CUIMUN XXIVStudy Guide

DISEC

CUIMUN XXIV

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Welcome Letter from the Chairs p. 3

Introduction to the Committee p. 4

Topic A: The use of cyber-attacks and personal data against democratic institutions

1) Introduction p. 5

2) Timeline of Events p. 7

3) Discussion p. 10

4) Bloc Positions p. 15

5) Conclusion – Key Issues p. 16

6) Bibliography p. 17

Topic B: The implications of Fully Autonomous Deadly Robots

1) Introduction p. 19

2) Timeline of Events p. 21

3) Discussion p. 24

4) Bloc Positions p. 28

5) Conclusion – Key Issues p. 30

6) Bibliography p. 31

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CONTENTS

STUDY GUIDE

Welcome letter from the chairs

Dear delegates,

With CUIMUN now just over 2 months away, we hope you are as excited as we are. The topics that you will be discussing are both very relevant and contentious issues. While cyber-attacks have been known to exist for a while now, their use against democratic institutions is a new phenomenon, and could undermine democracy in multiple countries. Lethal autonomous weapons, or killer robots as they are otherwise known, have not been discussed much at the United Nations and yet may completely change the rules of warfare as we know them, putting serious life or death questions in the hands of automated machines that lack the reasoning or empathy that humans have.

All three of us have previously been in DISEC either as a delegate or chair and so we can all testify as to how engaging and simulating it is as a committee. Whether this is your first time at a Model UN conference or you’re a veteran who has already been to 10 or more conferences, the three days spent at Cambridge will be ones to remember as you all fiercely debate over the security issues of today. Remember that no issue in international politics has a simple answer and so stay true to your countries beliefs, but also do not forget the importance of compromise and negotiation.

This study guide covers both issues comprehensively, so do make sure to read through it all so that you can come to committee sessions fully prepared to participate. It will also help inform you of your country’s positions when it comes to doing research for this. Also don’t forget to check the further reading sections for each topic as this will give you guidance for your research.

That aside, we look forward to welcoming you all to DISEC in November and do not hesitate to ask us any questions that you may have, as your chairs we are always happy to help.

Kind regards,

Alfie Jenkins, George Mullens and Fariha Baba

Directors of DISEC

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Introduction to the committee

With the creation of the United Nations and the failure of the League of Nations, the formation

of the General Assembly, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC),

otherwise known as the First Committee, occurred due to a realisation from member states that

there was a necessity to deal with a wide variety of international security issues worldwide.

Due to its role within the General Assembly, DISEC is considered to be amongst the most

powerful committees within the UN. Similarly, DISEC’s role in discussing security issues allows

for all member states to have an equal say without the restrictions posed by the Security Council.

Members of the First Committee will generally work together and pass numerous non-binding

resolutions by consensus, which will then go onto the Security Council to be debated.

The First Committee also has close relationships with a number of other disarmament bodies

both within the UN system. For instance, DISEC has cooperated with the Geneva based

Conference on Disarmament, as well as the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

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Topic A: The use of cyber-attacks and personal data against democratic institutions

Introduction

With increased technology and

communications on a global scale, the

threat posed by cyber security can have

long lasting impacts upon democratic

institutions. Similarly, with personal data,

actors can gain a full understanding of

electors globally. With these two

technological developments, democratic

institutions and voters can both be targeted

on an international scale and influenced by

foreign actors.

While the UN does not have a single definition for cyber-attacks, they can be defined as

“socially or politically motivated attacks carried out primarily through the Internet. Attacks

target the general public or national and corporate organizations and are carried out through the

spread of malicious programs (viruses), unauthorized web access, fake websites, and other

means of stealing personal or institutional information from targets of attacks, causing far-

reaching damage.”1 Indeed, while cyber-attacks have advanced in the last few years, they have

been used to target military operations in Iran to power grids in Ukraine, and of course, the

Democratic Party in the USA. From traditional information operations to attempts to hack state

electoral systems, countries have engaged in concerted campaigns to undermine democracies and

thus weakened electoral trust. This has also been impacted by the use of personal data through

websites such as Facebook to run negative adverts and videos towards selected voters, thus

influencing political campaigns.

Hence, the far-reaching effects of cyber are still not fully known today. Countries like the

Netherlands, Ukraine, France, the UK and the US have all been recently affected by this

1 NEC (2018) “What constitutes a cyber-attack?”, Available at: https://www.nec.com/en/global/solutions/safety/info_management/cyberattack.html, Accessed on 14/08/2018

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combination of influencing voters and cyber-attacks on democratic institutions. Current evidence

points towards the Russian Federation aiming to influence these countries through cyber-attacks.

While it is unknown whether the Russian Federation collaborated with companies like

Cambridge Analytica to find out voter information, the use of fake social media accounts to

promote Russian foreign policy and interests demonstrate the wide effects of current

technological developments.

This study guide will mostly focus on the 2016 US Presidential Election as an example of how

cyber-attacks and the use of personal data can impact democratic institutions. However, it is

worth keeping in mind that cyber-attacks and personal data have been used in all regions of the

world. Delegates are therefore encouraged to find examples from their own countries. This topic

will not explore whether there was indeed collusion between the Russian government and the

Trump campaign. Instead, delegates are asked to consider how increased use of personal data

and cyber-attacks can be used to have serious implications on democratic institutions.

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Timeline of events (2-3)

This timeline of events focuses on Cambridge Analytica and the 2016 US Presidential election.

The timeline follows how Cambridge Analytica used the data of over 50 million Facebook users,

collected without Facebook’s permission, to target voters in the 2016 US presidential election.

2010

Facebook launches a version of Open Graph API, a

development tool which allows for app developers to access a

user’s data2. This essentially allowed for a developer to find out

all of your personal details, from our music preferences to

responses to online quizzes and personality tests. This, as we

will see later, formed a vital part of the microtargeting of

voters.

