Phasing Out Opium: Developing a Sustainable Future in Afghanistan

Afghanistan Alternative Development CommitteeChris Paventy, Lauren Mellinger, Greg Nelson,

Koh Nakamura, Pavitra Ramaswamy, and Luciana Amodeo

Syracuse University

December 8, 2009

Executive Summary

USAID Afghanistan commissioned an assessment project to the Afghanistan Alternative Development Committee of the Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse University, to provide an overview, options and recommendations on phasing out poppy cultivation from the Helmand province. The report proposes diversification of the Afghan economy to integrate local farmers as well as strengthening the capacity and political will of the Government of Afghanistan to fulfill its national anti-narcotic commitment in the Helmand province. It monitors the strategy employed till date, studies the existing mechanisms in place in the southern region to combat the drugs menace and addresses the legal & institutional frameworks for combating the opium problem. In addition, it explores the major actors in the eradication effort from the international community, the Afghan national government, and the local Pashtun population.

Security Overview

The security situation has consistently perpetuated an unstable environment in the state of Afghanistan. As such, USAID efforts and resources have been limited due to constant disruption by Taliban forces, concentrated primarily in the south/southwestern region of Afghanistan. In the past, this has been especially true of Helmand Province. However, as a result of past/current military operations, both on behalf of the United States as well as ISAF, the security situation has improved and been moderately stabilized. Thus, the following section will briefly outline the current/projected military presence in Afghanistan, the geographical security risks in regards to Helmand Province, military efforts to alleviate such risks, and present concerns which still pose significant problems.

Current/Projected Military Forces in Afghanistan

There are currently 68,000 U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan, primarily concentrated in the eastern region of the country. Additionally, there are approximately 38,000 International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) strategically positioned throughout the remainder of the territory, with an increasing focus of efforts in the southern region. ISAF is a NATO led military coalition designed to aid security efforts in Afghanistan as a means to provide a secure and stable environment for reconstruction development. Contributing nations include all 28 NATO member states, as well as 14 other countries.1

On December 2nd, 2009, U.S. President Barak Obama announced that he will allocate and additional 30,000 troops for deployment to Afghanistan, with the primary purposes of securing the southern region from Taliban forces and building a reliable, self-sustaining Afghan military presence throughout the state. The additional troops will raise the total U.S. presence to approximately 100,000, and the expected NATO contribution of an additional 6,000 troops will bring the total foreign military presence in Afghanistan close to 150,000 strong.

Geographical Risks at Present in Helmand Province

1 The 14 countries include: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Ireland, Jordan, New Zealand, Sweden, Singapore, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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There are three main geographical risks in Helmand province, which is located in the southern region of Afghanistan: mountain ranges to the north; dense trees and shrubs surrounding the Helmand River, which enters Helmand through the Northeast and exits through the West/Southwest province border lines; and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the south. The mountain ranges that exist in the northern region offer Taliban forces a convenient hiding place, as some of the mountain peaks reach as high as 20,000 feet in altitude. Current U.S. helicopters in the region are unable to reach such a height safely, and as such transportation into the area is difficult at a scale sufficient to safely expunge the Taliban presence. Similarly, the trees and shrubs that run along both edges of the Helmand River form a jungle terrain suitable for Taliban offensives.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border, located along the southern border of Helmand province, offers a unique obstacle to security efforts in the region. The border area is currently suspected of housing the primary concentration of Taliban and extremist jihad forces in the region, and as such offers a porous line of transnational transfer for insurgents. Additionally, the Pakistan government has publicized complaints that an insufficient effort is being placed into security responses on their side of the borderline. As Taliban forces are being pushed further south across the Afghanistan-Pakistan line, these forces are then finding hiding places in the nearby Balochistan Province of Pakistan, thus upsetting the status-quo. Still apprehensive in regards to past U.S. withdrawal from the region in the early 1990’s, Pakistan officials are suspicious of the United States as a security ally, and as such pose a difficult partner in terms of an international security coalition.

In addition to the three main risks listed above, there is also the concern of the topography of Afghanistan in general. The terrain is covered in desert and rock, and is mostly unpaved outside of the urban districts. As such, transportation lines are difficult to establish, in terms of both supply lines and troop mobility. Supplies most readily reach military forces in Afghanistan through the Pakistan border, which are forced to travel through heavy concentrations of Taliban forces. Air lift is the only other option, as the entire country is landlocked, thus making naval transportation a virtual impossibility. Furthermore, the quickest transfer of troops throughout Afghanistan is by means of helicopter, of which there are currently too few to offer sufficient means of transportation.

