Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003989

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT(IDA-5395)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR13.1 MILLION (US$20.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FOR A

EMERGENCY FOOD CRISIS RESPONSE AND AGRICULTURE RE-LAUNCH PROJECT

September 29, 2016

Agriculture Global Practice

Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective September 14, 2016)

Currency Unit = CFA Francs (CFAF)1 CFAF = US$ 0.00171US$ 1.00 = FCFA 584

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAAAGETIP

Analytic and Advisory ActivitiesAgence Générale d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Publics

BAS Beneficiary Assessment Survey CAS Country Assistance StrategyCBCAR Central Bank of Central African RepublicDA Designated AccountEA Environmental AssessmentEPA Environment Protection AuthorityERR Economic Rate of ReturnESMPESSAF

Environmental and Social Management PlanEnvironmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework

ESW Economic and Sector WorkFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationFCS Fragile and Conflict-affected StatesFMGAM/GAM

Financial ManagementGroupements d’Agro-Multiplicateurs de semences/Groups of Agro-Multiplicators of seeds

GDP Gross Domestic ProductIPM Integrated Pest ManagementICRICRACIAR

Implementation Completion and Results ReportInstitut Centrafricain de Recherche Agronomique/Central African Institute for Agricultural Research

IDA International Development AssociationIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIFR Interim Financial ReportIEG Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank GroupISN Interim Strategy NoteMCDMR/MCRD

Ministère en charge du Développement du Monde Rural/Ministry in Charge of Rural Development

M&E Monitoring and EvaluationMOF Ministry of FinanceMOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation

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MTR Mid-Term ReviewNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationPAD Project Appraisal DocumentPDO Project Development ObjectivePIM Project Implementation ManualPSC Project Steering CommitteePSUPURCARA/EFCRAPLP

Project Support UnitProjet d’Urgence en Réponse à la Crise Alimentaire et la Relance de l’Agriculture/Emergency Food Crisis Response and Agriculture Re-Launch Project

SOE Statement of ExpendituresTOR Terms of Reference

Vice President: Makhtar DiopSenior Global Practice Director Juergen VoegelePractice Manager: Siméon K. EhuiProject Team Leader: Nicaise EhouéICR Team Leader: Soulemane FofanaICR Primary Author: Soulemane Fofana

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

EMERGENCY FOOD CRISIS RESPONSE AND AGRICULTURE RE-LAUNCH PROJECT

ContentsA. Basic Information.......................................................................................................vB. Key Dates....................................................................................................................vC. Ratings Summary........................................................................................................vD. Sector and Theme Codes...........................................................................................viE. Bank Staff..................................................................................................................viF. Results Framework Analysis.....................................................................................viiG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs....................................................................ixH. Restructuring (if any)..................................................................................................xI. Disbursement Profile....................................................................................................x1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design................................................12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes...............................................53. Assessment of Outcomes...........................................................................................114. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome.........................................................185. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance......................................................186. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................217. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners...........21Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing..........................................................................23Annex 2: Outputs by Component..................................................................................24Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis..................................................................27Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes.............28Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results (if any)...............................................................30Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)......................................31Annex 7: Summary of Government’s ICR....................................................................33Annex 8: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders........................39Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents.......................................................................40MAP...............................................................................................................................41

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A. Basic Information

Country:Central African Republic

Project Name:

Emergency Food Crisis Response and Agriculture Re-Launch Project

Project ID: P149512 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-53950ICR Date: 09/29/2016 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument:Investment Project Financing

Borrower:GOVERNMENT OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Original Total Commitment:

SDR 13.1M Disbursed Amount: SDR 13.08M

Revised Amount: SDR 13.1MEnvironmental Category: BImplementing Agencies: World Food Program (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) under contract with the Ministry of Rural DevelopmentCofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 01/17/2014 Effectiveness: 04/02/2014 04/02/2014 Appraisal: 02/05/2014 Restructuring(s): 02/13/2015 Approval: 03/07/2014 Mid-term Review: 11/30/2014 12/08/2014 Closing: 09/30/2015 03/31/2016

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome High Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately

Unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Unsatisfactory

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Performance: Unsatisfactory Performance:

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

NoQuality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

NoQuality of Supervision (QSA):

None

PDO rating before Closing/Inactive status

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Agriculture, fishing, and forestry/crops 80 80 Agriculture, fishing, and forestry/animal production 10 10 Agriculture, fishing, and forestry/general agriculture 10 10

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Rural development/global food crisis response 100 100

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Makhtar Diop Practice Manager/Manager:

Siméon K. Ehui Severin Kodderitzsch

Project Team Leader: Nicaise Ehoue Manievel Sene ICR Team Leader: Soulemane Fofana ICR Primary Author: Soulemane Fofana

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators (as approved)

The Project Development Objectives (PDOs) was to protect and rebuild livelihoods, human capital, particularly of children, and to re-launch the productivity of the agriculture sector.

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Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators and reasons/justifications

There was no change in the PDO; however, two PDO indicators and four intermediate indicators were adjusted during a restructuring soon after the MTR; both the original and revised ones are presented below.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Direct beneficiaries for support in food crop production (number)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 143,200 147,105

Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Achievement of 102.7%, i.e. the target was reached. With the savings from purchasing large quantities involving 316.9 metric tons, incl. negotiated costs with the Groups of Agri-Multiplicators (GAMs) of seeds, and following a decommissioning as seeds, the number of vulnerable beneficiaries reached could be increased.

Indicator 2: Direct beneficiaries for livelihood assistance (number)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 1,100,000 440,563 721,635

Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016 03/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

163.8% of the revised target was achieved and 65% of the original target. The new crisis that emerged in Ouham, Nana Gribizi, and Ouham Pende, and the returning populations led to significantly increased numbers of beneficiaries.

Indicator 3: Direct child beneficiaries for human capital protection (number)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 424,500 108,063 153,248

Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016 03/31/2016

Comments (incl. % achievement)

142% of the revised target was achieved; however, achievement amounted to only 36% of the original target. The improved security situation in the country and preventive food distributions along with the gradual re-opening of health facilities have promoted and facilitated an increased access of children.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: General food distribution (tons)Value (quantitative or

0 1,400 5,105

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Qualitative) Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

364% of target achieved. This indicator was not formally revised during the Restructuring, even though later on it appeared in ISRs as a revised target of 5,086.7 tons.

Indicator 2: Blanket supplementary feeding (tons)Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 2,500 372.2 439

Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016 03/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

118% of revised indicator achieved but only 17.5% of original one.

Indicator 3: Targeted supplementary feeding (tons)Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 2,000 1,034.4 1,158

Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016 03/31/2016

Comments (incl. % achievement)

112% of revised indicator achieved; only 58% of original one . The improved security situation in the country and the progressive reopening of health facilities have improved access of malnourished children as well as pregnant and lactating women.

Indicator 4: Emergency school feeding (tons)Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 1,470 824 602

Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016 03/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

73% of revised indicator achieved; 41% of original one.

Indicator 5: Increase in seed production capacity (tons)Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 350 321

Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016

Comments (incl. % achievement)

92% of target achieved. 316 tons of seed were produced in 2014, but these were declassified and reassigned to vulnerable populations because of their capacity for food production. The productions of the GAMs in 2015 have not yet been determined by FAO except for 5 tons of peanuts produced by the Centre-African Institute of Agricultural Research (ICAR)/Institut Centre-Africain de Recherche Agronomique (ICRA) in the northwest; no seeds were produced in the South -West. In reality, the project could only produce selected seeds. Information will be updated once the production data for 2015 is known to NGO partners.

Indicator 6: Increase in grain and seed storage capacity (tons)Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 150 24

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Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

16% achieved. As of the date of completion, only 12 of the originally targeted 75 warehouses for storage were completed as observed at ICR. With an estimated average storage capacity of 2 tons per warehouse, this would amount to 24 tons.

Indicator 7: People trained (number)Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 200 446

Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

223% achieved. Given the high need for training, the project has taken into account the additional requests made by the government and international & local NGOs.

Of which youth trained 150 300 (= 200 percent

achievement)Of which decentralized personnel

50 146 (= 292 percent achievement)

Indicator 8: Direct beneficiaries (number)Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

1,667,700 583,7831,021,988 (= 148 percent achievement)

Date achieved 02/21/2014 09/30/2015 03/31/2016 03/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

175% of the revised indicator achieved; only 61% of original target

Of which female 30 percent

51 percent (= 170 percent achievement)

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived PDO IP

Actual Disbursements(XDR millions)

1 05/31/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 08/24/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.45 3 01/22/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.45 4 06/18/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.08 5 30/07/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.08 6 01/12/2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.08 7 04/11/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 13.08

H. Restructuring (if any)

ix

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in XDR millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes MadePDO IP

02/13/2015 N S S 13.08Extension of Closing Date and reduction of several target values related to Component A

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1. The Central African Republic (CAR) is a mid-sized (623,000 km2), sparsely populated (4.6 million), landlocked country in Central Africa. It is one of the poorest country in the world with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US$471 in 2012 and ranked 196th out 198th in the 2014 UN Human Development Index (HDI). Its economy has been characterized by low-growth and decreasing economic opportunities as most investment has shifted from export-oriented agricultural production (such as cotton and coffee) to rent seeking activities on extractive industries including timber, diamonds, and gold.

2. Country context. Since early 2013, the country has experienced massive armed clashes and inter-communal violence, creating an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, which unraveled the country’s social fabric, displaced over 25 percent of the country’s population, and resulted in a steady deterioration in the political and security context that led to depressed economic activity, loss of administrative capacity, declining social service provision, and protection incidents. Exacerbating the political problems is the government inability to provide basic services to its citizens. The crisis prompted an international response in early 2014, including peacekeeping intervention from African Union (AU), France, European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) forces as well as concomitant emergency relief by UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).1

3. Emergency food crisis. The United Nations’ Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated in early 2014 that about one million persons were internally displaced, including over 500,000 in the capital city of Bangui alone. 2.6 million people were estimated to require humanitarian assistance. The surge in violence in December 2013 occurred after months of a steady deterioration in the political and security context in CAR that led to depressed economic activity, loss of administrative capacity, declining social service provision, and security incidents.

