitous," "free" in the sense that it is apparently an effect without suffi-

cient cause. Such suicides are not committed to advance any particular historical

cause, i.e., to advance any Japanese social or political cause. As we Americans know,

such suicides are never committed for the sake of liberty or equality or fraternity,whether they are committed with a sword or an airplane.

Post-historical (i.e., post-scarcity, egalitarian) civilization presented a problemfor Kojeve, as it does for most thoughtful members of the postwar left. Is the

Japanese way of life the solution? At first glance, it is not. The Japanese live and

die for nothing, for no reason. In this respect, the Japanese appear to be Last Men.

But Kojeve, never at a loss for a reason, explains the Japanese civilization: "AllJapanese without exception are currently in a position to live according to totallyformalized values - that is, values completely empty of all 'human' content in the

'historical' sense." They live or die "from pure snobbery." Pure snobbery created

in Japan great subtleties of art - the No theatre, "caligraphy," the precious haiku

- to which no Western form of objectification can yet do justice.42 As for the other

working and the fighting of which the Japanese are capable, Americans have and

have had direct experience of these. So Kojeve takes heart: "... since no animal

can be a snob, every 'Japanized' post-historical period would be specifically hu-

man." He allows himself to hope or "believe that the recently begun interaction

between Japan and the Western World will finally lead not to a rebarbarization of

the Japanese but to a 'Japanization' of the Westerners (including the Russians)."With Heidegger, Kojeve holds out the hope that it is only the "foreground world

of Japan [that] is altogether European or, if you will, American. The background

world of Japan, on the other hand, or better, that world itself, is what you exper-ience in the No play."43

But Kojeve only permitted himself to "believe" that the world may be "Japan-ized" and thus that man need not return to animality. In the same way, Heidegger

only presents himself as an inquirer into the possibility that the "background world

of Japan" can avoid being Americanized out of existence. But Kojeve, no less thanSartre, Merleau-Ponty, and even Marcuse, hopes that the reduction of human life

to the mere exchange of energy need not occur. That is, he hopes that the univer-

sal society of consumers-producers can be avoided. Still Kojeve goes further than

the other New Left teachers by finding a reason for his hopes -snobbery. So

Kojeve appears to avoid the nihilistic conclusion that at the end of history, when

there is no longer any reason for wars and bloody revolutions, precisely wars and

bloody revolutions - "wars of national liberation," "cultural revolutions" - must

be fostered in order to avoid man's reanimalization. Kojeve seems to have dis-

covered away

to avoid the dominion of the Last Man without man-madecataclysm.Or else, can one imagine a war to the death between the Snobs and the Last Men?

42 See the critique of Rashomon in On the Way to Language, pp. 16-19.

43Ibid., p. 17.

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Now it is Kojeve's contention that snobbery s a formal value, a value empty of

all rational (historical) social and political content. Snobbery s valuable because it

allows the snob "to remainhuman,"

to remain "aSubject opposed

to theObject"even though he is "in harmonywith Nature and given Being." Man lives according

to such values so that "hemay oppose himself as pure 'form' to himself and to others

taken as 'content'of any sort." "Style"or, as we say today, "life-style" hus becomes

the last reasonablerefugeof man's humanity.

TOWARD A SCIENCE OF SNOBBERY?

But is snobberya formal value? This essay concludes by examining this ques-tion. That is, this essay may indicate in what sense this question is important to

American students of politics. Kojeve's analysisof the contemporarysituation cul-minates in the suggestionthat even at the end of history truly human life may pre-vail. It will prevail because the distinctively human desire to raise oneself above

and to oppose the mob, "snobbery," an prevail in a mass society. But according to

Kojeve, snobberyis - must be - a formal value: no particular social or political

arrangementnecessarilycorrespondsto it. If this is not the case, if snobbery s not a

formal value, then snobbish life would be a serious antithesis to "life at the end of

History." The wholly egalitarian society of consumers-producerswhich Kojeveclaims is the United States (and the Sino-Soviets) could not possiblybe life at the

end of history even from Kojeve's point of view. Further, in maintaining that

snobberyis a formal value, Kojeve attempts the rational defense of the New Left'sThird World-ism and its anti-Americanism.

Therefore, the inquiry into whether snobbery s a formal value seems necessaryfrom both a theoreticaland a practical point of view. From a merelypracticalpointof view, once we see - if we can - that snobberyis not a formal value, we may

begin to distinguish sham snobberyfrom genuine snobberyon the basis of its con-

tent. Consideronly one example. One value about which much snobberyhas arisen

is "free expression." It seems to have widespreadsnob appeal. Those who formal-

ize "freeexpression" n this country like to hold in contempt those massesof Ameri-

cans who hold on the one hand that freespeech

isgood

and on the other hand that

some particular opinion ought not be expressed. Such contempt is justified onlywhen or if "freeexpression"can be formalized. That is, only in an historicalcondi-

tion such that the content of a speech is irrelevant to its value does such snobberymake senseas a matter of practice.