ISAF Military Operations

ISAF has launched a number of military operations throughout the Afghanistan region. In recent history, five major operations have been conducted specifically geared towards the security of Helmand province. To begin, on March 6th, 2007, Operation Achilles was launched with the goal of securing the northern region of Helmand province. Involving approximately 5,500 troops, including both NATO forces and Afghan soldiers, the overarching purpose of the offensive was to secure the area for purposes of reconstruction and economic development.

Following the success of Operation Achilles, a series of three offensive missions were conducted on April 27th, May 19th, and June 19th, 2009; Operation Zanfar I, Operation Zanfar II, and Operation Panther’s Claw respectively. The purpose of the Zanfar operations was to pose an initial strike throughout the central region of Helmand province along the Helmand River, in preparation for the larger Operation Panther’s Claw. The latter operation – a British led offensive - was charged with task of securing river crossings along the Helmand River with the goal of

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establishing a semi-permanent military presence throughout the central portion of the region and simultaneously cutting off Taliban insurgent supply routes to the north.

On July 2nd, 2009, Operation Strike of the Sword commenced. Standing as the largest U.S. led military strike in Afghanistan since early 2004, the mission incorporated over 1,000 U.S. Marines, who were subsequently supported by both British and Dutch forces. The operation’s goal was to push the military presence further south, thus securing more space in which the Afghan government could begin reconstruction efforts without disruption by Taliban forces. All five missions have been declared successes by ISAF reports.

Present Concerns

Currently, there are four main security concerns persisting in the Helmand province of Afghanistan.2 First is the need to maintain current security conditions in occupied territories, as a means of establishing the proper time and space for sufficient reconstruction efforts to take root. Second, in light of President Obama’s desire to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan by August of 2011, there is an immediate need to build and train local Afghanistan military/police forces. Third, the development of safe and secure transport lines are required to maintain both of the above conditions, if future sustainment of a stable environment is ever to occur. Fourth, the border security between the Afghanistan-Pakistan must be tightened on both sides. Although Afghanistan is the primary focus in the current environment, it is essential to not simply push Taliban forces into Pakistan territory, where they will have time to recruit and rearm, all while disrupting the lives of the Pakistani population. Establishment of future security and stability in the region is contingent upon complete eradication of the Taliban element.

Agriculture and Alternative Development

Introduction

According to USAID, 85 percent of Afghans are dependent on agriculture and agribusinesses for their income. The decline in the price of opium worldwide has prompted Afghan farmers to seek new opportunities to produce and market alternative crops. According to a recent survey of worldwide opium production by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime in 2009, opium production in Helmand province declined to less than 70,000 hectares. Although this is a notable decrease from previous years, opium production in Helmand remains significantly higher than in other Afghan provinces. This dramatic turn-around in Helmand can be attributed in part to the successful introduction of terms of trade more favorable to licit farming and the development of food zones through USAID. The continued promotion of licit commercial agriculture will not only increase the income of rural Afghan farmers, it will foster widespread recognition among the farmers in Helmand province that opium production and trade ultimately has a destabilizing effect by fueling the insurgency and overall contributing to the lack of security in the province.

Resources and Infrastructure in Helmand Province

2 It is important to note that these concerns do not represent policy recommendations as conveyed to USAID. Rather, they are general security concerns, which much continue to be addressed if reconstruction efforts, such as those pursued by USAID, are to be successful both now and in the future.

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Helmand province is rich with natural resources, and has the capacity for diversifying agricultural crops, thus fostering the development of alternatives to opium production. The province is fertile with deep soils, thus there is tremendous potential for agricultural development, livestock, fishery, forestry and horticulture. Moreover, the infrastructure is already in place for natural water sources and irrigation. In addition, Helmand is home to a suitable climate for long season cultivation of crops including wheat, maize, beans, barley and orchards. In the southern part of the province alone, there is potential for planting three different crops annually. As the security situation improves in the province, there is tremendous potential for transforming the local economy through the development of alternatives to opium production.

Potential for Alternative Development and Agricultural Diversification in Helmand

Prior efforts in the field of alternative development have already dramatically reduced the number of opium-free provinces in Afghanistan. Not only does Helmand province have the capacity and natural resources to support the development of alternative crops, several Afghan agricultural products have an excellent reputation in international markets, including: almonds, pistachios, pomegranates and grapes. The climate and agricultural infrastructure currently in the region are also well suited for the development of cereal crops including wheat and maize. As the price of grain has risen dramatically in recent years, there is tremendous potential for transforming one of the highest opium producing regions in the world toward licit agricultural development. Therefore, expanding the market for these crops is the best way to promote licit agriculture in Helmand Province. Continuing to promote the development of licit agriculture by expanding the USAID program will not only result in a significant decline in opium production, it will foster the development of a sustainable economy in the province.