2013

Cambridge Analytica is founded by UK-based Strategic

Communication Laboratories Group (SCL) in a move supported

by Steve Bannon, the now former chairman of Breitbart News

and the Mercer family, a Republican mega-donor3.

2014

Cambridge Analytica gains data from Facebook users via Cambridge University researcher

Aleksandr Kogan. Aleksandr Kogan created an app, similar to one used by Cambridge

University’s Psychometric Centre. The app created by Kogan was then used by Cambridge

Analytica to set up personality tests. While they agree that the app would be used for ‘academic

purposes’, the app also gave information from users’ friends – who did not consent for their

information to be used. This allows for Cambridge Analytica to gain information for over 50

2 Kozlowska, H., Gershgorn, D. & Todd, S. (2018) “The Cambridge Analytica scandal is wildly confusing. This timeline will help”, Available at: https://qz.com/1240039/the-cambridge-analytica-scandal-is-confusing-this-timeline-will-help/, Accessed on 16/083 ibid

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million US voters. Kogan himself stated that he did not know what Cambridge Analytica wanted

to use the data for4.

March – April 2015

Former Cambridge Analytica employee Christophe Wylie, who then became a whistle-blower

against the company, met Corey Lewandowski, a Trump campaign operative, to discuss

microtargeting techniques5.

Summer 2015

Donald Trump announces his candidacy for President

in June6. This is followed by the use of cyber-attacks

by hackers linked to the Russian Federal Security

Service (FSB) against the Democratic Party’s

computer network7. This is followed by a report from

the FBI to the Democratic National Committee (DNC)

that at least one computer system was hacked by a group linked to the Russian government8. At

the same time, thousands of fake accounts are created on Facebook and Twitter, who masquerade

as regular users who support Donald Trump or hate Hillary Clinton. These accounts are used to

promote false news, conspiracy theories and a lack of trust in democratic institutions. These

Russian linked accounts used numerous different methods to appear legitimate. For example,

virtual private networks (VPNs) were used, making the accounts appear as if they are operating

in the US. Stolen identities and PayPal accounts are also used to funnel funds to pay for pro-

Trump ads9.

4 ibid5 ibid6 Time (2015) “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech”, Available at: http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/, Accessed on 16/08/20187 Bump, P. (2017). “What happened and when: The timeline leading up to Donald Trump Jr.’s fateful meeting”, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/11/what-happened-and-when-the-timeline-leading-up-to-donald-trump-jr-s-fateful-meeting/?utm_term=.9a221f6764a0 , Accessed on 16/08/2018

8 Lipton, E., Sanger, D., Shane, S. (2016) “The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S.”, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html, Accessed on 16/08/20189 Kafka, P. (2018) “The U.S. government says Russia infiltrated Facebook with fake users, accounts and groups supporting Donald Trump”, Available at: https://www.recode.net/2018/2/16/17021048/robert-mueller-russia-facebook-social-media-donald-trump-presidential-campaign-2016-hillary-clinton, Accessed on 16/08/2018

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2016

After the folding of the Cruz campaign, Cambridge Analytica was hired by Donald Trump’s

presidential campaign. Cambridge Analytica then claimed in a leaked campaign debrief that the

company prepared over 10,000 different ads for the Trump campaign which was then viewed by

billions of times by Americans10.

April 2016

Hackers allegedly gain the credentials of a Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee

member through a phishing attack, an attempt to gain sensitive information such as usernames,

passwords often through emails which appear to be official emails11.

June-July 2016

Thousands of stolen DNC emails and documents are leaked online by conspirators who were

then charged in the July 2018 indictment under names such as DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.012. This

is followed by the opening of the DCLeaks website and collaboration between Wikileaks and

Guccifer 2.013, releasing another cache of DNC documents. On July 22nd, Wikileaks publish a

further 20,000 emails from several DNC emails. The emails are particularly damaging towards

the DNC, as they disparaged Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders and instead favoured Hillary

Clinton. This led to the resignation of Debbie Wasserman Schultz, the chair of the DNC. This

move vitally decreased voter trust in the Democrats.

October 2016

WikiLeaks publishes thousands of emails from Hillary

Clinton’s campaign manager, John Podesta which revealed

excerpts from Clinton’s speeches to Wall Street14.

10 Lewis, P. & Hilder, P. (2018), “Leaked: Cambridge Analytica’s blueprint for Trump victory”, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/23/leaked-cambridge-analyticas-blueprint-for-trump-victory, Accessed on 16/08/201811 OpCit, n.712 Mueller, R. (2018) “Indictment of Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States”, Available at: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4598929-Netyksho-Et-Al-Indictment.html, Accesed on 16/08/201813 OpCit, n.714 Koran, L., Merica, D. & Lo BIanco, T. (2016) “WikiLeaks posts apparent excepts of Clinton Wall Street speeches”, Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/07/politics/john-podesta-emails-hacked/, Accessed on

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November 2016

Donald Trump is elected as President of the United States.

16/08/2018

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Discussion

As one of the fundamental values of democratic countries, free and fair elections are one of the

main characteristics which enable citizens to express their political views. Therefore, elections

are the ultimate expression of democracy and

actions that intend to effect elections clearly

have an impact on the faith placed by citizens

in their democratic institutions. This section

will be divided in two, firstly looking at the use

of cyber-attacks and secondly looking at the

impact of the use of personal data.

Cyber-attacks

In recent years, external interference and the subversion of election process in democratic

countries disrupt the electoral process through technological tools that attempt to corrupt

information and voting systems15. The abstract threat posed by cyber-attacks renders subsequent

action more difficult. Indeed, the wide variety of cyber-attacks enable actors to do everything

from installing spyware on opposition computer systems and stealing election strategies to

manipulating social media posts16. The impact of this is widespread and critical towards the

maintenance of international peace and security, resulting in the undermining of a country’s

democratic stability and the public’s faith in democratic institutions.

