Political Hypocrisy:

Magical Realism and the Death of the Political Actor

by

Ged Mirfin

All politicians are hypocrites! This has become the stereotypical view of politicians at both a

national and a local level unfortunately. The problem in a nutshell is that the people increasingly

distrust the political system they’re part of. Political hypocrisy they feel has become so rife that it

is harder to find an example of genuine and really sincere politicians than it is the obverse. The

reason why the general public is so incensed about political hypocrisy is that it has such a huge

impact on our daily lives. There’s a lot of hypocrisy in the world, especially in politics, but is it

really so bad? Is it one of the worst kinds of vice or just a necessary evil? Hypocritical behaviour

bothers us so much in large part because we want to take people’s words and actions as

representative of their character. Hypocrisy reveals startling inconsistencies between behaviour

and character. Worse still hypocrisy is the contrivance of a false appearance of virtue or

goodness, while concealing real character or inclinations, especially with respect to religious and

moral beliefs. Hypocrisy is the practice of engaging in the same behavior or activity for which

one criticizes another. In moral psychology, it is the failure to follow one's own expressed moral

rules and principles. According to British political philosopher David Runciman, "Other kinds of

hypocritical deception include claims to knowledge that one lacks, claims to a consistency that

one cannot sustain, claims to a loyalty that one does not possess, claims to an identity that one

does not hold.". American political journalist, Michael Gerson, meanwhile, says that political

hypocrisy is "the conscious use of a mask to fool the public and gain.

Indeed the original Greek word hypokrites, literally translated, means “impersonating from

underneath”. Hypokrites was a stage actor who narrated each drama by impersonating its

characters underneath masks and costumes: a pretender. Hypocrisy is feigning to be what one is

not or to believe what one does not. At its heart is the notion of pretence pretending to be what

one is not with the intention to deliberately deceive. Dissembling is not the art of lying it is the

art of spinning a yarn – a false narrative, as I will discuss later. The key manifestations of

hypocrisy not surprisingly read like character traits: sanctimoniousness, smarminess,

unctuousness, unction, oiliness,, oleagiousness. Hypocrisy derives from the Greek word.

Hypokrisis, meaning ‘to play a part’, hypocrisy is very much the ancient art. Literally, as it

happens, since the original Hypocrites were, in fact, classical stage actors. Its theatrical origins

shed some light on the concept. Hypocrisy s not simply lying. Hypocrisy is, rather, a question of

character, or better still, a question of whether the persona constructed, the role one plays,

provides a false impression of one’s actual beliefs and practices. The portrayal of politicians as

political actors is important when it comes to understanding the changing nature of the political

stage they are on. The Third Industrial Revolution in which advanced computers and software

are invading the last remaining human sphere- the realm of the mind. I’m not suggesting that

Cyborgs are replacing living and breathing human beings, although the robotic performance of

some politicians does make you wonder, but rather the digital and on-line world has become

increasingly removed from the real world to such an extent that politicians are now becoming

separated from their digitised self which they are unable to control because it is in the hands of

the army of technicians who work within the electronic media. Hypocrisy is therefore becoming

less of a conscious life-style choice and more of an unconscious stream of dreamscapes brought

to life by graphic artists, web designers and on-line PR specialists. Where does one world finish

and another start? That is why what is understood by hypocrisy is so difficult to typologise.

Even so there is surprisingly little written on the subject of political hypocrisy anyway despite the

fact that citizens frequently erupt in anger when they discover their leaders have lied to them.

No sphere is more thoroughly stained with double standards than the political. Barely a week

passes without a story of an ostentatiously upright MP’s extra-marital affair or a seemingly

upright MP receiving a brown envelope or corporate hospitality in return for asking questions on

behalf of a private sector client about public sector funding. Whether it’s a do-gooding narcissist,

a moralising adulterer, or an austerity-preaching hedonist, the virtuous posture rarely travels

unaccompanied by a contradictory reality. Private vice, it seems, is the permanently exposed

underbelly of contemporary politics. In return, the pervasive whiff of hypocrisy provokes an

understandably cynical response: politicians – you can’t trust them. Perhaps lying seems like

such an amorphous concept that it is difficult to study, or maybe scholars have shied away from

a subject because of its contentious and problematic nature.

Magical Realism

What is abundantly clear is that political hypocrisy is so rife in modern society that the

electorate has become increasingly disenchanted because it is impossible to make a legitimate

choice any more between meaningful alternatives. That disenchantment has manifested itself in

an exponential decline in political deference. Are we witnessing the decline of principled

politics? If so, then the ultimate destination of political travel is not just fake news replacing real

news but fake politics replacing real politics. If politicians can no longer say what they mean and

mean what they say then there is a danger of the underlying superstructure of political narrative

breaking down and its replacement by a magical realist world in which nothing is ever quite

what it seems any more. Matthew Strecher defines magic realism as "what happens when a

highly detailed, realistic setting is invaded by something too strange to believe".Magical Realism

is characterized by the bending of reality and melding it with superstition, old wives’ tales, and

exaggeration to dramatic effect. Divergence between fact and fiction, real and unreal becomes

immaterial. In such a world anything becomes possible. At the heart of magical realism is the

notion of fantastical events in an otherwise realistic setting: Brexit and the End of Austerity?

Magical Realism may seem purely mythical, but beyond the purpose of entertainment and

stretching the imagination, it also contains astute observations of the social and political

conflicts. Political fantasy exists side by side in real world settings - the chimerical, abstract,

fantastical, unbelievable are presented as an easily attainable destination just around the next

corner or over the next hill when of course there is ultimately an element of mythical shangri-lah

which politicians are forced to describe because the common everyday reality is a far less

appealing and ultimately disappointing destination. A bit like the seaside on a wet windy day

when all the shops are closed and the prospect of a go on the rides or a walk on the pier lacks

the enthusiasm it has on a scorching hot day when the sun is out. This is why politicians

increasingly resort to “deliberate withholding of information and explanations about the

disconcerting fictitious world". The gap between fantasy and reality is the hypocrisy of the bright

glorious future versus the mundane disappointing reality. Such political hybridity - because

that’s what it is - is critical to maintaining the political meta narrative or should that be meta

fiction that encapsulates messy contemporary reality. The day that the mass public become

immune to fake news and develop a heightened awareness of the hidden meanings contained in

government messages will represent a significant tipping point in the ability of that government

to educate or prepare an already mistrustful and suspicious electorate of some unpalatable

outcomes. Telling the public they can’t have something is always far more difficult than

promising to deliver them shangri-lah beneath the summer moon (Led Zeppelin - Kashmir). It is

also far more dangerous. The consequences of no longer being able to rely on hypocrisy to the

same extent has already been seen in several populist political movements in Europe.. Populism

unbound as we have seen has delivered political change. Who knows what the result of

populism bound will be?

