west africa - community trend report - april 2013

COMMUNITY TREND REPORT APRIL 2013hansonwade.com

IDENTIFYING THE CRITICAL INHIBITORS TO CURBING PIRACY AND MARITIME CRIME IN WEST AFRICA AND GENERATING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES FROM INDUSTRY MASTERMIND GROUPS HELD IN ACCRA, LAGOS AND LONDON.

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INTRODUCTION

COMMUNITY TREND REPORT APRIL 2013

HOW THIS REPORT WAS CREATEDOver the course of three months across three global locations in early 2013, hand-picked groups of maritime security thought leaders were selected to take part in Mastermind roundtable sessions. These interactive forums were designed to establish some common ground in identifying the key challenges, solutions and predictions for the African maritime security industry.

Over three days in Accra, Lagos and London, the views of almost 80 organizations were pooled, combined and are included in this

report, which is designed to be circulated widely and which – it is hoped – may play a role in moving the industry forward in the

finding of a collective solution to the West African maritime security challenge.

ABOUT THE AFRICAN MARITIME SECURITY NETWORKThe African Maritime Security Network is a global, senior group of key industry and government security stakeholders committed to finding collaborative solutions to the challenge of combating maritime crime in both East and West Africa.

The network meets formally four times each year:

In January (at Oil & Gas Infrastructure Security West Africa in Lagos), in June (at Oil & Gas Infrastructure Security East Africa in Kenya), in July (at West African

Maritime Security in Lagos) and in October (at Combating Piracy Week in London).

In between, through a combination of Mastermind groups and other knowledge sharing opportunities, the network exists to encourage

communication, cooperation and collaboration to tackle maritime crime.

To find out how you can be a part of the network, contact [email protected]

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INTRODUCTION


ABOUT HANSON WADE Hanson Wade operates the African Maritime Security Network on behalf of the African security industry. The company has established its pedigree in developing industry-leading forums for the exchange of best practice in tackling piracy and maritime crime through years of working closely with the industry.

The meetings which have played such a central role in the development of the African Maritime Security Network

have been described as “the de-facto reference point on the maritime security calendar” and “the best piracy event

I’ve attended” by industry and government attendees alike.

CONTENTS Introduction ..................................................................................... 2

Executive Summary ......................................................................... 4

Identifying Challenges .................................................................... 9

Addressing Impacts ....................................................................... 20

Finding Solutions .......................................................................... 23

Predictions ..................................................................................... 32

Recommendations ........................................................................ 39

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY• No permanent solution can be

found to the maritime security challenge without a genuine commitment from regional governments to tackle the problem. There are some examples of this being done successfully, but there is much still to do.

• Government should not view industry’s proactive approach towards security as the solution to the problem; this should be seen merely as bridging the gap until a more sustainable political solution is found.

• The recent discussions on changes to the use of armed guards in West African waters requires companies to not rely on this as the panacea – armed guards are a temporary solution and need to be viewed as such. All other efforts to address this problem need to continue in line with this.

• The lines of communication between government and industry must remain open and industry lobbying of government to develop a dedicated response capability should continue. Findings like these and minutes from relevant forums should be widely circulated among all stakeholders.

• International support – be it financial, assets or people – from all sectors should be given to the efforts to create, train, and develop the capability of a military response force to tackle piracy and maritime crime across the region.

• Communication is key, and efforts should be channelled into creating a central source for information gathering and sharing (e.g.OCIMF). Once created, efforts must be made to counter under-reporting and ensure all companies use this resource to maximise it’s effectiveness.

• Clarity to be provided by OCIMF and other relevant organisations as to how the information gathered will be effectively disseminated for the benefit of operating companies, and what immediate response might be possible once information is reported.

• Increased collaboration and information sharing between individual companies is vital to prevent a dilution of effective response capability – company policy should give more freedom for individuals to discuss security matters both internally and with wider industry.

• Increased visibility and information sharing about how individual companies conduct thorough risk assessments is needed and best practice should be shared openly to encourage collaborative experience sharing.

• Collaboration, communication and coordination are key, and the industry should seek to advance their ability to do all three by supporting forums which allow the dissemination of “lessons learned” such as the Hanson Wade meetings region-wide throughout the year.

• The entire industry should support these forums and efforts at collaborative experience sharing, rather than just the more proactive operators and governments across the region, which means companies who traditionally have not been open being prepared to cooperate more.

• A number of companies are undertaking an internal review of whether intelligence gathering and analysis can be done in-house or whether this should be outsourced to external solution providers to ensure they remain one step ahead of the threat. ÒÒ

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INTRODUCTION


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CONTINUED

• Whilst everyone agrees that it is important, some still feel there is work to do in vetting employees and carrying out due diligence to reduce the risk of information passing to criminals, militants and pirates from within.

• The Security function and Social Performance functions must work closer together and a greater internal collaboration must be achieved to apply soft solutions onshore as well as hard solutions at sea to the maritime security challenge.

• Effective engagement, training of the local population to take security jobs and therefore be less likely to engage in illegal activity is needed – success has been seen through incentivising local communities in order to encourage their support of your operations.

• Minutes and recommendations from such forums as the West African Maritime Security forum should be widely disseminated to both industry and government. Individual companies should pressure government to respond to recommendations made at such forums.

• Security personnel should report back to BIMCO (or any other relevant body) any company experiences that will influence the recommendations made in the ‘Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region’.