Critical state infrastructure can be viewed as having three main characteristics. The symbolic

importance and therefore, the state’s dependence on the structure, to the extent that damage to it

could impact socio-economic factors17. For example, in Israel, internet service providers have

been added to the traditional definition of critical infrastructure which would usually include

electricity, communications and fuel lines. Demands have been made recently in the United

States to add other bodies such as election campaigns and academia due to their influence in the

15 Siman-Tov, D., Siboni, G. & Arelle, G. (2018) “Cyber Threats to Democratic Processes” Available from the Center for Security Studies at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/6690e2b2-bd9e-40ef-aabb-185d8a449116/pdf, Accessed on 19/08/201816 ibid17 ibid

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democratic process. This in part is due to the

increased use of technology in all critical

state infrastructures which can therefore be

targeted by actors18.

A democratic election process has numerous

components that interact with electors and

players alike from the media and social

media platforms to formal party structures

which select election candidates. As seen in

the 2016 US election, cyber can impact all of these components. The election process can be

summarised in four stages as seen in this diagram19. States are responsible for the maintenance of

these systems and keeping in mind vulnerabilities. These systems are also extremely vulnerable

to cyber-attacks, as proven in 3 US states where e-voting machines were hacked, resulting in the

theft or exposure of details about approximately 21 million US citizens, with hackers showing

that it can take as little as 90 minutes to hack a US electronic voting booth20.

However, these cyber-attacks have a

problematic impact in terms of how

the international community deals

with them. In conflicts which have a

military nature, it is clear to visualise

who the supposed opponents are.

Instead, with cyber-attacks, domestic

politics can be affected from a

distance without casualties or even

repercussions for those that perpetrate

these attacks. Questions of how

institutions can even attempt to curb

18 ibid19 ibid20 New Scientist (2017) “Hacking a US electronic voting booth takes less than 90 minutes”, Available at: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2142428-hacking-a-us-electronic-voting-booth-takes-less-than-90-minutes/, Accessed on 19/08/2018

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these actions are difficult to answer; while with more traditionally military attacks, organisations

like the UN can attempt to seize weapons, the low cost of entry for cyber-attacks render it

extremely difficult for institutions to prevent it21.

Presently, there is no Geneva Convention equivalent which governs cyber warfare. Cyberspace

has therefore become essentially a Wild West in which countries can attack each other without

inflicting serious damage or repercussions. The United Nations was not the first institution which

attempted to regulate cyberspace. The Council of Europe in 2001 wrote the Budapest Convention

on Cybercrime22. While the convention is not concerned with cyberwarfare per se, it does render

certain actions illegal under international law. For example, the use of industrial espionage by

Chinese hackers in 2010 which allowed for these hackers to steal classified information in F-35

fighter jets would be considered illegal23. As of 2018, 61 member states have ratified the

convention. Most notably, the Russian Federation and China are not signatories to the treaty.

The UN has attempted to implement guidelines on global cybersecurity, most notably in two

General Assembly resolutions 57/239 of 200324 and 58/199 of 200425 which call for more

awareness and responsibility of member states to

prevent, detect and respond to cybersecurity

threats and to share and assist strategies between

member states. However, these resolutions have

been criticised by experts as not doing enough in

attempting to better protect member states whose

cybersecurity systems are vulnerable.

Other efforts have emerged. For example, the UN

and International Telecommunications Union (ITU) announced the launch of the Global

21 Beaver, M. (2016) “The United Nations and Cyberwarfare”, Available at: https://globalriskadvisors.com/united-nations-cyber-warfare/, Accessed on 19/08/201822 Council of Europe (2001) “Convention on Cybercrime”, Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/7_conv_budapest_en.pdf, Accessed on 19/08/201823 Supra, Beaver,M. 24 UNGA (2003) Resolution 57/539, Available at: https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/UN_resolution_57_239.pdf, Accessed on 19/08/201825 UNGA (2004) Resolution 58/199, Available at: https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/UN_resolution_58_199.pdf, Accessed on 19/08/2018

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Cybersecurity Index which measures the status of cybersecurity worldwide26. A 2010 report by

the UN Group of Governmental Experts, a group which includes diplomats from the United

States, Russia and China concluded that cybersecurity threats are amongst the most serious

challenges that the international community faces in the 21 century.

Personal Data

With the vast quantity of data that large technology companies possess, actors who aim to

manipulate democratic institutions can exacerbate fears and tensions by aiming to foment racial

tension with targeted advertising. Similarly, with the promotion of fake news and conspiracy

theories, vulnerable electors can be targeted with further adverts and articles that reinforce their

political beliefs, regardless of whether these adverts or articles are factually correct or not27.

These issues can cause distrust in political systems, encouraging voters who do not want to vote

as their vote can seem useless if the entire democratic system is rigged.

One of the more difficult challenges presented by the use of personal data is how to ultimately

undermine the use of conspiracy theories and false stories which are then used to undermine

democratic institutions. While many European countries and agencies have established centres to

counter fake news by identifying and pushing back against false narratives, if electors do not

trust their governments then these efforts can seem to be ineffective28. In essence, the

combination of the use of personal data and false stories can create an echo chamber online in

which electors only see information that relates to their own political views. This combined with

the use of cyber-attacks on democratic institutions creates a situation in which there is a total

lack of trust in the entire democratic process, which can be seen in the elections of populist

governments globally.