4. The results of a Multi-Sectorial Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) undertaken in January 2014 by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Program (WFP), and other development partners indicated that households were adopting negative coping strategies, including selling productive assets, taking on debt, and reducing the number of meals and food consumption. This survival mode compromised the households’ ability to restart their agricultural livelihoods when the situation stabilized, as well as lifelong damage to human capital resulting in longer term economic loss. Food prices across the country increased substantially due to disruption of transportation services, markets, and traders. Almost all communities anticipated not having enough seed to plant for the 2014 agricultural season (March and May), which raised the risk of a very poor agricultural harvest in 2014.

1 Meanwhile, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), together with the Bangui Forum, has been leading a political initiative that has included the installation of a transitional government and national elections. Faustin-Archange Touadera, a former prime minister and mathematics professor, was declared the winner of a presidential election in February 2016 seen as crucial to turning the page on years of sectarian violence. He campaigned as a peacemaker who could bridge the religious divide. The situation was pretty calm up to June 2016 when again various incidence of violence occurred.

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5. In early 2014, the WFP appealed for US$107 million in aid to CAR, but received only 12 percent of that amount, suggesting a large shortfall. WFP adopted a phased approach to the CAR crisis. In the first phase from January to April 2014, WFP focused primarily on providing assistance to those in immediate need, by scaling up an integrated food distribution, blanket supplementary feeding packages for the most vulnerable, and ensuring targeted nutrition support and school meals to support as basic services are gradually re-opened. In the second phase, from May to August 2014, an expanded, integrated food and nutrition safety net was planned to be introduced for moderately food insecure populations in need as the lean season was expected to start to “bite”, and support to basic health and education services were to be expanded. WFP sought to closely and continuously monitor the situation with humanitarian partners on the ground and aimed to maintain flexibility to adapt beneficiary figures, targeting, and duration of assistance as necessary.

6. FAO’s strategic response plan in CAR aimed at an immediate livelihood emergency assistance and distribution of seeds and agricultural tools, targeting the most vulnerable populations. FAO also aimed at providing food production assistance to severely food insecure populations (including refugees and IDPs) as long as required, with a particular emphasis on support during the agriculture season. Saving the 2014 agricultural campaign starting in April 2014 was considered to be essential to prevent further decay of the food insecurity situation. FAO interventions included activities to: (i) improve access to essential agricultural inputs (seeds and tools) to increase food production; (ii) linking relief, rehabilitation and development by quickly increasing purchasing power in rural and suburban areas through cash transfers and cash-for-work activities; and (iii) rebuilding destroyed infrastructure (such storage facilities).

7. Given the difficult situation on the ground, in early 2014 that about one million persons were internally displaced, including over 500,000 in the capital city of Bangui alone and 2.6 million people estimated to require humanitarian assistance, it was therefore considered urgent to pursue immediate delivery of food and agricultural input support to affected populations while reinforcing the resilience of the structures that support the producers through the production and purchase of quality locally produced seeds, with the objective of maintaining human capital and setting the basis of the agricultural recovery. It was in this context that based on OP10.00 paragraph 11 the current project was prepared to respond to the need of the population and alleviate their suffering.

8. Based on the above, the World Bank developed and presented to its Board a US$100 million emergency response for CAR drawing on the restructuring of the existing portfolio of five active projects, of the unallocated IDA 16 balance, and the first year of IDA 17 frontloading. This response included this emergency food and agriculture re-launch project for US$20 million derived from the cancellation of the unallocated resources of an exciting agricultural project with a poor performance on the ground.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

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9. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to protect and rebuild livelihoods, human capital, particularly of children, and to re-launch the productivity of the agriculture sector.

10. In particular, the Project aimed at financing food expenditures and agricultural production assets. Food expenditures were to be effectively targeted towards selected beneficiaries by setting a prioritization list within the contract with WFP to use WB funds (in descending order of priority): (i) blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) for under-five child nutrition; (ii) targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) for pregnant and lactating women (PLW) and children aged 6-59 months in areas that suffer from moderate acute malnutrition; (iii) emergency school feeding (ESF); and (iv) general food distribution (GFD). In the contract with FAO, agricultural assets to be covered included subsidized seeds and equipment as well as training to seeds producers and women groups and to the most affected households, subsidized seeds to NGOs participating to the Food Security Cluster (FSC), and training to field decentralized services of the Ministry of Rural Development.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

11. The PDO remained unchanged. However, soon after the MTR, on February 13, 2015, a Level 2 Restructuring took place under which two PDO indicators and four intermediate indicators were significantly adjusted downward. Rather than providing rounded targets, the revised indicators are unusually specific, and it is not clear how these were determined or why these were so specific. The reasons for the restructuring were that: (a) results were overestimated during appraisal, and (b) due to insecurity in Central African Republic, costs of the activities under Component A had become higher than the original estimates; thus, the original targets were no longer realistic.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

12. The project’s main beneficiaries were the people most affected by and vulnerable to under-nutrition and households, which were affected by a reduced agricultural production capacity. In particular, this included: (i) livelihood assistance to about 722,000 people; human capital protection to about 153,000 young children (6-59 months old), 602 tons of food for schoolchildren provided via school canteens; and (ii) food production support for about 147,100 people including as well as provision of training for 446 people (incl. staff of participating NGOs and decentralized field staff of the Ministry of Rural Development).

13. Targeting . Based on the Food Security Assessment of 2013, the initial, identified priority prefectures were Bangui, Ouham, Ouham Pende, Lobaye, Nana-Mambéré and Ombella M’Poko, Basse Kotto, Mbomou, and Ouaka. Based on further consultations WFP included the Northeastern parts of the country in its priority geographical targeting of the project as well as parts of the Nana-Gribizi prefecture.

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14. FAO activities targeted the prefectures of Ouham, Ouham Pende, Nana Gribizi, Lobaye, Ombella M’poko, Ouaka, and Kemo. To avoid exacerbating ongoing tensions in country by favoring one region/group/area over another, targeting of beneficiaries was undertaken with caution. Targeting of beneficiaries’ populations in need was done at the community level and was based on the communities’ socio-economic profile (with special consideration given to the proportion of female-headed households), coping strategies, food stock availability, food consumption patterns, and households hosting displaced persons. Regular consultations with affected populations and communications campaign to local religious leaders to inform their communities about distributions were implemented.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

15. The Project aimed at contributing to the efforts of: (i) stabilizing household livelihood and preventing further negative coping strategies by households during the lean season beginning in March/April 2014; and (ii) revitalizing the country’s agriculture sector before the planting season in 2014. It had two components: (A) Human Capital Protection and Livelihood Assistance; and (B) Re-Launch the Productivity of the Agriculture Sector.

16. Component A: Human Capital Protection and Livelihood Assistance (US$12.0 million IDA). This component was designed to protect the human capital of children, including those in the first 1,000 days of life, and to prevent negative coping strategies by poor households – such as selling assets, incurring debt, and sacrificing food consumption - which would have compromised human capital and livelihood recovery in the longer run. WFP was to procure internationally specialized foods, unavailable locally, to be used for blanket and targeted feeding of young children, 6-59 months, as well as for pregnant and lactating women. It also was to procure staple foods (grains, legumes, oils) where possible in neighboring countries through competitive procurement, and to move them by land to CAR. These foods were intended for distribution to food insecure households, in the affected prefectures at numerous distribution points, with coverage increasing over time as the lean season began to take its toll. The total human capital protection and livelihood assistance program implemented by WFP intended to reach more than 1.1 million people. The distribution of food was particularly aimed at supporting those populations returning from safe-havens to areas of origin and their farmland to support the 2014 planting season (March-May). General food distributions to the rest of poor households were planned to continue to be undertaken by WFP as part of its overall response program in CAR. The World Bank financing was relatively small compared to the whole WFP program, and it was prioritized towards the protection of human capital, particularly children and pregnant and lactating women.

17. Component B: Re-Launch the Productivity of the Agriculture Sector (US$8.0 million IDA). This component aimed at restoring food production capacity for the most affected people in the food insecure areas. Despite the fact that the 2014 situation called for humanitarian aid, the project intended to go beyond the essential agricultural input provision and support seeds suppliers and farming women groups in strengthening their capacity for resilience in a broader scope than just production. This component intended

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to finance support purchase of groundnut, maize, rice and vegetable seeds (about 400 tons) for subsidized distribution to seeds producers’ groups (17,400 households), and 370 women’ groups (11,100 households) to restore domestic food production capacity. In addition, it intended to support procurement of about 55,000 pieces of farm equipment for subsidized distribution to the same beneficiaries, 740 processing units, and rehabilitation and construction of 75 post-harvest and seed storage facilities at community and village level for women’ groups, and of the seed laboratory control for the Central African Institute for Agricultural Research (ICRA). Component B also intended to provide training to the beneficiary farmers and to 50 field personnel of the Ministry of Rural Development as well as 150 young graduates, who were to participate in the implementation of the project.

1.6 Revised Components

18. The components were not revised.

1.7 Other Significant Changes

19. During the restructuring, the closing date was extended to March 31, 2016 “in order to complete the 2015 growing season and inform the implementation completion and results report with the full results on component B”. The restructuring note stated that the cropping calendar (from sowing to post-harvest) of the project target crops (maize, groundnut, rice, sorghum, sesame and cowpea) will last from May 2015 to February 2016. It was argued that the extension of the closing date until March 2016 would allow the project to cover two growing seasons, the minimum to get reliable results in agriculture due to the nature of the sector and related risks.

20. Nevertheless, the Project’s closing date was extended from September 30, 2015, to March 31, 2016 in order to permit the government/FAO to more fully implement the planned actions.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

21. Incorporation of Lessons Learned. The project design drew on lessons learned from ongoing and completed projects. This included: (a) outsourcing implementation to non-governmental partners can be an effective strategy in fragile states; (b) for emergency operations, intense implementation support may often be needed immediately following effectiveness to rapidly close any “readiness gaps” and ensure successful outcomes; (c) weak institutional capacity within key ministries hinders development impact from Bank investments, but cannot be adequately addressed through emergency operations; and (d) non-traditional partners can introduce new and innovative ways of doing things.