• Guidance is needed on the effective use of a citadel in West African waters, and security personnel should explore the range of the latest technologies available to provide additional support and a thorough cost-benefit analysis should be carried out.

• Company funding should support regular crew training and training of those who carry out crew training. Crew training should focus on how to react at capture, during captivity, on release and post release.

• Increasing attention should be given to emerging threats, such as cyber attacks. Companies should review their internal processes and assess any vulnerabilities, putting mitigation measures in place where necessary.

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INTRODUCTION


The nature of the threat faced in West Africa has been distinct from the more publicised security threats posed when operating in East Africa.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

MILITANT ACTIVITY

ORGANISEDCRIME

SOMALI PIRACY MODEL

What is the threat?

Gulf of Guinea Gulf of AdenVs

Mixed reports exist and have been circulated regarding the exact nature and extent of the maritime threat in the Gulf of Guinea.

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INTRODUCTION


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Comparison of Trends of Maritime and Riverine Criminal Activity Nigeria 2011 & 2012

Lagos Attack Trend Jan to Dec 2012

This graph shows a clearly negative trend line that indicates a declining level of risk in the Lagos anchorage and ports.

Note the approximately quarterly spike in attacks in the Lagos area.

If the trend pattern continues it is likely that the and no more than 1-2 vessels will be targeted.

Copyright© Stephen Phelps, Security & Intelligence Solutions Ltd.


2011

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Linear (2011)

Linear (2012)

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INTRODUCTION


Gulf of Guinea Reported Incidents Trend Jan 2011 to Dec 2012

West Africa Incident Reporting Rates 2012

Additional Vessel Attacks - (Source: S&I Solutions Ltd Regional Network)

Vessel Attacks - IMB, IMO, ONI Figures

• Numerous statements by maritime bodies and MarSec companies that GoG is developing hotspot

• Trend suggests otherwise

Possible Reasons

• Improving MarSec?• Criminals now focussed

on bunkering?• Incomplete data?• Deliberate underreporting?• Inefficiant reporting?• MarSec industry marketing?



Monthly Totals

Linear (Monthly Totals)

Figures fro Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Cameroon

Note: These figures cover all reported and identified attacks on vessels in West African waters in the geographical area Togo to Cameroon between 01 January and 30 June 2012. The majority of additional attacks reported to S&I Solutions Limited occurred in Nigerian, Cameroonian and Beninese waters.

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IDENTIFYING CHALLENGESThe immediate challenges facing companies involved in the offshore industries in the Gulf of Guinea are wide ranging in scale and nature. It is clear that the vast majority, if not all, of the threats faced offshore stem from onshore issues. Indeed, piracy and acts of maritime criminal activity are the symptom, not the cause, of this malignant threat. What is also clear is that the causes of these threats are often inextricably linked with the solutions.

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SECTION 1 IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES


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GOVERNMENT Government engagement is fundamental to the long-term resolution of the piracy challenges in West Africa. Government needs to be able to provide the capability to respond to the threat. Assessing current government capabilities across West African countries, it is clear that the ability to coordinate a meaningful response to the threat is not where it needs to be at the present time.

A profusion of questions still remain regarding where individuals can feed or draw information and contacts to respond in the appropriate manner. The lack of a designated response capability that can support coordinated action is a clear area requiring improvement.

Lack of political will and the erosion of discipline which can arise from this can lead, if unchecked, to corruption and collusion. Mutual suspicion among states clearly exists. Where corruption thrives, issues of lack of funding ÒÒ

THE LACK OF A DESIGNATED RESPONSE CAPABILITY THAT CAN SUPPORT COORDINATED ACTION IS A CLEAR AREA REQUIRING IMPROVEMENT.

4 key areas identified as immediate action relating to government are:

Government bodies need to be more transparent as to who to contact and when, and what response can be expected, in what timeframe to any threats which are reported

Industry lobbying of government to develop a dedicated response capability needs to continue with support offered if needed to build government response capability

Individuals with a responsibility for security should ensure they know who within the government they need to reach out for swift action in the event of an incident

If reliable support cannot be assured in the meantime, companies should ensure that they are able to effectively respond to a threat without having to rely on external agencies

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and lack of maintenance of maritime infrastructure exist.

THE INABILITY TO PUBLICALLY TALK ABOUT CORRUPTION ADDS ANOTHER LAYER TO THE CHALLENGE OF TACKLING IT.

Additionally, frustrations exist as a result of the lack of regional coordination of security at a government level. Legal bottlenecks arise out of the fact that each region has its own pocket of legislation, which are

not properly coordinated. A coordinated response would give rise to a disciplined, structured and effective regional approach to the fight against piracy.

“I’ve been here six months and I still don’t know who to talk to”

The lack of confidence in government’s ability to act to effectively prevent piracy and maritime crime means that corporations are taking responsibility for managing the threat themselves. The overriding thought is that if government assistance is needed urgently, it might not be available so plans

need to be made to ensure security is managed in-house.

For those who are able to engage with the government, communication is key. Worryingly the comment of “I’ve been here six months and I still don’t know who to talk to” seems commonplace. This lack of clear communication channels signifies a concerning lack of formal procedures and protocols that would allow industry and government to work more effectively together. Only when this has been achieved will a strategic, thorough and effective solution to maritime crime be achieved.

