Western States Legal Foundation Information Bulletin Fall 2002

The Military Space Plane, Conventional ICBM’s, and the Common Aero Vehicle: Overlooked Threats of Weapons

Delivered Through or From Space

Throughout the late 1990's, U.S. programsdeveloping new weapons intended to operatethrough and from space proceeded largely out ofpublic view, pushed forward by aerospacecontractors, think tank military transformationpromoters, and space weapons advocates in themilitary and Congress. The Bush Administrationhas brought the space weapons enthusiasts tothe forefront, led by Defense Secretary DonaldRumsfeld.1 With the ascendance of the spacewarriors and the Bush administration’sdetermination to push forward with research ona wide variety of missile defense technologies,U.S. space weapons programs are attractingincreased attention.

Much of that attention, however, is focusedon systems that would be placed in orbit. Theseinclude the space-based laser and various kindsof kinetic kill devices, that could be used for avariety of military purposes ranging from anti-satellite warfare to missile defense to destroyingtargets in the atmosphere or on the ground.Most such systems are decades fromdeployment. They present significant technicalobstacles and operational issues, including thevulnerability of complex, expensive systems inorbit to attack.

Widely overlooked, the U.S. also is exploringnew ways to deliver weapons through and fromspace in the near term– a potentially destabilizingundertaking. These new systems, evolutionary

improvements of existing technologies, wouldbe very difficult to defend against, and ifapproved could be deployed in the next ten tofifteen years. They include highly accuratelong-range ballistic missiles with non-nuclearwarheads, maneuverable re-entry vehicles thatcould deliver a variety of weapons, bothnuclear and conventional, and a next-generation re-useable launch vehicle that couldperform a variety of military missions in space,including weapons delivery, and then land likean airplane.

Labels used by the military for theseoptions are the conventional ballistic missile(CBM), the Common Aero (or Aerospace)Vehicle (CAV), and the Military Space Plane(MSP), sometimes also referred to as the SpaceOperations Vehicle (SOV). The militarytargets envisioned for CAV’s and conventionalballistic missiles include hardened and deeplyburied targets, such as missile silos andunderground tunnels or bunkers for commandand control or munitions storage, mobiletargets such as mobile missile launchers, airdefense systems, and ground combat forces ininstances where aircraft cannot be deployedquickly enough. The Space Plane could deliverseveral Common Aero Vehicles. If successful,in the long run the Space Plane also couldprovide the military with cheaper, more reliableaccess to space, making the placement ofweapons in space more feasible.

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There are indications that the BushAdministration intends to move ahead with thefirst steps towards such systems. The DefenseDepartment has future funding programmed, forexample, for “the modification of a strategicballistic missile system to enable the deploymentof a non-nuclear payload.”2 This descriptioncould fit either various types of conventionalwarheads for a submarine launched ballisticmissile, a land-based intercontinental ballisticmissile (ICBM) or the CAV, envisioned as amore sophisticated system capable of greatermaneuvering and the deployment of a variety ofsubmunitions and sensing systems. At the sametime, NASA and the Air Force are cooperating ina renewed effort to develop reusable launchvehicles, with the Air Force envisioning amilitary version that could perform a variety ofmissions, from delivering CAV’s to orbitingsatellites. Global Non-Nuclear Strike: ConventionalICBM’s and the Common Aero Vehicle

Two related programs conceived during the1990's could provide the groundwork for the“non-nuclear payload” envisioned for a modifiedstrategic ballistic missile system. They wouldtake advantage of continuing advancements inU.S. capabilities to deliver weapons accuratelyover great distances, ranging from upgrades inglobal positioning systems to improvements inmissile reentry vehicle technology. The goal is tobuild pilotless systems that are accurate andversatile enough to destroy a variety of targetsusing conventional weapons, at intercontinentalrange. These systems are the Maneuverable (or,in some planning documents, “Modified”) NonNuclear Reentry Vehicle (MNNRV) and theCommon Aero Vehicle (CAV).

Both concepts are intended to expand thetypes and maneuvering capability of payloads

that can be delivered through or from space.The MNNRV would be an improved reentryvehicle, the component that carries the payloadof an intercontinental ballistic missile back intothe atmosphere. According to the NationalSecurity Space Roadmap, it “would relyprimarily on maneuvers, and very high reentryspeeds to evade defenses, thereby aidingpenetration to assigned targets. The limitedcontrollability of the MNNRV, allows forprecision attacks against high value, time-critical hard surface and hard and deeplyburied targets .” 3 The increasedmaneuverability of the MNNRV, along withguidance improvements, would improveaccuracy.4 The CAV is another type ofreentry vehicle improvement that wouldprovide additional maneuverability, and thatalso would allow the delivery through or fromspace of many of the advanced types ofarmaments that currently only can be deliveredby aircraft. It is a “common” aero vehiclebecause “The vehicle could serve as acommon form of delivery for CBM[conventional ballistic missile], MSP [militaryspace plane], or orbital systems.”5

Improved maneuvering re-entry vehiclesfor non-nuclear warheads would not presentsubstantial technical obstacles. The U.S. AirForce 1997 Space Force Application MissionArea Development Plan (MADP) noted that“Technology for the conventional ModifiedNon-nuclear RV (MNNRV) concept is fairlymature. With full funding and an aggressiveschedule the first operational sortie could beready in 3 years.”6 Non-nuclear payloadsunder consideration included penetrators ofvarious types, including both dense heavy rodsdesigned to destroy hard targets by kineticenergy to hardened warheads using highexplosives.7 Some flight testing of ballisticmissiles with kinetic energy rods already has

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been conducted.8 The MADP and othercontemporaneous planning documentsenvisioned mounting these MNNRV’s onMinuteman ICBM’s and basing them at eitherVandenberg Air Force Base in California orCape Canaveral, Florida, both to comply witharms control treaties and to avoid confusion withnuclear weapons if they were launched.9 It isalso conceivable that a non-nuclear reentryvehicle could be delivered by a submarinelaunched ballistic missile.

Air Force Space Command sees the CAV asa first step towards acquiring the capability tolaunch conventional weapons from the UnitedStates and strike anywhere on earth. Accordingto the Air Force Space Command StrategicMaster Plan for FY02 and Beyond,

“During the mid-term [2008-2013], we willexpand the options available to ourwarfighting commanders by fielding aninitial global Conventional Strikecapability.... CAV will provide warfightingforces with a Conventional Strike capabilitywith near-global range, prompt responsetime from launch to target, penetration ofhostile natural or man-made terrestrial andatmospheric environments and enemydefense avoidance. The CAV system will becapable of dispensing a variety of munitionsagainst ground targets to include WMDstorage sites, C2 [command and control]facilities, maritime forces and massed groundforces.”10

The munitions envisioned for each CAVinclude “three 250 lb small smart bombs, six 90lb powered LOCAAS (Low Cost AutonomousAttack System) munitions, a hard and deeplyburied target (HDBT) penetrator, a deployableunmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Hunter/Killerpackage, an agent defeat payload, and other

special weapon payloads.”11 Other CAVpayloads under consideration includeunmanned aerial vehicles for battle damageassessment and electromagnetic pulse (EMP)weapons designed to disrupt or destroyelectronic equipment.12 The military also doesnot see the CAV as posing particularly difficulttechnical problems.13

Although still in the concept stage, theconventionally armed CAV appears to haveconsiderable momentum. It was endorsed bythe Department of Defense 2001Transformation Study Report .14 TheDepartment of Defense plans to conduct astudy in FY2002 of “Common Aero Vehicle(CAV) Utility for Conventional Deterrence andGlobal Precision Attack to determine themilitary utility of conventional precision strikefrom space transiting systems.”15 The ability todeliver CAV’s in large numbers is listed as arequirement in a recent joint Air Force–Nat iona l Aeronau t ics and SpaceAdministration (NASA) study on next-generation reusable launch vehicles, a programexpected to provide a replacement for NASA’sspace shuttle and reuseable “space planes” forthe military.16 Air Force insiders areanticipating many years of funding for futuremissile systems, with new types of reentryvehicles better suited to defeating hard targetslikely to be part of the work. In early 2001 thenewsletter of the Air Force Space and MissilesSystems Center looked forward to decades offurther missile development:

Over the last year, the force applicationsteam has secured SMC’s role in the futuremissile system commonly referred to asMinuteman IV that hopes to be a $20-30billion procurement between 2004 and2040. New missions for the system includeholding both hardened and deeply buried

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targets and strategic relocatable targets atrisk. Concepts being evaluated for thesemissions may include an earth penetratorreentry vehicle or a “smart” maneuveringreentry vehicle. With respect to forceapplications, the Minuteman IV activity issimply the first initiative, among many, forpossible future space weapon systems. Inparallel with the Minuteman IV is anothereffort addressing conventional prompt globalstrike needs which is referred to as theCommon Aero Vehicle (CAV).17

Conventional ICBM’s, the Common AeroVehicle, and the Potential for More AdvancedNuclear Weapons Delivery Systems