22. Project Preparation . The Project was prepared as an emergency operation aimed at addressing targeted food needs of war-affected populations and prepare to re-launch the

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agriculture sector in CAR. Due to the urgent needs to quickly respond to the pressing demands, a great effort was made by the project team to accelerate the project preparation with the management support2. Hence, it took less than three weeks from the project concept note approval to appraisal, about a month for its approval, and about the same time until effectiveness.

23. Due to the limitation of viable means that would have allowed effective and immediate implementation of activities and also due to the absence of Government implementation capacity on the ground, the Project was designed with two contracted components which were implemented by WFP and FAO, respectively. WFP focused on activities related to food crisis and reducing the impact of the food insecurity (Component A), and FAO implemented activities related to revitalization of the agriculture sector (Component B). During preparation, the task team worked with FAO and WFP teams as a way to ensure a comprehensive and mutually acceptable way of working with the two institutions in order to minimize delays and establish effective selection and contracting procedures. This approach was discussed with the counterpart Minister in CAR who was fully on board (and remained so in the new Government appointed at the time). Funding necessary for this operation came from the cancellation of the Agro-pastoral Recovery Project, approved in May 2011, with an amount of US$ 23.8 million. Due to the nature of the crisis that was taking in place at the time of preparation in CAR, none of the activities of that project could be implemented as planned, and the funds remaining in that Project, in the amount of US$ 21 million, were cancelled.

24. Risk Assessment . Risk during project preparation and implementation was correctly assessed as H (High), given the insecure and dynamic environment with limited capacity and infrastructure in CAR. The reason is that the CAR has experienced sustained periods of political instability and internal conflict, resulting in weak governance and poor socio-economic outcomes. The government’s capacity at the central and decentralized levels to implement policies and donor programs has been severely affected and is very low. The risk inherent in these capacity constraints was therefore correctly identified in the PAD as high. To limit the impact of this risk on project implementation, the government’s decision makers, together with the Bank, selected as implementing agencies for the project FAO and WFP, which had, in general, good track records and experience in managing Bank funds.

2.2 Implementation

2 On January 31, 2014, a notification memo seeking approval to process the operation under OP 7.30 dealing with De facto Governments and OP10.11 (formerly OP8.00) was approved by the RVP.

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25. In view of the crisis and the low government capacity for providing food and agricultural services in the country, WFP and FAO were contracted by the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD)/Ministère en charge du Développement du Monde Rural (MCDMR). WFP was contracted to implement Component A - Human Capital Protection and Livelihood Assistance. FAO was contracted to implement Component B - Re-Launch of the Productivity of the Agriculture Sector, but its implementation was weak (see below). The Agence Générale d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Publics (AGETIP; part of the Ministry in charge of infrastructure) was assigned the coordination and financial management of the project; however, its work was nearly non-existent (see below) despite several recommendations made during the implementation missions urging more active AGETIP involvement.

26. The Project was approved by the Board of Directors of the Bank on March 7, 2014, with a total funding of US$20.0 million, and it became effective on April 2, 2014.

27. Coordination between the Government and the implementing agencies for the project management did not function as expected. AGETIP-CAF was chosen to coordinate; however, it “remained on the sidelines”3 of the implementation of activities and of the monitoring and evaluation of the project. FAO’s reporting was unsatisfactory with weak follow-up of activities in the field and non-compliance with the Agreement terms in the form of delays in submitting quarterly reports. Information from FAO on activities during 2015 was still not available at the time of completion, and only 12 warehouses with a total capacity of 24 metric tons were constructed and delivered by project completion.

28. Given the context of the crisis in the country, FAO, WFP, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development were to hold regular consultations during implementation to address issues. Additionally, FAO and WFP were to send quarterly technical progress reports to the Bank. As for WFP, its monitoring and evaluation system in place was effective, and it provided regular reports, while FAO did not. The environmental and social aspects of the project and consideration of diversity (indigenous peoples and other minorities) are believed to have been implemented satisfactorily, but reliable information was not available to the ICR team.

29. As of the closing date, 100 percent of funds were disbursed (per client data, disbursements amounted to US$12.0 million via WFP and US$8.0 million via FAO). The financial statements provided by WFP showed that the resources were fully used for project activities. As far FAO was concerned the last Aide memoire and the letter of transmission clearly specified that all activities should be completed by the end of the closing to avoid ineligible expenses to be reimbursed by the Government. In its response to the aide-memoir letter of transmission. , FAO’s representative claimed that “all activities had been initiated well before the closing date and should not be considered” ineligible”. It is worth mentioning that several e-mails exchanges between the Task Team and a FAO project Coordinator, most of recommendations to FAO to improve its

3As assessed by the final supervision mission.

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performance and to regularly send reports to the Government and the Bank was not implemented. While the Task Team constantly informed the management of these shortcomings, no official correspondence was sent to FAO for compliance. Unfortunately, the financial management review conducted during the closing mission indicated that at least US$ 881,000 expenditures were made with no justification.

30. Overall, results of project implementation are considered moderately unsatisfactory, affected by the difficult country conditions, problems under Component B, and non-performance of AGETIP. During 2014 and from January 2015 through August 2015, the security situation in the country had improved. However, the outbreak of violence in September 2015 had again impacted the overall security situation and has had two major consequences, namely: (a) population movements, and (b) abandonment of crops in the field. From December 2015 onwards, there was again an improvement in the security situation, which in turn made the planned elections possible. Furthermore, the MTR identified various issues with regard to FAO project implementation, and it therefore demanded that FAO prepare, before the end of 2014, “a very detailed action plan” to address the problems that were identified, including the absence of M&E. However, it seems that this action plan was not produced. However, FAO was not able to complete all project activities by March 31, 2016. By the project closing: (i) only 12 storage units of the originally planned 75 were completed; (ii) animal distribution to the beneficiaries in the perspective of increasing their resilience was not completed; (iii) seeds to be delivered to the National Agronomic Research Center were not delivered; and (iv) no information was available to the ICR team whether all the 55,000 planned agricultural implements were provided at the subsidized price.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

31. M&E Design. The Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) was a tool developed by the World Food Program, FAO, international NGOs, and the National Institute for Economic and Social Studies which allowed in principle to collect data on a yearly basis in CAR, including this Bank-funded project. The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system for the project was intended to be participatory and handled by FAO and WFP. A study was planned to be undertaken by WFP and FAO to evaluate the impact of the project’s interventions including whether the increased access to food, seeds, and equipment had an intended impact on nutrition and production levels. However, the study was not carried out.

32. Monitoring tools and expanding the existing database for nutrition activities, school feeding, and food distribution interventions were to be refined. WFP M&E focal points at the country and sub-office level as well as FAO relevant staff were to be trained. Partner NGOs, UN agencies, and Government Technical Ministries were to be involved in the development of M&E tools to ensure integration and coherence. WFP also planned to use NGOs for third-party monitoring in areas that remain inaccessible to staff. Food security, market, and nutrition indicators were to be monitored jointly with partner NGOs through a multi-sectoral surveillance system led by Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and monthly surveillance bulletins issued.

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33. M&E Implementation. WFP carried out regular monitoring. However, FAO did not have an M&E system. While designing the project, the Bank and Government Teams counted on FAO to use its own M&E system to follow up project implementation. But with the reality on the ground, the Bank and the Government discovered during implementation that the said system did not exist, and FAO did not put a system in place for the Bank-financed project. This should have been noted and addressed during the first supervision mission. It was only towards the end of the project that FAO hired an international consultant to write a report, but it lacked substance and accuracy because of the absence of monitoring.

34. M&E Utilization. Generation of monitoring data has been satisfactory for Component A. Also, in terms of reporting, WFP documents have consistently been of good quality and were delivered in a timely manner throughout the project period. FAO’s monitoring under Component B has been weak or inexistent and the reporting unsatisfactory.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

A. Safeguards Compliance

35. Environmental Safeguards: The Project was classified as environmental category B mainly because any negative impact would be local and limited, and specific mitigation measures were designed. The proposed intervention included: (i) supply of food, (ii) supply of seed and equipment, and (iii) rehabilitation of storages facilities. An Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) was prepared (see below), and appropriate elements were incorporated into the Project Implementation Manual (PIM). Potential negative impacts of the Project focused on the following: (i) deterioration of soil; (ii) surface water and groundwater pollution risks due to the increased use of pesticides; and (iii) loss of vegetation following the installation of storage facilities.

36. An Environmental and Social Mitigation Assessment (ESMA) and Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) were developed in project areas and integrated within subprojects cycle. The existing Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), Pest and Pesticide Management Plan (PMP) and Indigenous Peoples Plan (IPP) for the World Bank’s Agro-Pastoral Recovery Project (P124278) prepared in 2012 were updated before the implementation of activities on the ground. The Project excluded activities requiring resettlement.

37. As this operation was subject to OP/BP 10.00, paragraph 11, related to Projects in Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance or Capacity Constraints, an Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) was prepared. It provided general policies, guidelines, codes of practice, and procedures to be integrated into the implementation of the Project. The ESSAF described the approach and principles to be followed to ensure due diligence in managing the potential adverse environmental and social impacts and risks associated with the Project.

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38. The ESSAF was developed specifically for this Project to ensure due diligence to avoid causing harm or exacerbating social tensions and to ensure consistent treatment of social and environmental issues by the Government of CAR and service providers. The purpose of the ESSAF was also to assist the WFP, FAO, and all concerned public agencies in screening project-supported activities for their likely social and environmental impacts, identifying documentation and preparation requirements, and piloting the investments. The detailed descriptions of project-supported activities and their exact locations were made available to facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of project implementation. In addition, the ESSAF provided a framework for the establishment of guidelines and codes of practice for the prevention and mitigation of potential environmental and social impacts as well as for safeguards procedures. The relevant safeguards instruments (ESMF, PMP, and IPP) were updated and disclosed 120 days after the project effectiveness; however, the ICR team was unable to assess how these were implemented.