It is at this point that the electorate will seriously begin to question whether they have chosen

wrongly, and whether they should put up with leaders questioning his or her whole mandate or

lack of it. Theresa May take note!

The practice of professing beliefs, feelings, or virtues that one does not hold or possess - political

falseness has thus far not led to the resignation of a British Prime Minister. Even a Remain

supporting Prime Minister can profess that Brexit means Brexit and seemingly get away with it.

Thus far!

Whether such contrariness is genuinely revealing of one's real character or actual behaviour is

open to question. The late political theorist Judith Shklar: “It is easier to dispose of an

opponent’s character by exposing his hypocrisy than to show his political convictions are wrong.”

This is a message worth dwelling upon during every election. It is when that profession becomes

evidently false - that point when political hypocrisy verges over into Political Lying that the

problem is likely to occur. “How can you tell when a politician is lying? He moves his lips.” Is the

joke. MPs who profess to honour the result of the Referendum but continue to Vote in

Parliament to overturn the result of the Referendum and support Remain fall into this camp.

This kind of behaviour is political pretentiousness of the highest water. The point at which such

behaviour becomes thoroughly duplicitousness and two faced depends on the qualifications

offered and the arguments offered to support such actions. This is why it is so very difficult and

so very frustrating for the general public when it comes to assessing standards of hypocrisy

because there are no universally accepted standards or benchmarks that one can refer to. It has

been likened to fire in one hand and water in the other, mix them together and one gets a lot of

smoke which it is difficult to see through.

Seen through the lens of magical realism it is possible to see political Hypocrisy as a tool for

reconciling the irreconcilable views of different generations and epochs - in the case of Brexit the

older parochial minded heavy industrial generation with the newer much more cosmopolitan

minded post-industrial generation where never the Twain shall meet. Impossibly old traditions

struggle against appallingly new modernity in which Public conceptions of good and bad policy

rub up against Private conceptions of morality and self-interest right or wrong with the resultant

Public Anguish being seemingly more garish and extreme than any previously reported Popular

Conceptions. This isn’t a dialectic that is reconcilable. Ultimately Tradition or Modernity will

triumph. Politicians are having to play a dangerous game. Hitching their horses to one historical

force or the other is playing a dangerous sport. Unless they are talented political circus riders

jumping with agility from historical horse to another with skill and lightening agility they are

likely to be crushed beneath the hooves of the galloping masses, badly damaged and never to

rise again.

The Death of the Political Actor

The emergence of the actor politician able to weep insincere crocodile tears on the political

stage is no coincidence. Legend has it that a crocodile shed tears and moans in order to lure

passers-by into its clutches, and then, still weeping devours them. Indeed the ability to pretend

or weep tears of sorrow when policies fail and have to be abandoned in front of a packed house

containing an invited audience who have paid to see a scene delivered in a particular way is

becoming a key part of their political actor apprenticeship. Only the leading figures on the

political stage are able to pull it off with anything like the confidence required and not

disappoint their audience. Those who don’t or can’t exit their stage like David Davis and Boris

Johnson before the reviews of their performance by the critics damage their reputation and

public profile. Those that stay on the stage too long like Theresa May become far less popular

with the danger of being seen by future historians of the political stage as great but

fundamentally flawed actors or reduced to bit Part players because they were unable to handle

the big roles.

David Runciman: Political Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond

David Runciman who is Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies at

Cambridge University, Professor of Politics, and a fellow of Trinity Hall in his book “Political

Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond” (2008) asks the meaningful

question: What kind of hypocrite should voters choose as their next leader? The question is

utterly cynical but, as Runciman suggests, it is actually much more cynical to pretend that politics

can ever be completely sincere. argues that we should accept hypocrisy as a fact of politics--the

most dangerous form of political hypocrisy is to claim to have a politics without hypocrisy.

Runciman does not so much defend hypocrisy per se as delineate its benign forms from its

malign. In other words, at times a certain amount of dissembling on the part of our political

representatives might actually be desirable; at other times less so. Runciman however argues

that there is a special kind of dishonesty associated with misrepresenting oneself entirely in

one’s political capacity. Instead of vainly searching for authentic politicians, therefore we should

try to distinguish between harmless and harmful hypocrisies and worry only about the most

damaging varieties. For Runciman, though inherently unattractive, hypocrisy is also more or less

inevitable in most political settings, and in liberal democratic societies it is practically ubiquitous

No one expects any sort of integrity in their politicians any more. Does this signify a societal

breakdown. In an advanced industrial society? For some it does. For others it is a natural

consequence of the increasingly fraught and complicated nature of the political process. The

book addresses the problems of sincerity and truth in politics, and how we can deal with them

without slipping into hypocrisy ourselves. Runciman tackles the problems through lessons drawn

from some of what he calls the “great truth-tellers in modern political thought” including -

Hobbes, Mandeville, Jefferson, Bentham, Sidgwick, and Orwell - and applies his ideas to different

kinds of hypocritical politicians from Oliver Cromwell to Hillary Clinton. Runciman catalogues the

sheer variety of the kinds of lies, functions of lies and conceptions about lying before making a

case for the benefits of lying in certain circumstances. He argues that we should accept hypocrisy

as a fact of politics, but without resigning ourselves to it, let alone cynically embracing it. We

should stop trying to eliminate every form of hypocrisy, and we should stop vainly searching for

ideally authentic politicians. Instead, we should try to distinguish between harmless and harmful

hypocrisies and should worry only about its most damaging varieties. He poses the question -

What are the limits of truthfulness in politics? And when, where, and how should we expect our

politicians to be honest with us, and about what?

Runciman’s aim is to demonstrate that the people don’t always know what’s in their best

interests, and some lies from on high are actually perpetrated for the people’s own good, not the

least of which is maintaining public order.

For Runciman, the best guide for distinguishing between harmful lies and useful mendacity is the

liberal tradition—the strain of modern political thought which he argues is most attached to the

idea of politics as the realm of truth-telling and interpersonal trust. He argues that many political

thinkers within the liberal tradition going back to Hobbes thought long and hard about a

problem that persists to this day: how much lying can we tolerate—and when, what kinds and

why? Or as he puts it: “What sorts of hypocrites [do] we want our politicians to be?” He provides

what he calls a “practical guide” (in his own words) for dealing with political hypocrisy in the

modern era.