Even the least ambitious version of theCAV– one which would be carried by aMinuteman ICBM and that would deployconventional munitions already being developedfor delivery by conventional aircraft- could havesignificant destabilizing effects. But if the CAVand the MNNRV system were developedsuccessfully for this limited role, there apparentlywould be no significant technological obstaclesto adapting them to other payloads– includingnuclear weapons. Nuclear roles for both theCAV and for the maneuverable re-entry vehiclewere considered during concept development forthese programs in the late 1990s. One optionexplored for the Maneuverable Reentry Vehiclewas a nuclear earth penetrator warhead, amodification of the B-61 nuclear bomb.18 Thenuclear version as then envisioned wouldreplace existing nuclear re-entry vehicles, andwould be based at silos currently used fornuclear ICBM’s.19

Although the CAV currently is envisioned asa means to deliver conventional weapons, itcould be used to deliver nuclear warheads aswell , with potential accuracy and

maneuverability improvements over existingre-entry vehicles:

Common Aero Vehicles (CAVs) candeliver both nuclear and non-nuclearweapons to targets anywhere on the globefrom CONUS [continental U.S.] bases withappropriate deployment systems. TheCAV can be deployed from multipledeployment vehicles including missiles,Military Spaceplanes (MSPs), or spacebased platforms. The inherentmaneuverability of the CAV, providesincreased accuracy, lethality, and enemydefense evasion. The aerodynamic shapeand glide capability substantially extendsthe range and cross-range of the weaponsystem. Additionally, it can be fitted withvarious sensors to provide for targetacquisition, tracking, and identification aswell as increased accuracy.20

A single Minuteman III ICBM could carrythree independently targeted CAV’s 7,000miles or more. Each could carry a variety ofconventional munitions or a single nuclearweapon, either a standard existing design or awarhead modified for lower yield or enhancedearth penetrating capabilities.21

The nuclear CAV concept was abandonedin the 1990's, a time when the climate wasinhospitable to the development of newnuclear warheads and delivery systems.22 Inthe current context, however, with the BushAdministration advocating both research onnew nuclear weapons concepts and pre-emptive strikes against states with weapons ofmass destruction that are viewed as a threat,concepts like the nuclear CAV may berevived.23 The 2002 Nuclear Posture Reviewstated that

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There are several nuclear weapon optionsthat might provide important advantages forenhancing the nation's deterrence posture:possible modifications to existing weaponsto provide additional yield flexibility in thestockpile; improved earth penetratingweapons (EPWs) to counter the increaseduse by potential adversaries of hardenedand deeply buried facilities; and warheadsthat reduce collateral damage.24

The NPR also stated that concept developmentfor next-generation ICBM’s is continuing:

The Air Force Systems Command(AFSPC) led the Ballistic MissileRequirements (BMR) Study (1998 to 2000)which documented a number of needsbeyond the current baseline ICBM mission,such as extended range, trajectory shaping,strategic relocatable targets, and hardeneddeeply buried targets, that the nextgeneration ICBM could address. The LandBased Strategic Nuclear Deterrence MissionNeeds Statement (MNS) drew from theanalysis done in the BMR study indocumenting the need for ICBMs beyond2020. To expand on the MNS and addressalternatives for the follow on ICBM, AFSPCplans to conduct an analysis of alternatives inFY04 and FY05 with an IOC by 2018.25

At the time the nuclear armed CAV wasbeing considered in the mid 1990's, the militaryanticipated that it “would be more accurate andwould have greater range. These attributes couldallow for lower yields as well as increasing thetarget set that can be held at risk. Additionally,penetrators could be incorporated to strikeburied targets.”26 The target set against whichthe nuclear CAV would provide added capabilityincluded “HDBTs [hard and deeply buriedtargets], SRTs [strategic relocatable targets, such

as mobile missiles], and HFTs (sic)[presumably HST’s-- hard surface targets,WMD or missile storage facilities].”27

Conventionally armed CAV’s andmaneuverable re-entry vehicles also are seen asable to provide improved capabilities againstsome of these targets, and the military wouldprefer to use conventional weapons whereverpossible. But the military maintains that thereare types of targets, particularly deeply buriedtunnels and bunkers, that cannot be attackedeffectively with conventional weapons. Theycontinue to look for ways of using nuclearweapons that will destroy such installations,while reducing “collateral damage”-- civiliandeaths and ecological devastation– to the pointwhere nuclear weapons use is politicallyfeasible.28

Lieutenant General Bruce Carlson, Director for ForceStructure, Resources and Assessment (Joint Staff).Presentation Slides, “Changing Needs & Priorities inRequirements & Capabilities for Future Military SpaceForces,“ National Defense Industrial Association,2002 Space Policy & Architecture Symposium,February 2002 . SEAD: Suppression of Enemy AirDefense; HDBT: Hard and Deeply Buried Targets;Recce: Reconnaissance.

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The Military Space Plane

Another military space program withsignificant offensive capabilities that has receivednew impetus under the Bush administration isthe Military Space Plane. The Space Plane is thegeneric label for reuseable vehicles that can belaunched into space, perform missions rangingfrom orbiting satellites to delivering weapons,and than return to earth, landing in a mannersimilar to the current Space Shuttle. The SpacePlane is a major element in the NationalAerospace Initiative, a new Department ofDefense-led effort to coordinate a variety ofgovernment research and development activities.These include hypersonic flight (above five timesthe speed of sound), reuseable launch vehiclesand other means of improving access to space,and a variety of other advanced spacetechnologies.29 The initiative built on a numberof other studies, including a recent jointNASA–Air Force120 Day study of reuseablelaunch vehicle requirements that resulted in anagreement between NASA the Air Force, and theNational Reconnaissance Office to cooperate inNASA’s Space Launch Initiative.30

NASA initially planned to spend almost $5billion dollars through FY2006 on its SpaceLaunch Initiative, intended to produce sufficientprogress in relevant areas to select technologiesand proceed with development of a newreuseable launch vehicle (RLV).31 The NASA-USAF 120 Day Study begun in late 2001examined how the Space Launch Initiative couldserve the desires both of NASA for a mannedfollow-on to the Space Shuttle, and of themilitary for a Space Plane. The 120 Day Study,along with the National Aerospace Initiative andsubsequent research in the Space LaunchInitiative, was intended to work towards a“credible, comprehensive plan to develop RLVs”that would “consider initial prototype flight as

early as 2007.”32 In the fall of 2002 the BushAdministration announced plans to reallocatesome Space Launch Initiative funds fromresearch aimed at a “third generation”reuseable launch vehicle that could replace thespace shuttle to a smaller, less ambitious“orbital space plane,” that could be launchedinto space by expendable rocket boosters.33

The orbital space plane is billed as analternative means to deliver crew and cargo tothe International Space Station. It also may becompatible with the military’s space planedevelopment path, which emphasizes near-term development of cheaper and more reliablespace access and which appears to require lesslift capacity than a full-scale shuttlereplacement.

“Coercive Space Power:” from“Counterspace” to Global “PreemptiveStrikes”

Materials prepared by Air Force andNASA officials for industry briefings reveal thetypes of missions envisioned by Military SpacePlane (MSP) advocates. The Space Planewould conduct “offensive and defensivecounterspace operations” employing radiofrequency, microwave and jamming systems;deploy a variety of systems for surveillance,communications, and reconnaissance, andwould provide “Decisive PrecisionFirepower.”Offensive missions would include“Covert and Non-nuclear strike,” and “HaltPhase” operations against a mobile adversarybefore other U.S. forces could be deployed.34

Space Plane combat operations “may includepreemptive strikes” against “hard and deeplyburied targets,” “National level leadershipcontrol nodes,” “WMD and missile launch andstorage sites,” air defense systems, and avariety of other targets.35 The briefingmaterials noted that the MSP is intended to be

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NASA- USAF Reusable Space Launch Development 120 Day Study Industry Day Briefing, Payloads and SensorsTeam, January 15-18, 2002, Slide 16

a “real coercive space power system,” andstressed that there should be a strong “Focus onMilitary Utility—There is NO Business Case forMSP.” (Emphasis original). The briefers urgedtheir audience to “Think Like a Warfighter (DeadTargets are the Product).”36

The primary means of delivering munitionsfrom the Military Space Plane would be theCommon Aero Vehicle (CAV). Together, theyare seen as providing a powerful new weaponssystem able to strike anywhere on earth with avariety of high tech weapons As explained in a“White Paper” prepared by MSP advocates inconnection with the NASA-Air Force 120 daystudy,

Once a target is identified, the spaceplanecan respond from the U.S. and strikeworldwide targets in under an hour. Themunitions employed are generally thesame as those used on conventionalaircraft, only they are released from asmall, low cost, precision guided missilecalled a Common Aero Vehicle (CAV).The CAV enables interchangeable use ofvirtually the entire arsenal of nextgeneration air munitions currently indevelopment at the Air Force’s AirArmaments Center. It protects themunitions during hypersonic reentry anddispenses them with the same accuracy