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INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SHARINGClarity and understanding of the threat is critical. Specific details are needed as to what the real nature of the threat is and how serious it is likely to be.

The tendency currently is for individual companies or bodies to collect information – sometimes for their own use, or sometimes to disseminate – rather than having a central source. This silo structure makes it almost impossible to develop an understanding of the “bigger picture”.

Feeding into this is the problem of underreporting. It is difficult to gain clarity on the exact nature of the evolving problem posed by West African pirates and criminals given the ad-hoc nature of incident reporting.

Companies fail to report every incident or attack for a number of reasons, including crewing issues, impact on reputation, insurance issues (rise of insurance premiums) and the fact that a report raises a ‘scene of a crime’ consideration which means a ship cannot move. The Nigerian Federal government has concerns about Lloyds imposing a war tariff around Nigeria, which would severely affect their attractiveness as a trading destination, thus ÒÒ

4 key recommendations for action to increase intelligence gathering and sharing:

Channel efforts into creating a central source for information gathering and sharing (such as OCIMF). Once this has been created, efforts must be made to counter under-reporting and ensure all companies use this resource to maximise its effectiveness

Undertake an internal review of whether intelligence gathering and analysis can be done in-house or whether this should be outsourced

Careful vetting of employees and due diligence must be carried out on all employees to reduce the risk of information passing to criminals, militants and pirates

Collaboration, communication and coordination are key, and the industry should seek to advance their ability to do all three by supporting forums which allow intelligent dissemination

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there is little pressure from government to report incidents.

Threat intelligence is important as there needs to be a way for IOCs and offshore operators to share more intelligence. The inherent problem of perceived ‘competitive advantage’ needs to be eroded and companies should have a responsibility to participate in full and open intelligence sharing. The current lack of information sharing results in a failure of companies to learn from mistakes made by other organisations.

There exists a relative immaturity in the market; companies need to know how to get better intelligence, how to develop contacts and cultivate an intelligence network which will allow them to predict an incident before it occurs.

COMPANIES SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND ANALYSIS CAN BE DONE IN-HOUSE OR WHETHER THIS CRITICAL SECURITY TASK SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY EXTERNAL SOLUTION PROVIDERS.

When intelligence is gathered and recommendations/guidelines are produced as a result of this, there is a lack of visibility and widespread dissemination of this information due to the lack of a central information source. An example is the ‘Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region’, guidelines

produced by the Round Table of international shipping associations (BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO). Although launched in December 2012, the guidelines are yet to be widely disseminated and many individuals are not yet aware of their existence.

Just as information can be used to the advantage of security representatives from industry, so too can it be used counter-productively by pirates, militants and criminals who make use of insider informants. It has been found that many gangs have very good information on where and when transits are going. The counter intelligence challenge of supressing the information gangs are receiving is a significant one. Companies should be open about how they implement vetting procedures and conduct due diligence on employees.

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COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATIONThe matter of lacking international and regional coordination and cooperation is a key inhibitor to responding effectively to a threat. This is at both a government and industry level. Effective communication and government engagement are clearly linked. The apparent tendency of government departments and individual companies in trying to address their own problems and agendas essentially leads to a dilution of effective response capability. ÒÒ

4 key recommendations for action to increase cooperation and coordination:

Increased collaboration and information sharing between individual companies is vital to prevent a dilution of effective response capability

Company policy should give more freedom for individuals to discuss security matters both internally and with wider industry

The industry should come together at forums such as the West African Maritime Security conference to actively participate in information sharing on a regular and scheduled basis

The entire industry should support these forums and efforts at collaborative experience sharing, rather than just the more proactive operators and governments across the region, which means companies who traditionally have not been open being prepared to cooperate more

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Evidently more communication and collaboration is required between companies and governments, and between other stakeholders to enhance the effectiveness of any response.

Internal factors also play a part. Many individuals in charge of security feel restrained by their company’s regulations that prohibit them from discussing security incidents and matters even with their colleagues.

THERE SHOULD BE AN ONUS ON COMPANIES TO ENCOURAGE BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFORMATION SHARING IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY LEARN FROM INCIDENTS.

Further to this, industry and government would benefit from a forum designed to anonymously share information regarding incidents that occurred and to encourage learning. It was suggested in the discussion that the West African Maritime Security conference be that forum.

In the event of an incident occurring, there is an urgent need to have a central body that can be called and an effective response team that can be launched to provide immediate assistance. Reliance on individual navies does not always provide the quick response needed in the event of an incident.

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COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENTIncredibly important to tackling piracy at the roots is effective coordination and implementation of Corporate Social Responsible (CSR) activities and programmes. Local content and community relations are very difficult to establish, manage and push forward, but are absolutely vital to have any business success. The big question is how does a maritime company deal with community engagement onshore where they may not necessarily have any operations.

Given the security threats presented by local community unrest and agitation, it is of vital importance to effectively engage with local communities and build a relationship of trust. One problem is companies telling the communities what they want to do for them, rather than asking them what they want. There seems to be an entrenched feeling that whatever the oil companies do, they cannot do enough in the eyes of the community.