The philosophy of Thomas Hobbes as one of the first Political Thinkers to confront the problem is

particularly significant. Hobbes central insight was that “to rule in a modern state is by definition

to play a kind of double role—that of the every man who is also the only person with real

power.” For Hobbes, as long as this rule is understood and honoured, occasional lying or public

concealment of one’s true nature or motives should be an accepted aspect of political life,

whether one is playing the role of sovereign or subject. More to the point, given the

fundamental truth that politics—especially political language—is an inevitably hypocritical

business, the only genuinely troubling form of hypocrisy is a political leader’s insistence upon his

own unwavering sincerity, which amounts to the thinnest of lies about the nature of power. In

the absence of a sovereign power to arbitrarily, prescribe a moral code, there exists instead “the

endless attempt by individuals to re-describe what they happen to prefer as virtue, and what

others happen to prefer as vice”. The danger of ‘colouring’ is that the reality of political power,

its sheer arbitrariness, is concealed as something morally justified. According to Hobbes, “If the

moral arbitrariness of the state of nature produces the need for sovereign power, then the need

for that power is the one thing that no one should try to hide behind the colourful language of

vice and virtue. For the one thing that colour terms might mask is the fact of moral arbitrariness

itself, ie, the fact that there are no virtues and vices.’

In his discussion of the nineteenth-century utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, Runciman returns to this

concern with the hypocritical presentation of political power as morally sanctioned. Like Hobbes,

Bentham despised the concealment of basic social facts of existence with what Runciman calls

mere ‘babble’. This Bentham characterises as ‘insignificant’ language, be it ‘the meaningless

jabber of professional jargon’, the contradictory use of meaningful discourse or ‘cant’: the sing-

song consolation of pleasing, well-meaning words.

As Runciman writes in his discussion of Orwell, ‘obscurantist language is most dangerous when it

attempts to conceal the truth about political power’. Runciman’s concluding chapter on Orwell

mounts a defence of the necessity of such concealment. Writing of the English alliance of

democracy with imperialism, Orwell notes that the brute force implicit in the latter is blunted by

the moral charade of the former. Imperialism without the mask of democracy would be fascism.

For Orwell Democratic Hypocrisy was preferable to the truth of the total lie. These are, for

Runciman, democratic fictions, the masks necessary to protect citizens from the arbitrary

exercise of power.

Runciman’s ideal politician, is an individual who is able to involve himself in the charade of

politics, of moral posturing, of visionary pretences, whilst remaining detached enough to

recognise it for the mask that it is. That person is a “self-conscious hypocrite who strikes a

heroic, tragic pose; his is a reckoning with the disenchanted reality of the real world, where the

exercise of state power demands the adoption of the leader’s charismatic mask for its popular

assent.” In other words the Political Actor has to bridge the world of reality and unreality

learning how to deliver his hypocritical monologue in both, stylistically adopting his lines to a

black and white as well as colourful reality as Hobbes would have it.

We are reminded by Runciman that we exist in a a historical moment in which the exercise of

political power lacks ideological justification. In consequence, the personality of the leader, his

convictions and beliefs, assumes ever greater importance. And with this, the risk, indeed, the

necessity of hypocrisy grows ever greater. Hence his conclusion: “What matters is not whether

liberals are worse than they would like to appear, but whether they can be honest with

themselves about the gaps that are bound to exist between the masks of politics and what lies

behind those masks.” It is both a colourful and at the same time provoking thought.

There are ‘no simple solutions’ he contends in his concluding remarks. But such a reckoning with

the ‘complexity’ of political reality and unreality all too easily becomes reconciliation – a

synthesis if you like between the unbelievability of political realism and the believability of

magical realism.

Runciman however is careful not to suggest that hypocrisy is the particular vice of any one

segment of the political spectrum.

Politics in the modern era therefore is partly becoming a matter of deception and compromise.

Politics requires us to talk about complex issues as though they were simple, and to keep hidden

from the public some of the nastier deals and compromises that enable us to get things done in

communities made up of quarrelsome, naive and opinionated people. There is no question of a

politics of pure uncontaminated sincerity. So, if hypocrisy is still a vice in the political realm, it

has to connote something more complicated than just saying one thing and doing or believing

another. Political credibility matters as I discussed in a previous meeting.

Indeed it can be argued that a certain level of hypocrisy is necessary in any party-political

system. Parties and especially governments require their members to be publicly loyal to lines

and leaders in whom, being human and therefore endowed with their own opinions, they do not

always have faith. This public hypocrisy is needed for policy to be made and implemented; the

private, negative kind of hypocrisy, in which politicians secretly denounce the ideas or people

they praise in public, can also be virtuous too, since it can indirectly lead to policies being

improved. Anyone who thinks about these things for a moment understands that political

hypocrisy has its uses, and is anyway inevitable. The question is, how and where to draw the line

between good and bad hypocrisies?

The prevalence of deception however may be one of the great ironies of democratic politics. A

foundational principle of liberal democracies is that they require transparency, accountability,

and trust between representatives and the represented—not the webs of secrecy and lies

characteristic of authoritarian regimes of the past. Yet politicians and elected officials rank right

up there with used-car salesmen in terms of the public’s confidence in their words, especially

when boasting of their own honesty and integrity. And lying—meaning an intentional deception

of one sort or other, whether through phrases, gestures, actions, or even inactions and silences

—seems to be more prevalent in politics than in almost any other area of public life. Populist

Political Parties like UKIP start from the premise that politics has become, one big, immoral con.

Fraudulent language and behaviour however are no more prevalent in contemporary society

than anywhere else or at any other time; Machiavelli, after all, wrote the book on successful

political lying in sixteenth-century Italian states.

Public Cynicism and the Populist Reaction

Indeed overt mendacity may actually be harder to get away with now than in the past given the

rise in scrutiny of public figures. Public Cynicism however results in a kind of Political Hypocrisy

that is very costly. Public cynicism allows the costly hypocrisy of politicians to thrive. A renewed

scrutiny of the many flavours and uses of mendacity in political life is taking place in academia.

John Mearsheimer: Why Leaders Lie:The Truth About Lying in International Politics

In his short book “Why Leaders Lie:The Truth About Lying in International Politics John

Mearsheimer the R.Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of

Chicago, reiterated Hannah Arendt’s famous maxim that “truthfulness has never been counted

among the political virtues”. Is lying in international politics a shameful behaviour or a useful

tool of statecraft? When is it good for leaders to lie to their own people? Is there too much--or

too little--lying in international politics? John Mearsheimer answers these and other questions.