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and effect as if being dropped from aircraft.These munitions are designed to selectivelystrike surface targets, mobile vehicles, deeplyburied bunkers, aircraft in flight, andpotentially even bio-terrorism targetsrequiring Agent Defeat munitions designedto destroy biological weapons.37

The “White Paper” also stresses that the CAVmakes it easier to deploy force unilaterally:

A key advantage of CAVs is that theyreenter controlled airspace only over thetarget country, and the U.S. need not seekover flight permission from any othercountries. Currently there are few potentialdefenses against munitions delivered byCAVs. Thus, they can be used to strike hardand deeply buried land targets, naval basesand surface combatants, airbases, andmilitary and civil infrastructure.... Militaryspace planes armed with CAVs provideglobal power projection without the massivelogistics tail required when employingconventional airpower overseas—a criticalcapability for a transformed force.38

The initial MSP concept calls for it to belaunched from and to land at air bases in thecontinental United States. When deliveringweapons, the Space Plane likely could fly a sub-orbital trajectory, releasing its payload and thenlanding at another U.S. base.39 “The operationalgoal of the SSTO MSP [single stage to orbitmilitary space plane] is to take off on demandfrom CONUS, and deliver a CAV to any locationin the world within an hour.”40 But the SpacePlane also could be placed in orbit in a crisis.“Orbiting the earth, a CAV-armed militaryspaceplane would be ready to precisely strikefixed or mobile WMD and other high valuetargets within moments of combat

identification.”41 It also could place space-based weapons or sensors in orbit.42

There are several different technologiesunder consideration for the MSP. The SingleStage to Orbit approach explored by NASAduring the 1990's apparently has beensupplanted for the near term by two stage toorbit concepts, which require less of atechnology leap from existing booster andspace shuttle technology.43 Also beingconsidered are various air-breathinghypersonic technologies, either for initialacceleration of a space plane in the atmosphereor to power long-range hypersonic aircraft thatwill operate on the upper fringe of theatmosphere. These would be able toaccomplish some or all of the space plane’smissions, particularly long range offensivestrike.44 Top Defense Department research anddevelopment officials envision a “steppingstone” approach that will produce someuseable hardware in the near term, such as ahypersonic missile and a hypersonic “cruiser”for global attack, while building the technologybase for reliable, cheaper access to space in thelong-run.45

The Space Plane, the CAV, and the BushAdministration Military Vision

Despite the technological difficulty andexpense of the Space Plane, its multiplemissions and the opportunities it provides todevelop other militarily useful technologies arelikely to sustain the concept for some time tocome, particularly in a time when there is littleCongressional opposition to military spendingof any kind. An Air Force Scientific AdvisoryBoard “red team” assigned to examineDefense Department hypersonic technologyproposals noted that “neither the threat noreconomic business cases, with or withoutshared use, justifies a hypersonic system,” and

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Force Applications capabilities evolve to timely, flexible and precise Global Engagement

“Presently, our only option for prompt, global strike is nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). AFSPC’’sfuture conventional Force Applications options include: Continental United States (CONUS)-based conventionallyarmed ballistic missiles, on-orbit systems able to attack terrestrial targets and reusable space operations vehicleswith global range. The latter has the triple advantage of ballistic missile-like response times, bomber-like flexibilityfor in-flight recall and/or retargeting, and CONUS basing. Attaining the Vision end state produces a low risk, lowcollateral damage force application capability that nearly instantaneously imposes our will on an adversary. We willbe able to control the tempo of operations, accelerating and decelerating attacks against all targets at the Joint ForceCommander’’s (JFC) choosing, while reducing the exposure of our troops and materiel to danger. Near-real-timeintelligence data, combined with a global response time of minutes, could change the nature of conventional militarydeterrence.” Air Force Space Command, Strategic Master Plan for FY02 and Beyond, February 9, 2000, section2.2.4, http://www.spacecom.af.mil/hqafspc/library/AFSPCPAOffice/2000smp.html

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that the decision to proceed with such programsis “vision-related.” The Scientific AdvisoryBoard concluded that a comprehensivehypersonics plan would be needed if “the AirForce vision of ‘controlling and exploiting thefull aerospace continuum’ is to becomereality....”46

But with the advent of the BushAdministration, it appears that just such a visionis ascendant. The goal of “full spectrumdominance”47 that has become the mantra ofmilitary doctrine documents over the past decadeis being pursued via the development of a widerange of weapons technologies, with a growingemphasis on space systems and the ability tostrike targets anywhere on earth quickly from theContinental U.S. or from space. The BushAdministration’s 2001 Quadrennial DefenseReview announced a policy of “forwarddeterrence,” and emphasized that “[c]apabilitiesand forces located in the continental UnitedStates and in space are a critical element of thisnew global posture.”48 Portions of the “DefensePlanning Guidance” recently leaked to the LosAngeles Times also called for development ofmilitary space systems, directed energyweapons, hypersonic missiles, and capabilitiesthat will allow “unwarned” offensive strikes.49

The Administration appears to have boughtthe Air Force Space Command “vision,” as setforth in the Air Force Space CommandStrategic Master Plan for FY02 and Beyond:

The ability to halt an enemy’s operationswithin hours, minutes, or even seconds, restswith providing a prompt, global,conventional strike capability. The far-termaddition of an SOV [space operationsvehicle], combined with CAV, will providewarfighting forces with improved and moreflexible conventional strike capabilities.

Moreover, space-based directed energyweapons systems, such as the SBL [spacebased laser], will offer US and Allied forcesrevolutionary air superiority and globalattack advantages in speed, range andresponse time over all terrestrial systems.The SBL capability for rapid global strikeagainst space and airborne targets will givethe US a formidable military advantage.The combination of SBL, along with SOVassets delivering the CAV, provides acomplete range of prompt, global,conventional strike options to the future.50

Both the CAV and the MSP are consistentwith the Bush Administration’s main “militarytransformation” goals. They would allow theU.S. to attack quickly anywhere on earth,without risking pilots or requiring exposed,politically problematic forward bases. Themultiple roles envisioned for the Space Planeincrease the likelihood that some version willbe developed and deployed. If it achieves itsobjective of substantially cheaper and morereliable space launch with rapid turnaroundtimes, the Space Plane would remove hurdlesto deploying larger and more complex systemsin space, such as space-based components ofmissile defenses (no longer limited by the now-defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) and newnetworks of surveillance and communicationssatellites. It also would open the door to thewholesale weaponization of space.

New Weapons, New Dangers

Although neither the CAV or the MilitarySpace Plane would be “space-based weapons”in the sense of weapons permanently deployedin orbit, the addition of new classes ofstrategic weapons, especially highly accurateand powerful non-nuclear weapons with globalrange, adds yet another complication to a

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looming 21st century arms race. While thesesystems are feasible extensions of relatively well-understood space and rocket technologies, theystill will require enormous technologicalresources and will be very expensive. They alsowill derive much of their effectiveness fromworking in combination with a global grid ofsurveillance and communications satellites,which will allow these new systems to be rapidlydeployed and accurately targeted. Few otherstates, if any, are likely to be able to develop acomparable global precision strike capability inthe foreseeable future. And even if developedand deployed initially for conventional missions,the CAV, alone or along with the Space Plane,apparently would give the U.S. the capability todeploy more maneuverable, accurate, andversatile nuclear re-entry vehicles if it chose todo so.

Particularly if combined with increasinglycapable missile defenses, a global precisionconventional strike capability may create anexacerbated “use it or lose it” predicament forU.S. adversaries, who may perceive aconventional first strike by the U.S. as far morelikely in a crisis than a nuclear strike.51 CAV’sdelivered by missiles or spaceplanes wouldaugment the already formidable array of long-range, accurate, powerful conventional weaponsa U.S. adversary would face in a crisis; includingan increasing variety of long-range, fast, stealthymissiles. This perception is strengthened by anovert U.S. doctrine of seeking to destroy anadversary’s weapons of mass destruction pre-emptively:

The United States has long maintained theoption of preemptive actions to counter asufficient threat to our national security. Thegreater the threat, the greater is the risk ofinaction— and the more compelling the casefor taking anticipatory action to defend

ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as tothe time and place of the enemy’s attack.To forestall or prevent such hostile acts byour adversaries, the United States will, ifnecessary, act preemptively. NationalSecurity Strategy of the United States ofAmerica, September 2002.52

Nuclear Weapons in the Age of GlobalConventional Strike

The U.S. still plans to retain a strategicnuclear arsenal far larger than is needed toannihilate any country. These nuclearweapons systems also are being constantlymodernized, even in the absence of completely“new” warhead designs, and could benefit aswell from the improvements in guidancesystems and maneuverable re-entry vehicletechnology that would result, for example,from efforts to develop conventionalintercontinental ballistic missiles. This wouldresult in a more “useable” strategic arsenalconsisting of both long-range conventionalmissiles capable of taking out a wide range of“softer” targets previously assigned to nuclearwarheads, and nuclear weapons capable ofdestroying hard targets like missile silos withreduced yield due to increased accuracy.