Often communities believe that these companies are going to exploit them and leave. There is a lack of understanding of the potential to benefit commercially from this activity, for example through being employed as a security guard. If communities can be educated on the long-term benefit for them, then they are more ÒÒ

4 key recommendations for action to increase community engagement:

The Security function and Social Performance functions must work closer together and a greater internal collaboration must be achieved

Educate the community on the commercial benefits open to them with operating companies moving into the region

Effective training of the local population to take security jobs and therefore be less likely to engage in illegal activity

Companies should look to replicate the success which has been seen through incentivising local communities in order to encourage their support of your safe operations

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likely to respond positively to increased and on-going activity. There is a lack of experienced or skilled workers within the region which leads to a reliance on ex-patriot workers, which again increases the frustrations of local communities.

Traditionally, CSR programmes have not always been closely enough linked to the security agenda, being viewed in the majority as a PR function.

As a result security and Social Performance initiatives often occur independently of each other and therefore are not successful in achieving the aim of the programme to establish a long-term relationship with host communities and thereby reduce the root cause of the issue.

CURRENTLY, MANY CSR PROGRAMMES FALL DOWN DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE SECURITY AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE FUNCTIONS TO WORK TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY.

Lack of understanding and cooperation between these two departments often leads to the failure to achieve the overall goal of the CSR programme of engendering a long-term harmony with local communities and thus prevent disruption to operations.

USE OF PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITYThere is concern and confusion about how and when companies can employ and utilise the services of private security companies. The question surrounding the use of arms still exists, particularly when moving between international and territorial waters.

Widespread confusion exists regarding where national naval responsibilities end and where

PMSCs can pick up. National government engagement is needed in order to gain ÒÒ

3 key recommendations for action when engaging with private maritime security companies:

Clarification from national government is needed on where national naval responsibilities end and where PMSCs can pick up

Thorough vetting of local security groups should be undertaken before engaging services

Clarification is needed from a national government and legal perspective on the Rules for the Use of Force in the Gulf of Guinea

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ADDITIONAL CONCERNSAnti-bribery laws, such as the United States Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom Bribery Act, make payment of bribes illegal. Governments have been active in investigating reported payment of bribes and enforcement trends point to an increase in international government enforcement of these laws.

The terrorist threat and link to this offshore criminal activity is rarely openly discussed. As such, there is a lack of clarity on the exact nature

of the threats faced when operating in West Africa and little indication of how this is likely to evolve.

clarity on this. The Rules for the Use of Force are also not widely understood. The question of liability exists.

In East Africa the rules and regulations relating to the use of armed guards are increasingly clearly stipulated which has led to a modus operandi being developed by individual companies. The situation in West Africa, however, remains unclear which can lead to a fractured response to security

threats and mitigation measures. The use of local security groups are sometimes unreliable and the use of unlicensed commercial companies is illegal, which creates difficulties when looking to employ additional security measures. The question remains, are we going to go down the route of legitimisation in West Africa as has occurred in the East (and has been proven to be an effective deterrent to pirate attacks)?

THERE APPEARS TO BE AN APPREHENSION WITHIN THE INDUSTRY OF NORMALISING THE USE OF ARMED SECURITY AND A FEAR OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT ESCALATION THAT WOULD RESULT FROM THIS.

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WHO’S RESPONSIBLE?Everyone is talking about the oil companies taking responsibility for solving this problem, but the industry needs to apply more pressure on governments to grade assets and move forward.

IOCs are forced to take a lead. The nature of the oil & gas industry by definition means that the companies operating in this space view one another as direct competitors. However, in order to launch an effective and lasting response to piracy, there needs to be a move, certainly within the security functions, from competition to collaboration.

There seems to be an expectation that the IOCs and external companies owe it to the local government to sort out this problem. That’s not the case. Oil & gas companies are not capacity building.

Their actions are currently just filling the gap to mitigate for the lack of government involvement and ability to take decisive action. Lobbying needs to intensify and government participation in this matter needs to drastically increase to find a lasting solution to this scourge.

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ADDRESSING IMPACTSOnce the nature of the threats faced by companies operating offshore in West Africa have been identified, it is then important to understand the question of ‘how are these concerns affecting you at a company level and also at a personal level’?

Understanding the impact of security threats at both the company and individual levels provides the opportunity to take action at both of these levels to counter any potential risks or vulnerabilities that stem from these.

SECTION 2 ADDRESSING IMPACTS

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MANAGING THE CORPORATE RESPONSEThe insurance ceiling means losses are covered, so impetus to change from inside the industry is low. Security costs are often absorbed by insurance companies, who equally have a strong financial motivation for engaging in this market.

There is no uniform operating environment, so it is recognised that IOCs are exposed to different threats. The IOCs themselves have different approaches to certain problems. This lack of a homogenous response means that complex layers of corporate motivations and drivers exist.

PERHAPS THE BIGGEST COMPANY DRIVER IS TO PROTECT ITS REPUTATION AND CORPORATE IMAGE.

Certain organisations are prohibited from operating in certain areas due to reputational damage relating to the use of excessive force incurred in the past.

Regions where high security risks exist lead to high production costs as the company needs to spend more to operate securely. Although insurance premiums absorb much of the cost of additional security, this in itself is a huge outlay. Costs relating to operational delays due to the threat profile in the region also have a significant impact on a company’s bottom line.

The sheer number of stakeholders that have to be dealt with along all points within the supply chain requires multiple points of contact and coordination, which again, leads to increased costs and delays.

Smaller, yet significant, factors that impact on companies including recruitment and retention of workers, and pressures caused by the development of pressure groups which lead to greater pressures on the company to perform undue actions.