According to Mearsheimer,, lying in interstate relations is actually considerably less prevalent, or

dangerous, or even frowned upon, than might otherwise be assumed. More worrisome is when

elected leaders spread falsehoods about international affairs and engage in fear-mongering on

the home front. Such lies produce not only political debacles, Mearsheimer asserts, but also a

culture of dishonesty in which trust in policy-makers and, potentially, democratic governance is

undermined. When leaders lie to their own publics about foreign policy conduct, significant

damage can result--particularly in democracies. “It is clear from the historical record,” writes

Mearsheimer, “that although lying is often condemned as shameful behaviour, leaders of all

kinds think that it is a useful tool.”

Mearsheimer defines lying as "when a person makes a statement that he knows or suspects to

be false in the hope that others will think it is true. A lie is a positive action designed to deceive

the target audience". He is primarily concerned with international lies-for-the-sake-of national

interest, not lies for personal gain. On the other hand, the democratic state of law thrives and

depends on trust, and so is ripe for abuse. Our politicians, more than autocrats, require the

oxygen of public support for their policies, and so when it fails to appear, they are tempted to

create it artificially. Mearsheimer categorises the lies our leaders tell us according to the effects

they seek to achieve. More precisely, Mearsheimer identifies seven different types of

international lies. A chapter is devoted to each of these lies explaining in more detail the nature

of the lie, its intended audience, its motivations, and what outcomes are expected. He

concentrates on four issues about international lies: The classification of types of lies; the

motives for the different types of lies; the circumstances that make each type more or less likely;

and the potential costs of lying. First, inter-state lies where the leader of one country lies to a

leader of another country, or more generally, any foreign audience, to induce a desired reaction.

By inter-state lies, leaders would acquire certain advantages or prevent other countries’ gain

from their own. Second, fear mongering, where a leader lies to his or her own domestic public

trying to create support for policies that might be unpopular without lies (think of the Iraq war)

in order to amplify a threat they feel the populace would otherwise underestimate-to convey

public about the seriousness of the menace. Third, strategic cover-ups, employing lies to prevent

controversial policies and deals from being made known publicly where a country tries to cover-

up botched policies using lies for the purpose of national, not personal, interest in order to limit

the international fall-out from other states. This form of international lying takes place mostly in

democratic states where debates are blatant. Fourth, nationalist myth making;. These are stories

about a country's past that portray that country in a positive light while its adversaries in a

negative light. This is where the leader of one country lies to a leader of another country, or

more generally, any foreign audience, Nationalist myth making Mearsheimer argues is designed

to induce a desired reaction. reinventing the historical record in order to bind their populations

with a guiltless national identity. Nationalistic myth is also one of the paramount means for

leaders to delude citizens’ minds by enhancing perpetual social cohesion. Fifth, liberal lies, are

given to clear up the negative reputation of institutions, individuals, or actions, embellishing

their government’s often illiberal methods with idealistic motives. This is where a lie is used to

counter accusations that an action is contrary to liberal norms such as international law; social

imperialism, which "occurs when leaders tell lies about another country for the purposes of

promoting either their own economic or political interests or those of a particular social class or

interest group"; and ignoble cover-ups, "when leaders lie about their blunders or unsuccessful

policies for self-serving reasons". He also emphasizes that there are two other kinds of

deception besides lying: "concealment,” which is where a leader remains silent about an

important matter, and "spinning," which is where a leader tells a story that emphasizes the

positive and downplays or ignores the negative. Mearsheimer explains the reasons why leaders

pursue each of these different kinds of lies. He argues that international lying can have negative

effects, and there he emphasizes "blowback” which is where telling international lies helps cause

a culture of deceit at home, and "backfiring," which is where telling a lie leads to a failed policy.

Each category of lie - and he makes clear that these initial categorisations are the start rather

than the end of the research process are illustrated by historical examples. Instead of focusing

on finding perfect definitions, Mearsheimer develops categories to help manage the different

forms lies can take. The categories are specific in design, but flexible enough to encompass a

variety of cases.

Mearsheimer argues that leaders lie to foreign audiences as well as their own people because

they think it is good for their country. His two main findings are that leaders actually do not lie

very much to other countries, and that democratic leaders are actually more likely than

autocrats to lie to their own people. According to Mearsheimer, “The public, by and large, trusts

its leaders not only to tell the truth, but to get the job done. When they don’t get the job done,

they get punished, and when they don’t get the job done and it comes out that they lied, they’re

in really serious trouble. If you’re going to tell a lie, make sure the policy.” Indeed the founder of

the modern Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk, had a saying: “For the people. Despite the people.”

Mearsheimer argues that leaders are most likely to lie to their own people in democracies that

fight wars of choice in distant places. He says that it is difficult for leaders to lie to other

countries because there is not much trust among them, especially when security issues are at

stake, and you need trust for lying to be effective. He says that it is easier for leaders to lie to

their own people because there is usually a good deal of trust between them. Mearsheimer

demonstrates how if a leader lies to sell a policy that works, people are unlikely to care all that

much. If the policy turns out to be a failure, in the initial period following the general public will

be furious, shocked at the deception played upon them. In no time at all however, they will

implicitly trust the government once again. “There’s no question that once a President lies,

people are then quite jaded in how they look at the President,’ he says. “But that quickly wears

off. Trust reassert itself. And then people are vulnerable all over again.” Mearsheimer reaches

the conclusion that, “In large part because most people don’t have much choice but to trust

their own government, because their own government its tasked with protecting them.” The

problem is that Politicians nowadays treat the electorate like medical orderlies treat Alzheimer’s

patients, telling them anything that will keep them subdued. It doesn’t matter what untruths the

people are fed because they will not long remember. But in politics, forgotten falsehoods almost

guarantee new treachery. The rise of democracy has enabled politicians to convince citizens that

government poses no threat because they control its actions—or so the myth goes. This is part

of the reason for the rise of populist political parties in both Western Europe and the United

States. Lies subvert democracy by crippling citizens’ ability to rein in government. Citizens are

left clueless about perils until it is too late for the nation to pull back.

Unfortunately, Why Leaders Lie does not provide a clear standard for judging official deceit.

Should we presume that “good government” is when politicians lie to the people for the public

benefit and “bad government” is when politicians lie for selfish interests? How can we

distinguish between the two? We have to trust politicians to tell us which is which. What about

the ethics of lying? What about condemning leaders who lie? Does the end justify the means? If

the end is the “national interest” what is that and should we always promote it? Is the ability to

lie a virtue for a leader? If the state is an evil one, is promotion of its statecraft a good thing?