B. Fiduciary Compliance

39. Regarding Component A, WFP provided satisfactory interim and final reports and transmitted these to the Bank on time. Concerning Component B that FAO was charged to implement, interim reports were often received late and the final report not received. That final report should have addressed the issues of the unaccounted funds of US$ 881,000.

40. During the World Bank’s final implementation support mission from February 29 to March 4, 2016, the team requested FAO to: (a) transmit to the Bank complete financial statements, audited by FAO; and (b) provide a comprehensive picture of the remaining activities up to the closing date, and (c) provide several other reports needed to complete the project in a proper manner.

41. In that context, a comprehensive analysis of the financial management of the Project was carried out by the Bank’s Financial Management Specialists. This revealed that US$ 881,000 are considered non-eligible expenditures made by FAO, since there was no justification of the incurred expenses. The final mission conveyed to the government and FAO that this amount of unjustified expenditures must be reimbursed to the Bank. FAO has not complied, and the Bank has not yet sufficiently elevated the matter.

42. FAO did not provide the various reports as requested before the closing of the project on March 31, 2016. Further, FAO has not provided them during the period March to September 2016, and it did not provide the refund.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

43. An emergency project in the context of CAR was justifiable after a protracted conflict, which has torn apart the social fabrics and has prevented the country to produce the basic staple food it needs. In this perspective this emergency project helped to meet the immediate needs for the most vulnerable portion (children under 5, pregnant women)

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of the population through food distribution, while paving the way to re-launch the agricultural sector based on input and small equipment availability. In order to sustain the achievements of this project, the newly-elected Government is re-emphasizing agriculture as its primary instrument to spur economic development and sustain peace through youth employment and integration of ex-combatants. The Bank is supporting the Government with re-engagement and policy notes in which agriculture will play a central role. Going forward, two projects have been planned to support agricultural development: one is a transport project and one an agriculture project. Both aim to connect the potential agricultural basins to facilitate inputs and outputs flows, institutional and capacity building, and rural infrastructure, which, together and in turn, are expected to improve productivity, production, and markets access.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Relevance of Objectives

Rating: Substantial

44. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-1), prepared by the CAR Government in October 2007, was (and up to now still remains) the key reference document for programming external assistance. It consists of four strategic pillars:

Pillar 1:  Restore security, prevent conflict and consolidate peace; Pillar 2:  Promote good governance and the rule of law; Pillar 3:  Renew and diversify the economy; and Pillar 4: Develop human capital.

45. After the 2013 crisis, the World Bank’s priority was to provide emergency aid to restore basic public services and provide food, health care, and other vital services to the Central African people, including the many refugees and other people displaced by the conflict in the capital and in rural areas. Of the four CAS pillars, two are clearly relevant to the operation – renew the economy (agriculture) and build human capital. Providing food could also be expected to contribute to the consolidation of peace (pillar 1). The PDO was over-ambitious in terms of rebuilding livelihoods and re-launching agricultural productivity, given the rather sparse activities that were planned under the project.  In fact, on the livelihoods front, except for food distribution (which cannot be considered as livelihoods support), there was no other activity.  The food distribution was meant to provide food for food-insecure households until they are able to go back to work. In addition, the project carried out some food for work program for youth working on roads etc. While the relevance of objective is Substantial, that of design and implementation is Modest.

Relevance of Design & Implementation

Rating: Modest

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46. The project design was based on two components entrusted each to WFP and FAO as Service Providers. Given the risky and volatile environment and weak Government institutions at the time, it was a reasonable approach. However, lessons from the poor performance of the predecessor Agro-pastoral Recovery Project (which had interventions similar to activities on component B) could have been better considered. Also, it was not realistic to assume that AGETIP would be motivated to carry out the assigned coordination and financial management functions of the Project without any incentives. Further, the absence of a monitoring capability by FAO could have been detected. Targets in the results framework of the PAD also were ambitious; several of the targets for WFP outputs were reduced by more than 50 percent at mid-term, i.e. less than 12 months after appraisal. One argument for extending the project by 6 months was that “it would allow the project to cover two crop seasons, the minimum to get reliable results in agriculture”, which could/should have been considered at appraisal.

47. FAO was in charge of the implementation of activities related to revitalization of the agriculture sector, while WFP was in charge of the implementation of activities related to food crisis and reduction of the impact of the food insecurity. The Government of Central African Republic entered into contractual agreements with the two specialized agencies which were already on the ground, and had a network of contacts with NGOs.

48. However, although the PAD says in Annex 3 (Implementation Arrangements) that AGETIP will ensure coordination and handle the project using its financial management platform and be in charge of: (i) preparing the project’s Interim Financial Reports (IFRs), (ii) submitting to the Bank applications for withdrawal of proceeds, and (iii) preparing annual financial statements, no subsidiary contract was signed with AGETIP to adequately cover this aspect. All project funds were paid directly to WFP and FAO. Consequently, without any incentives to do the job it was asked to perform, AGETIP never really followed up, coordinated, or supervised WFP and FAO. Furthermore, it did not produce any report. This should have been foreseen at design or corrected early on during implementation.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Rating: Low

49. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to protect and rebuild livelihoods, human capital, particularly of children, and to re-launch the productivity of the agriculture sector.

50. The PDO as stated was too broad and not achievable with a small emergency project of 18 months’ duration.

51. Targets were adjusted significantly during the Restructuring. Thus, a split level analysis was done to assess achievements.   As far as disbursement are concerned: (i) US$12 million, i.e. the entire amount for Component A, was disbursed to WFP on April 25, 2014; (ii) US$5,750,000 was disbursed to FAO on April 24, 2014; and (iii) US$2,250,000 was disbursed to FAO on April 24, 2015 (i.e. precisely one year later). So by the date of the Restructuring about 88 percent of the total resources had been

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disbursed. If the split level analysis was done on a per Component basis, the downward revisions of the indicators at the time of the Restructuring did not come into play for the ratings, as 100 percent of the funds had been disbursed (and most of them likely used) before the Restructuring, while the original PAD indicators were still in place, thus making achievements under Component A only moderately satisfactory.52. To assess PDO achievement the ICR team focused on key PDO indicators (beneficiaries) including how these were achieved and what was provided to the beneficiaries.  For example, regarding livelihoods assistance, the actual achievement was 721,635 beneficiaries. Thus, compared to the pre-restructuring target of 1.1 million livelihood beneficiaries only 66 percent were reached, while with the revised post-restructuring target 163 percent of 44,563 were reached. The question would be the staple foods distributed to the above population.  It was expected that 1400 tons of food would be distributed to 1.1 million people (or 1.3 kg per person).  Actual achievement was 5,105 tons for 721,635 beneficiaries (or about 7 kg per beneficiary).  So, even though 100% of the food quantity distributed target was achieved, the food was distributed over a 163% of the targeted population resulting in each beneficiary receiving no more than 60% of the targeted food quantity.   So, for the pre-restructuring period, the project covered 66% of the originally intended beneficiaries but provided 500% of the per capita food target; for the post-restructuring period, the project covered 163% of the revised beneficiaries but provided only 60% of the targeted food quantum.  In both cases the achievement would be Modest.  Overall achievement: Modest.

53. For the human capital achievement, there are three components: blanket feeding for children to prevent a peaking in malnourishment; targeted feeding for pregnant and lactating women and for children with moderate-acute malnutrition; and school feeding program.  The targets were as follows: 

a) Original beneficiaries: 424,500 (broken down as follows: 220,000 under blanket feeding; 33,500 under targeted feeding; and 197,000 under school feeding).  This actually totals to 450,500 beneficiaries.  The quantum of food to be provided was 5,970 tons (2,500 tons for blanket feeding, 2,000 tons for targeted feeding, and 1,470 tons for school feeding);

b) The above targets were revised during restructuring to only 108,063 beneficiaries. The food targets were revised to 2,230 tons, as follows: blanket feeding: 372 tons; targeted feeding: 1034 tons; and school feeding: 824 tons). So clearly, although the beneficiaries were reduced to 24% of the original target, the food quantity was reduced to 37% of the original target.  On average the per capita consumption was expected at about 20 kg; and

c) Achievements are as follows: 92,795 beneficiaries covered under the blanket program with 439 tons of food; 34,324 beneficiaries under the targeted program with 1,158 tons; and 26,129 beneficiaries under the school feeding program with 602 tons.  The beneficiaries totaled to 153,248 with 2,199 tons of food or about 14 kg per capita.  If one was to add the 31,908 pregnant and lactating women

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compared to the revised target of 18,000 women (original 7,500 women), the per capita food distributed falls to less than 13 kg or 65% of the revised target. 

54. In this context one also has to consider whether the blanket, targeted, and school feeding was all highly nutritious imported food (as opposed to the regionally procured staple foods).  This seems to have been the case as WFP seems to have purchased and distributed Plumpy Sup and Supercereal (see Table 1), but the team was not able to verify this. Table 1: Nutrition content of food distributed by WFPCommodity Description Nutrient profilePlumpy Sup/Doz: This is a fortified, energy-

dense, lipid-based supplementary food provided in individual resistant packages.  

 

247Kcal, 5.9g protein, 16 g fat. Essential fatty acid meets micronutrient requirement

Supercereal (CSB+): Corn soya-blend with sugar is prepared from heat-treated maize and soya beans, sugar, vitamins and minerals.

420-840Kcal 16-32g protein, 9-18g fat, essential fatty acid, meets micronutrient requirement

55. In terms of the achievements, a quick assessment is as follows:

a) Pre-restructuring: 153,248 beneficiaries OR 36% of the original target of 424,500 beneficiaries with more or less similar per capital food distribution (about 14 kg);

b) Post-restructuring: 153,248 beneficiaries OR 142% of the revised target of 108,063 beneficiaries but with 65% of targeted per capita food distribution; and

c) The situation is similar with actual food distribution: for example, for school feeding, 41% of original target (602/1470) and 73% of revised target (602/824); likewise, for targeted feeding: 58% of original target and 112% of revised target; for blanket feeding the achievement was 18% of original target and 118% of revised target.  With the 88% disbursement having occurred before restructuring, the performance is not encouraging. The achievement with the 88% disbursement weight is Low; for post-restructuring, this is Substantial. Overall achievement: Low.