In a 2000 paper titled “Nuclear Weapons inthe 21st Century,” Stephen Younger, then LosAlamos Laboratory Associate Director forNuclear weapons, explored several options fora “mixed force of long-range conventional andlower-yield nuclear weapons with improvedaccuracy,” noting that if numbers of warheadsare significantly reduced, “specialconsideration might be given to maneuveringreentry vehicles that can deal effectively withenemy defenses.”53 Younger also suggestedthat lower yield nuclear options should beexplored because

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...[T]he current stockpile may not be credibleagainst some set of potential adversaries. Forexample, if a national emergency were todevelop that involved the imminent use ofweapons of mass destruction againstAmerican interests, would an adversaryconsider our threat of a multiwarhead attackby the Peacekeeper ICBM or a TridentSLBM as overkill and hence not a realisticthreat? Such a reliance on high-yield strategicweapons could lead to “self-deterrence,” alimitation on strategic options, andconsequently a lessening of the stabilizingeffect of nuclear weapons.54

The Bush administration elevated Younger tobe Director of the Defense Threat ReductionAgency, a key nuclear weapons and strategicpolicy position. And similar views now prevailin the government, with the new Nuclear PostureReview calling for “New Triad” that placesgreater emphasis on long-range precisionconventional weapons in the strategic arsenal,and for renewed research on special purpose andlower yield nuclear weapons. The governmentmaintains that the addition of conventionalstrategic strike capabilities to a large nucleararsenal will reduce, not increase, the danger ofnuclear catastrophe. As explained byUndersecretary of Defense for Policy in Senatetestimony earlier this year,

Within the New Triad, nuclear forces will beintegrated with, rather than treated inisolation from, other military capabilities.This creates opportunities for substitutingnon-nuclear strike capabilities for nuclearforces and defensive systems for offensivemeans. This does will [sic] not blur the linebetween nuclear and non-nuclear weapons,but it will reduce the pressures to resort tonuclear weapons by giving U.S. Presidentsnon-nuclear options to ensure U.S. security.55

But the “New Triad” envisioned by themilitary planners includes far more thannuclear forces and precision conventionalweapons. It also includes new spacesurveillance and command and controlsystems, missile defenses, and weaponsdesigned to degrade or destroy an adversarieselectronic equipment.56 We are driftingtowards a new arms race with more types ofweapons that can strike halfway across theplanet in hours or minutes, more dependenceon electronic systems that operate at speedsbeyond human comprehension and thatthemselves will be the targets of new forms ofdeception and attack, and more useablenuclear weapons. The likely result will bemore nations building armaments rather thanthe infrastructure and institutions necessary fortrue human security.

The Perils of Empire

We didn’t seek to have a major empire. Wedidn’t seek to be the most powerful country onthe planet. It sort of happened to us. StephenYounger, then Associate Director for NuclearWeapons, Los Alamos National Laboratory,1999.57

As a global power, the United States hasimportant geopolitical interests around theworld.DoD's new planning construct calls formaintaining regionally tailored forcesforward stationed and deployed in Europe,Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, andthe Middle East/Southwest Asia to assureallies and friends, counter coercion, anddeter aggression against the United States,its forces, allies, and friends. U.S. Departmentof Defense, Quadrennial Defense ReviewReport, 2001.58

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The push towards technologies that canstrike quickly and hard anywhere on earth fromspace or from bases in the U.S. has increased asthe military has grown more concerned about thevulnerability of forward bases and extended linesof transport and communication to missiles andweapons of mass destruction. In its 2001 reportProliferation: Threat and Response, theDefense Department stated that

...[T]he United States must be prepared tofight and win under conditions where anadversary may use asymmetric meansagainst us —unconventional approaches thatavoid or undermine our strengths whileexploiting our vulnerabilities. Because of ourconventional military dominance, adversariesare likely to use asymmetric means, such asWMD, information operations, or terrorism.Such asymmetric attacks could be used todisrupt the critical logistics pipeline —fromits origins in the United States, along sea andair routes, at in-transit refueling and stagingbases, to its termination at airfields, seaports,and supply depots in theater —as well as ourforces deployed in the field.59

Unable to compete directly with the massive,globe girdling U.S. high-tech military machine,potential adversaries instead are likely toconcentrate on its weak points. In this regard, itis important to consider the type of “deterrence”states that see themselves as possible targets ofU.S. military action are likely to seek. U.S.global capabilities extend far beyond what isneeded to defend U.S. territory. They protectU.S. economic and political advantagethroughout the world– they are, in essence, theforces of empire. U.S. military strategists planobsessively for “asymmetric” warfare, butconcentrate on technical solutions to problemswhich at their core are political. At the heart ofthe imperial relationship lies an “asymmetry”

that historically has doomed every imperialmilitary enterprise. An imperial power is, bydefinition, a foreign power. When it goes towar with societies it seeks to dominate, it mustat minimum demoralize or destroy thedominant indigenous political structure, andmust somehow control the population as well.Those who oppose imperial powers cansucceed by achieving far less ambitious goals:they only have to inflict enough damage tomake a particular military interventionpolitically unsustainable.

There is the additional “asymmetry” thatno matter how successful the empire is atportraying those who resist as barbarians inneed of a strong civilizing hand, militarymethods that kill large numbers of civiliansinevitably undermine the legitimacy of imperialmilitary action. In military jargon, this isrepresented as a “sensitivity” to civiliancasualties on the part of the U.S. public. Thissensitivity is characterized in various,contradictory terms: as an inherent virtue of“democracies,” as a temporary “post-Vietnam” weakness of national will that mustbe overcome. But in the final analysis, it is theconsequence of an American empire that neverhas been fully justified by those who rule totheir own people, who may find it difficult tounderstand how they are being “protected” bysending their sons and daughters to kill poorpeople on the other side of the world.

The development of U.S. military strategyand technology over the last decade derives inlarge part from two developments: the end ofthe Cold War and the spread of the technicalwherewithal for weapons of mass destructionand missiles to deliver them. Some states thatsaw themselves as potential adversaries of theU.S. have been seeking WMD of one kind oranother for many years, as a deterrent againstthe superior military forces of the U.S. and its

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regional allies or to counterbalance regionalpowers. The collapse of the Soviet Union bothremoved formal or informal securityarrangements relied on by some states, andcontributed to the rapid ascendance of the U.S.as an unchecked global military power. Somestates now find themselves in a position wherethey must “deter” military action by the UnitedStates and its allies by themselves.

With U.S. conventional capabilities far out ofreach, missiles with sufficient range to target therear areas of forward deployed U.S. forces andnon-nuclear weapons of mass destruction areseen as a relatively cheap equalizer. Chemicaland biological weapons may be militaryinstruments too crude to allow a clear cut victoryover a superpower military (or even over anadversary of comparable power, as the Iran-Iraqwar demonstrated). But they can vastlycomplicate the task of maintaining a largemilitary intervention from afar. They make itdifficult to obtain forward bases by threateningU.S. allies who might provide them, raise the riskof substantial casualties to U.S. forcesthemselves, and slow the pace of U.S. militaryoperations if troops have to operate incumbersome protective gear.

In response, the U.S. has sought the meansto detect and destroy WMD and supportingfacilities; and defenses designed to protectforward deployed troops, their bases, and hostcountries against short and medium rangemissiles. And the military has sought to limit itsforward base vulnerabilities by designing “airexpeditionary forces” that reduce the logisticalsupport infrastructure needed to support aircampaigns, and by relying more heavily onmissiles delivered by ships and long-rangeaircraft. At the same time, the U.S. is seeking todevelop nuclear weapons with new, more“discriminate” capabilities.60 The political and

moral “asymmetries” afflicting an imperialpower in its foreign wars make retaliation withlarge Cold War style nuclear weapons forWMD use (or pre-emptive attacks before theycan be used) less “credible,” so options likeaccurate, low-yield earth penetrating nuclearweapons are being explored.61 The next stepsare systems like the Space Plane and theCommon Aero Vehicle, that can strike quicklywith powerful, accurate conventional weaponson the other side of the globe without anyforward bases at all. All of these strategies andweapons, of course, are premised on theassumption that the U.S. has the need and theright to deploy overwhelming military forceanywhere, even inside other countries.62

The likely result of these efforts, however,will be to help create the “worst case” worldthat Pentagon contingency planners conjuredup to keep their weapons acquisition budgetlines alive when their Cold War rationaleprecipitously collapsed. The increasedcapability these systems could give the U.S. todestroy mobile targets like missile launchersand hard targets like missile silos withconventional weapons in an hour or two,anywhere on earth, may make future efforts toprevent further missile proliferation and toreduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons andother weapons of mass destruction futile.