Political lies are far more dangerous than most political scientists recognize. Big government

requires Big Lies—and not just about wars but across the board. The more powerful centralized

administration becomes the more abuses it commits and the more lies it must tell. The

government becomes addicted to the growth of its own revenue and power—and this growth

cannot be maintained without denying or suppressing the adverse effects of Leviathan’s growth.

The more power government seizes, the more easily it can suppress the truth. But if people are

content to be deceived, elections become little more than patients choosing which nurses will

inject their sedatives. If the citizenry does not punish liars, then it cannot expect the truth. And

the more arbitrary power the U.S. presidency possesses, the more it attracts the type of

politician who will not hesitate to lie to capture office. And therein lies both the problem and the

explanation of why failure to deliver a meaningful Brexit may result in the emergence of a much

powerful populist movement in Britain that spans both left and right.

Mearsheimer therefore explains the reasons why leaders pursue each these difference kinds of

lies. His central thesis is that leaders lie more frequently to democratic audiences than to leaders

of other states. This is because International Lying can have negative effects including blowback

and backfiring. Blowback is where telling lnternational lies helps cause a culture of deceit at

home. Backfiring is where telling a lie leads to a failed policy. He also emphasizes that there are

two other kinds of deception besides lying: "concealment,” which is where a leader remains

silent about an important matter, and "spinning," which is where a leader tells a story that

emphasizes the positive and downplays or ignores the negative.

Mearsheimer does not consider the moral dimension of international lying; he looks at it simply

from a realist perspective. He rightly focuses on the more morally ambiguous realm of lying in

the national interest. According to Mearsheimer, sometimes Lying is a useful tool of statecraft

and there are going to be cases when it makes good sense to lie to your own people. One always

needs to be aware however that lies can backfire. This is the blowback effect, where when you

lie to your own people about foreign policy you run the risk that you’ll soon be lying to them

about other aspects of policy, and lying will become routine and undermine the trust that’s

necessary to make the country function. Once it’s known that a particular leader has told a lie,

especially an important lie with significant policy consequences, he or she in a sense opening

Pandora’s Box. It can take on a life of its own. So ultimately for Mearsheimer the lesson is: Lie

selectively, lie well, and ultimately be good at what you do."The fact is,”according to

Mearsheimer, “that strategic lying is a useful tool of statecraft.” so a blanket condemnation of

Lying is unrealistic and unwise.

Mearsheimer’s identification of the key pitfall of state dishonesty as the corrosion of trust in

public debate invites an analogous retort: it suggests that what we need is not more honesty but

better cover-ups. If lies are well told and perfectly concealed, trust in public debate would in fact

prosper. Of course, this is exactly why leaders are so tempted to lie; although they know that

generalised duplicity would pollute the deliberative ecosystem, there is no reason to believe that

a particular instance of lying will be discovered.

Of course, leaders need to set an example of honesty and integrity for their organizations. (They

shouldn’t lie for selfish reasons.) But part of the art of leadership is knowing when lies have to

be told, and being able to distinguish those deceptions — the ones created for unselfish reasons

—from the purely self-serving kind. leaders lie because leadership at times requires deception.

“It is clear from the historical record,” writes Mearsheimer, “that although lying is often

condemned as shameful behaviour, leaders of all kinds think that it is a useful tool.” Of course,

leaders need to set an example of honesty and integrity for their organizations. (They shouldn’t

lie for selfish reasons.) But part of the art of leadership is knowing when lies have to be told, and

being able to distinguish those deceptions —the ones created for unselfish reasons — from the

purely self-serving kind.

Not all lying is virtuous, of course. The many falsehoods the Bush & Blair administrations told in

the run-up to the Iraq War were very damaging to both the U.S. and Britain alike, ensnaring

them in an unnecessary war and fostering cynicism and distrust among both the Americans and

the British. What differentiates noble lies and ignoble ones, Mearsheimer writes, is their success.

Double-dealing is a tricky gambit. Political scientist Robert D. Putnam has likened the foreign

policy process to playing two board games at the same time, each at a different table. Sitting at

the table that represents domestic politics are advisers, union leaders, rival politicians, and so

on. (In autocracies, a combination of generals, relatives, and radicals might take their place.) The

second table represents international politics, and gathered around it are other heads of state.

The challenge for the leader shuttling between the two is to make moves that satisfy those at

the domestic table while fending off threats at the international table. The game becomes much

easier if foreign policy decisions are obscured from the domestic audience. A ruler who says yes

to the United States without being labelled a stooge can enhance his position internationally

while holding on to power at home.

Although Mearsheimer does not say so, duplicity is becoming harder to practice. Leaders are

finding it increasingly difficult to send one message to foreign powers while telling their own

people something else. Both David Cameron and Theresa May have become caught in this

narrative void as regards the European Union. The day-by-day erosion of the British

government's narrative monopoly is a case study in the difficulties of media management in a

modern-day democracy. Advances in communications technology and democratic representation

have steadily accelerated the free flow of information and tied the hands of governments hoping

to dam it. This is partly good news, since governments will find it harder to bamboozle their

people into accepting bad policies. "Whenever leaders cannot sell a policy to their public in a

rational-legal manner," Mearsheimer writes, "there is a good chance that the problem is with

the policy, not the audience."

Lying, it transpires, is the vice of the accountable. Whereas those with the power to flout rules

achieve their ends by other means, those constrained by the law must resort to deception. It is

also, in the words of La Rochefoucauld, “the tribute vice pays virtue”; unlike threats and

coercion, those who lie implicitly reaffirm the value of truth, and those who lie about the

principles their actions embody simultaneously reaffirm the value of those principles. The

prevalence of lying in our political class emerges as a somewhat perversely comforting thought

—it demonstrates that they have no other means of getting what they want, and that at least

when we detect it, we can bring its perpetrators to justice.

False Consciousness

Furthermore, although it may be that definition for descriptive purposes is inherently useful it

distorts things when it comes to the moral dimensions of lying. Negative repercussions will crop

up when deceits are rife or over the top, no matter how noble the lies might seem. The selection

of the initial definition therefore may rule out, or make more difficult to understand, what

makes a lie wrong, when it is wrong. The intention to bring about certain consequence of

political lies is wrong. The wrongness of the intention is a function of the badness of what it tries

to bring about--false belief or consciousness. The fact elites can be so widely successful in

deception to an extent is supported by the concept of false consciousness, a Marxist notion,

used mainly by Engels, and similar studies of other members of the Frankfurt Critical School such

as Adorno, Horkheim, and Marcuse on the topics of manipulation, power- and social structures,

and group behaviour.