However, other online initiatives allow for individuals to make proposals directly to their

representatives online; for example, eDemocracia in Brazil, Parlement et Citoyens in France and

Better Reykjavik in Iceland allow for suggestions to politicians, essentially allowing for a voice

26 ITU (2018) “Global Cybersecurity Index”, Available at: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/United-Nations-Launches-Global-Cybersecurity-Index.aspx, Accessed on 19/08/201827 Zarate, J. (2017) “The Cyber-attacks on Democracy”, Available from the George W. Bush Institute at: https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/democracy/zarate-cyber-attacks-on-democracy.html, Accessed on 19/08/201828 ibid

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for electors nationally29. Similarly, with policies like the EU’s General Data Protection

Regulation (GDPR), companies are under a legal obligation to use a user’s data responsibly and

allows for fines of up to 4% of global turnover for failures to abide by these regulations30.

In short, the impact of both cyber-attacks and personal data can have serious consequences on

public trust in democratic institutions. Elizabeth Denham, the Information Commissioner stated

in a report that societies are “at a crucial juncture where trust and confidence in the integrity of

our democratic process risks being undermined”31.

29 Monbiot, G. (2017) “Big data’s power is terrifying. That could be good news for democracy”, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/06/big-data-cambridge-analytica-democracy, Accessed on 19/08/201830 Financial Times (2018) “Democracy has to be protected from data”, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/5c012980-84fd-11e8-a29d-73e3d454535d, Accessed on 19/08/201831 ibid

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Bloc Positions (1-2)

As mentioned previously, the US has been a prominent subject of the issue in question. The US

has been working particularly closely with the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre to delve

further into this issue, publishing multiple joint advisory reports regarding issues such as

targeting of network infrastructure devices with high ranking officials from both states giving

statements calling for ‘responsible nations’ to address the Russian cyber threat. The UK is also

investigating the Brexit Vote Leave campaign’s use of data for targeted ads on the Facebook

platform.

The adoption of the GDPR in April 2016 by the European Union, although only recently

enforced, has done much in the way of providing a layer of protection for an individual’s

personal data, therefore preventing harmful utilisation of this data. Additionally the European

Commission has given a half a million pound fine to Facebook as result of their breaches of data

protection laws. As part of the ongoing collaboration between the two institutions, the African

Union, with the EU, has recently been placing a greater weight upon forming a coherent

approach on cybercrime, especially given events within the last year, including the attempted

hack of the Kenyan voting system, a week before their general election.

In Asia, ASEAN have been seeking cyber protection from Russia, in ongoing discussions with

the nation. With the exception of Singapore, all ASEAN countries spent a below world average

percent of GDP on cyber security in 2017, a particularly alarming figure given that it is now

considered the fastest growing internet region in terms of user growth . It is also very important

to note the underlying political structure of the countries in question; for example the impacts of

personal data misuse (of the kind seen recently by America) is limited to a local level in China,

but could have a much larger, state wide impact in Indonesia.

For Russia, with regards to involvement in the aforementioned DNC hacking, the Kremlin stated

in 2016 that we could ‘completely rule out a possibility that the (Russian) government or the

government bodies have been involved in this’ and as reports have continued to surface more

recently of alleged Russian hacks, the Kremlin has continued to deny involvement. As a result of

these accusations and others from organisations such as the EU, Russia has been the target of

multiple sanction regimes over the past two years which are continuing to increase in magnitude

for reasons both related and unrelated to this topic. Multiple commentators have questioned to

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effectiveness of such sanctions for reasons such as supporting the Kremlin’s narrative of a

‘Russia besieged by the United States’.

Conclusion

As our individual internet usage increases and we become ever more reliant and trusting of

communications systems, we run the risk of damaging the institutions upon which many nations

are built. The recent US election has been a reality inducing nightmare of what can and will be

done with our personal data and communications systems should we choose not to protect them

sufficiently. Whilst researching delegates should consider the below issues, however please keep

an eye on the developments that may have occurred since the writing of this guide, especially

given the prominence of this topic in the news at the moment.

1. What can be done to aid member states whose cybersecurity systems are vulnerable?

2. What kind of government/democratic processes apply to your country? Given this information, how could a cyber-attack effect your country?

3. Is it appropriate to recommend for election campaigns to be labelled as ‘Critical State Infrastructure’?

4. What can countries do to aid the protection of personal data for their citizens?

5. How should we tackle the issue of advertising targeted at vulnerable voters with of aim of influencing political beliefs?

6. In what ways can member states provide platforms for their electors to voice concerns around the democratic process?

7. How should member states respond to situations which include interference in democratic processes through cyber-attacks/use of personal data?

Bibliography

Beaver, M. (2016) “The United Nations and Cyberwarfare”, Available at: https://globalriskadvisors.com/united-nations-cyber-warfare/, Accessed on 19/08/2018

Bump, P. (2017). “What happened and when: The timeline leading up to Donald Trump Jr.’s fateful meeting”, available at:

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/11/what-happened-and-when-the-timeline-leading-up-to-donald-trump-jr-s-fateful-meeting/?utm_term=.9a221f6764a0 , Accessed on 16/08/2018

Council of Europe (2001) “Convention on Cybercrime”, Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/7_conv_budapest_en.pdf, Accessed on 19/08/2018

Financial Times (2018) “Democracy has to be protected from data”, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/5c012980-84fd-11e8-a29d-73e3d454535d, Accessed on 19/08/2018

ITU (2018) “Global Cybersecurity Index”, Available at: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/United-Nations-Launches-Global-Cybersecurity-Index.aspx, Accessed on 19/08/2018

Kafka, P. (2018) “The U.S. government says Russia infiltrated Facebook with fake users, accounts and groups supporting Donald Trump”, Available at: https://www.recode.net/2018/2/16/17021048/robert-mueller-russia-facebook-social-media-donald-trump-presidential-campaign-2016-hillary-clinton, Accessed on 16/08/2018