But in this essay we consider more the theoretical difficultiesof snobberyas a

formal value. If snobbery s not a formal value, if the truth of snobbery s not simplythat it somehow allows a man to remain human in the age of the technicalization of

man himself, then it is necessary to discover and foster the content of snobbery.Such a discoveryand such fosteringwould show that, even if man'sputative histori-

cal or temporal end has been reached, his end simplyhas not. For theologians, thismight appear to be no discoveryat all, but would it not be importantfrom the pointof view of (modern) philosophy? We suggest, therefore, that a science of snobberyseems desirableand necessaryboth in itself and for the sake of our age. This essayconcludes by suggestingthe direction in which such a science could be developed.

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The science of snobberyis not a new but only a neglected enterprise. In the

middle of the last century,William Makepeace Thackerayfounded snobologywhile

at the same timeacting

as the editor of Punch.Thackeray,

the author of the first

novel without a hero, despised everything "vain glorious." That is, he was a

Hobbist (at least as much as, for example, Norman Mailer is today an existential-

ist). Now Thackeray'sBook of Snobs was intentionallyanti-snobbistand so it seems

that snobbery may have had some content, something worthy of opposition. What

was it in snobberythat Thackeray opposed? In a perhaps too serious moment, he

wrote: "As long as [newspaperspublish a "societypage"]how the deuce are peoplewhose names are chronicled in it ever to believe themselves the equals of that cring-

ing race which daily reads that abominable trash?"-44The snobbish "society page"has perniciouseffects on all classes.

According to Thackeray, snobberyand the manners- "life-styles" born ofsnobberyare the result of the wholly unjustified belief of membersof any class that

there are sociallyor politically significantdifferences between men. From this pointof view, men are equal or at any rate equally contemptible. This being the case,

Kojeve is in agreement with the first snobologiston the nature of snobbery. Snob-

bery is a formal value; there is no serious reason to be for or against it. Therefore,it is altogether fitting that the inventor of the polemical science of snobberyshould

also be the editor of Punch. Thackeray'ssnobologyhas entertainment value only.45But, as we have indicated, the study of snobberyis a serious matter. Indeed,

Kojeve hoped that studied snobberywould be man's fate. Thackeray'sapproach to

the subject fails. But Kojeve understands snobbery from the same (egalitarian)

point of view as Thackeray. The difference is that Thackeray opposed snobberyfor the sake of humanity whereas Kojeve believes that snobbery is the savior of

humanity. How can this be? We can only conclude that the egalitarian under-

standingof snobbery s not sufficient.

Indeed, we may begin to wonder whether the Punch snobology itself (or the

spirit that inspired it) emptied snobberyof its content. Perhapsthe first snobologyimitated the other modern sciences. Perhaps that polemical snobology, by aimingat the relief of man's estate, strippedits object of its truestmeaning in order to give

it what appeared to be a sociallyuseful meaning. If this is the case, snobologymustinquire into its roots. In order to refound snobology,a non-polemical snobology,we

should try to establishthe pre-scientific phenomena of snobbery. This is not an easytask since hardlyanyone before Thackeraywas interested in snobs. Such an inquirymight even appear esoteric. Nevertheless,we should not hesitate merely becausewe

appear to advocate a snobbishsnobology. Although much more of this inquiry re-

mains, the following conclusionsare not contra-indicated.

Strictly speaking, there were no ancient snobs; that is, there is no Greek orLatin equivalent for "snob." Apparently, the ancients were not compelled to think

in snobbishterms. As nearly as I can tell, snobs or concern with snobberybegan to

show up in late medieval or very early modem times. At that time, the snob was

simplya very low-class fellow, a cobbler'sapprentice. In early modem times he be-

44 Thackeray, The Book of Snobs, in Works (Cambridge, 1895), VII, 332.45 See Snobs, p. 518, where this is confessed.

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gan to be seen as somethinglikeour contemeporary nobs.Then, the snobwas under-

stood no longer as just a lower class fellow, but rather as a lower class fellow who

apesthe manners of the

upperclass. Sometimes he

appearsas the lower classmem-

ber who in aping the upper class takes unfair advantage of it; e.g., while minglingwith and kowtowing to the upper class, he picks its pockets. Next Thackeray radi-

calized snobbery. For him and his readers,a snob is anyonewho thinks that anyone- himself or someone else - is superiorin a way that demands social recognition.