Peter Oborne: The Rise of Political Lying

The idea of false consciousness has been taken up by Peter Oborne in his book “The Rise of

Political Lying” in particular in a Chapter (6) entitled “Construction of the Truth”. False

consciousness is a concept which has been further elaborated on through the French

postmodernist school of philosophy which flourished in the 1970s and appears to have become

mainstream in several leading University Politics Departments. The 'post-modernists’ corrosion

of the notion of objective reality, is particularly associated with the writings of the philosophers

Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Foucault argues in his book, “Truth and Power”, that Truth

only makes sense as part of a wider system of politics. He argues, “Truth is to be understood as a

system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and

operation of statements. Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which

produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it.” In effect

for Foucault, Truth is no more than the effect of the rules of political discourse. For Foucault

therefore as all discourses are equally valid including a discourse based on lying Truth was there

to be created through lying. For Foucault this should not be viewed as particularly surprising,

illogical, self contradictory or unfathomable because it has to be remembered that ultimately

Truth has to be seen as part of the effect of power relations, the ultimate expression of political

dominance maintained by the perpetuation of an ongoing narrative or fiction. What politicians

who lie have done is to construct a plausible narrative or story. Truth can be verified but a

truthful narrative based on lies can be manufactured. The problem is that manufactured

narrative has come to dominate the news to such a degree that it is no longer possible to tell the

difference between what is false and what is real. Political reality, according to Peter Oborne is

no longer something that exists ‘out there’ which is checkable and subject to independent

verification. On the contrary it has become something that can be shaped and used in the

ongoing battle for power. Reality is something that can be created (as well as destroyed) as part

of an all pervading narrative which is difficult to refute. Truth has become something that can be

constructed The unintended consequence of post-modernist philosophy is thus devaluing of the

content of a statement against its context. Oborne quotes Charles Leadbetter who wrote,

“Politics...is about constructing narratives that make sense to people: stories that encompass

their identities, aspirations and fears, and the policies that reflect them.” Yet as Leadbetter

further points out, “it is in these Central tasks that politicians seem at times to be most

deficient.” Has the demand by Party hierarchies for strong political narratives meant that a

tipping point between the Politics of Truth and post-Truth politics has been reached. Post-Truth is

distinguished from a long tradition of political lies, exaggeration and spin. What is new is not the

mendacity of politicians but the public’s response to it and the ability of new technologies and

social media to manipulate, polarise and entrench opinion.

Colin Crouch: Post-democracy

In his 2004 book Post-democracy, Colin Crouch used the phrase "post-democracy" to mean a

model of politics where "elections certainly exist and can change governments," but "public

electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professionals expert

in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues selected by those

teams." The problem for Crouch is that Political Parties have very largely ceased to engage in any

direct sense with voters. The new elite talks a private language of its own which is little

understood by the general public and has private interests of its own which are inaccessible to

that same general public. Surrounding themselves with an array of bit-part actors who use their

special communications skills to mislead and cheat manufacturing a series of images of the

current leadership whether that be of the left or the right for public consumption. They help

create in other words a magical realism that is so convincing it is difficult to see as a false reality.

What this does is to make the political leadership's intentions even less clear. It is the ultimate

deceit achieved through political subterfuge. That is why it has been easy for advisers to treat

the whole of perceived reality as one enormous fabrication to bolster and support the image of

the leaders they serve. According to Oborne, such an approach can bring short-term political

advantages but in the long-term this means that the electorate largely ceases to participate in

the political process. This is dangerous. The populist backlash therefore should not come as a

surprise. Oborne writes, the population, “has been reduced to the role of dupe or victim, to be

manipulated by the expert media and communications manipulators”. Oborne points out that

this is the complex new world where fact and fiction merge. He goes on to demonstrate how

what he calls, “the abolition of truth” in politics is a phenomenon which manifests itself in other

spheres like the public reporting of show business, pop music, football which have become more

about the creation and display of elaborate fictions – dominating all British mainstream media.

PR Agents cheerfully admit to deceit and fabrication in producing hopelessly distorted or false

copy. Politics is increasingly based on contrivance and artifice from showbiz. Political figures

become trivialized and hollowed out like characters in a soap opera. Politics has become a form

of entertainment rather than the transmission of discoverable truth. Political success falls to the

party or individual that can most successfully create and sustain its own version of the truth in

the age of mass communication.

Lying by political leaders has now become a sophisticated art supported by information

operations conducted through campaigns on print, electronic and social media. The rise of social

media has certainly changed the communication process and allows

misinformation/disinformation to spread more rapidly and without a reality fact check. On the

other hand it provides more channels to refute lies and spin.

Fake News

To those absorbing post-truth, what matters is how sincerely the speaker, writer or politician

presents his claims; and if the claims back up what you already believe, then they are bound to

be true. Never mind the evidence, one way or another. And if someone is foolish enough to

challenge you, all you need to do is say that you're offering alternative facts. If that doesn't

work, accuse your challenger of fake news.

This is why the debate about what is and what is not fake news has become so antagonistic and

conflictual between the purveyors and receivers of Political lies on both sides. Political lies are

bad because they result in false beliefs. We need true beliefs to promote our welfare and avoid

harm. The Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq should remind us, lest we need it of the very

worst state of false belief. We value honesty as a virtue. The importance of this access to the

minds of politicians should provide prudential as well as moral reasoning, It is very fascinating

though, leaders lie to a very broad domestic, and international audience, and, if believed, posses

the power to determine the reality of everyone.

The problem is that Moralists tend to see every political lie, no matter how minor, as an ethical

crime. Either it compromises the integrity of the individual in question, or it undermines

democratic values and fosters a culture of deception and mistrust. As Mearsheimer points out,

to accuse someone of lying in our contemporary ethical climate is so strong an allegation that

euphemisms (think of “less than forthcoming” or “not entirely straightforward”) are often used

to intimate that a person is being dishonest. Cynics, see lying politician as the embodiment of a

fundamental truth about politics. There are a few however who insist that not all types of lying

are alike. Moreover, tolerance for a little political mendacity, especially of the right kind, may not

be such a bad thing when you consider the alternative: a politics of coercive truth-telling and

sincerity, of little red books, groupthink and purges.

Martin Jay: The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics

In his book The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics the intellectual historian Martin Jay,

who is Sidney Hellman Ehrman Professor of History at the University of California–Berkeley,

argues that the debate about political Hypocrisy tends to vacillate between moral outrage and

amoral realism Jay holds that there are two general views about the morality of lying: “Two

general camps, have been perennially opposed: rigorous absolutists or deontologists, who

denounce lying in itself as an intrinsic evil to be avoided at all costs, and consequentialists or

contextualists, who are concerned with the practical impact of lying, whether or good or bad (p.