Poppy Production and Prices

Afghanistan produces 93% of the global poppy production.3 Between 1995 and 2007, we have witnessed the production increase from 54,000 to 193,000 hectares annually (Figure 1). This rapid growth in production has presented tremendous impediments for state-building efforts and general success for the Afghan people; moreover, it has fueled the Taliban insurgency in the southern and eastern areas where the Pashtun tribes are predominant. Helmand province alone accounts for two-thirds of the total poppy production in Afghanistan. Due to the immense proportion of poppy production that the province represents, it is of great import that Helmand province be at the center of any poppy eradication policy.

Since 2007, poppy cultivation has been on a downward trend and this has been the case for Helmand province as well (Figure 1). Recently, it has been announced that Helmand province has observed a 37% decrease in 2009, which is 29% greater than projected by UNODC.4 Three factors exist for this recent reduction. First, the Afghan government in connection with other key actors has implemented an eradication policy, which has placed pressure on farmers to move towards alternative crops. Second, 2008 proved to be a difficult year for farmers due to an especially severe drought, as agriculture in Helmand depends highly on irrigation. Third, the market price for raw poppy has reduced steadily and substantially since 2003 (Figures 2 & 3). In

3 Stephen Jones, “Afghanistan and Narcotics: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends, 2001-2009,” House of Commons Library, March 24, 2009.4 UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009: Summary Findings,” September 2, 2009.

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Helmand, the price for raw poppy was $67 USD in June of 2009, which was down from $642 USD in January of 2003.

The explanations for why the prices have fallen so drastically since 2003 are very similar to the reasons just listed for the decline in poppy cultivation. Firstly, the law enforcement activities have made the marketability of opium much more difficult for farmers. Given that local farmers have limited financial resources, it is not perplexing to understand that additional obstacles to have to maneuver around creates a difficult situation for poppy farmers to continue at the same production level as before. In addition, the cost of transportation for production and trafficking has risen to add yet another impediment. Finally, possibly because of the sharp increase in cultivation since 2002 a surplus of poppy created the price to fall.5 When prices were at their height in 2002 and 2003 the total poppy production was around 75,000 hectares. This could suggest that during that time there was too little supply for the amount demanded. Conversely, the reason that prices are at an all time low could be contributed to a surplus of poppy due to the past few years of increased cultivation. This surplus would have caused the price to fall under the equilibrium price. If this proves to be the case, then prices should increase to the point where the amount supplied and amount demanded are equal. It is difficult to predict exactly where this equilibrium point truly lies.

Alternative Crops and Prices

In order for a successful poppy-eradication policy in Afghanistan, and more specifically in Helmand province, it is vital that the focus be placed on diversification of the economy. One direct substitute for poppy cultivation currently does not exist. In the past, many have searched to do just the opposite: to find a miracle crop that will be more valuable in the world market to replace opium. As mentioned previously, Helmand province has the potential to produce a wide variety of crops, some of which currently have comparable market prices such as cotton, beef, poultry, and lamb (Table 1 & Figure 4). Historically, cereal production has been the central sector to Helmand province. Viewing the market price for wheat, maize, and barley these products do not seem promising substitutes for opium. Although their prices are much lower per kilogram, other factors are important to remember. All three crops are much less labor intensive as poppy, which requires yearlong cultivation and care. They only require labor during three to four months of the year. Therefore, farmers could use the additional free time to concentrate on other crops. The cereal crops also yield much greater quantities than opium.

Inextricably connected to the diversification of the economy is creating access to foreign markets for these domestic products. Currently, countries that are located close to Afghanistan should be focused on. Pakistan already plays an important role for Helmand province, while it also presents the biggest problem due to the Taliban and insecurity. Other regional neighbors such as India and the United Arab Emirates have begun to be consumers of Afghan products. In order for local farmers in Helmand to obtain the best price for their goods they must be able to penetrate these markets and develop new trade agreements elsewhere in the region. Another possible short-term solution to this problem is Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs). These zones, pending congressional action, will enable areas in Afghanistan, deemed to be vital to

5 Jones, “Afghanistan and Narcotics: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends, 2001-2009,” House of Commons Library, March 24, 2009.

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Afghanistan’s stabilization by President Obama, to have “duty-free access to U.S. markets.”6 This solution will help with this issue of opening new markets, however, it will not be as sustainable in the long run because of the shear distance between the two countries. A much more viable and sustainable policy will be regional.