Koran, L., Merica, D. & Lo BIanco, T. (2016) “WikiLeaks posts apparent excepts of Clinton Wall Street speeches”, Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/07/politics/john-podesta-emails-hacked/, Accessed on 16/08/2018

Kozlowska, H., Gershgorn, D. & Todd, S. (2018) “The Cambridge Analytica scandal is wildly confusing. This timeline will help”, Available at: https://qz.com/1240039/the-cambridge-analytica-scandal-is-confusing-this-timeline-will-help/, Accessed on 16/08

Lewis, P. & Hilder, P. (2018), “Leaked: Cambridge Analytica’s blueprint for Trump victory”, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/23/leaked-cambridge-analyticas-blueprint-for-trump-victory, Accessed on 16/08/2018

Lipton, E., Sanger, D., Shane, S. (2016) “The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S.”, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html, Accessed on 16/08/2018

Monbiot, G. (2017) “Big data’s power is terrifying. That could be good news for democracy”, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/06/big-data-cambridge-analytica-democracy, Accessed on 19/08/2018

Mueller, R. (2018) “Indictment of Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States”, Available at: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4598929-Netyksho-Et-Al-Indictment.html, Accesed on 16/08/2018

NEC (2018) “What constitutes a cyber-attack?”, Available at: https://www.nec.com/en/global/solutions/safety/info_management/cyberattack.html, Accessed on 14/08/2018

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New Scientist (2017) “Hacking a US electronic voting booth takes less than 90 minutes”, Available at: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2142428-hacking-a-us-electronic-voting-booth-takes-less-than-90-minutes/, Accessed on 19/08/2018

Siman-Tov, D., Siboni, G. & Arelle, G. (2018) “Cyber Threats to Democratic Processes” Available from the Center for Security Studies at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/6690e2b2-bd9e-40ef-aabb-185d8a449116/pdf, Accessed on 19/08/2018

Time (2015) “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech”, Available at: http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/, Accessed on 16/08/2018

UNGA (2003) Resolution 57/539, Available at: https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/UN_resolution_57_239.pdf, Accessed on 19/08/2018

UNGA (2004) Resolution 58/199, Available at: https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/UN_resolution_58_199.pdf, Accessed on 19/08/2018

Zarate, J. (2017) “The Cyber-attacks on Democracy”, Available from the George W. Bush Institute at: https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/democracy/zarate-cyber-attacks-on-democracy.html, Accessed on 19/08/2018

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Topic B: The implications of Fully Autonomous Deadly Robots

Introduction:

On the 19th of November 2014, Mark Zuckerberg – CEO of Facebook – invited Elon Musk over

for dinner in his home in Palo Alto. Musk had previously said that artificial intelligence could

produce a real life terminator32 while Zuckerberg has rejected any such notion. Zuckerberg tried

to convince Musk at the dinner that he was wrong and worrying about nothing but the latter was

not moved from his position, remaining firm in his belief that A.I could become more dangerous

than nukes in one tweet that he posted. Films such as The Terminator and The Matrix come to

mind when thinking about this possibility, which cannot be ruled out.

The future of A.I and arguments/questions over it are already prominent today. This year,

thousands of Google’s employees signed a letter protesting the involvement of the company in a

Pentagon programme that could be used to improve the targeting of drone strikes, with the letter

saying ‘we believe that Google should not be in the business of war’33. As anther New York

Times article puts it, ‘Artificial intelligence research has enormous potential and enormous

implications, both as an economic engine and a source of military superiority. The Chinese

government has said it is willing to spend billions in the coming years to make the country the

world’s leader in A.I., while the Pentagon is aggressively courting the tech industry for help. A

new breed of autonomous weapons can’t be far away.’34

Technology can only improve as time goes on. We have already seen drone strikes becoming

mainstream as a new form of combat – prominently from the United States but also from other

32 The Verge, ‘Elon Musk is worried that AI research could produce a real-life Terminator’, 18/06/2014,

available from; https://www.theverge.com/2014/6/18/5820880/elon-musk-worried-ai-research-could-

produce-real-terminator , accessed on 22/08/2018

33 Shane, S and Wakabayashi, D ‘The Business of War; Google Employees Protest Work for the Pentagon’, The New York Times 04/04/2018, available from; https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html, accessed on 22/08/201834 Metz, C, ‘Mark Zuckerburg, Elon Musk and the Feud Over Killer Robots’, The New York Times, 09/06/2018, available from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/technology/elon-musk-mark-zuckerberg-artificial-intelligence.html, accessed on 22/08/2018

20

major powers – with questions surrounding their legality and morality brought up in debates but

lethal autonomous weapons, also known as killer robots are the next step up. Lethal Autonomous

Weapons Systems – or LAWS for short – can be defined as any weapons system that can

exercise the use of force and select targets to kill without a human operator. On the battlefield,

they operate on their own accord and pick targets to strike on their own accord. This makes for

an important distinction between drones and LAWS. Whereas the former still has a human

controlling the weaponry and deciding when to strike, the latter has no such thing, there is no

human control behind the use of force in instances involving LAWS.

Killer robots might not seem particularly prominent at the moment but it is imperative that

DISEC discuss this possibility now before a Terminator scenario becomes real. A controversial

topic, with some countries and sections of civil society calling for a total ban on killer robots

while others argue that a ban either will not work or is not needed, this is a debate sure to be

engaging for all.

21

Timeline of events

Although the concept of Lethal Autonomous Weapons may seem like a new addition to the field

of warfare, such ideas date back for quite some time. The following is taken from Foreign

Policy35.

1495;

Leonardo da Vinci designs a ‘mechanical knight’ which can mimic

various human motions. His notebook showed a system of cranks and

pulleys beneath the armoured exterior but it was not clear how the

fighting machine would be powered.