The Military Space Plane, together with thesub-orbital and orbital weapons it could carry,also could renew interest in systems designedto destroy objects in orbit– either space planesor satellites. The Space Plane itself is seen bythe military as a key component in plans for“space superiority,” including the deploymentof directed energy weapons and satellites thatcould be used for anti-satellite warfare.63 Withthe U.S. possessing an overwhelmingadvantage in all forms of conventional

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weaponry, in space-based systems for theircoordination and targeting, and perhapseventually in missile defenses, other countriesmay seek to target the “weak links” in high-techspace dependent systems, such as satellites inpredictable orbits. And the more successful theeffort to reduce the vulnerability of the “frontend” of U.S. global expeditionary forces, themore potential adversaries will look for ways toattack the immensely complex U.S. high-techinfrastructure that produces the weapons andcoordinates the wars, making the entire planet apotential battlefield.64 The dilemmas of“deterrence--” an increasingly misleading labelfor efforts to dominate any imaginable militaryconfrontation anywhere on earth-- not only willremain, they will have grown even morecomplex and unstable. This endless sequence ofcountermoves may serve to justify almost anyimaginable high-tech military, surveillance, and“security” program, but it does nothing to makeordinary people anywhere more secure.

Caught in the Crossfire: Democracy, CivilianCasualties, and the Temptations of High-TechWeapons

Weapons designed to “deter” large-scalewarfare among advanced industrialized societiesalso frequently end up getting used in “small”wars with horrific results. The B-52 and otherplanes designed for nuclear war with Russiarained bombs for years on Vietnam (their Sovietequivalents later did the same to Afghanistan).Cruise missiles, B-1 and B-2 bombers, andglobal satellite-aided targeting systems whosedevelopment began for Cold War strategicwarfare have been used repeatedly forintervention throughout the last decade. Anti-aircraft weapons that fire thousands of roundsper minute, developed for use against modernstrike aircraft, today are being used to take downdwellings that the Israeli Army suspect housed

snipers. The continuing militaryconfrontations among the most heavily armedstates in this way intensify warfare, and itsterrible direct and indirect effects on civilians,across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Already, the still-undesigned Space Planeis being touted by its advocates as a solutionfor the intractable difficulties of targeting“terrorists,” purportedly providing quickresponse times that will allow a devastatingassault from above before adversaries can slipaway.65 But as we have seen from thepharmaceutical factory in Sudan to theChinese Embassy in Belgrade to one “wrong”village after another in Afghanistan, althoughU.S. forces today can hit targets moreaccurately, they often don’t hit the righttargets. Target selection is only as good asavailable intelligence about what is beingtargeted. Weapons that will be fired from orthrough space are likely to be used in situationswhere there is little or no information fromground observers. Target selection will dependon images from space or high-flying aircraft,combined with other types of indirectinformation.66 Governments and othersophisticated armed organizations will be wellaware of U.S. tactics, and will conceal ordisperse military assets of sufficient value to beworth hitting with expensive space systems.U.S. decision-makers will have at theircommand yet another means to applyenormous “precision” firepower without riskto American troops. And as is always the case,the poor of some distant land will be caught inthe middle, “unwarned” until their small partof the world comes to an end...

In addition to those who will be killed dueto “targeting errors,” many more will die as“collateral damage” in wars that never wouldhave been fought, but for the temptations that

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such overwhelming military power brings.Weapons systems having global reach make iteasier for a small faction at the top of theExecutive Branch of the U.S. government to goto war quickly, without the need to build a broadpolitical consensus. The permanent militarymobilization of the past half century already hasmade it far easier for the executive branch to goto war against all but the most powerful states–there is no need to retool factories or greatlyincrease the number of people in uniform. Thedevelopment of technologically superior aircraftand long-range missiles have made it possible toinflict frightful damage with greatly reduced riskto U.S. combatants. But to sustain a largemilitary operation at a great distance, the U.S.still must mobilize a large and expensive systemof logistical support, and face the risk that if awar went badly those bases and lines ofcommunication could be vulnerable. Asubstantial capacity to strike with conventionalweapons from or through space would removesome of these impediments, and with them theset of decisions that must be made, the concretemanifestations before the fact of war’s gravityand cost, and the time to reflect and discuss thatstill are unavoidable on the road to war. Whetherused for “covert” strikes that the public (andeven Congress) only finds out about later, or towreak spectacular, nearly instantaneousvengeance, the availability of conventionalweapons deliverable world wide in hours orminutes may remove the last vestiges ofdemocracy from decisions of war and peace.

The ability to wage war without broad publicsupport, however, is viewed by influentialmilitary thinkers as a positive thing, to bepursued by the development of technologyappropriate to the task. A recent RAND studyfor the Air Force stated that

Most U.S. military operations for theforeseeable future will be undertaken withlimited or less-than-majority Americanpublic support. Technological advancesthat expand the USAF’s effectiveness willhelp it play an important role overcomingpossible domestic constraints on the use offorce such as casualty sensitivity.67

Among the “examples of technologicaladvances that might provide the USAF withcapabilities that will help overcome or alleviateU.S. domestic constraints” identified by theRAND study were “[h]ighly effectiveunmanned weapons, such as cheap standoffmunitions and space-based assets, that pose norisk of U.S. casualties.”68

Although the Common Aero Vehicle(CAV) and the Space Plane have powerfulbackers, they still are programs that are early inthe development process, and that can bestopped. If they proceed much further,however, deployment in some form willbecome more difficult to prevent. The CAV,based as it is on current missile and reentryvehicle technologies, will benefit from otherongoing efforts to modernize the strategicmissile force. Improvements in reentry vehicletechnologies and guidance systems inparticular will make the CAV less of a leap astime goes on. The Military Space Plane, incontrast, is a relatively high-risk program. Butso long as military programs that will benefitsignificantly from less expensive and morereliable space launch continue, there will bepressure to build the Space Plane or somethingmuch like it. Missile defenses and relatedspace-based surveillance satellites, along withother multi-billion dollar upgrades in space-based military sensing and communicationsystems, will both provide demand for cheaperand more frequent space launches, and will

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drive the development of a wide range of basicspace technologies– light structures, radiation-hardened electronics, rocket propulsion, and in-space power generation. And increaseddependence on all of these systems will heightendemand for yet another layer of space-basedhardware to protect them.69 All of this also willprovide technology development andinfrastructure that will make deployment ofweapons platforms in space easier. We are onthe verge of a new, powerful segment of themilitary-industrial complex, on the order of thenuclear weapons complex that dominated thearms racing dynamic of the Cold War.

Despite the unpromising political climatewithin the United States, it is imperative thatthose who favor peace address themselvesseriously first to the control and eventually tothe prohibition of weapons operating throughand from space. Further, these efforts are morelikely to be successful if they are part of abroader movement that addresses the causes ofinternational conflict rather than just theinstruments of warfare, and that challenges thelegitimacy of an enormous, permanent militarywhose mission is global dominance.

The Road Ahead: Arms Control and SocialChange

Two forms of arms limitation that have meritare a “Prevention of an Arms Race in OuterSpace” Treaty and a treaty aimed at abolishinglong-range ballistic missiles in the long term, andwhile in the short term stopping their furtherdevelopment. A number of countries, includingRussia and China, recently have put forwardproposals for a treaty that would ban theplacement of weapons in space and the use offorce against objects in space.70 Such a treatywould prohibit a number of the weaponssystems currently being contemplated by the

United States, including space-based ballisticmissile defense platforms like the space basedlaser (which also could be used for otheroffensive purposes) and various proposed anti-satellite technologies, both ground and space-based. It would not, however, ban new typesof long-range missiles or missile payloads, likethe Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) or othertypes of maneuvering re-entry vehicles. It alsowould not prohibit a Military Space Plane, nor,perhaps-- unless its definition of placingweapons “in space” were made explicitlyrestrictive-- the temporary deployment ofweapons-carrying Space Planes in orbit duringa crisis.

There have been a number of proposals fora second type of treaty that would addresssome of these issues by controlling andeventually eliminating long-range ballisticmissiles. Many of these proposals haveincluded as a starting point an immediate banon the flight testing of ballistic missiles, ameasure that would halt development ofparticularly destabilizing systems like the CAVand other types of maneuvering reentryvehicles. Ideally, a missile flight test ban and aframework for reductions in long-rangemissiles should include a prohibition on missiledefense tests. An effective ban on offensivemissile testing would do much to eliminate thethreat that missile defenses supposedly willdefend against, while continuing developmentof missile defenses could make substantialreductions in existing long-range missilesdifficult to achieve.71

Working for far-reaching disarmamentmeasures like these, despite their dismal short-term prospects, is worthwhile because theymake sense, and if implemented could have alasting effect. They hold more promise forprogress towards disarmament than the typical

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arms control treaties of the last half-century,which served primarily to maintain status quorelationships among the most powerful states,and their advantage over everyone else, whilemarginally reducing the chances that they woulddestroy each other, and the rest of the worldalong with them. Treaties that prohibit thetesting of high-tech weapons are of particularvalue, because they are an immediatedisincentive to investment in further weaponsdevelopment.72

Treaties that aim to prohibit entire classes ofmilitary systems and arenas of confrontationhold out some hope of first slowing the growthand then beginning to disassemble the vastmilitary-industrial complex, particularly in theU.S., but also elsewhere, and hence eroding itsimmense political and economic power. Anynarrower forms of arms control are likely to fallvictim, sooner or later, to pressure for moremilitary technology, more sales, and morepolitical power. This has, in essence, been thefate of the entire edifice of Cold War armscontrol, and of the ABM treaty in particular,which were brought down not by chance but asa result of a large-scale, sustained campaign byU.S. arms makers, their allies in the military, andtheir political representatives.73

To be effective, furthermore, the control oflong-range missiles and space weapons must beclearly understood from the outset as part ofbroader efforts including first the withdrawal ofmilitary forces to home territories, and eventuallythe elimination of all forces with global reach.Otherwise, even broad initiatives like a long-range missile ban only would expand theadvantage in other power projection forcespossessed by the U.S., allowing it to overpowerexisting “asymmetric” threats even as themilitary and the arms makers gather strength foranother round of treaty busting.74 These facts,

evident to most people outside the UnitedStates, are likely to doom such initiativesbefore they can begin. Without a substantialpullback by the U.S. from its aggressive,forward-based global military stance, armscontrol progress of any kind is unlikely.