48).”

He argues that there are those absolutists who don't get the distinction between a "fact" and a

"lie” and that this is where most get hung up in our world of political correctness and wanting to

make our politicians blameworthy. Jay attempts to avoid framing of the debate over lying and

politics in this manner by examining what has been said in support of, and opposition to,

political lying from Plato and St. Augustine to Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss. Jay attempts to

demonstrate that each Political Thinker’s series of argument correspond to a particular

conception of the political realm, which decisively shapes his or her attitude toward political

mendacity. He then applies this insight to a variety of contexts and questions about lying and

politics. He concludes by asking if lying in politics is really all that bad?

According to Jay some think that "the political" is a realm in which lying and cheating are routine

and accepted. Jay, however, thinks that this view is incoherent since lying requires that one

violates norms requiring that one speak truthfully. It seems likely that conventional norms and

expectations about honesty and truthfulness in the political sphere vary from society to society.

Jay agrees; he says that American culture is particularly opposed to Machiavellian duplicity.

Although Jay is sanguine about liberal institutions as safety valves his aim is also to move away

from moral absolutism in the realm of political life without compromising democratic ideals. He

points out the obsessive concern with publicity, sincerity and the “zeal for truthfulness” which

has characterized Western modernity since the late eighteenth century.

A Rousseau-like commitment to honesty in its many forms has endured to become a hallmark of

modern democracy, where, as Jay notes, quoting La Rochefoucauld, “Hypocrisy is the homage

vice pays to virtue.” But as Rousseau also writes:, “If the obligation to tell the truth is founded

only on its usefulness, how will I make myself the judge of this usefulness? Very often, what is to

one person's advantage is to another's prejudice; private interest is almost always opposed to

public interest (p. 61).” That is why Rousseau advocated the triumph of the General Will -

subservience of the citizen to the all powerful absolutist state whose version of the truth

supersedes that of the individual even when it is based on hypocrisy because it’s truth is

superior to that of the citizen.

Jay is particularly concerned at the emergence of the modern democratic state. Technocracy he

fears as one more (doomed) effort to isolate the absolute, unvarnished truth and put it in the

service of a pure democratic politics. Is this perhaps why populists are so attached to answers

derived from the people’s common sense. Both promise today, according to Jay, in different

ways, to solve the problem of phoniness and deception in politics once and for all.

Yet the political lie has not only endured but prospered. So what is to be done? Jay thinks the

classical liberal intellectual tradition, with its insistence on the ideal of rational consensus, holds

few answers. He is more warmly disposed toward those theoretical stances that acknowledge

the various fictions at the core of each and every political vision. That category includes the

strain of recent thought that sees politics itself as a form of theatre in which masking and a

certain amount of dissimulation and hypocrisy are vital, whether in forming coalitions or simply

in preserving the illusion of representation. Precedents extend all the way back to Hobbes’s

great insight about the king’s double act as the ruler and as one of the people. Mainly, though,

Jay sides with modern republicans like Arendt who, while denouncing certain kinds of lying,

found a way to make principled defences of others.

Jay follows Arendt closely in stressing the potential value of lying from below—that is,

prevarication on the part of private individuals in an effort to resist the inquisitorial authority of

the church or state.- citizens challenging various democratically endorsed surveillance

techniques. From this perspective, lying can sometimes look like a way to encourage a better

future. Like Runciman, Jay ultimately emphasizes the value of pluralism of opinion, debate and

rhetoric, even at its most misleading, over the search for perfect truthfulness.

For Jay the best strategy for exposing the most damaging kinds of untruth is to sustain a free

press, an independent court system and the open academic culture of our universities—and to

try to simply live with it. For Runciman in a climate of round-the-clock news reporting, with its

vicious circle of lying and “gotcha” coverage, journalists are often the willing purveyors of

hypocrisy For Mearsheimer all we can do is to hope that we can eventually vote the worst

offenders out of office. It seems that “truthiness,” serial hypocrisy and their close cousins are the

price that must be paid for democracy.

Sophia Rosenfeld: Hypocrisy in American Political Attitudes

Sophia Rosenfeld, Walter H. Annenberg Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania is

author of “Hypocrisy in American Political Attitudes” which illuminates and defends, attitudinal

hypocrisy within the personal politics of Americans. The book argues that the wielding of

conflicting attitudes is a necessary characteristic of American politics.

According to Rosenfeld, "Fake news, wild conspiracy theories, misleading claims, doctored

photos, lies peddled as facts, facts dismissed as lies—citizens of democracies increasingly inhabit

a public sphere teeming with competing claims and counterclaims, with no institution

possessing the authority to settle basic disputes in a definitive way.” How do we know if

something is true? Our options are limited. We can place our trust in experts, institutions, and

publications that, governed by some form of peer review, promise the results of patient study

and methodological rigour. Or we can depend on answers derived from our own lived

experience? The problem is being intensified, according to Rosenfeld because of the very role of

political leaders, along with broadcast and digital media. Adopting a historical perspective

Rosenfeld explores a long standing and largely unspoken tension at the heart of democracy

between the supposed wisdom of the crowd and the need for information to be vetted and

evaluated by a learned elite made up of trusted experts. What we are witnessing now, under the

pressure of populism, she argues, is the unravelling of the détente between these competing

aspects of democratic culture.

President Trump began his Election Campaign for President, according to Rosenfeld, as the

embodiment of a familiar kind of right-wing, common-sense populism. Instead of deference to

well-trained scientists, academics, journalists, and even governmental authorities, he touted the

true wisdom of “the people.” In place of fancy studies built on research, data, and modelling, he

promised plain-spoken, off-the-cuff reports on the state of our world and obvious, practical

solutions to our problems.

One of the consequences of the tangle of distortions, deceptions and fabrications that prepared

the way for the declaration of war on Iraq in 2003 has been a renewed scrutiny of the kinds and

uses of mendacity in political life. Some have reflected on lying itself reconsider its effects on

modernity. Truth, she argues, in the absence of any real logic or proof what constitutes truth is

based on a gut feeling.