1898;

Nikolas Tesla unveils the first wireless remote-controlled vehicle in

New York. He tries to sell the device –along with plans for radio guided torpedoes – to the U.S

military but he is not taken seriously.

1943;

Two German FX-1400/’Fritz X’ bombs hit the Italian Battleship Roma, killing all 1,200 sailors

on board and splitting the vessel in half. Arguably, Fritz Xs are the first radio-controlled drones.

1953;

The USS Mississippi tests an early computer-guided missile. A few years later and the Talos

missile system goes online, featuring a homing device that can automatically correct for varying

altitudes and speeds.

1988;

The USS Aegis air-defence system in the Persian Gulf detects what is apparently a hostile

aircraft, but is in fact an Iranian commercial airliner. But as the missile system is in

semiautomatic mode, it shoots the jetliner down and kills everyone on board.

35 McCormick, T ‘Lethal Autonomy; A Short History’, Foreign Policy, 24/01/2014, available from; https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/24/lethal-autonomy-a-short-history/, accessed on 29/08/2018

22

1994;

The U.S government gives a contract to General Atomics to

construct the RQ1- Predator drone, which transmits real time

video footage via satellite link. This is guided by ground-based

controllers that can be miles away. One year later and the aircraft

is deployed to Bosnia and by 2001 it has been upgraded to carry

Hellfire missiles. The era of drone warfare is born.

2006;

South Korea announces a plan to install sentry robots along the demilitarised zone with its

northern counter-part. These are armed with machine guns and capable of autonomous targeting

however, human approval is necessary before they open fire.

2009;

The United States Air Force releases a document for a long-term plan to implement ‘fully

autonomous capability’ for aircraft, including the use of force. ‘The end result would be a

revolution in the roles of humans in air warfare’ the report claims.

2012;

Cambridge University’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk publish an article which

discusses the possible risks of artificial intelligence going haywire, suggesting that we ‘risk

yielding control over the planet to intelligences that are simply indifferent to us, and to things

that we consider valuable – things such as life and a sustainable environment’.

April 2013;

A broad coalition of NGOs launch the ‘Campaign to Stop Killer Robots’ (discussed below).

May 2013;

UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, calls

for a moratorium on autonomous robot development and calls on states to consider if current

international law frameworks are sufficient enough to govern their use.

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July 2013;

The unmanned air vehicle Northrop Grumman X-47B lands on the USS H.W Bush deck, making

it the first unmanned autonomous vehicle to land on an aircraft carrier.

October 2013;

The British parliament discovers that BAE Systems’ supersonic Taranis drone has been

undergoing secret tests out in the Australian outback. BAE reassures legislators that a human

operator is still involved in the control of the weapon.

November 2013;

All 117 governments that are party to the U.N Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

agree to discuss lethal autonomy next year, with activists remaining hopeful that a ban may

follow.

24

Discussion:

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and the problem;

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is a coalition of non-governmental organisations and

broader civil society who, as the name would suggest, have the primary aim of making the

international community implement a ban on all forms of lethal autonomous weapons. It is

spearheaded by Human Rights Watch who have written extensively about killer robots, including

a report which gives several arguments in favour of a pre-emptive and legal ban on these new

types of weapons. The report is very long and detailed, and so would be impossible to cover in

this study guide alone, and so some of the key points from the article will be discussed.

Legal dangers;

Legal dangers are the first to be mentioned in the report. It cites that ‘the difficulties of

programming human traits such as reason and judgement into machines means that fully

autonomous weapons would likely be unable to comply reliably with international humanitarian

law’36. International humanitarian law requires that distinction is made between lawful and

unlawful targets37 and even weaponry with very advanced technology would struggle to make

such distinctions, lacking the human ability to understand the intentions of other humans and to

identify with them. While machines can be equipped with sensory and processing capabilities,

identifying if a human is a soldier or civilian, surrendering or injured is much more difficult,

especially when on contemporary battlefields, people often hide their identities.

Proportionality is also a contentious

issue. In any planning for a military

operation, considerations are made

about the anticipated military

advantage and potential harm to

civilians/collateral damage. Again,

accounting for these factors would be 36 Christian, R. ‘Making the case, the dangers of killer robots and the need for a pre-emptive ban’, Human Rights Watch, 09/12/2016, available from https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/09/making-case/dangers-killer-robots-and-need-preemptive-ban, accessed on 01/09/201837 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Customary IHL’, available from https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1, accessed on 02/09/2018

25

difficult for a machine, especially when we consider that every battle plan made will have a

different context to consider, and even if an algorithm could be developed that calculated

anticipated military advantage, no programmer could account for the potentially infinite number

of contextual possibilities in a conflict or military operation. And when the question of civilian

harm is brought into the equation, the risks are potentially too high.

Non-legal dangers;

Legal dangers are not the only concerns raised in the objections to lethal autonomous weapons.

Moral arguments have also been expressed. These are often dismissed by critics of implementing

a pre-emptive ban on LAWS, some saying that autonomous weapons could be programmed to

act ethically, thus making them moral agents38. But much of civil society and many states are not

convinced by this line of thinking, fiercely arguing that control over life or death situations

cannot be ceded to a machine. An interfaith declaration by religious leaders calling for a ban on

LAWS stated that ‘robotic warfare is an affront to human dignity and to the sacredness of life’39.

Human Rights Watch identifies three core issues relating to morality and LAWS, the lack of

human qualities necessary to exercise a moral judgement, threat to human dignity and absence of

moral agency40. Any killing by a machine is arguably inherently problematic because machines

cannot exercise human judgement or compassion. Humans are endowed with the ability to apply

reason and intellectual thinking when considering a life or death situation involving the use of

force. Machines are not, and so do not have the human empathy that acts as a check on killing.