56. For the support to food crop production, the intended beneficiaries were about 143, 200. This target was not modified during the Restructuring.  The support was to be provided in the form of seeds distribution, farm equipment, processing plants, seeds, grain storage capacity, and training. Although the number of beneficiaries appear to have been achieved (147,105), the seeds distribution target of 350 tons was not achieved. The

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ICR team was not able to verify the provision of all the 55,000 of on-farm equipment or implements and 740 processing units. Only 12 units with a total capacity of 24 metric tons out of the planned 150 metric tons were constructed and delivered for storage purposes. The assessment indicates that seed production by GAMs was highly inefficient and faced numerous problems.  There is no report on seed production by GAMs and ICRA yet.  As such, this one aspect of seed production and distribution is not yet verified.  Thus, achievement of this component of the PDO is also rated Low. 

3.3 Efficiency

Rating: Modest

57. Given the emergency nature of the Project and the very difficult security situation in which it was prepared, no financial or economic analysis had been carried out at appraisal. The justification for not doing such a full ex-ante analysis in the PAD has to do with the nature of activities supported by the project: on one hand, the benefits of the human capital protection and livelihoods assistance and the capacity building which are qualitative in nature, and, on the other hand, the short time frame and the difficulty to collect data such as the yield of production, surplus marketed food and prices by the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E).

58. However, the team assessed operational efficiency of the overall cost of delivering the interventions by looking at the ratio of indirect to direct cost which includes all in- country program costs, salaries and benefits, housing, insurance, and commodity costs. Also, the team benchmarked the cost of Plumpy Sup and Fortified Blended Food used in the prevention of Acute Malnutrition treatment by WFP. According to the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund, a ratio of indirect to direct cost of 7 or less is cost effective. As shown in Table 2, WFP overall costs incurred fall within the range and therefore compares to the set standard. Indirect costs in CAR are about half the cost in South Sudan.

Table 2: Breakdown of overall program costs by WFP (USD)CAR South Sudan

Direct cost 11,214,953.27 (93.46) 208,906,823 (85.72) *

Indirect cost 785,046.73 (6.54) 14,623,475 (14.28)Source: WFP. UN Central Emergency Response Fund rule of thumb <=7 *figures in parenthesis are in percentage.

59. As shown in Table 3 also, there are efficiency gains in the cost of procuring important supplement for the prevention of acute malnutrition in CAR compared to a generic product price. Clearly, the cost in CAR compares well with cost of generic product with similar content.

Table 3: Unit cost for select supplementCAR Generic product price

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Plumpy Sup $3,194.046 $3,703/MT

Cereal (rice-based) $580/MT $650/MT*

Supercereal + $447 $570/MTSource: WFP * data used is wheat based http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp247204.pdf

60. The WFP component, based on coverage and cost-effectiveness, seems to have been efficient.  The team had little or no information on FAO to assess efficiency. The team noted that the ineligible expenditure and inadequate administrative efficiency related to the FAO-managed component would affect the overall efficiency of the project but given that WFP managed component is 60% of total project cost, overall efficiency can still be rated as Modest. Although, the target set for FAO managed component was not achieved, the investments made under the component can be expected to generate some economic and social benefits. In summary in the absence of a full EFA that covered the whole project in context of escalating conflict, the cost-efficiency analysis done showed some efficiency gains, the overall efficiency of the project is still rated Modest.

61. WFP costs involved seem reasonable in comparison with the benefits/achievements (two of which were significantly reduced at MTR), e.g. US$20 million with almost 150,000 beneficiaries for crop production, over 700,000 beneficiaries for livelihood assistance, and over 150,000 direct child beneficiaries. This was done by distributing more than 5,000 tons of food, more than 1,100 targeted supplementary feedings, over 600 emergency school feedings, more than 320 tons of seed produced, etc. The amount of crop and food distributed, as well as seed, for the amount of the project is reasonable and consistent with other countries in the sub-region. This is further reinforced considering the security situation in the country during those years and the difficult operating conditions of FAO and WFP.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Unsatisfactory

62. The overall outcome rating for the Project “Assessment of Outcomes”: is Unsatisfactory as it is rated: (i) Substantial for relevance of objectives, (ii) Modest for relevance of design/implementation, (iii) Low for Achievement of Project Development Objectives, and (iv) Modest for Efficiency. The U rating is based on these four sub-ratings, which in turn are based on the various findings discussed in detail above and briefly re-stated/summarized here. These show some achievements under very difficult country conditions, but also shortcomings including a PDO that was too general (rebuild livelihoods and human capital; re-launch the productivity of the agricultural sector) and not achievable with a relatively small emergency project of 18 months; even if the targets had been achieved, the links between them and the very general PDOs are tenuous and were not elaborated. There were moderate achievements by WFP on Component A, with significant overestimation at appraisal of food distribution and corresponding, downward corrections during the restructuring. There were also partial achievements by FAO on

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Component B, but the absence of monitoring and evaluation contributed to limited credibility of the limited information provided.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

63. The Project was designed to have poverty reduction impacts and to address gender aspects and social development.

Gender Impact

64. The project has a significant impact on women, particularly under the Human Capital Protection and Livelihood Assistance Component executed by Word Food Program (WFP). At project closing about 721,635 people (out of the revised target of 440,563) -- of which 377,315 women (46 percent) -- benefitted from the project exceeding the 30 percent target. As food provision is essentially an activity of women in CAR, as well as in most African countries, the needs of the households would have never been met without the project, particularly for children of whom 13% benefitted from the project. Moreover, activities specifically designed for pregnant and lactating women performed well, as about 32,000 women benefitted as against 18,000 targeted. The activities of resilience among 370 women's associations were so successful that other donors adhered to and expanded them to other women. These activities, mostly under women’s responsibilities, focused on the capital replenishment villager’s production systems, which was a source of animal protein and contributed to the diversification of income and a leverage for social cohesion.

Social Impact

65. By many accounts the project contributed to social cohesion by easing tension among community by alleviating malnutrition in households severely affected by the conflict. Through the project, WFP procured 7,317 tons of food of which 7,154.2 tons were delivered nationwide (98 percent). The project also developed an Integrated General Food Distribution and Blanket Supplementary Feeding by providing seed protection food rations in coordination with the FAO's distribution of agricultural inputs of seeds, tools, and fertilizers. In addition, coverage of treatment of malnutrition increased from 10 health facilities in January 2014 to 100, while the chronic malnutrition rate decreased from 7.5 percent in May 2012 to less than 6.4 percent in December 2014 in the project areas. While this may be perceived as small dent, it laid the foundation on which additional interventions would contribute to reverse the cycle of violence.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

66. Not applicable.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

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67. Not known.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

68. A Beneficiary Assessment Survey (BAS) could not be completed due to the security situation, the short duration of project implementation, as well as weak M&E. However, a Synthesis Meeting was held on March 21, 2016, and limited focus group interviews were carried out on March 19, 2016 as a basis for the meeting (see Annex 6).

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: High

69. While some important gains were made under the project, these remain fragile because of the volatile security situation in the country. For example, the seed production system put in place with the help of the project can be derailed if security remains a concern or deteriorates. The security situation in the country remains a challenge, and therefore there are significant risks to the operation’s development outcomes.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

70. Because of the emergency nature of the project, it took less than 3 months from project concept to effectiveness. The Bank put in place a dedicated team to ensure that that the Government request was adequately dealt with in timely manner. The project design was appropriately simple in terms of targets, but with a PDO stated too broadly for an 18-month emergency project. Implementation of the two components were entrusted to two well-established UN agencies known for their general competency in their areas of work; however, the absence of a functioning M&E system by FAO could have been spotted. Institutional considerations related to AGETIP would also have shown that it lacks not only technical and financial expertise but more importantly the motivation, since it had no financial incentives to do the work. Since the Government contracted with WFP and FAO to execute the Project, a customized review of the financial arrangements of these agencies was performed in conjunction with the Bank’s guidance regarding FM arrangements in UN organizations based on the elimination of audit principle. To avoid unnecessary bureaucracy, which could have hindered project implementation, a one-time transfer of funds to the UN’s agencies was agreed upon during project preparation. However, in hindsight, given the US$ 881,000 of unaccounted funds by FAO, and non-

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completion of some activities even with the extension of the closing date, some phasing the disbursements would have been more appropriate.

71. The rating is considered to be moderately unsatisfactory. The project was responding to a serious need. However, technical, institutional, and fiduciary aspects were not adequately considered. M&E was not well designed, and the government’s contribution to the project intervention via AGETIP was not fully thought through as AGETIP had no incentives to do its work.