Alternative Development Program

The Alternative Development Program (ADP) is USAID’s development project in Afghanistan to provide alternatives to local farmers as a means of reducing the dependency on poppy production. The program has two broad goals, which are to increase jobs for and sales by afghan farmers, herders, and businesses and to increase their confidence in the government.7 The specific role that USAID plays in achieving these goals is to “provide the materials, technology, and expertise necessary to produce, process, and market high-value crops.”8 In addition to these core actions, the ADP is charged with improving watershed management and irrigation and infrastructure such as roads between farms and marketplaces and actual marketplace infrastructure. Furthermore, the ADP facilitates access to credit and seeks to develop new markets. Some examples of what the program has accomplished as far as opening new markets is that in India and Dubai it was able to open a market for apples and pomegranates respectively. The program has also been able to extend 21,000 loans to women-owned businesses of which many of the women were widows.9

The budget for the program between FY2002 until FY2006 was $315 million. In 2007 alone the budget increased substantially to $229 million. This sharp increase is indicative of the attention that the program started to receive. To accomplish the aforementioned objectives, it is imperative that the budget be increased to a greater extent, especially as the security situation in the province continues to improve.

Recommendations

I recommend a few changes in the program so that the alternative crops can be cultivated and markets can be secured for them. Firstly, I recommend that the annual budget for the program be increased by 30% within a year to coincide with President Obama’s recent announcement of additional security forces. This will allow for more USAID personnel to be on the ground in Helmand province working with the locals to become efficient in cultivating these new crops.

Second, I recommend that the program’s focus be altered to give greater importance to developing new foreign markets. This should be done in connection with the national Afghan government and the farmers to build greater cohesion. The focus should be put on finding regional markets as opposed to global markets due to the difficulty of transporting products. However, I suggest that the agency advocate for legislation to be passed regarding the ROZs in order to give Helmand province a short-term stimulus.

6 “South and Central Asia Regional Overview,” USAID, October 2009.7 “Agriculture (and Alternative Development) Sector Profile,” USAID, November 30, 2009.8 Ibid.9 Ibid.

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Key Actors and Cooperation

Introduction

As discussed so far, since 2002, the USAID has been a very active player eradicating opium production in Helmand Province. However, as you know, besides the USAID, there are many other actors involved in this issue. In this part, I would like to examine the actors and their relationship with the USAID. So, first off, I am going to briefly explain the structure of the USAID in Helmand. Then, I will talk about other actors in the province, including the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Afghani government. Finally, considering the relationship between the USAID and other actors, I would propose a recommendation.

USAID structure

The USAID implements various projects from alternative development to governance. They also work with a team of outstanding local and international partners to carry out diverse projects. For instance, in the case of Alternative Development Program, the USAID chooses the appropriate partner considering the needs of the project. In addition, USAID has personnel in 19 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRTs) across Afghanistan. As USAID’s primary representative in the provinces, field program officers monitor all U.S. reconstruction and development efforts in the area of responsibility of the PRT.

International partners

In Helmand province, the United Kingdom plays a crucial role because of its leadership of the Helmand PRT. The DFID, the U.K. counterpart of the USAID, is also supporting the region by focusing on Alternative Agriculture Livelihood. DFID’s activities in Helmand are actively coordinate with the Helmand PRT and with USAID’s activities. The “Lashkar Gah Bost Airport and Agriculture Center,” is an ongoing project, consisting of an Agriculture center, Industrial Park and Upgrade of Bost Airporthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bost_Airport. The construction of the airport was completed this past June, and it is said that these facilities would expect to create 2,500 jobs. In addition, the International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) is also a key player in the region. Supported by the USAID, the ICARDA, as the leader, created the Future Harvest Consortium to Rebuild Agriculture in Afghanistan (FHCRAA) that is a meeting of 34 organizations. Under this framework, programs and projects have been implemented in collaboration and cooperation with NGOs, U.S. Universities, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), other Future Harvest Centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).

Afghani government

With the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the USAID has been supporting the National Area Based Development Program (NABDP), which is managed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). Under the framework of the NABDP, projects have been requested by local communities through the District Development Assembly (DDAs)

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in Helmand. As of March 2008, a total of 207 projects have been contracted by the MRRD. For instance, 30 irrigation projects have been started in Garam Seer District of Helmand. In addition, there is the central government-led Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) at a national level, and there is the Helmand’s Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) effort at a local level.