Human dignity is undermined because the opening words of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights asserts the ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of

all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’41.

LAWS, would not be able to comprehend the value of life nor the significance of its loss. The

38 Arkin, R. ‘Governing Lethal Behaviour in Autonomous Robots’ Chapman and Hall /CRC (May 29 2009)39 Pax Christi International, ‘Interfaith Declaration in Support of a Ban on Fully Autonomous Weapons’ Available from; https://www.paxchristi.net/sites/default/files/interfaith_declaration.pdf, accessed on 02/09/201840 ibid, 201641 United Nations, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ Available from; http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html, accessed on 02/09/2018

26

concept of dignity to human life would be done away with if machines were in a position to

make independent decisions about who should live or die in conflict42.

Moral agency is also at stake. One roboticist claims that killer robots could be programmed to

operate on the basis of ‘ethical’ algorithms but this is not convincing for Human Rights Watch

on the grounds that a) such an algorithm is unlikely to be developed and b) Moral agents have

free will, intentionality and consciousness. Killer robots would act according to an algorithm and

so cannot be held morally accountable for their actions in the way that humans can.

Against a legal ban on autonomous weapons:

Former Chief of General Staff for the British Army, Kathleen McKendrick makes a case against

a ban on lethal autonomous weapons, arguing that it is not the answer to the otherwise legitimate

concerns that people have over their use. She starts off by saying that an international agreement

on the best way to address the challenges are partially undermined by a lack of ability to agree on

a definition of the capabilities that cause concern, notably the question of whether human

operators will still retain meaningful control over the use of force. She says that a number of

different ways in which human control can be lost ‘are grouped together’, citing examples such

as ‘systems which overload human operators with information’ or a ‘human crew responsible for

deciding the targets of a remotely piloted aircraft’ who feel ’sufficiently disassociated from their

decisions to lose effective control of them’43. She goes on to argue that states which already

42 Elias, R. “Facing the Brave New World of Killer Robots,” Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law, vol. 3 (2016)43 McKendrick, K ‘Banning Autonomous Weapons Is Not the Answer’ Chatham House, 02/05/2018, Available from; https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/banning-autonomous-weapons-not-answer, accessed on 02/09/2018

27

develop autonomous weapons responsibly implement a range of control measures on weapons in

both their procurement and usage, with the aim to ‘culminate in ensuring military commanders

and operators are competent, informed and that their control over the use of force is enhanced,

not undermined, by the tools they use.’44.

She acknowledges that a moral agent is necessary to comply with international humanitarian law

but also says that machines would not be taking on such a role due to it being beyond their scope,

meaning that ‘international humanitarian law already effectively prohibits the use of any such

systems’45. Delegates will need to consider whether grey areas might exist in a LAWS capability

and the international laws concerning a required moral agent in the use of force. If grey areas can

exist in what defines ‘human control over the use force’ as cited above then the same may be the

case for other areas in this topic.

What position a delegate’s country has on LAWS will determine which arguments they will look

to when debating in committee sessions but do not necessarily treat the debate around killer

robots as one in which countries are either ‘for’ or ‘against’ their usage in absolute terms. Some

of you may find that a middle ground argument exists and so this should be considered as well.

The Human Rights Watch report cited gives some of the key objections raised to banning LAWS

and so both this and the Chatham House article should be the starter readings for understanding

the arguments around this topic (the HRW report is rather long so do not necessarily read all of

it).

44 ibid, 201845 ibid, 2018

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Bloc positions:

Bloc positions for this topic are somewhat unorthodox due to the nature of this issue and the

requirements to pursue such technology. Therefore please carefully consider the ‘Notable

Outliers’ section at the end.

The majority of the European Union has avoided taking a strong stance on this issue, shown by

actions taken surrounding the research strand of the European Defence Fund46. There were

initially calls for programmes focused on the development of such technology to be barred from

accessing the fund, though within the requirements for funding, vague wording has been

introduced, blurring the line between what is and is not eligible for funding. During the

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 2018, France and Germany have both called

for the creation of a political declaration and a code of conduct to provide guidance on this issue

for the international community47, and showed disappointment surrounding the decision

regarding the fund.

Much like the EU, Asia has largely lacked in dialogue surrounding this issue, with many

countries in the region having not made a public statement on this issue since the UNHRC

discussion in 201348. This comes with the exception of a few countries with capabilities to

develop autonomous deadly robots (see below) and Pakistan who has openly made statements

against such technology.

Within African states there has been a greater push for national legislation regarding this matter.

In public forums, notable statements have been made by South African representatives49 who

have called for an international ban on behalf of African countries who are non-supportive of

these defence developments.

46 European Commission (2018) “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of The Council establishing the European Defence Fund, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-eu-defence-fund-regulation_en.pdf , Accessed on 15/08/201847 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (2018) “Five years of campaigning, CCW continues”, Available at: https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2018/03/fiveyears/, Accessed on 15/08/201848 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (2015) “Country Policy Positions” http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/KRC_CCWexperts_Countries_25Mar2015.pdf49 Ibid

29

Most countries within North America, e.g. Mexico and Cuba, have expressed their support for a

ban on autonomous deadly robots by joining the Non-Aligned movement50. The Non-Aligned

movement is formed of 22 countries, all of which have called for a ban on lethal autonomous

weapons systems. A list of these countries can be found here:

http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/KRC_CountryViews_16Nov2017.

pdf

Additionally, Venezuela took the step to submit a working paper on behalf of the Non-Aligned

Movement to the CCW in March 2018.

Notable outliers:

China, Japan and South Korea all currently have the capability to develop autonomous deadly

robots, all have at some point called for responsible use of LAWS. Russia has also claimed to be

developing similar ‘neural networks’ weapons technology51, raising concerns that autonomous

robots are leading to a new arms race, focused between major powers of the Asian continent.