According to Thackeray, the footman who grovels before the royal footman is

equally a snob with the royal footman (or the royalty itself) that expects such

groveling. Today, when all footmen have disappeared, Thackeray'sunderstandingremains: anyone who thinks that he is superior (in a way that society ought to take

notice of) is a snob. In the age when groveling is strictly taboo, in the classless

society,only the expectation of grovelingcan produce a snob. Therefore, in modemtimes snobberyhas progressedfrom the objective condition of the lower or lowest

class to the merely subjectivepreference for an upper class. This late kind of snob-

bery, almost the reverseof original snobbery, s what Kojeve hopes will save man's

humanity.Then may it be concluded that snobbery s a value without historical content?

In the post-historicalsituation, snobberywill indeed create "life styles"which can-

not be lived by, thoughts that cannot be comprehended by, art that cannot be

"appreciated"by "just anyone." On the other hand, Kojeve seems to think that

"just anyone" is capable of being snobbish; to repeat, he is in fundamental agree-ment with Thackeray. Snobbery, he indicates, is not the preserve of any "class"

of men; the whole world may be "Japanized." So egalitarian is Kojeve. And so it

becomes possible to speakin tones of distant admirationabout lower class"culture"

and "life styles." In this sense, the value of snobbery s empty. No particular social,cultural, or political arrangementscorrespondto it. As my mother used to tell me,"You can be a snob about not being a snob."46 Every man is a snob and all snobs

are equal in the "'Japanized' post-historical period." The post-historical snobs

oppose themselves to themselvesand to "justanyone"else for the sakeof humanity.How does this situation differ from the state of nature-state of war, from a cata-

clysmic and "perpetual"revolution? There is at least this difference between thepost- and the pre-historical state of nature-war: the parties to the post-historicalstate would be able to understand their position in history. As Kojeve puts it, theywould be able to speak "adequately"about their situation. Understanding this and

being snobs, they would be unwilling on principle to sufficientlysubordinate them-

selvesto form a political community.But perhaps snobberyhas some content. The very fact that such a low value

as snobbery now appears to an eminently reasonable man as the last refuge of

"Arthur Koestler's interesting essay ["The Anatomy of Snobbery," Anchor Review (Garden

City, 1955), I, 1-25] sees this emptiness in snobbery. Still Koestler does not take snob-bery seriously enough; he is closer to Thackeray than to Kojeve. Nevertheless, if onethinks through what Koestler says about "art appreciation" (pp. 10-12), one can seewhat snobbery means at the level of speculative thought. Cf. Kojeve, On Tyranny(New York, 1963), p. 209. The difference between Koestler and Kojeve is especiallythat Koestler has (or had) not thought through his historical position. Cf. Humanismand Terror, pp. 1-24, 126-48.

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humanity suggeststhe need for a snobbishsnobology. For, if at the "endof History"

snobbery s such a refuge, then does this not indicate that what is irreduciblycharac-

teristic of man in his "naturetill now" is his natural need tograsp

or begraspedbythe presence of the naturally "high toned"? If this is the case, then the new science

of snobology,the snobbishsnobology,studies the human need for the presenceof the

naturallyhigh with the intention of heightening that need.

This new science cannot be historical in the usual sense. That is, snobologydoes not presuppose that history is an element of reality. One reason for its a-his-

toricity is its concern for its roots. Having such a concern, practically the firstorder

of business for the new science will be an inquiry into the reasons that the ancients

did not think in snobbish terms. Since the ancients did not think historicallyeither,no such inquiry can be scientific if it is historical. But even from an authentically

historical point of view, the new snobology is not an historical but a natural sci-ence. At the "end of History," when man is at last in harmony with "Nature or

given Being," the science of what is essential to man cannot be historical.

We must conclude that the New Left and its teachers cannot be expected to

become snobbishsnobologistseven for the sake of humanity. The radicalhistoricism

of the left is the result of the self-consciouslyirrational or merely willful desire to

create history even though history is finished. Even though the historical view has

exhausted itself, the left persists,as Merleau-Pontyonce wrote, "out of moral indig-nation." This exhaustion is itself the cause of this indignation. When the achieve-

ment of all the goals specific to modernity- which are nothing but the goals of

"History"and of the "Marxist revolution"- is accomplished by "capitalisticneo-

imperialists,"how can a sincereMarxist feel that "History"has done him justice?

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wettergreen - is snobbery a formal value considering life at the end of modernity

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