Recommendation

The structure of supporting local farmers in Helmand is very complex and requires continued progress. Even though there has been some cooperation between actors, such as the USAID and the DFID, there remains a need for increased coordination. For example, components of the various poppy elimination programs have not been properly integrated into central development programs in Afghanistan. I strongly believe that, with a better coordination with other actors, the USAID must maximize synergy between international research practice and knowledge of the local Afghan context. To achieve this goal, I would recommend the creation of a joint task force under the effective leadership of Afghanistan government. A workshop will be held annually to share lessons between projects carried by not only Afghanistan people but also the international community in Helmand. Government and NGO partners will benefit from capacity building through project activities, and lessons may be learned to shape Afghanistan’s future agricultural research strategy. Some may refute this idea by saying that the Afghanistan government lacks such capacity to lead the joint task force. However, this plan fits in President Obama’s stance, who recently announced the timeframe for a withdrawal out of Afghanistan. In the long run, we need a legitimate, sustainable Afghani government to govern the country. Therefore, while supporting the Afghani government, the USAID let the Afghanistan government to lead the joint task force.

USAID-Afghan Govt Partnership

Poppy cultivation undermines good governance and funds insurgent activities and hence it’s critical for USAID to co-ordinate with the Afghan government to counter narcotics activity in the Helmand province. According to a 2009 survey by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, opium cultivation in Helmand alone declined by a third, to less than 70,000 hectares. However encouraging the figures may be there is still a long road to be covered for making the region opium free.

Helmand, with a population of 1.4 million and an area roughly the size of Switzerland continues to produce the maximum amount of poppy in Afghanistan; it probably produces more narcotics than any other country. Hence neither the Afghan government not its international partners can afford to rest on their laurels. If the Afghan govt fails to make progress, insurgency will continue to grow, local economies will be destroyed and governments will become more corrupt. So any plan to eliminate the opium cultivation in Afghanistan has to begun by stemming the menace in Helmand.

The Afghan government under its 10 year National Drug Control Strategy aims at complete poppy elimination by 2013 in areas where alternative livelihoods have been made sufficiently available. USAID should review the counter-narcotics efforts currently employed in Helmand under this strategy and also review their ongoing projects in the region.

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Recommendations

Short Term Goals

1) Abolish Coercive Eradication Measures

Many Afghans view counter-narcotics strategies as a Western agenda. Criminalization of opium cultivation and forceful eradication measures may end up undermining government legitimacy particularly when the Afghan government fails to deliver on its end of the bargain by providing alternative livelihoods. Destroying poppy fields by taking military action or aerial spraying without providing farmers alternative livelihoods will only further alienate the local Afghans. USAID and the Afghan government should restrict the coercive measures to targeting opium warehouses and drug war lords.

Mid Term Goals

1) Focus on Trafficking-Deny Narcotics Proliferation Routes

Eradication of opium leads to price increase, which transfers profits from farmers to traffickers. Therefore, the focus should be on trafficking, where 80 per cent of the profits are located.10 One of the main goals for the USAID should be to trail the demand route for opium from the Helmand province. The Afghan govt will have to strike at the demand chain if they want to eradicate the supply link. Also, there has to be sustained efforts to track the money trail in the opium trade. USAID should work alongside the United States Department of Defense to assist the Afghan government in intelligence sharing and interdiction efforts to strengthen the police and military through the acquisition and provision of equipment, training and operational support. USAID should also provide the latest technical support to improve controls at ports and airports. Likewise, USAID funding should focus on the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier by improving the capacity of Afghanistan to secure its borders, facilitate counter-terrorism efforts, and reduce illicit trafficking of narcotics.

2) Trust Building: Promote Good Governance

Incentives for Affirmative Action: USAID-Afghan govt should launch a project that applauds affirmative action in the area of poppy elimination. Farmers who have given up poppy cultivation for an alternative crop should be awarded extra benefits and incentives. At the same time the Afghan govt must adopt lenient measures by helping opium growing farmers to secure a livelihood by developing other sources of income.

Strengthen Developmental Work: USAID alongwith the Afghan govt should facilitate the growth of schools, trade, markets, infrastructure to motivate the populace in the Helmand province. USAID in partnership with the Afghan government should continue to host the annual Helmand Agricultural Fair that provides opportunities for income generation and investment.

10 Goodhand, Jonathan'Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan', International Peacekeeping, 15: 3, 405 — 423

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Building Accountability: Afghan governance in the south has proved itself corrupt, incompetent and profoundly unpopular while Afghan society in the south is itself fractious, tribal, largely uneducated and unfamiliar with authority from the centre.11 At present, there is little accountability within the government. Corruption sometimes drives people to seek justice from the Taliban that is often perceived to be swift and cheap. USAID should set up an Independent Corruption Reporting Cell where local Afghans can report any grievance that they might have with respect to governance issues. Drugs & corruption in Afghanistan are interlinked and the only way to build faith among the Afghans about governance is to deal with Corruption.