Current mainstream discussion ofproposals for control of weapons in spacereveals how much political conditions must bechanged before significant progress is likely tobe possible. Some of the more thoughtful andconcrete proposals for control of spaceweaponization, for example, accept some sortof U.S. ballistic missile defenses as a faitaccompli .75 The potential for incrementalincreases in force projection through spacerepresented by programs like the Space Plane,research in air-breathing hypersonictechnologies that could lead to aerospacevehicles with global reach operating on themargin of space, and conventional ICBM’s islargely absent from discussion of space armscontrol proposals. Such technologies arerelevant to the problem of controlling spaceweaponization not only because theythemselves increase capabilities to projectforce through or from space, but because theirdevelopment provides technology base,infrastructure, and a heavily funded politicalbase in both the military and the arms industryfor the eventual development and deploymentof orbital weapons systems.

The main task of arms controlprofessionals is to formulate measures thathave some realistic chance of adoption bystates in the foreseeable future. But, in order tobuild the social movements that will benecessary to bring about real peace, real justice, and a livable future,ordinary people must look elsewhere foranalysis, for inspiration, for an idea of what

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1. Immediately before his appointment as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld chaired the congressionally mandated Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, which enthusiasticallyendorsed the expansion of U.S. military capabilities in space. See generally Report of the Commission to AssessUnited States National Security Space Management and Organization, Pursuant to Public Law 106-65, January11, 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html

2. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Senate Armed Services Hearingon the Nuclear Posture Review February 14, 2002, p.10.

3. National Security Space Architect, National Security Space Roadmap (1999), “Conventional Ballistic Missile(CBM) with Maneuverable Non-Nuclear Reentry Vehicle (MNNRV),” available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/roadmap/irm/internet/forceapp/init/html/cbmmnn.htm (obtained by Western StatesLegal Foundation via the Freedom of Information Act).

4. One proposed version of the MNNRV was described as follows:

“The modified non-nuclear RV has limited controllability through the use of moving mass control for center ofgravity control (gross) and jet reaction for fine control. Impact velocities could be as high as 9,000 fps (however thevehicle would likely be slowed to 4,000 to 6,000 fps), and the control system allows a nearly vertical impact angle.Accuracy would be achieved with a Global Positioning System (GPS) integrated inertial measuring unit (IMU) alongwith the jet reaction control system which can maneuver the vehicle around the center of gravity to allow the vehicleto fly at any commanded angle of attack or yaw. GPS updates are acquired exoatmospherically and are reacquired onlate reentry after GPS blackout has occurred. The GPS signal is acquired by several antennas likely located on the aftend of the vehicle to reduce the effects of plasma and heating. GPS-aided guidance could provide an accuracy of lessthan 10 meters CEP (circular error probable).” U.S. Air Force, 1997 Space Force Application Mission AreaDevelopment Plan, p.32 (obtained in part by Western States Legal Foundation via the Freedom of Information Act).

5. National Security Space Architect, National Security Space Roadmap (1999), “Conventional Ballistic Missile(CBM) with Common Aero-Vehicle (CAV)” available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/roadmap/irm/internet/forceapp/init/html/cbmcav.htm (obtained by Western StatesLegal Foundation via the Freedom of Information Act).

6. U.S. Air Force, 1997 Space Force Application Mission Area Development Plan, p.35 (obtained in part byWestern States Legal Foundation via the Freedom of Information Act).

7. Id.

8. See Defense Science Board 1998 Summer Study: Joint Operations Superiority in the 21st Century, Vol. II,“Supporting Reports,” p. 3. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/josup2.pdf That study also concluded that conventionalballistic missiles, including submarine-launched missiles, carrying either kinetic kill rods or explosive penetrators

must be changed and how to change it.76 Theymust ask for what is right, not for what ispossible today. The task of social movements isto change the limits of the possible. This willrequire a real peace movement, one thataddresses the causes of war as well as weaponsand their effects. The necessary socialtransformation can not begin unless its

possibility is acknowledged, and its possibilitycan not be taken seriously unless we canimagine a world no longer ordered primarily bythe threat and exercise of overwhelmingmilitary force.

By Andrew M. Lichterman

Notes

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would be relatively easy to deploy:

The enabling technologies are low risk. The launchers use basic missile technology with standard GPSapproaches for the warheads. The conventional penetrator warhead delivery vehicle uses existing reentry bodydesigns and the technology is well in hand to achieve the impact velocities and location accuracies for hard targetkills. Id.

9. U.S. military planners recognize to some degree the potential for catastrophic confusion conventionalintercontinental ballistic missiles would present. This is not seen as a fundamental flaw in the CONOPS (militaryjargon for “concept of operations”), but rather as just another technological and perhaps political hurdle to beovercome. The National Security Space Roadmap stated that

The Conventional Ballistic Missile (CBM) with Maneuverable Non-Nuclear Reentry Vehicle (MNNRV) supports the Space Force Application mission to conduct global prompt strikes through and from space against terrestrial targets. The MNNRV system would likely be based on the Eastern or Western ranges (ER and WR) to insure treaty compliance with the nuclear ICBMs, and to limit collateral damage from falling boosters. Inaddition, these systems could be open to inspectors from various countries to provide validity to US claims thatthey are not nuclear. Additional measures such as introducing an inert material in the propellant which will helpdistinguish its signature from other missiles could be incorporated. National Security Space Architect, NationalSecurity Space Roadmap (1999), available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/roadmap/irm/internet/forceapp/init/html/cbmmnn.htm (obtained by Western StatesLegal Foundation via the Freedom of Information Act).

10. Air Force Space Command Strategic Master Plan for FY02 and Beyond, February 9, 2000, section 6.2.2,http://www.spacecom.af.mil/hqafspc/library/AFSPCPAOffice/2000smp.html

The Air Force SAB Hypersonics Report described the Common Aero Vehicle program as follows:

Boeing and Lockheed Martin have been participating in Air Force–sponsored studies of advanced maneuveringreentry vehicles, often referred to as CAVs.... These vehicles with high lift-to-drag ratios have no primarypropulsion, but have movable surfaces to provide high cross-range capability. They are designed to carryconventional weapons (small bombs, submunitions, or penetrators) and can be deployed from conventionalICBMs or a hypersonic cruise vehicle operating at high altitude. United States Air Force Scientific AdvisoryBoard, Report on Why and Whither Hypersonics Research in the US Air Force, December 2000, p.35http://www.sab.hq.af.mil/archives/reports/2000/Hypersonics-Report.PDF (Hereafter Air Force SAB HypersonicsReport).

11. National Security Space Architect, National Security Space Roadmap (1999), “Common Aero-Vehicle (CAV)for Military Spaceplane (MSP),” available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/roadmap/irm/internet/forceapp/init/html/cavmsp.htm (obtained by Western States LegalFoundation via the Freedom of Information Act).

12. Report on Why and Whither Hypersonics Research in the US Air Force, December 2000, p.35http://www.sab.hq.af.mil/archives/reports/2000/Hypersonics-Report.PDF pp. 50-51.

13. “Basic CAV designs are relatively mature technology and have been flight tested successfully in several BallisticMissile Organization/Advanced Strategic Missile Systems (BMO/ASMS) programs.” U.S. Air Force, 1997 SpaceForce Application Mission Area Development Plan, p.49.

14. “To enable the United States to project power through space to any region in hours, accelerate research anddevelopment to develop the Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV) as a sortie platform and the Common Aerospace Vehicle(CAV) as its primary payload.” Transformation Study Report, Executive Summary, Transforming MilitaryOperational Capabilities, Prepared for the Secretary of Defense April 27, 2001 p.27.

