Blowout BP Gulf of MexicoThe Dutch Hurricane Proof Solution

Registered at Horizon Support and BP #BPCC-29893

Well MC 252 #1

Teamleader: Dick Swart16-02-2011

Presentation to the Petroleum Geologische Kring

Meeting at TNO facility Utrecht

• Dick Swart– International drilling expert / teamleader

• Willem Heijnen– International production/well technology expert

• Professor Ruud van der Hoorn– Centre for Advanced Technical Solutions

• Wouter Schiferli– TNO Oil & Gas division– Flow & pressure calculations

• Arie Vliegenthart– Swellable packer expert

Hurricane proof Dutch solution team

• What happened and what went wrong• The Dutch Hurricane Proof Solution• The BP solution• Findings and lessons learned• Impact to the industry

Presentation

• Drilling had been completed– Well was to be closed and temporarily abandoned– Production can restart once production platform arrives

• Riser mud displaced to sea water– Normally only done after second cement plug is set– Decrease in bottom hole pressure (ca. 250bar)– Influx of reservoir fluid (oil+gas)

• Failure of BOP’s to close in well • Ignition and following explosion

– 11 fatalities– Drilling platform burned for 2 days and sank

• Oil spill > 60 – 80,000 barrels/day

What happened

What happened

Explosion20 April

21.56 hrs

Rig sunk 22nd of April 10.21 CSTam

Contributing factors

• Effectiveness of well barriers not ensured• Mud displaced to seawater

– Caused 250 bar pressure drop, mud barrier ineffective– Normally not done without first placing additional barrier (plug)– 300bbls Kick not detected on surface whiles drill pipe pressure was

reported rising.• Well barriers failed, either:

– Bottom cement plug, and/or– Wellhead seal

• BOP shear ram did not close– Coupling or high strength drillpipe between rams?– Raised 9 7/8”casing?– Hydraulic leak?– Hydrate forming in BOP stack

Some accusations…Preliminary results from investigating committees• Behind schedule 5 weeks

– Corners cut to improve speed & lower cost• Not repairing BOP hydraulic leak (12-48 hrs)• Cementation (BP/Halliburton)

– Insufficient centralizer placement (10 hrs)– No Cement Bond Log (CBL) (12 hrs)

• Mud (BP/Transocean)– Not circulating ‘bottoms up’ (12 hrs)

• Well design (BP)– Single full production string ($10 million)– Rejected option:

• Two stage production string with liner hanger and tieback

• No lock down Casing hanger (BP/Transocean)– No lockdown sleeve installed– Reduces effectiveness of wellhead seals

Who did (not do) what?• BP

– Cutting corners in design, operations, supervision and management

• Halliburton/BP– Performed cement job in contrast to own guidelines– Bad quality

• Transocean/BP– Inability to detect 300bbl kick timely and react properly– Not closing in well (wrong equipment between shear rams or other

causes) • MMS

– Did (not dis)approve well design• US Government

– Reduced the MMS budget and control options

Initial Cause of Blowout bad cement job or ?

Hurricane Proof Dutch solution (Short term 4-8 weeks)

• Stop drilling the relief wells immediately, because cratering possibilities (BP will intersect above cap rock)

• Oil& Gas tight connection to Horizon BOP stack– LMRP cap riser stump or flange connection– Swellable seals or flange connection or combination

• Tie in to nearby infrastructure– Connection to eg Na Kika pipe line (@ ca. 5miles)– Flow MC 252 well to Na Kika pipe line with 80,000bbl/day minimum

capacity– System Hurricane proof i.s.o. disconnect and tie back systems with 14

days unrestricted maximum oilflow again

Hurricane Proof Dutch solution (Long term6-12 month)

• Drill reservoir production wells– 4 highly inclined wells in circle around flowing well– Reduce pressure on the reservoir

• Production from reservoir through 4 wells via newly to be installed subsea infrastructure

– Stop flow in uncontrollable well after a certain production period by

• Killing well with relief well(s)– Plug and abandon well MC 252 and recover Horizon

BOP stack

Advantages of the Dutch solution• Oil could be produced and sold.• Ample time to investigate/repair and recover• No need for further quick fixes such as top kill’s, junk

kill’s, intersection above the cap rock

Disadvantages of the Dutch solution• Cost money, had to pay NaKika for production loss• Not invented by Us• Would not show that one worked on the spill

Is the situation now OK ?