Creation of a Job bank in the Helmand province: USAID should work along with the Afghan government to engage the youth of Afghanistan in policy making and creating job opportunities for them in governance. Lack of jobs could push many unemployed young people into the rebel ranks.

3) Tackling Corruption in the Police Force

Improve Pay Package: USAID should work in tandem with the Afghan government to suggest a review of the pay package offered to Afghan police officers. An ordinary police officer in Helmand today earns a meager salary in return for risking his life in one of the most dangerous terrains in the world that was once considered a Taliban stronghold.

Routine Drug Tests: According to an estimate made by a UK official working group in the province, there are claims that 60% of the Afghan police in Helmand use drugs12. USAID should focus funding for counter-narcotics operations pending enforcement of mandatory drug tests for all officers across all levels in the province form time to time.

Training local forces: Joint efforts must be made to create a credible task force in the Helmand province capable of handling the security situation in the region and protect the Afghans from the Taliban. High casualty of the Afghan forces calls for review of existing training programmes. The Afghan forces have to be trained not just in counter-insurgency operations but also in law-enforcement.

Long Term Goals

1) Exploring Medicinal Usage of Opium

USAID in conjunction with the Afghan government should set up a research committee to follow up on the ‘Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan for the Production of Morphine and other Essential Medicines’ carried out by the Senlis Council in 2005. The objective of the study was to investigate the possibility that Afghanistan's poppy crops could be used to produce opium-based medicines such as morphine and codeine.

11 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6726869.ece12 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7895612.stm

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Engagement Approach with Pashtuns

Introduction

The USAID mission in aiding Afghan farmers from the opium trade to alternative crop requires appropriate interaction and engagement with local communities. This engagement necessitates a deep cultural and social understanding of local communities and how they function. Without this understanding the USAID mission will be unsuccessful. Therefore, it is critical that the mission take an important step forward in building greater cultural understandings and relationships between its workers and the Afghanis affected by their mission. In keeping with this idea, Afghanistan Alternative Development Committee advocates the teaching of Pashtunwali to its workers sent to the Helmand province and a focus of the mission around Pashtunwali principles. As such, as a representative of the USAID – Pashtun Advocacy group within Afghanistan Alternative Development Committee, the following pages will outline the core values of Pashtunwali and why they are central to the USAID mission in Afghanistan.

Pashtunwali

Pashtuns represent the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan today. The Pashtun tribe is largely group-oriented; there is a deeply engrained practice of communalism. The structure that rules the tribes is called Pashtunwali, “an unwritten code controlling, guiding and balancing, to large extent, the form, character and discipline of the Pathan way of life.”13 Given this understanding of the ethnic make-up of Afghanistan and how tribal communities function, USAID must be responsive to this information in its mission because,

Even though there are at present few traditional practices of Pashtunwali that were able to withstand the influence of pervading religio-political ideologies, due to war, drought, and displacement, it is critical for the reconstruction of Afghanistan to understand the “ideal” Pashtunwali in the minds of Pashtun men and women…yearn to return to a peaceful and “ideal” past.”14

Understanding the codes and practices of Pashtunwali and acting upon those codes within interpersonal engagements between USAID workers and Afghan Pashtuns is necessary to build sustainable relationships and garner critical support for transitioning to an alternative crop.

Pashtunwali is comprised of seven primary components and are meant to give meaning to the interactions the Pashtuns have with each other and the outside world. They are designed to give guidance to ethical and moral decisions a Pashtun will face during their lives. The seven primary components are:

1. Melmasthiaa. “The famous and greatest demand of Pakhtunwali (melma means a guest)

offers hospitality and protection to every guest irrespective whether he be an outsider, not in a position to return it, or be his fellow tribesman. A Pathan does not care for color, race, religion, or qaum in respect to Melmasthia, this

13 Pashtunwali, Afghanan dot Net14 Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women’s Legislative Authority, Palwasha Kakar

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is the proof that Pathans are free of any prejudice, jaundice and unnecessary ill will.”15

2. Nanawatia. “The principle underlying Nanawati is the complete supplication or surrender

of one's person before his antagonist or nay body who can take up his protection. It involves the mercy and placation of his enemy to forgive him and forget the revenge (Badal) intended to be taken upon him, whatever the seriousness of the dispute or the issues involved, the Pakhtunwali of a Pathan demands that he should be forgiven since the offender, being a human, has completely lowered his pride, which he seldom does.”16