Western States Legal Foundation Information Bulletin 21

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/d20010621transexec.pdf

15. RDT& E Budget Item Justification Sheet (R- 2 Exhibit), Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-wide, Technical Studies, Support & Analysis PE 0605104D8Z, February 2002 p.19.http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2003/OSD/0605104D8Z.pdf

16. The recent joint NASA–Air Force “One Team” 120 day study on reuseable launch vehicles listed as a missionrequirement for the military version the capability to deliver “150 CAVs in 2-3 Days.” NASA- USAF ReusableSpace Launch Development 120 Day Study Industry Day Briefing, January 17, 2002, Requirements and OperationsTeam Briefing Slides, Slide 7, “requirements Matrix: General Mission.” Downloaded fromhttp://www.losangeles.af.mil/smc/xr/public/req_team_industry_day.ppt, now available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/msp/req_team_industry_day.ppt

17. “Schriever Legacy Carries on in XR,” The XR Report, A Quarterly Newsletter of the Developmental PlanningDirectorate, SMC, Vol. 3 no.2, Jan-Mar 2001.

18. Space Force Application Mission Area Development Plan, p. 32. A gravity bomb earth penetrator version ofthe B61 nuclear bomb, the B61-11, was developed and deployed without underground nuclear testing by modifyingan existing B61 design in the mid-1990's. See “The Birth of a New Bomb: Shades of Dr. Strangelove! Will WeLearn to Love the B61-11?,” Greg Mello, The Washington Post, June 1, 1997, p. C-1. (“Mello”) See also “Newbomb, no Mission” by Greg Mello in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997.

19. Space Force Application Mission Area Development Plan, p. 32..

20. U.S. Air Force, 1997 Space Force Application Mission Area Development Plan, p.38

21. Id. at pp. 39-40

22. The Space Force Application Mission Area Development Plan directly acknowledged these politicaldifficulties. The nuclear CAV concept was rejected after the document was complete but before it was issued,resulting in a statement on its cover that

References to using the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) to deliver nuclear weapons should be disregarded.AFSPC is no longer considering using the CAV to deliver nuclear weapons. Where CAV is mentioned fornuclear weapons, the term Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) should be used. (Refer to the 1996 development plan.) These changes reflect current political realities and were brought to light after printing.

23. See Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb, “Bush Developing Military Policy Of Striking First:New Doctrine Addresses Terrorism,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2002; Page A1.

24. Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 34-35, provided in “Nuclear Posture Review Excerpts,” Globalsecurity.org, athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm For a more detailed analysis of the Nuclear PostureReview and current U.S. nuclear weapons policies and their relationship to other high-tech weapons programs, seeAndrew Lichterman and Jacqueline Cabasso, The Shape of Things to Come: The Nuclear Posture Review, MissileDefense, and the Dangers of a New Arms Race, WSLF Special Report, April 2002,http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/shape.pdf For additional information from a variety of sources about the NuclearPosture Review, see the WSLF NPR information page at http://www.wslfweb.org/nukes/npr.htm

25. Nuclear Posture Review, p. 41, provided in “Nuclear Posture Review Excerpts,” Globalsecurity.org, athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm

26. Space Force Application Mission Area Development Plan at 45.

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27. Id. at 39.

28. “For destruction of more deeply buried facilities, DoD and DoE are studying the sensitivities and synergies ofnuclear weapons yield, penetration, accuracy, and tactics.” Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and DeeplyBuried Targets, Submitted by the Secretary of Defense in Conjunction with the Secretary of Energy in response toSection 1044 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for the Year 2001, PL 106-398, July 2001,p.21. The unclassified content of the report can be found athttp://www.nukewatch.org/nwd/HiRes_Report_to_Congress_on_the_Defeat.pdf

See also Looking for New Ways to Use Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Counterproliferation Programs, Weapons EffectsResearch, and “Mini-Nuke” Development, WSLF Information Bulletin, Winter 2000, available at http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/mininuke.pdf

29. See Statement of The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, U.S. Departmentof Defense, Before the Commission on the Future of the US Aerospace Industry, May 14, 2002http://www.aerospacecommission.gov/051402testimony/sega.shtml

30. “ ‘National Aerospace Initiative” Pushes Dual-Use Technology,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 20,2002, p.32

31. See generally National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Introduction to NASA’s Integrated SpaceTransportation Plan And Space Launch Initiative, May 17, 2001http://www.spacetransportation.com/SLIfinal1.PDF

32. NASA- USAF Reusable Space Launch Development 120 Day Study Industry Day Briefing, January 17, 2002,Slide 2, downloaded from http://www.losangeles.af.mil/smc/xr/public/one.011_industry_day.ppt, now available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/msp/one.011_industry_day.ppt

33. See Estimate #26, “Budget Amendment: Department of Justice and the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration--11/13/02,”http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14nov20020950/www.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2003/pdf/26budamend.pdf

34. Id. slide 9.

35. NASA- USAF Reusable Space Launch Development 120 Day Study Industry Day Briefing, Payloads and SensorsTeam, January 15-18, 2002, slide 21. Downloaded from http://www.losangeles.af.mil/smc/xr/public/p_and_s_industry_day.ppt, now available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/msp/p_and_s_industry_day.ppt

36. NASA- USAF Reusable Space Launch Development 120 Day Study Industry Day Briefing, Payloads and SensorsTeam, January 15-18, 2002, downloaded fromhttp://www.losangeles.af.mil/smc/xr/public/p_and_s_industry_day.ppt, now available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/msp/p_and_s_industry_day.ppt

37. “The Military Space Plane: Providing Transformational and Responsive Global Precision Striking Power: AWhite Paper on the Operational Utility of a Military Spaceplane in the Emerging 21st Century International SecurityEnvironment,” (draft), Proposed by members of ONE TEAM in Conjunction With the 120 Day Reusable LaunchVehicle Study, January 2002, p.12 (hereafter Space Plane White Paper). Downloaded fromhttp://www.losangeles.af.mil/smc/xr/public/military_spaceplace_utility.doc, now available at http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/msp/military_spaceplace_utility.doc This paper was part of the “read ahead material”for the 120 day study.

38. Id.

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39. U.S. Air Force, 1997 Space Force Application Mission Area Development Plan, p.60 et seq.

40. Id. p. 61

41. Space Plane White Paper, p. 13.

42. “The SSTO MSP could conduct multiple missions including surveillance and reconnaissance, space control, andspace force applications. For the SFA [space force application] role, the SSTO MSP could be used to place spacebased weapons on orbit, or actually deliver the weapons against a target. The procedure for each mission is tailored tothe specific objective, and the payload contents are selected accordingly. Different weapons can be loaded toaccomplish different missions.” U.S. Air Force, 1997 Space Force Application Mission Area Development Plan,p.62.

43. See Bill Sweetman, .“Space Giants Step Up Efforts to Win Low-Cost Launch Race.”Jane ’sInternational Defense Review 33 (March 2000), pp.30-35.

44. See generally Air Force SAB Hypersonics Report.

45. See Dr. Ron Sega, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Slide Presentation, “Interoperability,Technology, and Transformation,” National Defense Industrial Association 2002 DoD Interoperability Conference,Mar 26, 2002, slide 13 http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002interop/sega.pdf.

The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board also noted that the pursuit of reliable space launch via a broad hypersonictechnology research program could result in a variety of other weapons-useable technologies:

Several potentially attractive outgrowths will be available during the course of the recommended program. Thesesystem concepts do not in themselves justify the entire investment required for an airbreathing hypersonicprogram, but given that the investment for space launch has been made, their development may be reasonable.Three such concepts have been identified:

1. A long-range hypersonic missile that has shown merit in global wargames2. An RLV-derived global bomber that provides both long range and fast response3. A series of technologies drawing on the plasma associated with hypersonic flight to provide high-powerdirected-energy systems, better aerodynamic performance, and/or survivability enhancements. Air Force SABHypersonics Report, p. vii

46. Id., at p.viii.

47. See generally, for example, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020,http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/jvpub2.htm U.S. Space Command, Long Range Plan: Implementing USSPACECOMVision for 2020 (1998), Chapter 2 http://www.spacecom.mil/LRP/TOC.htm

48. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p.26.

49. See John Hendren, “High-Tech Strategy Guides Pentagon Plan,” Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2002, and WilliamArkin, “The Best Defense,” Los Angeles Times, July 14, 2002.

50. .Air Force Space Command, Strategic Master Plan for FY02 and Beyond, February 9, 2000, section 6.2.3,http://www.spacecom.af.mil/hqafspc/library/AFSPCPAOffice/2000smp.html

51. For Russia, with its large and well-protected nuclear arsenal, this is not an immediate concern, but it nonethelessalready has begun to attract attention. Eugene Miasnakov of Center for Arms Control, Energy and EnvironmentalStudies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology has done a preliminary analysis of the strategic potential of U.S.

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precision-guided conventional weapons; a slide presentation of this work, “Counterforce Potential Of ConventionalPrecision Guided Weapons,” can be found athttp://www.armscontrol.ru/start/publications/pgm/Chicago-web_files/frame.htm For adversaries will less extensiveand sophisticated WMD arsenals, however, the “use it or use it” dilemma in a regional crisis is likely to be moreacute.