(b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies)

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

72. Despite the difficult political and security environment 5 formal implementation support missions were held. Moreover, the Bank managed to recruit a local consultant who, on day to day basis was entrusted to supervise activities carried out by the UN agencies. The consultant managed even to undertake several field missions with regular meetings held with the Ministry in charge of Agriculture and the UN agencies where issues were raised particularly the lack of involvement of AGETIP in coordinating the project activities and the inadequate inflow of information from FAO. It is worth noting, however that the Bank team was overoptimistic in rating the performance while proven results were not recorded on the ground by FAO and also without a deep analysis of WFP results. It is only during the last supervision mission that a critical assessment of performance revealed that the ratings should be decreased particularly for FAO performance. This was revealed in the last aide-memoire and the letter of transmission but was refuted by the FAO management particularly when the issue of possible ineligible expenses was raised. In summary, the Bank could have shown more candor in its rating and should have elevated AGETIP and the FAO-related issues to its top-management level. Based on the above, a Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU) rating is considered for the quality of supervision for the WB.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 73. Overall Bank performance is rated as “Moderately Unsatisfactory,” reflecting a “Moderately Unsatisfactory” rating for Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry and a “Moderately Unsatisfactory” rating for quality of supervision.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

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74. Government’s interest in the operation was high, but given its low capacity for providing food and agricultural services in the country, WFP and FAO were contracted by the Ministry in Charge of Rural Development (MCRD)/Ministère en charge du Développement du Monde Rural (MCDMR) to implement the project. The Agence Générale d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Publics (AGETIP; part of the Ministry in Charge of Infrastructure) which was assigned to provide coordination and financial management in the name of the Government in order to make sure that the project would be implemented as desired, was nearly non-existent despite several recommendations made during the implementation missions, including of course to the MCRD, urging more active AGETIP involvement. This explains Government’s moderately unsatisfactory performance.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies’ Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

75. The rating is based on a moderately satisfactory rating of the implementation of Component A by WFP (in terms of achieving original as well as significantly reduced targets) and an unsatisfactory rating for the implementation of Component B by FAO, given limited achievements, very significant problems with monitoring and reporting, unsatisfactory financial management, failing to provide a refund to the Bank, and the lack of response to Bank requests.

76. Activities carried out by WFP have been implemented moderately successfully [to reach 65 and 36 percent, respectively, of the original targets of the two key indicators]. FAO had some achievements under Component B but should have addressed the shortcomings, incl. those of M&E and reporting, which have been mentioned in the various supervision missions by the Bank. For example, the construction of storage facilities for seed producers experienced significant delays and many were not completed by the closing date despite assurances given by FAO. By March 31, 2016, at best only 12 of the initially planned 75 warehouses were completed.4 All project-related equipment and vehicles should have been transmitted to government shortly after the project closing. FAO was requested to provide an exhaustive list to the Bank of items to be transferred, along with five other specific reports5 before the closing date of March 31, 2016.

77. Institutional capacities at the Ministry in Charge of Rural Development (MCRD) were very weak for coordinating and monitoring project implementation. Additionally, four successive changes at the level of the Minister have occurred between 2014 and 2016, which did not help. From the start of the Project, AGETIP was appointed by the Government to coordinate the project, but it did not carry it out its responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. 4 During the last supervision end February/early March, 2016, the mission strongly urged the FAO to ensure that activities should be fully completed by March 31, 2016; otherwise there would be a risk of ineligible expenditure. Therefore, the mission, in agreement with his Excellency the Minister of State, proposed the establishment of a committee in charge of the weekly monitoring of activities from Monday, March 7, 2016 onwards. It is not known whether these meetings actually took place. FAO was also requested to provide a list of all remaining activities, including those that may not be completed before March 31, 2016. It is not clear whether that list was provided.5 See Aide Memoire of the World Bank mission of February 29 to March 4, 2016.

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(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

78. Overall Borrower performance is rated as “Moderately Unsatisfactory,” reflecting the “Moderately Unsatisfactory” rating for the Government, in particular because of the weak performance of the Ministry, the non-performance of AGETIP, and a “Moderately Unsatisfactory” rating for the Implementing Agency performance.

6. Lessons Learned

79. Outsourcing project implementation to well-established international institutions is not necessarily an effective strategy in fragile states, unless they have proven country-level institutional capacity and functioning procedures on the ground. WFP’s experience and know-how in developing and deploying school feeding program and food distribution were key in achieving the objectives under Component A. But FAO’s implementation performance was weak and the absence of a functioning M&E and related reporting system should have been noted during project preparation.

80. For emergency operations, adequate implementation budget/support is even more important than for regular operations, particularly in fragile states. Simplified financial management and procurement procedures help and the flexibility allowed in preparing emergency operations facilitates rapid approval, effectiveness, and initial disbursement, but the quality of implementation and achievement of results may be seriously compromised if adequate supervision resources are not provided.

81. Weak institutional capacity within key ministries hinders development impact from Bank investments. Institutional capacity in CAR remains extremely weak, and AGETIP, assigned by the government to coordinate the project, did not perform. This hindered effective implementation and proper reporting, particularly as FAO operations were not monitored and corrected where needed.

82. Given the volatile and risky security environment in which the project was being implemented, a third party supervision and monitoring could have been more effective for this project. A third-party entity, with the appropriate means and personnel, could have done a better job in ensuring that all planned activities were carried out on time or could have alerted and advised the Bank and the Borrower to take the appropriate measures when needed. As an example, the Bank and the Government would have learned at an earlier stage that FAO did not have the capacity or could not build 75 storage facilities, and a more capable firm or service provider could have been hired to do it.

83. If using specialized UN Agencies is appropriate to implement some projects in certain situations, payments should be phased. In doing so, one could avoid making a single payment of the entire funding for the implementation of the project, but instead

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one would do it in appropriate tranches in order to ensure that the total amount of money paid to carry out an activity is fully used to do it. This would provide better incentives to implementers and make them do a better job while respecting contractual agreements.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

84. The executive summary of the Borrower/Recipient’s completion report is presented in Annex 7. It was submitted to the Bank with a significant delay (only in late August 2016), and it lacks candor.

(b) Cofinanciers

85. Not applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

86. Not applicable.

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Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)6

ComponentsAppraisal

Estimate (USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Component A: Human Capital Protection and Livelihood Assistance/WFP

12.00 12.00 100%

Component B: Re-Launch the Productivity of the Agriculture Sector/FAO

8.00 8.00 100%

Total Project Costs 20.00 20.00 100%

(b) Financing

Source of FundsAppraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

IDA 20.00 20.00 100%

Total Financing 20.00 20.00 100%

6 Management costs were included under the Components. This explains why AGETIP was not really interested in coordinating the project’s activities. Without incentives AGETIP did not perform. But having resources put aside for AGETIP would have required its assessment and an audit which would have delayed project implementation. So all resources were allocated to the UN agencies based on MoU between the UN and the Bank.

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Annex 2: Outputs by Component

Component A: Human Capital Protection and Livelihood Assistance (US$ 12.0 million IDA)

1. Implementation of this component by the World Food Programme (WFP) was satisfactory. Of the about 6,988 tons of food originally planned for purchase, WFP bought 7,331 tons. Of this, 7,304 tons were distributed to beneficiaries, indicating a 99.6 percent completion rate. Overall, in 14 of the 16 districts of the country, 721,635 people benefited from the distribution of food, including 377,315 women (52.2 percent). For the prevention of child malnutrition, a total of 54,600 children were targeted, but 92,795 children have actually been reached for a completion rate of 170 percent. This was in part due to new crises in 2014 and 2015, which required WFP to extend assistance to other beneficiaries. On child moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), the initial target was 35,250. In total 34,324 children were actually treated, implying a 97.4 percent rate. Compared with dietary reference data, food distributions have significantly improved the nutritional status of children aged 0 to 59 months (see WFP survey results).

2. The project was able to support 31,908 pregnant and lactating women; this is 177 percent of the target of 18,000. The improvement in the security situation and the reopening of several health facilities closed at the beginning of the crisis helped with this achievement. Also, WFP interventions with various recipients have helped reduce the rate of Acute Moderate Malnutrition of 7.5 percent in the project area to some 6 percent by December 2014 in the project area.

3. Based on the implementation of the project in 2014, an overall improvement of food security in the project area was noted. However, the resurgence of violence in January and September 2015 again impacted on the security situation and access to agricultural fields. Surveys conducted by WFP in 2015 revealed a deterioration of the overall food insecurity of 49.9 percent over the whole territory including two major variants: (a) four prefectures severely food insecure for a threshold of 75-65 percent (Nana Mambéré, Haut Mbomou, Kadéï Mambéré, and Ouham); and (b) five prefectures in moderate food insecurity with a threshold between 65 and 40 percent (Vakaga, Mbomou Nana Gribizi, Bamingui Bangoran and Ouaka). Further, the situation of internally displaced people remains a major concern with an estimated 378,000 people.

4. Under the emergency school-feeding program, 26,129 students received 602 tons of food. This has contributed to the gradual reopening of classes and keeping students in school. Food canteens have also served as a social safety net.

Component B: Re-Launch of the Productivity of the Agriculture Sector (USD 8.0 million IDA)

5. A total of 143,200 beneficiaries were targeted under the project in terms of provision of seeds and 147,105 were actually reached according to information provided by FAO. This target was achieved thanks to the availability of seed produced by the

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Groups of Agro-Multipliers (GAM) of seeds and acquired at low costs. However, the performance of the implementation of this Component by the FAO was only moderately satisfactory for the following reasons: (a) very limited completion of construction activities of the warehouses and also livestock resilience activities as well as some activities such as acquisitions and distribution of seeds and fertilizers; (b) the limited quality and poor timeliness of reporting despite numerous observations that were made to FAO by the Bank's four support missions as well as the Steering Committee during each of the five meetings.

6. Regarding the activities of the crop year 2015, 388 tons of seeds were distributed to beneficiaries including: (a) 371 tons to 11,000 vulnerable households for food production; (b) 14 tons of commercial seed breeding R1 or R2 for 100 Groups of Agri-Multipliers (GAMs) and 3.6 tons of commercial seed breeding R1 or R2 to ICRA. Difficulties due to late deliveries of imported seeds and worrying quality, and a rainy season punctuated by irregularities, resulted in low seed production by ICRA and GAMs. Five tons of groundnut seed, post-R2 year were altogether produced by ICRA. As of the closing date of the Project, the final data for the production of GAMs had not yet been collected by FAO.

7. There have been numerous challenges with process of revival of seed production by GAMs in this emergency period. Indeed, the results show that the GAMs are identified and trained; nevertheless, they have been inefficient in terms of production. They need to benefit from strengthening in the context of the new Seed Act 2015 whose wording was supported by the World Bank. Finally, food production among vulnerable households in 2015 was estimated at 6,277 tons produced on approximately 19,241 hectares, indicating an estimated average yield of 326.2 kg per hectare. A final report with a comprehensive assessment of seed production by ICRA and the GAMs under the project has not yet been received.