3. Badala. “The word literally means revenge, whatever is paid for Tawan is also Badal,

whoever commits an offense is liable to pay Badal. It may be levied by Maraka or Jirga on the offender or the offended person may take his own Badal. The Badal for killing is to kill, but this may be mended through Nanawati and Jirga.”17

4. Nanga. “Nang is the central point of Pakhtunwali. All good qualities are based on the

principles of Nang. Nang kawal means 'to protect ones right'. A Pathan must demonstrate practically to protect the right of his brother, sister, his relatives and even his tribe.”18

5. Pakhtoa. “Pashto is the language of Pakhtuns. But figuratively it is used in much wider

sense connoting truth, reality manliness, protecting the right of sisters, brothers, or other close relatives, a high sense of ego, honor and pride, hospitality, and a sense of a firm belief on his faith. Pashto is the name of pashtun tribal law, customs and usages.”19

6. Ghairata. Ghairat means zeal. To keep on one's own and his tribe's prestige one has to

be zealous, courageous and somewhat headless… Ghairat is often tinged with fanaticism. It helps to preserve the tribal system.”20

7. MeRanaa. “The word means of the act of zealousness. Courage, bravery and militancy.

Pakhtunwali demands that whenever there is need for sacrifice to overcome his antagonist, to protect his family rights and even to safeguard that barriers of his homeland, a Pashtun must demonstrate merhana by practical proving this.”21

Past USAID-Pashtun Engagement

15 Melmasthia, Afghanan dot Net16 Nanawati, Afghanan dot Net17 Badal, Afghanan dot Net18 Nang, Aghanan dot Net19 Pakhto, Afghanan dot Net20 Ghairat, Afghanan dot Net21 MeRana, Afghanan dot Net

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USAID has previously invested a great deal of time and money in engaging with Pashtun Afghanis through diplomatic and consular programs. These include:

I. As the centerpiece of efforts to enhance civilian support for military operations, the Embassy plans to expand PRT operations with 110 new temporary-appointment, Department staff to support a range of different programs including:

One Regional Embassy Office in Herat with eight State/USAID positions; Four full-scale PRTs with a varying numbers of State, USAID, and USDA

representation in three provinces and an urban mission within Kabul’s city limits;

Twenty District Reconstruction Teams with two American positions from State and USAID and Afghan employees to provide capacity building at the district level;

Six Tribal Engagement Teams, primarily in Pashtun areas, operating out of existing U.S. platforms, with one State and two USAID positions; and

Four Fly-Away Teams with State, USAID, and USDA participation to assess needs rapidly and organize community programs for essential services.22

The increase in funding, especially in Public Diplomacy efforts, has included: “American Corners/Internet Access Training Program; Training of Afghan media staff and country-wide media tours for Kabul-based journalists; Outreach/media tours to build support (primarily in Europe for the Afghanistan mission; English teaching programs; University journalism programs; Provincial level public diplomacy grants; and Development of linkages between universities in Afghanistan and the U.S.”23 These efforts have strengthened the engagement between international forces and Afghanis.

The biggest and most troubling aspect of these efforts so far has been the lack of attention paid to ethnic groups and the over-focused attention paid to the Kabul province. A new focus is required that understand the uniqueness of ethnic groups and the diversity of Afghani provinces nation-wide. The recommendations outlined here honor the energy and financial support committed to diplomatic and consular actions while recognizing the need to widen USAID’s focus.

Justification for Pashtunwali as Mission Focus

Pasthunwali offers a valuable and unique insight into the inner dynamics of the Afghani people. Understanding and engaging in how they live their lives from a principled-center provides a powerful driving force towards achieving a stable relationship between Afghanistan and the international community culturally, politically and economically. The road to achieving this success is paved with opportunities and obstacles alike; but the opportunities garner greater momentum.

Opportunities

22 FY 2009 Supplemental Congressional Justification23 FY 2009 Supplemental Congressional Justification

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Using the values of Pashtunwali can help USAID workers to capitalize on the values of independence, justice and self-respect:

By motivating Pashtuns to live independently of a corrupt system that holds its farmers hostage to the drug trade;

By offering an opportunity to bring justice to an internationally illegal activity that has handicapped their growth and their acceptance in the global community.

By re-visioning the role of Afghan agriculture and culture in international trade and engagement.

Appealing to the code of conduct by which the Pashtuns govern their everyday lives gives the USAID mission firmer foundation in the Pashtun’s understanding of their overall agency, tribally and nationally. When USAID workers open themselves and their Pashtun counterparts to participating in a re-visioning of their tribal and national role, they will be able to see how their Pasthunwali values are deeply rooted in transitioning their crops, and in doing so transitioning their nation.