There is clearly a disconnect between the local and corporate perception of the threat, which often leads to potential non-allocation or miss-allocation of resources and the risk of the workforce failing to grasp the nature of the security threats they face.

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MANAGING THE INDIVIDUAL IMPACTSetting aside the individual impact of seafarers or offshore staff who are at risk of harm when working offshore in West Africa, although it is clearly a central reason why this threat needs to be tackled urgently, there is also an individual impact from this situation on the security function itself.

Lack of government engagement and support can lead to frustration among workers and undoubtedly affects levels of morale.

IF MORALE IS AFFECTED, STANDARDS CAN SLIP IF PEOPLE ARE NOT VIGILANT.

Where regulations do not exist, people are impacted. People working in that environment may be drawn into illegal activities with a higher potential for corruption. As a result, many workers become frustrated at not being able to achieve their objectives and security goals and therefore decide to leave the region. Ultimately, qualified, experienced workers will leave, which in turn creates a recruitment problem.

This in turn leads to higher expectation of expatriates coming to work in the region, which has a

cost impact. Individuals recruited will not necessarily be recruited because of their ability but on their willingness to come and work.

Friction between expats and locals can arise from unequal working conditions. An expat is likely to be employed with a background of expectations which have been signed off from HQ and that will not be compromised (including insurance, security, compensation, etc). This differs from individuals employed from in-country who are less well treated. There is a consensus that local talent development is key.

Fear breeds in perceived high risk environments. The knowledge that your vessel can be attacked leads to fear of lack of personal safety (however, as noted this is often matched with high salaries). Families of those working in a “high risk” region constantly worry about their loved ones.

In most countries, workers are escorted (often by armed security teams) wherever they need to go. This requirement of personal protection compounds the undesirable nature of working in this region and exacerbates the economic disparity between expatriates and locals.

FINDING SOLUTIONSA combination of hard and soft solutions are required to effectively combat the maritime threat facing the offshore industry. Some deterrents and potential solutions have been tried and tested over time with varying degrees of success.

It is evident from looking across some pipeline areas where there is no criminal activity that something must be working. This leads to the questions of ‘what has been tried, what has worked and what areas of improvement have been identified’?

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SECTION 3 FINDING SOLUTIONS


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CSR AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENTThe link between CSR and security needs to rise up the corporate agenda. The two departments are loosely linked, but this cooperation could be improved in many cases. Many companies will admit that their security and CSR functions are not working as closely as they should. In order to effectively engage with local communities to achieve the goal of minimising local activism, these functions should be inextricably linked.

The oil industry’s’ approach to CSR programmes has, in a large number of cases, not worked. This testifies to the fact that if money is being channelled into a community for sustainable development, it is crucial to have the procedures in place to ensure that it has worked.

The implementation of CSR programmes come with a word of warning. What tends to happen is that a company builds a school, for example, and hands it over to government. However, when the project is handed over, often it falls into disrepair as it is not effectively maintained. This raises a question of sustainability. Governments must be committed to maintaining these projects. In cases where this has been carried out successfully, improved ability to operate is clear.

Incentivising local communities can also work effectively. Programmes can be developed to pay the community a small monthly salary with a varied bonus. The

fewer incidents, the bigger the bonus. The problem here, however, is ensuring the money reaches the community & is not embezzled.

Key recommendations for action:

Recognise that onshore community engagement impacts on your offshore operations and therefore should be an area of focus

Take responsibility for ensuring the maintenance of community projects after they have been first built/implemented

Consider incentivising local communities in order to encourage their support of your operations

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IMPROVING COLLABORATIONCASE STUDY: WEST AFRICAN STAKEHOLDERS FORUM (WASEC)

An initiative by one participating organization led to the formation of the West African Stakeholders Forum (WASEC). The aim of this body was to bring government and industry together.

This organisation has a footprint across 4 countries and brings together both government agencies and the energy industry in a regular forum to have energy-related discussions. These discussions relate to all matters, not exclusively security. This forum has been

successful in helping industry to influence government.

Currently this initiative is only being run by one company, but there are plans to bring in other private companies and hopefully make it an industry forum

connected to energy agencies. Areas for improvement include the ability to bring other international players into the discussions.

It was suggested that an annual focal point was needed for the industry to share experiences, and the annual Hanson Wade West African Maritime Security Forum was recommended as that focal point.

This interface has created some leverage in getting responses from government. This has worked to the extent that the bureaucracy involved in this process has been reduced. As a result, the industry is starting to influence government rather than the other way around, as it has to.

Many companies are getting better regional footprints and need this community and connectivity to ensure effective information sharing. Prior to this forum being set up, companies simply were not talking to each other at all.


Minutes and recommendations from such forums as the West African Stakeholders Forum and the West African Maritime Security conference should be widely disseminated to industry

Individual security personnel should participate in appropriate forums and be open to experience sharing

Individual companies should pressure government to respond to recommendations made at such forums

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ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED INFORMATION GATHERING AND SHARINGOil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) has spearheaded an initiative to create a reporting centre. The aim of the initiative is to find a solution to the problem of underreporting and lack of information gathering.