• Start the PR, allowing the media to observe the seafloor, open up a response centre allowing people to contribute, hiring local people to clean-up the beaches etc…

• Cap the well asap to stop the spill• Use detergent to prevent the spill to come on shore• Kill the well asap to enable removal of the BOP demonstrating the well is

dead and no longer dangerous.

The BP Solution

• The well is killed using a top kill and not a bottom kill• There is no data available regarding the well bore condition in

the cap rock, hence erosion• There is no data available showing that the cap rock is sealed

BP Top Kill Scenario• BOP was closed• The well was killed• Well was intercepted above the cap rock • Cement was pumped from the top and has sealed the well

Reservoir

Cap Rock

BOP

ReliefWell

Frack’s ?

150 bar

No evidence that:• The cement did enter the cap rock annulus• There is sufficient cement to withstand the 150 bar pressure differential.• The overburdon is not fracked.

INTERNAL BLOWOUT SCENARIO ?

BP 8 Findings1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the

hydrocarbons.2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons.3. The negative-pressure test was accepted although well

integrity had not been established.4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the

riser. 5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the

well. 6. Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting

onto the rig. 7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon

ignition. 8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.

Government Findings

Lessons learned

1. MMS was lacking control due to industry pressure2. Safety culture is lacking3. Equipment might not be suitable for deep water4. No emergency response plans and adequate equipment5. Risk assessments are lacking and/or inadequate

Recommendations in the USA divided in caragory A-G

A. Improving the safety of offshore operationsB. Safeguarding the EnvironmentC. Strengthening Oil Spill Response, Planning and CapacityD. Advancing Well-Containment CapabilitiesE. Overcoming the Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Spill and Restoring

the GulfF. Ensuring Financial ResponsibilityG. Promoting Congressional Engagement to Ensure Responsible Offshore

Drilling

The total recommendation section of the report to Obama is 40 pages……

BP Blowout Consequencesfor the Dutch industry

This results in more inspections, more documentation, more evidence for performance which includes even the drilling of geothermal wells.

QUESTIONS

• Why was the Dutch help not accepted and implemented ? • Why was a bullhead cementation performed instead of

circulating cement as usual ?• Why was the relief well not drilled into the reservoir ?• Why was the second relief well not used ?• etc………..

Backup viewgraphs

New LMR Capwith 18” pipeline tieback and 3ea10” bypass valvesClamping tool or Flange connection

STEP 1

Hang new LMR cap with 18”diverless connector and 3ea 10”bypass valves close to MC 252 wellRemove old LMRCap

STEP 2

Install LMR Capwith all valves open on the riser stumpor flange

STEP 3Tie in MC252 into PLET toNa Kika pipeline

STEP 4

Open valvesto Na Kika pipelineclose 3 ea 10” valves 1 by 1remove DrilstringRESULT :A HURRICANE PROOFSYSTEM

Presently installed subseamethanol system to be usedPipe heating to be investigated

If necessary 3 ea 10” bypass valves can be used for floatingProduction systems as backup

Picture taken of removed riser bottom by ROV2 pieces of 5 ½” drill pipe sticking up inside riserstumpIf the inside of the 9 7/8”casing would have been clean than the Drill Pipe should have fallen to bottom or blown out of the well9 7/8”casing hydrauliced out of casing hanger by 250 bar pressure difference when displacing mud with seawater and/or temperature expansion with slip &seal assembly not locked2 pieces, because of chainsaw cut and one because of final shear, is our assessment, on what is pipe resting???? We assume on crushed casing by the shearramsAll rams do not function with hotline on seabed, technical failure or other obstructions inside the Horizon BOP stack?

Ongoing containment activities

Partly failed, had to cut with shears

Picture Slide 16