8. The training activities. The initial objective was the training of 200 trainees. Eventually, the Project provided different types of training to 300 youths, including 71 girls and 146 staffs of MCDMR and NGOs. In the action plan adopted by FAO, training has become the main pillar that supported the resilience of activities carried out by 370 women's associations, for which the main axes were: (a) awareness and adherence to fruit and vegetable production from home gardens and small livestock (completed in late August 2015); (b) strengthening horticulture and small livestock production and other work with high labor intensity; and (c) use of 315 units of transformations (cassava mill peanut grinder, peanut huller etc.) by those associations. Also, the training was provided on the Villages Activities Savings Credit (VASC) system/Activités Villageoises Epargnes Credit (AVEC). There were numerous challenges/delays.

9. The activities of resilience among 370 women's associations. Other financial partners joined in implementing these activities. The main activity were distributions of breeding kits to the beneficiaries. This was important: (a) in terms of the capital replenishment for villagers’ production systems; (b) as a source of animal protein and a contribution to the diversification of income, and (c) as a lever for social cohesion.

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However, the implementation of this activity was delayed; the technologies to be transferred were lacking. To have higher achievements along with sustainability, FAO should, with the support of the Agence Nationale de Développement de l’Elevage (ANDE), have provided recipient women’s organizations a guide that would facilitate their technical monitoring for livestock raising.

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Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis

The deficiencies in the M&E system of the Project, along with the difficult security situation, resulted in the lack of data necessary to conduct a robust economic and financial analysis of the project’s achievements. However, in its place, an attempt was made to assess cost-effectiveness by comparing the Project with similar emergency operations in other countries.

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Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

Lending Manievel Sene Rural Development Specialist AFTA2 Task Team Leader

Lynn R Brown Consultant AES Food Policy Specialist

Juvenal Nzambimana Sr. Operations Officer AFTA1 Sr. Operations Officer

Lucienne M M’Baipor Senior Social Development Specialist AFTCS

Senior Social Development

SpecialistEvelyne Huguette Madozein Team Assistant AFMCF Team Assistant

Marie Jeanne Uwanyarwaya Senior Executive Assistant AFTA2 Operations and Quality

Siobhan McInerney-Lankford Senior Counsel LEGAM Senior Counsel

Aissatou Diallo Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Senior Finance Officer

Kouami Hounsinou Messan Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW Senior Procurement Specialist

Emeran Serge M. Menang Evouna Senior Environmental Specialist AFTN1

Senior Environmental

SpecialistLova Niaina Ravaoarimino Procurement Specialist AFTPE ProcurementKolie Ousmane Maurice Megnan

Sr. Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Financial

ManagementMelissa C. Landesz Operations Officer AFTSG Safeguards

Supervision/ICRManievel Sene Sr. Agricultural Spec. GFA12 Task Team LeaderNicaise Ehoué Sr. Agriculture Economist GFA01 Task Team Leader

Théodore Mianzé Agricultural Specialist GGOPSTechnical aspects

on production capacity

Josué Akré Financial Management Specialist GGO26 FMHuguette Evelyne Madozein Program Assistant AFMCF

Kolie Ousmane Maurice Megnan

Sr. Financial Management Specialist GGO26 FM/General matters

Tchaoussala Haoussia Sr. Procurement Specialist GGO07 ProcurementBenjamin Billard Operations Officer GFA01 Review of ICR

Soulemane Fofana Senior Rural Development Specialist GFA01 Responsible for

ICR

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(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project CycleStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY14 20.65 81.20 FY15 17.55 79.10

Total: 38.2 160.30Supervision/ICR

FY14 0.5 9.92 FY15 0.45 31.76 FY16 2.5 71.77 FY17 0 0.16

Total: 3.45 113.61

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Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results (if any)

A beneficiary survey was not undertaken for this Project due to security situation in the country and short duration of project implementation.

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Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)

1. Selected field visits were undertaken on March 19, 2016 in or around Mbaїki, involving representatives of the Ministry of Rural Development, WFP, FAO, and the World Bank. The representative of WFP visited the nutritional center, located about 70 km from Bangui and 33 km from the city of Mbaïki, and reviewed activities carried out under Component A. For Component B work, at Mbaïki and at the Regional Centre for Polyvalent Research (PROM) in Boukoko, the team, including officials from FAO and MCDMR, met NGO partners, some members of women's associations that participated in the resilience activities, some producers within Groupings Agri Multipliers (GAM), and also the Director of CRPR Boukoko.

2. The findings from the field visits were discussed in Bangui on March 21, 2016 in a synthesis meeting that was similar to a small workshop. It was held on the premises of the World Bank, and the meeting was attended by representatives of the Ministry of Rural Development, WFP, FAO, and the World Bank.

3. The review meeting recommended that reporting be done on March 26, 2016, on various actions implemented under the Project including on: (a) nutrition activities under the auspices of WFP and implemented by CARITAS in Pissa, located about 70 km from Bangui; (b) resiliency activities with women's and mixed associations including: (i) under the Employee Savings Credit Village (AVEC); (ii) under the operating activity of transformation of materials; (iii) in the market gardening business; (c) seed production activities by: (i) visit the GAM stocks; (ii) the visit of CRPR of Boukoko for change on the available potential and opportunities for enhancement; (d) the visit shops storages whose buildings are in progress; (e) THIMO activities in the specific context of sweet potato production with a focus group including beneficiaries.

4. The review meeting noted the following regarding the warehouses in the Mbaïki area: (a) six warehouses were to be constructed by the NGO CADAPI, but none of the buildings have reached a completion rate of 50%; (b) six warehouses were to be constructed by Reprosa NGOs but construction had not started on March 19 and therefore could in no case be finished by March 31. Therefore, contrary to assertions made and assurances given by FAO, construction of warehouses will not be completed as agreed.

5. Regarding THIMO activities in Lobaye, the synthesis meeting, based on the field meeting, drew attention to the fact that the area reportedly planted with two hectares of sweet potato was less than FAO claimed. At most half, i.e. less than one hectare was planted and the costs incurred for carrying out such activity were excessively exaggerated. Moreover, the situation needed to be clarified regarding the amounts of savings which will be passed on to beneficiaries at the end of activities (21.6 million CFA in total, 4.75 million CFA for the beneficiaries of the potato production activity fresh) including resources from the sale of sweet potato produced.

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6. Regarding seed production activities, the meeting confirmed the failure of the activity conducted by FAO and with ICRA and the GAMs. First, production data was still not available at the end of the Project, and, second, the limited production is assessed as being of very poor quality.

7. Finally, regarding the resilience activities related to livestock production, there were several issues: (a) foods have been distributed unclean and were therefore inedible by chickens; (b) none of the animals planned for distribution were actually distributed by the end of the Project. Therefore, again, these FAO activities were not completed by March 31, 2016.

8. Given the limited completion or non-completion of some planned activities, as well as the unaccounted funds, the meeting recommended that “one last mission involving the Government and FAO be undertaken, which will make the final assessment of the situation.”

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Annex 7: Summary of Government’s ICR

1. Following the events of the political/military crisis in December 2012 which led, in March 2013, to a political change in the Central African Republic, the Government obtained from the World Bank financial support to implement an Emergency Food Crisis Response and Agriculture Re-Launch Project (PURCARA). The project, amounting to US$ 20 million, financed through a grant, aimed to "protect, restore livelihoods, human capital, especially children, and to boost agricultural productivity ".

2. The Project had two components:

-- Component A: Human Capital Protection and Livelihood Assistance" entrusted to the World Food Program (WFP) and funded at US$ 12 million, was to achieve the following specific objectives: contribute to: (i) the prevention and reduction of severe acute and moderate malnutrition for children 6 to 59 months; (ii) the treatment of pregnant and lactating women who are underweight; (iii) emergency school feeding; and (iv) general food distribution to households which are food insecure; and

-- Component B: "Re-Launch of Agriculture" had two sub-components: (i) "technical assistance”; and (ii) supplies of goods and services" for a total amount of US$ 8 million. These were aimed to restore the ability of production of food in order to meet the food needs of the most affected populations in food-insecure areas, to distribute essential agricultural supplies, but also to support seed producers and women's groups to strengthen their resilience and to train young graduates and agents of the Ministry in Charge of Rural Development (MICRD).

3. The project suggested that the implementing agencies work with the Ministries in Charge of Rural Development, Health, Education, and Planning as well as in partnership with United Nations sister agencies, including the UNICEF with regard to nutritional aspects, and national and international NGOs.

4. The project intended to cover five prefectures: Ouaka, Nana Gribizi, Ouham, Lobaye the Ombella, and Mpoko, and was planned for a project period of 18 months.

5. Taking into account the crisis situation and the weak operational capacities of public structures, the institutional framework implementation of the project provided that the WFP and FAO act as implementing agencies of the project, that the Public Works Agency (AGETIP) provide fiduciary coordination, that the public (ICRA, ANDE, ACDA) and national and international NGOs, through MoUs, participate in the implementation of field activities, and finally that the central and decentralized structures of MICRD coordinate the execution, facilitate the implementation of activities, and provide support to agricultural producers.

6. The main expected development outcomes of the project are:

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- 444,563 direct beneficiaries of livelihoods improvements;

- 108,063 direct beneficiaries of children in terms of the protection of human capital; and - 143,200 direct beneficiaries of agricultural production support.

7. The intermediate results indicators include:

- Regarding Component A, the quantities of food purchased and distributed; - For Component B: increasing seed production and storage capacity, the training of graduates and staff of public institutions and NGOs; - And for both components the number of recipients of assistance and the percentage of women.

Results achieved:

8. In spite of the very difficult context for project implementation within the context persistent civil and military conflicts in the area and its access roads, the levels reached by the three indicators for the development objective exceed expectations. They are between 131% and 162% and totaled on average 147% for the entire project.

The intermediate results:

9. Concerning intermediate outcome indicators on the four selected ones relating to the activities of the component A: three reached the targets, particularly those concerning the general food distribution, as well as general and targeted supplementation. For emergency school feeding, the level of achievement is 73%. Overall, with a target of 7317.5 tons of food to purchase and distribute, achievements were 7304.3 tons, or 99.8%.