The centre will have a similar function to the UKMTO. In the case of an incident, companies should report into the centre with details of this incident. This information will aid in building a bigger picture

of where assets are likely to be attacked and will therefore provide an indication of the mitigation measures that can be put in place. The centre will not, however, have the capacity to initiate a military

response to an incident. Incident response is, therefore, still an area where international efforts need to be channelled to find an effective and sustainable response.


Security personnel to report all relevant information into the newly-established information reporting centre

Clarity to be provided (by OCIMF and relevant organisations) as to how the information gathered will be effectively disseminated to the benefit of operating companies

International support should be given to efforts to create a military response force

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Increased visibility and information sharing about how individual companies conduct thorough risk assessments is needed and best practice should be shared openly

CONDUCTING A THOROUGH RISK ASSESSMENTWhen conducting operations it is crucial to identify and define the level of operational risk you are subject to; for example ISPS A, B, C, D. The operations of the vessels can then be managed according to the risk profile of their activities; for example C/D work only 12 hours and only during daylight hours.

Many organisations have a minimum requirement for all. For example the contract may stipulate that all fields are to be protected by security vessels and all security is to be managed on the field.

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IMPLEMENTING PROTECTION MEASURESThe Round Table of international shipping associations (BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO) have produced ‘Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region’. These guidelines should be read in conjunction with the ‘Best Management Practice for Protection Against Somali-Based Piracy (BMP4)’. They provide guidelines for recommended protection measures that can be implemented in order to reduce the risk of attack and hijack when operating in the Gulf of Guinea. ÒÒ

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As the nature of the piracy threat in West Africa is constantly evolving, there is a need for high levels of information reporting and sharing in order to ensure these guidelines continue to be relevant and up-to-date.

The use of a citadel is a possible method of providing an additional layer of security.

Often considered the last line of defence in a hijack or attack situation, the use of a citadel can be an effective passive security measure if implemented correctly. Western navies would not board unless they were sure all crew members were in the citadel. This is not such an issue in West Africa as western navies are not dealing with boardings.

The main purpose of the citadel is to buy time so that any response has time to get to you. Careful consideration should be given to whether or not aid is certain to arrive. There have been cases where crews have been able to pilot the vessel from the citadel and through doing so the pirates were not successful. Guidance on how and when to use a citadel effectively is required and should be followed closely to avoid crew fatalities.

A range of technologies can be utilised and implemented to provide additional security. The use of unmanned aerial reconnaissance (usually on fixed

assets) is increasing. However; the cost of utilising unmanned drones can be prohibitive.

A problem resulting from the proactive approach of commercial entities in taking responsibility for buying in solutions is the dilution of government will to address this problem themselves. A clear message is needed from government and a commitment

is needed for what they are planning to do and when. In the meantime, private companies should not be punished for bridging the gap by engaging with private security providers.

4 key recommendations for action to increase community engagement:

Security personnel should report back to BIMCO (or any other relevant body) any company experiences that will influence the recommendations made in the ‘Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region’

Guidance is needed on the effective use of a citadel in West African waters

Security personnel should explore the range of the latest technologies available to provide additional support and a thorough cost-benefit analysis should be carried out

Government should not view industry’s proactive approach towards security as the solution; this should be seen merely as bridging the gap until a solution is found

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EFFECTIVE CREW TRAINING Crew training is key to ensure that offshore crew remain vigilant and that they can follow the best practice under stress. Crew preparation should focus on making sure the crew know how to react and behave if the vessel is boarded. Survival in captivity training is also key and should focus on teaching crew members how to react at capture, during captivity, on release and post release.


Company funding should support regular crew training and training of those who carry out crew training

Crew training should focus on how to react at capture, during captivity, on release and post release

WHAT IS STILL NEEDED? In order for a united response to this threat, steps must be taken to counter the mutual suspicion that exists among all West African states. Action must be taken from the grass root level up to engage and reconcile the differences between organisations, regions and countries.

In reverse to this, a top-down approach is needed in order to tackle the security challenges emanating from entrenched

corruption. Increased lobbying should be directed on governments in forums such as the G8 Summit.

Increased media attention on this topic would bring this issue to the international stage. ÒÒ

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Once this has been achieved, efforts can be made to establish a regional force with a platform and contributing member nations. This would act as a solution to the current weak naval and incident response platform. Organisations such as MOWCA should spearhead this initiative and forums such as the West African Maritime Security conference should be utilised to increase stakeholder interaction to coordinate this.

The steps taken by OCIMF in developing a regional information sharing centre are certainly taking strides towards improved information gathering. More media attention is needed to encourage maximum reporting into one centre. Dissemination of “lessons learned” would undoubtedly aid companies and individual security representatives when directing a security response or applying protection measures. A formal mechanism for identifying applicable lessons learned from the Somali experience would be a valuable asset for companies looking to emulate success and avoid mistakes.

The lack of an assured military response is a continued concern. The provision of resources to support government forces is a major limiting factor. Having dedicated resources that can be called upon is vital to successfully combating the maritime threat. More of an onus should be placed on oil majors to

contribute financially or by donating assets to a coordinated military response initiative. The caveat here is the legal and liability issues that arise from donating assets.

There is a need for proper coordination and a clear understanding of the approach that has to be taken. Improved training of national naval staff would aid in incident response and effective policing of affected waters. Improved political will links clearly into this.

An international Contact Group should be established to focus directly and exclusively on overcoming the operational challenges presented by security threats in West Africa. An indication is that the International Maritime Organisation is in the early stages of coordinating this initiative.