It is critical that USAID workers appeal to the Pashtuns’ sense of Pashtunwali. First and foremost it demonstrates to Pashtuns that the workers are seriously engaged, not in leading Afghanistan along a “one-size fits all policy,” but a policy that has been tailored to the Afghan nation and its people. By framing crop transitioning in terms of Pashtunwali the USAID mission workers will literally and figuratively be speaking the language of the Pashtuns. In this manner, the process of crop transition will be viewed as a more organic process rather than one that has been impressed on the nation by a third party.

By drawing the connection between Pashtunwali values and crop transition, the policy of alternative cropping will gain greater legitimacy with the Pashtuns because the policy will come to mirror the people and their values in its practice.

By demonstrating to the Pashtuns that the United States and her representatives are invested and committed to offering alternative cropping that is aligned with Pashtunwali principles, the opportunity for improving international relations will swell. This can garner widespread support for closer relationships between the Pashtun majority and the Afghan government, Afghanistan and the United States and between different world citizens.

Obstacles:

Of course there are a series of potential obstacles that USAID workers face in persuading Pashtuns of the merits of alternative cropping:

Unwillingness to step away from a guaranteed paycheck; Unwillingness to work against fellow Afghanis and with foreigners; Unwillingness to work with Western conceptions of productivity and legality.

Rather than serving as detractors, these obstacles pinpoint the necessity of communicating with Pashtuns through the language of Pashtunwali. Building relationships by relying on Pashtunwali will take time and should always be considered and review as a process. But those relationships, once built will prove sustainably fruitful in many ways throughout the oncoming years of Afghan independence and national stability.

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Recommendations

In consideration of the role Pashtunwali plays in the Pashtun tribal society, the USAID – Pashtun Advocacy Group makes several recommendations for moving forward with alternative cropping in the Helmand province.

1. Before USAID workers set foot in Afghanistan they should be educated in Afghan social and cultural customs by natives. This education should include serious attention and focus on the Pashtun tribal society and their practice and incorporation of Pashtunwali in customary law.

2. Once educated in such customs, USAID workers should be trained in tools of persuasion that incorporate values of Pashtunwali.

3. Persuade Pashtuns of the benefits of alternative cropping by appealing to their sense of Pashtunwali.

Conclusion

Based on our findings, Helmand province and, by extension, Afghanistan still has the resources to be able to recover from the decades of conflict. It is imperative that the eradication of opium be a key priority in this state-building effort, as the harmful consequences of illicit drug cultivation and trafficking are innumerable and stand directly in Afghanistan’s path to recovery. As stated previously, the success of the Alternative Development Program depends largely on the success of armed forces to secure the country so that the Afghan people can confide in their government and pursue economic activities that are legally legitimate. If the country is not successfully secured then the progress that has been made in recent years may be susceptible to relapse.

The Afghan government, international community, and local Pashtun tribes will play a vital role in the fulfillment of the aforementioned goals. Therefore, it is indispensible that these actors support the ADP and find ways to collaborate together. As any form of multi-lateral plan for cooperation, a uniform strategy to solve these issues will call for each player to forfeit a degree of sovereignty, which constrains most organizations to not fully commit. However, we argue that the benefits of multi-lateral cooperation in this case by far outweigh the costs of attempting to carry out a piecemeal plan.

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Appendix

Figure 1

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 20050

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000Total Poppy Production

Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2009*Figures for 2009 are based on UNODC estimates of 8% reduction from 2008.

Figure 2

Oct-98

Dec-98

Feb-99

Apr-99

Jun-99

Aug-99

Oct-99

Dec-99

Feb-00

Apr-00

Jun-00

Aug-00

Oct-00

Dec-00

Feb-01

Apr-01

Jun-01

Aug-01

Oct-01

Dec-01

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700Raw Poppy Prices in Helmand (USD/Kg.)

Source: UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008*No recorded data between October 2003 and February 2004.

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Figure 3

Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05626466687072747678

Raw Poppy Prices in Helmand (USD/Kg.)

Source: UNODC Opium Price Monitoring, March-June 2009

Table 1Ave 2009 Prices (USD/Kg.)

Wheat $0.21Maize $0.15Barley $0.11Cotton $30.05Beef $58.96

Poultry $43.27Lamb $72.70

Peanuts $0.91Fish $4.41

Poppy $70.50Source: www.indexmundi.com

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Figure 4

Cotton Beef Poultry Lamb Poppy$0.00

$10.00$20.00$30.00$40.00$50.00$60.00$70.00$80.00

Ave 2009 Price (USD/Kg.)

Source: www.indexmundi.com

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