10. For component B, all indicators except the one relating to the storage capacity (48%), far exceeded the targets.

11. For all components, the rate reached for the number of people who benefited from the project support is 147%.

Other achievements:

12. Component A: In general distributions, WFP provided people affected by the food crisis with rations consisting of cereals, pulses, and oil, coupled with a nutritional supplement to prevent the risk of malnutrition. The activity of targeted supplementary feeding and treatment of related malnutrition, was conducted in children 6-59 months, pregnant women and nursing mothers. It was conducted by specialized partners in 80 hospitals and health centers.

13. The school feeding activity has encouraged the children to return to school; this involved 26,129 students and was supported with 603 tons of food.

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14. Component B: The project conducted activities to better understand the context in CAR in terms of seeds and propose a strategic framework to revive the agriculture sector. Inputs were provided to ICRA for seed multiplication, but for reasons relating to both quality and seed provisioning delay by FAO on the one hand, and internal operating difficulties of ICRA and execution of cultural operations on the other hand, only 5.6 tons of peanut seeds were produced.

15. FAO has signed memoranda of understanding with NGOs to support the production of seeds by agri-multiplier groups (GAM). Inputs and received training allowed GAM to produce 762.5 tons of seeds over the two years of the project, against a forecast of 592 tons, implying a 129% achievement.

16. The project foresaw the rehabilitation or construction and equipping of a seed quality control laboratory within the ICRA. This action was intended to be undertaken by an NGO partner of ICRA (WHH); however, the Ministry in Charge of Rural Development (MCRD) ruled that it was not possible to do this with project funds.

17. The project has begun construction of 60 warehouses for seeds with a capacity of 6 tons each for the Groups of Agri-Multiplicators (GAMs) of seeds to enable them to store agricultural products and seeds in good conditions. Following a call for tenders, eight companies were selected. Due to low financial capacity of contractors, work has experienced many delays. Warehouses whose works were finalized and not yet approved (23) corresponds to a storage capacity of 138 tons. The organization of seed fairs was recognized as an innovative activity in the project document. It was to benefit 7,000 farmers. The activity was not conducted and was replaced by direct seed distribution.

18. 22 400 vulnerable households benefited from the support of the project in terms of seeds and agricultural implements, that allowed them to sow, according to estimates by FAO and NGO partners, 17,285 ha, and obtain a total production of 9908 tons. In comparison to the targeted outputs this implies an achievement rate of 104.5%.

19. As part of the sustainable improvement of the resilience, food security, and nutrition of women's associations, instruction was provided on gardening activities, short-cycle livestock, savings and community credit, and processing of agricultural products.

20. The project benefitted 185 market gardening groups that received seed kits (tomato, cucumber, lettuce, spinach, okra, onions, amaranth) and agricultural tools (watering cans, hoes, shovels, rakes).

21. The project trained 176 facilitators and technical vegetable farmers in the field school approach and supported the installation of 374 CEP, of which 326 were operational.

22. The results were highly variable because of the difficulty of technical mastery and protection against pests. However, the effects of this activity were visible in urban and suburban areas and appreciated by the recipients.

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23. Activities concerning poultry farming began in late during the project period and involved 149 groups and 4470 beneficiaries. The food and veterinary products distribution also started towards the end of the project and that of pullets is underway. However, this delay, with the quality of food which had a constituent weevil, poses, with the end of the project, a problem in terms of technical supervision and monitoring results.

24. The project supported the establishment and operation of 382 village savings and credit associations, of which 377 are currently operational. They were able to collect from their members about 12 million CFA francs and 9 million grant credits used in part in income-generating activities. While important for the fund of resilience, they were implemented in 2015 and sometimes even later, which has not given much time to assess the sustainability of these associations.

25. The project has made available 295 women's associations a lot of three food processing units manufactured locally, including a cassava or maize mill, a peanut mill, and peanut sheller. But hope placed by the beneficiaries in this activity for the alleviation of their domestic work and income generation, quickly dissipated with the supply of defective equipment, especially cassava mills supplied with missing pieces and with a fragility that such groups had to make expenditures caused by repeated failures. The choice brought into the project with local manufacturing was one of the causes of the problems recorded, as local artisans do not have access to high quality raw materials.

26. In order to strengthen social cohesion and employment of young people in three prefectures (Lobaye, Ouham and Ouham Pende), the resilience of activities included a cash transfer component to remunerate youth engaged in high intensity work labor. This work was primarily directed towards the satisfaction of common interest and concerns and involved 100 young people each. In practice, NGOs have undertaken rehabilitation work and clearing of trails and rural roads, and one of them, the NGO REPROSA, conducted slashing 4km of trails and the culture of one ha of yam. The achievements involved a variable number of youth who received a total of CFA 54 million revenue.

27. The training of young graduates and the managers of the Ministry in Charge of Rural Development (MCRD) was organized in two phases: (i) General training on CEP and AVEC approaches for the benefit of 250 unemployed graduates and 12 technicians MCRD; and (ii) training of 50 facilitators selected from among young graduates, to support the activities integration process of CEP / AVEC groups, following the logic of the "Case of Resilience" strategy.

28. 153 members of NGO technical staff were trained in the CEP approach. Regarding the AVEC approach, training was provided to 167 participants from national and international NGOs and services of the MCRD.

29. The implementation of the component "Agricultural Re-Launch" has struggled because of some key staff were missing, including the International Coordinator of the component who was not available until 6 months after the start of the Project, the

36

international management expert for technical training, and the national consultant in monitoring and evaluation. These absences have affected the management, supervision and monitoring of the implementation of project activities and led to the difficulties of technical and financial reporting. The acquisition of goods and services was done reasonably well, notwithstanding the delays in the purchase of inputs and quality of food processing equipment.

Performance of the Project and the various Parties/Stakeholders

30. Given the results obtained, both in terms of key development as well as intermediary objectives, and difficult context of implementation, one can consider that the project was satisfactory in its overall performance. However, it remains that difficulties and shortcomings sometimes noted in the conduct of certain activities could limit this appreciation.

31. Overall, Government performance can be considered satisfactory, although it should be noted that the MCRD experienced four changes to his head during the two years of the project, that the Presidency of CNSPP recorded three mutations along with different appointments of cabinet directors, and that the first meeting of the national steering committee was held at the same time with the mid-term review, i.e. nine months after project start.

32. The involvement of public structures in the implementation of the component activities were effective, with varying performance, through ISDR, ICRA, ANDE and ACDA, especially the latter, by the participation in training and support for the identification of associations and groups receiving agricultural recovery support.

33. The World Bank has had a satisfactory performance for its role in supervising and monitoring the implementation of the project, through close monitoring of the project by the agricultural specialist in the Office of the CAR, and external supervision missions and review.

34. WFP has had a remarkable and satisfactory performance both in conducting operations which reported better than expected as well as in collaboration and communication with partners.

35. In contrast, the FAO performance can be considered as moderately satisfactory in terms of its achievement of objectives of development and intermediate results in the areas of seed production, training and resilience of livelihoods. It faced many problems of responsiveness and communication with stakeholders and operational difficulties that did not allow the completion of scheduled activities such as long seed stores, making provision of farm kits, and organizing seed fairs.

36. AGETIP has had difficulties with financial reporting consolidation which, according to it, always came late from the WFP. The completion mission of the World

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Bank noted, with respect to contractual arrangements, that AGETIP has not really played its part and that from this point of view, its contribution is not satisfactory.37. The high number of national and international NGOs involved in the implementation of the project did not allow an individual analysis. So the focus is on a comparative analysis of national and international NGOs.

38. Most national NGOs have recently been created and generally have a young staff and they could not benefit from extensive experience and apply it in times of crisis. With the restriction of movement for security reasons, these NGOs have not benefited from the agencies in order to obtain the necessary operational support. Also, their performance has been variable and relatively low in terms of information feedback and reporting.

39. With relatively higher costs of intervention, international NGOs that have sometimes outsourced activities with national NGOs, have the operational capacity (displacement means, communication, and personnel) and higher reporting.

Lessons to draw

40. The project implementation allows to draw some lessons that may be taken into account in the design and implementation of projects in crisis situations.

41. The implementation of PURCARA has helped to establish a partnership between the Government, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organizations and it has led them to work together for common goals and results.

42. Flexibility in operations and rigor in monitoring allowed in some cases to anticipate problems and take corrective action in a timely manner.

43. From the analysis of the activities of WFP, one can note the relevance of the combination of different interventions by partners who have promoted the resilience of vulnerable populations, including the protection of productive assets. On a pilot basis, WFP initiated in 2015 two activities namely: (a) the local program to purchase food from the Central African farmers where conditions are conducive to the revival of agricultural activities; and (b) the distribution of food coupons to program beneficiaries of vulnerable groups, to exchange with the fresh kind (of their choice) from local retail merchants. The two innovations have had the double benefit of encouraging the revival of the local economy while at the same time relieving the immediate suffering of the people.

44. For Component B, the program approach advocated to optimize the execution of supply contracts and monitoring of field activities by multidisciplinary teams, despite some gains on cost, has proved ineffective in conducting the operations of the project. Similarly, the idea of seed sovereignty is commendable, but cannot work and sustain in a crisis situation requiring emergency measures, where agricultural research system and quality control structures were absent from the field. Nevertheless, the seed operation has helped to revitalize state services involved in seed production and to provide financial resources for agricultural producer groups.

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Annex 8: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

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Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents

1. Country Partnership Strategy for the Central African Republic of July 31, 2009.

2. Project Appraisal Document of February 21 2014.

3. ISRs dated 5/31/2014; 8/24/2014; 1/22/2015; 6/18/2015; 30/7/2015; 1/12/2016; and 4/11/2016

4. Aide-Memoire of mission of December 8-13, 2014

5. Aide Memoire of mission of July 13-17, 2015

6. Aide Memoire of mission of February 29 to March 5, 2016

7. Conclusions of Synthesis Meeting, March 21, 2016

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MAP

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