Individuals and companies should carry out increased lobbying of governments to encourage a top-down approach to counter-piracy measures

Efforts should be made to establish a regional force with contributing member nations

More media attention is needed to encourage maximum reporting into the OCIMF-led reporting centre

A source should be established to disseminate “lessons learned” from companies operating in this region

Security personnel should lobby senior management from within oil and gas majors to contribute financially or by donating assets to a coordinated military response initiative

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SECTION 4 LONG TERM PREDICTIONS


LONG TERM PREDICTIONSIt is clear that the potential of oil & gas resources in West Africa will result in an increase in operations. The entrance of more oil & gas players challenging incumbents may lead to an increased threat simply because of increased activity. Equally the evolution of the industry will bring with it evolving security risks. Ghana is already seeing the need to develop hydro-electricity and import LNG, which brings with it a host of energy security challenges.

With the maritime industry expected to play an increasingly dominant role in this growth, so is it expected that the maritime threats will increase accordingly. It is hoped that as this occurs, the long term security problems will be taken into consideration by governments.

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COORDINATION Politically, Africa has traditionally been an unstable region which lacks the political will and positive engagement between the leaders to provide a short, or even medium term, effective solution to this problem.

What happened in Mali signals this. Additionally, the pipeline between Nigeria, Benin, Toga and Ghana has been sabotaged and no one has come forward to claim responsibility.

It is anticipated that the threats will increase if the stability of the region is not looked into and a coordinated political will exists and is sustained.

CONDUCTING A THOROUGH RISK ASSESSMENTIt is possible that with increasing security being applied to the maritime sector, security threats will continue to exists; however, it will be on land that these threats will increase.

This assertion is supported by the fact that there has been a consistent downward trend in the frequency of hijackings, sabotage, etc offshore.

This is in contrast to the inter- land and coastal areas where there has been an increase in the number of incidents.

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POLITICAL The political environment is more difficult to predict. On one hand, it could be asserted that political crises may grow due to political instability within the region. On the other hand, as we start to see more and more political stability it is possible that political instability may be radically reduced. Nigeria has had successful transition elections, which supports this idea.

Many of the key actors in causing this problem have already been pacified, and there are incentives and packages to stop them rising up again. Yet there still remains uncertainty about whether or not these militants have been effectively pacified in the long run.

With political change comes the risk of political instability. As elections take place and as new policies are implemented, the likelihood of spikes in security incidents become even greater. For example, Nigeria is currently struggling to pass the Petroleum Industries Bill. This Bill places an emphasis on promoting Local Content, which the oil & gas industry has said will create difficulties.

Serious political unrest may continue and possibly even spread from Nigeria, and we may likely see further disruptions. In Togo, there has been a political dictator, there is pressure on

him and in 3-5 years the political atmosphere will probably change too. Togo and Benin are similar. Benin is a little more stable, but this may change with elections and a new president taking office. Instability in government will impact on operations.

The threat also remains that companies operating under a national flag may be targeted because of the actions of that government.

THERE IS A REAL NEED TO REVIEW, REASSESS AND RE-STRUCTURE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

The responsibility for this should lie on all of the political class from all of the nations involved in the West African sub-region. A West African Maritime Security plan is needed to cut across all West African countries and solve common

problems. This plan should be in line with the ISPS Code and other codes and standards. Once this has been achieved, it would then be possible to manage risks and threats.

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND POLITICAL WILL Currently the vast array of laws and regulations adopted by different countries internationally, which often conflict with one another, are preventing a unified and coordinated response to the maritime threat.

For example, Britain has brought in legislation which has been passed into a defence policy on how they can go out and carry arms in line with international laws. The Nigerian government, however, is still not taking any position on armed guards, as are many other countries. The issue of armed security is a global issue, not a local one.

As the situation in East Africa testifies, a coordinated international response to piracy plays a significant part in curbing the piracy threat in West African waters.

FORUMS, SUCH AS THE WEST AFRICAN MARITIME SECURITY CONFERENCE, THAT ENCOURAGE INTERACTION AND COLLABORATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND INDUSTRY, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.

More cynical commentators may suggest that all of the aforementioned threats will continue until the lack of political will for lawful change against the fight against crime has been established. Corruption will no doubt persist and if governments at all levels fail to change their attitude and adopt reasonable political measures, piracy will continue to flourish.

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MANAGING THE CHINA INFLUENCE Awareness should be had of the rising Chinese influence and its wide-ranging impact on the way things are done. One should not underestimate the strategic value of Africa as a continent, and the growth of Chinese influence, which is uncontrolled and unethical.

From an industry point of view it is difficult, if not impossible to compete. Strict anti-corruption laws exist; such as the United States Foreign and Corrupt

Practices Act (FCPA) to ensure a certain level of standards and operational practices are maintained. Even so, there might be some spill over if Chinese

companies operating at different standards started to do things which could have a reputational impact on the rest of the oil and gas industry.

WHAT IS NEEDED FROM SOLUTION PROVIDERS?Essentially there is a need for solution providers who have credible, capable employees with the right equipment.

Currently this is not available. Competency, investment, training and flexibility would provide a substantial help to operating companies and organisations attempting to improve the maritime security environment. The question of funding for this remains.

Solution providers are not doing anything to suppress the view that the Gulf of Guinea is the next big problem. It is in their business interests to elevate the threat level.