52. At p.15 (pdf version).

53. Stephen M. Younger, Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Los Alamos National Laboratory, June 2000,LAUR-00-2850, p.12, p.14.

54. Id., p.13

55. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Senate Armed ServicesHearing on the Nuclear Posture Review February 14, 2002, p.5

56. For critical commentary on the Nuclear Posture Review, see sources cited above at note 17.

57. Stephen Younger, Video transcript, Los Alamos National Laboratory “Security Immersion Workshop,” June 21,1999. Video obtained by the Los Alamos Study Study Group, Santa Fe, NM, www.lasg.org

58. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p.20.

59. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (January2001) p.77

60. A 1999 Department of Defense planning document identified as a priority the ability “to provide national leaderswith improved options by increasing the responsiveness of strategic forces and developing more discriminate options,as done most recently with the introduction of the B61–11 earth-penetrating weapons.” U.S. Department of Defense,Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology), Defense Technology Area Plan, (2000), p.XI-7,obtained by Western States Legal Foundation under the Freedom of Information Act. Full document available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/dstp2000/dtappdf/contents.pdf

61. For an overview of U.S. research on more useable nuclear weapons, see Looking for New Ways to Use NuclearWeapons: U.S. Counterproliferation Programs, Weapons Effects Research, and “Mini-Nuke” Development,WSLF Information Bulletin, Winter 2000, available at http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/mininuke.pdf

62. An extreme version of this kind of thinking can be found in a recent speech by the Chief of Naval Operations,who claims that “homeland security” justifies forward deployed forces that can attack deep inside other countries. What this really means, of course, is that we have to be able to protect our invasion forces operating in other people’s“homelands:”

To make sure this is put in the right context, think back a few years when the words that we used were almosttotally defensive when defining ourselves. I want us to think much grander than that. I don't want this to bethought of in terms of defending just ourselves.

What Sea Shield does is extend homeland security to the fullest extent with forward deployed forces, buyingtime and buying space for the detection and tracking of threats headed toward our country....

As we look to the future, Sea Shield's littoral control capabilities will build upon a rich mix of manned andunmanned systems on, over, and below the sea. This combination of platforms, sensors, and weapons willassure access and provide the foundation of battlespace dominance.

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Perhaps the most radical change embedded in Sea Shield will be the ability to project defensive firepowerdeep over land. New technologies will allow sea based missiles to engage enemy air targets far over the horizon,before they can threaten joint and coalition forces operating ashore. Admiral Vern Clark , Remarks as delivered“SEA POWER 21: Operational Concepts for a New Era,” Current Strategy Forum , Naval War College, Newport, RI June 12, 2002 https://ucso2.hq.navy.mil/n6/webdoc01.nsf/(vwLookup)/9F890504AEC4B4B885256BE500745139?OpenDocument&Return=/n6/webdoc01.nsf/(vwWebPage)/N6.htm?OpenDocument&Expand=6#cat6

63. See generally NASA- USAF Reusable Space Launch Development 120 Day Study Industry Day Briefing, January17, 2002, downloaded from http://www.losangeles.af.mil/smc/xr/public/one.011_industry_day.ppt, now available athttp://www.wslfweb.org/docs/msp/one.011_industry_day.ppt

64. Already, this possibility is becoming a focus of military concern, spawning a new area of doctrine– “criticalinfrastructure protection”– and another potential profit center for military contractors. For a sampling of militaryofficials framing the new threats and the contractors repackaging their wares to meet them, see the presentations fromthe National Defense Industrial Association June 2002 Security Division Symposium & Exhibition collected athttp://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002security/index.html.

65. “The marriage of today’s precision weapons, new deep earth penetrators, and the responsive global reach ofspaceplanes ensure our ability to kill future terrorists if we know where they are. With such responsiveness, evenfleeting intelligence can be acted on with a good chance of success. As the military spaceplane shrinks the U.S.decision-to-action loop, the terrorist is forced onto the defensive and must move to simply survive. Essentially,terrorism is deterred with terrifying responsiveness—this is the effect of coercive spacepower.” Space Plane WhitePaper, p. 13

66. Regarding civilian deaths from aerial bombing in the Afghanistan campaign, see Dexter Filkins, “Flaws in U.S.Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead,” The New York Times (Web edition), July 21, 2002, and Carl Conetta,“Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties,” Project on DefenseAlternatives, Briefing Report #11, January 18, 2002 http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html. Connetta, in acareful analysis of media reports of civilian deaths, suggests that the combination of rapidly planned strikes and lackof reliable, on-the-ground intelligence-- the type of circumstances in which “global strike” weapons like the SpacePlane and the Common Aero Vehicle are likely-- to be used may have contributed to a high rate of civilian casualties.

67. D. L. Byman, M. C. Waxman, E. V. Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, Rand Corporation, 1999,p.132.

68. Id.

69. “An increased dependence upon space capabilities may lead to increased vulnerabilities. As space systems becomelucrative military targets, there will be a critical need to control the space medium to ensure US dominance on futurebattlefields. Robust capabilities to ensure space superiority must be developed--just as they have been for land, sea,and air.” United States Space Command, Vision for 2020, p. 7 http://www.spacecom.mil/visbook.pdf

70. See “Working Paper Presented by the Delegations of China, the Russian Federation, Vietnam, Indonesia,Belarus, Zimbabwe and Syria: Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of theDeployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects,” 27 June 2002,available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/cd/speeches02/chiruswp_062702cd.html For additional resourceson this topic see Reaching Critical Will Web Resources on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) atthe United Nations, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/paros/parosindex.html

71. For an overview of ballistic missile control proposals and an argument for their revival, see A. Lichterman,Z.Mian, M.V. Ramana, and J. Scheffran, Beyond Missile Defense, International Network of Engineers and ScientistsAgainst Proliferation and Western States Legal Foundation Joint Working Paper, January, 2002,

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http://wslfweb/org/docs/missilecontrol.pdf

72. For more on this point, see Marek Thee, “Military Technology: a Driving Force Behind the Arms Race,” in HansGunter Brauch, ed., Military Technology, Armament Dynamics and Disarmament: ABC Weapons, Military Use ofNuclear Energy and of Outer Space and Implications for International Law, (St. Martin’s Press, New York: 1989),pp.39-64, at 56 et seq.

73. The military is by no means a passive actor in U.S. foreign policy. An internal Navy newsletter noted that

We are continually defending one of the foundations of our seapower, freedom of the seas, against legal andoperational constraints and restrictions on U.S. naval forces. In so doing, the U.S. Navy has become an activepresence on the world's backstage, molding and influencing the policies, agreements and treaties that support theships, submarines and aircraft that are forward, on center stage. In another recent example, our office was infrequent contact with Joint Staff representatives at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ReviewConference at the UN in New York in May. Our action officers ultimately had a direct impact on shapinglanguage for a final "way ahead" document that protected U.S. policy and yet was acceptable by all nationsattending this highly publicized multilateral arms control forum. SPI [Strategy, Policy, and Intelligence] Newsand Notes Issue No. 5, August 2000, a publication of U.S. Navy Plans, Policy and Operations (N3/N5))

For information on the intimate relationships among defense contractors, legislators, and executive branch officials,and anti-arms control think tanks and lobbying groups, see Michelle Ciarrocca and William D. Hartung, Axis OfInfluence: Behind the Bush Administration's Missile Defense Revival, op cit., and William D. Hartung, withJonathan Reingold, About Face: The Role of the Arms Lobby In the Bush Administration's Radical Reversal of TwoDecades of U.S. Nuclear Policy, World Policy Institute, May 2002,http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/reportaboutface.html

74. Military Space weapons advocates already are thinking about the dangers posed to their agenda by possible spacetreaties. The Rumsfeld-led Space Commission argued that we must protect a status quo in which “[t]here is noblanket prohibition in international law on placing or using weapons in space, applying force from space to earth orconducting military operations in and through space,” warning that “[t]he U.S. must be cautious of agreementsintended for one purpose that, when added to a larger web of treaties or regulations, may have the unintendedconsequences of restricting future activities in space.” Report of the Commission to Assess United States NationalSecurity Space Management and Organization, Pursuant to Public Law 106-65, January 11, 2001,p.17.

75. See, for example, Philip E. Coyle and John B. Rhinelander, “Drawing the Line: The Path to ControllingWeapons in Space,” and Disarmament Diplomacy, No.66 (September 2002), pp.3-7; and James Clay Moltz,“Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control,” Arms Control Today, Vol.32 no.3 (April 2002), pp.3-9.

76. For the author’s views on the kind of social movement organizing needed for progress on disarmament, seeAndrew M. Lichterman, “ Some Thoughts about the Path to Abolition of Nuclear Weapons and Strategies for Organizing in the United States,” Western States Legal Foundation Working Paper No.1, 1999,http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/wp1.pdf and “Up from the Concrete: Making Connections and Building Coalitions fora U.S. Movement to Abolish Nuclear Weapons,” Western States Legal Foundation Working Paper No.2, 2000,http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/wp2.pdf

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