Additionally, the United States has already replaced the majority of its surveillance capabilities

to unmanned aircraft52 and has invested heavily into autonomous defence technologies research.

The USA, similar to many of the others mentioned in the section, have focused on the potential

humanitarian and military benefits53 of this technology to justify their development.

50 Ibid51 TASS (2017), “Kalashnikov gunmaker develops combat module based on artificial intelligence” Available at: http://tass.com/defense/954894 Accessed 19/08/201852 DARPA (2018), ‘OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET)” Available at: https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/offensive-swarm-enabled-tactics Accessed 19/08/201853 The UN Office at Geneva (2018), “WP.4: Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems”, Available at: https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf Accessed on 19/08/2018

30

Conclusion – Key issues:

In conclusion, our newfound technological capabilities have placed our community in a newly

held position of responsibility. With the correct usage of LAWS unclearly defined

internationally, guidance is severely needed on this issue before such technology can be used in

combat. As opposition towards and development of LAWS both continue at an increasing pace,

delegates must now search for a middle ground upon which directions for appropriate usage of

this technology can be outlined. For this topic particularly, country policy is very varied and

scattered amongst groups, so please take the time to look for official statements from your

country regarding this issue. Delegates may find answering the following questions useful in

their research:

1. At this current time does your country have the capability to produce autonomous deadly

robots? If not, are they interested in developing this area of technology?

2. In your country’s view, does international law cover usage of autonomous deadly robots?

3. How can we define ‘human control over the use of force’?

4. Is it morally correct to allow for robots to make decisions in life or death situations?

5. How could Humanitarian benefits arise from usage of this technology?

6. Upon whom should the responsibility of the outcome of an attack using LAWS fall upon?

7. Given the developmental nature of this issue, should this topic be revisited at intervals?

8. What measures should be implemented by those developing and (in the potential future)

using LAWS to avoid unintended spread or usage of the technology?

Further Reading:

1) Campaign to Stop Killer Robots website; https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/

2) Human Rights Watch report on making the case for a pre-emptive ban;

https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/09/making-case/dangers-killer-robots-and-need-preemptive-

ban

3) UNA-UK Campaign hub on killer robots; https://www.una.org.uk/campaign-stop-killer-

robots?page=1

31

4) The case against a ban on killer robots;

https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/banning-autonomous-weapons-not-answer

5) Secondary article on why killer robots should not be banned;

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-31/killer-robots-weapons-banning-them-is-not-a-good-

idea/10177178

6) Economist report on how LAWS are a game changer;

https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/01/25/autonomous-weapons-are-a-game-

changer

Bibliography:

1- The Verge, ‘Elon Musk is worried that AI research could produce a real-life

Terminator’, 18/06/2014, available from:

https://www.theverge.com/2014/6/18/5820880/elon-musk-worried-ai-research-could-

produce-real-terminator , accessed on 22/08/2018

2- Shane, S and Wakabayashi, D ‘The Business of War; Google Employees Protest Work

for the Pentagon’, The New York Times 04/04/2018, available from:

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-

project.html , accessed on 22/08/2018

3- Metz, C, ‘Mark Zuckerburg, Elon Musk and the Feud Over Killer Robots’, The New

York Times, 09/06/2018, available from:

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/technology/elon-musk-mark-zuckerberg-artificial-

intelligence.html , accessed on 22/08/2018

4- McCormick, T ‘Lethal Autonomy; A Short History’, Foreign Policy, 24/01/2014,

available from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/24/lethal-autonomy-a-short-history/ ,

accessed on 29/08/2018

5- Christian, R. ‘Making the case, the dangers of killer robots and the need for a pre-emptive

ban’, Human Rights Watch, 09/12/2016, available from:

https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/09/making-case/dangers-killer-robots-and-need-

preemptive-ban , accessed on 01/09/2018

32

6- International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Customary IHL’, available from: https://ihl-

databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1 , accessed on 02/09/2018

7- Arkin, R. ‘Governing Lethal Behaviour in Autonomous Robots’ Chapman and Hall /CRC

(May 29 2009)

8- Pax Christi International, ‘Interfaith Declaration in Support of a Ban on Fully

Autonomous Weapons’ Available from:

https://www.paxchristi.net/sites/default/files/interfaith_declaration.pdf, accessed on

02/09/2018

9- United Nations, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ Available from:

http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html, accessed on

02/09/2018

10- Elias, R. “Facing the Brave New World of Killer Robots,” Indonesian Journal of

International & Comparative Law, vol. 3 (2016)

11- McKendrick, K ‘Banning Autonomous Weapons Is Not the Answer’ Chatham House,

02/05/2018, Available from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/banning-

autonomous-weapons-not-answer, accessed on 02/09/2018

12- European Commission (2018) “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and

of The Council establishing the European Defence Fund, Available at:

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-eu-defence-

fund-regulation_en.pdf , Accessed on 15/08/2018

13- Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (2018) “Five years of campaigning, CCW continues”,

Available at: https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2018/03/fiveyears/, Accessed on

15/08/2018

14- Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (2015) “Country Policy Positions” Available at:

http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/KRC_CCWexperts_Countri

es_25Mar2015.pdf

15- TASS (2017), “Kalashnikov gunmaker develops combat module based on artificial

intelligence” Available at: http://tass.com/defense/954894 Accessed 19/08/2018

16- DARPA (2018), ‘OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET)” Available at:

https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/offensive-swarm-enabled-tactics Accessed

19/08/2018

33

17- The UN Office at Geneva (2018), “WP.4: Humanitarian benefits of emerging

technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems”, Available at:

https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F

004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf Accessed on 19/08/2018

34