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WHAT ELSE DO WE NEED TO PREPARE FOR? It is possible that there will be a diversion of investment in West Africa due to the significant finds being made in East Africa. Nigeria, as just one example, is reliant on the thriving oil & gas activity for economic prosperity. A divergence of this attention could be disastrous for individual countries and the population and local communities within these countries that rely on continuing oil & gas operations for their livelihood.

Further region-wide political unrest is likely. There is a lot of mutation that goes on between Ghana and Nigeria. The operating environments are similar. Whatever happens in Nigeria is

likely to be repeated in Ghana. This replication of procedures, rather than learning, is dangerous.

The growth of extremism in the region is likely to continue. Mali is

an example, where both European and African countries have committed forces. Those countries that have provided troops are likely to be targeted. This includes ‘insider threat’, ÒÒ

Key recommendations based on long-term predictions:

There is a need to review, reassess and re-structure political institutions. The responsibility for this should lie with all relevant countries within the West African sub-region

A coordinated international response should be generated; particularly regarding the matter of armed security personnel

Increased interaction and collaboration between industry and government should be encourages at forums, such as the Combating Piracy: West African Maritime Security

Increasing attention should be given to emerging threats, such as cyber attacks. Companies should review their internal processes & assess any vulnerabilities, putting mitigation measures in place where necessary

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the Mali mix, disenchanted employees, asymmetric threat. It should, therefore, be recognised that this threat is not just an external problem, but internal, as the impact on individual countries would be huge. Therefore processes need to be put in place internally within companies.

The cyber threat is a growing threat globally and it seems reasonable to assume that it may play a part in attacks on the oil & gas infrastructure in the future.

In working with solution providers, there is a need to ensure that Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) change their behaviours or grow capabilities to meet the needs of the oil & gas industry moving forward. This is an onus on the security providers.

Trust and transparency are needed. Establishing a transparent legal and economic environment for companies to operate in is crucial to creating a stable economic environment for investment.

There is a risk that “piracy fatigue” will set in and result in complacency from shipping companies and oil & gas operators who have dealt with piracy in East Africa and believe they can address the West African threat without investing in training and applying the most up-to-date intelligence.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONSA full and proper recognition of the magnitude of the security challenges faced by oil & gas companies when operating in West Africa is required. This extends beyond the horizons of simply the Gulf of Guinea. The maritime industry is yet to begin to grow. It will be responsible for the world’s largest economy growth and therefore will undoubtedly bring with it significant and varying security threats. ÒÒ

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SECTION 5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS


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In looking at the fundamental question of why preventive measures are not able to curb the significant piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, it can be concluded that the lack of political will overrides other existing factors.

At the international level, consistent international policy on issues, including the use of armed guards, will be paramount to successfully launching a unified international response to the maritime threat. Widespread lack of understanding and confusion relating to a plethora of international, regional and country-specific rules and regulations rules has had the counter-productive effect in many cases of leading

to inactivity. A set of guidelines should be generated to alert every oil & gas vessel entering West African waters exactly what they need to do. It is recommended that West African nations together must come up with a blueprint for maritime security and develop an acceptable regional security manual. The legislation makers should be invited to make a spirited response to come up with this blueprint which would be turned into an acceptable security manual. This in turn would counter the widespread feeling within the industry that there is too much talking and too little action.

The only real and lasting solution to this will be a political one. The quality of the maritime security environment cannot be improved upon without political support. Government willingness and ability to act must improve in order for an effective and lasting response to piracy and wider maritime crime to exist. It is critical, therefore, that a method be devised of ensuring that all relevant information from today should be brought to the attention of the authorities in the sub-region.

At both the government and industry level, communication and information sharing must improve in order to effectively understand the nature of the threat faced and therefore implement ÒÒ

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solutions that effectively combat this threat. A forum is needed to anonymously share information relating to incidents that occur and to encourage learning. Companies remain concerned about the reputational damage they would encounter should details about security breaches become common knowledge. There needs to be a move, certainly within the security functions from within companies, from competition to collaboration. The industry as a whole would benefit from a moto such as “the more we work together, the more we can control”.

The lack of coordination between CSR and the community is a missed opportunity. CSR and security functions need to work much closer together to ensure a successful long-term programme. A seemingly small internal change could have huge repercussions on the ability of a company to operate securely in a region where local community agitation and unrest is widespread. Sustainability and issues of legacy need to be considered and acted upon in order for these programmes to have the desired effect.

What is known for sure is that any lasting change will certainly not come overnight. Changing the mind-set of local communities is a long process. Time, energy and resources must be channelled into fighting the threat of piracy and maritime time in the Gulf of Guinea.

IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT COMPANIES WILL HAVE TO SPEND AROUND 15% MORE ON SECURITY IN THE NEXT 3-5 YEARS.

The popular belief is that there are vast differences between the East and West African pirate threats. In reality, this seems not to be the case. Notably, there seems to be a shift in focus with pirates and maritime criminals in West Africa increasingly adopting Somali tactics and carrying out more kidnappings. The question exists, when will the West African business model change from product to crew? Or will they continue to target both?

There is a fear that what is happening in the Gulf of Guinea will filter down to Angola. If a solution is found and piracy and maritime crime can be capped, then it is possible to prevent this expansion. In order to achieve this, immediate international action is vital.

west africa - community trend report - april 2013

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