For Rosenfeld therefore it is important to distinguish between the lies told by candidates and

political parties during electoral cycles – the misrepresentations of self and the

misrepresentation of the world at large by those already in power. The U.S. Senator, Ron Paul

labels “serial hypocrisy” as preaching one thing on the campaign trail and practicing another in

private life. Personal hypocrisy is just one type of dishonesty common among politicians more

worrisome, according to Rosenfeld, is a special kind of dishonesty associated with

misrepresenting oneself entirely in one’s political capacity. For Rosenfeld a foundational

principle of liberal democracies such as the United States is that they require transparency,

accountability, and trust between representatives and the represented and lying—meaning an

intentional deception of one sort or other, whether through phrases, gestures, actions, or even

inactions and silences—seems to be more prevalent in politics than in almost any other area of

public life, with the possible exception of advertising and this is a cause for concern.

Rosenfeld argues that the risk of deploying such rhetoric in the public arena, though, is not just

that we end up with simplistic responses to complex problems. For her, by undermining faith in

traditional sources of intellectual authority, from the major news outlets to Respected National

Bodies and the CIA, common-sense populists recast all those who participate in the “knowledge

industry” as biased enemies rather than objective analysts working in the interest of the

common good. And when counter-evidence provided by reputable fact-checkers is read as just

more propaganda, it not only becomes that much easier for political leaders to lie with impunity.

Many people will decide their only option is “self-investigation” in their own instinctive read on

things—just as those engaged in pulling the wool over our eyes hope they will do, according to

Rosenfeld.

Now, however, Trump has taken his approach to the truth in a new and even more worrying

direction. Now, according to Rosenfeld, increasingly, he is insisting on supposed truths that are

easily and convincingly refuted by anyone with the ability to see or hear. In the context of

democratic politics, faith in information provided by key institutions, including government

agencies, academies of science and a free press should temper the impulse to trust exclusively

one’s own experiential sense of the world. The problem for Rosenfeld, paraphrasing Hannah

Arendt is what happens when all institutions are compromised and forced to promote only the

ruler’s warped view of reality? What happens, in other words when the fantasy world of magic

realism replaces the view of the real world in the eyes of the those who are watching? It is both

an enticing question and a powerful warning! For Rosenfeld this is a terrifying development from

the perspective of both politics and epistemology. An angry, simplistic common-sense populism,

is being advanced by an anti-elite which aims at trampling down an independent, non-expert

reading of the world appears to be taking place. The danger is that it is undermining, possibly in

lasting ways, the ability of the public to counter preposterous claims. It is an anti-intellectualism

writ large. Has the role of Rupert Murdoch-owned media, both in the US and the UK also

contributed to the malaise? Instead of functioning as part of a system of checks and balances, it

can be argued, those media outlets now operate in symbiotic lock-step with hypocritical

politicians. The debate about the extent of News International's influence is contested but at the

very least it muddies the waters of political discourse by casting doubt on facts, reason and

morality.

Concluding Remarks: How to Reclaim Moral Credibility?

So, where does this leave us? Psychoanalyst Carl Jung wrote that “a little less hypocrisy and a

little more self-knowledge can only have good results in respect for our neighbour; for we are all

too prone to transfer to our fellows the injustice and violence we inflict upon our own natures.”

We have become so accustomed to political exaggerations that we are not offended at specific

lies. We should be offended. Hypocrisy is lying when the liar knows the truth.

The question is: How to Reclaim Moral Credibility? The best strategy for exposing the most

damaging kinds of untruth is to sustain a free press, an independent court system and the open

academic culture of our universities—and to try to simply live with the rest. Is all we can hope

for, however, to hope that we can eventually vote the worst offenders out of office. It seems that

truth, serial hypocrisy and their close cousins are the price that must be paid for democracy.

What is new however is the degree of public cynicism that we face in today's brand of populist

politics. Calling out hypocrisy rarely inspires consistency or truth in politics. Both the Left and the

Right therefore need to start fighting for ideas again. When we do, we can elevate the dialogue

by focusing on evidence and reason and not calling out one another for hypocrisy. We also need

to determine what is good and bad political hypocrisy, and what a tolerable and even desirable

level of it might be. Calling out hypocrisy in people who want to be consistent and principled can

be an effective tactic, but unfortunately, politics is hostile to both consistency and principles.

Ultimately we would prefer a contest of stated beliefs, values and principles. Whether politicians

lean Left or Right, we prefer those who have integrity and who don’t seek approval for virtues

that don’t exist. Political Tribalism therefore explains much of our ill-tempered political and

media discourse. Theatrical Tribalism does not have any role in ensuring political accountability.

Such thinking allows us to explore the notion that political hypocrisy is not a necessary evil

exactly, but that, in certain of its forms, it is simply necessary. It does not matter whether or not

our politicians are all wearing masks, if that is what is needed to make our form of politics work.

What does matter is if people are hypocritical about that. In this sense, the private passions and

beliefs of public figures ought to be the least of our concerns. According to Runciman, “A

tolerance of the disjuncture between the socially necessary demands of public virtue and the

reality of private passions prevents one from succumbing to the self-deception of the

tyrannically virtuous.” This is as good a quotation to end on as any other in relation to this

subject. As Runciman further points out this is a useful rejoinder to the ethical postures and

soul-bearing routines of contemporary politicians, for whom the mask is taken for the man.

What we do not know is when we are facing the actor and when we are facing the real person?

II would not like to think that we encouraged the moralisation of politics, a transformation of

public roles, of political masks into displays of self-righteous sincerity thereby dressing up the

exercise of political power in ethical terms encouraging the introduction of a kind of self-

abnegatory politics based on the forced introduction of high ethical codes of conduct. This would

lead to its own sanctimoniousness – not least the question of who would draw up these codes

and who would be responsible for supervising them and penalising those who broke the rules.

Recent events in Westminster regarding the treatment of MPs from either side who have fallen

out with their Party Leadership and have been threatened with deselection have not filled me

with confidence.

Can these inconsistencies ever be good? Yes they can is the answer. Acting hypocritically can

even be virtuous. Being politically authentic with all the self contradictions that involves is a

powerful change agent. At the same time it is possible to concede that there are at least some

situations in which hypocrisy is bad. So how do we know when and how much hypocrisy is

permissible? To strike the right balance, politicians need that all-too-rare virtue of moderation.

We shouldn’t expect some formula or set of rules that guarantees right conduct if we act in

accordance with it, however. That is why ethics are in end ultimately “situational” depending

very much on the political context in which one finds oneself. At the end of the day hypocrisy is

sometimes expedient. It is a vice but ultimately one has to be true to oneself and ones

principles, if one has any of course. In the end the public will have to judge themselves whether

the hypocrisy one exhibits is a sign that one is virtuous or a villain.

Ged Mirfin

ged.mirfin@gmail.com